KIM PHILBY IN HANSARD ARCHIVE I Compiled by Eliah Meyer

SPAIN. HC Deb 05 April 1938 vol 334 cc194-5 194 54. Mr. Gallacher asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that Mr. H. A. R. Philpot has been offered the decoration of the Military Merit Cross by General Franco; and whether Mr. Philpot has been authorised to accept this decoration? 195 Mr. Butler I assume that the hon. Member is referring to Mr. H. A. R. Philby, a newspaper correspondent serving with General Franco's forces. I have seen in the Press a report of the award of a medal by the Spanish Nationalist authorities to this gentleman. Mr. Philby has not sought and has not been given any official authority to accept the distinction in question. ********************************************************************** BURGESS AND MACLEAN HC Deb 25 October 1955 vol 545 cc28-9 29 48. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton asked the Prime Minister whether he will move to appoint a Select Committee to investigate the circumstances of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean in particular, and the efficiency of Civil Service security arrangements in general. The Prime Minister No, Sir. Lieu1.-Colonel Lipton Has the Prime Minister made up his mind to cover up at all costs the dubious third man activities of Mr. Harold Philby, who was First Secretary at the Washington Embassy a little while ago; and is he determined to stifle all discussion on the very great matters which were evaded in the wretched White Paper, which is an insult to the intelligence of the country? The Prime Minister My answer was "No" to the hon. and gallant Member's Question, which was not about all that but asked for the appointment of a Select Committee. My answer remains "No." So far as the wider issues raised in the supplementary question are concerned, the Government take the view that it is desirable to have a debate, and an early debate, on this subject, in which I as Prime Minister will be glad to take part. Mr. Robens Has the Prime Minister made any investigation as to the reason why briefs supplied by Foreign Office officials to Ministers answering Questions in this House have been at so much variance with the facts of the case? The Prime Minister That seems to be one of the matters which might well be raised in the debate. ********************************************************************** FORMER FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS (DISAPPEARANCE) HC Deb 07 November 1955 vol 545 cc1483-611 1483 Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.[Mr. Buchan-Hepburn.]

 3.34 p.m. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Harold Macmillan) It can rarely have happened in our long Parliamentary history that the political head of a Department should have had to unfold to the House of Commons so painful a story as that which it is our duty to consider today. To understandthough not, of course, to excusethis story, it is necessary to cast our minds back to the 1930s and to recall the kind of background against which the two principal characters grew up. At that time all kinds of violent opinions were being expressed. The circumstances of the Spanish Civil War, with Fascists and Communists backing the rival forces, divided British and, indeed, European opinion acutely. This had a particularly disturbing effect upon young people, many of whom, we remember, thought it their duty actually to take part in these fierce revolutionary struggles. When Hitler had made his pact with Stalin and the Second World War began, some of those who had espoused extremist views found that their ideological beliefs exerted a pull which was to prove stronger than their patriotism. This clash of loyalties was buried in 1941 by our alliance with Russia. But, when the war ended and there came an estrangement between this country and Communist Russia, it revived. Thus it was that men could be found in Britain who could put the interests of another country before those of their own, and could commit the horrible crime of treachery. This occurred not only among criminals and degenerates, but in men holding high technical and scientific posts, among men of philosophic and literary attainments, and, finally, in these two cases, the subject of this debate, in the Foreign Service. There are many on both sides of the House who, as Ministers or as private Members, have seen the work of the 1484 Foreign Service at home and abroad. I know they will agree with me when I say how fortunate we are in this country to have a Foreign Service of the highest quality, giving the most loyal and devoted service to the Crown and to the nation. I think that all of us today are feeling how severe is the blow that has been struck against its reputation. Our Foreign Service regards this case as a personal wound, as when something of the kind strikes at a family, or a ship, or a regiment. We must recognise, too, that this case has caused a profound shock to Parliament and to the general public, both at home and abroad. Before dealing with the actual handling of this affair, I want to say a few words on the subject of ministerial responsibility. When what is known as the Maclean and Burgess case was entering its final phase, with the findings of the Australian Royal Commission and the publication of the White Paper, I made it clear that full ministerial responsibility must be taken by those Ministers, past and present, who presided over or were connected with the Foreign Office during all this period. This was not a mere act of quixotism or chivalry; it is a plain constitutional truth. It will be a sorry day when we try to elevate something called the Foreign Office or the Treasury or any other Department of State into a separate entity enjoying a kind of life, responsibility and power of its own, not controlled by Ministers and not subject to full Parliamentary authority. Ministers, and Ministers alone, must bear the responsibility for what goes wrong. After all, they are not slow to take credit for anything that goes right. This does not mean that they have to accept responsibility for wrongful acts on the part of their officials of which they have no prior knowledge. But in discussing this case it is quite wrong to assert that the Foreign Office, if by that is meant "officials" made decisions of their own. Ministers are responsible and, in fact, took all the important decisions. Moreover, they took those decisions in full knowledge of all the relevant facts so far as they were known at the time.

The House will realise that both the Opposition and the present Government share the responsibility. The main acts in the drama took place while the Opposition were in power. The investigation 1485 into the leak, the narrowing of the suspicion down to Maclean, and the escape of the two traitorsthat Government took a number of steps before, during and after their flight. When the present Government succeeded in October, 1951, much had already been done to investigate the whole circumstances of the case and to improve our security measures. From that point, the responsibility rests with them. The White Paper published on 23rd September has given a short, but, I believe, correct and objective, account of the story of these two men and of the various incidents that surround this strange drama. I have seen a large number of criticisms in the Press and elsewhere arising from the White Paper, and I fear it will be necessary to deal with them in some detail. First, there is the general question of the amount of information given to the public. We are accused of having said too little and too late. Secondly, there are the detailed criticisms of the way the affair was dealt with throughout its various stages. The chief points at issue are, I think, as follows. There is the question of the original appointments of Maclean and Burgess divergent as they were. There is the question of their progress in the Service. There is the question of whether, in view of certain incidents in their careers, Maclean and Burgess should have been dismissed the Service, or, at least, whether they should have been posted as they were. There is the question of the watch kept upon Maclean when he became suspect. There is the question of the escape of Maclean, and how he got warning, and whether he should have been prevented from leaving England taking Burgess with him. There is the question of the defection of Mrs. Maclean. There is a general criticism of the incompetence or inefficiency of the security measures taken both by the Foreign Office and by the Security Service. I will try to deal with all these if I can, but before I do so perhaps the House will allow me to make one or two preliminary observations. It has been stated that security in the Foreign Office ought to be in the hands of 1486 the Security Service. It is argued that Foreign Service officers who are dealing with security are amateurs or are doing a job for which they have no background or training. At present, as the House perhaps knows, each public Department is responsible for its own securitythe Foreign Office, the Ministry of Supply, and all the other public Departments. The officials who are for the time being in charge of this work are in the closest and most constant touch with the Security Service and continually seek their advice, and I know of no case where their advice has been disregarded. It is true that the Foreign Office officialsit is true for the Ministry of Supply or other Departmentsare amateurs in the sense that they do not spend their whole careers upon this job. Nevertheless, this has a corresponding advantage, for it means that an increasing number of officers in the Service, both at home and abroad, gain some experience of security work. Security work in the Foreign Service really falls into two categories. Many hon. Members will know this well. There is what one might call the physical and technical sidethe boxes, the keys, the ciphers, the precautions against listening in apparatus, and all the rest of that side of it. Then there is what one might call the human side, involving personalities. It is argued that members of the Service itself have a natural reluctance to report adversely on or to take action against their own colleagues. But I believeI hope the House, on reflection, will share this viewthat, broadly speaking, security as well as efficiency is better safeguarded in this way and a due sense of responsibility is thus maintained.

For my part, I am not much attracted by the only other alternative, that there should be a kind of N.K.V.D. or Ogpu system in our public offices; in other words, that everybody, wherever he goes and whatever he does, high and low, should be watched by an appropriate officer of a police department. Mr. Percy Daises (East Ham, North): rose Mr. Macmillan I have a long speech to make. Perhaps I might be allowed to develop what I have to say in detail. 1487 Mr. Daines Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us the status of the chief officer in charge of security at the Foreign Office? Mr. Macmillan The Permanent Under-Secretary, the Head of the Department. The status of the officer upon whom this would mainly devolve would be that of an Under-Secretary. Having made that point, there is just one other point that I should like to make before I come to the details. All through the criticisms which have been madeI do not complain of themI have felt a sense of impatience, and, indeed, natural impatience, that action of a precautionary kind was not taken or could not have been taken when it might still have been effective. I am bound to say that I think some of these complaints are based on a misapprehension of the rights of a citizen in a free society in time of peace. I shall revert to this point at a later stage, but I should like to mark it here. I would only venture to add this warning. Action against employees, whether of the State or anybody else, arising from suspicion and not from proof may begin with good motives, and it may avert serious inconveniences or even disasters, but, judging from what has happened in some other countries, such a practice soon degenerates into the satisfaction of personal vendettas or a general system of tyranny, all in the name of public safety. Now I should like to say a word on the question of the handling of publicity. It is said that the statements made either by Foreign Office spokesmen or by Ministers during all these years have been disingenuous and obscure. Why, it is asked, was not more information given earlier in greater volume and spontaneously? Of course, I do not intend to try to convince the House that everything that has been done by myself or my predecessors has been absolutely right and prudent in every detail. Happily, there is very little experience of this sort of thing in our country, and successive Ministers have not found it easy to strike just the right balance between saying too little and saying too much. I am sure, however, that they have all been influenced by one over-riding consideration. Naturally, the disappearance of the two men opened up a large new 1488 field of investigation for the Security Service. These inquiries continued for a long time; indeed, for several years. At any stage while they were in progress a full statement would have indicated to the world the degree to which they were meeting with success. Consequently, as anyone with any experience of this kind of work knows, the investigation itself might have been compromised. If one is working on a line which may lead to success and perhaps to prosecution, the less one talks about it the better and that is what we meant by the paragraph in the White Paper when we said: Counterespionage depends for its success on the maximum secrecy of its methods. Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it. This governed the problem of the timing of public statements.

Unless we were to publish a kind of running commentary such as would have been highly prejudicial to the work of the Security Service, we had to decide on the right moment for telling what we knew of the story. Ministers may have decided wisely or unwisely, but the paramount considerationand I want to emphasise itwas for facilitating the work of investigation in its widest sense and, above alland perhaps this is the most important pointof not endangering valuable sources. It is worth looking back to the way in which the case developed. When Maclean and Burgess fled in May, 1951, the first thought of those responsible had to be not how much they could tell the public, but what they could do to minimise the harm that had been done. The Security Service still had extensive inquiries to make, not merely to reconstruct the story but to improve the Service. But when Petrov defected on 3rd April, 1954, a whole new vista on the case was opened up. On 3rd May, 1954, the Australian Government set up a Royal Commission and it was clear that the hearing of Petrov's testimony in many mattersin many matters quite unconnected with Maclean and Burgesswas to be a vital part of the work of that Commission. From then on his credibility as a witness was to be under examination. We knew in April, 1954, that the Australian Government intended to set up a Royal Commission. 1489 When, therefore the Press announced on 28th April, 1954, that Petrov possessed information bearing on the case of Burgess and Maclean, we were unable to confirm or deny the truth of that information. The statement was made in the first place on 28th April that his information was hearsay information, which, of course, it was, and was to be treated with reserve until a fuller account had been received from Australia. Petrov let it be known that if, as soon as he said anything to the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation it was to be given publicity in this country, he would then refuse to say any more at all. This is a most important point. Since it was essential that Petrov should give his evidence before the Royal Commission, it was decided not to make any further announcements bearing on his testimony. The Report of the Royal Commission is dated 22nd August, 1955. It was laid before the Australian Parliament and first became public on 14th September, 1955. It then became possible to answer questions which had hitherto remained unanswered and that was done by the Foreign Office spokesman in reply to questions arising out of an article in the "People" on Sunday, 18th September and the White Paper published nine days after the publication of the Royal Commission's Report. Having made those first points, I should now like to deal with the specific questions which I mentioned earlier. Since the first three all related to the official careers of Burgess and Maclean and their progress in the Foreign Service, I will deal with them together. I should first emphasise, however, that the circumstances in which the two men entered the Service were very different. Maclean came into the Diplomatic Service before the war by a very severe competitive examination, in which he showed conspicuous ability. I have heard it said that the Civil Service Commission Board, who interview all candidates for the Service, ought to have known of Maclean's reputation for extreme Left-wing opinions while he was an undergraduate. In fact, his college authorities gave him an exceptionally good report in which no mention was made of his Left-wing views. But even supposing that the Board had known that 1490 he had expressed Communist opinions as an undergraduate Mr. Charles Pannell (Leeds, West) On a point of order. In the nomenclature of politics, "Left-wing" is a connotation for this side of the House. Can I ask you, therefore, Mr. Speaker, to ask the Foreign

Secretary to use plain English and refer to Communist affiliations and not Left-wing affiliations? Mr. Macmillan I said extreme Left-wing, which I think was a fair point. Perhaps the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) will wait for what I was about to say. I was about to ask the House, whether supposing the Board had known that he had expressed even Communist sympathies as an undergraduate, in those days would the House have felt that such a man should automatically be excluded from the public service? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Would the House not have regarded those leanings as one of the aberrations of youth which he might be expected to live down? It is not fair to bring in an atmosphere of today when judging events of the 1930's. It is important to realise that until and after Maclean's appointment in Cairo in 1948 the quality of his work was not only good, but outstanding among his contemporaries. During his first fourteen years in the Service his conduct gave rise to no adverse comment. His behaviour in Cairo, which culminated in a sudden application for sick leave, at the time was interpreted as the result of a prolonged period of overwork and strain. He was regarded as a valuable member of the Service and there was every reason to suppose and to hope that he might make a full recovery from what appeared to be a sort of nervous breakdown. The Foreign Office, like, I think, any other decent employer in the circumstancesit should be remembered that at the time there was no suspicion of any kind as to his loyaltytried to see that a man who had served for fourteen years got the right medical treatment and had a chance of recovery. It is quite easy to say that our trusting him in that position was wrong. Perhaps it was. It is very easy to be wise after the event. But he was given a second chance, and at the end of five months' medical treatment 1491 was put at the head of the American Department. This Department in the Foreign Office deals principally with Latin-American affairs. Major questions relating to the United States are dealt with regionallyfor instance, N.A.T.O. affairs would come under the Western Organisations Department, Middle East affairs would come under the Middle Eastern Department. The United States questions which are dealt with by the American Department are largely routine, welfare of forces, visitors, and the like. The appointment implied no promotion for Maclean and provided an opportunity to watch his conduct and his health. At this time, may I remind the House, no suspicion rested on him. As soon as he fell under suspicion, in the middle of April, 1951, one of those informed was Sir Roger Makins, now our distinguished and highly successful Ambassador in Washington. Sir Roger was then his immediate chief, being the Superintending Under-Secretary of the group into which this Department fell. It is, however, quite untrue, as has been suggested, that Sir Roger Makins was in any way responsible for the conduct of an inquiry, or that he checked or cleared Maclean. It is not the case at all and such a suggestion is false and grossly unfair to Sir Roger Makins. That is the career of Maclean up to date. Burgess's career Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington) How did Maclean come under suspicion? Mr. Macmillan I am coming to that later. It is in great detail. That is Maclean's career up to date, how he got in, how promoted, and what was his career up to the date of the suspicion. Burgess's career in the Foreign Service was, of course, totally different from that of Maclean's. He was taken on as temporary Press Officer in the News Department of the Foreign Office, which was then housed in the Ministry of Information, in 1944. His

previous career, to the extent that it was then known, gave what seemed to be a respectable background. He had served with the B.B.C. for six years. From early 1939 until the end of 1940, Burgess worked in the special Department which, on the outbreak of war, was 1492 responsible for propaganda to neutral countries. The appointment to the News Department was temporary and did not involve establishment. In 1945, he took advantage of the opportunity open to temporary officers to apply for establishment in the junior branch of the Foreign Service. He appeared before a Civil Service Commission Board which duly recommended him for establishment. In fairness to the Board, I ought to say that it was impressed by Burgess's excellent academic record as well as by the good reports which it received covering his employment in the B.B.C. and in the Foreign Office News Department. However, I must also say that we now know that Burgess's work while with the wartime Department, to which I have referred, had been unsatisfactory. It is, unfortunately, the case that during the warand perhaps one can hardly wonder at itmany wartime Departments did not keep good records about their temporary staff. The fact remains that neither the Foreign Office nor the Civil Service Commission knew of Burgess's failings. This process by which he was established was not completed until October, 1947. In the meantime, the late Mr. Hector McNeil, who was then Minister of State, asked that Burgess be appointed to his private office as a personal assistant because of his experience in drafting and general publicity work, and this was done in December, 1946. Burgess proved useful to Mr. McNeil who recommended him for promotion to the senior branch of the Foreign Service, but as there was a good deal of doubt about his suitability for the senior branch, and as he had little experience of the ordinary duties of the Foreign Office it was decided that he should be given a thorough trial on routine work in the Far Eastern Department. While he was working in that Department, allegations were made that during a period of leave abroad, late in 1949, he had been guilty of a serious indiscretion about intelligence matters. The charges were fully investigated by a disciplinary board, and he was severely reprimanded, informed that he would be transferred and that his prospects of promotion would be diminished. 1493 There was much discussion as to his future post. It was desirable to send him to a post where his general suitability for the Foreign Service could be properly tested. It was, therefore, decided to send him to Washington for a period of trial on routine work. There have been suggestions that, having been guilty of serious indiscretions, he was promoted. That is not so. He remained, as he had been since his establishment, a member of the fourth grade of the junior branch of the Service. In Washington, Burgess was a failure. The Ambassador reported unfavourably both upon his office work and upon his behaviour outside, and in May, 1951, four years after his establishment and nine months after his appointment at Washington, he was recalled, and the conclusion was reached that he would have to leave the service. Until the day of Burgess's disappearance there were no grounds for suspecting that he was working against the security of the State. He had been indiscreet, but, then, indiscretion is not generally the characteristic of a secret agent. There is one further point that I think, in fairness to the late Mr. McNeil, I ought to mention. I observe that a former Minister and Privy Councillor recently stated that he had warned McNeil about Burgess when he became his personal assistant. I am bound to say that I feel very sorry about the timing of this particular revelation.

So much for the official careers of the two men. I think that I have said enough to show that it simply is not true that they were protected by senior officials. It may be argued that their superiors ought to have known more about them, and I shall have something to say later about the subsequent improvements in the Foreign Office system of reports on the staff. I must now deal with the other questions which I posed about the escape of the two men, the competence of the measures taken to keep Maclean under observation and how he got warning of it. To understand the problem, I must first say something of the background. It was in January, 1949a very important datethat a report was received that certain British information had become available to the Soviet authorities 1494 a few years earlier. However, there was no indication as to how it had become available. The leak might not even have been from British sources. Diligent inquiries were begun immediately, but the field of possibilities to be covered was very large. Further evidencewhich was not available when the investigation begangradually came to light, and it is, in fact, greatly to the credit of the security authorities that the circumstance in which that information had leaked to the Soviet Government became known at all. I cannot give the details, but it was an almost incredible act of skill that, given the magnitude of the task, how broad the possible field was and the paucity of the information available, the field was gradually narrowed down in the course of two years to one suspect, and that the right one. The House will not expect me to give full details of the investigations, but I hope that it will accept my assurance that they were pursued with diligence and efficiency. But, even when suspicion narrowed down to Maclean, the evidence was both inconclusive and circumstantial. The best, perhaps the only, chance of obtaining evidence which could be used to support a prosecution lay in obtaining admissions from him. But there was no firm starting point for an interview with him. It was highly desirable to obtain further information about his contacts and activities which could be used as a reason for questioning him. A watch was, therefore, put upon him for the primary purposeindeed, the sole purposeof securing such information. As was said in the White Paper, everything depended upon the interview, and its success depended also on the use of an element of surprise. If he were alerted to the fact that he was under investigation or suspected it, all hope of obtaining the essential confirmatory evidence would probably have gone for good. For that reason, the decision not to watch him at Tatsfield was deliberately taken after a careful survey had been made of the technical problems involved in keeping him under observation in the neighbourhood of his home. The conclusion was that the risk that he would be put on his guard would be too great. Obviously, it is far more difficult in the country to conceal from a man the fact 1495 that he is being watched than it is to watch his movements or his contacts in London. I should, perhaps, remind the House that in the case of Fuchs the Security Service decided to take exactly the same risk, and they were justified in the result. The object of the watch was to obtain evidence of contact or of something that he did that would be conclusive against Maclean. It was in no sense its purpose to prevent him leaving the country. It is perhaps worth remembering that there is no power to prevent a man against whom no charge can be brought from leaving this country. Whether this gap in our security ought to be closed is another question, and I will come to it in a moment. Mr. David Logan (Liverpool, Scotland Division) Would the right hon. Gentleman explain how two men in responsible positions and guilty of an aggravated offence, if proved, both got leave of absence at the end of the

week, and why both of them, when they were supposed to be guilty of treason, were allowed to leave the country? Mr. Macmillan The first point was, of course, that to have refused weekend leavewhich would have been very unusualwould have put the man on his guard all the more. And as the object was to try to catch him in an action which would justify a charge, it was very important not to refuse leave or any other normal advantage given to the servant; and, as I have tried to explain, there is no power under the law of England to prevent a man leaving against whom the Executive is not prepared to produce a charge. Whether there ought to be I will come to in a moment, but that was the law as it then stood, and, indeed, as it stands today. Nevertheless, it seems more than probable that Maclean somehow discovered that he was under observation. How, I do not knowwe do not know. We do not know for certain. The arrest of Fuchs on 2nd February, 1950, may well have caused Maclean to wonder whether his activities in America might not eventually be uncovered. Looking back on it, we may wonder whether this event contributed to his breakdown in Cairo in April, 1950. Assuming he was suffering 1496 from a general uneasiness on this score, it would need only the slightest indication that the circle was narrowing to put him on his guard. He would have been particularly sensitive to any hint, direct or indirect, that he was under investigation. Although, therefore, the circumstances of the disappearance are certainly explainable in terms of what is called a "tip off," it is quite possible that Maclean may have taken flight with Burgess because one or other of them noticed circumstances, or a combination of circumstancesto which they would have been particularly sensitive, of coursewhich may have aroused their suspicions. Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton) Did not the withdrawal of the secret documents give that "tip off," and in view of that why have we to assume that there was a third traitor here at all? Mr. Macmillan I am coming to that point. That is another possibility, and I am trying to deal with all the possibilities. Although, as I say, the circumstances are explanatory in the terms of a "tip off," they are not necessarily the effect of that. That is what I am trying to say. However, the possibility of a "tip off" had to be seriously considered and searching and protracted investigations into this possibility have been undertaken, and are proceeding even at the present time. In this connection, the name of one man has been mentioned in the House of Commons, but not outside. I feel that all hon. Members would expect me to refer to him by name and to explain the position. He is Mr. H. A. R. Philby, who was a temporary First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington from October, 1949, to June, 1951, and had been privy to much of the investigation into the leakage. Mr. Philby had been a friend of Burgess from the time when they were fellow undergraduates at Trinity College, Cambridge. Burgess had been accommodated with Philby and his family at the latter's home in Washington from August, 1950, to April, 1951; and, of course, it will be realised that at no time before he fled was Burgess under suspicion. It is now known that Mr. Philby had Communist associates during and after his university days. In view of the circumstances, he was asked, in July, 1951, 1497 to resign from the Foreign Service. Since that date his case has been the subject of close investigation. No evidence has been found to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess or Maclean. While in Government service he carried out his duties ably and conscientiously. I have no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has at any time betrayed

the interests of this country, or to identify him with the so-called "third man," if, indeed, there was one. As regards others whose names have been in any way associated with this affair, I have made, or caused to be made, and studied myself, the most careful, rigorous and impartial investigation into each case which I have been able to have made; and I can assure the House that nobody is being in any way shielded. I am sure that my predecessors would not have hesitated to have taken the appropriate action, if they had found evidence of guilt, but, in fact, no such evidence was found. A number of Foreign Service officers who had associated, as office colleagues or outside, with Maclean and Burgess were examined by the Foreign Office Security Service. If, of course, any evidence not already available can be produced by anybody either inside or outside this House, I trust that it will be made available to the authorities. Mr. Herbert Morrison (Lewisham, South) It is said in a newspaper this morningthough I appreciate entirely what the Foreign Secretary has saidthat Philby and his family have disappeared. Does he regard that a matter of significance in all the circumstances of the case? Mr. Macmillan I have no reason to believe that they have. In fact, I think it is very improbable that they have. Mr. R. J. Mellish (Bermondsey) It may be that Philby has gone into hiding because of the scandalous publicity arising from certain statements. Mr. Macmillan Well, I was trying to state the case as fairly and as absolutely accurately as I can. I must emphasise, however, that on the important question of what decided the two men to escape we really have, as the hon. Member has suggested, very little evidence. 1498 As stated in the White Paper, arrangements were made to keep certain highly classified material from Maclean, but these arrangements were not as ham-handed or crude as some people may believe. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that in spite of all the precautions. Macleanwhom we now know was an experienced agentmay have become aware of them. Suspicion has also been cast on those who were aware of the decision of the then Foreign Secretary that Maclean should be interrogated. That decision was taken on 25th May, 1951, but the evidence of Petrov suggested that the flight of the two men was planned well before that date and, therefore, that really answers the case of any suspicion falling upon those who were privy to the decision of the right hon. Gentleman. Mr. Sidney Silverman (Nelson and Colne) I understood from the right hon. Gentleman's account of the matter earlier that right up to the day when Burgess fled this country there was no suspicion against him at all and there was no investigation on security grounds. If I have that right, can the right hon. Gentleman then say why Burgess should run away? Mr. Macmillan Well, the fact that there was no suspicion on the part of the authorities against him does not mean that he may not have been conscious of his own guilt, and, therefore, thought that the best thing was to be off. I am just stating that there was not any suspicion against him. I think that that deals with that matter. I have been asked for full details, and I think that I ought to give them. There is then the question of Mrs. Maclean. It is said that she ought to have been prevented from going to Switzerland to live with her mother, Mrs. Dunbar. It may be

10

said that it was naive to rely on Mrs. Maclean's assurance, and her mother's assurance, that they would keep in touch with the Security Service; and on Mrs. Maclean's alleged desire to educate the children out of England. However, the point is that Mrs. Maclean is really of little importance. Anything she knew before Maclean left she must have got from him. She had no means of obtaining any information after he left, and whether she remained in this 1499 country or left made little difference. She could do no particular good in England; she could do no particular harm abroad. Again, the over-riding fact remains that there is no power under the law of England to prevent her from leaving this country. Hon. Members will ask what lessons have been learned and what steps have been takenthat really is the vital pointto try to ensure that there can be no repetition of such a deplorable story. This leads me to the question of security checks. Since 1945, a check has regularly been made on all new entrants into the Foreign Office and all new temporary employees. This check is made to ensure that no adverse security record is held against candidates for employment. Since 1945, all officers already employed have been so checked, but it is acknowledged that this check is not adequatewhat is called the negative checksince it will only reveal persons who have already come to the noticeunfavourable notice, if you like of the security authorities. Indeed, when applied to Maclean and Burgess, it revealed nothing about the subversive political associations of their early days. From 1951 onwards, it was recognised that more must be done to check the reliability of persons holding important positions in the public service. At the beginning of 1952, a regular system of positive vetting was introduced. This procedure entails detailed research into the whole background of the officer concerned, including his school and university career and any previous employment before joining the Foreign Service. In a large number of cases, personal inquiries are made of university tutors, past employers and others who have personal knowledge of the candidate. Since 1952, about 900 cases, involving the senior, junior and clerical branches of the Foreign Service, have been examined. So far, there have been four cases in the Foreign Service in which an officer's political activities and associations have led to his leaving the Service altogether. In about half-a-dozen other cases it has been considered prudent to move officers to other work of less importance to the national security, or to accept their resignations. This positive vetting procedure is not confined to the Foreign Service. It is 1500 now operated in all Government Departments having access to classified material involving the security of the State. Immediately after the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South, who was then Foreign Secretary, set up a committee to look into all aspects of the security arrangements in the Foreign Service. The committee was an official one, and it may perhaps be criticised on that account, but I think that it was a wise act of the right hon. Gentleman, who chose officials singularly well suited to their taskmen with great records of devotion to the public service. The committee was presided over by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Sir Nevile Bland and Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, were the other members. The committee reported in November, 1951, approving the security check, including the plans for positive vetting which had already been prepared. It recommended that vetting should be extended to all members of the senior branches and the senior grades of the junior branches of the Foreign Service. In fact, the present practice of the Foreign Service goes beyond that recommendation, since many more junior grades, which must inevitably be employed on highly classified work, are positively vetted. The committee considered not only political unreliability in itself, but the problem of character defects,

11

which might lay an officer open to blackmail, or otherwise undermine his loyalty and sense of responsibility. Shortly after the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, and before the Cadogan Committee reported, fresh instructions had been issued by the Permanent UnderSecretary of the Foreign Office to heads of missions and other senior officials impressing upon them the need to watch in particular the forms of behaviour among their staff likely to sap an officer's discretion or sense of responsibility or his public duty, or to expose him to undue influence or blackmail or to heighten in undue measure the tension of his existence. The committee commented on these instructions with approval and emphasised that not only the heads of missions but some junior officers in charge of sections throughout the Foreign Service, and, indeed, in other services, ought to be reminded of their 1501 responsibility for the security and personal reliability of the staffs serving under them, and instructions were issued in this sense. Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East) May I ask the right hon. Gentleman one question on vetting? Did he say that there was no vetting at the Foreign Office before 1945; that is to say, between 1939 and 1945 officials were not submitted to political vetting to which other people who came into the Government service had to submit? Mr. Macmillan I said it was of a negative kind. It was merely said, "Have you got anything against this man?" and the point of the positive vetting is diligent research into the previous records. In the old days, we should have been rather shocked at positive vetting, but we have had to accept it as one of the necessities of present conditions. I want to refer to a point to which I have seen some allusion maderecruitment for the Foreign Service. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman is to raise the matter, because I saw something in one of the newspapers this morning which made me think that he might intend to do so. It is said that recruitment is kept to a closed circle, and that its members are taken too narrowly from one social group. I think I should remind the House exactly what has happened about the Foreign Service. There is so much going on that it is always difficult to remember, and the public memory is short. During the war, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary, gave great thought to the question of the future of the Foreign Service. He proposed a scheme to his colleagues in the Coalition Government on which much labour was spent, and this scheme made certain radical changes. The scheme was set out in a White Paper, and certain arrangements under it required an Order in Council and a Bill. All this was under the Coalition Government in 1943. The Leader of the Opposition, the deputy Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Bevin, who subsequently became Foreign Secretary, held high positions in the Coalition Government. After the war, Mr. Bevin succeeded as Foreign Secretary 1502 and held that office, if I remember rightly, for five years. He was certainly not the man to be unduly impressed by the outward semblance of things; he went to the inner core. He was not a defender of privilege, and, at the same time, was not a man to yield to prejudice. It fell to him to implement the scheme which had been laid down by the Act of 1943. If he had not been satisfied with it, I am sure that in his five years at the Foreign Office he would not have hesitated to propose some amendment or alteration. Actually, he felt for the Foreign Service a loyalty and devotion which has been amply rewarded by the respect and affection in which his name will always be held at the Foreign Office. It may be worth emphasising what were the major points of the Eden-Bevin reforms, if I may call them that. First, the amalgamation of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic

12

Service with the Consular Service and the Commercial Diplomatic Service into a single whole. That was the first big point. Secondly, the reorganisation of the arrangements for recruitment and training with a view to opening the service to anyone with sufficient qualifications. I ought to add, for there has been much misunderstanding on this point, that the work of selecting recruits for all except the most junior grades of the Service has for a long time been in the hands of the Civil Service Commissioners. I want to emphasise this. The Foreign Service is not a service renewing itself by co-option. Its new members have for a long time been chosen by an outside body. It is sometimes said that the Foreign Service, like the rest of the Civil Service, is a sort of closed shop, that its failures are protected and that there is no means of getting rid of incompetent or unsuitable people. I would, however, point out, that since the introduction of the Foreign Service Act, 1943, members of the Foreign Service have not enjoyed the same degree of security as that of the rest of the Civil Service, for this Act introduced arrangements more like those of the fighting Services, which provide for compulsory retirement of established members who do not make sufficient progress to justify their retention or promotion. Fifty-nine officers have been retired under this Act in the last ten years. The House will also observe that the new scheme for the conduct of the Service and the amalgamation and other 1503 conditions applied not merely to new entrants but to existing officers who became subject to the new conditions as to postings, promotion and retirement. The House will see that the remodelling of the Foreign Service was initiated by a Conservative Foreign Secretary and, after exhaustive inquiry, by a Coalition Government. It was implemented by a Labour Foreign Secretary only ten years ago in a Parliament which, with all its faults or merits, cannot be accusedI am speaking of the Parliament of 1945of being too prejudiced in favour of the past or standing too rigidly upon ancient ways. Therefore, it does not seem to me that a case for a further inquiry into the recruitment and organisation of the Foreign Service has been made out. Now, with regard to the Security Service and the Maclean case there is one point that I should like to emphasise. I spoke just now of how this information was got and how it had to be sifted. The information originally available necessitated a search in a field of about 6,000 people. That is to say, on the technical character of how this was got, there were 6,000 people each of whom might have been the man. These the Security Service eventually narrowed down to one. That in this case, unlike the Fuchs case they were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to justify a charge is, of course, to be regretted. The difficulties in our system of law are very real. Of the skill, perseverance and loyalty of the Security Service there can be no doubt. I should like to add this tribute. It is indeed remarkable that we are able to recruit men of such high character and attainments. The rewards are not very large; the responsibilities are very great. After all, most of us gain some satisfaction in life not only from doing a job well but from the public acknowledgment of success. These men are cut off from all that. They work in secret. Most of their successesand there are, indeed, successesmust be kept quiet. Any failure hits the headlines. For this service, then, not fame but patriotism is the spur and the reward. On the more general aspects of security I should like to add this: I am satisfied, and I hope the House will be satisfied, that all these new arrangements which 1504 have been made have enormously strengthened the security system. I doubt whether any substantial improvement can be made within our existing system of law, on which I will say a word before I sit down; but, unfortunately, it is not sufficient to satisfy ourselves that we have taken all possible steps. We cannot ignore the fact that this incident, following upon others in the world of science, has had a serious effect upon our

13

reputation abroad. That is inevitable. Of course, many of the allegations made by irresponsible people are so exaggerated that they carry with them their own refutation. Nevertheless, there is a real danger that a feeling might be spread among our Allies that our own reliability, hitherto regarded as a model, is no longer to be trusted. It is of the greatest importance for our defence and our safety, depending as they do on close relations of confidence with our Allies, in the old world and in the new, that successive Governments should be known to have taken all steps within their power to stop any loopholes and to strengthen any legitimate methods of defending our vital secrets. Do not let foreign observers compare the present position with the situation as it was some time ago. I can honestly say that it is my belief that every practical means has been taken which is open to the Executive. I would, therefore, make an appeal that we should not injure our own interests by spreading abroad a false and, still more, an outdated picture of our security system as it stands today. Before I conclude I hope the House will bear with me for one or two moments more for some final reflections. As I have already stated, we have to face a world completely changed from anything the older ones among us knew or thought possible; and what a change it is. Since 1689 in England and since 1745 in Scotland there has been no real dispute about the character of the rgime. Bitter as have been political conflicts at certain times, there has been no question for all these years of serious acts of treachery to the country. We have to go back to the period of the wars of religion to find any parallel for the new ideological conflicts which divide the world and which may continue to divide it for many years to come. It is difficult for the older ones among us to realise the new situation which 1505 Fascism, Nazism, Communism and other totalitarian methods of government have produced. It is hard for us to conceive of a son betraying his father or a father denouncing his own children. We cannot imagine a state of mind which regards spying as a virtue and treachery as a duty. We have to read again the problems that confronted the Elizabethan statesmen, Burghley and Walsingham, when the Secret Service first developed, when espionage and counter-espionage, plot and counter-plot were inseparable from international politics. This brings us up directly against a new problem. It is really that of public security in a free society during a period of intense ideological warfare. We could, of course, reintroduce some methods and take again some powers which we abandoned long ago and we hoped had gone for ever. Even in a modified form these would have been very helpful in dealing with the case which I have had to outline to the House today. The story might easily have been unravelled if less regard had been had to the law. Here, may I say that I was struck by a criticism which appeared recently in one of the popular papers. Why, asked this critic, was Mrs. Maclean not prevented from leaving England. This is what it said. I quote from the article: the authorities said they would have had no legal power to stop her. There is no law for this. Then it goes on: Could not they have found one? There we have the very nub of the problem. Could not theythat is, the authoritieshave found one? Hitler would have found one, of course. Mussolini would have found one. Stalin had got one. In time of war we, too, were forced to find new measures to control the rights of the individual, but they were never very much liked here, and I do not suppose that there was any product of war more distasteful to those who had to operate them or to the general public than the powers under Regulation 18B. In recent years, however, the question of treachery, particularly treachery inspired not by motives of personal gain but by misplaced ideological convictions, has loomed much larger in our national life than at almost any time in our long history; and nowadays it is not only the bureaucracy who

14

1506 are the holders of our national secrets. Perhaps even more secrets are in the hands of large sections of industry and of the scientific world. With this extension of the problem we are brought face to face with the fundamental question of liberty. How can the interests of security be maintained without damage to our traditional liberties? At what point do reasonable and necessary security measures become the repugnant attributes of the police State? In short, how do we, in modern times, achieve good security in a democratic society? The review which I have given of the security measures taken in recent years will, I hope, convince the House that everything that it is possible to do under existing lawor everything that we can seehas been done to protect us against treason and subversion by Government servants, or by others, who have secret material. To the extent that security practices can be improved under existing laws every effort has been made to achieve it, and I believe that these measures make the recurrence of an affair such as this exceedingly improbableI do not say that they make it impossible. I repeat, however, that these measures do not, and in my view cannot, go beyond the letter and the spirit of the law. At any rate, before the limitations of the existing law were relaxed, were it no more than this, I think that Parliament would have to weigh very carefully the balance of advantage and disadvantage, for it would, indeed, be a tragedy if we destroyed our freedom in the effort to preserve it. 4.40 p.m. Mr. Herbert Morrison (Lewisham, South) Mr. Deputy-Speaker, before I proceed with my speech, perhaps I may be permitted to stray beyond the bounds of order for a few moments to refer to the deeply regretted death of my right hon. Friend William Whiteley, Member for Blaydon. He was respected in all quarters of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] He was a very fine Member of Parliament, a man of the most upright character, and I would say, having seen a good many Chief Whipsand I think that the Government Chief Whip will agreethat William Whiteley will stand out as one of the great Chief Whips in the House of Commons; a 1507 servant not only to his party, but a man who also had a sense of duty to the House as a whole, including the Opposition. We all deplore his passing. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear. hear."] We have heard a very able, full and competent speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I am sure that the House as a whole is thankful to him for the information which he has given this afternoon. I think the Government were right themselves to take the initiative in offering a debate on this matter, and that it is right that a debate should take place. It will probably be rather less exciting than one felt that it might be when the Government announced it. The atmosphere has somewhat cooled down. We are grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his speech, although I must say that while I agree with the great bulk of itas will be apparent in the course of my observationsI am not quite as satisfied as he is with things as they are. This is not a party political matter. We are concerned with a problem of Government and administration, and I hope that it will be handled as such throughout the debate. We, in our country, have a very great Civil Service, of which we can be proud. I do not think that there is any better in the world. I agree that the Civil Service of the Foreign Office is also one which does credit to the country, both at home and abroad. It is true that, now and again, a tradition of earlier policies and earlier biases is to be found in the Foreign Office, and it is necessary for the Secretary of State to push hard to get it altered. The Foreign Service is a very good one. Having had for a short period, contact with other foreign services, I am inclined to say that I know of none better than ours. But there is always a temptation for a Minister in charge of a Departmentor a

15

Minister who has been in charge of a Departmentrather to assume that that Department is completely perfect. That, of course, would be foolish and unwise. There are always imperfections, and it is as well to bear that in mind. The Secret Servicefor which, in its wider aspects the Prime Minister is responsible and wasis also a good one as a whole. During the greater part of the war I was Secretary of State for the 1508 Home Department and Minister of Home Security. I had a good deal to do with the Secret Services or, at least, had a good deal of knowledge from them and, although I was not in charge of them. I watched their work. Compared with the secret services of Nazi Germany ours were eminently superior. I did not think much of the Nazi secret services. I thought a great deal of our own. In the beginning of the war, they were, perhaps, a little reckless in their political judgment, and sometimes saw Communistsand even Fascistswhere they did not fully exist; but my experience was that they improved as time went on. I agree with the Foreign Secretary that we all feel that this incident of Burgess and Maclean is a disgrace to our country. With him, I know that the Foreign Officethe Foreign Service as a wholefelt that it was a disgrace and a reflection upon the Service. It was also an unhappy incident for the Security Service. We are all sad about it; just as we were sad about the case of Fuchs, of Dr. Nunn May, and of Pontecorvo, cases which were, if anything, more serious even than these cases, and which might have a greater effect upon the future peace of the world even though they did not raise so much excitement. However, we have to keep a sense of proportion about these things. If we remember the number of men employed in our public services, the number of cases of this kind are very limited. That does not mean that we should underestimate them, nor that we should not be worried about them. Each is a worrying incident, but things have occurred in this way before. After all, the noblest band of men in history had their Judas. He suffered, and I think that these men will suffer, in one way or another, in due course. The existence of Communism and Fascism creates a new security problem. The Communistand, indeed, the Fascist; he does not exist so much now, but he could again if our economic situation became really seriousare both different from the ordinary espionage agent, in this respect: they both have a loyalty, not to their own country but to another country or other countries. I do not know that they have a sense of guilt about this external loyalty. They may even feel that it is a virtue. If one 1509 reads the Communist daily newspaper, or reads the periodicals or other information coming one's way, one cannot help but feel that they have not the slightest feeling of obligation or loyalty to the United Kingdomthat their loyalty is to another country. I reserve the right to disagree with my own country if I think that my own country is wrong in a given course of policy. I reserve the right to agree with other countries if I think that they are right, but I am always very suspicious of anybody, whether a Government servant or somebody else, who persistently expounds the view that our country is always wrong, and the Communist countries are always right. There is something wrong with that, and it gives rise to legitimate suspicion. It is sometimes said that Communism is a religion. I do not think that is fair to religion. I think that in some ways it is a disease. In fact, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), some years ago, very rightly said, "The Communist party is not a party; it is an organised conspiracy". There is a great deal of truth in that. Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire) Churchill said that about the Tories. Mr. Morrison

16

If I could think of something to quote to please my hon. Friend, I would do so, but I have not got such a quotation ready. Nevertheless, there are some Communists who are innocent, sincere but deceived. It is the case that in the Security Service we are up against a new problem. Formerly, a man who was a national of another country was hired as a spy, or even a national of one's own country was hired as a spythat was the game, and they were often very brave men. But the new situation of a voluntary act of service in the interests of a foreign Power against one's own country is a very serious matter for security in all sorts of ways. Let no one think that this aspect is confined to the working classes: I do not think that anyone does think so. In fact, the cases with which we are concerned are not of that character. There have been some working-class cases, but the funny thing about the middle and upper classes, the well-to-do class, is that if they go 1510 wrong in this fashion they are, if anything, worse than other people. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It is so. They begin by revolting against their families and they may finish up by secretly revolting against the State. That is rather curious. What I have said about the Communists is equally true about the Fascists. Mr. C. Pannell Perhaps my right hon. Friend will address himself to the point to which the Secretary of State did not address himself, namely that, generally speaking, this talk about the liberty of the subject has not been applied circumspectly to members of the working-classes; the Ministry of Supply screened, and effectively screened, persons, including members of my union, on the slenderest suspicion, and that, broadly speaking, the tests of the Foreign Office were not equitably inflicted upon the working classes. Mr. Morrison I think that there may be some truth in what my hon. Friend says. I was Minister of Supply for a few months. Some workmen were dismissed before my arrival. I had complaints from a Labour Member of Parliament, the late Arthur Jenkins, about it, and I went into it and came to the conclusion that they had been dismissed on inadequate information and on inadequate grounds. Therefore, I think there is, or that there was at any rate, some truth in what my hon. Friend says. I agree that it would be wrong to assume that because a man is a Communist or a Fascist at university he must be necessarily guilty for life. All sorts of things happen among university undergraduates. I never studied at a university. I am a product of the elementary schools, and I am not ashamed of the fact. But all sorts of things happen at the universities. Abnormal ideas are evolved, and, indeed, sometimes university students are encouraged to evolve them because they are thought to be good for the youthful mind. There was, for example, the motion carried at the Oxford University Debating Society that they would not fight for their King and country, and many people were understandably shocked about it. But the House may be sure that three-quarters, and may be more, of those young men did fight for their King and country when war came. So what happens at university is not conclusive either 1511 way if we were to take it as conclusive that because a man was a Communist or a Fascist in his university life, he must, therefore, be permanently held under suspicion as likely to betray secrets of State, I think that we should be degenerating into McCarthyism, because that was exactly what McCarthyism wasa probing back and the assumption that if there had been such a relationship the man must be held to be guilty. The dates of all these incidents are revealed in the White Paper, and five Governments in all were involvedthe pre-war Conservative Government, the Coalition

17

Government, two Labour Governments and the present Government. Therefore, we are all in it. Five Governments have been concerned with these two men, and I feel that we must all do our best to help the House, but we must have due regard to security in the process. I will tell the House what I know about this matter during the short period that I held office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. So far as I can recall, I never met Mr. Burgess. I think I met Mr. Maclean only once, and that was at a social gathering, which bears out the point that his office as Head of the American Department was not of the kind which would bring him into frequent contact with the Secretary of State. I will tell what I know. As I say, five Governments were involved, as well as a number of Ministers at the Foreign Office. Unfortunately, two of the Ministers who were at the Foreign Office during part of the timeMr. Bevin and Mr. McNeilhave died. Nothing I shall say should be taken as criticism of themthey are not here to answer for themselvesbut I may have to refer to matters which occurred during their period of office. I will tell the story of my own part in this matter. In the middle of April, 1951, I was verbally informed, in general terms, of leakages that had occurred. At that time, it was still not known who were the informants, although suspicion narrowed down to a quite limited number of people. To the best of my recollection the names were not mentioned to me. The Security Service arranged to investigate, and it sought and obtained full Foreign Office co-operation. I hope that no one here or outside the House 1512 will think that anybody in the higher reaches of the Foreign Office who were responsible in this matter would for one moment have sought to protect any of their colleagues from a charge of espionage. I am quite sure that they would not. That would be an unjust suspicion. At a later date, as outlined in the White Paper, Maclean became the principal suspect, and as a consequence some top-secret papers were withheld from him. That was a decision which, no doubt, occasioned some difficulty because it might arouse suspicion. On the other hand, if the papers had continued to be supplied to him, it would have laid the authorities open to great criticism in due course if trouble arose. In all these matters we have to remember this dilemma of the security authorities. Apart from the small security branch of the Foreign Office, the wider security authorities, of course, were responsible to the Prime Minister and not to the departmental Ministers, which is quite right. The evidence against these men at the material times right up to their departure was insufficient to warrant decisive action on charges of espionage. If they had been arrested and ultimately found innocent, that would have brought discredit both on the Foreign Office and the Security Service, and charges of goodness knows what would have been made. The evidence was insufficient. It could not justify arrest, and further evidence was needed in order to justify effective action. There was another reason why precipitate action could not very well be taken. That was that one of the most valuable things to do in counter-espionage is not only to find out the man or the men who are responsible for espionage but to find out their contacts and the channels through which they act and from whom they receive their orders. Therefore, precipitate action might destroy the wider operation of unravelling the network of espionage against our country. Mr. Daines Could my right hon. Friend, who was Home Secretary at this time, explain why the ports were not alerted in case Maclean went; and, secondly, could my right hon. Friend explain why Maclean's passport was not withdrawn? May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the fact that passports have been withheld from British 1513 citizens. There

18

was the case of Dr. Burhop, who wanted to attend a scientific conference on the Continent, and his passport was withheld. My main question is, why were the ports not alerted? Mr. Morrison That is a perfectly legitimate point to raise. I am inclined to think that they ought to have been alerted, but, having said it, I do not know what one would have done effectively if they had been alerted. There is this to be said, of course, that it would have been very useful to have known immediately if they had gone and by what route. They might have been followed. Therefore, I think that my hon. Friend has raised a fair point of criticism. With regard to the withdrawal of passports, I do not think that can be done. Of course, in war we did all sorts of thingsI had a hand in them. Mr. H. Macmillan The law about passports is very complicated. I think it is possible to refuse a passport. I do not think it is possible effectively to withdraw a passport. In law the passport, it is quite true, is the property of Her Majesty, and the person who holds the passport does so as a kind of tenant, but the only way in which one could effectively get a passport back would be by applying to the court, and therefore evidence would be required to prove to the court why the passport ought to be withdrawn. Therefore, it cannot effectively be withdrawn except by the kind of evidence which would be regarded as satisfactory enough to support the bringing of a charge. Mr. Morrison There would have had to be some sort of charge, some sort of evidence given, in which case one is in a dilemma. Undoubtedly it was done in war-time. On the spur of the moment I cannot deal with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Daines), but undoubtedly it was done in war-time, when there used to be a delightful area of doubt at to who was most responsible for the passport and visa businessthe Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary. We got on as best we could. Nevertheless, there is something in what my hon. Friend says. It is important that the contacts should be touched and the network of espionage uncovered. I would remind the House that it is not unusualand I think this is well knownfor the police even to 1514 leave at liberty a known criminal against whom they have got complete evidence and against whom they would undoubtedly secure a conviction. Sometimes the police leave him at liberty for a time in order to find his contacts and to spread the net rather wider. That is what happened in April, 1951, except that our evidence was inadequate. The first minute that I received on this matter from the officers of the Department was on 25th May, 1951. On the same day the Security Service reported to the Prime Minister as their political chief. On that day I authorised the questioning of Maclean. The Security Service took the view that they must choose the right time for that questioning, for the reasons which I have given, and which are outlined in paragraph 10 of the White Paper, and to secure further evidence. In the light of the Maclean and Burgess experience, I set up the committee of inquiry to which the Foreign Secretary has referred, and I was grateful to the members of that committee for the work they did, though they reported after I had ceased to be Foreign Secretary. They reported to my successor in November, 1951 and, as we have heard, further security checks were recommended, and according to the White Paper they have been put into effect. It has been asked why Burgess was on leave. Burgess was not exactly on leave. He was in substance suspended with a view either to his resignation or dismissal after he had

19

been heard by a disciplinary board. It was during this period that he disappeared. But I will return to the merits of these two gentlemenif that is the right wordlater. I must say in justice to myself that the case of Burgessthat is to say, of his troubles in Washingtonwas not raised with me as it was hoped he would resign. It would have come to me after the disciplinary board had heard him. I think I ought to have been told earlier about the troubles of Mr. Burgess in Washington, and I am inclined to take the view that after he had been heard by the disciplinary board I should have dismissed him. Further, it must not be forgotten that even then it would not have prevented him from escaping from this country. Mr. Daines My hon. Friend said a moment ago that he set up a committee 1515 of inquiry just after he heard of the Maclean affair. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] What my right hon. Friend conveyed to me was that he was cognisant of the Maclean case only just before the setting up of the committee of inquiry. Clause 10 of the White Paper says: In January, 1949, the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier. Was my right hon. Friend, as Foreign Secretary, informed of that by his heads of departments, or by the Security Service? Mr. Morrison I said I was informed in general terms about certain problems which had arisen in the middle of April, 1951. To the best of my recollection that was the first time. I do not know, of course, what had been conveyed to earlier Foreign Secretaries. My hon. Friend has misunderstood what I said about the inquiry. It was not into the case of Burgess and Maclean specifically but into the question whether the internal arrangements affecting security were adequate. It was a useful inquiry, which I think did useful work. I come to the record of these two men and my reasons for thinking that there is ground for some unhappiness about the way in which they were treated. Maclean was guilty of disgraceful conduct in Cairo in 1950. Apparently he got drunk, got out of hand, went to a party in a flat and proceeded to smash the place up. I do not think that overstrain and drunkenness are adequate explanations or, if they are, that they are adequate excuses for conduct of that sort on the part of an important officer of the Foreign Office serving abroad. Both men were Communists at Cambridge, and I have dealt with that point. The White Paper says both of them were cured when they left the university. Whether that was so or not we cannot now be quite sure. The White Paper assumes that because Burgess joined the Anglo-German Club that is evidence to the effect that he was cured. I am speaking from memory, but my recollection is that the Anglo-German Club about 193536 was a body under some suspicion as being under Nazi influence. Mr. Hugh Dalton (Bishop Auckland) It stank with Nazis. 1516 Mr. Morrison My right hon. Friend, being more proletarian in his language than I am, and having had a university education, says it stank with Nazis, and I am prepared to accept that. It is no defence of Burgess, in any event, that he slid from the Communists to the AngloGerman Club. It is recorded in the White Paper, and has been stated by the Secretary of State, that early in 1950 Burgess was reported for indiscreet talk about secret matters in the later part of 1949. For that, after a hearing by a disciplinary board, he was severely reprimanded. Laterbut this was not until 1950 or 1951, I am not quite sure which

20

there were complaints as to his work and behaviour at Washington. The State Department complained about his reckless motor driving, and he was careless with confidential papers. That situation was dealt with and he was brought home and was due for either resignation or dismissal. In my judgment, in the case of Burgess also, in view of careless talk about secret matters in 1949, a severe reprimand was not good enough. I think that in both of these cases they should, for those offences, have been dismissed. I do not like to say this but I feel I must say it. It is not a peculiarity of the Foreign Office for it runs through the Civil Service, and the motives are, I think, in many ways meritorious. It is not a matter to be recklessly condemned. I think that in the Civil Service as a wholewhether it is more so in the Foreign Office I do not knowthere is a tendency, if an officer falls down on his job or is guilty of an offence which is somewhat serious, to say, "He is an old colleague. Can we not do something about it to prevent him from being fired?" Often what happens is that he may be transferred to other work. [HON. MEMBERS: "Promoted."] I would not say "promoted," for that is perhaps going rather far, but one never knows. He may be transferred to another State Department, and new State Departments are particularly likely to get such men. Or he may be rebuked. I think that a little sacking now and again would not do any harm. It would do some harm to the men concerned but it might do a lot of good to the rest of the Service. 1517 I think that in the Civil Service generally, and to some extent in local governmentwhether it is more so in the Foreign Office I do not knowthere is a tendancy generally to help colleagues out of trouble. In some cases that is right but in some cases the colleagues ought to be left in trouble and ought to be fired. But do not let the House think from this that there is any legitimate charge against the Civil Service that they would seek to protect a man who had been guilty of espionage against his country. The next question I ask myself is this: was Macleanand therefore Burgesstipped off, as the saying is? Or was it the cut in confidential papers which warned him? I am inclined to think that he was tipped off by somebody. If so, I wish we could find the somebody. I am inclined to think that these men were tipped off. Certainly it was a remarkable coincidence that I should have given that order on 25th May and they were missing on the night of 25th May. I have received a letter from a respected friend of mine whose judgment of men and affairs I respect. He asks me not to give his name, although it is available to the Foreign Office if they want it and if it is any use to them. He does not want to be pursued with publicity in this matter because it is not very nice. This is what he says: I was very interested to read your remarks about Maclean and Burgess the other day because I know them both and actually lunched with Maclean the day before he disappeared. The point I wanted to mention to you was that on that day I am sure that he had no intention of leaving England in the way he did. He spoke to me so normally of his private affairs, his wife's confinement and his plans for the immediate future that I am convinced he was not then intending to leave the country. This makes me feel that subsequent to meeting me on 24th May he received some warning that he was under suspicion and immediately left the country with Burgess. It may be, therefore, that someone in the Foreign Office told him on 25th May that you had author iced him to be questioned. Of course, it was not only the Foreign Office who knew, for the Security Service knew as well. I read that letter for what it is worth as the impression of a man who lunched with Maclean that day before his departure. I am inclined to think that Maclean was tipped off by somebody who knew what was going to happen.

