G.R. No.

L-26100

February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow: On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922. On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively. On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening. On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void. On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not bind them, for they were not parties to that action. On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent Lutes. On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed. On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, 1963. On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private petitioners. On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond.

Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966. Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course. 1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings? First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953. The title of the Act reads AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. Section 1 thereof provides SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 2 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels. 3 We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... nevertheless ... the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government."5 The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it." But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper. This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by the government to private persons. Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A.

931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings. The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when we take stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a petition for reopening. 10 In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases on the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court. We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening. 2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act. To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion. Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of fact. We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication. 3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes? The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No charge has been made hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title. This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17 It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention." 22 With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931. To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not. It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." 25 Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28 The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" was but inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressed in the body. 30 At the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted." Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must give to the statute does not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads: This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to present his claim within the time prescribed by law.

There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940. This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly requested. In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation. The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.nt FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered. G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents. G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents. G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents. G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents. These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of

Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition). Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment. A The Information filed by the People 1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused. Crim. Case No. 19639 VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081 INFORMATION The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows: That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11- inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith. Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66) The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved. 2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused. CRIM. CASE NO. 29677 VIOL. OF PAR. 3, PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975 INFORMATION The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows: That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith. Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32) The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved. 3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused. CRIM. CASE NO. 933 For: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DEADLY WEAPON (VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9) INFORMATION The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows: That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997) B. The Orders of dismissal In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. 1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner: ... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect. And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding. The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66) 2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows: As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or

impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions. The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law. With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals. This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion. It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L46229-32) 3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus: ... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused. It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997) In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges. C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People. As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3. We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law; WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me; WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that: 1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer: (a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081: (b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph; (c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. 2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. 3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. 4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed. Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. (SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President Republic of the Philippines D. The arguments of the People In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of

dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1 The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2 E. Our Ruling on the matter 1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3 Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4 To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides: Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense. We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers. 2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question? We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant. Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3). 3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state. 4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8 There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3). First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons. The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997) We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied) While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble") In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9 Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent. In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that: From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder: WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ... WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 1339) It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else. Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied) When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied) 5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10 At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following: And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results? 6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused. American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12 Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz: Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246) The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692) F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14 In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15 G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies below. Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow: Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge. Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz: First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case

should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16 Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Section 8. Rule 117 states that: An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule. Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h]) As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present. H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense. On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following: In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17 Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government. WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee. Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated. According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources. SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession. As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said: Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.) It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.) Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires

that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion: Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . . Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129). Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations. It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens. Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands. It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land. This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows: SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter. SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate

said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.) It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters. SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government. These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention. It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been. And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition. It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their

homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-21735

January 30, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE IGNACIO Y SANTOS, defendant-appellant. An information for estafa thru falsification of a commercial document a Philippine National Bank Check for P4,608.62 was filed on December 29, 1961 against Jose Ignacio y Santos. When arraigned on August 31, 1962, Jose Ignacio y Santos pleaded guilty. Thereupon the Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced him "to suffer one (1) year, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision

correccional, as minimum; to indemnify the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P4,608.62; and to pay a fine in the sum of P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of both indemnity and fine, and the costs of the proceedings." Not satisfied with the penalty imposed, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Thereafter he appealed to the Court of Appeals. By resolution of July 25, 1963, the Court of Appeals has certified the case to this Court because "the only question for determination is one of law". Appellant, as stated, pleaded guilty to the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document. The penalty for estafa where the amount involved is P4,608.62 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (Art. 315. par. 1, No. 3, Revised Penal Code). The penalty for falsification of a commercial document is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos (Art. 172, par. 1, Revised Penal Code). So, for the complex crime afore-stated, the penalty is that provided for falsification of a commercial document, the same to be applied in its maximum period (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code for the offense" (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225). In People vs. Mape, 77 Phil. 809, 811, we said: "For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower should be determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by the Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum period as the circumstances modifying liability may require (People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549). The basic penalty that the Code provides in this case is, as aforesaid, prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The penalty next lower to it, therefore, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, which is four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Thus, the minimum of the sentence imposed by the court a quo, that is, one (1) year, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, is within the range prescribed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the absence of abuse, and appellant has not shown any, the discretion of the court a quo to fix the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence anywhere within the range provided by law, will not be interfered with (People vs. De Joya, 52 O.G. 788). Since appellant admits that the maximum term of his sentence is correct, there is no need to state the reasons why it is so. We may, however, mention that in fixing the maximum term of the sentence, the court a quo rightly considered in appellant's favor the simple mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Appellant's error lies in contending that, contrary to what has been held in People vs. Mape, supra, the mitigating circumstance should also be considered in determining the minimum of his indeterminate sentence. As to the fine of P3,000.00, the same is obviously in order. Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides, in addition to imprisonment, "a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos". WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 85472 September 27, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIBERTO YABUT y PALINGO, accused-appellant. Three persons were originally charged with the crime of robbery with multiple homicide and serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. 1 Renato Teodoro was acquitted for lack of

