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Background Briefing: Cambodias Relations with China and Vietnam Carlyle A. Thayer July 24, 2012

[client name deleted] Q1. Given that Cambodia's present leaders owe their political careers to Vietnam, yet rely so heavily on Chinese aid and are siding with Beijing on the South China Sea, how much do you think this will strain relations with Vietnam? ANSWER: Hun Sen is a graduate of Vietnams Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy where Vietnams top leaders are trained. Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia in 1989. Plenty of water has flowed under the bridge since then. China did its own pivot, dropping the Khmer Rouge and giving Cambodia economic assistance. Vietnam has adopted a pragmatic stance to Chinese inroads into Cambodia and Laos. After all, these countries are members of ASEAN and like Vietnam, are members of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. And they all benefit from the development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Vietnam has managed to secure its most important interests a secure border and the end of anti-communist dissidents using Cambodia as a base to attack Vietnam. Vietnam is a strong investor and trading partner with Cambodia. See charts. Vietnams merchandise trade with Cambodia is larger than Chinas. It jumped when the Thais closed border crossings. Q2. And how do you think those strains could play out? Politically, economically, etc.? ANSWER: Both Vietnam and China are able to develop close relations with Cambodia. Vietnam is obviously displeased by how Cambodia vetoed the joint

2 communique. But Vietnam got the support of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. The two sides Vietnam and Cambodia - have a structure for their bilateral relations that will stand the current strains. Economic relations will not be hurt appreciably. Q3. Since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, is this a particularly unusual position for the two neighbors? ANSWER: Vietnam has seen its influence in both Cambodia and Laos wane comparatively as Chinas influence has increased. But Vietnam does not view these relations in zero sum terms. Vietnam has its own niche in both countries. Vietnam has more to be concerned about regarding Chinas direct actions in the South China Sea than it does with Chinese influence in Cambodia. Chinas influence is based on a hefty economic presence. China has not used its position to fan anti-Vietnamese nationalist flames. Q4. Could it end up creating a major rift between them? ANSWER: No. I think Vietnam is capable of managing its bilateral relations with Cambodia in a pragmatic way. Cambodia might have vetoed the wording of the joint communique but it has not adopted an anti-Vietnamese attitude. Cambodia will cease to be Chair of ASEAN in five months. The issue of the South China Sea is not purely a bilateral one. Cambodia has to be concerned not to alienate those countries that supported the Philippines and Vietnam Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Cambodia-Vietnam relations came under greater strain when FUNCINPEC was an effective coalition partner in government. FUNCINPEC leaders were often antiVietnamese in public remarks. Q5. And while neither Cambodia nor Vietnam has made any mention of it, do you think it likely that the Cambodian National Assembly President's visit to Vietnam this week has some fence-mending element to it? ANSWER: Cambodia and Vietnam have been able to overcome past irritants in the bilateral relations including anti-Vietnamese riots that caused the cancellation of President Tran Duc Luongs visit to Cambodia and disagreements over border demarcation. I am sure both sides will be keen to get on with it. Cambodias bacon has been saved by the intervention of Indonesias foreign minister Marty Natalegawa. His shuttle diplomacy righted ASEANs keel. The problem of the joint communique is in the past, attention will now focus on China-ASEAN discussions on a Code of Conduct by senior officials.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Cambodias Relations with China and Vietnam, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 24, 2012.