21

1518 We are much obliged to the Foreign Secretary for telling us about Mr. Philby. There are definite statements that the family are missing and no doubt if it should become of significance the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to inform the House. I come to my conclusions. I think that any wild or extreme criticism of the Foreign Service would be unfair and would be wrong. I have met a large number of the members of the Service, as have other hon. Members without experience of Ministerial office, in other countries. It is clear that the Secretary of State must be the master of the Department, irrespective of what his political opinions may be, but the latest reforms were made as recently as war-time. There have, of course, been roughly three stages in the history of the British Foreign Service. There was the old days, when aristocratic gentlemen became ambassadors without any pay at all. Then there was the later period when competitive recruitment had developed in part but not to its present standard. Then there were the reforms initiated by the present Prime Minister and, as has been said, largely carried out by Mr. Ernest Bevin. The second stage of Foreign Office people have survived and their ideas are not quite the same as those of the postwar, reformed recruitment. There are survivals but time will solve that problem, and it is passing. They are largely university menall of them I suppose in the higher reaches. That is true of the home Civil Service as well. Whether it is necessary that there should be such a high proportion of university people I do not know. Whether the products of primary and secondary education could get through I do not know. Many people who are now getting to the universities started their education in primary schools. They get through by certificates and competitive examinations which did not happen in the early daysand enter the public service. Recruitment to the Foreign Service, so far as I know, is substantially the same in principle as recruitment to the home Departments, that is to say it is all through the Civil Service Commission. The examination is somewhat different from that for the home Departments but by and large it is not enormously different. 1519 The question I want to submit for the consideration of the Prime Minister and the GovernmentI was involved in earlier arguments about itis based on the fact that the Foreign Service is separate from the home Civil Service. It is separately recruited, it maintains its own life and, I think my right hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) will agree, it is not as much subject to Treasury co-ordination as is the home Civil Service [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend thinks it is much the same. The point I want to raise is whether it is right that the Foreign Service should be entirely separate from the home Civil Service? In the home Civil Service there are transfers between one Department and another. It is a very good thing that there should be transfers between Department and Department. That gives men a varied experience, and their knowledge becomes richer and more varied in knowledge. I readily concede the point that we must have a substantial proportion of Foreign Office people who are to be in the Foreign Office for life. There is some dilution now, however, in respect of the labour attaches, who are recruited through the Ministry of Labour, but I am not at all sure that it would not be a good thing for more men from other home Departments to be transferred to the Foreign Office and for men from the Foreign Office to be transferred to home Departments in order that they might get a wider variety of experience through the collective experience of the Foreign Office and the home Civil Service. I suggest to the Government that in these circumstances, and in the light of these unhappy and beastly incidents, there is a case for an inquiry. I still think, in view of

22

public apprehension, or even misunderstanding, that there should be an inquiry into recruitment to and promotion in the Foreign Office and into the administration of the Foreign Office. That should include the problem of the very heavy burden which falls on the Secretary of State in modern times. It is much heavier than it used to be, and has had grave effects on the health of more than one Secretary of State. I think that aspect ought to be looked into to see whether there could be more delegation to existing junior Ministers and for Parliament to be told about it. 1520 Such an inquiry would do no harm; if the Foreign Office emerged well out of such an inquiry that would be for the good of the Foreign Office, and, if there were improvements to be made, that would be for the good of the country. That task could be done by a Select Committee or some other suitable body. I think the Foreign Secretary is wrong in resisting any inquiry into that matter because we should remember the heavy burden on the Foreign Secretary. It is almost impossible for him to devote the attention to administrative details and personal questions in the Department which is possible for a Minister in charge of a home Department. The Department knows that, with the consequence that it is quite possible for the Department not to take to the Secretary of State or one of the other Ministers matters which in a home Department would be taken to the Minister. That is not because the Department is trying to dodge the Minister, but because it knows that the Secretary of State is so heavily burdened that it must "chance its arm" a bit. I think these matters need looking into. Otherwise we shall have trouble over the health of future Foreign Secretaries, as we have had over the health of past Foreign Secretaries. Secondly, there is a case for looking into security, partly in the light of the circumstances of the Burgess and Maclean case, and partly in order to be satisfied that the Security Services are good. Here we are dealing with a different story altogether. It is much more difficult to have an inquiry into the security services. It clearly cannot be a public inquiry; that would be ridiculous. Nor can it be an inquiry with a public report; that, I think, is out of the question. We cannot expose to the public view the security machine of our own or other countries. We cannot risk a divulging of the secrets either of espionage or counter-espionage. On that matter there should be investigation by a judge or judges in private, a private report being made to the Prime Minister, but I think that step ought to be taken. I hope that the Prime Minister, in his reply can give us and the country some comfort about that matter. I do not know whether all my hon. Friends will take this view, but both fields might be covered by a Committee 1521 of Privy Councillors, representing both sides of the House, and with experience which makes them specially qualified in these mattersbut inquiry there must be. We are up against a new problem in these matters. The country will not be satisfied without an inquiry of some sort, covering an adequate field, for our country has a right to know that adequate action is being taken arising out of an experience which is disturbing and worrying to us all. 5.27 p.m. Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan (Perth and East Perthshire) The two speeches to which we have listened this afternoon will undoubtedly have impressed the House. Although we may not agree with everything that has been said, I think it most desirable that the debate should open with such thorough speeches, one from each side. It seems to me that there are three main issues before us. The first I do not think has been mentioned so far in Parliament or in the Press, but it may be a vital link in the whole story, or mystery. What connection is there between Guy Burgess and Dr. Otto John, the West German security chief, who defected to the Communists in 1954? Otto

23

John was chief legal adviser to Lufthansa before the war and became a member of the Canaris Group, which plotted the death of Hitler. When that went wrong his brother was executed by the Gestapo and he escaped through Spain and came to London about the end of 1944. In the last months of that year he worked for the B.B.C. Later he was employed in the Foreign Office and afterwards by a London law firm. He returned to Germany in 1949 and was appointed president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitutionwhich is a high falutin' way of saying, the security machine watching and reporting on neo-Nazi activities. That appointment was made with the consent of the British and American Governments. Is it a factmy information is that it is in the B.B.C. offices and, later, in the Foreign Officethat there is information to the effect that Otto John was a close associate of Guy Burgess? I hope that my right hon. Friend will answer that, if he can, when he replies. They certainly had all too much in common outside their public duties. 1522 As head of the counter-Communist intelligence in Bonn, John would have received information from British and United States sources. It is known that he was in touch with a number of what might be called double agents, agents working each way. Did Otto John maintain his contact with Burgess? If he did, he could have been very useful indeed to him and Maclean, and possibly also to Mrs. Maclean. I believe that the Government have the information that can answer this question, and I hope that if possible, if security will permit, something may be said on that point. The second vital issue affects the internal administration of the Foreign Office, to which both right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken have already referred in some detail. I should like to say straightaway that I have not the slightest reflection to make on any of the right hon. Gentlemen who have held the important and difficult office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In spite of anything that I may say, I hope that that is fully realised. The Fighting Services have a system of regular confidential reports on officers. They are made annuallyin the Navy, I believe, it is sometimes six-monthlyand they give their seniors a clear picture not only of their ability, but also of their moral character and behaviour and that is very important. Excessive drinking is a weakness that would be recorded. The Foreign Office, I understand, has a similar system of reports. I asked my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in two Questions the other day if he would place in the Library a copy of these forms, which he very kindly did. But I also asked what arrangements existed in his Department for the submission of confidential reports on personnel. On behalf of the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Joint UnderSecretary replied: The heads of Foreign Service missions abroad and of departments in the Foreign Office report regularly on their staffs on printed forms which vary for each branch of the Service. A report on each member of the senior branch of the Service is sent in at least every two years. For new entrants to the branch reports are submitted every six months during the period of probation. Reports on all other branches are sent in at least once a year."[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th October, 1955; Vol. 545, c. 35.] 1523 So we have the clear statement that there is a comprehensive system of reporting on forms for the purpose in the Foreign Office in much the same way as in the Services. Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Brixton) Was the hon. and gallant Member told how or on what date the forms to which he has referred were introduced? Colonel Gomme-Duncan No, I was not; I did not ask for that. I asked what the system was at the moment. I agree with the hon. and gallant Member that the date is of some importance in this case.

24

From that reply given by my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary arise questions of great importance, questions that must be answered by the Government if they will do so. Who reported on Burgess and Maclean, and what was written about them? There are these different forms, particularly the one which is called F.2 and which deals with Branch A and the first four grades of Branch B in the Foreign Service. That one has a section which calls for reliability reports, contact with foreigners reports and social behaviour reports, and at the end a large space is left for a detailed pen picturethat is the actual wordingof the officer reported upon. The reporting on officers of any branch of Service, including the Foreign Office, is a most distasteful job for the senior officer who has to do it. That makes it all the more important that there must be a man of moral courage to say what is correct. In the Fighting Services, the officer reported upon has to sign the report himself, but as far as I can make out from the Foreign Office forms, the officer reported upon does not have to sign. That makes it much easier for the officer making the report to be absolutely frank than if he had to show it to the man, human nature being what it is. It does away with any excuse for moral cowardice. Was there a report on Burgess and Maclean? Was their behaviour, or misbehaviour, recorded, and what was said? Was this very important item of information included: that in 1940, I understand, Maclean was associating with the representative in London of the Tass Agency? Everybody knows that the Tass 1524 Agency, in any country where there has been an inquiry, has been proved to be the centerpiece of an espionage system. Was that known at the time? It seems to me that a very great deal depends upon the answer to that question. The third issue arises from a statement made by the Leader of the Opposition when he was Prime Minister in March, 1948. He was explaining the proposals of the then Labour Government for screening State employees. Very briefly, not giving the whole details, the right hon. Gentleman said: I have said that there are certain duties of such secrecy that the State is not justified in employing in connection with them anyone whose reliability is in doubt. Experience, both in this country and elsewhere, has shown that membership of, and other forms of continuing association with, the Communist Party may involve the acceptance by the individual of a loyalty, which in certain circumstances can be inimical to the State. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say: The Government have reached the conclusion that the only prudent course to adopt is to ensure that no one who is known to be a member of the Communist Party, or to be associated with it in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, is employed in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State"[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 17034.] That is a very prudent, very comprehensive and very desirable state of affairs, which the right hon. Gentleman deserves full credit for bringing into effect. But why was the principle laid down by the Prime Minister of that time and not carried out, apparently, in the case of Burgess and Maclean? Both were known to have past associations with Communists, and while in Paris in 1938 Maclean made no secret of his sympathy with the Spanish Communist Party. In the same year, as has been mentioned by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), Burgess underwent the mysterious conversion into pro-Nazism. But both were undoubtedly employed in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State. Both had access to secret papers, and it is known now that Maclean was making microfilms of them for the Russians. How and why were they exempted from the screening which was supposed to have been applied to all servants of the State, 1525 as

25

laid down by the Prime Minister of that day in 1948? It is much more important to probe these things than to chase individuals in the security department. There is, however, one thing that Parliament can and should do, and I think that this debate will bring it out more clearly than before. There should be sufficient money and staff for the security services to do their jobs properly. I believe that they have been starved of these things. The worst thing that could happen would be for the BurgessMaclean incidentI call it no moreto develop into a party wrangle. I see no signs of that happening and I am quite convinced that the House would not lower itself by doing it on such a vitally important matter for the country. Parliament's duty is to ensure that such a thing cannot happen again. After all, it is a truism, but it is quite true to say, that what has happened has happened; but that is no reason why those who have been proved incompetent should be employed in high office any longer. What this House wantsand, I believe, the country as wellis reassurance and evidence that such things cannot occur again reasonably. It is no good saying that something is utterly impossible, but we want to be reasonably sure that that cannot happen again. I doubt whether, so long as the men who were responsible for security at that time remain in high positions, the confidence of the country will be maintained. Let us, however, keep our consideration of the matter on the high level at which it has started, I beg the House with great humility, for it is not a matter for party wrangling, is not a matter of personalities, but a matter of the national interest and of the best possible safeguarding of our beloved country. 5.40 p.m. Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East) I shall try, in saying what I have to say, to keep the debate on the high level that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel GommeDuncan) has set for us back benchers in following those two excellent speeches from the Front Benches, the speech of the Foreign Secretary and the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). 1526 Indeed, as a Labour back bencher who has from time to time criticised the Foreign Secretary, and the Prime Minister, too, I should like to congratulate the Foreign Secretary, for the second half of his speech, which dealt with the tremendous problem of the combination of freedom and public security in a world of clashing ideologies, was a classic statement of principle which we can all, I hope, agree upon and accept. It can do nothing but good that that statement of principle was made. However, the first half of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a completely unsuccessful effort to explain away his own White Paper, and that is something which we must discuss. I think it is rather futile to waste our time holding an inquest on Burgess and Maclean. What we ought to consider today are the lessons we can learn for the future from that lamentable incident. I shall try to confine most of my remarks to that problem, but I think that in this debate we are faced with two opposite difficulties. Certainly, there is a danger that we shall encourage witch hunting, and, goodness knows, at one part of the Foreign Secretary's speech I was slightly afraid. That was when he said that we had to consider our allies in what we did. I hope he did not mean that he thought our allies, the Americans, had been more successful in dealing with these problems than we have. I am sure he did not mean it, because if we have shown a degree of lassitude they have shown an extreme in loyalty tests which, I think, has done more damage to their liberties and to the strength of America in the world than Burgess and Maclean have done to us. Think of the State Department. Think of the panic efforts to impose loyalty there by elaborate code! Think of the effect of the feeling that officials could not risk

26

writing what they really meant in their diplomatic messages for fear of being read aloud at a Congressional inquiry. That is an object lesson of the dangers of extreme panic about security. But there is another side to this. We must see that the cause of McCarthyism was not so much the effect of the fear of espionage as the popular suspicion that for political reasons either politicians or high officials were covering up the signs of people in privileged places. Indeed, I believe that if the Truman Administration had gone into matters thoroughly and 1527 had been seen not to have been covering up matters, then the McCarthy hysteria might have been prevented beforehand. Therefore, it seems to me absolutely essential in this Burgess and Maclean case that any suspicion of covering up, any suspicion, not of these two, but of other people, being covered who were responsible for the fact that they could do what they did must be removed. Frankly, neither the White Paper nor the Foreign Secretary's speech has wholly removed those suspicions from my mind. I was very glad that the Foreign Secretary said that we have to remember that security does not apply only to a couple of thousand high officials in Whitehall who are dealing with secret documents. It applies to the tens of thousands of industrial workers, especially those in aircraft factories. They are subject to security, too. When I was listening to my right hon. Friend's description of his perturbation of mind when considering the case of Maclean, to his description of what was the real agony of making up his mind whether the man should be kept on, and when I considered all the trouble that was taken for Maclean, I could not help recollecting an incident brought to my attention last August of a constituent of mine, an aircraft factory worker in Coventry. He was sent for by the personnel manager and was told that he was a security risk because he was a member of the local branch of the Communist Party. He was dismissed from the factory overnight. There was no court of appeal for him. There were not "three wise men" to consider his case. There was no sort of protection for him. He was chucked out because of an untrue allegation. I do not want to argue the case, because I am dealing with it elsewhere, and I acknowledge that the Minister of Supply has been very helpful, but it made me think, and I made some inquiries. We have to face the fact that security covers all our aircraft factories and that literally scores of people are now being moved from one position to another, very often without their knowing why, and having their careers blighted by security charges. I wonder whether the procedure in other cases is based on as idle gossip as the accusation against my constituent, from which I am trying to liberate him. 1528 I say to the Foreign Secretary and to the Prime Minister that the faintest suspicion that security regulations are enforced ruthlessly on the small fry in the factories but with infinitely greater restraint and conscientiousness the higher up a man isthat suspicion is utterly destructive of democracy in this country. I must say that I wish my constituent had received the amount of licence which was accorded to Burgess and Maclean. My constituent was completely innocent, but was thrown out on common gossip. There was not the care taken over him that was taken over these two men in highly key positions. The thoroughness and care taken in their cases contrasts with the rough treatment accorded to an aircraft factory worker who talked one night out of school. Therefore, I say that our major preoccupation must be to seeif we are to have security regulations, as we mustthat they are imposed with the most ruthless equality. No. That is wrong. They should be imposed with greater severity the higher one goes. Surely those who have official State secrets in their hands, those who have access to secret documents, must accept a severer interpretation of security than workers in aircraft factories. If some of them say, "We are such sensitive souls, and our talents,

27

though very great, are not the sort of talents which can thrive in a world of red tape security," then they must be told they must go elsewhere. They must be told that their genius must be dispensed with. But although security is essential, we ought to keep its range as small as possible, and it must be enforced most of all in areas like the Foreign Office or the three Services. With that as a background let us consider the White Paper on Burgess and Maclean. I start with the last paragraph of it, which tells us why we could not be told. Counterespionage depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods it says. I had better declare my interest in this subject. During the war I was a temporary member of the Foreign Office, and so directly responsible to the present Prime Minister. I was also a member of a secret department and at one time 1529 responsible to the present Foreign Secretary in Algiers. When I talk of secrets and security, therefore, I talk with some personal experience. I know perfectly well that much of what I learned about it is now out of datethe type of security which we accepted and which included the steaming open of one's letter and the tapping of one's telephone conversationsnot unusual things to happen, I then supposed, when one had secrets. I am sure the Prime Minister will know what I mean when I tell him that in a secret department the greatest temptation in the world is to use secrecy not in the national interest but in the Departmental interest, or in the personal interest, to "cover up". Every politician, every Minister, every general is tempted at some time or another to suppress information, not because it is helpful to the enemy but because it may be harmful to his future reputation or to a friendor to that organisation to which he belongs. Every ambassador, also, is constantly tempted to suppress information which seems to contradict the way in which he is running the policy of our country in his area. But secret departments are the worst because they are subject to no Parliamentary control. The Prime Minister technically is responsible for the Secret Service, but it is clear from the Burgess and Maclean case that the Service did not bother to tell many Cabinet Ministers what it was doing. I gather that the Foreign Secretary hardly knew before 25th May, and I gather that the Prime Minister of the time was not told, although the Secret Service was responsible to him, that for two years it had been investigating somebody at the Foreign Office. Mr. H. Morrison I said that the Prime Minister was told at the time I was toldon 25th May, to the best of my recollection. Mr. Crossman Therefore, for two years our counter-intelligence had been doing an elaborate investigation of 6,000 people. The investigation was narrowed down to one person, in the course of two years; of all this the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were told nothing. That may be perfectly all right. I know enough about secret departments 1530 to know how much they resent telling politicians anything at all, because they regard politicians as very "leaky" people and very dangerous people to whom to tell secrets. The trouble, of course, is that secret departments are not responsible to Parliament. Despite the Foreign Secretary's commendation of their patriotism, which I do not deny, I say that there is nothing more morally corrupting than the power to lie because it is claimed to be in the nation's interest, or to keep secrets by saying that it is in the nation's interest. That corrupts. And that is why these Secret Departments, in the very essence of their nature, are liable to the moral corruption of constantly using national security to "cover up." They do it either out of rivalry with another Departmenta rivalry on which Secret Service organisations seem to spend most of their timeor because a

28

friend has gone wrong and someone wants to cover the matter up. Therefore, when someone quotes this paragraph from the White Paper, I as an old member of the gang do not believe a word of it. That is just what the Minister was bound to say if those concerned were "covering up." I admit that The Times has been getting rather extreme of late in its judgment on all sorts of issues, but on Saturday, in a leading article headed "The Ostriches," I think it got matters roughly right. It said: As the authorities no doubt calculated when holding back information for so long, many targets for criticism have now moved on The suspicion is bound to be that, after the early days when the interests of secrecy had to be heeded, there were political reasons for putting off information in the hope that the storm would blow itself out. This, of course, is confirmed by the Foreign Secretary's speech today. The right hon. Gentleman was just a bit short about the Petrov case, but those of us who have read the Petrov material know that Petrov provided no evidence whatsoever except hearsay evidence. At least nothing else has been published. He said what he had to say, for 5,000. I gather from an extraordinary passage in the Foreign Secretary's speech that Petrov refused to talk if his revelations were published in Britain. Presumably, he wanted to sell his information to a newspaper, because he then would be paid for the articles, whereas if what he 1531 had to say was reported as straight news he would not get the money. All that Petrov said was what he picked up in gossip from somebody else. The hearsay blew up into a major scandal and the Petrov case forced publication here. There is reason to believe that we would have had no White Paper if the Petrov case had not forced publication upon the Government. That worries me and makes we wonder a little, and that wonder is increased when I look at the White Paper itself. The Foreign Secretary very properly said that he believed in Ministerial responsibility. All right. Let him be responsible for this. It is easy to talk about Ministerial responsibility if it consists only of being nobleand staying in office. Ministerial responsibility to me means taking the punishment if something outrageous is done. If the Foreign Secretary takes responsibility for this, the only decent thing to do is to resign. The White Paper, as it stands, far from defending the Foreign Office, puts it deeper into the mire. If, after four years, this tissue of palpable half-truths and contradictions is the best that the Government can produce, the impression of "covering up" is more strongly substantiated than ever. Those responsible are very highly intelligent people, and if this is the best that they can do there must be some reason for what they are doing being so completely unconvincing. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the White Paper give elaborate reasons why these people were allowed to get away. We are told in paragraph 11 that it is possible that Maclean observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers. The Government are now saying, "We were not quite so ham-handed as that in denying secret papers." But if Maclean had been a spy for 16 years, and if the chief reason for his being a spy was removed from him, I do not see how one could stop his access to top secret material without his noticing it. If he was denied the papers that must surely have tipped him off. We are told, by the way, in an earlier paragraph of the White Paper, that he was given a job in the American Department in order to give him an unimportant rle where he might rehabilitate himself. But the Head 1532 of the American Department seems to have had access to the most secret types of papers. Anyway, Maclean is tipped off by not having the papers. Then comes the problem of

29

whether to search his house or not. We are solemnly told that his house cannot be searched, or that there must be no suggestion of it for fear he runs away. It was not uncommon, during the war, for a man to be suspected. I dare say that the Prime Minister was responsible for us when we did certain things. When we had a person under suspicion and he was denied secret papers all we did was to say to him, "I warn you that you are under suspicion. Of course, you are not guilty. We are only investigating, but one way in which your guilt will be proved will be if you 'skedaddle.'" We found it a very effective way of keeping people still while investigation was going on. Am I now to believe that Maclean could not be detained at the ports if he had been warned that his flight would prove his guilt? Anybody knows that that could have been done, and we ask ourselves why that was not done in this case. Why, in this case, was there such solicitude about the lady? I know that she was going to have a baby, but such solicitude is not always shown. I know of times when people have been treated rather roughly. This was an astonishingly tender treatment. The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden) This is very interesting. The hon. Gentleman is making points to which I will try to reply later, but the parallel which he is making between wartime and the case of Maclean is not, of course, a true parallel. The control which we had over the ports during the war was quite different from the control of the ports under the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), when he was Foreign Secretary. The hon. Member may have other information, but I believe it to be true, and the legal opinion given to me has always been that there has been no power within the Government of this country to stop British people at the docks. That was the problem, both in respect of Maclean and of Mrs. Maclean. For the latter, I take personal responsibility, for it was my own decision in her case. I 1533 had all the papers and I came to the conclusion that I had neither the possibility of stopping, nor the right to stop, Mrs. Maclean. Mr. Crossman I entirely agree about Mrs. Maclean. I do not see why she should not have joined her husband, but I was talking about a search of the house not being made because she was expecting a baby. My suspicions are nearly all based on this paragraph. It is not a question of the ports. It is a question of whether we could not have kept Maclean from going by telling him frankly that he was under suspicion. I assume that he had already been tipped off by not having the secret papers. I now ask why we might not have tried saying to him, "Maclean, you are under investigation, and if you move that proves your guilt." I think he would have stayed in that case. At least, it would have been a risk worth taking, whereas, this way, it was certain what would happen. You tip him off, you do not keep a watch on him, you allow him a long week-end. After that it is certain that he will "skedaddle." whereas, by my method, we might possibly have bluffed him into staying. I would remind the Prime Minister, if he has Dr. Fuchs in his mind, that at the critical moment the police bluffed Fuchs into a confession before they actually had the evidence in their hands. I am asking myself, therefore, why that was not done in this case, when we had already withdrawn the papers and had, therefore, warned Maclean of his plight. It still puzzles me. The Foreign Secretary made it clear to us that one of our difficulties was that M.I.5, the counter-intelligence organisation, is not responsible for the actions which are taken. It is responsible for advising each Government Department upon the records and the personalities of the people there, but the actions are left to the Department in question.

30

Therefore, we can never know whether the Foreign Office was not sufficiently strongly advised by M.I.5 or whether, despite the advice, something held it back from taking the necessary action. That brings me to my own suspicionMaclean belonged to the lite of the lite; he was one of the inner group of really gifted men, one of the half-dozen 1534 stars for top promotion; an intimate friend, a confidant, a man who spent long evenings with half-adozen people who are now in key positions. I am not blaming anyone. I am only saying that if a man has been desperately misjudged, if risks are taken for himand, of course, risks were taken for Maclean; if a risk is taken and it does not come off, then certain people are not very anxious to have the extent of the risk they took on his behalf exposed. We find a striking sentence at the beginning of the White Paper about Maclean's conduct: Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking. Surely it is clear that the excessive drinking was the result and not the cause? Anybody looking at this can see that the man was suffering from a terrible psychological strain, the strain of being a traitor. He had those two loyalties which drove him into drink and drove him into treason. [Interruption.] [An HON. MEMBER: "Wise after the event."] Very well. I say this to the Prime Minister: it is rumoured that before he went Maclean hinted to certain close friends that he was under a terrible strain. I have even been told that he gave broad hints as to what the strain was; and I am further told that his friends regarded all this merely as signs of nervous breakdown. The trouble is that we cannot investigate these rumours. If there had been a full investigation, we could have found out from his Foreign Office confidantes exactly what Maclean said in his confidential talks. The curse of the policy of the White Paper, the policy of concealment, has been that those rumours have grown and grown in this country. And not unreasonably, for someone has to explain why, when suspicion had narrowed down to one man, there was this curious hesitation to take the risk which was taken with Dr. Fuchs. We are not talking about ports now; we are talking about facing Maclean with it and breaking him down. We are talking about the long shot which came off with Fuchs. Why was it not tried with Maclean? I do not think that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will think me unfair when I say that, at least until recently, the Foreign Office has been under 1535 one great difficulty, the defect of its virtue. It has a sense of exclusiveness about it. My right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South hinted at this. I believe there is a sense in the Foreign Office that when a chap has become a member of the club, he can do no wrong. Everybody outside, of course, knows nothing about foreign policy. Even if The Times correspondent has been a long time in a place where the ambassador has been working only one month, the ambassador apparently is capable of telling the expert truth in his telegrams, but The Times can say nothing of value. I accuse the Foreign Office of the kind of exclusiveness shown by those who are defending a privileged position somewhat precariously. This is a peculiarity of the Foreign Office. As I have said, during the war I was a member of a secret auxiliary department for psychological warfare, attached to the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister knows, because he was in charge of our department, that we had to obey the security rules. It was a nuisance that we could not telephone over an ordinary line the content of a secret document but, instead, had to use a "scramble." It was a nuisance that we could not recruit certain people. I may have thoughtindeed, I did thinkthat the security regulations which prevented me from recruiting those people were wrong, but I had to observe them.

31

It was much more irritating when I found that although we had to keep the regulations, the Foreign Office next door did not have to bother about them. The Foreign Office was too high and mighty. It was infra dig. for the Foreign Office to abide by the common laws of security. The Prime Minister laughs, but he knows that this was a fact The Prime Ministerindicated dissent. Mr. Crossman If the right hon. Gentleman shakes his head again I will say one of the unpleasant things which I did not mean to say. There was a difference in the security treatment of the auxiliary department and of the Foreign Officebetween the types of people we could recruit and the types recruited by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office was allowed certain moral types which were forbidden to us. That has now been admitted by the Secretary of State for 1536 Foreign Affairs when he revealed that those types have been dismissed since 1952. Yet they were there in 1945 and during the war. I could go into detail about this disparity. There was a curious perverted liberalism which tolerated as eccentricity inside the Foreign Office conduct which would have been condemned if anybody else had done the same thing outside the Foreign Office. The plain fact about this case is that the security officer ought not to have come into this question at all. For even if these men had not been suspected of any relationship with Russia, they were unfit to be members of the Foreign Office. Yet they were permitted to be members of the Foreign Office. What did the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs say? That the Foreign Office felt this as a personal wound. I could not agree more. It was a personal wound requiring to be "covered up." In a sense, it was the tradition of the Foreign Office which had been jeopardised by Maclean and Burgess. They had been allowed an eccentricity and it had turned out to be treason. Of course, the Foreign Office was extremely upset when what it had regarded as Donald Maclean's funny way of "talking Left-wing" turned out to be treason. As for the other fellow, I am amazed that the Foreign Office could consider accepting him as a member when they knew all about him. I am amazed that the Foreign Office considered a man of that type, a man who had been noted in his previous secret department as a "no good" as brilliant, irresponsible, utterly "gabby," the very type who should not be allowed anywhere near a secret paper. How did he get in? It was mentioned that Hector McNeil was the Minister. I appreciate the way in which the right hon. Gentleman made this reference. But I want to add that it is the job of senior civil servants to advise young Ministers. Was there any advice given to Hector McNeil that another type of personal private secretary might be better than Burgess? No, something much queerer occurred. The Foreign Office accepted Burgess not for the "A" but for the "B" class. His mind was absolutely first-rate, he was a brilliant fellow, wonderful at languages. The deficiencies in Burgess were moral. Are we to be told that "A" class means 1537 that people are moral, but that "B" class people are immoral? What is even queerer is that when Hector McNeil asked whether Burgess could be put up into the "A" class the request was resisted. Why? If the grounds were failings of personal character he should not have been either "A" or "B"[An HON. MEMBER: "Or 'C' or 'D'."] As an hon. Friend says, or "C" or "D," and if he was merely being judged on his intellectual merits, he should have been in the A class or nowhere. This is proof that the Foreign Office was worried about Burgess, but not worried enough, because he had already got his foot inside the door of the lite. There we have the two of them, Maclean right in the lite of the lite and Burgess pushing his way up by means of some somewhat unsavoury personal connections which perhaps got him in in the first place. A competent establishment officer should have forbidden Burgess ever

32

to have been appointed, and should certainly have thought twice about giving Maclean, only three months after his nervous breakdownnotice that it was only three months after the breakdownthe appointment as a head of a department. It is no good the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister, or, indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, telling me that I am a suspicious type of person. Perhaps I am, and perhaps I understand this, because I lived in this sort of world. But the average man in the street, when told that this is a true and satisfactory explanation, knows perfectly well that whatever clever men produced this type of bunkum, it is always for the same reason. In Britain, influential people do not want to have too much interrogation or inquiry into what went on in the Foreign Office lite. The crime in the Foreign Office was, first, to turn a blind eye to Maclean's deficiencies for far too long; to prefer private friendship and belief in him to public duty, and then when he had gone, to prefer Departmental loyalty to duty to this country. We are a democracy and we really have the right to know the facts when something has gone wrong. I want, in conclusion, to say two things briefly about the proposals for an inquiry which have come from this side of the 1538 House. First of all, I will say a word about our proposals for an inquiry into security. After the Foreign Secretary's speech I feel much less need for this inquiry than I did before the debate. But, then, I never believed that security was the main problem in this case. The main problem is the establishment of the Foreign Office, and the conduct that was committed in the Foreign Office. Still on security, I have one point to make in addition to what my right hon. Friend said. I think the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right in saying that we are back in the Elizabethan age and that treason has become a possibility; I would say that it is a possibility for every thoughtful man. Everyone who faces the world's dilemmas today finds his national loyalties in conflict with others. We have talked about Russia, but there might be a conflict between our national loyalty and American interests. The Russians are not the only people who have secret services. I can conceive of a time when an Englishman might think it his duty to pass information on to America, feeling he had a moral duty to do so, and then, later, he might well be proved to be a traitor if the world went the wrong way for him. The Foreign Secretary is right. This is a basic problem. Surely, then, the Prime Minister will agree that policemen are really no good for this job. We have to detect the type of person who is not a common criminal. Such a person is not detectable in the ordinary way; he is not a spy selling himself for money. For this task one has to have an understanding of Marxism and other philosophic problems of the modern world. I should feel a great deal more confident if I had been told that we are to have a heads of M.I.5 not ex-policemen but people who have studied deeply the ideologies of the modern world and can put themselves in the place of young men and know what they are feeling. We want a new type of person for this task. The less we have of security the better, provided that the quality of it is really first-rate. Secondly, I would remind the House that this searching for spies is really a relatively small part of security. Nine-tenths of security means security against carelessness, security to prevent information going to the enemy, either because of their technical power to break down 1539 our codes, because of documents being left about, or because of careless talk; and it should be that way, for we get nine-tenths of our information about the other side by reading their newspapers, by doing things which can be done in public, or by using techniques for getting inside which are not known to them. This means that the Foreign Office, like every other part of the Civil Service, must have strict rules about carelessness and cannot go on saying, "We are too talented and

33

sensitive to work under security rules." As a matter of fact, it is a great relief to have security rules. Those of us who had the secret for ten weeks before D-day thanked God for security. There it was, a corset to keep us safe. If we put the documents back in the safe, we were safe. If we telephoned on the correct line, we could not be courtmartialled. It is untrue to say that this type of security, if sensibly enforced, is demoralising. If there is not too much of it, and every regulation makes sense, the Foreign Office should not think it infra dig. to be like an ordinary officer in the Army or an aircraft worker, who is subject to this sort of thing. I hope that what the Foreign Secretary means is that the Foreign Office did learn this lesson in 1951 and has already accepted the need to observe security regulations. As for security against the spy, I think that this issue is relatively unimportant. The number of people to whom this sort of thing will be applied in our country is small. Our great danger is that of getting so panicky about the relatively small problem of searching out spies in the Foreign Office that we shall neglect the big problem of setting up a security organisation against leaks. The final point is this. The real problem of the Foreign Office is not security at all, but whether the reforms which were introduced ten years ago were soundly based and have produced the right results. I may be told that they were introduced ten years ago and that it is much too early for another inquiry. I should have thought that the period of ten years was just about right and that it was, therefore. Just about time to look at the effect. As The Foreign Secretary reminded us, this was. after all, a Coalition reform. Again, we are looking at the matter as a Council of State and not as parties. What did the 1540 reform do? It cut the Foreign Office off from the rest of the Civil Service and made it autonomous, and, at the same time, sadly undermined the specialised services inside the Foreign Office. I was very struck by three excellent articles in the Manchester Guardian last week three thoughtful articleson this subject. My tentative conclusion is that we got the worst of both worlds. We certainly lost by the diminution of the specialised services; and we probably gained nothing, instead. The autonomy granted to it only increased the arrogance of the Foreign Office and the jealousy of the rest of the Civil Service. That was the result of giving the Foreign Office this privileged position. I should like to see the Foreign Office part of the Civil Service along with everybody else, but encouragement to foster the specialist services, which it requires just as every other Department requires them. I do not see that the case for cutting it off has been proved in any way, nor, if I may say so to some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway, do I believe that the so-called democratisation of the Foreign Office has had any of the effects which Ernest Bevin hoped for. Let us be candid. If we take 100 boys from lesser grammar schools, we do not take 100 people who are less snobbish than those from larger grammar schools. What we have done generallyI am glad we have done itis to take the best from the secondary and smaller grammar schools in rather larger quantities and so reduce the high proportion of the old public school. But if anybody thinks that that is democratisation, that is not the case. It very often happens that a person who comes up from below and enters the Foreign Office, with its august position, in order to obtain the protective colouring required, becomes more Foreign Office than the rest. Indeed, in my little experience of going round embassies, I have found that, on the whole, the man from the smaller grammar school is even more Foreign Office than those who came from the kind of school from which I come. Therefore, do not let us talk too much about the effect of democratisation on the Foreign Office. I do not think there has been any

34

democratisation, and if there had been, I am not sure that it would have the effect we desired. 1541 Mr. T. L. Iremonger (Ilford, North) Is there not a slight difficulty there? If one were to insist upon comparatively high academic requirements, would it not be slightly difficult to recruit pupils from secondary modern schools? Mr. Crossman I did not suggest that it should be exclusively from secondary modern schools. I do not think that anybody seriously maintains that we should recruit for the Foreign Office any differently than for the rest of the Civil Service, that is to say, predominantly from the universities. I said that the effect of the democratisation was merely that we took recruits from slightly lesser known grammar schools as well as from the better ones. I suggest to the Prime Minister that there is really a case for looking at the position again after ten years and seeing how it is working; for seeing whether we should not put back the Foreign Office as part of the Civil Service; for seeing that security arrangements are accepted and not thought to be infra dig. I beg everyone to realise that the best sort of security is to choose one's civil servants correctly, and to trust them. Nothing is more disastrous than to believe that one will catch a lot of spies by being terrified of one's civil servants. The method of recruitment must be made correct; the discipline of the office must be made correct; the heads of Departments must be people who know their stuff; the establishments officer must be correct. If all those things are done, we will have a Civil Service far more loyal than we would have if we introduced American loyalty tests. 6.21 p.m. Mr. Rupert Speir (Hexham) Like the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), I should declare that during the war I was connected with some of the Intelligence departments of this country. I confess, to my surprise, that I agreed with a great deal of what the hon. Member had to say. This is the first time I have found myself in so much agreement with him. Having said that, I must also say that I do not think that he was altogether fair to the Foreign Office. He omitted to point out that the Foreign Office had already decided to get rid of Burgess before he fled from this country. I also feel that the hon. Member was somewhat 1542 wise after the event. If he and some of the other critics had been as wise at the time as they now are, they would have been very useful members of our Intelligence Services. I cannot agree with the hon. Member when he says that the debate should be entirely dominated by the Foreign Office and conditions of Foreign Office recruitment. After all, both the individuals concerned might have been employed by any other Department of State. We ought, therefore, to give consideration to the adequacy of our security services as well as to conditions of recruitment for the Foreign Office. The debate is very much to be welcomed, because, during the past four years, our secret services have been very much maligned. Some wild and irresponsible charges have been made against them, and not being able to answer or refute the charges has put them very much in the same position as the unfortunate patient of a garrulous dentist who carries on a conversation with the patient who is not able to answer back. The Secret Service does not come out of this affair too badly. Sufficient credit has not been given to M.I.5 for the fact that it was on the tracks of Maclean when he left the country. Indeed, it was probably because M.I.5 was trailing him that he bolted. But for M.I.5's investigations Maclean might still be in the Foreign Office, still be betraying his

35

country and still be passing secrets to foreign Powers. M.I.5 ought to be given considerable credit for the fact that out of 6,000 possibles they had spotted who it was who was responsible for this leakage of information. As the Secretary of State said in his opening remarks, it is indeed easy to be wise after the event. It is easy now to ask why the two men were not more carefully watched and why they were allowed to leave the country. I do not believe that those critics and others appreciate to the full the difficulties which face a Security Service in a free society. As paragraph 26 of the White Paper points out: In some countries Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards. We do not do that sort of thing in this country. The difficulties are immense. If one is carefully and closely to watch a suspectand Maclean was only a suspect 1543 the difficulties of not arousing his suspicion are tremendous. It was the hon. Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Daines) who asked why Maclean's passport was not withdrawn. I can think of no more certain way of arousing a suspect's own suspicion than to withdraw his passport. Mr. Daines The hon. Member rather misunderstands the inference of what I said. I was saying that the order should have gone to the ports, so that if Maclean had got to the ports, he could have been held there and had his passport withdrawn. That was done in the case of Dr. Burhop. He had his passport withdrawn. Mr. Speir I misunderstood the hon. Member. What I wanted to emphasise was that there are immense difficulties in the way of keeping a 24-hour watch on a suspect without his knowledge, and that, unlike in a police State, the resources of our security services are comparatively limited. As has been already emphasised, the great point now is to see that all the gaps in our system have been adequately dealt with. Everyone is agreed that what we want to do is to make sure that the lessons of this unfortunate case have been properly learned. I was very glad indeed to hear from the Secretary of State that our system of vetting for confidential employment, not only in the Foreign Office, but in other Government Departments, has been tightened up. I agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East when he says that it is just as important that we should have a proper system of vetting for employment in secret research work in industry. He spoke about one of his constituents who had been removed because he was a branch secretary of the Communist Party. Mr. Crossman Falsely alleged to be. Mr. Speir I find it difficult to believe that he was removed if the information was really false, because in my experience the security services have been very careful indeed in the advice which they have given. It is my belief that they have all too often given the benefit of the doubt to the individual. In these conditions of cold war we just cannot afford to take any risks. Although I do not want to see a McCarthy attitude growing up in this 1544 country, although we do not want any kind of witch hunting and although there is no need for panic action, there is a need for tightening up the arrangements for vetting all those connected with confidential employment, be it Government employment or otherwise. Anyone with doubtful affiliations should not be given confidential employment. After all, today there are plenty of other jobs available. I hope that the vetting will, therefore, be carried out in a thorough and fearless fashion.

36

While talking about the work of our Intelligence Services, I should like to put in a plea for greater support for some of them, whether they deal with counterespionage or otherwise. At present, economy is in the air and every Government Department is being urged to cut expenditure as much as possible. I am convinced that it would be false economy of the worst kind now to reduce our expenditure on our Intelligence Services. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) when he says that he considers that the Intelligence Services have, in the past, been kept far too short of funds to enable them to carry out their proper work. There is, of course, the difficulty which the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) mentioned, and that is that so much of the work of our Intelligence Services is not known to the public, or to Parliament. That is obviously so because their work is of a secret nature and has to be carried out behind the scenes. It is quite true that since the war a great deal has been published about their activities; some of us think that far too much has, in fact, been published. However, for all that, a great deal still remains unpublished, and I hope that it will continue to remain unpublished. But discretion has one very definite disadvantage. It is that Parliament and the public cannot assess the true value of these Intelligence Services. I agree that it would reassure the House and the country if an inquiry were held at the present time into the adequacy of our Intelligence Services. It certainly seems to me that some of those services could be considerably improved. To give one small example, it is fairly obvious that the work of our forces in Cyprus 1545 has been handicapped and hindered by lack of adequate intelligence. Mr. Crossman Bad policy. Mr. Speir Bad policy may enter into it, but there has also been a lack of adequate intelligence, as there was, first of all, in Kenya and originally, too, in Malaya. Bad intelligence means that our men are killed and wounded unnecessarily. I believe that we could improve our Intelligence Services all over the world. At the moment they are being neglected and skimped, and I should like the Government to give an assurance that they intend to see that, whatever economies are made, they will not be false economies so far as the Intelligence Services are concerned. It is quite clear from what is going on in the Far East, the Middle East, the Near East, in Europe, and, indeed, all over the world, that, in spite of the welcome smiles now emanating from Moscow, the Communists are still waging a ruthless cold war. A cold war is, very largely, an intelligence war; and I hope that the Government will note that fact and will act accordingly. 6.33 p.m. Mr. Frank Tomney (Hammersmith, North) It seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary in opening this debate was not primarily speaking to this House in confidence. He was trying, if I understood his speech and its tone aright, to reassure the people of England that although we have been through a difficult time, we have now got the issue under control and that, from now on, everything will be all right. That, shortly, seemed to me to be the message that he was trying to give to the House and the country. Quite frankly, nobody that I have met believes in either the content or the essence of the White Paper, and that goes for the men in the pubs, the factories, the workshops and the clubs. It is, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), an attempt to cover up something within a circle of associates in the Foreign

37

Office, to protect somebody from the follies of misjudgment, mismanagement and neglect. Unless there is an independent inquiry into the workings of the espionage and security services of the Foreign Office, the thinking man in the street will not 1546 be reassured. We have moved on a long way since 1867. We have moved on from the initial conditions qualifying entry into the Foreign Service; we have moved on into another world populated by opponents of a cunning and vicious natureinto a world of Communism whose methods and policies, and the way in which they must be fought, do not yet seem to be fully understood in some circles in Whitehall. I think we can say that at this moment civilisation as we know it is poised on a fine point of judgment in time, and what we may or may not do within the next few decades may well decide whether the world goes Communist or not. What in its most simple entity is the Communist doctrine? It is a belief in the sovereignty of man over the sovereignty of God. That is what gives it its faith. It attracts to its ranks, by virtue of its faith, liberal and progressive thinkers, eccentrics, people with grudges and those who either on account of physical or mental failings are political or moral outcasts. That is why it recruited to itself Burgess and Maclean. I beg the House not to misinterpret or to misunderstand the full force of the threat and challenge of this danger. It is now known that both Burgess and Maclean were watched from their university days onwards and up to the time that they entered the Foreign Service. It is well known that men with these peculiar weaknesses are the subject of political blackmail and can be used in the chancellories of the world against their own country. It is known that the Communists use such men to their own advantage. Until we get in our security services, whether M.I.5 or anywhere else, a new type of mind conditioned to the forces with which it has to deal, we shall never be able to combat the challenge which the Communist doctrine offers to the free world. It has used and will use in every country into which it goes every progressive movement, whether it be the British-Soviet Society, the National Council of Women,* this or that front, the British Peace Committee or any other organisation, to infiltrate and to start world movements in order to take Western civilisation and democracy off their guard. * [See OFFICIAL REPORT, Friday, 11th November, 1955; Col. 2133.] 1547 Some very cryptic things have been said today about the American system of security. We know what happened in the case of Burgess and Maclean. I take the view that neither of these men should ever have been employed in the Foreign Office in view of the reports which were forthcoming about their conduct. I have inquired into this matter very carefully and have read much about it, and it seems to me that what was known about both Burgess and Maclean was more than enough to justify, not the penalty of resignation, but the penalty of their expulsion before they had held their posts for even a year. Maclean's habit of getting habitually drunk and of letting off steam in pubs and clubs are things which should not have been tolerated for one moment. They would not have been tolerated in some pubs and clubs that I have known. Maclean would quickly have been put in his place. This country is faced with the responsibility of looking again at the method of recruitment to the Foreign Service from this numerically small circle of people coming from the public schools. From my slight contact with the foreign embassies, I cannot say from whence the different secretaries have come or to what kind of school they went, and neither do I know what sort of background they had; but to my way of thinking there is something wrong with our great public schools. For instance, I cannot understand why they do not send more men into the scientific industrial professions where they are so badly needed.

38

When these boys have gone through the schools and the universities, having received a good education in the arts and graces, and then look round for something to do, do they qualify by virtue of examinations for the Civil Service or the Foreign Service? Do they qualify on the basis of a desire to make a career; because of an impetus within themselves to do something good for the country? Do they wish to make a career for themselves, or do they qualify because they want something to do? If after they are trained in the skills and arts and graces, they enter the service for the sake of something to do, the country has no use for them, because inevitably they will fail in whatever job they take on. 1548 If the accusations made by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East are substantiated, there is something seriously wrong with our methods of selection, recruitment, entry, promotion and general direction. I heard the Foreign Secretary, when discussing security arrangements, refer to reports from the ambassador downwards about his staff. Today the world is so locked in the conflict of a cold war that every possible contingency has to be covered. Who investigates the top man in the first place, or is he never investigated? It is all very well saying, as has been said today, that our liberty is a precious thing which we must not discard when making sure that our freedom is not destroyed. But, in a world where such forces are ranged against us, can we seriously depend on our archaic laws ill deciding whether or not we shall arrest or interrogate a person on suspicion? Does that position hold good in modern politics and in the atmosphere of a cold war as we know it? History can teach us some sharp and potent lessons about what has been going on in international modern politics since 1939. The United States have been mentioned several times in this debate. Let us take the case of Alger Hiss. He was first brought to the notice of President Roosevelt in 1939 by Adolph Berle, and at that time President Roosevelt pooh-poohed the idea and said that it was impossible. The activities of Alger Hiss were further brought to the notice of President Truman and the same thing happened. But who or what was Alger Hiss? He was one of the First Secretaries in the American State Department. When we realise what tremendous power these people can wield, when we remember what happened at Yalta and how it affected the politics of Europe and elsewhere, especially the United States and Britain, when we remember the penalties that Yalta imposed on the foreign policies of the Western world, and when we realise that behind President Roosevelt sat Alger Hissa self-confessed perjurer and Soviet espionage agentthat is a very sobering thought. We do not desire McCarthyism in this country. But, in defence of our liberties and our people, we have the right to ask for an inquiry into the Foreign Office and our security services and the way they work. I do not think we can depend any 1549 longer upon the established system and the methods we have known. One can trace back to 1951, when the Burgess and Maclean case first broke, a period of three or four years when the matter was toned down. Nothing was heard about it until the Petrov trial in Australia, and one begins to wonder why this matter was not dealt with in the meantime. Inquiries may have been conducted by our security services. Inquiries may have been conducted by the F.B.I. in the United States. Although the advice of Adolph Berle was not taken, they may have been going on. But it was the Petrov trial which brought the Burgess and Maclean case to the light of day, and let no hon. Member imagine that Petrov was not a brave man. The Soviet espionage system does not forget its enemies. The clearest example I can give to the House is that of the murder of Trotsky in Mexico.