evidence. 2 Angeles San Antonio and Eriberto Yabut were convicted as charged. 3 Both questioned their conviction, but San Antonio eventually withdrew his appeal. 4 Eriberto Yabut thus remains the lone appellant in this case. Judge Alfredo C. Flores found that on October 31, 1982, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, Angeles San Antonio, a member of the Teresa Rizal Police Station, and Eriberto Yabut, a meat dealer, arrived, at the residence of Gen. Amado Santiago, at Valle Verde, Pasig, Metro Manila, and pretended to be looking for Renato Teodoro, the family driver. Thelma Cruz, the general's sister-in-law, said Teodoro was not there. San Antonio then asked for coffee, which was served by two maids, Joaquina Ege and Lydia Catarig, upon Thelma's instruction. 5 To their surprise, the maids saw guns pointed at them, a .45 caliber pistol by San Antonio and an armalite by Yabut. The intruders announced a robbery, eliciting cries of alarm from the two maids as they were forced into the library. Thelma, who heard the maids shouting, rushed to the room of Santiago upstairs. Meantime, the other persons in the house, namely, the spouses Dario and Rosario Enero, who were then visiting, and Alfredo Bultron, the house caretaker, were rounded up to join the two maids. When Santiago came down, San Antonio also took him to the library, where his hands were tied by Bultron upon Yabut's orders. 6 San Antonio then ransacked the rooms upstairs while Yabut stood guard in the library. Thelma had hidden under a sofa, but was asked to come out by Santiago upon prodding from San Antonio and Yabut. The two got from her the amount of P800.00, the cash sale of Santiago's store for that day. They also took several pieces of jewelry with a total cost of P545,000.00 as itemized in the information. 7 The two men had started to leave when San Antonio, as if by afterthought, grabbed Yabut's armalite and fired at their captives in cold blood. Joaquina Ege, Lydia Catarig, the spouses Rosario, and Dario Enero died on the spot. Santiago and Alfredo Bultron suffered physical injuries. 8 San Antonio was arrested the next day by the Pasig police. 9 Yabut was voluntarily surrendered by his mother. 10 The loot, together with the armalite and the .45 caliber pistol, was recovered in San Antonio's house. 11 A paraffin test conducted on San Antonio found him to be positive of gun powder residue. 12 A similar test on Yabut yielded negative results. 13 At the trial, both San Antonio and Yabut admitted their participation in the crime charged. Yabut, however, offered to enter a plea of guilty only to the lesser offense of simple robbery, saying he had no part in the killings. 14 San Antonio tried to exculpate himself with the explanation that at the time of the commission of the offense, he was under the influence of drugs. 15 The trial court rejected these manifestations and found both accused equally guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision read as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing accused Angeles San Antonio and Eriberto Yabut to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and solidarily the heirs of the victims, Joaquina Egre, Lydia Catarig, Dario Enero and Rosario Enero, in the sum of P30,000.00 each; the sum of P15,000.00 to Alfredo Bultron; the sum of P200,000.00 to Gen. Amado Santiago and the further sum of P545,000.00 by way of damages to the spouses Amado and Eleanor Santiago. With costs. The bail bond filed by accused Renato Teodoro is hereby cancelled. SO ORDERED. In the appeal, Yabut contends that the trial court erred in finding the existence of conspiracy between him and San Antonio; in not holding him guilty only of robbery; and in considering nighttime and the killings and serious physical injuries as aggravating circumstances. 16 Yabut's conviction will be sustained. The well-settled doctrine is that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime; only rarely would such a prior agreement be demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. 17 Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. 18 In the case at bar, the evidence shows that Yabut and San Antonio were together when they borrowed the car they used to get the armalite in Yabut's house. 19 San Antonio admitted they brought the armalite to Santiago's residence with robbery aforethought. 20 Both San Antonio and Yabut, brandishing their weapons, herded the occupants of the house into the library. 21 Yabut ordered Bultron to tie the hands of Santiago. 22 While San Antonio was ransacking the rooms, Yabut