39

After fifteen years of patient waiting on their part a manservant in his house, an employee of the Soviet espionage system, took a pickaxe and murdered Trotsky. Other murders have taken place throughout Europe, because we are dealing with a Government which does not recognise the sanctity of human life or the human soul, a Government which has condemned people to death, not by hundreds but by millions, a Government which has forced through policies that have resulted in the death of millions. That is the kind of thing with which we are faced in the world today. That is why I cannot speak too strongly in condemnation of the Foreign Office and their handling of this matter. Whoever is covering up whom and on what pretext, whether because of the membership of a circle or a club, or because of good fellowship or whatever it may be, they must think again and think quickly. Make no mistake about it, the Soviet protects those it values. Although my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) read out a letter from a friend of his who dined with Burgess and Maclean the night before they escaped and who at that time had no idea, nor was he given any idea, that Maclean was going to escape, this escape had been engineered for at least a month in advance. If a man who is valuable to the Soviet services might talk and give 1550 people away, he is taken care of and got out of the country. This thing did not just happen in a day. That is where our security services were wrong. The escape must have taken at least a month to organise. Mr. Daines Surely my hon. Friend would agree that before Maclean went he would have to get permission from the party in order to make sure that he would gain entry into Czechoslovakia or Russia? Mr. Tomney That is right; so the escape was not organised overnight. It must have been organised one or two months in advance. I have seen the same pattern repeated all over the world. I was in Japan with the hon. Member for Farnham (Mr. Nicholson) at this time last year. We saw a strike of municipal employees. I watched them march along the streets, and I saw the same technique used there as in Western capitalsthe cheer leaders; the coaches going along; the loudspeaker vans; the band at the assembly point; the full battery of loudspeakers; the flags and bunting. I have known of the valuable work done by labour attaches in that part of the world because they understand the forces at work. The labour attachs, introduced by the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, were probably the last and best innovation of the Foreign Office reform in 1947. I should like to see them established in all our embassies. If we are to have a balanced view about the forces with which we must contend, it is essential that we consider statements of persons who know the point of view of the man-in-the-street. Otherwise we shall not obtain a proper assessment of what is going on. In my view, it is absolutely essential that the Foreign Office consider this. It should establish labour attachs in every capital. That is an urgent and absolute necessity; not just in order to study labour problems or give advice about industrial problems, but in order to keep a matter-of-fact workaday eye on the world at large. I now want to say a word or two about Burgess and Maclean and their conduct in the Foreign Office. I am not going to take part in any witch-hunting, but I will give the Under-Secretary, if he will 1551 see me privately, the names and sources where I got my information. My first question is this: is it or is it not the fact that, on the first day when Maclean entered the Foreign Office, he declared to a colleague that he was a member of the Communist Party? My second question is this: why have M.I.5 not yet

40

interviewed members of the Washington staff of the Foreign Office who were directly associated with Burgess and Maclean? Why have they not been interviewed? [An HON. MEMBER: "And grilled."] The third point, and on this I am prepared to give names and dates if necessary, is that I have always taken the view that a secret service should be absolutely secret and that most of its members should not be known to each other. To be successful, it has to work in an atmosphere of great secrecy. I do not know, and the public at large do not know, how the members of M.I.5 are recruited, whether they are more military or more intelligence, whether they are ex-policemen or retired generals, but, if they are, it will not do. In the circumstances of the ideological war with which we are now dealing, we want a new type of man, the type of man who understands the principles and ideology of Marxism, a man who can interpret and read the minds of the men with whom he has to deal. When Petrov finally defected, the man with him was a member of the Australian Secret Service, who had worked for two years to get the desired resultand got it. That is why I want to know more about M.I.5. I take the view that this service would be better vested in a special branch or superspecial branch of Scotland Yard. I cannot for the life of me see how any Department in Whitehall can use its own security forces which are attached to each particular Department. It is tantamount to saying that each atomic plant in this country shall have one security man in each department, all perhaps conflicting, all having different friendships and loyalties. I take the view that this job should be a professional job, that the pay and pensions should be adequate, and that the staff should be recruited from the best type of man available. This Service is supposed to be secret. I travelled back from Thailand last year by air, and we had to stay in Rome overnight. On the same plane was a man 1552 who had been to China. He was the general manager in London of a large mercantile and commercial bank. I know nothing at all about mercantile and commercial banking, but I struck up an acquaintance with him and I had a long talk with him while flying half-way across the world. When we stayed in Rome, at the breakfast table next morning he said "The man at the next table is M.I.5." "How on earth do you know?" I asked. "Because he told me," he replied. If that is soand this information can be checked, because the details of the flight can be checkedit is stupid police folly. Let us make no mistake about it. Our military destiny is tied up with N.A.T.O., and the United States is the strongest and most permanent member of N.A.T.O. The Burgess and Maclean issue has made a tremendous impact on the United States security service. Unless we are prepared to put our house in much better order than is envisaged by the Foreign Secretary, I am afraid that our journey from now on will not be very happy. 6.55 p.m. Mr. Peter Rawlinson (Epsom) I have been chiefly impressed in this debate, apart from the length of the speeches, by the loyalty, which I have always heard of and read about previously, of political chiefs to the Service they represent or the Department to which they are responsible. The loyalty which they have shown, tributes to which I have listened to here today for the first time, has impressed me, although I well appreciate the constitutional position of the Minister who is responsible for the Department. I have wondered sometimes if some of the more junior civil servantsnot the heads of Departments, with whom I have no acquaintance whatsoeverwho make criticisms of their political chiefs should not sometimes take a lesson from those political chiefs who

41

have to stand here and answer for some of their misdoings. No one in this House desires that there should be any witch-hunting in this matter. As has been said by many speakers, no one supports the kind of system which is found in other countries, under which individuals can be harried and bullied by committees set up to investigate their behaviour; but the ramifications of a conspiracy are extremely 1553 difficult to trace. They might range throughout the whole body politic. Therefore, there must be a sufficient, sensible and proper investigation into the background of those persons who have undertaken the Government's service. There must beand I was glad to thear the Foreign Secretary say sothese positive checks, but I wonder whether, in the positive checks that are now made, when inquiries are made about certain people, answers in writing are obtained, or whether they are purely oral. That is something which, I feel sure, would add further to the investigations which must be made into a person's background. We cannot escape the obvious conclusion that this is a story of incompetence. The law has been mentioned on several occasions, and it has been stated that there is no law by which these people could have been prevented from leaving the country. It was said by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man) that there was no law to prevent them leaving the ports. Why was there no guard on the ports? Is it really seriously suggested, if somebody had been guarding the ports, had been looking out for these people and had been warned that they might take it into their heads to try to escape, that when they arrived at Southampton to board the packet for St. Malo and were approached by a security officer and asked their business, they would have been able to march on board and sail away to St. Malo, having informed the security officer that that was what they intended to do? Is it seriously suggested that no pretext could have been made whereby these people could have been taken back to London and have been required to answer questions on certain matters of which, by their flight, they had shown they were guilty, and which we now know to be treasonable activities? Surely, the technicality of arrest, mentioned by my right hon. Friend, is not in this case a real answer. The real answer was that no one thought that these men were going to flee. It was thought that security had been such that these men were not aware of what was happening. It was a grave story of incompetence. Mr. Speir Will my hon. Friend allow me? Is it not the case that only one of these individuals was suspect, and that the other was not under investigation at all? 1554 Mr. Rawlinson My point is that, in these circumstances, the ports should have been watched. If it was thought that these people might flee, if they were known to have had some association, these steps should have been taken. Mr. Daines Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that, as the interrogation had been ordered by the Foreign Secretary, even the fact of applying for a weekend pass was suspicious and should have sounded the alarm? Mr. Rawlinson I agree to this extent. If there had been this thorough investigation and one had eventually reached the conclusion that this man out of some 6,000 should be investigated, then not to have taken the proper and sensible precautions seems to be an incredible piece of bungling.

42

It is quite clear, from what has been said by some people who seemed to know them or their acquaintances well, that these two persons were people who must at all times have been an extreme risk. Apparently, they had "chips on their shoulders" of various kinds which one would have thought straightaway would have led their superiors to suspect that they were persons who were not proper or suitable to hold such responsible jobs. Our good fortune has been that in the immediate past we have not had persons who have been in control of various public matters, or in responsible positions, whose loyalties have got across the frontiers. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said that since 1689 and the wars of religion there have been no such circumstances; but in fact there have been. In the history of our relations with Ireland there were persons such as Erskine Childers. There always have been, and always will be, people whose loyalties conflict, who do not put patriotism as the highest of loyalties. In this House it seems wrong to suggest that, because it is only a new phenomena, people might in fact be putting disloyalty ahead of patriotism, and that the security people were not in fact aware of the matter. Then after the flight comes the story, which has been adquately dealt with, of the information which was being supplied. It seems to me that what must be hidden is the source of the information or knowledge about what the Government may know of Burgess and Macleanthat 1555 is, of course, vitally importantbut not the extent. Surely, if inevitably we compromised the source by revealing the extent, that would be dangerous; but what danger was there in telling the House or the country immediately after the flight all the matters that have now been told us so very much later on? The inadequacy of the White Paper has also been discussed. Mention has been made of how in paragraph 3 it talks about Maclean being the head of the American Department and says that it does not deal with major problems of Anglo-American relations. Paragraph 11 says that one explanation may be that Maclean observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers. It appears, once again, to hon. Members on both sides of the House and to the people in the clubs and pubs that here there has been some covering up by bureaucracy. The story has been heard, and read of, of Departments where the bureaucrats have attempted to "cover up" after initial mistakes have been made, and it has been suggested that there is a feeling among the people who are in the same Service that they must assist those who have made the error to prevent them being entirely shown up. I agree that we cannot have, and would not want to have, in this country a secret service having any executive power. It must rest upon the criminal law and the executive power of the police. If we had a secret service which had full executive power obviously it would degenerate into something which nobody in this country would want. Security is the real part of the problem, and this is a matter in which security was bad. I have listened to what most hon. Members have said about the Foreign Service and these people who are members of it. I do not agree with much that has been said. It appears to me that security is the failure here. In security it is not so much money or measures that matter. What matters is having the right man at the head of the Security Service to ensure that the best security this country can have is provided. 7.5 p.m. Mr. Malcolm MacPherson (Stirling and Falkirk Burghs) I must say that after a beginning with which I did not agree I found much in what the hon. Member for 1556 Epsom (Mr. Rawlinson) said later with which I did agree. I thought that the statement by the Foreign Secretary on the rights of a person under suspicion was much preferable to the opening statements in the speech of the hon. Member. However, my remarks will be concerned not with the security side of the

43

matter but with the question of the personnel with whom we are concerned in the Foreign Office. It has already been suggested that the Foreign Office ought to be grouped together with the Civil Service as a whole. As a matter of principle, I am inclined to agree with that suggestion. I take roughly the same line about the wartime reforms as that taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). In principle, it is a sound idea that the Foreign Service should be part of the Civil Service as a whole; but there will be practical difficulties. One of the difficulties which has faced the Civil Service as a whole in recent years has been that of getting the right people for the administrative class, which corresponds to the branch in the Foreign ServiceBranch "A"to which Maclean belonged. The situation has already been stated by the Civil Service Commissioners to be one of considerable difficulty, but if I can believe recent reports it has this year become extremely bad, so bad that the number of candidates acceptable has not been equal to the number of vacancies. In the Foreign Service, on the other hand, if one can take the evidence of an article in the Observer yesterday, there seem to have been this year quite sufficient candidates for the vacancies. Even if one skims away half of them with the first qualifying examination and assumes that they were not serious candidates, there were still ample to fill the vacancies. If we merge the Foreign Service with the Civil Service as a whole, let us make no mistake that very shortly we shall run into an acute problem of staffing the upper branches of the Foreign Service. This difficulty is not confined to the Civil Service. It is one that concerns all, or nearly all, the public services. There are just a few exceptions. When business is booming and attracting people with the offer of high salaries and extraordinarily good prospects, we find difficulty in attracting scientists to the public services and administrative people 1557 to the first division of the Civil Service. There is difficulty in attracting all the officers we need for the Armed Services. There is difficulty in staffing the local government services. We cannot get sanitary inspectors, and we cannot get the specialists such as tax inspectors for the Civil Service, because industry and commerce are booming and offering far better prospects. That is the difficulty behind the whole question of staffing. That will be immensely emphasised for the Foreign Service once we link the Foreign Service with the Civil Service as a whole. What I wanted to talk about was not so much that general problem which the public services in general are facing as a result of the present economic situation, but rather the intake of the upper branch of the Foreign Service. They are, of course, university recruits like those for the first division of the Civil Service. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East, I was struck by the articles that appeared recently in the Manchester Guardian. One of the points they made was the extreme variety of interests for the Foreign Service now. They used a phrase like "Atoms, oil, international payments" to illustrate the new and highly technical interests that the Service now has to deal with. Again, like my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East, I was struck by the fact that the reforms of the war years had destroyed a number of sources of expert knowledge without replacing them properly. But, in general, we have been producing rather more of these experts in languages and the affairs of particular regions, and these experts in matters of "atoms, oil and international payments," than we formerly did. Since the war the universities have given far more attention to these things, with the establishment and development of the schools of African and Oriental languagesat London University, for instanceand more attention to the Slav languages and cultures elsewhere. We have far more people who can be considered as replacements than we had formerly.

44

There is, however, very little sign that the Foreign Office has been making use of these new sources. Since the war recruitment to Branch A seems to have been exactly of the sort that would justify the accusations of inbreeding and so on 1558 that are currently being made. I have not the figures for this year, but from 1945 to 1954up to and including last year's intake426 appointments were made to the senior division of the Foreign Service. Leaving aside figures and turning to percentages, I find that 77 per cent. of those appointments were to graduates of Oxford or Cambridge; 5 per cent. to graduates of London; 5 per cent. to Scottish graduates; 1 per cent. to graduates of all provincial universities; a very small percentage to graduates of universities outside this islandIreland and New Zealand, for instanceand 8 per cent. to candidates who had no university education at all. Mr. Godfrey Nicholson (Farnham) To present a fair picture, perhaps the hon. Member would give similar figures of the candidates? Mr. MacPherson That point was made previously, and the Joint Under-Secretary answered it in a way which completely destroyed his own case. He said that the high Oxford and Cambridge figures reflected the high number of applicants from those universities, but the figures he gave for 1954 proved exactly the opposite. In 1954, of 30 vacancies in the senior branch, 28 were filled by Oxford and Cambridge graduates. The hon. Gentleman stated that there were 287 applicants, of whom 221 came from Oxford and Cambridge. Now, 221 is not to 287 as 28 is to 30 but as 23 is to 30. In other words, the proportion of Oxford and Cambridge appointments in the one year for which we have figures was very much greater than the proportion of Oxford and Cambridge applicants. I think that that answers the hon. Member for Farnham. I mention those figures because they give some shadow of backing to the suggestion that the Foreign Office is a kind of club, that there is a certain exclusiveness about it. After passing through a university one assumes that one will be thrown among people of all sorts of different types of education and coming from other types of universities. In the Foreign Office, however, appointees come from Oxford and Cambridge and are put right into the middle of a group of people who also come from those two institutions. That must lead to some possibility of inbreeding, of narrowness of interest, 1559 of loyalty to the club from time to timeto put it mildlybecoming an obstacle to one's greater loyalties. I must say that I do not think it at all likely that this intake reflects in any serious way the intellectual requirements of the Foreign Office. I should not imagine that there is all that difference, intellectually, between the products of Oxford and Cambridge on one hand and those of London University and the provincial and Scottish universities on the other. Nor would anyone suggest that there is any ground for thinking that there is any wide divergence in the moral qualities and characters of the graduates. But, despite the fact that recruitment is farmed out to the Civil Service Selection Boardas it should bethere is still far too narrow a range of intake. That must be bad for the Service and must have played some part in creating some of the difficulties to which we have been addressing ourselves this afternoon. During the period from 1945 to 1954 to which I have referred, there has been a great influx of people from the elementary schools, and the maintained secondary schools coming under the public authorities, into the universities generallybut mainly into the provincial and Scottish universities. In spite of that huge influx, the high figures for Oxford and Cambridge have continued. No sign of it has been reflected in the appointments to the Foreign Office. I regret this. I think that it is one of the things that

45

make a case for an inquiry into the methods of appointment, the sources of appointment and, indeed, into the methods of training after a man has entered the foreign service. On the previous occasion to which I have referred, the Joint Under-Secretary seemed to be rather complacent and said that he was quite sure that the best candidates were obtained. I suggest very strongly that, however good the present candidates are, the Service would be improved as a whole if they came from more varied sources, had more varied experience, were of more varied types and had more varied backgrounds. The hon. Gentleman said that there was no need to widen the source of recruitment. I doubt it. I think an inquiry might well look into the possibility of widening the sources of recruitment. 1560 We have to remember that the reality of some of the popular feeling about these things lies in the fact that it is popular feeling. If people think that the people in the Foreign Service spend a lot of time drinking cocktails and that sort of thing, and are the type to whom this comes naturally because of their social background, the habit is developed of thinking of diplomats, and of the Foreign Office generally, as being rather different from the rest of the people. That is rather unhealthy. If there were two universities dominating the intake into the Foreign Service, I would far rather they were Liverpool and Bristol, for example, than Oxford and Cambridge. Admirable institutions though they are, of our 16 or 17 universities Oxford and Cambridge are the two which, to the ordinary man in the street, are a little more distant and represent a life rather different from his ownmuch more than do the provincial universities. There is undoubtedly a great deal of loose talk about the way in which diplomats live, but there is a strong case for trying positively to improve the understanding of diplomats by the people in general and of the people in general by diplomats. As long as we adhere to the present very narrow intake, there are potential difficulties. In addition, we are losing an immense amount. The wider our net is castI do not think that it is necessarily a matter of democratisation, which the hon. Member for Coventry, East, was talking aboutprovided we keep to the approved standards, the more variety and the better and stronger as a whole will be the Service that we shall build up. 7.20 p.m. Mr. Godfrey Nicholson (Farnham) The hon. Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson) made an exceedingly thoughtful speech, with much of which I am in full agreement. He said that the wider our net is cast the better Service we would get. But I reach different conclusions from those that he reached. For instance, I am quite certain that the Foreign Office is making every effort to cast its net wider. Then is the hon. Gentleman really saying that the Civil Service Commissioners are actively prejudiced in favour of Oxford and Cambridge? I know that he is not saying that, so he need not trouble to deny it. I 1561 am sure that he would not dream of saying so. If one admits that only educational examinations and personal qualifications are taken into consideration, if one admits that examinations are conducted fairly, and efforts are being constantly made to interest the provincial universities, I do not think that the burden of his charge is so heavy as he makes it out to be. With regard to Oxford and Cambridge, I do not know exactly the proportions, but the vast majority of the undergraduates of those universities are maintained by grants from Government or public bodies. My experience of the Diplomatic Service is not extensive, but I certainly know a number of its members. Last year, I went with a Parliamentary delegation to the Far East and saw a great deal of three Embassies in Tokyo, Bangkok and Rangoon. I was deeply struckand I am very glad to have an

46

opportunity of paying this tributeby the exceedingly high standard of integrated efficiency typical of each of those three Missions, and I was immensely struck by the wide variety of social background of the members of those Missions. I am talking not only about the senior branch. I could not have been more favourably impressed than I was. My opinion was backed up in each of those three capitals when I talked to English businessmen and British citizens resident there. All of them said that the foreign nationals there were constantly expressing envy of our Foreign Service and saying that they wished their missions were as efficient and as representative. I am sorry that this debate has so much taken the tone of an attack on the Foreign Service. We must avoid complacency, but Mr. Malcolm MacPherson I am sure that the hon. Member will not take it that I am attacking the Foreign Service. I am trying to suggest how we can improve it. We are continually doing that in public life in this country, without necessarily attacking something which we want to improve. It is not simply a matter of the social background when one talks about Oxford and Cambridge, although that is important. I think that the proportion of maintained scholars is probably less at these two institutions than the hon. Member thinks. Apart from social questions, there is the purely 1562 intellectual question of people coming from the same kind of intellectual channel. These two universities are like each other and different from the universities of Leeds or Glasgow. The channel they come from is the same kind intellectually, apart altogether from the social side. Mr. Nicholson The hon. Gentleman is very disarming. I was not accusing him of making an unfair or unreasonable attack. I was thinking of the speech made by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), which I regarded as most unhelpful. I do not want to be led away by the hon. Gentleman into the question of intellectual channels. I think that everyone bears the stamp of the institution at which he was educated, but I think that social background is perhaps one of the most important things. I was saying that I believe that it is the experience of hon. Members in this House that wherever they go, or almost everywhere they go, they find that the British Mission in a foreign capital has the highest reputation of any mission. It is a great pity, as I have said, that this debate has taken that particular trend. While we must avoid complacency, it is not only unjust and unfair but shortsighted and inimical to the best interests of this country if it goes out to the world that the House of Commons has spent the best part of a day in attacking a service that is the envy of every other nation in the world. There have certainly been these mistakes over Maclean and Burgess, but the fact remainsand I say it categoricallythat our Foreign Service is varied in its personnel, is democratic in the sense that in all ranks its members are drawn from the most diverse social background, is efficient, and is envied. While not attempting to cover up what has happened, I do beg the House to keep a sense of proportion and a sense of balance. Something was said by the Foreign Secretary about members of the Foreign Service having fewer of the rights of the ordinary citizens than do members of the rest of the Civil Service. He referred to the committee which gets rid of people who are considered unsuitable. I believe that if the confidence which has been a little shaken is to be fully restored, the work of that committee will have to go further, and I think that members of the 1563 Foreign Service will have to accept a further diminution of their rights. I was struck by the fact that the Foreign Secretary seemed to think that there was very little intermediate stage between retaining a man in the Foreign Office and prosecuting

47

him. I believe that more use should be made of transfer to other branches of the Civil Service. There are two criteria. The first is reliability, and the second is vulnerability. I am not talking about political reliability, but about reliability of character. In the course of our lives we meet many peoplewe are probably very often of that type ourselveswho are very well-meaning, but are not of the strongest character, and because of that they are bound to be weak links in any chain. They may be indiscreet; they may contract unfortunate marriages, and they may mix in questionable circles in foreign capitals. I believe that members of the Foreign Service, because they have a position which is highly responsible and exceedingly honourable, must be prepared to accept to a greater extent than they do at present transfer to other branches of the Civil Service if their characters are thought to be weak. So far as vulnerability is concerned, there have been references to the unfortunate habits of Burgess and various people. Without delivering moral judgment, we must face the fact that people who are perverted in their tastes are extremely vulnerable to blackmail. I did not know Burgess well. I met him once or twice. At one time, he was the B.B.C. representative who arranged the speakers for "The Week in Westminster." One had only to look at his eyes to see that he was an unreliable and shifty type, brilliant though he was. I believe that if in those days there had been the same careful scrutiny of people's character, habits and background as there is today he would not have been in the Foreign Office for one week. Apart from that trend in the debate, which I deplore, there has also been the undertone, voiced by the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney), of general anxiety so far as our security services are concerned. This debate may indeed have done good if it calls the attention of the Government and of public 1564 opinion to the grave uneasiness which is felt by people who "know their stuff" about the way in which we are dealing with the Communist menace in this country. By "people who do know their stuff" I mean people like the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North and many of his friends. Our security services are necessarily shrouded in secrecy, and no one demands an open inquiry to bring all their methods to light. This debate will have done good if it shows the Government that there is keen anxiety. It will have done harm if, to public opinion throughout the world, it reflects serious anxiety over the Foreign Service. I start where I began: do not make any mistake about it, we have the finest Foreign Service in the world. It is democratic, varied, efficient and the envy and object of respect of every other people. 7.30 p.m. Mr. A. J. Irvine (Liverpool, Edge Hill) I did not have the advantage of hearing the early stages of this debate, but I am tempted to intervene by certain observations which I heard in the speeches latterly delivered. I listened with great interest to the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson), and with a great deal that he said I agree. But I found difficulty in finding the connection between what my hon. Friend had to say and the particular issue of security with which, I understand, the House is concerned in this debate. It may well be that the Foreign Office suffers from not having as widely representative an establishment as one would wish, but I should have thought that it would be a difficult case to argue that one consequence of that was that its position in terms of security was, by that circumstance, in any way endangered or diminished. Mr. Malcolm MacPherson I do not think there was any suggestion at any time that the debate was concerned entirely with security. Indeed, it seems to me that one of the advantages of a debate like

48

this is that we can try to look forward and deal with positive suggestions for reform rather than concentrate simply on the individual issue that causes the debate. On the question which my hon. Friend has raised about the connection 1565 between the type of personnel in the Foreign Office and security, I think he probably did not have the advantage of hearing the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man), who went into that fairly fully. Mr. Irvine I am obliged. I made my observation regarding my hon. Friend's remarks only in order that the position might be made clear. In considering the whole extraordinary and almost incredible story of Maclean and Burgess, I feel that it is a great mistake to attach too much importance to the detail of their escape and to the detail of the manner in which they were able to evade the authorities. There was, obviously, some bungling. There was, quite clearly, a failure to keep the watch that should have been kept and to put upon them the restraints which, in the light of events, it is quite clear would have been desirable. But there is another side of the picture which compels us to recognise how extraordinarily difficult it must be to ensure that two people of that type and character and with those objectives are not able to escape. It is a task involving considerable difficulties indeed. I am reminded of the story of Gilbert ChestertonI think it is "The Man Who Was Thursday"which begins, if my recollection is aright, with a picture of twelve anarchists, or it may be more. One by one, as each chapter of the story unfolds, an anarchist turns out to be a detective. In the last and culminating chapter the position is reached where they are all standing at the end of a pier at some point on our coast. The last anarchist who has been discovered to be a detective looks round upon his colleagues and says, "But where are the anarchists?" The reply comes back, "There aren't any anarchists. We are just a lot of bally policemen looking at each other." There is no doubt that in all these affairs it is easy to criticise and deride the forces of security. The advantages are with the culprit who is seeking to get away and the disadvantages are with those who are trying to prevent him from doing so and who, at the same time, are obliged to keep within the law and obliged to avoid the danger of letting it be known prematurely that a man is suspect. Therefore, for my part, I would think it 1566 is quite wrong to found any serious criticism of the Security Services upon the details and circumstances of the escape of these two men. The anxiety that I feel about this whole affair relates not to that but to what appears to me to be a far more important matter, namely, the breakdown which the incident appears to reveal in the intuitive sense and judgment of the associates and superiors of these men in the Foreign Office. That is what causes anxiety, not any trouble in the mechanics of the matter and not, in my view, any particular detail of the Security Service. But that it should have been possible for two people of this kind, of whom we now know all that we do, to remain so long in the Foreign Office and hold at one time or another positions of considerable importance, suggests that there was the most astounding breakdown in what one had always liked to think was the traditional faculty in the Foreign Service to distinguish between the good and the evil and between the sensible and the foolish. Mr. Nicholson Judas amongst the Apostles. Mr. Irvine That is a parallel I do not intend to follow. That is the matter that gives rise to anxiety.

49

I can only conclude, however, that the breakdown of intuitive sense in the Department cannot have been as bad as at first sight it appears to have been. It must have been widely known within the Department that these two were undesirable men. If one takes that view, if one takes the view that it must have been apparent long before these two men escaped that they were undesirable typesif one takes the view, in other words, that there cannot have been such a complete breakdown in the intuitive perspicacity and judgment of the Department that their true character was not known within itone turns to the reason why the judgment which must have existed about these men was not exposed and made public and why action was not taken. I can only assume that the reason for that was the deeply rooted desire in the Department amongst the civil servants there to be loyal to each other. One feels, then, that the real lesson to be learnt from this incident is not that the security services were necessarily 1567 gravely at fault, or necessarily that there was as complete a breakdown in the intuitive perspicacity and judgment of members of the Service as at first sight appeared, but that we are dealing with the consequence of men in a great Department feeling that their obligations to each other and to the Department were such that the truth should not be revealed. It is a difficult thing, of course, to suggest what is the proper remedy for that. It may well be that in this context the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs have particular relevance. Mr. Nicholson Would not the alternative explanation, and the more reasonable one, be that there was anxiety to secure evidence for a prosecution? Is not that conceivable? Mr. Irvine I should have thought that that was an unlikely explanation of what occurred. The suggestion that crimes can go on being committed indefinitely because it is thought undesirable to check them for fear that there is insufficient evidence is a line of thought, and of inaction, that is full of danger. We are speaking about conjectures here, and for my part I do not know any of the persons concerned, but I should certainly say that it is very unlikely that the explanation for this incident is to be found in the reluctance of persons to take action before there was sufficient accumulation of evidence. It may have played a part, but it does not seem to me to go to the root of the matter. I think that, in the last analysis, when the matter is traced to its source, probably the real root of the trouble here is a kind of inverted virtue on the part of the Department. I think that the sense of loyalty and of keeping together was carried to the point where things which should not have been allowed to continue in the public interest were allowed to continue. It may well be that the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs are particularly relevant to this point, and that the mistake because that is what it isof too intense a loyalty to a Department and to one's colleagues in a Department, to the point where it is not compatible with loyalty to the highest national interests, can be treated best by expanding the sources of recruitment into 1568 the Department. To find the remedy for that is a very difficult task, and for the moment I am not able to think of another than the remedy which my hon. Friend has suggested. I would say, in conclusion that one further lesson, which I have no doubt is felt in all parts of the House, of all this is that an incident of this kind must not be allowed to be made the occasion or the excuse for any kind of illiberal witch-hunting and pursuit. I am not at all sure that the most valuable outcome of a debate like this may not prove to be the insistence by the House as a whole that that shall not be. I speak as one who prefers

50

contention in political life, but perhaps we are discussing today a theme upon which Members in all parts of the House can find a very large measure of agreement. We do not want in this country any processes which can be regarded as witch-hunting. At the same time, we can, perhaps, agree that an example has been provided here of how loyalty among colleagues in a Department has been carried to the point where the national interest has been adversely affected. If there be any substance in that view, offered to the House only after consideration of all the aspects of this extraordinary case, we may be confident that no section of the community will be quicker to learn the lesson than the Civil Service itself and the Foreign Office in particular. 7.45 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Cordeaux (Nottingham, Central) The hon. Member for Edge Hill (Mr. A. J. Irvine) has, I think, exonerated the security services, although possibly he may have been referring to this case only. I do wish I could agree. All of us who have had the honour to serve in any of the security services of this country and two have already spoken todaywould like to take that view. I cannot, and it cannot be doing any service, I am sure, in the long run to the branch of this great Service whose reputation is at stake in this debate to try to minimise what I feel is the seriousness of the matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Speir) and the Foreign Secretary both referred to the extreme new difficulties which are now faced by our security services thanks to the fact that agents can now often be recruited not 1569 only by giving them money, not only by threatening them, not only by any of the old-established ways, but by appealing to their ideology. It is very true indeed. What I contend, what has been suggested by many hon. Members in the debate, and what is certainly suggested in the White Paper, is that since the war, at any rate, our Security Service has been going the wrong way about it to detect those people. This particular failure by the Security Service in the case of Burgess and Maclean is bad enough in itself, but I maintain that it cannot be considered in isolation. As I see it, it is the culmination of a series of failures, which were far more damaging to the safety of this country than this one. I refer to the cases of the three Russian agents engaged on atomic research in this country, that is to say, Dr. Alan Nunn May in 1946, Dr. Fuchs in 1949, and Professor Pontecorvo in 1950. I hope that the House will bear with me for a few minutes while I say a few words about each of them, for that leads to the point I am anxious to make. The first of these three agents and traitors, the least considerable and the least harmful, was Alan Nunn May. At Cambridge he was definitely recognised as a Communist. When he left there he went to Russia on a visit, and when he came back he joined the editorial board of the Scientific Worker, which is the official journal of the National Association of Scientific Workers, and which at that time, I think it would be quite fair to say, included many Communists amongst its directors. I am not suggesting that for these reasons Nunn May should not have been employed on atomic research in this country. After all, in those days, in the 'thirties, it was not so very uncommon to have those views when one was an undergraduate. What is more, when Nunn May was engaged by Tube Alloys, the cover-name used for atomic research in those days, any person who was a strong pro-Russian was considered also to be strongly anti-Hitler. When, however, after the war our actual enemy, Germany, changed to potential enemy, Russia, men like that in such vital positions should have been considered by our security services not, perhaps, with suspicion but, at any rate, with a very inquiring eye.

51

I do not think that too much blame can be attached in the first case, but the 1570 point is that, as a result, our security services apparently made no sort of inquiries about the antecedents and background of other atomic scientists who were working for us. If they had done so, they would have found a very much more important man, Dr. Klaus Fuchs. They would have found that he was a refugee in this country from Nazi persecution in Germany in his youth, that he had been a member of the Communist Party all his adult life, that all his brothers and sisters were Communists, that he had been reported to the Chief Constable of Bristol as a Communist, and that his name had been found in the note-book of one of the chief suspects in the Canada spy trial. Yet, apparently, none of these facts was discovered by our security services, and it was only three years later, when word came from America, that we were able to get busy on him. One would have thought that after that, at least, our Security Service would have been alerted in this kind of case, but not a bit of it. We then come to the worst of the three cases, that of Professor Pontecorvo, which followed very soon afterwards. Professor Bruno Pontecorvo, like Fuchs, was in his youth a victim of Fascist persecution, this time in Italy. He had a brother there who was a well-known and active Communist. He had a sister who was married to a professed Communist, and his first cousin was a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party. After those two earlier examples, it was nothing short of shameful that our security services knew nothing at all about this. After Pontecorvo had escaped and Questions were raised in the House, these were the kind of replies that were given. On 23rd October, 1950, in answer to a supplementary question by my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Erroll), the then Minister of Supply, the right hon. Member for Vauhall (Mr. G. R. Strauss), said that Pontecorvo has been screened several times during the last few years by our security officers. In answer to a further question, the right hon. Gentleman said: according to the security officers, the screenings were particularly satisfactory."[OFFICAL REPORT, 23rd October, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 2489.] 1571 How easily satisfied some people can be, particularly when we recall that, according to a further reply by the right hon. Gentleman that day, there had been since the Fuchs case a certain tightening up of the system. I wonder what it amounted to. Heaven knows what it was like before. Early in 1950, apparently alarmed by the Fuchs trial, Pontecorvo himself went to some of the security authorities and told them that he had Communist relations in Italy and had recently seen them when he had been over there. At about the same time we received a report from Sweden saying definitely that both Pontecorvo and his wife were Communists. Pontecorvo continued to carry out his highly secret work, and in July of that year he blithely set forth with all his family for a motor tour of Italy. He did not come back on the day that he was due to return. Instead, he wrote a letter to the atomic station at Harwell, where he was employed, telling those in authority there that he could not come back on time because his car had broken down. The reply given by the right hon. Member for Vauxhall in the House of Commons on 6th November, in answer to a Question, was Dr. Pontecorvo's leave expired on 31st August. On this date he had written a note to Harwell, received on 4th September, saying that he had trouble with his car In reply to a further Question, the right hon. Gentleman said of Dr. Pontecorvo, the reasons for this man over-staying his leave seemed quite normal. He had a motor-car breakdown, and was asked to visit some people in Switzerland, and it was, naturally, only about a week afterwards that those at Harwell became worried about him."[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th November, 1950; Vol. 480, c. 56781.] "Normal" and "natural." Ye gods! All I can say is that if our security authorities

52

consider that sort of behaviour in the case of a man of Pontecorvo's antecedents and background normal and natural, none of them is fit to hold his job. I am sorry to have inflicted this old history on the House at such length, but it leads me to the point that I want to makethat these three top-grade Russian agents, all atomic scientists, men varying very widely in every way, in character and upbringing and so on, had one thing in common. It is that if, when the poten- 1572 tial enemy became Russia instead of Germany after the war, our security authorities had carried out even the most cursory investigations into their backgrounds, all three would have been found utterly unfit for their jobs. It seems barely credible to me that, after all that, the same thing should have happened in the case of Maclean; but in fact it did. Maclean was of about the same age as the three and was at Cambridge with Nunn May. He was then recognised as a Communist. He went into the Foreign Service immediately afterwards. But although we are told in the White Paper that in January, 1949, knowledge came to those concerned that information was being sent from our Foreign Office to the Russians and highy secret but widespread and protracted inquiries were begun, those widespread inquiries were not spread widely enough even then to include Maclean's background just before he joined the Foreign Service. A year and a half later, in April, 1950, the inquiries were not even spread as widely as that, when, in fact, the suspects had been narrowed down to two or three of whom, of course, he was one. They were not even spread widely enough to include his background immediately before he joined the Foreign Service when the suspects had been narrowed down to onehe himselfbecause paragraph 4 of the White Paper states that the information was obtained only after Maclean had escaped. Therefore, it amounts to thisthat all this time the security services have been neglecting what should be the chief channel of their inquiries, because, as has been said, these spies are now recruited very frequently for ideological reasons rather than for what I might call the old-fashioned reasons. These facts are not in doubt. They are stated in the wretched White Paper, but the White Paper also discloses that in many other ways our security services did not prove up to the job. Paragraph 26, which has been enlarged upon in the debate today, states that no watch was set on Maclean, except in London, as it would have been too dangerous and would have been likely to have alerted him, because he lived in a quiet country area. Surely our Security Service is not going to confess that its trade craft has fallen to that level? 1573 Of course nobody who knows anything about this subject imagines that such a watch is kept by the village policeman doffing his uniform and putting on a bowler hat and a tweed suit above his uniform boots and following somebody down a country lane. There are other methods, and the fact that apparently no watch of any kind was placed on Maclean during the week-end in which he escaped is nothing short of shameful. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) agreed to the interrogation on that Friday morning of 25th May. Maclean had asked for and obtained leave for the following Saturday morning. Therefore he was not due in the Foreign Office between the Friday evening and the Monday morning. Whatever may have been the reason why he went when he did, whether it had been arranged long before or suddenly we do not yet know, but it must have been obvious to our security authorities and those in charge that this week-end was the danger period. Yet, as I said, not a step was taken to keep any surveillance on him throughout that period. It has been said once or twice in this debate that the chief value of a secret service is that it should be secret. Unfortunately that excellent maxim has been so consistently flouted since the war by amateur authors cashing in on their experiences and breaking into print as a result of two or three years' temporary service in one of our great Services in

53

wartime that we can well afford a slight risk of loss of secrecy once more in a good cause. The cause I am suggesting is an inquiry into our Security Service. I do not feel that whitewashing will satisfy the people of this country about this case. Their faith in our Security Service has been sadly shaken, and it must be our first resolve to try to restore it at all costs. The same thing applies to their faith in our Foreign Service. My hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Mr. Nicholson) said that the public confidence had been a little shaken for the first time by this case. That was a triumph of understatement in view of what people are thinking. Our Foreign Service has always received the criticism from which, to a large extent, our Security Service has been free. It has been accused of being too much 1574 divorced from reality, of having too many receptions and cocktail parties, of being staffed by too many old school ties. Yet even its more severe critics in their wildest moment have never before this case suggested that it harboured traitors, and now people know that it did and they believe that it still may do so. The only way in which we can be fairly sure of reassuring the people of this country, both as regards the efficiency of our security arrangements and about what has happened in this case, is to appoint a committee of inquiry. I would suggest that it should be a committee formed of the judicial members of the Privy Council, sitting in secret and reporting to the Prime Minister. That would go far to reassure our people who deserve reassurance. Therefore, most earnestly I ask my right hon. Friend to reconsider the decision that it is not necessary to hold any such inquiry. 8.5 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Brixton) I find myself in cordial agreement with the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux). I hope that there will be a judicial inquiry along the lines he advocated and mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) earlier in the debate. This debate will be a sham exercise unless it is followed by such an inquiry. We want an inquiry into the recruitment and staffing of the Foreign Office. We also want an inquiry into the efficiency of our Security Service. Those should be two separate and distinct inquiries. It may be found necessary to have a different form of inquiry in each case since exactly the same security considerations do not apply to an investigation into the staffing and recruitment of the Foreign Office as would obviously and necessarily apply to an examination of our Secret Service. Unless there is an inquiry people will remain profoundly dissatisfied with the official pronouncement made on the subject by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I will not go as far back as did the hon. and gallant Member for Nottingham, Central. I will go back only to 1951. In the light of what the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said today, I 1575 have come to the conclusion that if Burgess and Maclean had not left the country all that would have happened would have been that Burgess would have been asked to resign on pain of dismissal and would probably have resigned in that way. Maclean might still have been carrying on in some capacity in the Foreign Office because, up to the time of his disappearance, there was still no evidence against him to justify proceedings under the Official Secrets Act. When these two men disappeared, the first statement on the subject was made on 11th June, 1951, in this House. I suggested on that occasion that it looked as if perhaps their immediate dismissal might be justified. I was told that it would be premature to come to a conclusion about it one way or the other. The House seemed to accept that, and as the White Paper reveals, one year afterwards these two men were suspendedalmost a week after they had disappeared. It took a week for somebody to make up his mind that

54

they ought to be suspended. After they had been suspended they were still kept on the Foreign Office list because a decision to terminate their appointments was not taken until 1st June, 1952, with effect as from 1st June, 1951. That struck me at the time as very odd and I asked a Question about the delay of one year and when it was finally decided to dispense definitely and permanently with the services of these men. This is the reply I received from the right hon. Gentleman who is now Minister of State at the Foreign Office: It is because the search of them was continuing. Indeed, the search is still continuing. But, having been absent without leave for a year, my right hon. Friend has considered that as a disciplinary measure their appointments should be terminated and that they should be dismissed the Service." [OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd July, 1952; Vol. 503, c. 417.] In July, 1952, a year afterwards, somebody had taken the terrible decision that the time had come when the appointments of these two men should be terminated. I merely mention that because it is symptomatic of the attitude, atmosphere or spirit which apparently prevailed in the Foreign Office at the time, and still 1576 prevails. As a matter of fact, I was so flabbergasted and breathless at that reply that I was unable to ask another Question about the subject for eighteen months. On 25th January, 1954, I decided to take the plunge again. I asked the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Minister of Supply what was going on, and he said that investigations were continuing, but no detailed account of their nature could be given without prejudicing the chance of their success. I was then told, in another blinding revelation of the obvious, that if I presumed that these two men were behind the Iron Curtain I should probably be right. It will be noted that even then the right hon. Gentleman was not committing himself to anything. Anyhow, I waited another year. On 31st January, 1955, I asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affiairs what was going on. The right hon. Gentleman who is now the Minister of State replied that he had no statement to make at that momentthis is the illuminating sentencethe reason being that he would not wish to make a statement based on inadequate information and insufficient researches seeing that the investigation was still being pursued. So at the beginning of this year no statement could be made, research was still going on, the information was inadequate, and there was "nothing more to say at the moment." The Foreign Secretary was asked about it on 27th April"Nothing to add." One of the Joint Under-Secretaries was asked about it on 20th June"Nothing to add." Then we got a White Paper which virtually had nothing to add to what everybody already knew, and we have today had an eloquent speech, full of interesting political philosophy, by the Foreign Secretary which adds nothing at all to what anyone who has been following this matter with his own unaided resources has been able to discover. In those circumstances, it is not at all surprising that the White Paper has met a unanimity of obloquy rare in the history of White Papers issued by any Government since White Papers have been issued, whatever that date might have been. It has been condemned everywhere. I will not weary the House by detailing the journals from which these 1577 comments on the White Paper have been extracted: disingenuous reticence buckets of whitewash paucity of information cover-up to protect men guilty of supplying successive Ministries with incomplete information admission of failure an insult to any reasonable man's intelligence. Those are quotations from comments made by papers representing almost every shade of political opinion and thought in this country. I quote them because they bear out what I believe every speaker in the debate has tried to adopt as the tone of his speechthe non-party political approach that we have been trying to make towards the very serious problem which has

55

been exposed by the events in the Burgess and Maclean case. Very many Governments are involved, perhaps ever since the time when Maclean entered the Foreign Service. It is idle and unprofitable now to apportion blame, and I am glad we have not wasted our time trying to do so. There is one quotation which I should like framed and hung in every department of the Foreign Office. It is from "Gulliver's Travels": Providence never intended to make the management of public affairs a mystery to be comprehended by a few persons of sublime genius. I should like that quotation hung in every Government Department, but particularly in the Foreign Office, because there, over the years, has been created a kind of order which I can only describe by saying that they have tended to regard themselves as a new Samurai of twentieth century England. It is an attitude of mind which has been stressed by previous speakers. What is wrong with the Foreign Office is not only the inefficiency of its security servicesthat is one of the issuesbut the attitude of mind and spirit of the place, which makes it an extremely awkward problem for any Government to deal with satisfactorily. The point that I want very seriously to make is that there is a reluctance, from which many Governments have sufferedthe present Government suffer from itto tell the people the truth and the whole truth. The people will know how to judge all right if they are told what the truth is. Never was there a more intelligent or fair-minded public than is now to be found in this country. What have we to be afraid of? Why not on every possible occasion give the benefit of the doubt 1578 to the principle that, as far as possible, the people of this country should be told the truth and the whole truth? One of the difficulties about the matter over the past few years has been the reluctance to tell the people the truth. That is responsible for all the omissions from the White Paper, the evasions in answers to Questions in this House and in another place, and the stupid situations in which successive Governments have found themselves involved as a result of following the Foreign Office tradition that the world will come to an end if ordinary people are told a little too much. I will not go through the White Paper in detail. That would be a waste of time at the present stage. I merely want to draw attention to two or three points, and I will do so very briefly. On the Friday before Maclean had his Saturday morning off, just at the time when everything was approaching a climax, and after it had been decided that there should be questionsincidentally, it was not even known that Maclean was missing until the Monday, as has been pointed out by previous speakersthe senior security officer, who knew that Maclean was under observation, saw him go off in a taxi-cab but had no instructions to stop him. What sort of security arrangement is that? We now learn from the White Paper that the Foreign Office was aware for two years and three months before the disappearance of the two men that secret information had leaked out. Then suspicions narrowed down to two or three people, and somewhere about that period, so careful were those concerned not to give Maclean any warning that he was under observation that it was decided to deny him access to secret papers which would normally have gone to him in the course of his duties. Of course, anyone as intelligent and as competent as Maclean had been certified to be by Sir Roger Makins and others who had had him under observation would have easily smelled a rat, to put it no higher, as soon as secret documents were being withdrawn from his observation. Even when Maclean had disappeared and investigators rushed to his home at Tatsfield, they did not trouble to examine the mass of papers which he had left behind. It may well be that Maclean had extracted anything that might be of value 1579 or which might have created suspicion. After Burgess was recalled to London and was on the way out, as has been made clear by preceeding speakers, he made a telephone call to the United

56

States and talked to some unknown person. That is known because he left a friend of his to pay the bill of 7. Here was a man in that very short period since his return to this country with a view to having some disciplinary action taken against him making a long telephone call to the United States to somebody or other and apparently nobody was concerned about what he was doing or what his intentions were. I will say for the British Security Serviceand I agree with a great deal of what was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel GommeDuncan)that within a few days of the disappearance the British Security Service had all the facts of the tip-off. I do not want to take up the time of the House, but let me now come to the situation that existed in the middle of April, 1951, when, according to the White Paper, the field of suspicion had been narrowed to two or three persons. The Government cannot even make up their minds whether it was two or three. Why is there this "or"? Either the field had been narrowed down to three persons, or it had not. Let us have a little more precision. Let us at last depart from the verbal gymnastics in which, whoever it is who draws up these documents, is so proficient. Had the field of suspicion been narrowed by mid-April to three persons? That is a simple question which I hope can be answered. Why play around with "two or three"? I said that but for the fact that Burgess and Maclean disappeared, the Security Service might still have not had any firm evidence against them. The reason for that is very simple and is tacitly admitted by the White Paper. It is that even by April, 1951, and possibly since, there was no legally admissible evidence to support a prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts. That is from paragraph 10. Are we to allow the security of the country to hang in the balance until legally admissible evidence to support a prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts is available? It is quite obvious that the 1580 Foreign Office Security Service and the Foreign Secretary himself could have had powers and sufficient information on which to act which would have enabled the Foreign Secretary, without any prosecution under the Official Secrets Acts, to take steps to ensure that the security of the country was not endangered in future. If we are to rely on prosecutions under the Official Secrets Acts, then goodness knows in what difficulties and imbroglios we shall find ourselves. Mr. John Peyton (Yeovil) Is the hon. and gallant Member suggesting that these two men should have been arrested, without a charge being levelled against them under the Official Secrets Acts? Lieut.-Colonel Lipton No. All I am suggesting is that these two men, for reasons quite apart from the Official Secrets Acts, proved themselves unfitted to be in the Foreign Office. Why, therefore, do we have to wait for the accumulation of sufficient evidence under the Official Secrets Acts to get rid of some drunks, homosexuals, or people temperamentally unfitted by reason of their characters to occupy any position in any Government Department? That is the point I am trying to make and surely it is not a point which is difficult to comprehend even by the most ignorant members of the general population who must not be told too much by the Foreign Office about what is going on. It is said that the field had been narrowed down to two or three persons. Let us assume that what the White Paper means is that the suspicions had been narrowed down to three persons. We still do not know whether one of the three was Burgess. We have not yet been told that. The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. R. H. Turton) The hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) should remember what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He

57

said that no suspicion rested upon Burgess at the time of his disappearance. Clearly, the hon. and gallant Member did not listen to my right hon. Friend's speech. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I did hear him say that, but I hope that the Under-Secretary will also recall that I referred to that point earlier when I suggested that had he not disappeared, Burgess would 1581 still be in the country and probably reemployed in some other Government Department. All that would have happened would have been that he would have been asked to resign. We are now left with two people whose identity is not yet disclosed. Three people came under suspicion, one was Maclean and the other two did not include Burgess. Why is there such great reluctance by the Foreign Office to say what has happened to those two people? Mr. George Thomas (Cardiff, West) Does my hon. and gallant Friend think that it is the job of a Government Department to smear people on suspicion? Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I will come to that point in a moment. There is a very simple answer to it and hon. Members will have an answer to that criticism. I am not asking the Foreign Office to mention any names, but why is it that they will not disclose and have not yet disclosed how many people have been asked to resign, have been dismissed, or transferred to other positions as a result of, or following, the inquiries arising from the MacleanBurgess disappearance? Mr. Turton My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary gave the exact number in his speech. Perhaps, again, the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton was not present when the speech was made. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I listened as carefully as I could to the speech of the Foreign Secretary, and I apologise if I did not catch that figure. However, the right hon. Gentleman has added one little crumb of information to the inadequate information provided in the White Paper. When the speech of the Foreign Secretary is carefully analysed, as it can only be carefully analysed when we see it in print tomorrow, the general public will see how very little he added to what was already known to anyone who has been following the matter. I now come to the remarks made by the Foreign Secretary about Mr. Philby, but before dealing with them I will deal with the question of smear referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas). One of the things which deliberately encourages the spreading of what we all deplore and know as McCarthyism is the reluctance on the part of the Government to disclose informa- 1582 tion. The withholding of information creates the very risks which we all want to avoid and which every decent-minded person deplores, the risk of suspicion and distrust in which McCarthyism flourishes. If only the Government had had the courage to take the people of this country into their confidence four years ago! There is nothing in the White Paper, except the disappearance of Mrs. Maclean, which could not have been disclosed four years ago. As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) pointed out, the Petrov trial added little or nothing to the known facts. Nothing has happened in the past four years to suggest that it would have been contrary to the public interest if this White Paper had been published four years ago. Mr. Daines

58

Before my hon. and gallant Friend leaves the case of Mr. Philby, I would point out that in the course of a Question, which was greatly publicised, he made what was tantamount to a charge against that gentleman. The House is in a privileged position, and I think that my hon. and gallant Friend owes it to the House to give the source of that information. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I was saying that the information given by the Foreign Secretary in the course of today's debate has added little or nothing to what was already known, and that it is the withholding of information which creates an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Mr. G. Thomas Give the information and we shall all be satisfied. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton We had to wait four years before the Government made a statement. The hon. Member Mr. Daines On a point of order. My hon. and gallant Friend has made what amounts to a charge against an individual who cannot defend himself in this House. I repeat that he owes it to the House to give the source of his information, or should withdraw the charge. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton The question of what I owe or do not owe to the House is a matter not to be decided by my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Dailies), but by the House as a whole and by you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and the general public outside. However, let us 1583 Mr. Peyton Further to that point of order. Would you care, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, to enlighten the hon. and gallant Gentleman on what he owes to yourself and the House? Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris) That is not a point of order. The hon. and gallant Member is himself responsible for any statement he makes in the House. Mr. Tomney Will you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, give the hon. and gallant Member directions that he should inform the House? Mr. Deputy-Speaker I cannot give any such directions. Every hon. Member is responsible for any statement he makes in the House, and the hon. and gallant Member is likewise responsible in this case. Mr. H. G. McGhee (Penistone) You do not know him, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I am very glad, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you have helped to dispel the queer illusions which exist in the minds of some hon. Members as to what you can and cannot direct. I made as careful a note as I possibly could of what the Foreign Secretary said in his speech. He said, "There are still inquiries being made. The name of one man"I am quoting as accurately as possible"has been mentioned in the House of Commons, but not outside." I hope that I am not quoting the right hon. Gentleman inaccurately. My first comment on that is that in itself the statement is inaccurate, because the name of this man has been mentioned outside the House of Commons. Not only has it been mentioned, but it has appeared in print.

59

I have now had sent to me a copy of the American newspaper the Sunday News of 23rd October, that is to say, the Sunday before the House resumed after the Summer Recess, from which I extract the following quotation from a long article entitled, "Identify 'Third Man' who helped spying officials flee Britain." The quotation which I wish to extract from this article reads as followsand do not forget that this article was published on 23rd October, that is to say, two or three days before the House resumed: 1584 Although the Foreign Office is dead sure Philby triggered the 25th May, 1951, flight of Burgess and Maclean, his only punishment was being fired. In view of the fact that the name of Mr. Philby had already been reproduced in print outside the House, I do not think it is quite accurate for the Foreign Secretary, if he was sufficiently wellinformed in the matter, to suggest that the name of one man has been mentioned here and not outside. That is just not an accurate representation of the position. Mr. R. Brooman-White (Rutherglen) I wish to ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to clear up one point. He has a great deal of information about this. Has that name been mentioned outside the House in this country in any circumstances which would leave the way open for legal action by the man whose name has been smeared? Lieut.-Colonel Lipton I am dealing with the statement of the Foreign Secretary. I did not know what he was going to say. All I know is that a little while ago the Foreign Secretary said, in a very carefully prepared part of his speech, that the name of one man has been mentioned in the House and not outside. I produce evidence to indicate that when the name of this man was mentioned in the House it had already appeared in print outside. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he had been privy to much of the investigation into the leakage. I do not quarrel with that. I expect that is an accurate statement of the case, because it was part of his duty, in the position he occupied at Washington, to discharge certain responsibilities in connection with security. But what the Foreign Secretary went on to say was that Mr. Philby was a friend of Burgess at Trinity College, Cambridge; that he had Communist associations during and after his university days, and that in those circumstances he was asked to resign from the Foreign Office on 1st July, 1951. I suggest that this part of the Foreign Secretary's speech is on a par with the verbal gymnastics that were displayed in another place by a Government spokesman and is not as frank as it ought to be. The only interpretation I can place on these remarksif I am quoting the right hon. Gentleman correctlyis that because of these Communist associations 1585 with Burgess during their university careers, and their Communist associations after their university days, Philby was asked to resign from the Foreign Service on 1st July, 1951. Then the Foreign Secretary went on to say that, since that date, he has been the subject of the closest investigation. I have no doubt that that is so. I have dealt with the point previously, namely, that if the Foreign Office is to keep on investigating people until it has sufficient evidence under the Official Secrets Act to prosecute, it may well be that all kinds of people will be able to get away with all kinds of things. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting) As the hon. and gallant Gentleman has based a great deal of his case on the statement that certain statements appeared in the American Press before the House of Commons met on 25th October, can he confirm or deny that the statements from the American Press of 23rd October to which he has referred were based on disclosures which had already been made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself to newspapers in this country? I was myself in the United States on 23rd October, and read various Press

60

reports which referred to Mr. Philby, and these Press reports were based on allegations made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself in this country. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton The very simple answer to that is this. While it is true that the name of an hon. Member is mentioned in this particular article, that hon. Member is not myself, and I do not know[HON. MEMBERS: "What is the date?"] It is 23rd October, 1955; that is the date of the article. According to some articles in unspecified American newspapers on unspecified dates, the right hon. Gentleman has suggested that I mentioned the name of Mr. Philby. If that is so, I should be very pleased to examine these particular periodicals. At the moment, I personally have no knowledge whatever of any articles appearing in the American Press to that effect, and, therefore, I am not able to answer the right hon. Gentleman or make any withdrawal based upon the statement which he has just made. What I was in the course of saying was that the Foreign Secretary himself has 1586 said that since that date1st July, 1951Mr. Philby has been subject to the closest investigation, and that there was no evidence to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess and Maclean, but that, while he was in the Government service, he carried out his duties competently and conscientiously. I have given way far too much, but I am willing to give way once again. Mr. Raymond Gower (Barry) Could the hon. and gallant Gentleman say whether he heard the name of Mr. Philby at any time before he happened to read it in an article in an American paper? Lieut.-Colonel Lipton Yes, the name has been the subject of comment for months and months past in this country. The name has been literally hawked about. As a matter of fact, if the hon. Gentleman takes the trouble, he will see that one paper, the Daily Sketch, published a special interview with Mr. Philby, which appeared, I think, in the issue of 3rd October last. It must not be suggested that the American article to which I have referred, while it may be the first mention in print possibly associating Mr. Philby with the third man, is necessarily the first mention or discussion of his name in this country. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that he has no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby had at any time betrayed the interests of this country, or identified himself with the socalled third man, "if indeed there was one." Now we are entering into the field of imagination, because I am not quite sure what the Foreign Secretary meant when he talked about the so-called third man, "if indeed there was one." Everything depends on what the Foreign Secretary meant, or what he intended to convey, when he read out the very carefully prepared section of the speech which he gave to the House earlier today. Is he trying, or does he wish, to suggest that of the three people to whom the field of suspicion had been narrowed down by mid-April, 1951, Mr. Philby was not one? If so, will he please say so? A statement about that would help to clarify the position. I am very sorry that after considering as carefully as I possibly could the note that I made of what the Foreign Secretry said, I cannot depart from the terms of the supplementary Question that I put 1587 to the Prime Minister on 25th October last. That is a quite serious statement to make, but I make it because I am absolutely convinced that I am serving the public interest by forcing the Government, and in particular the Foreign Secretary, to provide much more information than has been provided hitherto. It may be that I have some other information which, as it involves what was said by Secret Service agents, I cannot quote in this House. What I suggest to the Government is that the case for some inquiry, first, into the staffing arrangements of the Foreign Office, and, secondly, into our security services, has been made out. It will be found, if

61

both these inquiries are embarked upon, that many people will be induced to give information, especially to a private inquiry which we hope will be made by a High Court judge, into the Secret Service. Perhaps people will be more willing to give information than they have been up to now. Mr. Nutting May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to be good enough to forward to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary the evidence upon which he is basing his charges against Mr. Philby? I quite understand the reluctance of the hon. and gallant Gentleman to bring that evidence before the House of Commons, but perhaps he would be good enough to forward it to my right hon. Friend. Lieut.-Colonel Lipton No. I am prepared to forward that information to a judicial member of the Privy Councila High Court judgewho, as has been suggested from this side of the House, should carry out an investigation into the operations of the Secret Service and who should report to the Prime Minister in a private report. Surely that is not an unreasonable offer to make. All I want to say, and I must rapidly draw to a conclusion[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Before I draw to a conclusion, I want to say that I will not be gagged by anybody in this House or outside in the performance of my duty. [HON. MEMBERS: "Say it outside."] Even Mr. Philby has not asked for it to be repeated outside. Let us leave it at that for the time being. 1588 In the course of carrying out what I believe to be my public duty as a Member of Parliament I say quite deliberatelyand I think that when the verbal niceties of the Foreign Secretary's statement are examined in the OFFICIAL REPORT tomorrow it will be found that I am justifiedthat I will not make any withdrawal at all at present. The whole tendency of the debate has been to stress the importance of this two-pronged inquiry, first, into the staffing and recruitment of the Foreign Office and, secondly, into our security arrangements. The whole of the debate will have been a complete waste of time unless it is followed by one or both of the inquiries which quite a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House are very anxious to see instituted at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Daines In spite of the intervention of the Minister of State, I think that my hon. and gallant Friend owes the House an answer. The only evidence he has brought against Mr. Philby is a quotation from the American Press which emanated, apparently, from a British Member of Parliament. He is a lawyer, and knows that that is not evidence, and I think he should withdraw what he said. 8.50 p.m. Mr. R. Brooman-White (Rutherglen) The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) has been somewhat diffuse, and a little difficult to follow. I shall turn my attention to one phrase only, in which he brushed aside the whole speechwhich was welcomed on both sidesof my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary as "interesting political philosophy." My right hon. Friend's main theme was that in the conditions of the postwar world we are again facing a security problem which has not had to be faced since the wars of religion. We are dealing with the extremely difficult and delicate balance which has to be struck between the needs of national security and the rights of individual liberty. We must have constant and difficult decisions to make as to how far any action is justified on suspicion. After listening to the hon. and gallant Member, one is at least

62

quite clear where he stands on that. He is in favour of acting on suspicion, of smearing on suspicion, by 1589 directing public suspicion on to an individual against whom nothing at all has been proved. We must leave it to his own conscience to straighten out what that may cost in personal suffering to the wife, children and friends of the person involved. Other and serious issues have been raised. The hon. and gallant Member, in his conclusion, stressed that, apart from the general question of balance between liberty and security, there were the problems of whether or not there should be an investigation into the efficiency of the security services; and whether or not there should be further investigation into personnel and staffing, promotion and security arrangements within the Foreign Service. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Brixton is in favour of bath such inquiries. I differ from him. I do not see that any case has been made out for either. There has been public agitation, and that public agitation is admittedly a serious factor. The aftermath of the Press comments, ably stimulated, or followed, by the hon. and gallant Member, has given rise to a public uneasiness andI agreea public demand for some kind of action. But is action justified just because there has been a good Press story? Has any stronger case been made out? Let us be very careful about the ground on which we are to act. We know that public anxiety arising out of the Algar Hiss affair caused widespread uneasiness and was followed by disastrous repercussions in the United States. It is very easy to say that it cannot happen here. In a very minor way this is our Algar Hiss affair, and the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member have shown how near to the wind it is possible even for the House of Commons to sail. Let us be quite sure before we embark on investigations. There are four quite separate issues, and they have been confusion in the public mind and in the hon. and gallant Gentleman's statement. Firstly, there is the question of Burgess and Maclean being Soviet agentsought it to have been found out earlier? Then, that they had certain Communist contacts in the universityshould more direct security action have been taken on those grounds? Thirdly, there is the case that they were personally undesirablethat 1590 raises the disciplinary aspect in the Foreign Service. Finally, there is the question of whether or not the Government ought not to have said more, and said it earlier in their statements. I will try quite briefly to deal with each of these four headings. The first is: what is the ground for demanding at present stage that there should be an investigation into the security services? Public interest has been aroused, but let us try to see this in proportion. Surely, what the public has seen is only one corner of the battlefield on which there is unceasing conflict between the rival intelligence services of the great Powers. They have seen one corner of one action, and even in that we were not doing so badly. We have been told that a six thousand to one chance was just coming off. Out of 6,000 suspects, the security services were about to take action against one man to whom it had been narrowed down. Reviewing the field as a whole, is the public interest which has been aroused in this sufficient grounds for demanding an inquiry into the security services? Can one envisage, without knowing, whether we are doing well or badly? Indeed, how well we may be doing nobody outside the smallest possible group ought to know. One sees from Soviet statements that many prominent people, members of Communist Governments and the like, who have fallen from popular favour have been, or are said to have been, in touch with the allied or Western intelligence services. Even if 1 per cent. of that is true, we are doing all right.

63

If there had been no recent public outcry or clamour about espionage cases, I should be a great deal more worried. If nothing had been heard of Soviet agents, I should have thought that there might be more cause for alarm. All this outcry has arisen because in one case there was a near miss. We have been told that the trap was just about to close on these people. If it had closed, it would have been a great success for us, because under interrogation they might have divulged a great deal of valuable information about the Russian security services. In fact, it just missed and they got away. Is that sufficient ground for demanding a searching inquiry into the security services? I do not think that it is. 1591 We all know roughly what happens when there is a Government inquiry. The Department under investigation starts preparations to defend itself against the investigation to show that it has not done so badly after all. We all know that. We have seen it happen in various Government Departments. A great number of people start spending their time preparing to give evidence and to answer questions. And in order to do that they have to stop getting on with the day to day job which they should be doing. I entirely agree with everything that has been said on both sides of the House as to the need to give adequate facilities and the best possible personnel to the security services. I do not think that because they have failed to make an arrest in this case there are adequate grounds for an inquiry, which can do no other than impede their day-to-day work. This is not justified unless there is, over the whole field, a feeling that they are falling down on their job. That feeling must arise in informed circles; it cannot be found in this House or in the popular Press. Mr. Daines On that point, did the hon. Gentleman read a very interesting article in the Observer a week or two ago by a man who was a Russian espionage agent, according to the article, against Germany until 1947? He pointed out that the withdrawal of these men to Russia was quite contrary to the usual Russian practice, and he therefore suggested that it was because of fear of interrogation and break down and of information being given that they took that action. If that is so, surely it is a very important reason for an inquiry to be held? Mr. Brooman-White I do not agree that that follows. I said that we scored a near miss. It bears out my point that had we had these people in time it would have been a great success. Let us see this thing in proportion. I am not concerned to protect the security services against the inquiry. I am only concerned to see that we do not lose more in trying to create efficiency than we gain. The Soviet services with whom the Western services are in competition, have great advantages. On the repressive side, they have the full machinery of a police state. On the 1592 offensive side, they have the system of a nation which sets the greatest virtue on under-cover work. Their national heroes of the past were all men who, in Lenin's phrase, had "To know hunger, work illegally, and be anonymous." All their thinking is geared to that sort of thing. That gives them an advantage. They all understand that sort of work. Their Intelligence services probably have much more money and resources than our people. But they have a weakness. Periodically, quite frequently, they indulge in purges and blood-letting, which must be just about as debilitating as medieval medicine. To knock off the heads of the Soviet Chief of Secret Police and his various assistants may be good for promotion, but it cannot lead to the efficient functioning of the Department. Unless a very strong case is made, I am not in favour of messing around in a similar though milder way in that Department of our own against whom there is no solid ground for

64

suspecting that on balance it is not doing fairly well. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary paid the Security Services an eloquent tributeand only he and the Chiefs of Staff and a few others are in a position to see the picture as a whole and to measure the successes it has been achieving. Let me pass to the second point. During their undergraduate days, these men had Communist associates. There is no crime in that. Indeed, the only thing that has been proved against Mr. Philby is that he had Burgess staying with him and he had certain Communist friends. He may not have been very wise in his choice of friends, but what hon. Member of this House could say that all his friends were people against whom no shadow of suspicion could ever be cast? That point has been adequately dealt with. I should like to come to the question of the staffing of the Foreign Office departments and the question, which has been cogently argued from both sides of of the House, as to whether at this stage there is a case for further investigation and reform of the Foreign Office administrative machine. I think it was the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) who said that there was public uneasiness because there was a feeling 1593 that the personal judgment of the senior members of the Foreign Office had been at fault. Mr. C. R. Hobson (Keighley) Hear, hear. Mr. Brooman-White That is an important point. It is obviously true that the judgment was at fault. Mr. Hobson The record of Burgess was well known before ever he went into the Foreign Office. That is the gravamen of the charge of many hon. Members on this side and on the hon. Member's own side of the House. We want to know what people were doing ever to start the man. Mr. Brooman-White The point I was making is that after the war there was a great change in the whole system with the reforms instituted by Mr. Ernest Bevinthe great change in the whole structure of the Foreign Service, the bringing in of a consular service, and the rest of it. The numbers were vastly increased. In those circumstances, it is quite obvious that the senior personnel must have lost some of the contact which had previously existed between members of the Foreign Service and that they had lost the intimate touch with and the intimate knowledge of their subordinate staff. It may well be that the Foreign Office was slow in reorganising itself, in instituting the system of confidential reports and similar things which have now been instituted; but again one must say that the reasons which have been given today seem convincingly to carry the point that the necessary reforms have now been made. In present circumstances, the difficulties arising from that major reorganisation have been overcome. To my mind, no evidence has been advanced to the contrary. Time is running short and I must abbreviate my remarks. The whole tenor of the debate has been to stress the extremely difficult problems in striking the right balance between security and individual liberty. I am sure that the feeling of the country and of the House is behind the Government in ensuring that we do not depart from our traditional attention to the rights of the individual and the maintenance of personal liberty. 1594 9.5 p.m. Mr. Alfred Robens (Blyth)

65

The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rutherglen (Mr. Brooman-White) has resisted the proposal put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) that there should be a judicial inquiry into the Security Service, and he produced as his main argument for that that the Maclean incident was a "near-miss," that the Security Service had narrowed down to Maclean an inquiry in which there had been 6,000 suspects, and that Maclean just escaped the trap at the last moment. I suggest that it is for that very reason that there ought to be a judicial inquiry. It must be remembered that the attitude of our allies throughout the world, and particularly the United States of America, to the exchange of atomic secrets is conditioned by their fear of or confidence in our security arrangements and our ability to ensure that their secrets, imparted to us as friendly and co-operative allies, will not go to a foreign Power because of either the laxity or the inefficiency of our Security Service. Therefore, the proposal to have a judicial inquiry is one which, I hope, the Prime Minister will not lightly turn aside tonight. I hope that he will undertake to give it some consideration. What we want is security without McCarthyism. I very much regret that one of my hon. Friends mentioned in the debate the name of an individual other than Maclean and Burgess, because that is exactly what happened in the United States. It was because the United States Administration refused themselves to inquire into a number of rumours and allegations about their security that McCarthyism arose, and if the Truman Administration had not brushed aside the allegations which were being made and had examined their own security arrangements, then McCarthyism could never have been born. McCarthy stepped into the vacuum created by the refusal of the United States Administration to look into their own arrangements. We ought to learn from the lessons of the United States and the case of Alger Hiss. I agree with the Foreign Secretary that the standard of our Foreign Service is high, and that the Foreign Service is one of which we can be very proud. It is all the more to be regretted that we have the case of Burgess and Maclean. The 1595 case has often been referred to as the mystery of the missing diplomats, but it has not been a mystery for many years now, and reading the White Paper is rather like reading the back-files of one of our daily newspapers. The story has not been added to today, except that the Foreign Secretary termed them "traitors," and that it has become clear that they are behind the Iron Curtain, and, presumably, working for a foreign Government. The Foreign Secretary said he accepted the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility, and none of us would want to depart from that doctrine, but the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility, to be accepted to the full, presupposes that it is the duty of Ministers' advisersand that it should have been the duty of Ministers' advisers in the pastto keep Ministers informed of what it is important they should know. It is strange that the Security Service can have investigated 6,000 suspects and yet the first time my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, who was then the Foreign Secretary, knew anything about this was on the very day Maclean and Burgess left this country. I say there is something wrong about a security system that works within a vacuum and works without some consideration of the responsibilities of its political chief. About 6,000 suspects were being dealt with over a long period. Therefore, it seems to me that the Secretary of State should have been informed a very long time before that that this investigation was going on. I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) when he says that Burgess and Maclean as such are not important any longer. What is important is the lessons to be learned from them. Two things emerge. One is the question of establishment within the Foreign Office. It does not matter what the Foreign

66

Secretary may have said earlier today, or indeed what the Prime Minister will say later, the fact is that the public and many people in the House are quite sure that within the Foreign Office there is a close circle of "cover up" for one's friends. Mr. Nuttingindicated dissent. Mr. Robens The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but if that is not the case how can it be that a couple of drunks, a couple of homosexuals well-known in the City, could for so long occupy important 1596 posts in the Foreign Office? There is no commercial organisation anywhere that would not have fired them years ago. [Interruption.] The Prime Minister appears to be asking who put them there. The right hon. Gentleman is making a mistake in turning this into a political party issue. Maclean went into the Foreign Office in 1935. This is not a question of when these people were engaged. This is a question of the establishment of the Foreign Office, because the Prime Minister does not make these appointments. The Foreign Secretary does not make all these appointments. The appointments are recommended to Ministers on the basis of the advice of their advisers. The Minister does not go through the list and say, "We will now promote Jack Jones as head of the Department." He takes advice. I repeat that there is a feeling in the House and among the public outside that there is this "cover up" within the Foreign Office and I say that this is a matter which ought to be investigated. Mr. Nuttingindicated dissent. Mr. Robens The right hon. Gentleman goes on shaking his head. Let us have a look at Maclean and at one incident in Cairo. What happened? What does the White Paper say happened? It says: In May, 1950, while serving at His Majesty's Embassy, Cairo, Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking. What are the facts about one case? I will not deal with all of them about a fight that he had with an Egyptian guard, about the breaking of an Embassy colleague's leg on a boating trip. Maclean and a friend, both in a drunken state, went into the flat of a girl who was the librarian of the United States Embassy in Cairo. She was absent. They forced their way in and then began to drink all that was available. Having done that, they pushed a lot of the girl's clothing down the lavatory, they smashed the table and they knocked into the bath a heavy slab of marble fixed as a shelf over the radiator. It broke the bath. They returned to a flat in the same building belonging to a colleague. Maclean was with a man friend, and he had homosexual tendencies when in drink. 1597 As the Minister of State shook his head, I am now giving the facts. As I was saying, they returned to the flat belonging to a colleague in the same building. They collapsed on a bed and fell asleep. It was here in the evening that subsequently his wife found Maclean and, with help from a sister, half-dragged a completely sodden husband downstairs to a car and took him home. Is the right hon. Gentleman telling me that everybody in the Embassy did not know about that incident? Is he suggesting that this White Paper reveals one-half of that shocking story? It was not the only incident, but what happened to him? This poor, overstrained, overworked gentleman came back to this country, was given six months' leave of absence, and then was given the job in the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister Who was to blame? Mr. Robens

67

I am not allocating blame to individuals. I am saying that within the Foreign Office there is a close circle of covering up. I repeat to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary that it does not matter how many times either stands at that Box and says that it is not so. I do not believe that the public will accept that this is not the fact. Disgraceful behaviour of the kind in which Maclean indulged, not only in Cairo but in Washington and in this city, which was well known within the Foreign Office, ought to have been dealt with years ago and he should have been sacked. So I say that there is a need for two inquiries Mr. C. Pannell Before my right hon. Friend leaves that point, will he ask somebody representing the Foreign Office whether the facts of that incident were ever brought to the notice of the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs? If he was not acquainted with those facts it is wrong to ask the Minister to "carry the can" in the last resort. Ministerial responsibility depends upon knowledge being brought to the political head, and I say that it was not brought. Mr. Robens That is the point I have been making, that if the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility is accepted, and I accept it, it is the responsibility of the Departmental advisers to keep the Minister fully informed. I was asking whether these facts were known to the 1598 individuals concerned, because I am suggesting that they were not. I say, therefore, that there should be two inquiries. There should be one into recruitment for the Foreign Office. There should be an investigation of what has happened since the changes decided upon in 1943, whether they have broadened the basis of recruitment, whether a close circle exists or not and in what way covering up takes place. That kind of inquiry could be made easily by a number of methods which the Prime Minister can envisage for himselfeither by Privy Councillors, by a Select Committee or by some other method. If we want to wipe out of the public mind the idea that there is any covering up inside the Foreign Office, then we must have an inquiry in which these facts can be brought out. The second inquiry should be in relation to security and this could not be carried out by a Select Committee of this House. We suggest that it should be done by way of a judicial inquiry, the judges reporting to the political head of security, who is the Prime Minister. If the right hon. Gentleman refuses such an inquiry, the report of which obviously would be private, other than to himself and his immediate advisers, then we shall fall into the same error as the United States Administration fell into, and we shall make things unhappy for many people for several years. Of Burgess, what is it that the security people were able to say? Nothing at all. Indeed, but for the fact that he left this country, Burgess might easily he working at the B.B.C. today. He would have been fired from the Foreign Office because he was due to be fired. Here again, we had the same type of individual. All these things were well known. I repeat that the Prime Minister should be prepared to have some sort of inquiry, not necessarily on the lines we indicate, although what we have advocated seems to us to be the best way to do it. We contend that only a searching inquiry can reveal why both men were not dismissed the Service as completely unreliable and unfitted to represent their country at home or abroad. Another interesting thing is that while these men were protected and excuses were made for their drunkenness and perversions, ordinary working men who had Communist affiliations were kicked out of their jobs almost at a moment's notice. 1599 Does this mean that there is one law for a Communist sympathiser from Bermondsey and another for a Communist sympathiser from Cambridge University?

68

These are matters that trouble us and trouble the general public, and we believe that only inquiries on the lines that we have indicated will do anything at all to allay public disquiet about them. I hope that the Prime Minister will not turn them lightly aside, but will recognise that he has a duty to the House and the country, and will be prepared to accept the suggestions about inquiries made by the Opposition. 9.22 p.m. The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden) I can at least assure the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens) that I shall not lightly turn aside any suggestions which have been made in this debate, which, I must frankly say, is the one out of my thirty years' experience of the House of Commons in which I take part with the greatest personal regret. It so happens that nearly all my public life has lain in work with the Foreign Office. For ten years I was Foreign Secretary, which is a long time by any standard. It was in 1926, just after the Locarno Treaties, that I first worked there. I have known individually, as many right hon. Gentlemen have known, many of the leading members of the Foreign Service. The right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) was one of my predecessors as Under-Secretary. I must start by saying that this has been a very sad day for the Foreign Service, and a very sad day for our country, too, because the reputation of the Foreign Service is part of our national reputation. Personally, I think we could have done no other than offer and hold this debate in view of all that has happened. I do not want to stress the personal side of it too much, but I should like to say how much I agree with one observation which fell from the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), that whatever mistakes there might or might not have been in this business, one thing which is quite certain is that nobody at the Foreign Office at any time, no senior official or other official, tried to cover up any form of disloyalty to the State. 1600 It is very important that we should have that clearly in our minds. I do not think that anything the right hon. Gentleman said was meant in any way to deny that, but this is something that goes out beyond the confines of our discussion, and I think that for the reputation of our Service, which is still very high in the world, we ought to make that absolutely plain. If mistakes were made, they were not that kind of mistake; they were not mistakes even remotely tinged with disloyalty. Before I come to the subject of the debate, I want for a moment to refer to what was said by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South at the beginning of his speech. From our side of the House I should like to say a word about Will Whiteley, because although he was Chief Whip of the Opposition and earlier Chief Whip of the Government, I am sure that it would be true to say that he had countless friends on this side of the House and not a single enemy. It is men like him who do the toiling and work in this Chamber quietly who do so much to make our Parliamentary institutions possible. We should salute his memory from both sides of the House in that spirit, a great Parliamentarian though he was silent. Now I return to the questions I have been asked and to the debate. The right hon. Member for Lewisham, South said something about the duties of the Foreign Secretary and how heavy they were. I do not at all deny that. How could I? But they are heavy in a way somewhat different from other Departments of State. The Foreign Office is essentially a policy-making Department and therefore the Foreign Secretary's duties are a strain, because at any hour of the day and most hours of the night he may be asked to make some decision which affects policy. That does not happen in the same way in other great administrative Departments.

69

I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman meant to give the impressionif he did, I should like to correct itthat on that account Foreign Secretaries do not give pretty close attention to the personnel of their office, both at home and abroad. They do, and all important appointments both at home and abroad, certainly in my experience, were brought to me. That brings me to say a word on the subject of the Foreign Service as it is now and the reforms of which the 1601 hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) spoke. Perhaps the purposes or the context of those reforms are not yet entirely understood. What happened was that before 1919 there was a Foreign Office in London and a Diplomatic Service, entirely separate. In that year they were brought together. Before they were brought together, it can be fairly said that they had a certain fairly close affiliation with the rest of the Civil Service. They were as part of the Civil Service before the two joined together. Then in 1943 we added to those two organisationsthe Foreign Office as it then was and the Diplomatic Servicetwo numerically very large organisations, the Consular and Commercial and Diplomatic. We made the whole into one single Service. One or two hon. Members in the debate have suggested that that was not a very good plan and that we should go back to considering putting the Foreign Service as it was, making it part of the Civil Service. Frankly, I think that that is absolutely unworkable, and I should like to tell the House why. The first reason is that members of this amalgamated Foreign Service undertook thereby to accept service either at home or abroad. That is something which cannot be asked of anybody who is in the Civil Service today. In fact, at the moment in the Foreign Office there are three abroad to one at home. The larger proportion is still overseas. So any question of merging them with the Civil Service more closely must be ruled out. As a matter of fact, there are very considerable temporary exchangesand that is all to the goodexchanges with the Commonwealth Relations Office, with the Board of Trade and with the Ministry of Labour. Those are all helpful and, over and above that, today individuals do sometimes transfer from the Foreign Office to other Departments, or vice versa. That has been going on ever since the reforms were instituted. I am frankly a believer in those reformsnaturallyand I think that they are having their effect on the working of the Foreign Service. When I asked the Cabinet to approve those reforms, my main concern then was to prevent the continuation of the Foreign Service in its various Departments, to prevent having a Foreign Office that did 1602 not go abroad, a Diplomatic Service which operated entirely abroad, a Consular Service again abroad and a Commercial Service yet something else. That seemed utterly wrong in these modern times and it seemed that the thing to do was to bring all four Services together and to make it possible for members of all four to move from one to the other according to where they were best fitted to go. I am quite sure that that conception is still the right one, and that it is right for someone in the Consular Service, if he shows the particular quality, to become an ambassador, as some have in recent years, or for someone in Grade A of the Foreign Service, to do a good consular job in some post, probably learning a great deal more of the aspect of commercial matters than he would otherwise be able to do. Therefore, my strong advice to the House on all that is not to touch these arrangements yet. We must give the matter a little time to see how it is going to work out. I do not want now anything in the nature of a formal review of how these changessome of which have been in force for only a very few yearsare, in fact, working out. But that

70

does not prevent us from taking any action we think fit at any time to make adjustments as they seem necessary as these reforms develop. I say frankly that I deeply regretand I know that the whole House doesthat Mr. Bevin is not now here to take part in this debate tonight. I am revealing nothing which is not known to many people when I say that we had many discussions on this question of reforms when Mr. Bevin succeeded me at the Foreign Office I believe that they must be given a full trial. When that has been done, and, if the House is not satisfied with their working, then by all means let us have a review, but I do not want to have that review now after such a short spell of experiment. I will now deal with some of the questions which have been asked about Maclean, and to which the right hon. Member for Blyth added. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) asked whether there were any reports on Maclean. Yes, most certainly there were, and they were uniformly good until 1603 Cairo, in May, 1950, that is to say, until he had been 18 months in Cairo. Several people have said tonight that the behaviour in Cairo was so bad. There had been the drinking bouts, which the right hon. Member for Blyth described with a wealth of detail. I, of course, did not know about them at the time. I was not in the Government. I make no complaint; there is no reason why I should. Several right hon. and hon. Members have asked why, after all that, he was not dismissed the Service. That is an arguable proposition, and I have no doubt that it was weighed very carefully in the Foreign Office at the time. I am not going to say what I would have done if I had been Foreign Secretary and had had to take that decision. I think that it would have been an apallingly difficult decision to take. The House must remember, in all fairness, that up to that time there was no hint or the remotest suspicion of treason, or of anything remotely resembling it. Therefore, what the House is asking us to say is, was it wrong that this man who had a brilliant record should be given a second chance? It is a subject on which I should hate to be dogmatic in the abstract now, just looking back on what has happened since. I believe that there are a great many employers who would take on a man a second time. I have known in regiments somebody who had a pretty bad go and who, perhaps, lost a stripe as a result; but he may have come back not so long after and proved himself in action with his comrades. I am not asking the House to judge thisthank God I do not have to judge itand all I can say is that I think it is rather harsh to say that there is nothing to be said at all in favour of giving anybody a second chance. I think that is a doctrine that this House should hesitate about before it lays it down. As for his leave, it was not three months, as someone said, it was five months' leave that he had; and after that a medical examination. I have been asked a number of questions about the private contacts of Burgess and Maclean. Many of them I cannot answer, because I do not know the answer. But this I can say. It was as a consequence of this that we were led in 1952, following on the examination which, quite 1604 rightly if I may say so, was set in train by the previous Government, to adopt this whole series of measures which we have taken. I was interested to watch the mood of the House this afternoon as my right hon. Friend described those measuresthe "positive vetting," as it is called. Personally, I think it is right, and I think it is inevitable. But I do not pretend that I like it very muchgoing along to the tutor of someone and saying, "What did you really think of So-and-so when he was in your college at So-and-so?" It is very disagreeable to the ordinary British instinct. But I think we just had to do that much.

71

 Mr. C. Pannellrose The Prime Minister I hope the hon. Gentleman will not interrupt me, unless it is very important. Let me get on a little further and I will then give way. I want to be sure that I shall be able to finish tonightnot like the other night when I could not; but that was my fault. What I was saying was that I think this was the minimum we had to do, and also the maximum, in fact, that we could do within the existing law. And therefore I believe that we have acted rightly in the spirit of what the House would wish. Now let me answer another question that I was asked. There is no reason to suppose, I am told, that there is any connection between the departure of Burgess and the defection of Otto John. That does not mean to say that we know everything about these things, but that is our information. I was asked also something which is more importantand I think that we must get this clear if we canwhy was not the Fuchs treatment applied to Maclean? My answer, after elaborate researches, is that I think it was applied to Maclean in exactly the same way. As I understand it, what the Government at that time, the Foreign Office at that time, were trying to get was evidence with which to confront Maclean as Fuchs was confronted with evidencenot complete evidence, but enough evidence to have a chance to get him to confess more. As I understand it, the trouble about Maclean was that there was not anything like the amount of evidence to enable him to be treated on that subject as 1605 Fuchs had been treated. But it was hoped, by using this method, to get enough evidence against Maclean to treat him specifically as Fuchs was treated, and the intention was exactly the same in the Maclean case as in the Fuchs case. I think that is right, and I think that is necessary, but what the hon. Gentleman was Mr. Crossman Surely, the trouble is that Fuchs was not "tipped off" whereas in the case of Maclean, if we understand aright, the denial of secret papers to Maclean gave him warning? The Prime Minister I wonder. I know the hon. Gentleman said thatI am afraid that I am not familiar with all the details of what secret papers were stopped and what were allowed to go through. It could have tipped him off, but I imagine that it was very intelligently done. I would rather doubtthough I do not knowwhether that was what tipped him off. I was rather puzzled when the hon. Gentleman went on to ask why the Government at that time did not warn the ports and withdraw the passports. Mr. Crossman No, I did not say that. The Prime Minister Well, somebody else did. That, most certainly, would have alerted him completely. It would have been a most fatal step to take, because if we had alerted the ports all round the countryand they are very numerousit must have been known to a very large number of people, and would certainly have got back in due course to Maclean. Personally, if I may put my view, I think the Government were right not to warn the ports and not to withdraw the passports, but were right to try to treat him as they treated the Fuchs case. I am sorry that, though it worked in the Fuchs case, it did not work in this one. I should like to say one final word about the question of the present arrangements in respect of the Foreign Office. I say this deliberately, after having spent, I can assure the House, very much more time on this topic than I would have wished over the last year. I am convinced, as Prime Minister, that the Foreign Office is now following a correct and careful security procedure, and that its standards are of the very highest, 1606 either in

72

this or any other country. That does not guarantee us against future disasters, but it does give the strongest assurance that I can give to the House, with all the responsibilities that rest on me, that we have done all that we can do within the law. Now I want to connect with that the Security Service and say something about it. My right hon. Friend spoke of the creditable piece of detection by which the Security Service got on the trail of a spy. Unfortunately, I cannot explain in detail how the Security Service followed Maclean's activities and eventually detected them. I admit and one has to say this to the Housethat this is something that has been concealed from the House and must continue to be concealed, for good reasons. I cannot and I shall not reveal the methods and sources on which our Security Service relies, but there is one thing that I can say that might help the House about this. The Foreign Secretary mentioned the initial information on which the Security Service was working in 1949. I think it is quite true that the right hon. Gentleman was not informed until the spring of 1951, the reason for that, as I understand it, being that even thenand I have to be careful how I express thisthe shred of evidence was pretty thin when they informed him. Before then, it was of very little value. However that may be, my right hon. Friend referred to the fact that during that period after 1949, over a long period, a field of investigation was opened which covered 6,000 people and they narrowed it down to one. That indicates the complexity of the inquiry and the care and patience with which it was pursued. It also indicates the continuing information on which it rested. More than that I am not prepared to say. In this case, as in every other case of counter-espionage, it is, of course, essential not to let the others know what you know. As one hon. Gentleman rightly said, we must not let them know all we know lest that might guide them to know how we know it. That was the problem which there has been throughout this case. I cannot say any more about that than that this consideration played a continuing part throughout all the years when we have been dealing with this case. Some hon. Members of this House may have had the experience which I once had 1607 of dealing in military operations, as I think the right hon. Gentleman had, with mining and counter-mining. You try to do the best you can so that the other fellow shall not hear or see what you are doing, and he does the same. That is the closest parallel to espionage and counterespionage, and in both exercises silence is the essence of success. I still look forward, though without much confidence, to a debate in the Soviet Parliament on the defection of Mr. Petrov. The truth is that there are one or two Ministers who are responsible and who can judge the current record of the Security Service on the basis of facts and figures; but, in the nature of things, we cannot disclose all that. Too many people would like to know, but there is one test which can be applied, and I think the House would perhaps like to have it applied. It was touched on gently earlier in the debatewhat they achieved in the war. Curiously enough, this record can be quite accurately assessed and measured, because, of course, it can be checked against the German records captured at the end of the war. Unfortunately, we cannot do that in the other case. It may be discussed because it is a closed chapter. I can say in general terms that, as checked against German intelligence, the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly correct. The counterespionage achievement of our Security Service during the was was quite outstanding. I want to give a practical illustration of this which may interest the House. The Normandy landing in 1944, in which some hon. Members probably took part, achieved a complete tactical surprise. We know that not only because of what happened at the time but from the German records which now make it quite clear. That could never have

73

happened if our Security Service here had not achieved such outstanding success in purging away enemy spies from the home base from which it was launched. Hon. Members knowhon. Gentlemen have referred to ithow many people, how many soldiers, knew; yet the base was so purified that in fact nothing at all was gained by the enemy. That is perhaps the greatest tribute to the Security Service that there has been, 1608 and it deserves credit for it. It is a remarkable record. I do not knowI cannot go into our record against Communist spies since the war, but I think on the whole that the result will compare not unfavourably. Now I come to the question of an inquiry into the Security Service. I do not think that there is need for such an inquiry, but I will make a suggestion. I should like to say why I do not think it is really necessary. Following the Fuchs case, and in part as a result of the criticism of our security organisation, an official inquiry was made in 1950that was not referred to by my right hon. Friendwhen the Socialist Government were in office. It was a secret inquiry. Its report was secret, but I think I can tell the House that the conclusion of the report was that the Security Service was found to be well equipped, well organised and capable of adapting itself to its admittedly quite different tasks, as several hon. Members have said. I have no doubt that that is true and that we can have confidence in the Security Service. As the Foreign Secretary explained earlier this afternoon, for many generations past, perhaps for centuries past, it has happily been unnecessary to question the loyalty of men and women in the public service. Perhapsand I admit this to the hon. Member for Coventry, East; I think perhaps there is something in thisthat induced a certain tendency to feel that it cannot happen here. That, I think, may well be true. Perhaps we were a little laggard to realise the danger for that reason, but there is no doubt at all, and I really can assure the House of this, that any such comfortable illusion was finally shattered by the disappearance of Maclean. No time was wasted once the extent of the threat was understood. There has been a progressive tightening of security measures throughout the public service. The Foreign Secretary has described the positive vetting, and I do not want to go into that any further, except to say that I think those proposals go as far and are as stringent as this House would be willing to approve without encroaching on those principles which hitherto Parliament has most jealously guarded, and, I think, rightly guarded. Let me conclude with this observation. This debate has shown that this is not a 1609 matter which concerns only the political party which happens to be in office. We are all agreed about that. We are all agreed to see that every justifiable precaution is taken to ensure that men and women in the public service shall not work against the security of the State. I would, therefore, proposeas I have proposed to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Oppositionthat we should convene a small, informal conference of Privy Councillors from both sides of the House. I say Privy Councillors not, I beg the House to believe, because we think that we are better than any other people, but because it is those who actually dealt with these matters who, I think, can now usefull discuss them further. I propose that we should examine togetherif the House were willing that we should do sothe security procedures which are now applied in the public service; and also consider whether any further precautions can properly be taken to reduce the risk of treachery such as that which we have been discussing today. That is the offer I make. I do not ask for an immediate answer, but I would ask the House to ponder it. In certain measure, I think that it covers all the suggestions made

74

this afternoon, but behind it there is a larger question, and I want to close by putting this to the House. Mr. Tomney Does the right hon. Gentleman mean that all the Privy Councilors connected with the Foreign Office would be on that Committee? The Prime Minister Nothat would be discussed between the two sides of the House. What I suggest is that a number of Privy Councillors who have had experience of thisnot necessarily Foreign Office experience, but other experience as wellshould be appointed, perhaps two or three, as would be agreed on both sides, to examine this matter together to see whether there is anything further we can do within the lawor whether, in fact, there are any changes in the law which Parliament must be asked to face. That is the concluding comment that I wish to make in the last few minutes, because I have given a great deal of thought to this very difficult question. Behind all that the House has been discussing this afternoon, behind the anxieties, the fearsto some extent the confusionthere is a larger question, and it is this. How far 1610 are we to go in pursuit of greater security at the cost of the essential liberties of the British people? That is why I have suggested Privy Councillorswho are not judges. This is not, I think, a matter for judges, but for Parliament. The only reason that I said Privy Councillors is that they are Members of Parliament. It is essentially Parliament's decision. For instance, it has been suggested that Burgess and Maclean should not have been allowed to escape. All right. Under the law as it stands today they could not have been prevented from escaping, unless a charge could have been preferred. No charge could be preferred. Now, would the House like that law altered? Would the House agree that the law should allow any British subject to be detained on suspicion? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] But we have to face these questions. When there is no evidence on which a man can be charged, would the House be willing that people should be held indefinitely by the police while evidence is collected against them? In this case, as we now know, detention would have been justified; but some hon. Gentlemen think, too easily, that because that was so it would always be justified. It is not so in the least. Who could tell then, at the time when the right hon. Gentleman rightly took his decision to take the action he did, whether Maclean was innocent or guilty? No one knew. British justice over the centuries has been based on the principle that a man is to be presumed innocent until he can be proved guilty. Are we going to abandon that principle? Perhaps, worst of all, are we to make an exception for political offences? In this debate I have said something in defence of the Security Service because I think that it has been criticised, but the last thing that I would wish to see in this country is the Security Service having the power to do some of the things which some of our friends of the Press do not seem to realise would flow from what they advocate. It may be trueit probably is truethat if the Security Service had those powers, Burgess and Maclean would not be where they are today. I think that is true. I think that if the right hon. Gentleman had had the powerand Burgess and Maclean is not the only case; we have had problems of this kind, he and 1611 I; certainly I have had them many times ariseif he had had those powers, they would not be where they are today. But what would have been the consequences, if he had had these powers, to British freedom and the rights which this House so far has always been determined to defend? I want to make one thing quite clear before I sit down. I would never be willing to be Prime Minister of a Government which asked those powers of this House. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn)

75

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion. Motion, by leave, withdrawn. ********************************************************************** PERSONAL STATEMENT HC Deb 10 November 1955 vol 545 c2014 2014 Lieut.-Colonel Lipton In a supplementary question on the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, on 25th October, I asked the Prime Minister whether he had made up his mind to cover up the dubious third man activities of Mr. Harold Philby "[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th October, 1955; Vol. 545, c. 29.] some-time First Secretary at the Washington Embassy. During my speech in last Monday's debate I said that after considering my note of what the Foreign Secretary had said I could not depart from the terms of my supplementary question on 25th October. I have since considered carefully the full report of Monday's debate and, in particular, the speech of the Foreign Secretary. I have also read the statement issued to the Press by Mr. Philby, in which, according to The Times newspaper report of it, he refers to his personal friendship for Burgess and says that he regards his resignation from the Foreign Office as a direct result of an imprudent association. As a consequence of that further examination, I am satisfied that there is no justification for the allegation that Mr. Philby is the person who warned Burgess and Maclean, or that he engaged in dubious, third man activities. In such circumstances, I consider it proper, and regard it as my duty, to withdraw unreservedly the charge implied in my supplementary question and in my remarks during the debate last Monday, and, accordingly, I have asked permission to make this statement to the House, so that it may appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT of the proceedings of this House, and in order to say how deeply I regret that the charge was made. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 20 March 1963 vol 674 cc363-4 363 10. Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux asked the Lord Privy Seal what inquiries have recently been received by Her Majesty's Embassies concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Harold Philby; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Heath On 24th January, at the request of Mrs. Philby, Her Majesty's Embassy at Beirut made inquiries of the Lebanese authorities to try to trace the whereabouts of Mr. Philby who had been missing since the previous evening. Subsequently Mrs. Philby informed the Embassy that she had received a reassuring letter and a telegram from Mr. Philby in Cairo. In view of this the inquiries of the Lebanese authorities were not pressed. 364 On 28th February the Foreign Office were requested by his employers, the Observer, to inquire from the authorities of the United Arab Republic whether there was any record of Mr. Philby having entered Egypt and whether his whereabouts were known. Our Embassy was informed that Mr. Philby had not entered the United Arab Republic since his visit in June/July, 1962. Meanwhile Mrs. Philby has informed the Embassy in Beirut that she has received further communications from her husband from Cairo. We understand that the United Arab Republic authorities are continuing their inquiries. Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux Can my right hon. Friend give the House a little more information than that in response to my request for a statement? Does he realise that, in view of disclosures made in this

76

House by the Prime Minister on 7th November, 1955, there will be very grave disquiet in the public mind until the whereabouts of Mr. Philby are discovered? Mr. Heath I have given my hon. Friend all the information which is in our possession. It is not possible for me to speculate on the whereabouts of Mr. Philby. On the last point in his Question, it may reassure my hon. Friend to know that since Mr. Philby resigned from the Foreign Service in 195112 years agohe has had no access of any kind to any official information. Mr. Lipton Would it not be more in the public interest if the machinery of State were concentrated on tracing the whereabouts in England of missing witnesses? Mr. Speaker That is wholly out of order. It does not arise. ********************************************************************** MIDDLE EAST (MR. HAROLD PHILBY) HC Deb 30 April 1963 vol 676 c100W 100W Captain Kerby asked the Lord Privy Seal what further news he has had from Her Majesty's Embassies in the Middle East regarding the whereabouts of Mr. Harold Philby. Mr. Heath No news has been received since my answer of 20th March to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux). ********************************************************************** MR. H. A. R. PHILBY HC Deb 17 June 1963 vol 679 c1W 1W Mr. Mason asked the Lord Privy Seal to what extent his offices have tried since 30th April to establish contact with Mr. H. A. R. Philby, Middle East correspondent of the Economist and the Observer, who has been missing in the Middle East since 23rd January; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Heath Inquiries are continuing. I am not in a position to make a statement. ********************************************************************** DISAPPEARANCE OF MR. PHILBY HL Deb 01 July 1963 vol 251 c517 517 EARL ST. ALDWYN My Lords, I should like to inform your Lordships that at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Dundee will be making a statement on Mr. Philby. ********************************************************************** THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MR. PHILBY HL Deb 01 July 1963 vol 251 cc540-3 540 3.52 p.m. THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF DUNDEE) My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, it might be convenient if I were to repeat a statement on the case of Mr. Harold Philby which was made a few minutes ago in another place by my right honourable friend the Lord Privy Seal. My right honourable friend said on March 20 that shortly after the disappearance of Mr. H. A. R. Philby from the Lebanon Mrs. Philby received messages purporting to come from him from Cairo. At the request of his wife and of a British newspaper which he was representing, Her Majesty's Government made inquiries concerning his

77

whereabouts from the Governments in both Cairo and Beirut, without success. I can now tell your Lordships that more recently Mrs. Philby has received messages purporting to come from Mr. Philby from behind the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya reported on June 3 that Mr. Philby was with the Imam of the Yemen. There is no confirmation of this story. Although there is as yet no certainty concerning Mr. Philby's whereabouts, there has been a development which may throw light on the question. On November 7, 1955, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, at that time Foreign Secretary, said in another place 541 that it had become known that Mr. Philby had had Communist associations and that he was asked to resign from the Foreign Service in July, 1951, which he did. My right honourable friend also said that his case had been the subject of close investigation and that no evidence had been found up to that time to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess and Maclean or that he had betrayed the interests of this country. My right honourable friend added that inquiries were continuing. In fact the Security Services have never closed their file on this case and now have further information. They are now aware, partly as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby himself, that he worked for the Russians before 1946, and that in 1951 he in fact warned Maclean, through Burgess, that the Security Services were about to take action against him. This information coupled with the latest messages received by Mrs. Philby suggests that when he left Beirut he may have gone to one of the countries of the Soviet bloc. Since Mr. Philby resigned from the Foreign Service in 1951 he has not had access of any kind to any official information. For the last seven years he has been living outside British legal jurisdiction. 3.57 p.m. LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH My Lords, we are much obliged to the noble Earl the Minister of State for repeating in this House the statement which was made by the Lord Privy Seal in another place. I think that on both sides of the House we have received with a fair degree of sadness the news that another incident should have arisen, though in this case, fortunately, it is not a new incident of current espionage. How much harm this man may have done when he was in the Foreign Service we do not yet know. I think it is a good thing that at last it has been found with reasonable certainty who was the third man, the one who tipped off Burgess and Maclean. At any rate, that mystery is cleared up. It is comforting to know that he has been discovered. He is now living abroad and outside British jurisdiction. But if he should come within British jurisdiction, I presume that he would be liable 542 to be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. I hope that what was done in the other case will not be repeated in this one. Why it was done I do not know. I do not see why these people, who are guilty of treachery to the State, should be able freely to draw money from this country in order to keep themselves going when they go abroad and take refuge in the hands of another Power. I just do not understand it. There is one other thing I should like to say arising out of this incident and one other recent bit of controversy that has arisen about another personnamely, that newspapers, especially those which are largely edited by longhaired journalists, might exercise reasonable care as to whom they employ. I should have thought it was not greatly desirable that a person who was caused to resign from the Foreign Service because he was unreliable, and has since found himself behind the Iron Curtain because he wanted to go there, should, in connection with employment, be given by newspapersI will not say preference, although sometimes I think that is what it is. But

78

that is for the newspapers to decide. Thank goodness, we have a free Press, and we have an interesting Press. I should not like to interfere with them at all. I only, with the greatest respect, throw out the hint that a little discrimination in regard to whom they employ, especially on sensitive jobs, would be to the best. We are obliged to the noble Earl for the statement that he has made. It has its lessons, and I hope that everybody concerned will learn the lessons that are to be learnt from it. It would appear that he resigned from the Foreign Servicethat is a comfort to meat a time when I was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I did not get any comfort out of Burgess and Maclean. If I had known previously about those two lads I should have sent them out "fired" them. But this at least is a little comfort, and we are obliged for the statement. 3.59 p.m. LORD REA My Lords, I think the whole House will agree that the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, has really covered the ground in answer to the statement, for which we are grateful to the noble Earl. I must dissociate 543 myself from the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, in his thinking that no journalist is to be trusted if his employing editor is long-haired. There is something to be said for his point of view. In this particular regard, the matter is twelve years old. It might have happened in the lifetime of almost any Government, except a Liberal Government, which we have not had for the last fifty years. Therefore, I do not think we can attach any blame to any Party. It is sad that this has come about now, but I will say to the noble Earl, if I may, that the public do appreciate being told as much of these affairs as is consonant with security. We are grateful to him for letting us know how this matter is proceeding. THE EARL OF DUNDEE My Lords, I am greatly obliged to the noble Lord opposite for his remarks, and to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, and I should like to assure him that I entirely exculpate the Liberal party from any part in this. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 01 July 1963 vol 680 cc33-5 33 The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath) With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the case of Mr. Harold Philby. I informed the House on 20th March that shortly after the disappearance of Mr. H. A. R. Philby from the Lebanon Mrs. Philby received messages purporting to come from him from Cairo. At the request of his wife and of a British newspaper which he was representing, Her Majesty's Government made inquiries concerning his whereabouts from the Governments in both Cairo and Beirut, without success. I can now tell the House that more recently Mrs. Philby has received messages purporting to come from Mr. Philby from behind the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya reported on 3rd June that Mr. Philby was with the Imam of the Yemen. There is no confirmation of this story. Although there is as yet no certainty concerning Mr. Philby's whereabouts, there has been a development which may throw light on the question. On 7th November, 1955, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, at that time Foreign Secretary, told the House that it had become known that Mr. Philby had had Communist associations and that he was asked to resign from the Foreign Service in July, 1951, which he did. My right hon. Friend also said that his case had been the subject of close investigation and that no

79

evidence had been found up to that time to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess and Maclean or that he had betrayed the interests of this country. My right hon. Friend added that inquiries were continuing. In fact, the security services have never closed their file on this case and now have further information. They are now aware, partly as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby himself, that he worked for 34 the Soviet authorities before 1946 and that in 1951 he in fact warned Maclean through Burgess that the security services were about to take action against him. This information, coupled with the latest messages received by Mrs. Philby, suggests that when he left Beirut he may have gone to one of the countries of the Soviet bloc. Since Mr. Philby resigned from the Foreign Service in July, 1951, he has not had access of any kind to any official information. For the last seven years he has been living outside British legal jurisdiction. Mr. Gordon Walker I thank the Lord Privy Seal for taking this opportunity to put the record straight. He said in his statement that it was"partly" as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby that this new information became available. Could the right hon. Gentleman say to whom this admission was made and in what circumstances? Since the right hon. Gentleman said that it was"partly" as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby, there must have been other evidence. Could that evidence have been known if the matter had been more diligently pursued in 1955, when the Prime Minister made his statement? Could the Lord Privy Seal tell us how an employee in the Foreign Office was able to know the intentions of the security services? This seems to me a matter of very great importance. Could the right hon. Gentleman tell us a little more about the Government's ideas as to the whereabouts of Mr. Philby? Surely it is inconceivable that he can be with the Imam if he has been working for Russia before and since 1946. If he is in the Yemen, and on the other side with the Government, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether he is having anything to do with the fate of our soldiers now in the Yemen? Mr. Heath We have, naturally, tried to secure confirmation of the report that he was with the Imam. There have been a number of statements or rumours of this kind, but, as I said in my statement, we have not been able to obtain confirmation. As to the evidence, I have said that the security services have never closed their files on this matter and, therefore, 35 over this long period of twelve years, they have continued with persistence to endeavour to find the truth about this matter. From time to time, they have been able to obtain items of information and finally, as I have said, there was, in part, the admission of Mr. Philby himself. Mr. Gordon Walker To the security services? Mr. Heath I did not say that. Mr. Gordon Walker To whom? Mr. Heath I am not prepared, nor would it be right, to give information about the way this information was finally brought together. That, however, is the conclusion we have reached. As to Mr. Philby's activities in the Foreign Service, he was a temporary First Secretary up to July, 1951, in the Foreign Service and in that capacity, as has already been stated, he had knowledge of certain information which he was then able, we now know, to pass to Burgess and Maclean.