stood guard with his armalite, ready to react to any resistance on discovery. 23 All these acts showed unity of purpose between Yabut and San Antonio in the execution of the robbery and the killings and physical injuries that followed. Where conspiracy is shown, the acts of one conspirator and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of the conspirators in the crime become secondary. 24 The act of one conspirator is the act of the other conspirators, and each of them is equally guilty of the crime committed. 25 Hence, Yabut, as a conspirator, cannot be held guilty only of the lesser offense of robbery but must also answer for the shooting of the captives. The Court also applies the accepted principle that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide. 26 The single exception to the rule is when it is clearly shown that they endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. 27 But there is no such showing here. On the contrary, Yabut actually threatened the lives of the captives, saying he would make "dominoes" out of them, by which he meant he would mow them down one after the other. 28 The plea for the exoneration of San Antonio on the ground that he acted under the influence of drugs has become irrelevant with the withdrawal of his appeal. It is unacceptable in any case. As for the aggravating circumstance of night-time, there is no showing that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the offense or for the purpose of impunity. At any rate, this circumstance cannot affect the penalty prescribed for the offense, for reasons to be given presently. The designation of the offense is erroneous. The information should have charged the appellant simply with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. We have consistently held that the number of the homicide or injuries committed should not change that designation although they could have been considered aggravating circumstances before the modification of the penalty for this offense. 29 The term "homicide" as used in the said provision is to be understood in its generic sense and includes murder and physical injuries committed during the robbery, which are merged in the crime of robbery with homicide. As we held in People v. Maranion: 30 . . . it is the nature of the crime of robbery with homicide that the homicides, irrespective of their number, committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery, are merged in the composite crime of "robbery with homicide." It is error, therefore, to treat the death of the victims as "double or multiple homicide," for in this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Robbery with homicide is now punishable with the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition of the death penalty. 31 Under the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, "In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed." This is the reason for not appreciating nighttime and the shooting of the victims for the purpose of increasing the penalty. A witness for the prosecution, Lt. Florencio Reyes, testified that the entire loot, including the jewelry taken, was recovered. 32 There was therefore no justification for the award of P545,000.00, representing the amount stolen, as actual damage. No evidence having been presented regarding the actual damages sustained by Bultron and Santiago as a result of their respective injuries, the award therefor cannot be allowed either. As we held in People v. Degoma, 33 courts cannot simply assume that damages were sustained by the injured party nor can they rely on speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The Court notes with distress that the crime was committed by still another policeman, who by his own admission was under the influence of drugs. This is a dismaying commentary on the image of our men in uniform, to whom the people used to look up as their shield and weapon against the lawless elements. Now many policemen have themselves joined the lawless elements and have become the predators rather than the protectors of the public. It is time to launder the soiled and disheveled khaki and bring back to it the cleanness and the starch that inspired so much respect and confidence before in the men who wore it. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, but with these modifications: The civil indemnity for the death of Joaquina Egre, Lydia Catarig, Dario Enero and Rosario Enero, is increased to P50,000.00 for each victim. The award of P545,000.00 as actual damages to the spouses for the things stolen from them is deleted. The award of the amount of P15,000.00 to Bultron and the additional award of P200,000.00 to Santiago for their injuries is also disallowed, no evidence having been presented to support them. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-7747 November 29, 1955

NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and appellees. This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul the sale of a homestead which had been inherited by them from said decedent. Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land containing an area of 10.0709 hectares, more or less, in San Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija in the year 1917. His application was approved on June 22, 1917. He filed the corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on June 15, 1943 the said final proof was approved by the Director of Lands, who thereupon ordered the issuance of a patent in his favor. (Exhibit A.) At the time of the issuance of the above order, Sergio Nicolas had already died, so the order directs the issuance of the patent to his heirs, represented by his widow. In or about the year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the defendants. The above transfers were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the defendants secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 has been issued also in their favor, covering the said parcel of land. The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the conveyances executed by plaintiffs to defendants and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land received by the defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged the execution of the sales in their favor. After the issues had been joined the parties presented an agreed statement of facts, the most pertinent parts of which have already been set forth above. The trial court held that the transfer or conveyance of the homestead made by the heirs of the original homesteader was a mere transfer of the rights of the original homesteader to the land authorized under the provisions of Section 20 of the Public Land Act (A. A. 141); therefore, as it was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the conveyance was valid. It held that section 118 of the Public Land Act is not applicable; that both Section 20 and Section 118 being apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled subh that the prohibition contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be absolutely useless. Against this judgment the appeal was prosecuted in this Court.The provisions which affect the conveyance sought to be annulled are as follows: SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before patent is issued the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not agan apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent. (C. A. 141). SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patentor homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twentyfive years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (Id.). The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strone and consistent that the original period of five years from the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured. (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when properly sold by the homesteader within

five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer made without such previous approval is null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A. 141). As the conveyances now in question are claimed to have been and were evidently made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be determined is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section 20 of the Act. The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows: That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas executed in or about 1947 a transfer of homestead rights over the land in question in favor of the defendants, which transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the approval of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the title being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land records of Nueva Ecija. The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or homesteader "has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through no fault of his own." Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made with with previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the requirements of section 20 has been complied with. But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of official acts the Director of Lands must have recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because the homesteader could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on this necessary requirements, because the order for the issuance of the patent states just the opposite. The order for the issuance of the patent states expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation, possession and otherwise, thus: (5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements contained in the final proof papers was conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the residence and cultivation requirements of the law; and . . ., the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.). The order for the issuance of a patent as well as the statements of fact therein contained, as abovequoted, conclusively disprove the existence of the requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead through no fault of his own. In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order for the issuance of a patent, after the approval of the final proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the corresponding officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the prohibition should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued, which in this case is June 13, 1943. Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants heren in the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section 20 of the Public Land Act that the Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent.

In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for the sale. No damages or costs. So ordered.