80

 Mr. Gordon Walker Can the right hon. Gentleman answer my other question, whether, in 1955, if the matter had been more diligently pursued, the other evidence that is now apparently available could have been discovered? Mr. Heath No, Sir; I do not think it could have been discovered. The inquiries made at that time were extensive and intensive and I do not believe that at that particular moment it was possible to come to any other conclusion than my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, as Foreign Secretary, announced to the House in the debate. Mr. Lipton Does the Lord Privy Seal's statement mean that Mr. Philby was, in fact, the"third man" that we were talking about at the time of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean? Mr. Heath Yes, Sir. ********************************************************************** MINISTER OF SECURITY HC Deb 02 July 1963 vol 680 cc191-3 191 Q1. Commander Kerans asked the Prime Minister whether, in the light of the Profumo affair, he will now give consideration to the appointment of a Minister of Security. The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan) I think we must first await 192 Lord Denning's report on the security aspects of his inquiry. Commander Kerans Will not my right hon. Friend look into this matter again? Surely it is a fact that certain of the Departments work in watertight compartments. It is this lack of liaison which brings these troubles upon us. Surely the appointment of a Minister would take some of the weight off my right hon. Friend. The Prime Minister That is a question to be considered, but it is important that Ministers should not feel absolved from responsibility for security within their Departments. Mr. H. Wilson Even before the latest events came up, does not the Prime Minister remember that, in the debate on the Radcliffe Report on Vassall, we from this side pressed for a Minister to be appointed to deal with these matters? In view of the right hon. Gentleman's appalling admissions that nobody told him anything, which suggests to some people that those under him thought that he probably did not want to be told, and in view of the fact that even since the Denning inquiry was set up the Lord Privy Seal has been forced by American newspaper revelations to make yet another statement, will the Prime Minister now tell us whether, assuming that he has enough judges left to go round, he intends to appoint an inquiry into the Philby affair? The Prime Minister No, Sir. The right hon. Gentleman must learn to distinguish between invective and insolence. Mr. Wilson Since the right hon. Gentleman failed to answer the questions put to him, either in the Radcliffe debate or in the debate a fortnight ago, will he now answer my question, because it may have escaped his notice that he is the Minister responsible for security? The Prime Minister

81

The questions which the right hon. Gentleman has put to me were complicated and offensive. I would only say to him that if we are reaching a situation when every success of the security services is greeted as a failure, we will have a vested interest in not discovering traitors. 193 Mr. Wilson The right hon. Gentleman must not be so petulant. He has no right to laugh this off. Is he aware that he was the Minister who cleared Philby and that for eight years since then he has been free[HON. MEMBERS:"It was the party opposite."] In view of the interruptions, is the Prime Minister aware that Philby was appointed by the Earl of Avon and sacked by Lord Morrison? Will the right hon. Gentleman now tell us, since he cleared him eight years ago, what freedom Philby has had at the Arabic Centre at Shemlan, which the Prime Minister knows all about, and how far in these circumstances the right hon. Gentleman, if he is not prepared to take account of these factors, will do as his hon. and gallant Friend asked and appoint a Minister of Security? The Prime Minister The operations of this man were, of course, during the years 1946 to 1951. He was then got rid of. What I said in the debate in 1955 was on information that was available. What has now happened is not a failure of the security service. It is a success. Mr. Grimond Can the Prime Minister assure us that while Mr. Philby has been in the Middle East he has not been in a position to acquire confidential knowledge? Can he also tell us whether he proposes to follow the suggestion which he made for permanent machinery to supervise these breaches of security? The Prime Minister The answer to the first part of that question is in the affirmative. With regard to the second part, this was machinery which I had in mind and am following up with regard to having permanent machinery to deal with any problems which come up as a result of discoveries. I say very sincerely to the House that, in dealing with these matters, I hope the House will realise their complexity and the danger of putting some questions and the still greater danger of answering some of these questions. ********************************************************************** SECURITY (MR. PROFUMO) HC Deb 02 July 1963 vol 680 c196 196 Q5. Mr. W. Hamilton asked the Prime Minister if he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT the names of all those questioned in the course of the Lord Chancellor's inquiry into the security aspects of the Profumo affair. The Prime Minister No, Sir. Mr. Hamilton I can see the point about the invidious character of giving in an answer the names of people who are questioned, but can the Prime Minister tell the House how many in total were asked questions by Lord Dilhorne? Can he further tell us why he and the whole of the Cabinet, presumably, were completely satisfied with roughly a fortnight's investigation of the security aspects of the affair when it has taken them twelve years to find out about Mr. Philby? The Prime Minister

82

The Report made by the Lord Chancellor was confidential. I showed a copy of it to the Leader of the Opposition, which seemed to me the proper procedure. The position now is that Lord Denning is conducting a judicial inquiry. ********************************************************************** PRESIDENT KENNEDY (MEETING) HC Deb 02 July 1963 vol 680 cc198-9 198 Q7. Mr. A. Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on his recent meeting with President Kennedy. Q9. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his recent official discussions with the President of the United States; and to what extent matters connected with security were raised during these talks. Q14. Mr. Rankin asked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the result of his talks with President Kennedy. The Prime Minister I would refer the right hon. and learned and hon. Gentlemen to the joint communiqu issued after my talks with President Kennedy. I will arrange for this to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT. Mr. Henderson Can we take it from the terms of the communiqu that in the event of a successful outcome of the talks in Moscow leading to an agreement for the banning of nuclear tests, President Kennedy and the Prime Minister are in agreement that that will be followed by a meeting with Mr. Khrushchev to deal with outstanding problems? The Prime Minister I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman's keen interest in these matters, and he knows mine. While we must not be too optimistic, we must struggle hard to get the result we want. Should we get it, great opportunities will, of course, open upfor all of us. Mr. A. Lewis I have seen the communiqu but there is no reference in it to any question of security. Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether or not he mentioned to the President recent security cases in this country, with particular reference to the Philby case? Is it because of that case, and the stories circulating in the American Press, that the Lord Privy Seal made his statement yesterday? Or did the Prime Minister not think it worth while having discussions on this matter? 199 The Prime Minister I am not prepared to reveal the character of the discussions I had with the President. The hon. Gentleman has shown his usual suspicion and lack of generosity in his approach to every problem. ********************************************************************** HON. MEMBER FOR BRIXTON (PERSONAL STATEMENT) HC Deb 02 July 1963 vol 680 cc207-11 207 Mr. Lipton On a point of order. Mr.Speaker, I seek your guidance in the following matter. On 10th November, 1955, I made a personal statement in the House withdrawing charges I had made that Philby was the"third man" who had warned Burgess and Maclean.

83

I made this statement having regard, in particular, as I said at the time, to the speech three days previously of the then Foreign Secretary, the present Prime Minister, in which he said: I have no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has at any time betrayed the interests of this country, or to identify him with the so-called 'third man', if, indeed, there was one."[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th November, 1955;Vol. 545, c. 1497.] Mr. Speaker What is the point of order which arises now? Can that be made plain to me? Mr. Lipton Subsequent events have shown that I should not have made that personal statement, but I had to assume at the time that the then Foreign Secretary had wider access to more information than was available to me. What I now hope may be possible is that the formal decision of the House will enable me to withdraw that personal statement so that the record may be put straight. Finally, I ask you and the House to believe that in connection with this matter I have been animated by no desire other than to serve loyally and to the best of my ability the interests of my country and the people I have had the honour to represent for many years. Mr. Speaker The hon. Member's observations about his motives will no 208 doubt appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT of today's proceedings. He must take procedural advice about securing some pronouncement on the other matter. I cannot do anything about it myself, much as I would like to help the hon. Member. Mr. Wigg Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. This case, like the recent one, has no place in the precedents of the House. This is a completely unique situation and my hon. Friend, therefore, has no recourse but to come to you and the House and seek guidance about the steps which should be followed. May I make one point plain? Not wishing to lack in generosity, we gave the Prime Minister notice that we intended to raise this matter today and, not wishing to lack in respect, we gave you notice, Sir. The Prime Minister's honour is not involved, but his competence is. My hon. Friend and I accepted statements made by the Prime Minister, doubtless made in good faith, but a Select Committee was refused and a judicial inquiry was refused and every point of fact was ignored and as a result Mr. Speaker It is perfectly true that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), with his usual courtesy, told me that he wanted to raise something of this kind. That does not entitle him to make a speech about it now. I would be obliged if he would make his point to me. Mr. Wigg I am coming to the point of order. [HON. MEMBERS:"Oh."] I do not know why hon. Members opposite resent this. This, like the previous case, concerns the security of the country. My hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) has been traduced. He has been Mr. Speaker There must be a point of order which arises now and which entitles the hon. Member to address me. I am not causing him to resume his seat with violence, or rapidly, but I must follow the rules of the House and know what is the point of order on which he has risen. Mr. Wigg The point of order is this, [Interruption.] I can understand and sympathise with the anxiety of hon. Members opposite. I do not want to use too strong words, although I

84

could use 209 the word"blackmail", but my hon. Friend was coerced into withdrawing a statement because of the action of the Government. The point is that either the Prime Minister had full knowledge, in which case he was a rogue, or he did not have full knowledge, in which case he was a fool. The House must decide what to do about it in relation to the honour of my hon. Friend. Mr. Speaker I want to know what the point of order is. With due respect, the whole thing is an abuse of our procedure unless there is a point of order. Mr. Wigg The point of order[An HON. MEMBER:"Bogus."] I wish that the hon. Member who made that statement would get up and say why it is bogus. My point of order is this, that my hon. Friend was coerced into making a personal statement withdrawing something which is known to be true. The Prime Minister, who was given notice, is not here, and he was the man who made the statement. In those circumstances, surely a method has to be found. I would have thought that we could leave it to the generosity of the Government to put a Motion on the Order Paper so that my hon. Friend would be able to withdraw his personal statement. Mr. Speaker I can help the hon. Member. If he feels in need of assistance about the procedure and practice of the House I would humbly offer my services to him in private, and, indeed, the officers of the House would be anxious to assist, but more than that on any point of order I cannot say. There is not one. Mr. H. Wilson On this point of order[HON. MEMBERS:"There is not one."] This is between us and you, Mr. Speaker. On the point of order[Interruption.] Mr. Speaker Order. I would be obliged if the House would keep quiet. I am being addressed and I desire to hear what is being said to me. Mr. H. Wilson On the point of order raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton), could you confirm what I, and, I think, some of us thought we heard you say earlier on this difficult matter of how the personal statement which my hon. Friend 210 was very much pressed and coerced into making could be withdrawn from the record or corrected? Did we understand you to say much earlier that you would take this matter under advisement, consider how this could be done, if it could be done at all, and report to the House? If that is what we understood you to say, it could end this business and we could get on with the foreign affairs debate. Mr. Speaker I do not think that I said that. I shall look at what I said. If I said that, I did not mean to say anything of the kind. The position is that as to the methods of recording the facts now revealed, and so on, and what happened in November, 1955, there are no doubt procedures available, but they do not arise now. I ask the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member in question, if they wish to do so, to come and consult us privately when we shall give all the advice we can about the available methods, but I can give no further help now. Mr. Bellenger What I should like to put to you, Mr. Speaker, is that this is the second occasion on which on the word of Ministers private Members have been forced to retract, apologise, or withdraw statements they have made in the House. Would you allow me to ask the

85

Leader of the House whether he can do something to ascertain what we could not ascertain before? Mr. Speaker Questions of this kind do not arise today. We concentrate a good deal on business matters on Thursday. If we had to argue business questions every day we should never get on at all. Mr. G. Brown I am a bit puzzled by what you have just said, Mr. Speaker, that if we wish to consult you privately you will give us some help. My hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) is in the unenviable position that he was pushed into withdrawing something which has turned out to be accurate. On what ground do you deny us in public the advice which he asks of you in public which you say you are willing to give in private? Mr. Speaker This is much too clever for me. I am not here to give guidance in public. That is not my duty. My 211 duty is to rule on points of order when they arise. I respectfully, and as courteously as I could, offered assistance in thinking out procedures whereby the hon. Gentleman might attain his end, but I have no right to detain the House by suggesting them now, and in any event would wish to think out the matter with those who can help me. There is no other mystery about it. The point is that it does not arise as a point of order at this moment, and we have much to do. ********************************************************************** BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE HC Deb 04 July 1963 vol 680 cc592-601 Mr. Wade Is it the right hon. Gentleman's intention that there should be a debate on the case of Mr. Harold Philby and the recent disclosures relating to him? Mr. Macleod No, Sir. I have no such intention. Sir A. V. Harvey Last wek, my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) asked the Leader of the House whether he would find time for legislation about an airport authority. Is the Leader of the House aware that London Airport urgently requires something to be done about it? As the previous Minister of Aviation said that there would be such an authority, will he give this matter his urgent attention? London Airport is rapidly becoming a disgrace to this country and legislation is required to deal with it. Mr. Macleod I am well aware that legislation is necessary to deal with this matter, but I know that my hon. Friend realises that it cannot come into the busines for next week or, at this stage, into the business for this Session. But I agree that it is an important matter and, of course, I take note of what he said. A good deal of study on this matter has taken place. Mr. Lipton Will the Leader of the House find time to discuss a Motion which I put down with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) relating to a personal statement which I made to the House on 10th November, 1955? If, for any reason, he does not like the terms in which the Motion is drafted, will he agree to enter into discussions with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley and myself with a view to an agreed Motion which will enable the House formally to permit me to withdraw that personal statement? 596

86

 [That this House deplores the fact that on 10th November, 1955, the hon. Member for Brixton was prevailed on by the formal assurances of the then Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bromley, to make a personal statement withdrawing and regretting charges and disclosures regarding Mr. Harold Philby, which the Government now belatedly admit to be true.] Mr. Macleod Naturally, in my capacity as Leader of the House I shall be very glad to discuss with the hon. Member and anybody he chooses to bring with him any matter concerning the business of the House. I can deal only with the Motion which now stands on the Order Paper, and I certainly do not propose to find time to debate that. Mr. Warbey Will the Leader of the House say when we shall have a debate on foreign affairs? When is the House to have an opportunity to discuss, in addition to the problems of and preparations for war, the problems of the Yemen, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cuba, Berlin, and other problems which are before the United Nations and which are likely to lead to breaches of the peace? Mr. Macleod I cannot suggest that there is any possibility of another foreign affairs debate at present. The hon. Member knows that we had a two-day debate on the subject, ending last night. On one particular matter which he mentioned, and only on one aspect of that in relation to the Yemen, there will be a statement in a few moments. Mr. P. Williams As the Government are to make an announcement in due course on policy in relation to the North-East, will my right hon. Friend agree that this would be a highly desirable subject to be debated by the House as soon as possible? Mr. Macleod It certainly is an extremely important subject and no doubt one which is in the mind of the Leader of the Opposition as the Opposition are considering the remaining days which are available. [Hon. Members:"Government time."] I cannot provide an opportunity within Government time. We have spent less time in this Session on legislation and more time on debate than, I think, in any single Session since 597 the war. That charge cannot be laid against the Government. There are opportunities available to the Opposition. Dr. King On Wednesday, we are to debate the Rochdale Report. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the ports of Britain and the areas around them have been anxiously awaiting some declaration of Government policy and of its attitude to the Report? Shall we merely have a general debate on the Report on Wednesday, or will the Leader of the House precede it by presenting a White Paper setting out the Government's views? Mr. Macleod The debate would take place on a Government Motion, which I think has already been tabled, welcoming the statement made by the Government on Wednesday, 6th March, on the Report. Naturally, my right hon. Friend will develop that statement when he opens the debate. Mr. Robert Cooke Will the Leader of the House indicate when time might be found to debate the Wilson Report on Noise? Will he say whether the Government intend to take effective action on this important subject? Mr. Macleod

87

I cannot suggest an early opportunity for debate, but I very much agree about the importance of this subject. The statement made in another place, repeated in this morning's HANSARD, shows the seriousness with which the Government regard this problem. Mr. Wigg Has the right hon. Gentleman given very careful consideration to the Motion standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton)? If he has, has he borne in mind the fact that if a wrong has been done to my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton, it is a wrong which has been done to the House as a whole? This House lives by precedent, and if this wrong is not put right, then in twenty or thirty years' time this precedent will guide a future Speaker in the conduct of a similar matter. Will the right hon. Gentleman not remember that recently, when some of the cards were in my hand, I went out of my way to meet the Government in this matter so that a similar situation could 598 be put right? Would not the Leader of the House reconsider his duty to the House and find time, not by discussions with my hon. Friend and myselfthat would be presumptuousbut by discussions between the usual channels to find a form of words which could be tabled without encroaching on either Government or Opposition time and in the interests of the House as a whole? Mr. Macleod I readily responded at once to the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton), and if wider consultations are required I should be glad to have them, too. The point which I have made is that I certainly could not accept any suggestion in the terms of the Motion which is on the Order Paper at present. Mr. H. Wilson Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that this is fundamentally a House of Commons matter? The issue raised at this stageI should hope that he would take this viewdoes not go into the wider questions of the Philby affair, which might be a matter for other handling. This is the second case in recent weeks where a problem has arisen about a personal statement, and we have no precedent to guide us in the whole history of Parliament, in Erskine May, and all the rest of it. It is important to get some declaration about it. Would the Leader of the House consider having discussions either through the usual channels or with my hon. Friends on the basis that perhaps an agreed Motion might be found which would enable the House to dispose of this matter quickly and without any controversial or acrimonious debate on the wider issues in order to get the record straight, because, as I say, this is a House of Commons matter? Mr. Macleod I recognise that it is a House of Commons matter, and I have said that I would have discussions either with the right hon. Member or with the hon. Members for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) and Dudley (Mr. Wigg). Mr. McMaster Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the need for an early debate on the affairs of Northern Ireland, in view of our heavy unemployment and the difficulties facing our shipbuilding, aviation and textile industries? 599 Mr. Macleod Yes, certainly. I am reasonably confident that we will be able to have such a debate before we rise for the Recess. Mr. Charles A. Howell

88

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman a question for his consideration when he is picking the days for the various debates? Will he give the House an assurance that the Minister of the Crown who is responsible for the Department concerned will be present in the House for the debate and will give priority to being here rather than accept engagements outside? Mr. Macleod Obviously, there is a supplementary question behind that question, and I am not informed on what the hon. Member has in mind. Dame Irene Ward Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that before he enters into any conversations with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and those who support him he will seek the views of some Members of Parliament who have been here for a long time? Is he aware that I have a great deal to say before we get involved in any Motion of any kind? I support the view that the Motion of the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) should be debated, but I am a bit tired of hearing hon. Members opposite talking as if they were the only people in the world Mr. Speaker Order. The fact that the hon. Lady has a great deal to say about the matter may take it outside business questions. Mr. Snow Does the Leader of the House recall that a few weeks ago I secured permission from the House to introduce a very modest Bill to amend the Public Health Act, 1961? Since the various outbreaks of typhoid are imposing strain on an increasing number of small authorities, will the Government provide some sort of help to get this very modest Bill through? Mr. Macleod I could not give that undertaking. As the hon. Member knows, the time for private Members' legislation in the ordinary way has been exhausted. There are many claimants and I cannot select from them. Mr. Grimond When the right hon. Gentleman is giving further thought to the Motion of the hon. Member for 600 Brixton (Mr. Lipton), will he consider whether there is not a perfectly good precedent for dealing with this? Is it not the custom of the House that when a Minister unwittingly misleads a Member of the House so that that Member, in turn, misleads the House, that Minister comes to the House and makes a statement, without prejudice, explaining the matter and making it clear that he unwittingly misled the Member in question? Mr. Macleod This subject is a great deal more complicated than that. If the right hon. Gentleman will read the speech of the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) in November, 1955, he will find that the hon. Member was interrupted on at least six occasions and that the majority of the interruptions were made by hon. Members on his own side, asking him to substantiate what he was saying. It is quite unfair to suggest that it was solely the statement of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary, which led to this situation. Dr. Bray Will the Leader of the House consider finding time to debate the Report of the Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries dealing with the electricity supply industry in view of the questions which it raises about the security of electricity supply and the public importance of maintaining that security?

89

 Mr. Macleod Yes, but the problems of the nationalised industries are dealt with under a sort of quota system, and I do not think that there is any time available. Mr. Wigg May I say to the Leader of the House that I entirely agree with the view which he has expressed about the 1955 debate? That is why I appeal to him as the Leader of the House. Mr. Macleod Exactly. That is why I sayperhaps to my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward)that I am, of course, prepared to discuss this matter with any Member of the House. I do not limit that in any way at all. But I think that it is a very much more complicated matter than the Leader of the Liberal Party suggests. Dame Irene Ward Let us have the truth. 601 Mr. Wigg I am much obliged to the Leader of the House for offering to have talks with my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton and myself. As this is a House of Commons matter, it would be entirely proper for the two Front Benches to discuss this matter first. Mr. Speaker If the hon. Member is addressing me, that is not a point on which I can express any view. I was rather hoping that we might bring business questions to an end soon. ********************************************************************** MR. PHILBY HC Deb 05 July 1963 vol 680 cc102-4W 102W Captain Kerby asked the Lord Privy Seal upon what date Her Majesty's Government first learned that Mr. Philby had moved behind the Iron Curtain; upon 103W what date Her Majesty's Government first learned that Mr. Philby was responsible for warning Messrs. Maclean and Burgess; and what details are known of any association between Mr. Philby and Mr. Blake, late of Her Majesty's Foreign Service and now serving a prison sentence for espionage. Mr. Heath As I informed the House on 1st July, there is, as yet, no certainty about Mr. Philby's whereabouts. It would not be appropriate for me to give details of either the exact time or place at which various items of information bearing on the case were received by Her Majesty's Government. I am not aware104W of any association between Mr. Philby and Mr. Blake. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 08 July 1963 vol 680 cc863-70 863 The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper: 51 and 56. Lieut-Colonel Cordeaux: To ask the Lord Privy Seal (1) if he will state the nature of the reply sent by him to the inquiry from the Observer newspaper on 28th February 864 1963, concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Philby; (2) by what authority an official of the Foreign Office urged the Observer newspaper to employ Mr. Philby; and whether his department or the Observer newspaper took the initiative in this matter. 52. Mr. A. Lewis: To ask the Lord Privy Seal on what date or dates Mr. Philby himself admitted that he worked for the Soviet authorities before 1946.

90

 55. Mr. Wade: To ask the Lord Privy Seal what assurances and recommendations were given to the editor of the Observer and the editor of the Economist by the Foreign Office before Mr. H. A. R. Philby was employed by them as a correspondent in the Middle East. 57 and 61. Mr. Grimond: To ask the Lord Privy Seal (1) what information was given by his Department to the Observer and other papers as to the suitability of Mr. Philby as a correspondent in the Middle East; (2) what evidence he has that Mr. Philby has been living outside British legal jurisdiction for the last seven years. 64. Mr. A. Lewis: To ask the Lord Privy Seal, in view of the Foreign Office's request for the resignation of Mr. Harold Philby as a security risk in 1951, why they advised his appointment with the Observer in 1956. The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath) Mr. Philby's name was given by the Foreign Office to the Observer in 1956 as a former journalist who was seeking employment. In reply to inquiries about him, the Foreign Office based itself on the statement made in the House of Commons by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary, on 7th November, 1955. The Foreign Office acted in this matter on the authority of that ministerial statement. The Observer was also informed that the circumstances in which Mr. Philby was asked to resign from the public service made it highly unlikely that he would ever again be employed in any 865 work involving access to official information. As I told the House on the 1st of July, he has had no such access since 1951. As to the Observer's inquiry on 28th February, 1963, the foreign editor of the Observer was given the same information as I gave the House on 20th March, in reply to a Question from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.Colonel Cordeaux) concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Philby. It was shortly before his disappearance on 23rd January, 1963, that Mr. Philby admitted that he worked for the Soviet authorities before 1946 and had warned Maclean, through Burgess, that the security services were about to take action against him. During the seven years before his disappearance Mr. Philby is known to have been living outside British jurisdiction, having made his home in Beirut. He paid a number of visits to the United Kingdom during that period. He is also believed, in the course of his journalistic activities, to have visited territories under British jurisdiction in the Middle East. Mr. A. Lewis The Lord Privy Seal has now admitted that Mr. Philby has been here at least on two occasions. Why did the right hon. Gentleman say that he had not been within British jurisdiction, when he was entertained here in London? If the right hon. Gentleman will look at the Daily Sketch of last Friday he will find that it seems to have more information than the Foreign Office. Why was it that only yesterday the deputy-editor of the Observer said that at no time had that paper had any inquiries made of it officially by M.I.5. or anyone working for M.I.5? Why not? Mr. Heath As I said in my original statement a week ago, Mr. Philby had lived outside British jurisdiction. I stated today that he made his home in Beirut and was domiciled in the Lebanon. I have also said today that he made visits to this country and also, in his journalistic activities, to some colonial territories in the Middle East. As for the last supplementary question, it would not have been appropriate, in inquiries made about Mr. Philby, to have made inquiries from the newspapers. 866

91

 Mr. Grimond Does the right hon. Gentleman not think it rather strange that, when, as we have been informed, the file has been open during all these years, and inquiries have been going on, the Observer was encouraged to take on Mr. Philby and employ him in Beirut? Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us when it was suspected that Mr. Philby was a possible agent? Why were no inquiries made of the Observer and why did the Lord Privy Seal say that during the last seven years Mr. Philby has been living outside British legal jurisdiction? Surely the point was that he was not available for questioning, otherwise what was the point? Did the right hon. Gentleman know that during that time Mr. Philby had visited Britain and had been within the jurisdiction and could have been available for questioning? Mr. Heath Mr. Philby was recommended to the Observer in 1956 on the strength of a statement made to the House of Commons that there was no evidence against him at that time. [Hon. Members:"Why?"] I am coming to that point. He was recommended because it was thought not unreasonable, and, indeed, wise, at that time that he should be in employment. [Hon. Members:"Why?"] There is a difference between the reason why he was asked to resign in 1951 by the then Foreign Secretary, because of his previous association, and the question of employment with a newspaper. It was thought, as the then Foreign Secretary stated in the House of Commons in 1955, that there was no evidence against him, and that it was not unreasonable that he should be employed by a newspaper. For that reason, it was put to the Observer. As for the second part of the question with which the right hon. Gentleman was concerned, I was aware that Mr. Philby had made his home in Beirut. The point about the legal jurisdiction was that it was possible to reach conclusions, as a result of the admissions made by Mr. Philby, only at a time when he was living outside British legal jurisdiction. He did not return to this country between that time and the time he disappeared. I was not aware of the details of his return to this country during the course of his journalistic conferences with his papers. 867 Mr. Wall Would my right hon. Friend make quite clear who took the initiative in finding Mr. Philby a job? Was it the Foreign Office or the Observer. Mr. Heath The Foreign Office took the initiative with the Observer, The Observer took the initiative with the Economist. Mr. Grimond I am greatly obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, but did he know when he answered Questions last Monday that Mr. Philby had visited this country at least twice? Mr. Heath I stated very clearly that I was not aware of the details of his return to this country. Mr. Biggs-Davison Since the Observer and the Economist have considerable attention paid to them, particularly, perhaps, overseas, may we now hope that since Mr. Philby must have influenced their judgment on the Nasserite rgime there will be an agonising reappraisal of their Middle East views on the part of these two journals? Mr. Heath It was a question for the two papers employing him to judge his work and its value to them. It was entirely within their competence and for them to decide whether he should continue in their employment. It will be seen from the Observer yesterday that it

92

discussed in great detail the quality of his work while he was employed by the newspaper. Mr. G. Brown Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this extraordinary position? The Foreign Office asks a man to resign for reasons which had to do with his past political associations. Why did the Foreign Office then take the initiative to get a newspaper to employ him in the Middle East? The Foreign Office is not normally an employment agency. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this sort of thing is bringing out in the open a lot of things which as a rule ought to remain not discussed in the open? Why did the Foreign Office do this? Mr. Heath There seems to be a slight contradiction in the right hon. Gentleman saying that these matters ought not to be discussed in the open and then asking me directly why the suggestion 868 was made about Mr. Philby. I ask the right hon. Gentleman, who has certain experience of these matters, to recognise that fact. After Mr. Philby was asked to resign in 1951 by the then Foreign Secretary, because of his previous associations, there was a period in which he had some employment, arranged presumably by himself. In 1955, the then Foreign Secretary stated that after a thorough examination of this matter no evidence had been found against Mr. Philby and, therefore, no charge of any kind was brought against him. In these circumstances it was thought not unreasonable, and, indeed, in some circumstances, as perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will now recognise, wise, that it should be suggested that he should resume his previous journalistic employment. For that reason an approach was made to the Observer. Dame Irene Ward While detesting Communism, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he thinks that in this free world, for which at the appropriate time many Communists fought, nobody who had Communist leanings at any time should ever be able to earn a livelihood again? Would my right hon. Friend like me to outline in the House the number of Communists appointed by right hon. Gentlemen opposite when they were in office? Mr. Heath I think that my hon. Friend is referring to the point which I was trying to makethat there is a difference between the reasons for which Mr. Philby was asked to resign, owing to his previous associations, and which surely are not incompatible with employment on a newspaper if the proprietors so decide, and the question of his security risk in Government employment where he has access to secret information. Mr. G. Brown Is the Lord Privy Seal aware of what he is now saying? The only interest of the Foreign Office in this man being employed by somebody so that he could work in the Middle East could have been a Foreign Office interest. What was that Foreign Office interest? Was it that he should be available for work that he had been doing before, which was security work? Why should the Foreign Office put itself out, 869 when a man had been asked to resign because he was not regarded as security-worth-while, and ask somebody else to employ him to go back there to do security work; and subsequently, when he was found out not to be security worth-while, why should not the Foreign Office accept responsibility? Mr. Heath The right hon. Gentleman is not entitled to draw the conclusions that he has just drawn. In any case, he will not expect me to make any further comment upon conclusions of that kind.

93

 Mr. Burden My right hon. Friend gave the House to understand, I believe, that the abilities of this journalist were assessed by the newspaper that employed him, but surely their assessment of his value and of his ability was coloured by the fact that he was suggested for employment by the Foreign Office. Dame Irene Ward Rubbish. Mr. Burden I do not believe that is rubbish. Is it not dangerous for the Foreign Office to suggest to newspapers that any particular journalist should be given employment? Is this proper behaviour? Mr. Heath No suggestions were made by the Foreign Office about the quality of Mr. Philby's work, or his capacity for carrying out journalistic tasks. What the Foreign Office did was to suggest his name to the Observer, and it was always the responsibility of the Observer[Interruption.] I am dealing with my hon. Friend's question. It was always the responsibility of the Observer and the Economist, or whoever else employed Mr. Philby, to make a judgment about his work. If my hon. Friend casts his mind back to the time of these episodes he will recollect that one of these newspapers took the view that Mr. Philby had been somewhat unfairly treated in that at the time when there was no evidence against him he was unable to secure employment. Mr. M. Foot Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the statement he made a week ago about Mr. Philby was because of the Government's ingrained preference for complete candour, or was there a less evident reason for it? 870 Mr. Heath I made the statement to the House because all the possible conclusions had been reached in this case, and I thought it right to tell the House at that time what those conclusions were. It is for similar reasons that I have answered these Questions after the normal Question hour today. Mr. Gordon Walker The right hon. Gentleman has told us that Mr. Philby made his admission just before his disappearance, presumably last January. Could he explain why, on 20th March, he told the House that he had given the House all the information in the Government's possession? Did he not know about this admission at that time, or was he not giving us all the information in his possession? Mr. Heath I can give the answer to that one very easily. The Question asked by my hon. and gallant Friend who asked Question No. 51 today concerned the whereabouts of Mr. Philby. If the right hon. Gentleman looks at my Answer he will see that I gave all the information that we had at the time about Mr. Philby's whereabouts. It was later than that that we gained further information about the suggestion that he might have gone behind the Iron Curtain. As the work on this particular case was still being carried on, it would, in any event, have been quite inappropriate for me and not in the national interest to have given such other information as we had. Several Hon. Members rose Mr. Speaker

94

We cannot debate this matter now without a Question before the House. [An Hon. Member:"It ought to be debated."] That may be, but not now. ********************************************************************** MR. H. G. BALFOUR PAUL HC Deb 09 July 1963 vol 680 c131W 131W Mr. W. Hamilton asked the Lord Privy Seal on what date or dates Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul was questioned in connection with the Philby affair. Mr. Heath At no tune has he been questioned about this. He has had no connection with, nor been in any way privy to, the investigation which preceded Mr. Philby's disappearance. ********************************************************************** BURGESS AND MACLEAN HC Deb 09 July 1963 vol 680 c133W 133W Q1. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Prime Minister whether he will move to appoint a tribunal under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921 to inquire into matters concerning Messrs. Philby, Burgess and Maclean. ********************************************************************** MR. PHILBY HC Deb 11 July 1963 vol 680 c175W 175W Mr. W. Hamilton asked the Lord Privy Seal on what date Her Majesty's Government first knew that Mr. Philby had passed on a warning to Messrs. Burgess and Maclean. Mr. Heath As I told the House on 8th July, it was shortly before Philby's disappearance on 23rd January, 1963, that he admitted that he had warned Maclean through Burgess. News of his admission reached Her Majesty's Government not long after it was made. This was the first admission by Philby of which we had knowledge and the first occasion on which we knew of this fact. ********************************************************************** FOREIGN OFFICE (EX-OFFICIAL) HC Deb 15 July 1963 vol 681 cc26-7 26 25. Mr. Shinwell asked the Lord Privy Seal on how many occasions in the last 10 years the Foreign Office has asked British newspapers to find employment for ex-officials of that Department. Mr. Heath Full records are not kept of approaches made by the Foreign Office to outside employers on behalf of former employees. But the Foreign Office always tries to help former members of the Service, who have retired or resigned, to find jobs for which they appear to be suitably qualified. Mr. Shinwell Is it not most unusual for the Foreign Office to seek employment for an ex-official of the Department who has beer at one time or another under suspicion, to put it no higher than that? Can the right hon. Gentleman inform the House who was the Foreign Office official who approached the Observer in order to try to obtain employment for Mr. Philby? Mr. Heath

95

I dealt last week with the case which the right hon. Gentleman is raising. As for the general matters to which his Question refers, I should have thought that it was not unusual but only the work of any good employer to try to help people in those circumstances. Dame Irene Ward May I ask my right hon. Friend whether, if we are to have this question perpetually from the other side of the House, he could please 27 inform me on whose authority Burgess became established in the Foreign Office at the time of the Labour Government? Mr. Speaker That question is again hypothetical. Dame Irene Ward On a point of order. It is not hypothetical at all. Mr. Speaker I am sorry to differ from the hon. Lady, as at all times, but a proposition beginning, "If we are to have this question"appears to me to be hypothetical. Mr. Shinwell The right hon. Gentleman has just informed the House that he dealt with one aspect of my Question last week, but he did not tell the House who was the Foreign Office official who approached the Observer to obtain employment for Mr. Philby. Can we now be informed? Mr. Heath No, Sir. I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to tell the House of Commons the name of a particular official dealing with matters in the Foreign Office. This was dealt with through the usual channels. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 15 July 1963 vol 681 c19W 19W 87. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Prime Minister on what date early this year Mr. Harold Philby was invited to an official dinner by the ambassador at the British Embassy in Beirut; for what purpose he was invited; and whether he will give the names of those in attendance at this dinner party. The Prime Minister I would ask the hon. Member to await my Answer to Questions on this subject tomorrow. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 16 July 1963 vol 681 cc334-6 334 Q7. Mr. MacDermot asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement following the further inquiries into the case of Mr. Philby. Q8 Mr. W. Hamilton asked the Prime Minister (1) on what date in the last seven years Mr. H. Philby renewed his passport; (2) whether Mr. H. A. R. Philby was invited by Her Majesty's Government to return to Great Britain at any time in the last three months; and what was the nature of the reply to such invitation. Q10. Mr. Greenwood

96

asked the Prime Minister what instructions were given by his Department to diplomatic representatives in the Middle East as to the kinds of information which should or should not be made available to Mr. Philby. Q11. Mr. Lipton asked the Prime Minister on how many occasions Mr. Philby was asked to official functions in Beirut by the British Embassy during the last three years. The Prime Minister I have made the most careful investigation into all the relevant events in this case and I have discussed them in detail with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. I hope the House will accept that it would not be in the national interest for hon. Members to inquire further into the past history of the case and I would ask the House therefore to refrain from any further public discussion of these matters. Mr. MacDermot I appreciate the difficulties about public discussion of this matter, but can I put two questions to the Prime Minister? First, does he not agree that the statement that Mr. Philby worked with the Soviet authorities before 1946 is perhaps the most serious aspect of the matter, in view of the position then held by him? Secondly, did the assertions by the Lord Privy Seal, that the security services had never closed 335 their files on this matter and that they thought that it was wise that Mr. Philby should be helped to find other employment, mean that he was still regarded then as being a security risk and, if so, was not this singularly unwise employment to find for him? The Prime Minister I appreciate the hon. and learned Member's knowledge of these matters in which, I think, he has some experience. He will also know the importance of the old tradition of the House that we should not discuss some of these aspects of our national functions. I would only appeal to the House to revert to this older tradition, which I think is in the national interest. I have had the advantage of having discussions with the Leader of the Oppositionanother very old tradition of our Parliamentary systemand I hope to have further discussions with him as to the best way in which we can try to regulate these affairs in the general interests of the nation. Mr. Hamilton Does the Prime Minister appreciate that we well understand why he wants to play this down, but can he specifically answer my first Question, namely, when Philby applied for the renewal of his passport and whether he was questioned by the authorities at that time about his past movements? Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that this is a question not of security but of the facts of the case, which the House has a right to have in its possession? The Prime Minister No, Sir. We lead from one question to another and one question leads to another. It is dangerous and bad for our general national interest to discuss these matters. It has been a very long tradition of the House to trust the relations between the two parties to discussions between the Leader of the Opposition of the day and the Prime Minister of the day. I ask the House now to revert to the older tradition[Hon. Members: "No."] which I think is in our real interests. Otherwise, we would risk destroying services which are of the utmost value to us. Mr. H. Wilson Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I can confirm what he has just said? In the two meetings which we have had, he has given my 336 right hon. Friend and me a very full and frank account of this case, which raises a number of issues which, frankly, cannot

97

be discussed across the Floor of the House. While we still have some grave anxieties about the way in which it has been handled, which I think it best we should pursue in further confidential discussions with the right hon. Gentleman, we feel that in the public interest this is a matter which should now be left where it is and not made the subject of further public discussion or public inquiry. The Prime Minister I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. As he knows, I am always willing to discuss with him, as I was with his predecessor, all these matters which always, through our history, have been questions outside party and which the Leader of the Opposition of the day and the Prime Minister of the day have a right and duty to discuss with each other. Mr. Grimond While appreciating what the Prime Minister has said, may I ask him whether he is aware that the Government and the House also have a duty to the public? A statement was made in the House, no doubt quite rightly, and the public are naturally interested in certain aspects of this case. Apart from the security aspects, there has been considerable speculation about how it came that this man was recommended to a newspaper, which apparently was not informed or warned or in any way asked about the inquiries which subsequently went on. It would be useful for the public at large if the Prime Minister could assure us that there was no lack of liaison between whatever branch is inquiring into Mr. Philby's activities and the Foreign Office, which apparently was not in a position to warn the Observer what was going on. The Prime Minister This question is just an example of the danger of being led into answering exactly the kind of points which the right hon. Gentleman has made. If he had any experience which, alas, I have and which others haveof the operations which we are forced to undertake in the present condition of the world, he would not have put his question. ********************************************************************** MR. PHILBY HC Deb 16 July 1963 vol 681 cc44-5W 45W Captain Kerby asked the Prime Minister (1) whether, in view of the fact that Mr. Philby was due to dine with him on the night of 23rd January, 1963, as his guest, the First Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy, Beirut, had been specifically ordered to regard Mr. Philby as an unauthorised person to whom any official information should not be disclosed under security regulations; (2) in accordance with which specific terms of his engagement Mr. H. A. R. Philby was paid 3,000 compensation out of public funds when he was requested to resign from Her Majesty's Foreign Service. The Prime Minister I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answer which I gave to Questions on this subject today. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Prime Minister (1) why, in view of the fact that Mr. Harold Philby confessed five months ago, the House of Commons was not informed at that time; (2) what action he took to ascertain whether Mr. Harold Philby entered this country within the last seven years. The Prime Minister I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer which I gave to Questions on this subject today.

98

********************************************************************** HON. MEMBER FOR BRIXTON (PERSONAL STATEMENT) HC Deb 17 July 1963 vol 681 c682 682 The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod) I beg to move, That this House desires formally to record that the assumptions which prompted the honourable Member for Brixtonto make a personal statement on 10th November, 1955, regarding Mr. Harold Philby were wrong and that his allegation of 25th October, 1955, has been justified by subsequent events. I move this Motion in circumstances that are unusual and, I believe, unprecedented. I believe, after reflection, that this is the right action to take and I therefore thought it right to draw up this Motion, to put my name to it as Leader of the House, and to commend it to the House. Mr. Marcus Lipton (Brixton) I thank the Leader of the House for moving the Motion. Question put and agreed to. ********************************************************************** MR. HAROLD PHILBY HC Deb 22 July 1963 vol 681 c131W 131W 58. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he will give the actual time and date before 23rd January, 1963, when Mr. Harold Philby admitted warning Maclean, through Burgess; and what was the actual time and date that this information was given to Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Heath I have nothing to add to the reply given to Questions on this subject by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 16th July. ********************************************************************** LORD DENNING (INQUIRY) HC Deb 30 July 1963 vol 682 cc234-7 234 Q8. Mr. Shinwell asked the Prime Minister if he will state an approximate date for the publication of the Report by Lord Denning. The Prime Minister I do not yet know the approximate date on which I shall receive Lord Denning's Report, so I am unable to give the right hon. Gentleman any information about publication. Mr. Shinwell If the Prime Minister receives Lord Denning's Report during the recess could he, without impinging on security, circulate substantial parts of it to right hon. and hon. Members? Is it likely that he will be able to comply with my request, which is a very reasonable one, before the date of the election? The Prime Minister What I undertook to do I will do. I undertook to discuss the Report, as soon as I received it, with the Leader of the Opposition. The Government will then decide the form in which it is to be published, whether in whole or in part. Mr. Shinwell Does not the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that, while it is quite proper and in common form that he should consult the Leader of the Opposition, right hon. and hon. Members are also entitled to know what Lord Denning's findings arewithout, of course, impinging on security? The Prime Minister

99

The first thing to do is to receive the Report and then I will carry out exactly what I told the House I would do. 235 Mr. Bellenger This is not the first occasion when the Prime Minister has seemed to suggest that this is a matter for him and the Leader of the Opposition alone. Although one recognises that there are many matters of high security which must be kept comparatively secret, nevertheless is not the House of Commons entitled to know something about this matter, having helped to set up the inquiry? The Prime Minister It is very common practice, and a very good one, that the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister or the Leader of the House should consult on matters of this kind. But I think the first thing is to receive the Report. Mr. H. Wilson In order that there may be no misunderstandingas obviously there isis not the position the Prime Minister has taken up on this as follows? In the case of the Radcliffe Report, which contained some, although not a great deal of, security matters, he did me the courtesy of showing me the whole of the Report from which, after discussion, certain security aspects were cut out and I was able to tell the House, as he himself did, that these did not invalidate the Report. Is it not now the Prime Minister's intention to show me the Denning Report so that there should be the same consultation about deletions? Is that still the Prime Minister's position? Will the minutes of evidence also be made available in the same way? The Prime Minister When I receive the Report I will discuss it with the right hon. Gentleman, and the Government must then decide the form in which it is to be published. It is perfectly clear, and I have said this several times. But I do not think that this will lead to any great difference of opinion. In any case, the first thing is to see what the Report says. Mr. Wilson In a sense, both the Prime Minister and I have been put on the spot by some of these exchanges. Will he just confirm that he intends the procedure to be the same as that followed in the case of the Report of the Vassall Tribunal? This is that he will show me Lord Denning's Report and that we shall discuss it and the question of what should be deleted on grounds of 236 security? Obviously, in the last resort, the Government's wishes about security deletions must prevail; there was no disagreement last time at all about that. Is that what the right hon. Gentleman intends to do, and does his offer to show me the Report include the minutes of evidence? The Prime Minister I do not know about the minutes of evidence because I have not yet seen them, I will discuss the Report with the right hon. Gentleman. I hope that we shall agree what ought to be omitted either on security or on any other grounds. [Hon. Members: "No."] When we have done that, the responsibility must rest with the Government. Mr. Shinwell Would the right hon. Gentleman say on what other grounds he is entitled to exclude hon. Members from knowing what Lord Denning's findings are? Will he answer that specifically and categorically? The Prime Minister I do not know how Lord Denning proposes to make his Report. He may decide to make it in various forms, whether in full or whether he himself would suggest a form in which he wishes it to be published. All this is very difficult to discuss until we see the Report.

100

Mr. H. Wilson Is not the right hon. Gentleman putting himself and all of us in a rather extraordinary position by his answer? Is he aware that the longstanding arrangement between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, which in the case of the Radcliffe Report and, if I may say so, the Philby case, worked very well, is based on the position that the Leader of the Opposition is in a sense trustee to the House and to some extent to the country to be able to certify that what has been deleted by the Government had to be deleted on the ground of security? Has not the Prime Minister rather altered that position, or suggested some possible alteration, and made it difficult for the Leader of the Opposition of the day, whoever he may be, to discharge that trusteeship responsibility, if he suggests that there is to be any exclusion of material on other than security grounds? The Prime Minister I think that that will not present any great difficulties. I 237 feel certain that when we discuss it together, as we have other matters, we shall agree in the same way. ********************************************************************** UNITED KINGDOM AND EASTERN EUROPE (DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION) HC Deb 02 August 1963 vol 682 cc832-48 832 1.14 p.m. Commander Anthony Courtney (Harrow, East) I am grateful for the opportunity to raise today a question which has been of some concern to me for some time past, namely, the mutual diplomatic representation between the United Kingdom and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. I wish to call attention to certain anomalies which I believe exist within that representation and to suggest to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State ways in which perhaps those anomalies might be corrected. I say at the outset that in this debate I am inhibited slightly by the fact that I have received much excellent hospitality and made a number of friends in the diplomatic missions of the countries to which I am about to refer. At this early stage I stress the hope that that hospitality will not be in any way mitigated by what I say today. As an amateur in the art of diplomacy I am depending, as many of my hon. Friends do, on textbooks such as Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice. I think it germane to this discussion to say that this was one of the first diplomatic textbooks which was translated into Russian. Diplomacy in this textbook is defined as: The conduct of business between states by peaceful means. I think we might add, with mutual agreement, that the object of such diplomacy is the improvement of relations between nations. For this purpose, by long usage, certain diplomatic immunities have been established and they are referred to in Satow's book in these words: Diplomatic immunities are founded on common usage and tacit consent on the understanding that they will be reciprocally accorded. It is further laid down that for the obvious use of the diplomat's operating art it is essential that a diplomatic agent should be able to communicate fully and 833 in all security on matters in which he is engaged. One might hold that that practice was not necessarily applicable to Governments of fairly recent vintage established by revolutionary action, but to the contrary, the Soviet Union, in its Decree of 14th January, 1927, declared that: Diplomatic representatives in their country, including commercial representatives, enjoy personal immunity on a basis of reciprocity and are not subject to administrative or judicial arrest or detention. I think that one can say with justice that the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries of Eastern Europe look upon the practice of diplomacy slightly differently from Western

101

countries. Those countries, we must note, have one strong thing in common. They have single-party Governments, the basis of which is the Communist Party which owes a great measure of control to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In fact Soviet influence appears to be predominant in all these countries. The theoretical basis of diplomacy under Communism also has a slightly different slant from that which we have in the West. I think the standpoint has never been lost that Soviet and other Socialist missions in foreign countriesI, of course, refer particularly to the United Kingdomare useful instruments for the presentation of the Communist image. To put that in general terms, it could sometimes be described as propaganda, which again in turn derives, as I think historians such as the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) would agree, from the very early practical example given by Trotsky at BrestLitovsk of appealing to peoples over the heads of negotiators and over the heads of Governments. It is quite natural, and perhaps we should not be surprised, that this influence does actually obtain, but there is another and rather more sinister aspect of Soviet Communist diplomacy generally to which I wish to draw attention. It has surely become evident from the events of the past few years that Socialist diplomatic missions in this country are looked upon as useful cover for secret police activities. These can be classified under three broad headings. In the first place, there is published evidence of the attempted recruitment of agents from among British 834 nationals by accredited diplomatic personnel. Perhaps I may mention the name of the Soviet attach Rogov, whom I knew, and the Yugoslav Pecjak in this connection. Secondly, it is established, again in published evidence, that diplomatic personnel have been used as the so-called "controllers" of existing agents in this country. We had the mention of Gregory in the Vassall case and the reference to Karpekov in this connection in the recent trial of the Italian nuclear scientist. Thirdly, there is recent evidence of an even more sinister character among these diplomats, namely, the expert conduct of research into the sleazier sections of our society, as exemplified by a naval colleague, Commander Ivanov. Surely, these facts, as I believe them to beculled from desperately little evidence, I agreeare supported by the fact that since 1949, when it can be said that the Iron Curtain really came down, 17 Soviet and other Communist diplomats have been declared persona non grata by Her Majesty's Government. There are other instances, as the House well knows, of the swift departure of diplomats from these missions shortly before, to use a journalistic expression, the "breaking" of news on security cases. Here I should like to express a few doubts and to ask a question. Why cannot we have details in this House of diplomats who are declared persona non grata in this way? What prejudice to British interests, if there is such a thing, is involved in not disclosing these matters? Surely, if in the opinion of the country which extends him hospitality a diplomat has been guilty of conduct which requires his removal, the first thing to do, and which is done, is that the Foreign Secretary speaks to the ambassador concerned. Are we, therefore, to assume that if, say, the Polish Ambassador is given such information by the Foreign Secretry, it is to be denied to Members of this House? I should very much welcome a little enlightenment from my hon. Friend the UnderSecretary of State on this subject. From the weight of evidence availableand a mass of conjecture has rather swamped the facts which have been given to usit is, none the less, fairly certain that in the opinion of reasonable men embassy contacts in the missions 835 to which I am referring were used for contact lines of communication for such individuals as Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blake and others. I say in parenthesis that this would not apply to a man like

102

Houghton who, some of us thinkwithout much background knowledge, admittedly was probably working for a different organisation, the G.R.U., and had his extradiplomatic contact in Lonsdale. Is it sufficient, furthermore, that if personal contacts exist, as I believe they do, in these cases, they should be left at that? Obviously, they cannot. There must be a physical means of passing the information, where it is bulk information, back to the country where use is to be made of it. An obvious conclusion here must be that the diplomatic facilities accorded in accordance with the ancient practice which I have described are misused and have been misused probably over a considerable period for this purpose. I think that I have said enough to confirm what must be in the minds of many people who have thought of these affairs, that diplomatic privileges in our sense of the term have beenperhaps, still are beingabused by the missions of the countries to whom I am referring. Another aspect of this is the treatment by the Governments concerned of United Kingdom missions in their respective capitals. Here again, there are anomalies to which I should like to draw attention. It would seemthis is a long story, but I have had personal experience of these mattersthat the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe look upon United Kingdom missions in their countries from two main points of view: first, as a convenient post office medium for the exchange of official communications, but, at the same time, as representatives of the United Kingdom who must be debarred from any real contact with the peoples of the countries to which they are accredited. One sees in that the remarkable difference in opportunity of real contact with Russians, Poles and others between diplomatic personnel in Warsaw and Moscow and between visiting businessmen, among whom I include myself. It is, I am afraid, true that our missions in those countries are subjected in vary- 836 ing extent to a degree of restriction and harassmentI cannot express it otherwisewhich applies both physically and administratively and which severely reduces the efficiency of these organisations as diplomatic media. They require, in addition, a disproportionate number of administrative personnel to look after what I could describe in military terms as the "teeth" of our missions, namely, the high-grade diplomatic personnel. At the same time, however, they do not allow the full employment of British nationals, requiring the employment of locally-recruited personnel, such as Mikhailsky, the Pole, who was of such considerable use to the Soviet secret police during his term of employment at the British Embassy in Moscow. That brings me to my second point in that connection. It would seem that the individuals belonging to our diplomatic missions in these countries are looked upon by their hosts as a target for the activities of the local secret services. We have surely had enough examples recently to bear out this conviction. We have had the seduction of Vassall in Moscow by Mikhailsky. We had the subversion of Houghton in Warsaw. We had the seductionagain, I use the word advisedlyof an air attach in Warsaw by a notorious and extremely attractive Polish agent-provocateur, all these, incidentally, under the noses of their respective ambassadors. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary knows of many other cases, successful and unsuccessful, of action against British individuals in these missions abroad. It is of interest in that connection that over 200 Foreign Service personnel have had to leave their posts in these missions since 1949 before the expiration of their normal term. Seventy-eight of these have left for reasons of misconduct or unsuitability. I cannot believe that these figures do not reflect to a considerable degree the activities of the secret police in those countries. I think that I have said enough to indicate my belief that

103

the principle of reciprocity in diplomatic practice and the same principle in the treatment of respective diplomatic personnel has not been observed between the United Kingdom and the countries to which I am referring. May I turn to numbers and to the relative strengths of the missions in the 837 United Kingdom and these countries? I think that it will be convenient to the House if I divide them into two, firstly United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and secondly, the United Kingdom and the remaining countries of the bloc. Where career diplomatic personnel bearing diplomatic immunity are concerned, the Soviet Union, by my calculation, has in this country at present 58 individuals. The corresponding figure for the British in Moscow is 39, a balance in favour of the Soviet Union of 19. Of the others, the British and Soviet nationals attached to their respective embassies and living in London or Moscow respectively, the numbers are Soviet 195, British 70in this case a Soviet preponderance of 125. When one breaks these figures down into the commercial representation, to which I shall draw special attention in a moment, the Russians have 125 and the Britishand this is a rather difficult calculationhave eight, the figure including two or possibly three B.E.A. representatives in Moscow. This gives a Soviet preponderance in commercial representation of 117. There are three commercial attachs diplomatically immune on each side, which makes no preponderance on either side. According to my calculations, the other Socialist countries have in this country a representation of 255 diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel, with 147 British personnel accredited to missions in those countries, a preponderance in favour of the Socialist countries of 108. Therefore, once again we see anomalies and lack of reciprocity not only in diplomatic conduct but also in numbers of mutual representation. Incidentally, nowhere in the diplomatic textbook, which I know many of us have studied, is the word "espionage" even mentioned. I am sure that my hon. Friend will say that the reason for the disparity on the commercial side is due mainly to a fact which we all know about and of which some of us have had experience. The Russians and these other countries operate State trading organisations which require a higher proportion of State servants in foreign countries to conduct their commercial affairs. We, on the other hand, by our system of private enterprise, send businessmen 838 over to Russia. I would lay a small bet, if that were in order, that my hon. Friend will mention the large number of Soviet trade delegation personnel in this country as being set against a comparable number of British businessmen visiting the Soviet Union. That is really not quite a valid comparison. A point which is often forgotten in this context is the very large number of Soviet and satellite technical and commercial delegations who are continually visiting firms and institutions in this country. I prefer to set these last against the numbers of British business men visiting the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries, leaving an unexplained preponderance of over 100 personnel by any calculation which I am able to make. This represents a glaring disparity on any count and an unhealthy state of affairs which can and should be corrected in the interests of ourselves and of these countries themselves. On the security aspect in which I have taken a certain interest and which I consider to be the most serious side of what we are discussing, it is surely reasonable to say, without any knowledge of this service, that our security service must be overburdened by the sheer weight of numbers resulting from the disparity to which I have drawn attention. I wonder whether I shall be greeted by my hon. Friendthough I think he is too wise by the old reply to such questions, "It is a very good thing to know who the foreign agents are so that we can keep a file and make sure with whom they make their

104

contacts." If that is so, I suggest that the price we have paid over the last 15 years has been heavy, and much too heavy to make up for any reasons which can be advanced in favour of such a state of affairs. The average of over 10 years during which Burgess, Maclean, Fuchs, Pontecorvo, Vassall, Philby and the rest have worked for our enemies is a high price to pay for the luxury of allowing our security service to be overburdened in this way. It would be only fair at this stage to refer back and give the Foreign Office credit for what has been done in the past to overcome the more glaring aspects of this affair. As I have said, 17 diplomats have been made personae non gratae since 1949. There has been placed on these diplomatic personnel a 839 rather half-hearted limitation of movement, such as that which requires a Soviet or Socialist diplomat who comes to this country to notify the Foreign Office when he wishes to travel a distance of over 25 miles from London. This is what has been done in the past. I suggest that for the future the circumstances justify a slightly more rigid application of the practice of persona non grata just as soon as it comes to the attention of our authorities that a diplomat is working in a way which excepts him from the normal conduct of diplomacy as defined by our ancient rules. Cannot we take a leaf out of the French book here? The French have turned out over three times the number in the equivalent period. I believe that many of them were Polish citizens. I should be interested to hear what my hon. Friend has to say on that point. Cannot we rectify that disparity of about 20 in the diplomatic personnel between ourselves and the Soviet Union and also pro rata between us and the other nations concerned? ********************************************************************** The Late Guy Burgess HC Deb 03 December 1963 vol 685 c970 970 32. Mr. A. Lewis asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will ensure that no moneys or bequests from the late Guy Burgess are transmitted to Moscow to Mr. Kim Philby. Mr. Maudling No, Sir. The late Guy Burgess was non-resident for the purposes of Exchange Control. Under the normal rules, any assets of his estate in this country are freely transferable to any other country. Mr. Lewis Is not the Chancellor aware that most people would think it very wrong for currency to go out of the country to this particular individual? Mr. Maudling In the first place, the currency is already out because he was non-resident. In the second place, I think that it is absolutely wrong for the Government to use powers given to them for one purpose for a quite different purpose. ********************************************************************** GEORGE BLAKE (ESCAPE FROM PRISON) HC Deb 31 October 1966 vol 735 cc41-4 41 Mr. Heath (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the possible implications for national security of the escape of George Blake. The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson) rose Mr. Gwilym Roberts On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman the temporary Leader of the Opposition[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]

105

 Mr. Speaker Order. The hon. Member does not advance his point of order by trying to make political points. 42 Mr. Roberts Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to bring the House into disrepute by using this Chamber to make political capital out of the movements of a convicted spy? Mr. Speaker Order. I have an idea that this Chamber is a place where political capital is made from time to time. The Prime Ministerto answer the Private Notice Question. The Prime Minister Yes, Sir. Inquiries on this were immediately set in train the moment Blake's escape was reported. They have confirmed that he has had no access to official information since September, 1960; that all possible measures were taken at that time to neutralise any further exploitation against this country of information which he had disclosed; and that his escape should not therefore result in further damage to national security. In accordance with the normal practice in cases of this kind, I have already discussed the matter with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, and, of course, I shall be in touch with him again if any new information comes to light. Mr. Heath The House will be glad to have the assurance which the Prime Minister has just given and to know that he has satisfied himself that in his view George Blake cannot do further damage to the national interest. As the right hon. Gentleman has said, he has had talks with me in the usual way about this matter. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in a case of such national importance and international significance, as I have described it, the country feels that it is entitled to an independent assurance such as was envisaged through the Security Commission in any normal security case? It would be an independent view which could be made public. Is he aware that because of the terms of reference of the Security Commission, this case does not, in fact, fit those circumstances? Therefore, will he consider, so that there should be an independent assurance to the country, either that the terms of the Security Commission should be adapted or another suitable form of inquiry should be made which could then give its own views to the country independently? 43 The Prime Minister I thought it right to make available to the right hon. Gentleman, in conformity with our longstanding practice, the information at our disposal. As the then Prime Minister said at the time of the Philby case, it was a long-standing tradition to discuss the matter between the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister of the day in matters such as this. On our information, there is no suggestion at all of any risk to national security. If any other matter came to light I should, naturally, want to discuss with the right hon. Gentleman whether any further inquiry was needed, and also the form the inquiry should take. On the broader question of the terms of reference of the Security Commission, which were, in fact, widened as a result of a statement of mine last year, I should be prepared to discuss this question as a general question with the right hon. Gentleman, although I do not think that there is any need for a reference to that Commission in this case. (...) ********************************************************************** ARMED FORCES NATIONALITY RULES

106

HL Deb 20 March 1967 vol 281 cc637-56 637 LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL (...)Of course, no one will dispute the fact that those who are going to have access to classified information must be, so far as it is possible to ensure, persons unlikely to be a security risk, but is there any reason to apprehend that a British subject born in Britain whose father merely happens to have been originally of Polish or Czech nationality should be more suspect than the offspring of a British born father and mother? I think those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. May I remind your Lordships of one or two names, in case you have forgotten? Burgess, Maclean, Alan Nun May, Philby, Houghton, Ethel Gee, Bossard and Sergeant Allen. None of their parents were of alien origin but of true British stock. However, it does not seem to have made any difference. ********************************************************************** SERVICES, PRESS AND BROADCASTING COMMITTEE (COLONEL LOHAN) HC Deb 27 June 1967 vol 749 cc257-73 257 Q9. Sir Richard Glyn asked the Prime Minister what specific inquiries were made in the autumn of 1964 as to the suitability of Colonel Lohan for the post he held; which Minister considered the result of these inquiries; and who was responsible for allowing Colonel Lohan to continue as Secretary. The Prime Minister First, I will tell the House why the information given to the House about the inquiries which began it 1964 on Thursday last was not given to the Radcliffe Committee. The answer is that it was not known to any of my right hon. Friends or myself until some days after the Radcliffe Report was published. On 13th June the Radcliffe Report and the Government's White Paper were published. Both made it clear that the Secretary of the Services, Press and Broadcasting Committee had not been positively vetted. On 14th June the Secretary made a statement to the Press flatly denying that he had not been cleared security wise to the highest level. On the same day a Parliamentary Question was tabled to me on this point by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond). On making inquiries about 258 the Secretary's security status, I learned, as I told the House last week, that early in 1964 preliminary consideration was given to his general suitability for a post of this kind. As I told the House, this led to a decision later in the year to make specific inquiries, one of a number of questions for examination being the over-close association with journalists and especially the journalist concerned in the case the House was debating. Colonel Lohan was informed of this. This particular anxiety was not wholly allayed, but, in the event, it was decided, taking everything into account, to allow the Secretary to continue in his post, which was not then a P.V. post, for the time being. At no stage, as the House knows, did he get full security clearance. In the later stages of the debate last Thursday both the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Barber) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) challenged me to deal with allegations made in the debate by hon. and right hon. Members about these matters. These issues were directly relevant to the conclusion the House had to reach and, having been challenged on them, I gave the reply and kept it to the very minimum. Sir Richard Glyn Is not the Prime Minister responsible for the security of this country? Was not he personally responsible for the decision made by others to continue Colonel Lohan as

107

Secretary? Is not he responsible for the failure of those concerned to convey to him and the Radcliffe Committee the results of the specific inquiries in the autumn of 1964? The Prime Minister I bear my full share of the responsibility, and share it with my predecessors, that these decisions were taken. The post was not a P.V. post, as I have said. Whether it should have been is a matter for much controversy. I personally think that it should. A week or two before the events of February, which led to the Radcliffe Report, my right hon. Friends and I were discussing certain changes in that respect; but then the incident occurred and, because of that, the matter was left in suspense until the Report was 259 received. Yes, I agree that it probably should have been a P.V. post all along; and I accept my share of the responsibility that it was not. Mr. Arthur Lewis Has my right hon. Friend's attention been drawn to an article by Chapman Pincher in last Saturday's Daily Express in which Mr. Pincher admits to a close association with Colonel Lohan, but says that it is no different from the close association he has had with the Paymaster-General? In view of that, will my right hon. Friend consider taking some action, or issuing a D Notice? The Prime Minister As my hon. Friend knows, no D Notices have so far been issued since this Government were formed. I read this highly entertaining article last Saturday. There is a difference between an association with any journalist and a civil servant, on the one hand, and an association between a journalist and a back bench hon. Member of the Opposition, which my right hon. Friend then was. This is the difference which I did not see clearly laid out in that article. Mr. Heath May I ask the Prime Minister one specific question and, in doing so, assure him that I am choosing my words very carefully? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] He will recognise the importance of this matter. Is it correct to say that in March of last year, 1966, very senior officials dealing with these matters placed on the record their conclusion that they were all satisfied that there were no grounds on which they could question Colonel Lohan's reliability? The Prime Minister I am aware of the correspondence between two officials at that time, following some of these inquiries; and it was this letter which I think the right hon. Gentleman was paraphrasing. Anxieties were still expressed in the course of that exchange. It was decided to look at the matter again. The matter was not looked at again until after the post was transferred from one Department to another and following further consideration, from Aviation to the Ministry of Defence, the whole matter was reopened again. As I have said, the reopening of it[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer") I am 260 answeringwas deferred because of that particular inquiry. Since the right hon. Gentleman chooses to quote a letter which, as he knows, is headed "Staffin Confidence" Hon. Members Oh. Mr. Speaker Order. The Prime Minister Since the Leader of the Opposition quoted, in paraphrase form, from a letter between civil servants which is headed "Staffin Confidence", I think that it would be wrong

108

for me to answer that question any further[HON. MEMBERS:"Why?"]without answering other letters in the same sense. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to know all the exchangesand I am not having one selected in this way; it happens to be the one which has been handed out to the right hon. Gentleman and wants to pursue the whole general matter, the importance of which I agree with him, then this is not the place to be bandying about arguments of security stages. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why say it?"] I answered at the end of the debate as I did because I was challenged by the right hon. Gentleman, but I kept my answer to the minimum. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to go into all the aspects affecting Colonel Lohan's clearance and his suitability for the post, I will be glad to show him all the papers that I have been shown. That is the right relationship on a matter of security. It is also the right relationship in a matter affecting the personal status of a civil servant. Mr. Heath The Prime Minister will recognise that this matter has been opened up as a result of his quoting words in the debate and giving us no opportunity to reply. I put this question to him specifically: will he confirm that this was a conclusionindeed, the final conclusion of those officials in March, 1966? Secondly, is he now saying that after March, 1966, the whole matter was opened up again and has not been settled? The Prime Minister To answer the second part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, the matter was opened up again during the winter. It was opened up again following the transfer of responsibility for this post from one Department to another. The matter came to a head 261 in late January or early February, but, because of the newspaper article and everything that followed, the matter was held over. To answer the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, he said that I was the one who had raised this. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Altrincham and Sale, in an intervention in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Raymond Fletcher), asked whether the Government would deal with the allegations which, he rightly said, were serious and which had been made by my hon. Friend. I was further asked specifically by the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), who was the Member of Parliament for the civil servant in questionwe understand his concernwhether the statement in the Radcliffe Report and the White Paper, or the statement of the Secretary himself, as to whether he had been positively cleared, was right. I gave my answer, using the minimum number of words that I could have used in all the circumstances. As for the quotation made by the Leader of the Oppositionhis paraphrase from itI did not think that it was for me to say whether or not that paraphrase represented the whole of the story. I have invited the right hon. Gentleman to come and see all the correspondence that I have seenthe reports, and so onand then he must decide, after that, what he feels to be the right course of action. Mr. C. Pannell Is my right hon. Friend aware that the fate of Colonel Lohan is something more than an interparty political row and that it goes down to the very principle of one man being isolated in a matter which has reached the stage of being a vote of censure in this House? Will my right hon. Friend therefore now say, without breaching security, why this man remained in this post for so long a period without, presumably, anything so deep in his relationship with the Government that would have necessitated his removal from a highly confidential post? The Prime Minister

109

In the statement which I made on the day of publication of the Report, I said that all of us understood lie extreme difficulties and anomalies of Colonel Lohan's position. 262 It is a lonely post[Laughter.]yes, he must take a lot of decisions on his own. One of the lessons which has come out of the original Report and our own inquiriesand the evidence shows the difficulties under which whoever has that post has to workis whether this post should have been a P.V. post all along. I take full responsibility for that. I am sure that my predecessor and the Ministers in the previous Conservative Government agree that we all assumed that it was a P.V. post. When it was discovered what highly sensitive material was going through the hands of the Secretary, we decided to reopen the question over a wide field, and those inquiries were going on. I agree with my right hon. Friend that very many things have gone wrong, and I take my share of the responsibility. It is not a question of one individual. As I said last Thursday, I had no intention of bringing out this information and would have been very loath to do so. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh"] I know the speech which I had dictated, and which I was ready to give in the House. I was very loath at that time to bring out anything about any individual.[HoN. MEMBERS: "0h"] But in view of the challenge by the right hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale I had to deal with the point, and I said the very minimum required. The right hon. Member for Ashford, perfectly appropriately, in my view, as he is the Member of Parliament concerned, also challenged me on these points. In those circumstances, I felt it right, particularly since it was germane to the decision which the House had to reach, to give the information which I had to giveand I gave as little as possible. Mr. Heath The Prime Minister must realise that he cannot leave the matter as it now stands. It is not sufficient to say that the Leader of the Opposition can see the appropriate papers. The Prime Minister said that the matter was reopened at the turn of the year. In fairness to Colonel Lohan, he must either say that the decision of March, 1966, was overthrown, and give the reasons, or he must say that the decision of March, 1966, still stands. The Prime Minister I had hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would prefer to 263 accept my invitation to read the papers rather than to press this point. But I will answer the question. The responsibility for what I say must lie on those who put the questions. I would prefer the right hon. Gentleman to see the papers and then to decide his attitude. He is not gagged by seeing the papers he never has been. The right hon. Gentleman asked about reopening the inquiry. As I have said, it was reopened because when it was realisedthere had been a change of responsibility both of the officials concerned and of the Department concernedwhat highly sensitive material was passing through his handsmaterial with a very high degree of sensitivitythe fact that it was not a P.V. post came to light. Certainly, I was surprised about it when I heard it. We therefore gave urgent consideration to whether it should have been a P.V. post. I thought that it ought to have been a P.V. post all along. The right hon. Gentleman put a specific question to me. I must answer it. We are dealing with a very important aspect of security. We are also dealing with the concern of the whole House, which I share, about the P.V. status of an individual, which is normally not a matter to be bandied about across the Floor of the House. I invited the right hon. Gentleman not to pursue the matter until he had time to see the papers. But if hon. Gentlemen opposite want to pursue it, for whatever motives may seem good to

110

them, then I must tell the right hon. Gentleman, as I have already said, that Colonel Lohan was not P.V.-ed at the time. It was not a P.V. post so that the P.V. inquiries were not completed. Whether he would have been P.V.-ed is a matter about which the right hon. Gentleman must form his own view. The right hon. Gentleman asked the question and he must form his own view. The matter did not arise at the time. Once we had decided that in principle it ought to be a P.V. post, then, obviously, the whole question had to be raised again. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to go on putting questions about this gentleman, whose cause he is supposed to be protectingand that is said to be the only reason for all that we have seen in the Press in the last few daysthen I think that the right hon. Gentleman 264 should do it as he would have done with any civil servant, by looking at the papers before he starts putting questions. Mr. Woodburn This man, whether rightly or wrongly, has suffered already. May I make a plea that the Leader of the Opposition will not use him as a pawn in the political field? Before any public discussion of the matter takes place, the Leader of the Opposition should get Colonel Lohan's permission to push his inquiries. Mr. Hooson The Prime Minister has said that Colonel Lohan was the subject of informal inquiries in 1964. Would he tell the House, first, whether Colonel Lohan was then asked to change his method of dealing with the Press? Secondly, if it were alleged that he was on too friendly terms with correspondents, was he warned that in the view of the Government he was on these terms with correspondents and that it should cease, or, if he were not so informed, why not? The Prime Minister Spread over 1964 to 1965I do not know the precise datehe was informed of the anxiety. There were never charges. Looking back on it, it might have been right if there had been a straight Civil Service board as is provided for in the rules of the Civil Service and the matter could have been thrashed out. But it was not done that way, I think perhaps regrettably. But he was made aware of what the anxieties were and there were discussions with him about it. Mr. David Griffiths Is my right hon. Friend aware that a considerable number of us who were in Parliament in 194551 were entirely suspicious of a lot of information that was conveyed to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite? The Prime Minister This has been a continuing problem not only in 194551 or 196164 or 196467. This is an endemic problem which all Governments have to face. I have already expressed my regret for my unworthy suspicions that what had happened in the Ministry of Aviation up to 1964 was due to the then Minister. Since it was continued afterwards, I knew that it was not. Mr. Heath The impression has been given so far that Colonel Lohan did not pass the P.V. test and that it was through some fault of his. Either this 265 was so, or it was not. In his last answer to me the Prime Minister implied that the test was done because the status of the post was changed. May I have a specific clear answer to this: was the P.V. undertaken because of the Prime Minister's doubt about Colonel Lohan and an overthrowing of the 1966 decision, or was it undertaken because it was decided to make the post a P.V. post? Secondly, did the test remain incomplete through any fault of Colonel Lohan, or did it remain incomplete for other reasons?

111

 The Prime Minister I will try to answer that question as far as I can, but I must first ask the right hon. Gentleman to make it clear whether he was referring to the original inquiries of 1964 and subsequently or whether he was referring to the reopening of the case at the turn of the year to which I have referred. Perhaps he will make that clear. Mr. Heath I am referring to the reopening of the case at the turn of the year. The Prime Minister The position is thisand again I want to choose my words carefully. I really would prefer the right hon. Gentleman to see the papers. He will find on this matter, as I found when I was in his position and had to consider the Philby case, that there were very difficult complications that cannot be explained across the Floor of the House and which make it difficult to give a straight open and shut answer. On the Philby case I fully supported the Prime Minister, incredible though from the outside the situation appeared. In this case there were certain difficulties about what kind of procedure should be followed after 1964. I have already hinted at that. I do not want to go further. I would prefer the right hon. Gentleman to see the papers. One of the reasons the matter was left rather open at the end of the day was that in any case it was not a P.V. post and the question of the final completion did not need to arise. With regard to the reopening at the turn of the year, one of the main factors that entered into our consideration at that time was the fact that, the whole matter, having been looked at again, it was re- 266 cognised that the highly sensitive and secret nature of the papers passing through the post made it highly desirable that at any rate it should be considered whether it should be a P.V. post. This was one of the reasons why the matter was reopened. There was a second reasonand again I choose my words carefully. As I reported to the House, the result of the earlier inquiries was that he should be kept in his post for the time being. That was the decision of the official concerned when the matter was last looked at. Now it was reopenedwith a new official, a new chairman of the D Notice Committee and a new Permanent Under-Secretary. Naturally, such papers are brought forward after a period of time. They were brought forward and looked at, therefore, because the matter had been deferred from the previous inquiry. That was one reason. The second reason was that I felt that the post probably ought to be a P.V. post. (...) ********************************************************************** MR. PHILBY (PRESS ARTICLES) HC Deb 24 October 1967 vol 751 cc452-3W 452W Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the Sunday Times and The Observer are serialising articles concerning the defection of Kim Philby; and what reply was sent by the appropriate Departments to their applications for clearance from a security point of view before publication. The Prime Minister The attention of the Editors of both papers was drawn to certain aspects of the articles in questionon which I cannot, of course, elaboratewhere, in the Government's view, it 453W would be contrary both to the public interest and to the requirements of current security to go into too much detail. ********************************************************************** BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE HC Deb 15 February 1968 vol 758 cc1579-89

112

Mr. Whitaker Could my right hon. Friend give an assurance that at some stage the House will have an opportunity to debate the new evidence on the Philby affair? Whatever the reluctance or embarrassment of the officials concerned, it must be the duty of the House to debate such a serious matter. Mr. Crossman There is a number of historical subjects in which I take a keen interest, too, but I cannot give a guarantee that the Government will give time to debate that matter. I suggest again that opportunities can be found to debate it on the Defence Estimates. ********************************************************************** Exchange Control Regulations (Kim Philby) HC Deb 02 April 1968 vol 762 cc168-70 168 37. Mr. Roebuck asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what were the circumstances in which foreign currency has been made available for the purchase by the Sunday Express of memoirs written by Kim Philby. Mr. Harold Lever I do not know from whom these memoirs were purchased. But payments to nonresidents for publishing rights in the United Kingdom of newspaper articles are covered by a general exchange control permission. Mr. Roebuck Has my hon. Friend not studied the interesting article in the Sunday Telegraph, describing how these writings were hawked around Fleet Street and the difficulties which the proprietors of the Sunday Telegraph had in deciding where the money would go? Is my hon. Friend aware that it would give great satisfaction to hon. Members on both sides of the House if he would undertake to have another look to see whether the money has not reached Philby by some circuitous route? Mr. Lever As I have told the House, these payments are covered by the general exchange control permission in relation to payment to non-residents for publishing articles. I will gladly look at any abuse which my hon. Friend may think is occurring in the regulations, but I am not aware of any at present. Mr. Lubbock Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the memoirs of Mrs. Wilson, the wife of the notorious train robber[Interruption.]are being published in 169 a Sunday newspaper? Since Mrs. Wilson is resident in Canada, will he make sure that an infringement of the exchange regulations does not take place in this case? Mr. Lever The hon. Gentleman has not given me any grounds for supposing that any such infringement has taken place. Mr. Shinwell Is my hon. Friend aware that his original Answer does not appear to be satisfactory? Is it not quite improper that a man who has been declared to be a spy, or any of his associates, should be able to profit as a result of the publication of articles in a British newspaper? May we have an assurance that he will not be allowed to make a profit? Mr. Lever It is not for me, in operating exchange control, to apply a moral censorship of any kind. If there is anything improper in these publications, that is a matter for the newspapers concerned and, perhaps, for the Press Council to comment upon. It is certainly not for exchange control.

113

 38. Mr. Roebuck asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will take steps to ensure that sums deposited in Great Britain to the credit of Kim Philby will be frozen; and that such sums are not made available to persons nominated by him. Mr. Harold Lever So far as I know, Philby has only one bank account in the United Kingdom. In view of the circumstances in which he left the country, arrangements have been made to ensure that no transactions may pass over this account without specific reference to the Bank of England. Mr. Roebuck Would my hon. Friend have a look elsewhere, to see that there is no other loophole through which money could escape? Mr. Lever We are always vigilant to ensure that the exchange control regulations are effectively enforced. If my hon. Friend has any ground for supposing that we have overlooked a loophole in respect of Mr. Philby, or any other person, I should be happy to consider his complaint. 170 Mr. Lipton Why have so many successive British Governments always handled Philby with kid gloves? Is it not quite monstrous that a traitor should be allowed to make money out of his treachery? Mr. Lever The Question, so far as I can see, does not relate to the handling of Mr. Philby with kid gloves, but to the proper enforcement of the exchange controls. I can assure my hon. Friend that the exchange control regulations affecting Mr. Philby are fully enforced. ********************************************************************** SIR FREDERICK CRAWFORD (WITHDRAWAL OF PASSPORT) HC Deb 14 May 1968 vol 764 cc1041-116 Sir Derek Walker-Smith (Hertfordshire, East) In spite of the glosses and palliatives sought to be put on this matter by the speeches of right hon. Members opposite, I remain of the opinion that we have in the action of the Government a situation which is serious, unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous, a situation inimical to the rule of law and the basic rights of individual liberty. It is no argument to defend that on the basis that there is arbitrary action also in Rhodesia. That argument is the classic case of the principle, "By Beelzebub, cast out Beezlebub". I prefer to invoke more respectable aid. The elements which are contrary to the rule of law are judgment without open investigation, condemnation without trial, and punishment without proof. All these elements were demonstrably present in this case. Sir Frederick had no more right of hearing before he was deprived of his passport than if we had been living in the days of the Star Chamber, and there was even less attempt to give him any form of quasijudicial hearing than apparently, we now see, was accorded to the traitor Philby. The only hearing, if one could so call it, in this case was the interview this morning with the Secretary of State, after the deprivation had been made; and it is not very satisfactory to have the hearing after judgment pronounced and sentence passed. He was then confronted with 1081 these undertakings of which, apparently, he had not been given any notice, or any prior right to examine. These things strike at the foundations of our constitutional edifice and at the rule of law and there is therefore a clear and imperative duty on the House of Commons, as the traditional guardian of these

114

principles, closely to examine the Government's purported justification for this course of action. Three main grounds of justification are put forward: first, that no punishment is involved in the deprivation of a passport; secondly, that the matter is within the prerogative and discretion of the Crown, that is to say, the Government, and that therefore normal constitutional principles do not apply and, thirdly, that the information available to the Government in this case was sufficient to justify their arbitrary action on the ground that Sir Frederick was giving aid and comfort to the rgime. I do not believe that any of these three justifications is valid. I need say very little about the first. To say that no punishment is involved in the deprivation of a passport is surely a sophistry at best in present conditions. For a businessman to be deprived of his passport, of his right to travel, adds a pecuniary penalty which must clearly have the substance, if not the form, of punishment. I pass to the second justification, on which the main constitutional issue turns. The Government appear to say that because this is a matter of prerogative, the citizen has no right of inquiry or redress and Parliament no right of explanation or interrogation. Is this correct? Can this be correct in the second half of the 20th century? Parliament must not be too awed, too mesmerised, too intimidated, when the high priests of the Executive chant the incantation of prerogative. Ministers must not be encouraged to think that they have only to erect a notice-board, "Domain of PrerogativeTrespassers will be prosecuted" and they will be able to take arbitrary action without examination.(...) ********************************************************************** SECURITY SERVICE HC Deb 19 July 1973 vol 860 cc845-75 845 10.4 p.m. Mr. Charles Loughlin (Gloucestershire, West) As youth stumbles away into space, I, as one of the old boys, will try to bring at least the Government down to earth. In raising the issue of the Norma Levy case and the subsequent Diplock Commission, I want to make absolutely clear at once my attitude to sexual morality, because there has been a suggestion that some of us are seeking to exploit sex scandals for political ends. I do not believe that I have the slightest right to judge any man or woman in the generality of the population. The defects in my own character are such that I would be presumptuous if I were to judge people solely on the basis of their sexual morality or immorality. There is, however, a clear distinction to be drawn between the generality of the populace and those of us who have chosen of our volition to enter public life. I believe that when we enter public life we have no right to assume that we can have a private life. No matter what sphere of public life we enter, whether at local or national level, public figures should be beyond suspicion in terms of corruption, graft and immorality. But there is even more need for those of us who are fortunate to become Ministers in Government to be as moral in our sexual lives as we are in any other moral aspect. We all know that prostitution has for a long time been used as a basis upon which people can be recruited in secret service work. The agent of a foreign Power, no matter what Power that may be, will grasp at any weakness of any Minister and will exploit that weakness, particularly in regard to peccadilloes of a sexual nature, to suborn him from his responsibilities to the nation he serves. In this case there were two Ministers involved. One, unfortunately, was Tony Lambton. While he was in this House I respected him and indeed had an affection for him, and we had a friendly relationship as Members of this House. I recall on a number of occasions having to go to his office to deal with my constituency cases. I was given by him the

115

846 best possible treatment, and indeed he was one of those Ministers who did not necessarily accept departmental advice. I shall return to Lord Lambton a little later. I want first to deal with the second Minister involved in this affair, Lord Jellicoe. I understand that Lord Jellicoe has a war record of which he can be very proud. I am not trying to suggest in any way that he is disloyal to this country. I believe that he won more medals or recognitions than virtually any other man in the war. Therefore, I want to be absolutely clear that in dealing with Lord Jellicoe I am not for one moment suggesting that he in any way jeopardised the security of this nation. He was, however, a Cabinet Minister and thus he had the greatest possible responsibility to see that his conduct was such that he could not in any way be used, be blackmailed by anyone or become a tool of anyone while he was a member of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister was right to accept the resignation of Lord Jellicoe, and I believe that the Diplock Commission's implied rebuke to the Prime Minister that there was no need for Lord Jellicoe to resign was wrong. I reject that rebuke, because the Prime Minister was quite right in accepting the resignation of Lord Jellicoe who, it is admitted, was engaged only in activities with call girls. But the fact that he was engaged in activities with call girls of any kind meant that he was a security risk. We cannot afford to have a Cabinet Minister engaging in activities in which he becomes a security risk. I wish to refer to the Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, Command Paper 9715. That conference was charged with looking at the entire question of the kind of steps that might be taken to ensure the nation's security. Paragraph 10 of the statement states: Some of the recommendations of the Conference deal with what may be called the relation between security risks and defects of character and conduct. The Conference recognise that to-day great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail, or influence by foreign agents. there is a duty on Departments to inform themselves of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any 847 loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability. That document was prepared in March 1956 and was presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by command of Her Majesty. It was a document ensuing from a conference of Privy Councillors on security. Some people may have construed those findings as being applicable solely to civil servants. Some of the paragraphs in the document may give that impression, but if it applies to civil servants how much more should it apply to Ministers? Do we have double standards, one standard for civil servants, who may be in a lower category than a Minister in terms of access to secret documents, and an entirely different standard for Ministers? Mr. George Cunningham (Islington, South-West) On the same tack, will not my hon. Friend agree that, contrary to what is recommended in the report, it would be highly desirable for the positive vetting procedure to be applied to Ministers, not before their appointment perhaps but in some brief period after their appointment, in the same way as it is applied to civil servants? Mr. Loughlin I shall be dealing in a moment with positive vetting as against briefing. I emphasise this point because it has never been retracted. It is still part of the manual. If it is the yardstick by which we ensure that civil servants are not exposed to temptation and if drunkenness, homosexuality or any form of loose living is among the matters taken into account, how can an association with call girls and with prostitution be other than loose living? How can it be argued that when a Cabinet Ministeror, for that matter, a Minister of any rankassociates promiscuously with call girls and prostitutes,

116

it does not matter, but that if the permanent secretary, the deputy secretary, an assistant secretary or a principal in the Department does, it matters a great deal? Implicit in the document is the fact that civil servants should draw to the attention of their superiors defects in conduct such as those to which I have referred relating to other members of 848 their Department. If members of the Civil Service should be policing themselves and if the permanent secretary in a Department is responsible for the conduct of his civil servants, so too is the chief Minister in the Department. The present head of the Department concerned is Lord Carrington. Perhaps the Home Secretary can tell me whether Lord Carrington was so incompetent and so negligent that he did not see these character defects and allowed a Minister to carry on in the way he did. If the Home Secretary takes that viewI shall come to dates presently for the right hon. Gentleman's benefitI want to know why Lord Carrington is still head of that Department and why he has not resigned because of his negligence and incompetence. I do not know what went on in that Department. I was only a very small fish but I know what went on in my Department. When I first became a junior Minister I was briefed and told how to conduct myself. A very charming gentleman told me about the pitfalls for which I had to look. I was never under any illusions. I knew what was happening. I knew that I was being briefed about the type of conduct which I should observe while I was a Minister. Like my own Minister at the time, Lord Carrington was responsible for seeing that Lord Lambton was briefed. Lord Lambton said that he did not know whether he was positively vetted or briefed. He was extremely vague about it, and he said so quite openly and in public. In my view, in a sensitive Department such as his there should have been no ambiguity. There should have been a very clear indication to Lord Lambton that he was being briefed and coached in some ways about the dangers inherent in the position that he was holding in terms of the nation's security. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South-West (Mr. George Cunningham) asks me whether I consider that positive vetting would be possible with Ministers. I think that it would be extremely difficult. Any Prime Minister forming a Government would find it difficult positively to vet most of the people whom he had chosen within days of the Government coming to power, though I agree that my hon. Friend said 849 if not at the time the Prime Minister appointed them, then shortly afterwards. By and large, Prime Ministers know the people they intend to appoint. By and large there are exceptions they know the character of the persons they wish to take into their administration. I go this far with my hon. Friend, and I shall illustrate it briefly. It is absolutely necessary that there should be, if not constant briefing, much more briefing than there is now. I see no reason for any Minister, be he senior or junior, not to have visits periodically from those who are responsible for ensuring that Ministers stay on the right lines. The senior Minister in the Department ought to do this with his junior Ministers. Mr. George Cunningham Without remotely suggesting that the need for positive vetting of Ministers arises from the Lambton-Jellicoe situationwhich it certainly does notI wonder whether my hon. Friend agrees that, because one knows the man and one has known him for some years, one can have complete confidence in him as a non-security risk? It was exactly that approach which proved to be unsuccessful in the Lambton case, and, in an infinitely more serious case, proved a disaster by letting Philby get practically to the head of M16. Mr. Loughlin I accept that, as regards Ministers, it is desirable to try to bridge the gap. I do not think that it is possible for positive vetting to take place either immediately before the

117

forming of a Government or immediately afterwards. But some attempt must be made to ensure that a Minister has a clear picture of what he should and should not do. For the benefit of the Ministerit may subsequently be for the benefit of the Government let me quote my own case. In my first Department, as I said, I was briefed very well, and I have no complaints. I was briefed very courteously and clearly. But I was in two other Departments, one of which was much more sensitive. No one came to me in the other Departments. I was briefed in the first Department. In retrospectI say it only in retrospectI think that it might have been as well if they had come to me in the third Department, 850 where I had a sensitive area of responsibility. It would have been better if I had been given a further briefing then. I say that because it might be helpful to the Home Secretary. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Robert Carr ) I do not want to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but that is one of the recommendations of the Security Commission which has already been accepted. Mr. Loughlin I read the Security Commission's report, but I did not notice that it said that there should he briefing when a Minister passed from Department to Department. Mr. Marcus Lipton (Brixton) It can be found in paragraph 37. Mr. Loughlin My hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) corrects me. There has been so much speculation and there have been so many vague hints that other Ministers are involved that it is essential that there should be another full and public inquiry. There is no hon. Member who does not know the name of the alleged third Minister in the case. The Prime Minister told the House that he readily accepted the assurances of the third Minister that he had not been involved in any of the scandals and, therefore, had not placed himself in a position of being subjected to any form of blackmail by other secret services. I do not know what the Home Secretary is doing. He may intervene any time he wishes. Mr. R. Carr I just do not like mud slinging. That is all. Mr. Loughlin I shall do a bit of mud slinging if that is the attitude of the Home Secretary. I am trying not to do any mud slinging. I am trying to deal with a matter which may be politically embarrassing to the Home Secretary, it may be politically embarrassing to the Prime Minister, it may be politically embarrassing to the Government, but it is important to the ordinary people of this country. The Prime Minister accepted the assurance of the third Minister. However, what we have to remembermy hon. Friend almost got to itwas that 851 Macmillan accepted the assurance that Philby was not the third man. I wonder why the third Minister has not attempted to rebut by libel action the statements that have been made about him. I turn to the motion that I placed on the Order Paper. [Interruption.] The Ministers keep muttering. They will not stop me if they stay here until five o'clock in the morning; I shall still say what I want to say. The motion makes a number of charges. The Diplock Commission apparently took evidence from some witnesses. We do not know who the witnesses were. We know who were not called, but the Prime Minister is head of the security services in this country. It is an indictment that the Prime Minister had to confess that he did not know whether certain witnesses had been called. Why not? What kind of an inquiry is it that can keep from the head of the security services the names of witnesses called before it?

118

But what is much more important is how the inquiry was conducted. As far as we could see, a number of prime witnesses were never called before the inquiry. First, there were Mr. and Mrs. Levy. 1 should have thought that if this case were to be investigated at all, the Levys were indispensable to the inquiry. Without them it was almost impossible to conduct an adequate investigation. We then had the journalists from the News of the World and the Peopletwo newspapers that I never read. The truth is that these investigatory journalists found out a great deal more about this issue than anyone else. They had knowledge. They had carried out a considerable investigation. My information is that none of those journalists was called before the Security Commission. If the Levys and the journalistsprime witnesseswere not called, how can we possibly have any confidence in the Security Commission's report? I think that a brief glance at the history of the affair might be useful, because the name of at least one of the Ministers was disclosed on 28th March. It was disclosed by no less a person than Mrs. Levy. According to The Sunday Times, she was being interviewed at Scot- 852 land Yard not about prostitution or pornography. It may be that she was being interviewed about drugs. Anyhow, she let slip Lambton's name among the names of other prominent persons. By one of those little twists of fate, somebody at Scotland Yard knew somebody at one of the security branches, they happened to meet each other five days later, and D5 was told. The security people were very interested and concerned and they acted pretty speedily. They not only started their investigation on 3rd April, but they were able to tell the Prime Minister on 9th April that there were serious grounds for believing that some of his Ministers were involved in what was likely to be a scandalous situation, and he was given Lord Lambton's name on 13th April. The Levys had been under surveillance by Scotland Yard, if not by the security branch, during the whole of that time and subsequently up to 21st May, the day that Lord Lambton resigned. When Lord Lambton went to Scotland Yard on the day that he resigned he was interrogated by police officials. He was asked on that day whether Mrs. Levy had given him drugs. Lord Lambton said, She has given me pep pills, but I have never taken them. I have in the past taken marijuana and opium in China. I want the Home Secretary to note the words, She has given me pep pills". In other words, she had given Tony Lambton drugs. The detectives then showed him a photograph of himself smoking in Mrs. Levy's flat and suggested that he was smoking cannabis. Lord Lambton replied, I would not deny that. Yes. I would not deny I have smoked marijuana. That is the report in The Times of 14th June 1973. All the time they were under surveillance and on 21st May Scotland Yard had corroborative evidence from Lord Lambton that drugs were being hawked in Levy's flat, that he had been given drugs by Mrs. Levy, and that he had smoked marijuana and cigarettes in Mrs. Levy's flat, indeed in the bed. I would have thought, as would any person with 853 the slightest common sense, that there was a substantial evidence for the arrest of this woman. Not long ago a case was reported in the newspapers of a young man who was found with drugs on him. When the case came to court it was stated that two grains of a drug were found in the ticket pocket of his jacket. That was the evidence on which the charge was based. He was found not guilty because he could prove that he had bought the jacket second hand and there was an element of doubt whether the drug was in the jacket when he bought it.

119

The police could not succeed there, but here was a situation in which Ministers were involveda situation in which security might be involved; a situation in which the police had tangible evidence that drugs were in the house and that this woman was trafficking in them. But they did not arrest her. Why? The Home Secretary has a responsibility to tell the House why. Mr. R. Carr rose Mr. Loughlin The Home Secretary can tell us after I and other hon. Members have spoken. In view of the evidence adduced at the Lambton trial, why was Mrs. Levy allowed to leave this country three days later? I conclude one of two things. Either the police have failed in their dutyand I will not make a charge of that kind against them unless I have reasonable proof. Or I can assume that it would have been politically damaging to have had the woman arrested. I go further and say that in view of the drugs evidence, once the whole thing came out it was essential that the Government should exercise their right to extradite this woman and bring her back to this country. [Interruption.] There are continual mutterings from the Government Front Bench, but I understand that drugs offences are extraditable offences in most countries. If not, the Secretary of State can tell us. Mr. R. Carr Surely the hon. Gentleman is aware that no Minister in this country has any power to direct the police or prosecuting authorities when or when not to arrest somebody. He has made false accusations about things being done for political convenience. If that is not 854 an accusation against the police and prosecuting authorities, I do not know what is. The fact is that when they had evidence they did not hesitate to bring a charge against a Minister. If they did not hesitate to embarrass the Government in that way, I hope the country will realise that they would not have hesitated to embarrass anyone else against whom they had evidence. If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that the police, with a Minister's connivance or support, can start arresting people against whom they have no evidence, he should be ashamed of himself. Mr. Loughlin The right hon. Gentleman is getting indignant. I thought I had portrayed quite clearly the circumstances in which the evidence was readily available, because it was available on 21st May. Mr. Carr It was not. Mr. Loughlin The right hon. Gentleman says that it was not. I have quoted from the Lambton drugs trial reported in The Times on 14th June. His secretary can get him a copy of it. It is in the Library. I have quoted the evidence given at the trial. Perhaps I should give it in a little more detail. It said: Mr. David Tudor-Price, for the prosecution, said Lord Lambton went to New Scotland Yard on the afternoon of 21st May, the day he resigned from the Government, and by appointment saw Deputy Assistant Commissioner Ernest Bond and Detective Chief Superintendent Albert Wickstead. He was asked if Mrs. Levy had given him drugs. Then follow the quotations I have already made. In other words, on 21st May he was asked either by Commander Bond or Chief Superintendent Wickstead about drugs. So it was known on 21st May and it would have been possible on the basis of that evidence, not oppressively to arrest Mrs. Levy but for any magistrate to swear out a warrantthere is nothing oppressive about that; magistrates do it every dayto search the Levys' flat and to make inquiries of Mrs. Levy with a view to establishing whether

120

that which Lord Lambton had said was true. But they did not. She was away. I think they got her away. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Mark Carlisle) Who got her away? 855 Mr. Loughlin I do not know. Perhaps it would be better to address that question to the Home Secretary. Mr. R. Carr Disgraceful. Mr. Loughlin I am saying that she was a prime witness in this investigation. Without her, there would be no real inquiry. Nor could the inquiry be complete. In addition to the absence of the Levys, there was the absence of those other prime witnesses, the journalists. 1 would like to know how the truth could be found out if the prime witnesses were not brought before the inquiry. I believe that the Diplock inquiry is meaningless. I believe that there is a need for a full public inquiry so that the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is brought out. 10.45 p.m. Mr. Marcus Lipton (Brixton) I wish to address myself to some of the broader considerations involved in this subject. The Diplock Report has appeared and, by a coincidence, the current issue of the New Law Journal is reported in this morning's newspapers as saying: Rarely can a government report on such an important subject as security have been so welcome to those who stand to gain by lax or confused security arrangements in this country. It continues: It seems to us that the ranks of the establishment have come together with an almighty clang. In my view, that is a perfectly fair description of the Diplock Report. The Government must accept the responsibility for what is now recognised by many people as a most inadequate handling of the matter. It seems to indicate that the security arrangements of the Government, for which the Prime Minister is ultimately responsible, are not as satisfactory as they ought to be. It is quite clear, on information available to me, that as long ago as May 1972 names were being mentioned and the existence of a VIP call-girl racket was known. I repeat that that was in May 1972. How did the whole business come to light? It came to light purely as an accidental byproduct of a raid on pornographic material in Soho. That raid took place in January 1973. In the 856 course of the raid, conducted purely as an anti-pornography exercise, documents were discovered in a secret safe in the flat which was raided. That was the first indication that something was wrong. What happened after that? There is a gap, and that gap is fully revealed in the report of the Diplock Commission. The Commission seems to accept that Lord Lambton began his deviation from the normal at some time in the late spring or early summer of 1972 that is to say, at about the same time as certain information became available to some Fleet Street journalists. I should like to knowI should like the Home Secretary to explainwhat happened from 1970, when Lord Lamb-ton was appointed, to mid-1972. Are we asked to believe that his deviations or defects of character suddenly took place two years after he took office? I find that rather difficult to believe. The Commission surely should have examined a little more closely that aspect of the matter. The other aspect of the matter which disturbs me is the role played by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence. It strikes me as evident that neither the

121

Prime Minister nor the Secretary of State for Defence carried out efficiently the duties of their office regarding security. The Prime Minister is responsible for ensuring that his Ministers understand and execute their basic duties. The Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for ensuring that his subordinate Ministers understand and execute those duties. That was made clear a long time ago in the Denning Report of 1963, which stated that responsibility for departmental security rested fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the heads of Departments. It does not seem that that was properly and adequately carried out by the Secretary of State for Defence. As my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) pointed out, it seems that Lord Lambton did not know the difference between vetting and briefing. That proves the direct failure of the Secretary of State for Defence to ensure that security procedures were being properly followed in his Department. My hon. Friend has 857 mentioned the report and the findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors in 1966. That conference was specifically called upon to deal with what he called security risks and defects of character and conduct. The report indicated that great care must be attached to character defects and factors tending to make a man unreliable or to expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents. Can the Secretary of State for the Home Department assure the House that the Secretary of State for Defence carried out his duties in the way that is expected of the senior Minister of such a sensitive Department? What happened when Lord Lambton had to be approached and told that the police wanted him? The Permanent Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Defence was given the job of telling him. Why did not the Secretary of State call Lord Lambton to his office and confront him with that accusation? Why did he depute that task to one of his civil servants? He may have been too busy looking after the Conservative Party. It strikes me as odd that, in a serious situation of this kind, the Minister responsible should depute his Permanent Under-Secretary to handle the situation. In paragraph 25 of the Diplock Report it is stated: At some date in the late spring or early summer 1972 he was given the telephone number of a 'Madam' who controlled a ring of highly-priced prostitutes. The proposition seemed to be accepted without any further examination that until the late spring or early summer of 1972 nothing was wrong. There was no further probe into the background of the case. At paragraph 274 of the Denning Report, Lord Denning said: I have had evidence which satisfies me that there is excellent co-operation between the Security Service and the police forces. Is the Secretary of State for the Home Department satisfied that that excellent co-operation is still as good as it was when Lord Denning referred to it in 1963? There are three elements in this kind of businessthe Security Service, the Special Branch and the Serious Crime Squad. This third body did not exist when Lord Denning reported in Septem- 858 ber 1963. All three are involved. I should like an assurance from the Home Secretary that there is close co-operation between all three branches of the administration of security and prevention of crime. Is that co-operation as good as it should be? It seems to me that it was lacking and that, therefore, certain people for the time being escaped the net. An attempt is still being made to extradite from the Continent one of the people who could give very interesting evidence. All that has been said by the Diplock Commission was said a long time ago by Lord Denning. The Diplock Commission said at paragraph 37 of its report: we recommend that any Minister should be given a further briefing by the Security Service whenever he is appointed to a post in which he will handle more sensitive information than

122

previously. The obvious deduction is that some Ministers have not been briefed by the Security Service on appointment to a more sensitive post. The commission said at paragraph 34: We might add here that we are aware of suggestions that other Ministers, besides Lord Lambton, may have been associated with the Levys. Our investigations have shown that examples of mistaken identity are common in dealing with prostitutes whose clients are generally anxious to preserve their anonymity. All suggestions that other Ministers have been involved with Norma Levy or other members of that ring have come from sources which we regard as wholly unreliable. We have come across no evidence worthy of credence to suggest that any Minister, other than Lord Lambton, was involved. I believe that further evidence has become available to the Government since 6th July, when the report was published. Is that evidence being examined and probed? If any Minister or anyone else connected with the Government is implicated, will the necessary steps be taken to clear up the matter? It is obvious to me that in recent days further evidence has become available, otherwise the police have not been doing their job properly. I refuse to believe that they are not doing so. All I want to know is whether the Government are taking heed of the additional evidence now available, and will take heed of more evidence that will become available in the not-too-distant future, before deciding what further action they should take. 859 The Diplock Commission suggested at paragraph 41 of its report: We believe that the attention of Ministers should be drawn more directly to the potential security implications of scandalous behaviour and of other circumstances which might expose them to pressure by hostile intelligence agents. It might be more appropriate for this to be done by the Prime Minister, rather than by the Security Service, perhaps in a document to which Ministers would be required to refer on appointment and from time to time subsequently. The obvious inference to be drawn from that paragraph is that the attention of Ministers has not been drawn directly to the potential security implications of scandalous behaviour, otherwise it would not have been reiterated in this report. It merely repeats what Lord Denning said 10 years ago. I would recommend the Home Secretary to make the relevant sections of the Denning Report compulsory reading for all Ministers. It was a document written in 1963. I should like to quote from it the words which should be framed and hung up in Ministers' offices. The fact that these words are partially repeated by Diplock 10 years later indicates that Lord Denning's recommendations have not been observed as well as they might have been. Lord Denning said: Public men are more vulnerable than they were: and it behaves them, even more than ever, to give no cause for scandal. For if they do, they have to reckon with a growing hazard which has been disclosed in the evidence I have heard. Scandalous information about well-known people has become a marketable commodity. True or false, actual or invented, it can be sold. The greater the scandal the higher the price it commands. If supported by photographs or letters, real or imaginary, all the better. Often enough the sellers profess to have been themselves participants in the discreditable conduct which they seek to exploit. Intermediaries move in, ready to assist the sale and ensure the highest prices. The story improves with the telling. It is offered to those newspapersthere arc only a few of themwho deal in this commodity. They vie with one another to buy it. Each is afraid the other will get it first. That could have been written by Lord Denning a few days ago. It is even more apt now. We have apparently made no progress. The Government must bear a heavy burden of responsibility in this situation, which is repeating itself 10 years after one of the classic reports on 860 security. The Prime

123

Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence ought to be ashamed of themselves for allowing this situation to come about. 11.3 p.m. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Robert Carr) We have heard two speeches, from the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Loughlin) and the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton), which were delivered in the public interest. I am quite sure that the hon. Members have nothing but the public interest in their minds. Like all of us, they enjoy serving the public interest. I could not help noticing the subject heading under which the hon. Members wished to raise the debate. The subject heading on the list reads as follows: The efficiency of the Security Service in the light of the Security Commission Report I have not heard much about the efficiency of the security services. Mr. Loughlin I think Mr. Speaker will bear me out when I say that in the letter I submitted to him I said that I wanted to debate the findings in the Security Commission's Report of July 1973. I asked for a debate on the findings in the report. The title to which the right hon. Gentleman refers was selected by my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Well-beloved). Mr. Speaker The hon. Member who has the topic for debate has to relate his speech to a Vote. That is the reason for the title of the debate. Mr. Carr I accept what the hon. Gentleman says, just as I am sure he will accept that the only title I was given was that on the circulated list. I see one hon. Gentleman laughing. Perhaps I should not have been altogether surprised at some of the matters that were raised. Whatever notice was given of the title of the debate, and under whatever Vote the debate is taking place, the fact is that we heard speeches that were largely mischievious nonsense and I cannot help notingI must say that I welcome the factthat the two hon. Gentlemen appear to have no support from their Front Bench. Not only is there no vocal 861 support for them, but there is a noteworthy absence of anyone on the Opposition Front Bench. All of us here and people outside know what deduction to draw from that. The first point made is about the method of inquiry adopted by the Security Commission. As the House knows, any Home Secretaryany Prime Minister for that matter, and any Ministeris in an almost impossible difficulty in talking about security matters because it is impossible for me, as it has always been for my predecessors, to talk about the methods of the Security Service and its structure, let alone seek to defend its efficiency in any case. With regard to the method of inquiry, I can only say that the Security Commission is supported in its existence by the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman supported it when he was Leader of the Opposition at the time the commission was established, he supported it during the six years he was Prime Minister and he supports it now that he is once more Leader of the Opposition. I think it needs to be put on record that the Leader of the Opposition fully supports the existence of the Security Commission, its membership, its terms of reference and the fact that the method it adopts in any inquiry is entirely for the commission itself to decide in the light of what it believes to be appropriate in relation to the particular case that it is investigating. That does not, of course, make the commission right, but at least it does make clear that any suggestion that the Government are trying to use a body of men, a procedure or a method of inquiry to cover up something unpleasant to them is absolutely without

124

foundation. The method, the body of men and the procedure are wholly supported by the Opposition now that they are in opposition, just as they were when they were the Government and before that when they were again in opposition. I hope that on a major charge I can leave it at that. I regret that in the speeches we heard, particularly the first oneI am sorry to use hard words but I think they are justifiedthere were a succession of smears. First there was the smear that to some extent we were setting one standard for civil servants and a lower and easier 862 standard for Ministers. There is no truth in that suggestion so far as concerns the moral standards of behaviour of Ministers and civil servants. The standards expected are high. They are higher than expectedand properly higher than expected, perhapsof men and women who do not have those levels of responsibility. But they are the same for civil servants and Ministers. There is one important difference, and that is the difference raised by the hon. Member for Islington, South-West (Mr. George Cunningham). That is the question of positive vetting. It is true that civil servants in certain positions are subjected to positive vetting, and Ministers from the Prime Minister down to the most junior Minister are not subject to positive vetting. There are many reasons for that, all of which, or at any rate the sum total of which, are accepted by all parties and were confirmed as being right by the Diplock Commission whose report we are concerned with tonight. That again, I suppose, is an arguable proposition as to whether that should or should not be so, but at least let us be quite clear that it is not a party matter. I am not suggesting that any hon. Member said that it was. To be absolutely fair, no hon. Member did so suggest. But I want to put on record for better or worse that it is a view held by the leadership of all parties that positive vetting of Ministers, for a totality of reasons Mr. Loughlin I said that. Mr. Carr I know. I am not seeking to make it a party matter. I am merely stating the fact that it is not a party matter, and it is worth putting on record that the leadership of all parties has always believed, for a variety of reasons, that the positive vetting of Ministers would not be appropriate, and this is still confirmed by the Diplock Commission. The second matter with which I want to deal is the attack on my right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. Mr. George Cunningham Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the point, may I ask him to confirm that the position is not quite exactly as he has stated it? In paragraph 42 of the report, while 863 the commission says that it thinks the difficulties are too great for positive vetting, or something like that, it goes on to say that in respect of any Minister who was not before his appointment a Member of either House of Parliament the Prime Minister ought to satisfy himself that there is no character defect or other circumstance which would mean that the appointment of that person would endanger security. That seems to me to be a long way off describing positive vetting. What we are saying is that in respect of people who are already in Parliament positive vetting cannot be required, but that in respect of someone outside the House something which amounts to positive vetting will be required. I suggest that that is a proposition which is, at the least, open to question. Mr. Carr I do not dispute that the whole matter is open to question. Clearly it is, and in the end it is a matter of opinion and judgment and not of proof. But I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman's statement is to some extent a statement of the obvious, and a very important obvious. Perhaps none the less, because of that, it is worth stating. There is no

125

doubt that we who live in this House together, both as a community across parties and in separate communities within parties, get to know each other probably better than most other communities that I can think of. Mr. Cunningham That is what they said about Philby. Mr. Carr The hon. Member believes in the need for positive vetting of Ministers. I am oldfashioned enough not to. All I am saying Mr. Cunningham My God! Mr. Carr This is a matter of opinion in which I differ from the hon. Gentleman. Hethis does not make him wrongis probably in a small minority, both in his own party and in the House. There may come a day when he will be able to say "I am right and I have been right all the time." All I am saying at the moment is that that is not the view of the overwhelming majority of any party. Anyway, it was not central to the matters raised today. 864 But it is important, in relation to my right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, to make it absolutely clear that the procedures as they existed were carried out. There have been suggestions from the beginning that the procedures as they were under the last Government have not been carried out. There it no truth in that at all, and I do not think that either of the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken tonight seriously suggested that that was the case. Mr. Lambton, formerly the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, was briefed in the proper manner. Of course, had he not been, my right hon. and noble Friend would indeed have had something to answer for. But he was briefed. It is true that when Mr. Lambton was interviewed on television he did not seem very clear about the status of different forms of vetting, but I really do not see how my right hon. and noble Friend can be blamed for that. I would not try to blame Mr. Lambton either. When dealing with this matter in response to questions on an earlier occasion, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister referred the House understood thisto the exceptional strain to which Mr. Lambton must have been exposed when he was being questioned on television. If any of us is prepared to stand up and put his hands on his heart and say that in equivalent circumstances, under equivalent strain, he would be clear about all these things, it might be wise if he showed more humility. My right hon. and noble Friend cannot be blamed for Mr. Lambton not knowing what sort of vetting took place. It is worth pointing out that since Mr. Lambton, perhaps mistakenly, was under the impression that he had been positively vetted, that was hardly evidence that it was a light and easy briefing that he had had. It was evidently a briefing which had sufficient effect on him to make him say, in those circumstances, "I have been positively vetted."He did not say "I cannot recall any vetting at all." Mr. Sydney Bidwell (Southall) I think the right hon. Gentleman is placing too much credibility on Mr. Lambton's 865 own words. In that television appearance, under questioning, did he not also say that, as far as he knew, the principal person in the situation, Norma Levy, was not aware of his situation? The right hon. Gentleman could not think that that was the case. Or is that what the right hon. Gentleman seriously thinks? The major point is that raised in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) concerning the disquiet which inevitably arose from the fact that the principal witness to the examination was

126

missing from the country but is now back in the country and inevitably, in the sheer logic of the evidence, new light must be thrown on the whole situation. Mr. Carr I will come to that issue in a moment, but it is not germane to the responsibilities of my right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. The hon. Member for Brixton seemed to think that there was something blameworthy in the fact that it was the Permanent Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Defence rather than the Secretary of State himself who saw Mr. Lambton. That could have been arguable, and it would be a charge calling for serious consideration had anyone at that stage wanted to see Mr. Lambton about a security matter. But that was not what the police wanted to see Mr. Lambton about. The police wished to see Mr. Lambton not about a security matter but about inquiries they were making in apprehension of a possible criminal offence. I think it perfectly proper for the police to have spoken in that instance to the senior civil servant rather than seek to see the Secretary of State for Defence himself. But, of course, if they had wished to see the Secretary of State, he would have seen them. However, I must repeat that at that stage we were dealing not with a security matter but with the possibility of a criminal offence having been committed, about which the police wished to interview Mr. Lambton and about which they did in fact interview him, as a result of which a criminal charge was laid against him, on which he has since been tried, convicted and sentenced. Mr. Lipton If a Minister in charge of a Department is told or gets to know that one of his junior Ministers is in 866 trouble, is it not his job to send for that junior Minister and find out what is going on? Mr. Carr I wonder by what remarkable telepathic insight the hon. Gentleman imagines that he knows that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence did not see Mr. Lambton. He seems to be suggesting that he knows that the Secretary of State did not see Mr. Lambton. That is a preposterous suggestion to make, and I do not believe that he has the slightest information, let alone evidence, on which to make it. Mr. Lipton So he did see him? Mr. Carr He was seeing him daily. Does not the hon. Gentleman know what sort of world we live in a Department? Does he imagine that a senior Minister never sees his junior Ministers? Does he not realise that a senior Minister is doing business with his junior Ministers day in and day out? The suggestion that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence stayed in some aloof, distinct and remote position is without the slightest foundation or evidence. Mr. Cunningham Can the Home Secretary tell us whether this matter was discussed between the Secretary of State and Mr. Lambton? Mr. Carr Not offhand, no. It may be a matter of personal relationships between two men who have been not only colleagues but friends to discuss their private affairs, but it is not a matter of business for the Secretary of State for Defence to discuss with an UnderSecretary when a possible criminal charge is under investigation. Indeed, I suggest that it might well be held, had he done so, to have been an improper thing to do.

127

I am aware, and I was aware from an early stage of this wretched situation, that while, as Home Secretary, I had serious responsibilities from a security point of view, not only did I have no responsibility, in relation to a criminal charge, to intervene but I had a definite responsibility to refrain from intervening. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear on 25th May, this was one of the reasons why we could not acquaint Mr. Lambton of some of the things we had heard, because to do so might have been to warn him of the 867 impending inquiries which the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions believed they ought to make into the possibility that he had committed a criminal offence. In those circumstances, it would have been entirely wrong and improper for anyone to give any warning to Mr. Lambton that such inquiries were pending or on foot. That was one of the reasons why, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made quite clearnot one of the reasons, but the reasonduring the considerable period we could not acquaint Mr. Lambton of some of the allegations made against him. It was also why the police informed the Security Service at a very early stage. It was also why the Security Service immediately informed me as Home Secretary and, of course, the Prime Minister. It was why the Prime Minister immediately instructed the Security Service to make all the inquiries it could to discover whether in its view there was any security risk of which we should be aware. As my right hon. Friend reported, several times during that period these inquiries to the Security Service were renewed and each time the Security Service replied "We have no reason to believe that there is any active security risk". Therefore, the normal course of the law and of inquiry in a potential criminal matter had to be allowed to take its course without any interference from Ministers. Mr. Cunningham I am sorry to intervene again, but that long answer conceals an inconsistency. The Home Secretary made to rebuke my hon. Friend the Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton) for thinking that the matter had not been discussed between the Secretary of State for Defence and the junior Minister and he implied that very likely there had been such a discussion. Now he is saying that he does not know whether there was such a discussion and, indeed, that it would have been improper for there to have been such a discussion. It is a circuitous argument. Mr. R. Carr I apologise; I did not think it was a circuitous argument. If it was, I did not intend it to be. There has been some suggestion that my right hon. and noble Friend somehow held himself aloof in all this. There 868 was no intention of that, but it would have been improper had my right hon. and noble Friend or any other Minister, in his official or his private capacity, warned Mr. Lambton of the charges which might be made against him and about which the police had expressed their need to inquire. It must be obvious to the House that, when such a thing is known, it would be totally improper to give the suspected person any warning, because that might pervert the course of justice. I pass to the demand made by the hon. Members for Gloucestershire, West and for Brixton that there should be another full public inquiry. Mr. Lipton I did not ask for that. Mr. Carr I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I do not believe that the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West produced one scrap of solid evidence or argument to support such a request. He mentioned that there was or might be a third Minister. He mentioned that everybody in the House knew who that third Minister was.

128

 Mr. Loughlin I must correct this. If I said that, it may be wrong. What I mean to sayI hope it will be corrected now in HANSARDis that every Member of the House knew the name that was being bandied about as being the third Minister. Mr. J. R. Kinsey (Birmingham, Perry Barr) No, they did not. Mr. Carr I cannot tell what other hon. Members know. I can only say that the hon. Member seems to have more knowledge than I and some of us at any rate. The hon. Member for Brixton, even if he did not ask for a further public inquiry, definitely said that some further evidence had come to lightI think he said since 6th July. I can only deny that absolutely. If the hon. Gentleman has any evidence or if he knows anybody else who has any evidence, let such person come forward and provide that evidence; and I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that it will be as thoroughly, as impartially and as fearlessly dealt with as was the original information which led to this whole sorry affair. 869 Mr. Lipton What is the object of the lengthy police interrogation of Norma Levy since she returned to this country? Mr. Carr It is not for me to know that. It is not for the hon. Gentleman to know it either. If I were to inquire of the police what they were doing, it would he wholly improper. If the hon. Gentleman began to suspect that I was doing that, I think he would be the first person to seek to raise the matter in the House, probably under Standing Order No. 9. I could not foretell how you, Mr. Speaker, would judge it, but I think you would not dismiss it lightly if somebody suggested that I as Home Secretary was inquiring into what the police were questioning someone about. It would be a wholly improper thing for me to do and a fatal step for any Minister to take. Mr. Lipton The right hon. Gentleman completely misunderstood what I said. Further evidence is now available, and I hope that the necessary steps will be taken to ensure that heed is taken of it by the appropriate authority. Mr. Carr The hon. Gentleman says with great confidence that further evidence is now available. I do not know whether the police are aware of further evidence. I can only say that I am not and the Government are not aware of it. If there is further evidence of which the hon. Gentleman is aware, providing it is evidence and not mere scandal mongering, I suggest that he gives it to the proper prosecuting authorities and it will be as fearlessly, fully and impartially dealt with as was the original allegation and evidence. Mr. Ronald Brown (Shoreditch and Finsbury): In this case all the names have been published of people who are supposedly concerned. Names have been bandied about in the Poulson affair. It is interesting that in the court case at present being heard which is called the Payola case reference is made to Mr. X, Mr. Y and Mr. Z. Can the right hon. Gentleman indicate why in the Payola case all the evidence is being treated secretly, with witnesses being referred to as Mr. Y and Mr. X, whereas speculative statements in Poulson 870 Mr. Speaker

129

Order. That is not a matter for the Home Secretary. It is for the court considering the case. It cannot be raised now. Mr. Carr I shall not refer to that matter, Mr. Speaker, but may I say without rancour that it is important for the House and the public to realise that under our systemit is one of the fundamental supports of our system and freedom in this countryMinisters do not, cannot and must not interfere in the course of criminal inquiries. That is absolutely fundamental. Mr. Lipton I accept that. Mr. Carr I hope that the whole House will accept it and act upon it. I can assure the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West that some of the things which he said are not embarrassing to me, to the Prime Minister or to the Government. I hope that they are slightly embarrassing to his conscience. The hon. Gentleman raised the question of the failure to arrest Mrs. Levy. There was some suggestion that the police did not arrest Mrs. Levy because it would have been embarrassing to the Government for them to do so. That is a scandalous, dirty suggestion to make without any foundation. It is a scandalous innuendo, not simply against the Government but against the whole Metropolitan Police, because it implies that they took instructions either from me as Home Secretary or from another Minister not to carry out their duty as they saw it. How can the hon. Gentleman make that suggestion when they had charged a Minister? If it was not embarrassing to the Government to do that, I think that we could have borne the embarrassment of Mrs. Levy being charged had the police any evidence against her. If they had had evidence against her at that stage, I am sure they would have charged her. The hon. Gentleman seems to think that the police should have charged her because Mr. Lambton or somebody else had said something at his trial. But does he suggest that because, say, my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State or someone else who may speak in this debate says that he knows that a 871 certain Mr. Loughlin who happens to be the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West has been partaking of drugs no one has said so, let me make clearit is to be regarded by the police as a reason for stopping the hon. Member from leaving the country or for making a charge against him? For heaven's sake! When that day comes, I hope that 1 no longer live in this country. Mr. Loughlin I can understand the right hon. Gentleman getting a little indignant, but let me put again the two points I made. Evidence was available to the police on 21st May. The right hon. Gentleman will recall that I quoted from The Times and I quoted what was said by the two policemen who interrogated Lord Lambton. The first question was whether Mrs. Levy had given him any drugs, and he said "Yes". The second question related to a photograph that was shown to him by the police and which showed him smoking a cigarette, and Lambton agreed, according to the evidence at the trial, that that cigarette could have been marijuana. Two separate pieces of evidence were given to the police: one was a photograph and the other was a statement made by a Minister, the person being investigated. I should have thought that that would have justified the police in taking action. Mr. Carr I have been a Member of the House for 23 years and, although I should require notice to name cases, I do not think that my memory is playing me false when I say that I have

130

heard hon. Members stand up for the liberty of the individual and criticise the police when they have taken action on evidence far more substantial than that. I do not believe that the charge that the police deliberately turned a blind eye bears one moment of serious consideration or inspection. The hon. Member is forgetting how this matter arose. The information about Lord Lambton came to the police in the course of inquiries in pursuit of what they believed might be a criminal offence. They were in hot pursuit of what they suspected might be criminal offences. Any suggestions that suddenly they cooled in that hot pursuit and withheld action when they had evidence which they believed would justify it certainly does not bear examination. 872 In any case, the hon. Member seems to be unaware that Mrs. LevyI think both Mr. and Mrs. Levyhad left the country on 20th May, which was the day before 21st May. The hon. Member must realise that, thank goodness, in this country we do not have the power to stop people from leaving the country unless there is reasonable cause to bring criminal charges against them. Once again I say that I hope I no longer live in this country if we ever reach the stage when the police have such powers. They do not have such powers, of course, and Mr. and Mrs. Levy had left by the time Mr. Lambton made the statement to which the hon. Member refers. The hon. Gentleman mentioned extradition. I can pass over that quickly. Under the extradition treaty that we have with Spain, an old treaty dating back to 1878 or in that period, the only possible charges that might have been made against Mr. and Mrs. Levy were not for extraditable offences. There I must leave it, because Mrs. Levy is back in this country and has had a charge made against her, so that her whole case is sub judice. The hon. Member for Brixton said that the existence of a call-girl racket involving topranking personalities had been known since 1972 and that there was some earlier evidence at the beginning of 1973. If so, it was not known to me as Home Secretary. If it was known to the hon. Member or to any people he knows, why, in the name of all responsibility, did he or they not come forward with the evidence? I cannot repeat too strongly that we all have some duty, it evidence comes to our attention which we believe to be more than just rumour or scandal mongering and to have sufficient credibility of substance to be a serious matter, to bring such information to the notice of the proper authorities. People should not make charges of that kind unless they have done their duty as citizens. The hon. Gentleman also asked whether I could assure him and the House about the degree of co-operation between the security services and the police. I can indeed so assure him. I think that is proved not just by my assurance but by the very way in which this matter came to our attention. The 873 police, in the pursuit of criminal inquiries, came across this allegation and they immediately reported it to the Security Service which immediately reported it, as it should, to the Prime Minister and to me as Home Secretary. That is evidence of the close degree of co-operation between the police and the security services. It is also within my personal knowledge that from that moment onwards, under instructions from the Prime Minister and myself, the police the whole time kept the Security Service fully informed. It would not have been proper for the police to keep me as fully informed, because it could prejudice a criminal inquiry, but there was no doubt about the close cooperation with the security services. Mr. William Wilson (Coventry, South) May I ask the Home Secretary one simple question? In the light of what he has just told us, it appears that the knowledge that the Government subsequently had about Lord Lambton came to them out of the blue. In view of what he said to us originallythat we in this House know one another and come to understand the characters of one another

131

how does it come about that such a matter as this did not come to light, ex-except out of the blue, when another entirely different inquiry was being pursued? Mr. Carr That is unfortunately true. We know each other well, but we do not know each other fully. I have to admit that. Mr. Cunningham All right. Mr. Carr The hon. Gentleman slaps his thigh and says "All right". He can go on believing that Ministers should be positively vetted if he likes, and I will go on believing that they should not and that I have the vast majority of hon. Members of both major parties on my side. Perhaps we in the majority are wrong, but it does not stop us holding our beliefs any more than it stops the hon. Gentleman holding his. Mr. Cunningham The right hon. Gentleman must admit that, in a serious matter like this, it is not good enough to go on saying that one person has his opinion and others have theirs. In para 874 graph 42 of the Diplock Report there is the sentence: We have also had in mind that the Government Chief Whip of the day can be expected to be very well informed about any member of either House of Parliament who is a potential candidate for Ministerial office. Does not the right hon. Gentleman at least think it curious that that should be one of the principal conclusions of a commission arising from a Lambton situation where clearly his colleagues were not fully aware of the character and activities of the man? Whatever conclusion one might ultimately reach on the point, is not that a manifest weakness in the Diplock Report? Mr. Carr The hon. Member can think so if he likes. I evidently cannot change his mind and he cannot change mine. We should remember that even positive vetting is not infallible. If I remember correctly, the Diplock Commission expressed the view that, even if the then hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed had been positively vetted at the time, these weaknesses or warning signs would not have been brought to light or would not have led to his non-appointment as a Minister. It is only a matter of opinion, but I think that was the view expressed by the commission. Mr. Cunningham I think that the right hon. Gentleman is thinking of Lord Jellicoe. In paragraph 23, after referring to Lord Jellicoe, the report says: If it had been disclosed in the process of positive vetting to which all civil servants are subjected before being employed on exceptionally secret work, it would not" the "it" means his conduct in our view, have been treated as disqualifying him. The commission says that about Lord Jellicoe, not about Lord Lambton. If the Home Secretary knows the report so little as to confuse these two things, I am surprised. Mr. Carr Perhaps I can tempt the hon. Member to turn to the last paragraph in the report, paragraph 43, which says: In the particular case of Lord Lambton and, a fortiori, in that of Lord Jellicoe, we are satisfied that positive vetting at the time of their appointment would not have brought to light anything which would have suggested that they were unsuitable on security grounds. 875 The hon. Member referred to some of the recommendations which the Diplock Commission made about the future. He said that he drew the inference that the proper procedures had not been carried out. I do not believe that he can substantiate that charge. Mr. Lipton

132

Why did the commission mention it? Mr. Carr Because it felt in the light of experience that in future we should have procedures which are even more stringent than in the past. That has been our practice through the decades. We have constantly improved and made more stringent our procedures. But there is no suggestion from the inquiries that the commission made that the standing procedures as practised by the last Government and as followed by the present Government were not followed. It has said that in future there should be even stiffer procedures. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made clear, we are accepting that. It is always easy when new procedures are adopted to say that perhaps they should have been adopted earlier. But what sort of a country are we living in? I do not believe that we should attract into public service the sort of men and women we have always managed to attract, regardless of party, if we were to make the conditions of that public service too much like living in a police state. That is why we are right only to go on adding to our procedures when, alas, experience proves it necessary. Experience has seemed to prove that it would be wise, unfortunately, to add to those procedures. That we shall do, but we in this Government have honoured to the full the procedures as we inherited them. ********************************************************************** THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR WALSALL, NORTH HC Deb 17 December 1974 vol 883 cc1353-7 1353 The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson) With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on a security matter. Publicity has recently been given to allegations that my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Stone-house) was spying for the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service at the time he held ministerial office. These allegations were first made by a Czechoslovak defector in 1969. With my approval, the Security Service investigated these allegations fully at the time. In the course of its inquiries it interviewed the defector, and it questioned my right hon. Friend about his contacts. Following its investigations, 1354 the Security Service advised me at that time that there was no evidence to support the allegations. I am today advised that no evidence to support these allegations has come to light at any time since then. There is no truth whatever in reports that my right hon. Friend was being kept under investigation or surveillance by the Security Service at the time of his disappearance. Mr. Heath Will not the Prime Minister agree that to make a statement of this kind is an unusual procedure? From time to time Press stories occur about intelligence activities. It has been a firmly held rule in the past that Prime Ministers and members of Governments do not make statements about allegations of this kind for the very sound reason that it now opens up a situation in which all sorts of stories can circulate in the Press and allegations can be made, and if they are not then denied in Parliament credence is given to them. Therefore I hope that the Prime Minister will assure the House that this is not to be taken as a precedent, and that when allegations about security matters are made in the Press a statement has not immediately to be made in the House. The Prime Minister has dealt with one allegation made in the course of Press stories. Of course, other allegations have been made on which the right hon. Gentleman has not touched. Therefore, it is still open to the Press to emphasise these allegations in the stories circulating which concern the right hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Stonehouse). I hope that further consideration will be given to that matter.

133

Could the Prime Minister also say what inquiries have now been made by the Government into the disappearance of his right hon. Friend? The Prime Minister I agree with the right hon. Gentleman to this extent, and to this extent only. It is always a difficult problem for anyone holding responsibilities such as he has held, and which I now hold, to know when to make a statement on these matters, and when not. Indeed, I think that in a previous case involving the right hon. Member for Sid-cup (Mr. Heath) considerable surprise was caused when he volunteered the statement that Philby was the third man 1355 involved on a famous occasion. I did not criticise the right hon. Gentleman for saying so, because he obviously was speaking with a full sense of responsibility. I believe that in this case there has been a serious Press campaign based on stories going back to 1969 when I had the responsibility for these matters. I caused the allegations to be fully investigated at the time, and found there was no substance in them. One must always face the possibility that defectors, when leaving a country where they previously were and finding their capitalintellectual capital, of coursediminishing, try to revive their memories of these matters. However, nothing has been said this week that was not said in 1969, when the most rigorous inquiries were made. It was proved at that time not only that there was no evidence that my right hon. Friend was a Czechoslovak spyindeed, that was not the suggestionbut that he was not in any sense a security risk. I think it is only fair and right to my right hon. Friend, since so many newspapers have published top front-page headlines on this matter, for me to say what I know about it, and to say that I have been into the matter. It does not follow that I shall comment in all future cases. Both the right hon. Gentleman and I agree that this is a difficult matter for discretion. I was also asked to comment on another aspect of the allegations. I have no information whatsoever about the disappearance of my right hon. Friend. This matter is being investigated by the United States police authorities, which are in touch with our own authorities. However, I have no information whatsoever. I only wish I had, but I have not. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman had in mind another issue circulated in the public Press with great confidence and certainty, that my right hon. Friend was an agent of the CIA. He was not an agent of the CIA. Mr. Molloy Notwithstanding the comments of the Leader of the Opposition, the majority of hon. Members of the House of Commons, the British people, and, indeed, the family and children of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wal- 1356 sall, North (Mr. Stonehouse) will be grateful to the Prime Minister for the statement he has made. Would the Prime Minister agree that the media should respond to his statement, in that the tarnishing rumours and innuendoes should cease and that the Stonehouse family should now be released from the distressing pressures causing unnecessary pain and anguish to them? The Prime Minister I agree with my hon. Friend. I made this statement be-cause of the publicity, which was not in the form of innuendo but as statements of alleged fact. Since I know the facts, I thought it right in the interests particularly of the family of my right hon. Friend that this should be said. Great distress has been caused. I understand that the mother of my right hon. Friend has suffered a serious heart attack because of the anxiety and pressure. Some members of the Press are hounding them in their homesthe children, their domestic staff and other persons connected with the familyto ask them far-fetched

134

questions about matters which at the end of the day must be settled by the police authorities in another country. It is time for these people to be given a little decent privacy and understanding and that some reticence should be shown by the Press. If it is of any help that I have given this statement this afternoon, considering the yards of newsprint devoted to the lie, which I have now disproved, I hope that perhaps the Press will use its newsprint to print the truth in place of the lie. Mr. Thorpe Is the Prime Minister aware that we are grateful for his statement? Is he also aware that the security procedures to which he alluded are well established and generally accepted by all sides of the House? Is he aware further that if the right hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Stonehouse) were here, he would be in a position to choose whether to make a personal statement or to take other advice? However, as he is not here, does not the Prime Minister accept that when allegations of this sort are made against an hon. Member of this House, if any of his colleagues, or indeed the Government of the day, of whatever complexion are able to rebut them, this is generally welcomed out of loyalty to a colleague in the House? Does the Prime Minister agree, finally, that, whilst there are still matters of 1357 grave doubt which have to be resolved, the less speculative conjecture there is the better it will be all round. The Prime Minister I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who has expressed the views of the whole House. There is one point which he recognised in what he said. The allegations, which have not been added to by any evidence, were made as long ago as 1969. I was satisfied by the thorough investigations, in which my right hon. Friend gave all possible help, that there was no truth in those allegations. It would have been obvious to the House that had there been a scintilla of evidence in 1969, my right hon. Friend would not have remained a member of the Government. ********************************************************************** EAST EUROPEAN REPRESENTATION IN UK HL Deb 05 February 1976 vol 367 cc1415-8 1415 3.21 p.m. Lord ORR-EWING My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the total of USSR personnel serving in the United Kingdom in diplomatic, trade and other posts; what is their estimate of the percentage of that total who have been trained by the USSR in espionage; and what is the total serving here in respect of the remaining Eastern European countries. Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, the number of USSR personnel serving in the United Kingdom in a diplomatic capacity is 94, with the Soviet trade delegation, 53;representing Soviet commercial organisations and the media, 106; commercial inspectors number 60; 1416 and there are 16 Soviet employees of international organisations. The total serving here in respect of the remaining six Eastern European countries is 476. It would not be in the national interest to disclose the Government's knowledge of foreign intelligence services. Lord ORR-EWING My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord the Minister for that reply, it is perhaps of some comfort to the House to learn that the present Government are maintaining the ceiling on USSR personnel set by my right honourable friend Lord Home of the Hirsel

135

in 1971. But are not these numbers of themselves really rather alarming? Can the noble Lord tell us how they compare with United Kingdom personnel of similar situation serving in Moscow? How do the figures compare in size with the number of representatives of our democratic ally, the United States of America, serving in Great Britain? Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, I confirm at once that the ceilings negotiated by the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, when he was Foreign Secretary, are being adhered to by this Government. They are, therefore, no more alarming in number today than they were then, when he negotiated them. On the second question of how many United States personnel represent their country in London, I have figures here which I should like to make available to the noble Lord, and in the appropriate form to the House. It is very difficult to compare the two figures, and I will not detain the House by attempting to do so. I should like to make the figures available to the House, and will circulate them in the Official Report. My Lords, may I just say that the economic systems being so different in these two countries, a great many Soviet personnel in this country are representatives of State trade organisations, as I tried to show in the breakdown of the figures. Clearly, this is not so to any great extent in regard to a country like the United States of America. Therefore, in comparing like with like, I would prefer the House and the noble Lord, who is a former Service Minister himself, to have the two complete sets of figures before them. The Earl of LAUDERDALE My Lords, can the noble Lord the Minister 1417 say how the numbers of British representation in Russia, official, industrial or those representing private enterprise, compare with the total figure of 329 that the noble Lord has just given for Russian representatives here? Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, I gave a figure of 94 for Soviet diplomatic representation in this country. The British diplomatic representation in Moscow is 82. Then we come to the realm of the not easily comparable; namely, trade delegations on the one hand and the representatives of private enterprise firms on the other. The two figures I have given, 94 and 82and I hope I am not being misleading as to the number of diplomats so defined in both capitalswill give the House some indication that the position is not all that dissimilar, having regard to population size and so on. The Earl of LAUDERDALE My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for that answer. However, he mentioned other figures for the Soviet trade delegation, commercial people, and soon. There are British subjects living and working in Moscow and in other parts of the Soviet Union. Can the noble Lord give us a figure for that total so that we may see the number of British versus Russian representatives?but perhaps he has not got the figure. Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, given notice, I will do my best. Clearly, this is a different category from the official representation I have been asked about. Lord CAMPBELL of CROY My Lords, if there were again to be a large proportion of Soviet officials in this country found to be carrying out intelligence or related activities regardless of their labels and within or going beyond the ceiling, will the Government, like my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel, arrange for some of them to leave? Might the Government add, as a reason, not only the Helsinki Agreement, but also that such officials have apparently not

136

been very efficient if their reports have led recently to the surprising impressions in Moscow of some leading persons in this country? Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, if they were that efficient, should 1418 we not perhaps encourage a greater number to come here? But seriously, this is a serious question, and I can give a double assurance. We are adhering to what I shall call the Home ceilings. Secondly, every proposal for an addition or a replacement at this level of representation in this country will continue to be scrutinised very carefully indeed. Lord BARNBY My Lords, is it to be understood from the reply given by the noble Lord the Minister that the Embassy here contains so many representatives of individual trading organisations that, in view of the very strong balance of payments running in Russia's favour, there may be disadvantage to us here in not reorganising the system of representation that we have in Moscow to meet something analagous to their advantage here? Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, that is really another question. However, I would remind the House that in the last two years our exports to Russia have doubled. Lord WIGG My Lords, if my noble friend is carrying out an assessment in terms of espionage as indicated by the precedent, would he hazard a guess as to what value to the Russian intelligence service are those British nationals who are such distinguished members of the Diplomatic Service as Messrs. Philby and Blake? What value they should count against the accredited Russian representatives serving in the Russian Embassy? Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS My Lords, not without very long notice. The figures referred to are as follows: US based staff working for the United States Embassy in London, diplomatic, administrative and technical, 255; for the US Consulate-Generals in Liverpool, Edinburgh and Belfast, respectively, 3, 4 and 2. ********************************************************************** CABINET DOCUMENTS (DISCLOSURE) HC Deb 28 June 1976 vol 914 cc39-106 Mr. Griffiths What the hon. Gentleman does not realise is that Cabinet papers are often all of a piece. It may be difficult, virtually impossible, to separate from one Cabinet meeting to the next the many items on the agenda. The serious matter that we are debating today is the fact that there exists a person with access to Cabinet papers, who is prepared, no doubt for sincere reasons, to make those papers available to others in breach of the law. It can be argued that Burgess, Maclean and Mr. Philby provided confidential material which they obtained in this country to the enemies of Britain because they genuinely believed that the acquisition by 89 the Soviet Union of nuclear secrets would balance up the power between East and West, and that, in their twisted view, this could lead to peace. No doubt, that was the rationalisation that led them to believe that they were justified in conveying secret information. The hon. Gentleman, however, should recognise that if there exists a person who can steal one kind of Cabinet paper in respect of subjects like child allowances on which he feels so strongly, equally such person can and probably does have access to Cabinet papers on other matterson defence and nuclear technology. By the same token he would be in a position to pass on those papers, too.

137

I hope the hon. Gentleman will realise that this is not a matter in which one can defend the crime by reference to the criminal's motive or by reference to the content of the Cabinet papers. That which is confidential to the Cabinet, regardless of the subject matter and regardless of the motivation of those who are custodians of those papers, must remain confidential to the Cabinet. Oherwise there can be no trust between colleagues in Government and no trust among outsiders who provide confidential information to Government in the belief that their confidences will be respected. Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North) The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful case, but he should not fall into the trap of saying that there are absolutely no grounds on which material from the Cabinet should be leaked. If there were an attempt by a Cabinet to mislead the House or the country or to breach our democratic principles, would not that be a point at which a line might be drawn? (...) ********************************************************************** Harold Philby and Donald Maclean HC Deb 13 December 1977 vol 941 c144W 144W 59. Mr. Lipton asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether Mr. H. A. R. Philby and Mr. D. D. Maclean hold current British passports. Mr. Luard No, the last British passports held by Harold Adrian Russell Philby and Donald Duart Maclean expired on 31st July 1967 and 29th July 1954, respectively. ********************************************************************** ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS) HC Deb 14 December 1977 vol 941 cc497-594 Mr. Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South) I wish to support the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) that before the House rises for the recess the Government should give a firm undertaking that the allegations of Josef Frolik will be fully and properly investigated after we return. My hon. Friend said that he and I have discussed this matter with one another for a number of months. I confirm the account that he gave to the House. I have seen virtually all the documents that he has seen and I have listened to the tapesto which he referredfrom beginning to end. I should like to take up a point made by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Jenkins), who is no longer in the Chamber. We are not talking about conjecture; we are talking about hard and well-documented allegations made by a defector who, as I shall explain in a moment, has been taken seriously by a number of Governments. I support the conclusions of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire and, in particular, his conclusion that there must be a full and independent investigation of Mr. Frolik's allegations. I see no reason why that investigation should not be mostly in public as was the investigation conducted by the committee of the American Senate. How ever, I recognise that there may be some aspects of that investigation that will have to be held in private. My hon. Friend said that he and I have spent some anxious months considering whether this matter should be raised in the House. What finally decided us that it must be raised was the new evidence referred to by my hon. Friend, namely, the letter from Mr. Frolik to Mr. Joseph Josten which has recently 559 come to our attention. As my hon. Friend explained, that letter refers in one passage to the allegations which Frolik made against John Stonehouse, that he was a spy for the Czechs, and to the statement that the right

138

hon. Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson) made to the House in December 1974, in which he said that there was no evidence against John Stonehouse to support the charge. The key passage, which my hon. Friend read out, declared that three months after the right hon. Gentleman's statement in the House he sent to the United States a high official of M15 to apologise to Mr. Frolik. I believe that Mr. Frolik's statement adds a totally new dimension to the matter, because it suggests that for whatever reason the right hon. Member for Huyton was wrong when he exonerated John Stonehouse. If Frolik is right in that statement there are some far reaching implications to be drawn. Is it possible that the right hon. Member for Huyton made his statement on the basis of official advice that was later found to be inaccurate? If so, was the right hon. Gentleman told subsequently that that information was inaccurate? If he was, would it not have been right for him to make another statement to the House setting the record straight? These are only some of the questions that arise from the letter by Mr. Frolik. Many others will readily occur to hon. Gentlemen, but I do not believe that this is the occasion for me to go into them. However, I do believe that this letter powerfully reinforces the case for the full and independent investigation for which my hon. Friend and I are calling. I have two further points to make. It is not my purpose now to argue whether Frolik is right or wrongthat will be the purpose of the investigationbut I believe that he is a witness to be taken seriously. He was flown to London from the United States after his defection and spent some time being debriefed by our security service. I understand that he has been questioned by it on a number of occasions. He has been questioned by the American intelligence service and was investigated by the Senate committee. I understand also that he 560 has been examined by the appropriate authorities of France and Germany. I suggest that the conclusion that we should draw from that is that he is a man whose word should not be taken lightly. It seems to me also probable that he was right about the RAF spy, Nicholas Praeger, who was convicted in 1971 on a charge of selling secrets to the Czechs. The second matter that I wish to raise is a more general one. We in the West, especially we in Britain, have a lamentable, not to say ludicrous, record in failing to pay proper attention to the evidence of defectors. I give the House three factual cases, all of them mentioned in a recent book by Gordon Brook-Shepherd called "The Storm Petrels", a book which gives every evidence of being well researched. In 1948, one Boris Bajanov defected from the Soviet Union. He had been successively personal assistant to Stalin and Secretary of the Politburo. It was as though there had defected from Britain to the Soviet Union a man who had previously been successively private secretary to the Prime Minister and secretary to the Cabinet. That is the measure of the importance of the man. He defected to India from the Soviet Union, and he was prepared to talk. One would have imagined that the British authorities who then ruled India would welcome him with open arms, would debrief him on matters relevant to India, and would then speed him on his way to London to be debriefed here. What happened was quite astonishing. There was a series of niggles. The first was about whether he should be admitted to India at all. After that, there was an incredible series of arguments between the Government of India and the Government in London about whether anyone would be prepared to pay his fare to London. In the end, he was unloaded on to the French. Therefore, his debriefing by the British was limited solely to a debriefing in Indiaa debriefing that was rather cursory, and related only to relations between Russia and India. We were never able in London to debrief him as we should have done.

139

The second case to which I wish to refer is that of Walter Krivitsky, who was 561 a KGB agent and who defected to the United States. Mr. Foot If there is any fresh evidence about anyone who has committed any crime, does not the hon. Gentleman think that he should submit it to some of the authorities? Does he not think that this is a reason why it should not be raised in a debate of this character? Obviously, if there are serious matters that he wishes to raise, he can submit the evidence. He should know that perfectly well. Mr. Blaker I shall be perfectly prepared to submit the evidence. What I am saying now is that all the evidence that is available should be the subject of a careful and independent investigation. The cases that I am now speaking about areor should bepublic knowledge. I am saying that too little attention has been paid to them. I return to the case of Walter Krivitsky. I am astonished that the Leader of the House does not know about it. If he had paid more attention to these matters, it might have been a familiar story to him. Mr. Michael Hamilton (Salisbury) Had the Leader of the House heard the earlier part of my hon. Friend's speech, he would have understood the significance of what my hon. Friend is now saying. Mr. Maker I should have thought so. I am obliged to my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Mr. Hamilton). Walter Krivitsky defected to the United States in 1938. He disclosed to the American authorities that Stalin had decided in 1934 to spare no effort to seek, in secret, an accommodation with the Nazi Government of Germany. He was not believed by the American authorities. He was not believed until 23rd August 1939, when an astonished world woke up to discover that the Nazi-Soviet friendship pact had been signed. However, Walter Krivitsky was believed on one count, and that was when he correctly told the American authorities, I am glad to say, that a Soviet agent was operating as a cipher clerk in Whitehall. The third case to which I want to refer is that of Alexander Orlov, who was a 562 general in the KGB and who defected to the United States, also in 1938. He had been the head of the KGB mission in Republican Spain, where, amongst other things, he was responsible for transferring the whole of Spain's gold reserves to Moscow, where they remain today. But, in spite of that good service to Moscow, he feared that he was about to be liquidated in one of Stalin's purges, and he defected. When Orlov arrived in the United States, he managed to secure interviews with the Attorney-General of the United States and with the Commissioner for Immigration, who allowed him and his wife to remain in the United States. But the extraordinary feature of this case is that those United States officials did not draw to the attention of the Department of Defence or the State Department or the Federal Bureau of Investigation the fact that this important former KGB general had arrived in the United States. Orlov disappeared into American life. He came to public attention again only in 1953, when he published a book. It was only then that the proper departments of the American Government discovered that they had had in their midst for 15 years one of the people who more than anyone else in the world would have been able to tell them about Soviet motives and intentions. It was only then that they discovered that in 1938, when Orlov defected, there had been operating out of Soviet diplomatic and trade missions in the United States 18 spy rings.

140

If the American Administration had learned in 1938 what Orlov had to tell them, it is possible that some of President Roosevelt's naive assumptions about Russian motivations and intentions would have been removed, with the result that the story of Yalta could have been quite different, that Roosevelt would have sided with Churchill instead of making concessions to Stalin, and that the Iron Curtain would have fallen a good deal further east than it did. There is a further feature to this case which is of interest to us directly. If Orlov had been properly debriefed in 1938 he could have told the Western authorities that Philby was already at that time a Communist agent operating as a journalist with Franco's forces in Spain. We in the West, especially we in Britain, are slow to believe facts like 563 these, and all that 1have been saying about these three cases is fact as far as I can ascertain. I believe that Frolik's allegations deserve as careful an examination as those of any other defector from the Eastern bloc, and I think that the House must make sure that that examination takes place. I want to quote what was said by a right hon. Member on 5th December, because it is apposite to this case. He said: Parliament, the whole House, every part of the House, will not let go of this question until all the facts have come to light and everything capable of remedial action has been dealt with, and dealt with from now on under the constant vigilance and supervision of the House of Commons."[Official Report, 5th December 1977; Vol. 940, c. 1059.] That was said in the debate on the Crown Agents by the right hon. Member for Huyton. I hope that the House will show the same determination to get at the truth on this matter as it did on that one. ********************************************************************** NATIONAL SECURITY (PRESS DISCLOSURES) HC Deb 01 February 1978 vol 943 cc484-6 484 Mr. Blaker I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely, the need for an inquiry into the disclosure in the Press of secret matters affecting national security. The matter is specific in that there is a report in today's Press that last summer the identity was disclosed of a man working in a top job in Downing Street who was said to be a Soviet agent. The story goes on to disclose a reference in a conversation with journalists to the Mr. Arthur Lewis On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On a number of occasions I have been told by the Table that, by established practice and by the rules of the House, no hon. Member may raise anything which is in any way of a secret nature. Anything of that nature must not be revealed, debated or mentioned. If the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) is raising something which he says is secret, I should like to know whether we shall in future be allowed to raise matters which are secret, since, frankly, I have been barred many times on that. Mr. Speaker In view of his long experience in the House, I pay great respect to what the hon. Gentleman says, but all that the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) has done so far has been to refer to what is in the Press today. That is not a secret. I think that we ought to hear what the hon. Member has to say. 485 Mr. Blaker I confirm, Mr. Speaker, that it is not my intention to raise any matters which are secret.

141

The story goes on to disclose a reference in a conversation with journalists to the fourth man in the Philby affair. It continues by saying that the civil servant involved had been the subject of an inquiry and had been cleared. Whether or not that last point is correct is not my concern today, important though it is. My concern is that this is not the first time that stories revealing what must be secret matters affecting the security of the country have appeared in the Press in recent weeks. Only last Monday stories were published which brought into question the efficiency and impartiality of the security services. I believe this to be a new departure in the way we deal with security matters in this country and one which has serious implications. I urge that it would be right for the Prime Minister to set up an independent inquiry into how these allegations came to be made public and the facts surrounding them. The exact terms of reference of the inquiry would, of course, be a matter for discussion in the debate. The matter is, therefore, specific in that it involves the need for an inquiry into the reports in the Press today and on Monday. The matter is important because these revelations reflect on the way in which responsibility for security has been and is being exercised. The efficient working of our security services is vital to the country's interests, and, at least, these stories must have damaged the morale of the security services. Moreover, it seems to me that today's story, like Monday's, involves the disclosure of official secrets. 486 The subject should have urgent consideration, because today's story suggests that what is involved is not simply one occasion but several occasions on which secret matters have been ventilated to and in the Press. For all I know, there may be more to come. The many serious and, indeed, alarming questions to which this matter gives rise should be cleared up as soon as possible. Not only is it important that the morale of our security services should be maintained, but it is important that public confidence in them should be preserved. The House should have the opportunity to express itself on the subject as soon as possible. Mr. Speaker The hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) gave me notice before 12 o'clock today that he proposed to raise this matter. He wishes there to be a debate on the need for an inquiry into the disclosure in the Press of secret matters affecting national security. As the House knows, under Standing Order No. 9 I am directed to take into account the several factors set out in the Order, but I have not to decide whether there ought to be a debate on the matter. I have to decide whether there shall be a debate tonight or tomorrow. Having listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said, I am afraid that I cannot grant his application. ********************************************************************** PRIVILEGES HC Deb 02 May 1978 vol 949 cc36-101 36 3.53 p.m. Mr. Speaker Before I call the Lord President. I must remind the House that the sub judice rule applies to the cases that are still before the courts. Mr. Alexander W. Lyon (York) On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This debate arises out of an incident on 20th April and the ruling which you gave the following day, on 21st April. I have put down an EarlyDay Motion, which is still on the Order Paper, that the ruling should not be cited or

142

drawn into precedent. My understanding was that such a motion, having critical implications for you, Mr. Speakeralthough we are discussing the reasons for the ruling rather than your personal convictionshould be debated. I am now assured that this is not true, but it would be more convenient that this point should be discussed in the debate because it relates to this issue. If I am called, I should like to speak about the proposition that I have tabled. Because it is somewhat critical of you, Mr. Speaker, does this mean that I am in any way prevented from doing so? Mr. Speaker Not at all, not merely because it is critical of me. Nobody would ever be prevented from speaking in such circumstances. But no doubt I would remember it, because I am as human as anyone else. The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) is learned in the law and I am sure that he will keep within the sub judice rule. All I am asking is that everyone should observe the sub judice rule and not refer to the cases that are now before the courts for consideration. 3.55 p.m. The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Michael Foot) I beg to move, That the matter of publication of the Proceedings of the House, other than by order of the House, in so far as the Privileges of this House are concerned and the matter of the application of the sub judice rule during 37 Business Questions on Thursday 20th April be referred to the Committee of Privileges. I shall be very brief in moving this motion. I believe that it would be desirable if we could proceed fairly rapidly, pass the motion and let all these matters be considered by the Committee of Privileges. This is the most orderly and fair way of dealing with the various matters that have been raised by motions upon the Order Paper. It is certainly my belief that the motion we have tabled should and would enable the Committee of Privileges to discuss all the motions that have been put on the Order Paper, to make its comments on them and then report to the House. That also applies to the motion of my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon). It is the case that the only way in which the House can criticise the Speaker is when such a motion has been put down for debate. This is the right way to proceed. However, I do not believe that it would be possible for the Committee of Privileges to consider these matters without taking into account Mr. Speaker's ruling on that day and the motion on the Order Paper in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York. Having made clear to the House that this motion is intended to, and in fact does, secure a situation in which all these matters can be properly considered by the Committee, I suggest that the best course of action is for the House to pass the motion as speedily as possible, allow the Committee to look at all the questions and then report to the House. No doubt when that report is made, there will have to be a debate because the matters raised in all the motions, and in my motion, too, are very important for the House. I am not minimising their importance, but precisely because of it, I believe that the best way to proceed is to enable the Committee of Privileges to review the whole situation. 3.57 p.m. Mr. Francis Pym (Cambridgeshire) We believe that it is the right and proper procedure to refer this whole matter to the Committee of Privileges. The events at business questions on 20th April and what was said on that occasion raise significant issues for the House. They gave rise to two rulings by you, Mr. Speaker, a number of Early-Day Motions and a 38 certain amount of speculation and uncertainty in the media and the Press.

143

At the time of these events, no hon. Member present was aware of any connection between the questions asked by four hon. Members of this House and a particular court case, because no objection was raised at the time and no attention was drawn to the matter. Since then, several opinions have been expressed about the way in which those four hon. Members raised the question. It is not for me to comment on that, because in this case the reference to the Committee of Privileges is the right course. However, there is some urgency here. A number of complex aspects of privilege and the reporting of our proceedings outside this House are raised and should be decided on with a minimum of delay. It is very important that there should be no repetition of what happened on 20th April. Any breaching of our own rules is obviously an extremely serious matter which the Committee of Privileges will have to consider very carefully. But in the case of the sub judice rule, unless this is strictly observed the process of justice itself is in danger. That process is what the rule itself is designed to protect. It is the fundamental principle that we in this House should observe the orders of the court. I always understood that this was fully accepted by the House. In addition to the application of the sub judice rule, there is also the important consideration of securityboth personal and national. There may be, in some cases, very good reasons for a court to require anonymity in respect of some witness, apart from any consideration of protecting the judicial process. Even in the absence of any court case or legal proceedings, there are people in the security services whose identity should never be revealed for their own and their families' sake, for their own safety, and because it would be contrary to the public interest. The House attaches much importance to the security of our country. It would be appropriate for the Committee of Privileges to consider the implications of this possibility which, in part, arises from the wider issue that we have to face of 39 the reporting of the proceedings of Parliament by live radio and the question whether the Official Report is to remain the only report exempt from a possible contempt of court. I ask a question of the House, which I am sure will arise in the Committee of Privileges. Ought we not to consider the suggestion that was first made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) in The Times last Thursday that if it transpires that something has been said which ought not to have been said, Mr. Speaker should have a right, a duty or a responsibility to order those words to be expunged from the record? That is one way of dealing with the matter. Mr. John Mendelson (Penistone) No. Mr. Pym At any rate, it should be considered whether some such procedure for protection may be desirable now that the proceedings of Parliament are broadcast. Mr. Mendelson That would be most dangerous. Mr. Pym The hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) is entitled to hold that view. The matter was raised originally by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet, and I think that it is a matter for consideration. The Lord President has assured us again, as he assured the House last Thursday, that the motion is drawn in the widest possible terms so that all the circumstances surrounding the events of that day can be considered by the Committee of Privileges, and I have no doubt that it will do so. The assurance of the Lord President was strong enough to

144

enable my hon and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) to feel that it would be right and proper to withdraw the Early-Day Motion which he had placed on the Order Paper in relation to the four Labour Members. All these matters should now be considered by the Committee of Privileges with urgency. Accordingly, we on the Conservative Benches believe that the motion should be accepted. 4.2 p.m. Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South) It is the custom of the House, when it 40 is found that a question of privilege should have precedence over the Orders of the Day, to commit the matter, usually without more ado, to the Committee of Privileges. I believe, however, that in a case such as the present one it is proper and advantageous that the House itself should have the opportunity of expressing a general view before it commits the question of privilege to the Committee of Privileges. The origin of the matter was the issuing of a statement by the Director of Public Prosecutions which said: It is not accepted that the publication of his name" that is, of something said in the House would not be a contempt of court, even if it was part of a report of proceedings in the House. I cannot imagine a more direct assault upon the essential privileges of the House than that proposition. It has from time immemorial been the privilege of the House to say in this place things that would lay the speaker open to proceedings if he said them elsewhere and to say them in this place without any danger of proceedings of any kind being brought on that account. If we did not have that privilege, we would be incapable of serving the purposes for which the House exists, either on behalf of the nation or on behalf of individual constituents, and our own personal responsibilities would be reduced to a very poor thing. When this privilege was first established and defended, it was probably not primarily against proceedings of courts outside or against the consequences of what we said being reported outside that we sought protection. We sought it in the first instance for the security of debate and deliberation amongst ourselves and to secure entire candour in what was said amongst us. However, those days have long passed. Today it is impossible to distinguish between the privilege of hon. Members of the House to speak under privilege here and the right to have what they say here published. For if it were merely our privilege that we might say what we would in this place but what we said could not be reported outside, that would, in contemporary circumstances, serve very little purpose. It seems to me, therefore, to follow that immunity from proceedings for the publication in any natural manner 41 the reporting in any natural sense of that termof anything said in the House is an essential part of the privileges of the House and that it cannot be infringed without infringing those privileges. The statement of the Director of Public Prosecutions did exactly that. He said that there would be liability to proceedings outside the House in respect of a publication even if it was part of a report of proceedings in the House. There was nothing in those words which distinguished what is called the Official Reportor Hansardfrom other reports. Nor, I submit with great respect, is there any such real distinction. The Official Report enjoys certain privilegesnot privilege in the sense in which we are debating it this afternoonit enjoys a special position by favour of the House. You, Mr. Speaker, have certain duties and responsibilities in regard to the Official Report. However, it is not official in the sense that it is the record of what is decided in the House. That record is the Journal of the House. I do not think, therefore, that it is possible to distinguish between a report in a newspaper of proceedings in the House and a report in the Official Report.

145

The Official Report, by its nature is or purports to be complete. But in no natural sense can a report of a debate which was less than complete, if it was clearly intended as a genuine report of what was said, not be regarded as attracting, logically and necessarily, the protection of privilege. Before this matter goes to the Committee of Privileges, it ought to be said in this place that the threat of proceedings against the genuine publication of what is said in the House is a high and manifest breach of the House's essential privileges. If that breach became established, the value of our privilege of freedom of speech would be gravely impaired. It is the counterpart of our immunity against the outside world that we are under our own discipline. It is the counterpart that we make our own rules, that we enforce our own rules and that we discipline those of our membership who infringe those rules. That is how the question of our rule against reference to proceedings that are sub judice came to be brought into this matter. 42 I say in passingand I trust that in doing so I am neither infringing the rule nor offering the least degree of disrespectthat I am not clear whether what was said by the hon. Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) and other hon. Members conflicted with the sub judice rule. Mr. Speaker I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but he is getting dangerously near the case in which this very fact is a matter of dispute. Mr. John Mendelson How can we avoid it? Mr. Speaker By sending the matter to the Committee of Privileges. Mr. Powell If I may continue my speechand I shall not detain the House unavoidablyI hope that I may be allowed to refer to the case that is sub judicenot to refer to its content, but to identify the case. I understand it to be the question whether contempt of court was or was not committed by certain other persons, not being Members of this House. I understand that the matter that is sub judice concerns whether there was a contempt of court by other persons doing, saying or publishing certain things. I must confess I cannot see that for an hon. Member to make a statement that does not concern the merits of that case can be a breach of the sub judice rule. However, Mr. Speaker, if I have said anything that offends in that respect, I apologise. My only intention was to indicate that, having the sub judice rule and being conscious of its importance, we must nevertheless be extremely nice in ensuring what does and does not constitute the mention or discussion of matters that are sub judice. As regards the breach in debate of this, that or any other rule of our procedure, it is the duty of hon. Members, to the best of their ability and knowledge and as they are advised at the time, to speak in accordance with the rules of the House; and it is the duty of the Chair, similarly subject, to prevent them from proceeding if they are in breach of the rules. For example, an hon. Member who quoted a speech made in another place, other than by a representative of the Government, would be pulled up by the Chair and reminded that he was out of order in doing so. There is no difference 43 in kind between that intervention in an hon. Member's speech and an intervention by you, Mr. Speaker, or another occupant of the Chair, to point out that he is in breach of the sub judice rule. Mr. Cranley Onslow (Woking) It is a difference of degree.

146

 Mr. Powell I am not sure that it is easy to distinguish between the degrees of heinousness of a breach of one rule or another. What is open to censure on the part of an hon. Member is not that he lays himself open to being reminded by the Chair that he is breaking one of our rules of debate. We all do that from time to time. He lays himself open to censure if he persists in it; and if he were to persist in it contumeliously, no doubt the House would proceed to disciplinary measures against him. The point that I want to establish is that even if there is a rule of the House that may be broken in debate, that does not annul what has been said up to that point nor place what has been said in a different category, for the purpose of our privilege, from anything else that is said in the House. That brings me to the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym), which I heard with a frisson of horror, that we might adopt a practice whereby if the rules of the House had been broken orand I understood the right hon. Member to carry his suggestion furtherwhere an hon. Member was thought by you, Mr. Speaker, or by the House to have mentioned matters that might be against the public interest, the order could be given that his words should be expunged from the record or that they should not attract the protection of privilege. I can think of nothing that would be more dangerous than this approach to our freedom of speech. I am sure, Mr. Speaker, that you will acquit me of any suspicion of intending disrespect or criticism, but I should like to refer to something you said last Monday. You said: Our privilege is something that was dearly obtained by our predecessors, but if it is abused it will be endangered.[Official Report, 21st April 1978, Vol. 948, c. 866.] 44 With the greatest respect, a privilege which cannot be abused is no privilege, for that which constitutes abuse is a matter of opinion and it is part of the privilege of this House and of individual Members to be able to say in this place not only what they could not say outside without risk of process but to be able to say that to which grave objection is taken by every other hon. Member. Unless an hon. Member could do that, or if it were possible for his doing of it somehow to be undone, we would have lost our power to serve those who sent us here. It so happens that, though I did not catch the actual words of the hon. Member for Barking on the relevant occasion, I took some objection, as a matter of taste, to her decision to utilise what I regard as her undoubted privilege. I am not on the matter of sub judice now; I am on the matter of privilege. Speaking loosely, I might have said that the hon. Lady was abusing her privilege. But there is no real distinction in this context between using and abusing privilege, or, if there is, it is a subjective decisiona matter of taste and of no more than of taste. Mr. Reginald Maudling (Chipping Barnet) Is it not a fact that, whereas an accusation can be withdrawn, a disclosure cannot? If an accusation is made contrary to the rules of order, it can be withdrawn. What is to be done about a disclosure which is made contrary to the rules of order? Mr. Powell I am coming to the question of disclosure and retroactivity, but for the moment I am concerned with the non-existence of a real distinction between the use and abuse of our privilege. Indeed, the only distinction is that a use of privilege is that of which hon. Members generally approve and an abuse is a use of which hon. Members generally, or perhaps the organs out of doors, happen to disapprove. Mr. Onslow

147

Would the right hon. Gentleman therefore say that he is unable to draw a distinction between an inadvertent breach of privilege, based on ignorance, and a deliberate breach for purposes and motives that may be generally taken exception to inside and outside the House for the very best of national reasons? 45 Mr. Powell I am sure that the use that the hon. Member for Barking made of her privilegeand it was a use of privilege, not a breach of privilegewas intentional. It is of the essence of our privilege that we can use it intentionally and not accidentally. On other hand, I am prepared to believe, and I think it probable, that her breach, if it were a breach, of the sub judice rule was unintentional. Nevertheless, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) will be aware that sometimes we in this House go as far as we can until the Chair draws our attention to the fact that we have strayed over the line. It is not unknown for the Chair to be slightly blind and slightly deaf. I address myself now to the question put by the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling): an hon. Member has said what, vis--vis the outside world, he undoubtedly has unqualified privilege to say; but though it appears that in doing so he has been in breach of the rules of the House, the words are saidnescit vox missa revertiand they are reported. I maintain that those words said in this House up to the moment when the hon. Member, on the instruction of the Chair, resumed his seat are as much things said in this House as any others. They attract the same privilege in this House and, by parity of logic, must attract the same qualified privilege outside it. Any notion is to be dismissed that we can, as it were, retrospectively unsay that which has been found to have been said contrary to the internal rules of the House. There is a final and recent aspect of this case which is interesting, although perhaps not fundamental. It is the fact that the reporting of this House, due to a decision of the House which I resisted and regret, is now taking place instantaneously as well as subsequently, or, at any rate, is sometimes taking place instantaneously as well as subsequently. If we were to make a rule that the reporting of this House was somehow to be censoredthat items which were in contravention of the rules of the House or, still more outrageously, items which if spoken elsewhere would attract proceedings were to be cut outI shall tell the House what would follow. There would 46 have to be a switch in a certain place not far from here, and the question would be asked "Whose finger on the switch?" I shall describe, although I cannot identify, the individual whose finger would be on the switch. He must be an individual who has an even more profound knowledge of the rules of this House than yourself, Mr. Speaker; who has an encyclopaedic knowledge of what is in agitation in the courts of the land from Land's End to John o' Groats; and he must be a person of such swiftness of perception that he can anticipate the words that are about to issue from an hon. Member's mouth before he has spoken them. This diverticulum of our difficulties we could excise, as I hope we shall excise it, by discontinuing what I regard as an undesirable practice. But we shall still be left with the necessity of defending, in the reporting outside as well as in the saying in this House, our undoubted and historic privilege and of distinguishing completely between the discipline which this House exercises over its Members and the privileges of this House. The discipline which is exercised over Members is not in itself a matter of privilege. It becomes a matter of privilege, or, perhaps more accurately, of contempt, only if there is a breach of the rules of the House which is found to amount to contempt. But in

148

themselves the rules of the House are not rules of privilege; they are internal rules of proceeding. Our maintenance of those rules can in no way impair either our privileges in this House or the implications for the reporting of our proceedings outside. I hope that the Privileges Committee when it takes this matter in hand will be fully aware how profound are the matters upon which its advice is being sought. I hope that it will understand that it is the most objectionable uses of the privilege of this House which are the most vital to its functions. If we go back through the history of this House, we find that very often it was the possibility of things being said in this House which were detestable to those who heard them and to those outside which led to the broadening of our liberties. I would not wish this House, in this year, to be a party to the narrowing of those liberties again. 47 4.24 p.m. Mr. Alexander W. Lyon (York) I agree with almost every word that fell from the lips of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell). We have absolute privilege in this place to say and do as we please. There can be no qualification about that if we are to do the work for which we are sent here. Any suggestion that that privilege is qualified in this House by some regard to taste or to objections about security, or any other cause, must be set aside in the general good that flows from the fact that we have this privilege to raise in this place whatever we wish in any way that we regard as responsible, even if that thought is opposed by every other person in the House. We are today debating a matter of great moment. The mere fact that it arises out of what some people may regard as a trivial matter in relation to the disclosure of a particular name does not, in my view, mean that we should underestimate the momentousness of what we are about to discuss. In the great case of Stockdale v. Hansard they discussed the description of a particular book as being obscene in respect of a Committee of this House which was described in the Report of the House as " by , printed by Stockdale". It was then printed in a blue book by Hansard out of which arose a libel action. It was out of such small beginnings that one of the greatest debates began in our history about the limits of the privilege of Parliament. I wish to deal with the way in which that issuean issue which was never finally settled in the nineteenth century and is still open in "Erskine May"was perhaps settled, I think perhaps inadvertently, Mr. Speaker, by a remark in your ruling of 21st April. May I approach the matter gradually? Mr. Speaker I think that would be better for me. Mr. Lyon I hope that in the matters I wish to raise I shall not be in breach of any rule of the House or of any sense of your own conduct, Mr. Speaker. What happened on 20th April was that some of my hon. Friends mentioned a particular name. That name was an issue not in the original proceedingsand I do not think that reference to those original 48 proceedings could conceivably be said to be sub judice, because the question is whether it was sub judice of the proceedings which are taking place today. On that matter you have made a ruling that the issue must go to the Committee of Privileges for discussion. I want to say nothing which in any way contravenes your view on that. It must at least be arguable that in the circumstances of the case which is now before the Divisional Court there was a breach of the sub judice rule which we laid down for

149

ourselves. But it is important to distinguish between the rule that we laid down, of which there may have been a breach, and the rule which is laid down by the courts outside for discussion of matters by the public of matters pending in the courts. The courts have a sub judice rule, and one can be in contempt of court by discussing matters which are then currently before the courts, but our rule is a different sub judice rule. If my hon. Friends were in breach of a rule, they were in breach of our rule and not of the rule of the courts. Our privilege is to say whatever we like within the rules of the House, and only within those rules. What I objected to, Mr. Speaker, was that when you came to deal with this matter on Friday 21st April you said: were this warning to be followed by legal action and you were referring to the warning given by the Director of Public Prosecutions it would not be the first time that the reports of parliamentary debates in the Press had been the subject of proceedings in the courts. As it is stated on page 81 of "Erskine May": 'There is a distinction between the absolute privilege of Members speaking in the House and the qualified privilege of a publisher reporting words spoken; in the latter case publication of parliamentary proceedings is protected, not specifically by privilege of Parliament, but on the analogy of the publication of proceedings in courts of justice.' This principle was followed in the case of Wason v. Walter in 1868, and no claim has been made by Parliament, either at the time or since, that its privileges were infringed by this or any other similar action."[Official Report, 21st April 1978; Vol. 948, c. 8656.] The correct impression of what happened in those days is contained on pages 200 and 201 of "Erskine May" which reads: The House of Commons claims that its admitted right to adjudicate on breaches of 49 privilege implies in theory the right to determine the existence and extent of the privileges themselves. It has never expressly abandoned its claim to treat as a breach of privilege the institution of proceedings for the purpose of bringing its privileges into discussion or decision before any court or tribunal elsewhere than in Parliament. In other words, it claims to be the absolute and exclusive judge of its own privileges, and that its judgments are not examinable by any other court or subject to appeal. On the other hand, the courts regard the privileges of Parliament as part of the law of the land, of which they are bound to take judicial notice. They consider it their duty to decide any question of privilege arising directly or indirectly in a case which falls within their jurisdiction, and to decide it according to their own interpretation of the law. It was the supreme issue in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard that we decided not only what are our privileges but what are the limits of our privileges. There is no contest that we are totally responsible for what goes on within this place. But the issue in Stockdale v. Hansard was how much of that lapped outside into reports, fair reports, of what had happened inside. The House never had any doubt in its own mind about how the issue should be resolved. There were three separate Select Committee reports upon the issue whether privilege extended beyond the confines of the House to reports that were made out side. I entirely agree with what the right hon. Member for Down, South said about there being no difference between Hansard and a report in The Times or indeed on the BBC. The issue must be the same in both cases. I quote from the Second Report of the Select Committee, in which it discussed the possible alternatives. One was that the House could take to itself the power to decide the limits of privilege for reports outside by passing an Act. The recommendation of the Select Committee was: The passing of an Act to enable the House for the future to publish its proceedings without having them questioned in a court of law, would, in the opinion of your Committee, be a virtual abandonment of the right which they have no doubt now belongs to this in common with the other House of Parliament, and which

150

ought not, as they conceive, to be surrendered. I quote, from the debate that followed that Select Committee report, from the speech of Sir Robert Peel, who at the time was Leader of the Opposition and I hope will be thought by those on the 50 Opposition Benches to be of some authority. He said: the result is, a firm conviction that the House of Commons has the right to institute free inquiry upon every matter of public concern,to elicit every fact connected with the subject of inquiryand to publish the evidence taken, and the conclusions drawn from that evidence, either for the use of its Members, or, if it shall so think fit, for the use and information of the community at large. Later in his speech he said, in relation to the challenge to that right by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Denman, in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard: I wish to speak with the highest respect for the person as well as for the station of the Lord Chief Justice. He said that he bowed to the Lord Chief Justice's knowledge of the law with deference, but added: but when his decisions impugn the privileges of Parliament, I have not only a right, but am bound by duty, to take cognizance of them. I do not believe that his judgment in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard, is maintainable. His direction to the jury, 'That the fact of the House of Commons having directed their printer to publish their Parliamentary Reports, is no justification for the publication, by them, of a Report containing a libel, upon any man.'I believe to be erroneous. Earlier he had said: If the right of publication be a privilege necessary for the performance of the functions of the House of Commons, then, like other privileges, it is not liable to question in a court of law. The House of Commons is the exclusive judge of the exercise of it. My understanding, after reading through those debates and the reports that followed, was that the House never resiled from that position. It is true, Mr. Speaker, as you pointed out in your ruling on 21st April, that subsequently in a case in the Queen's Bench, the case of Wason v. Walter, which decided that qualified privilege was attached to fair report of what happened in this place, the Lord Chief Justice said that the courts were entitled to decide what was the limit of privilege outside. He called in aid the decision of Lord Chief Justice Denman. But it is quite clear from our proceedings in this House that we never accepted that. Apart from the historical antiquity of all that, does it really matter in these days? In my submission, it does. It is of grave importance to the proceedings of the House that we make it clear that we, and not the courts, decide what is the 51 limit of privilege. Is it to be said, for instanceand the point has been made by the right hon. Gentlemanthat the BBC or the IBA were in contempt of the courts which are discussing this issue today by broadcasting the names that were spoken on Thursday, 20th April? That is a matter of the greatest moment to the broadcasting authorities. It is true that the Attorney-General has said that he does not wish to proceed, but who can say whether an Attorney-General would always take that view? Who can say that he, and he alone, would have the right to prosecute in similar circumstances? It must be laid down that the courts cannot intervene. But there is a wider aspect. We are progressing gradually, and I think unfortunately, to a conflict between the courts and Parliament. There is every evidence over recent years that the courts are bending their muscles in order to take on the Houses of Parliament, either corporately or individually, in deciding where the line must be drawn in determining who is responsible for the liberties of our people. I think that it is absolutely right that the courts, within their proper sphere, should try to draw that line. But it is equally clear that we within our sphere should also know where to draw that line. I believe that it is more important that we should know than that the courts should know, because we are at any rate accountable to the people, as we are elected by them.

151

When we, if we, ever go to the stage of adopting a Bill of Rightsthere are those who say that because we have adopted the European Convention we have already done so what we shall really be saying is not that there is one source which is wiser than another but simply that the decision would be made in one place rather than another, that the decision about what are the limits of statutory authority or power should be made by the courts and not by this House or by Parliament generally. In that situation there are bound to be conflicts. I would not have troubled the House with this discussion of what might be an esoteric point if it were simply a question of this particular issue. I think that the matter can be resolved sensibly and fairly 52 by the Committee of Privileges. What I am worried about, Mr. Speaker, is that the ruling you made on 21st April may prejudice the discussion of some momentous constitutional clash which may emerge in the future, because it will then be said that the whole issue was decided by the statement of Mr. Speaker Thomas on 21st April 1978 that the courts outside have the right to determine the extent of privilege outside, and that therefore it is a matter for the courts to decide. I want to make the position plain by registering my protest now. I hope that in due course the House will have an opportunity of voting and expressing its view and that it will make it absolutely clear that we decide the extent of privilege not only here but outside. If it is thought by any of those who listen to us or read about our discussions that we are asserting a claim to be above the law, I say that we are asserting that claim only to a limited extent, to the extent that it is necessary for us to perform our duties. There is no doubt about our right to that privilege here. The argument has been about that right outside. I end with a statement I found in an account of all these matters called "Printer to the House": But observe, too, the consequence had Lord Denman's judgment been allowed to stand. The evolution of Parliament from 1840 to the present day would have been rendered impossible. What is the use of a Parliament whose activities cannot be reported? 4.40 p.m. Mr. Mark Carlisle (Runcorn) On various occasions in the past I have both spoken and voted against sending a motion to the Committee of Privileges because on the whole I take the view that Parliament is not normally at its most dignified when, rushing to the protection of its privileges, it seeks to refer to the Committee comments made by people outside the House. On this occasion I believe that the motion tabled by the Leader of the House is totally justified and one which I hope the House will pass. Whatever our views on the merits of this issue, I do not think that anyone could suggest that there are other than vitally important principles at stake. There are in this one subject two separate issues. There is the issue of the right of the 53 Press to report accurately that which is said in this House, and there is the issue of the way in which hon. Members choose to make use of the privileges of this House. They are two important issues and to my mind they are totally separate. The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said that this matter started with the statement made by the Director of Public Prosecutions on the evening of 20th April with regard to his advice to the Press as to its right to publish what had been said in this House. With respect, I believe that that was not the commencement but the second stage. The commencement was the decision of hon. Memberstheir motives from my point of view are irrelevantunder the cloak of privilege to name someone to whom the courts had granted anonymity. These are two equally important but separate issues.

152

 Mr. Christopher Price (Lewisham, West) Does the hon. and learned Member not think that to use the phrase "to whom the courts had granted anonymity." when that is the issue before the courts is a little injudicious? Mr. Carlisle I am using my words carefully. The decision of the hon. Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) was clear. It was to use the privileges of this House to name someone to whom she understood anonymity had been granted by the order of a court. Both of these issues are vitally important. My only criticism of the motion would be that it has put the cart before the horse. It is really the question of the conduct on the Floor of the House on 20th April which comes to be considered before the question of publication of what happened. It was for that reason that I, on this first issue, tabled an Early-Day Motion asking that the conduct of the hon. Members during that Question Time be referred to the Committee of Privileges. It was on the assurance given by the Leader of the House last Thursday at Business Question Time that I withdrew that motion. As the Leader of the House made clear, he had tabled a motion in the widest possible terms which, he assured the House, embraced all of the motions standing on the Order Paper. Naturally, 54 I was happy to withdraw my motion I believe that it is essential that the Committee of Privileges should give careful consideration to what happened on that occasion. Mr. Speaker has said in his statement that in his view it was a breach of the sub judice rule. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Down, South that the rules of this House are something totally different from the privileges of this House. The rules of this House are that by which we agree to abide in the conduct of our debates. The privileges of this House are something we claim to ourselves to prevent ourselves from being open to action from outside. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it was ever intended that we should use the cloak of privilege to name people who, for whatever reason, may not have been named in other proceedings in a court of law in this country. It is important that the House, through the Committee of Privileges, should decide its attitude to matters of that kind. The right hon. Member for Down, South said that we cannot abuse privilege, we can only use it. I found it difficult to follow that part of his speech when he suggested that there is no difference here. I would have thought that the main difference must be in the motivation of the person who says the words concerned. For example, if I, by use of the privileges of this House, chose to make an attack on someone's integrity, believing my attack to be justified and to be in the public interest, I am clearly using the privilege which Parliament grants me. If, on the other hand, although I do not believe a word of an allegation that I have been told, I nevertheless choose to make use of the privileges of this House for the purpose of mounting that attack in the justification of which I do not believe and if I am motivated by malice against the individual, to my mind I am abusing the privileges of this House. Mr. Powell The hon. and learned Member is making the same distinction that I sought to make, namely, that the difference is a subjective difference. No hon. Member can know the motives of another hon. Member. We may feel that we know what these motives are and that we dislike the hon. Member and disapprove of his behaviour. But still the distinction between use and abuse remains 55 subjective. I do not think that there is any difference between us. Mr. Carlisle

153

I accept that the subjective intention of the individual is the difference between abuse or use of privilege. But I think that other people can objectively assess what is the motivation and decide whether that has been an abuse or a use. This is one of the matters which the Committee will clearly have to consider. Mr. Alexander W. Lyon The privilege is to say anything on the Floor of the House for whatever motivation one cares. It is obtainable by any hon. Member. Is the hon. and learned Member saying that the Committee of Privileges could rule that in some way the hon. Members who uttered that name were not covered by privilege at the time they did so? If that is not what he is saying, I do not understand what he is saying. Mr. Carlisle I am not saying that. Obviously the privilege is absolute of the individual. On the other hand, surely in any civilised debating chamber there must be some rules and some control over the abuse of that privilege. The point I am making is that it is a proper matter for the Committee of Privileges to consider whether, taking the right hon. Gentleman's terms, by making use of the privilege those hon. Members have abused that privilege and, if they have done so, what advice should be given to the House by the Committee. Let me give a totally different example. The fact is that for many reasons of a different nature the courts do from time to time grant anonymity to people who appear before them whether they be children of a tender age or people involved in divorce or wardship cases. More recently, Parliament has legislated to give anonymity to both victims and defendants in rape cases. I do not believe that any hon. Member opposite, particularly one of the four who made use of his privilege on this occasion, would for a moment suggest that, were a Member on the Floor of the House to use the privilege of the House for the purpose of announcing the name of either the complainant or the defendant in a rape case, other hon. Members should not make immediate complaint that he had 56 abused his privilege. Therefore, I believe that it is open and possible for the House, through the Committee of Privileges, to assess objectively whether it considers a privilege has been used or abused and, if it has been abused, whether it should make any recommendation to the House. Mr. Alexander W. Lyon I do not want to engage in argument across the Floor, but the issue is of crucial importance to the Committee of Privileges. It cannot be said that, simply because we use privilege in a way that is discreditable to us personally, there is any breach of the rules of the House. The only purpose of the Committee of Privileges must be to decide whether there was a breach of the sub judice rule and whether that involves any sanction. That must be at issue when one recollects that, while in the case of the rape victim there is statutory power for the courts to make an order for anonymity, in this case there is no such power. Mr. Carlisle With respect, I think that the hon. Gentleman is misunderstanding what I am saying. I thought that I was conceding that there was a distinction, as the right hon. Member for Down, South said, between the breach of the rules of this House, which in itself is clearly a matter which the Committee of Privileges can look at, and whether the way in which a person chooses to use the privilege of the House is in itself an abuse of that privilege such as would amount to a contempt of the House. It seems to me that both of those issues arise in this case.

154

As the right hon. Gentleman said, the one may be deliberate, the other may be unintentional. All I am saying is that I felt it right to put my motion down on the Order Paper because I believe that there is a serious principle here, a dangerous precedent for the future, if the House does not come to a view as to what attitude it is taking to matters of this kind. I say that without attempting in any way to comment on the seriousness or unseriousness of this issue. I turn to the second matterthe right to publish the proceedings of this House. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to suggest that what the Director of Public Prosecutions had done was clearly an intervening in the privileges of this House. With respect, I would have thought that, 57 while the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for York may well be right in arguing that immunity from all proceedings should take fair and accurate reporting of this House to the Press, it is highly questionable whether that is the legal position. It is therefore vital that this issue should be looked at by the Committee of Privileges. A great deal has been said in the newspapers about the fact that the Press, it is clear, has qualified privilege in reporting the proceedings of the House. The Press seems to assume that to mean that, provided it is a fair and accurate report, no action of any kind can ever come about as a result of their publication. I believe that that is a total misunderstanding of the defence of qualified privilege, which has always been a defence purely to an action by the individual for defamation against a paper. If it be a fact that the position of the Press vis--vis Parliament is the same as that of the Press vis--vis the courtslet us take that as a starting point clearly, if the Press chooses to give a fair and accurate report, even if it turns out to be totally false and defamatory, no one can bring action against it. But that does not mean that, by making that fair and accurate report, one may not be in oneself breaking an order of the court. I give the most obvious example. If a court of law in the course of a proceeding orders that the defendant Mark Carlisle shall hereafter be called "Mr. C", and a newspaper announces that evening that in court Mr. Justice Soand-So had announced that the defendant Mark Carlisle should be called "Mr. C", clearly that is a fair and accurate account of what happened. Equally clearly, it would not allow the person concerned to bring action for damages even if it were false. But equally it would be no defence of the order of the court banning the name to say "We have merely announced the order of the court banning the name." Therefore, where we have an area in which there is considerable doubt how wide are the limitations of privilege outside this House, we should say, in fairness and without prejudging the issue in any way, that someone who is then appealed to by the Press for advice as to the legal situation is in a difficult position and may well be misleading the 58 Press if he gives advice different from that which in fact he gave. I totally share the view of the hon. Member for York that not only the extent and limitation of the privilege within this House but also the privilege outside this House of the reporting of matters that go on inside this House should be a matter for Parliament and not for the courts. With that I agree, and it is for that reason and because this individual instance raises that issue in its clearest and starkest forms that I hope that the matter will go to the Committee of Privileges so that it can make its recommendations on the point. 4.56 p.m. Mr. Michael English (Nottingham, West) I, too, hope that this matter goes to the Committee of Privileges, and I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) as far as he went. We all ought to

155

be plain that the term "qualified privilege" only applies to the law of defamation and has nothing to do with this issue. I myself was glad that Mr. Speaker gave two rulings, one on the Monday and one on the Friday. I do not blame Mr. Speaker, as a man not trained in the law, for including in his statement on the Friday the phrase "qualified privilege". I think that he was advised and misadvised by other people. I am grateful for and glad of the fact that on that relevant Monday he did not use the phrase. It is really utterly irrelevant to import this question of absolute and qualified privilege into this matter. That, as the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn said, has relevance to the law of defamation, as to whether a person can sue another person about whether he has been libelled or slandered, but it has nothing to do with this particular issue. It would be very helpful to everyone if we now forgot it. I think that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House and his predecessors from all parties have forgotten that the late Lord Donovan once chaired a Joint Committee of both Houses, consisting also of Lord Selkirk, Lord Stow Hill, formerly Sir Frank Soskice, QC, of this House House, a gentleman who at the time was described in the report concerned as Mr. Samuel Silkin, Sir John Foster, a QC formerly of this House and now retired, 59 Mr. Charles Pannell, formerly of this House and now a peer, and myself. That Committee produced reports that have never been dealt with. It would have saved an awful lot of trouble if they had been. It isued two reports, one on broad casting and one on the particular issues which are relevant to this case. I am not suggesting for a moment that every single recommendation of that Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament on the publication of proceedings should have been approved by both Houses of Parliament. I am suggesting that they should have been discussed. If I may say so, my right hon. Friendnot alone but with his predecessors on both sides of the Houseis responsible for ignoring this issue and forgetting it, hoping that it would never arise. Now it has turned up in a different form. We all expected it to turn up in the form of a private individual suing another private individual because he had been libelled or slandered. It did not turn up like that. If my right hon. Friend says that the late Lord Donovan's Joint Committee did not cover every point, he would be absolutely right. As a Member of that Committee, I would agree with him. It has turned up in the sense of contempt of court, and in that sense, of course, all the law about qualified privilege which relates to defamation has nothing to do with the issue. If one court issues an order and another court issues an alternative order, or a different order, then the mere subject has a clear responsibility, and that is, if he can, to obey them both. If, for example, the High Court says "You must not write it", and this Court of Parliament says "You must not write it", the results are clear. It means "You must not write it or print it or put it on television or on radio." There is no real doubt about that. The problem arises when one courtit does not matter whichsays "You must not do it" and the other court says "You shall do it", in effect, or "You may do it." That is where the problem really arises. With what we usually call the courts of law there is no tremendous problem even in that, for ultimately the difficulty can be reconciled by going from the High Court to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords sitting as a 60 court. In the end, it would be foundI notice that one of my lawyer hon. Friends is kindly nodding his headthat the House of Lords, sitting as a court, would say that it either agreed or did not agree with the order of the particular court. That is fine. All the precedents on this matter go back to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, when the House of Lords, sitting as a court, was exactly the same as the House of Lords sitting as a legislative body. Nowadays, the House of Lords sitting as a

156

court is a body of lawyers, and usually it is a very small number of them. It is usually about five, although it can theoretically be a larger number. It certainly could not be the 1,000 or more people who theoretically belong to the House of Lords sitting as a legislative body. The arguments on this question go back well into the seventeenth century, and there is nothing at all which says that the House or Lords' rulings are privileged over those of the House of Commons. We do not really need to argue that particular point. No one would argue that the House of Commons, sitting as a court, can prevail over the House of Lords sitting as a court, or the House of Lords sitting as a legislative body. My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) suggests something that I shall translate as meaning "That has"something I will put in square brackets, as it were"to do with it". He is entitled to his opinion, and that is actually what this particular bit of law is all about. If he wants to say something else, I have no doubt that he will in due course. But in the end this House of Commons must prevail. There is no question of any contempt of court. There is no question of any contempt by one court of another. In the seventeenth century, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House well knows, Chief Justice Coke used to issue injunctions to prevent the Court of Common Pleas from interfering with his Court of King's Bench. That was decided in the seventeenth century. It was roughly decidedin many cases by forcethat the courts of law had to obey the High Court of Parliament, and since the early part of this century the rest of the High Court of Parliament has had to obey this part of it. 61 If necessary, we could pass an Act of Parliament to say what we determined, and, if the House of Lords disagreed with it, this part of the High Court of Parliament, this House of Commons, could still pass it. There is no question as to which shall prevail. I think that is the essential point. It is not whether any other court, in its jurisdiction in this United Kingdom, can issue any order. It can issue any order it likes. But if it is a puisne court, as the lawyers would call ita court of first instanceit can be overruled by a court of appeal. A court of appeal can be overruled by another court of appeal, namely, the House of Lords sitting as a court of appeal, if it is a case of contempt of court. If it is the House of Lords sitting as a law court, then on a question of the privileges of Parliament it can be overruled by the House of Lords sitting as a House of Lords. If it is the House of Lords sitting as such, it can in the end be overruled by this House of Commons representing the people of the United Kingdom. If that principle does not prevail, then no principle other than that can prevail in a democracy. 5.7 p.m. Mr. Emlyn Hooson (Montgomery) It seems to me that there is a good deal of confusion about what is parliamentary privilege, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the defence of privilege in the law of defamation. The defence of privilege in the law of defamation, whether it is absolute or qualified, is a totally different matter from the privilege of the House of Commons. The privilege of the House of Commons is absolute, and it is absolute to this House. I disagree with the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) when he says that it is absolute to the individual. It is not. It is absolute, surely, to the House. It is qualified in relation to the individual, because there are certain rules of the House which put a limit, to a certain extent, on the individual's use of it, in that there may be certain consequences from what the House regards as personal misuse of privilege. But it is very important for the Committee of Privilege to bear in mind this complete difference between the two senses in which we use the same word "privilege".

157

62 The second issue which appears to me to arise in the case is whether parliamentary privilege affords a defence to an action taken for contempt of court. That is the matter with which we are concerned here. If the newspapers had reported verbatim what was said in the House on a certain afternoon and those reports were not made by order of the House, would the fact that there was parliamentary privilege extend to those newspapers to give them, or their editors, a defence to an action for contempt of court? I am bound to say that I cannot see the logic in the distinction between the privilege which attaches to a correct and verbatim report of the proceedings of this House by order of the House and a correct and verbatim report which is not by order of the House. Why should Hansard be privileged and The Times and The Guardian, reporting exactly the same thing, not be privileged? I think that it would be very difficult for any court to draw the line and to say that there is a distinction. If it were drawn it would certainly be an artificial distinction. The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) mentioned the potential clash between the courts of this country and Parliament. The potential clash has always been there. At times it appears to be coming to the surface, and it is avoided, I think, by the good sense of the courts and the good sense of Parliament. Clearly, when Members misuse privilegeI am using the term in its widest senseit is difficult at the time to gauge whether it has been misused. For example, the late Colonel Marcus Lipton named Philby in this House when Philby was still a member of the Civil Service and living in this country. There were cries of "Disgraceful" and so on in this House. He was using parliamentary privilege. If at the time he had been challenged as to his motivation, I do not know how this House would have divided as to what it thought his motivation was. Mr. Christopher Price Is it not also true that Mr. Richard Crossman, Lord Wigg and the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) raised the whole Profumo affair in exactly the same way on the Floor of this Housein a way that might have been said by some people to be an abuse of privilege? 63 Mr. Hooson I think that is right. The only point I wish to make is that it is terribly difficult to establish whether a person has a right or a wrong motivation at the time when he is using the privilege. Mr. Powell Or ever. Mr. Hooson I hear the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) say "Or ever". That may well be so. The further one gets away from the event, the easier it is to appreciate whether there was justification for using parliamentary privilege. It must be used very carefully, otherwise it can lead to an immediate clash with the courts. The hon. and learned Member for Runcorn suggested that if any of the four hon. Members who named a person in the House had, for example, heard someone else mention the name of a complainant in a rape case, he or she would have been the very first to claim that privilege was being misused. In my view hon. Members must strike a delicate balance between the use of their absolute privilege and its abuse in such a way as to offend against the proceedings of the courts. Mr. Edward Lyons (Bradford, West)

158

Is there not one distinction between the matters we are discussing now and the type of occurrence where Marcus Lipton named Philby? On that occasion, no prior order of the court was in existence or alleged to be in existence. Mr. Hooson I think that there are distinctions in this case. Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk (Ormskirk) rose Mr. Hooson I must deal with the intervention before it slips my mind. I think there is a distinction between each case. That distinction is there. But I do not think it alters the general principle of the matter. It seems to me that if we had a repetition of the kind of identification that was made in those Questions, we would be heading for a first-class collision with the courts. The courts could not stand by and, as it were, watch parliamentary privilege being used as a cloak to affect its own procedure. That is why this House has to be so careful in the framing of the rules. Where the right hon. Member for Down, South 64 is right is to draw the clear distinction between the rules and privilege. If, in fact, there is the use of parliamentary privilege by an individual Member, and this House as a whole feels that he has misused itwhether it is used as a term of taste or otherwisethen it is up to the House to take action and use its own rules to discipline that Member. But that does not deal with the point at issue in this particular reference to the Committee of Privileges. ********************************************************************** OFFICIAL INFORMATION BILL HC Deb 19 January 1979 vol 960 cc2131-213 2131 Order for Second Reading read 12.4 p.m. Mr. Clement Freud (Isle of Ely) I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. There is a temptation on the part of an hon. Member drawing a high position in the Ballot to use the opportunity to introduce a private issue close to his heart. I had thought of a dishonours listan annual beano involving a ceremony in which honours were stripped from the newly undeserving. I had considered a Bill to provide for the mandatory scrapping of an existing Act each time a new Act hit the statute book. The possibilities are endless and the temptations considerable. I resisted the temptation. I looked at the hard-pressed Government, grafting away in their fifth year of office, and wondered whether, even though our temporary accommodationwhich people would keep calling the Lib-Lab pactwasover, there might be a Bill that would be of benefit to the nation, close to the hearts of my party and our supporters, and not a million miles removed from the policies of the Government. I decided on an Official Information Bill, which would provide for people to have the right of access to such governmental papers as affect their lives, obviously excluding such documents as would endanger the security of the nation or be detrimental to the administration of the country. Such issues currently fall under the Official Secrets Act, which stipulates, quite simply, that everything shall be secret. My Bill proposes a total change of attitude, so that everything shall be open, and makes exceptions. It relies on the generally accepted principle of spelling out what one cannot do instead of stipulating what one can do. It is a reckless and irresponsible man who, when favoured by the gods of chance in the Ballot, as I was so singularly favoured in getting the No. 1 Bill, throws away the

159

opportunity of 2132 introducing worthwhile reform by espousing a cause to which there is insuperable opposition. My Bill, the three parts of which seek, in order of importance, to establish access to official information, to repeal section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and to bring in legislation to present security and confidentiality in place of the repealed Act, is something that I have reason to hope the Government will welcome with some warmth. The Labour Party manifesto in 1974 said: Labour believes that the process of government should be more open to the public. We shall: Replace the Official Secrets Act by a measure to put the burden on the public authorities to justify withholding information. We know about Prime Ministers and manifestos, but Prime Ministers write the Queen's Speech, so let us look at the Queen's Speech of 1975. It said: Proposals will be prepared to amend the Official Secrets Act and to liberalise the practice relating to official information."[Official Report, 19th November 1975; Vol. 901, c. 8.] In 1976, possibly because of an administrative hiccup, there was nothing about the Official Secrets Act in the Queen's Speech. The Home Office had not put the boot in, because the Home Secretary said: I will, with permission, Mr. Speaker, make a statement on the Government's intentions on the reform of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. This section, which makes it a criminal offence to disclose official information without authority, has for some time been regarded as too broad in its scope. It has been described as a 'catch all' and there has been uncertainty about its interpretation and enforcement. The Government have concluded that this section should be replaced by an Official Information Act on the broad lines recommended by the Franks Committee. The Committee, whose membership included representatives of Parliamentincluding myselfand the media, and which presented a unanimous report, recommended that the sanctions of the criminal law should be strictly limited in their application."[Official Report, 22nd November 1976; Vol. 919, c. 1878.] The Queen's Speech in 1977 said: Legislative proposals will be brought forward for the reform of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act."[Official Report, 3rd November 1977 ; Vol. 938, c. 8.] The Queen's Speech of 1978 said: It remains My Government's intention to replace section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 with a measure better suited to present-day 2133 conditions. My Government will continue to make information on public policy more readily available."[Official Report. 1st November 1978 ; Vol. 957, c. 7.] It sounds as though we were meant to think back to the bellman in "Hunting of the Snark", who did at least say: What I tell you three times is true. We seem to have reached the point when what the Government have said six times is being delayed even further. The Council of Europe report No. 4195 invites The governments of member states which have not yet done so to introduce a system of freedom of information, i.e. access to government files, comprising the right to seek and receive information from government agencies and departments, the right to Inspect and correct personal files, the right to privacy and the right to rapid action before the courts in these matters We have gone on waiting. When I announced that, having drawn first place in the Ballot for Private Members' Bills, I would seek to introduce an Official Information Bill, the very recommendation that the Franks committee made and the Governmentin the form of the Home Secretarywelcomed, a newspaper headline said "Freud Bill Embarrasses Government". Oh, cruel men of Fleet Street. Embarrass the Government? Here was I, eschewing those measures close to the hearts of all Liberals, not bringing in a Bill for proportional representation, hesitating to bring forward site valuation rating, helping out an overworked Government, and, far from public or even private gratitude, I am accused of embarrassing that same Governmentembarrassing them with their own

160

oft-repeated policy. It is akin to embarrassing a butcher with a meat-hook or a milkman with a carton of yoghourt. Last Tuesday I had the good fortune to have Question No. 6 to the Prime Minister and for once, perhaps because the Leader of the Opposition did not once rise, it was reached. I asked the Prime Minister if he would come out with a warm welcome to the Official Information Bill which I propose to bring before the House on Friday? The Prime Minister replied: It may not discourage the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) to know that the Government have it in mind not to oppose 2134 his Bill on Second Reading."[Official Report, 16th January 1979 ; Vol. 960, c. 1496.] I looked behind for a knife. I really thought "With friends like that, who needs enemies?" If that is lukewarm support, give me an honest and dedicated enemy any day of the week. Clause 1 of the Bill calls for the repeal of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is a short sharp clause, because executions tend to be short and sharp. Until that law is fundamentally changed it will continue to be a crime to dispense official information, which is, of course, the purpose of the Bill. The Act that I seek to repeal was introduced in the Agadir crisis of 1911, the year that our Prime Minister was conceivedthat is, if the gestation periods of Prime Ministers are similar to those for the rest of us. Newsboys raced around the streets shouting "Uprising in Bosnia", and Parliament, in one hurried debate, rushed through all stages of the Act in under half an hour. It was a panic measure to deal with a minor spy crisis. It made it an offence for a servant of the Crown to communicate, or for anyone to receive, any official information. It made it an offence to fail to take care of it or retain it without authority. FinallyI do not argue with thisit made it an offence to use it in a manner prejudicial to the State or beneficial to a foreign Power, which is right and proper. The maximum penaltyto show how important it wasfor section 2 offences was two years in prison. It is interesting to note that whereas in 1911 the sum of 100 was probably more like 2,000 or 3,000 today, two years in prison in 1911 is more like 28 days, because in matters of sentencing, inflation works in reverse. Let us now look at the definition of official information. According to the former head of the British security serviceswe should not mention his name because it is an official secretanyway, according to Sir Martin Furnival Jones, anything that is on an official file is an official secret. If one wants to find out how to look after one's children in a nuclear emergency, one cannot, because it is an official secret; if one wants to know what noxious gases are being emitted from a factory chimney opposite one's house, one cannot, because it is an official secret. A man who applied for a job as a 2135 gardener at Hampton Court was asked to sign form E74, in case he gave away information about watering begonias. What is worse, if someone is good enough to tell one, then one is an accessory to the crime. My contention is that section 2 gives the Attorney-General more power than a bad man should have or a good man should need. Dr. Gerard Vaughan (Reading, South) With apologies to the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud), we ask your guidance on a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because we have just learned from the Press Association that the leaders of the London ambulance service workers have confirmed that they will not cover emergencies on Monday. In view of the very serious nature of the situation, we should like to ask the Secretary of State if he will make a statement later today. Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton) I realise that this is not a point of order. I will only draw the attention of the hon. Member for Reading. South (Dr. Vaughan) to the fact that the time for making or

161

requesting statements has now passed. We have had one hour out of private Members' time already today. I quite understand that the situation may well be serious. Perhaps I can leave the matter in the hands of Ministers. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Merlyn Rees) Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Yesterday, when I was making a statement, I said that I had made contingency arrangements for the situation in London on Monday. The responsibility for using them is for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services, who also pointed out that contingency arrangements were being made. Steps will be taken, but in what precise form I think is best left for discussion as to whether it would be appropriate to use the Army ambulances, or whether supervisors will do it, or whether the union will play a part in doing it. Everyone understands that the basic services will have to be provided, and we have informed the House that they will be. Dr. Vaughan Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I appreciate that 2136 Mr. Arthur Lewis (Newham, North-West) On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Member for Reading, South (Dr. Vaughan) is not on a point of order. You said yourself Mr. Deputy Speaker Order. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Lewis) will allow the Chair to handle this matter. We will get through it quicker if I am allowed to handle it in my own way. Dr. Vaughan I will be very brief indeed. I appreciate the point that you have made, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but we have only just had this information. I am grateful to the Home Secretary for what he said. Our view is that it might be necessary to announce the steps to be taken in advance of the crisis on Monday rather than wait until the care of patients was seriously jeopardised. Mr. Arthur Lewis Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. With great respect, you yourself said that the intervention of the hon. Member was not a point of order, and that this was not the time to raise a point of order. Now a procedure has been set whereby any hon. Member can use this as an opportunity Mr. Deputy Speaker Order. In my personal knowledgeand, I am sure, in the much longer personal knowledge of the hon. Member for Newham, NorthWestoccasions like this have arisen in the past and the Chair has been indulgent. The Chair does not wish to prolong the matter any further. Mr. Freud As the Franks committee report concluded in 1972, section 2 is a mess. It said: The main offence which section 2 creates is the unauthorised communication of official information (including documents) by a Crown servant. The leading characteristic of this offence is its catch-all quality. It catches all official documents and information. It makes no distinctions of kind, and no distinctions of degree. All information which a Crown servant learns in the course of his duty is 'official' for the purposes of section 2, whatever its nature, whatever its importance, whatever its original source. A blanket is thrown over everything; nothing escapes. The section catches all Crown servants as well as all official information. Again, it makes no distinctions according to the nature or importance of a Crown servant's duties. All are covered. Every Minister of the Crown,

162

every civil servant, every member of the Armed Forces, every police officer, performs his duties subject to section 2. 2137 I think that the most realistic writing on the inadequacies of section 2 is by Professor Wade. He said: The law as it now stands shows a complete failure to understand that accessibility of information about the government of countries is of vital importance in a democracy. He went on, concerning section 2: It is so crude, so excessively severe, that it is rendered tolerable in practice only by the Attorney-General's tight control of prosecutions. It also has the insidious effect of conditioning Ministers and civil servants to believe that unauthorised disclosure of any official information ought to be a crime. It lowers the reputation of the public service, since it is thought to be used for covering up mistakes, even when this is not true. It has aggravated the secretiveness for which British administration has a bad name with its best informed critics from the Fulton Committee to Mr. Crossman. It has become one of the great vested interests of government. It is a classic example of bad law creating bad practice. In view of all this, it is surprising that it took 28 years for the first real criticism of section 2 to come. It came from Lord Strabolgi in 1939. However, a quick flip through subsequent years is much more rewarding. Since the 1966-67 Session of Parliament, 13 Bills have been introduced in the House, each one seeking to amend the Official Secrets Act or to introduce legislation that required the repeal of section 2. Not one of these 13 Bills was passed. Clause 1 of my Bill seeks to repeal section 2 of the Official Secrets Act of 1911. I think that after 68 abortive years of bad law, which has inevitably led to bad practice, that section can now be laid to rest. The main part of my Bill deals with people's rights of access to information, though I accept that this commodity now flows more generously than it used to. By that I mean information such as I have tabled on today's Order Paper. If hon. Members look at today's Order Paper they will see that none of those questions will be answered unless there is a change of attitude by the Government. Those questions deal with such matters as fire worthiness certificates. It is now possible to write to the Department of the Environment explaining that one is going to Torquay for a holiday and asking which hotels have not been granted certificates of fireworthiness. The answer is that it is an official secret. If one applies 2138 for naturalisation and one is refused, and no reason is given for that refusal, one receives a one-line letter. One cannot find out the accident rate of cars before buying a new car. Four hundred garages every year lose the right to carry out MOT tests, because of fraud or incompetence. The identity of those 400 garages would appear to be a national secret. Even the day-to-day running of the White Fish Authority is classified information, jealously guarded by some faceless jellyfish who scrabbles away in a Whitehall office waiting for his inflation-proof pension to become due. I want to know what he is up to. I share the view of Stanley Baldwin, who said that power without responsibility was the prerogative of the harlot. I have a document here marked "Secret". It warns one that it is "the property of His Majesty's Government." It is a memorandum by the then Lord President of the Council, Mr. Herbert Morrisson, and is dated 1945. He writes: We have Learned much during the war, and there should be no return to the old timidity and reticence in the relations between Government Departments and the public and the press. It is the right and indeed the duty of the Government to inform the public of the facts necessary for the full understanding of its actions and decisions. Discretion must be exercised, and there must, for example, be no question of Government publicity being used to boost individual Ministers, but it is in the national interest that the citizen and taxpayer should be adequately informed by the Government on its administration and policy. The people 'have a right to know'. Today, 34 years after that wise and wily old man's memorandum,

163

we are not much further ahead, though we do have 1,500 official information officers employed by Government Departments at salaries in excess of our ownusually twice the salary of an MP. These information officers are largely ignored by civil servants and are written off as hacks by the press, and they justify their high cost to the nation by covering up sensitive news and by feeding optimistic tittle-tattle about their Ministers to the Ministers' local newspapers. It is almost exactly the opposite of Mr. Morrison's advice. The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Brynmor John) I wish they would do that. 2139 Mr. Freud From what the Minister of State, Home Office says, it appears that they are not even doing the incompetent job that one thought they were doing. My contention is that the people of the United Kingdom have a right to know how the country is governed. If a motorway is planned, the working papers that caused the Minister to approve the order should be available, as should the findings of the committee set up to advise him. In The Guardian today there is an interesting article by Simon Hoggart about the atomic tests in Utah and the high incidence of leukaemia there as a result of those tests. It is the United States Freedom of Information Act that has allowed this information to come out. In the United Kingdom it could not, and would not, have happened. If I had more time I could rabbit on about the committees that have sat and deliberated and reported but whose findings were never published because they did not suit the Government of the day. Their contents were leaked. We all heard about them, as with the 1973-74 committee that was set up to look into the number of users of cannabis. We heard that there were 5 million casual pot smokers. I think we have the right to see the report and also the reports about research into the relative dangers of smoking cannabis and tobacco. Information by leak is expensive and inaccurate, and my Bill seeks to provide accurate information as the right of all citizens. Clause 1 seeks to repeal section 2 of the 1911 Act. Because so much time has been spent on other matters this morning, I shall gallop through the other clauses. Let me say quickly, however, that clause 2 establishes the right to access to official documents and provides that a document is not only a piece of paper but a recording, by whatever means. An official document will not include a Minister's personal or general political correspondence. The aim of the Bill is to give the public the right to see the documents that bear on a Minister's departmental responsibility, and no more. Obviously, there are exemptions as to what the public has the right to see. These are set out in the schedule at the back of the Bill. Under the terms of the Bill, at the end of five yearsit used to be 50 years and was then reduced to 30 years, though neither of these figures is particularly 2140 relevant Cabinet papers will be published. The five-year period at least means that no Cabinet in the life of the same Parliament will be confronted with its own misdeeds. That is why five years seemed like a good period. It would, however, mean that we could have an intelligent discussion today of the issues at stake in the current crisis if we could examine the contingency regulations at the time of the miners' strike in 197374. Clauses 3, 4 and 5 deal with access to documents, and clause 5(b) underlines the desirability, notwithstanding this measure, of the Government showing good will in the further provision of information. Clauses 6 to 10 deal with the machinery of giving the public access to information, and clause 7 deals with computers. Clause 8 provides for the deferment of access to policy documents until such time as the decision in question is made.

164

This Bill does not try to find scapegoats. It simply seems important, after the event, to have access to the advice and the information available to the Minister. Clause 8(4) clearly distinguishes between policy advice and factual advice, for the latter must be available without delay. Clause 9 lays down a time limit for the production of documents. Clause 10 deals with the question of documents that contain exempt material and makes provision for, he disclosure of the nonexempt parts. Again, the United States Freedom of Information Act helped us here. This will prevent civil servants from putting one exempt sentence into every document, which is what they used to do. Clause 11 deals with the reasons for refusals and clause 12 with exemptions. Clause 13 provides for the publication of instructions to civil servants when dealing with the public. At present, reasons for refusing parole to prisoners are not given. This causes them much distress. When they are not told why they will not be released, they suspect the worstthat their wife may have run off, that their employer may have reneged on a promise to re-employ them, and so on. If there are rules, it is a fundamental necessity that the citizen as well as the administrator knows what they are. That is our main argument. Clause 14 deals with Departments' duty to preserve documents rather than to fol- 2141 low the current principle of weeding out not only irrelevant but damaging documents. Clause 15 requires Departments to publish realistic indices and conform to a recognised system of records. The trouble with the United States Act was that even when people went to the right Department they did not know what to ask for. It is important that we should not fall into that trap. Clause 16 deals with fees, which are limited to the cost of copying documents. We do not ask citizens to pay for the research that went into them. Clause 17 provides for regular inspection of Departments' information procedures. With three options before usparliamentary Committee, Parliamentary Commissioner and the High Courtwe decided to go for the Parliamentary Commissioner. The involvement of the Ombudsman means that, as he is an officer of Parliament, Parliament becomes involved in supervision of the Act. Moreover, by virtue of the fact that he is readily available to citizens, the Ombudsman is cheaper and quicker than, say, a court would be. He is already familiar with administrative practice and knows his way around Government Departments. That is an added bonus. I have been advised since the drafting of the Bill that two short new clauses will be required to give the applicant an ultimate right to appeal to the courts. I hope that this matter will be dealt with in Committee. Clauses 21 and 22 provide protection for civil servants. This is probably the only good news for civil servants in the Bill. Clause 23 is procedural. Only responsibility made us put part II in the Bill. It would be far preferable to ask the Government themselves to introduce a code of practice to take the place of the repealed section. In part II we have departed from the Franks committee and the Government White Paper on three matters. First, we limit the range of information that is liable to classification, and we would not impose criminal law on disclosure of Treasury matters. That is subject to Civil Service discipline. Secondly, we want to establish a proper system of classification, restricted to defence, security and intelligence 2142 information whose disclosure could do harm. Thirdly, we want to allow the propriety of classification to be challenged in court. We do not believe in the infallibility of Ministers or believe that they should be allowed to be judges in their own cases. I hope that the Home Secretary will deal in constructive suggestions rather than condemnation. It is astonishingly easy for a Government as well served as our Governments are, with as many gentlemen and ladies in the box behind Ministers,

165

passing notes, with as many people reading old Acts of Parliament, to make a Back Bencher's proposed legislation look silly because of some minor omission or point of law. I cannot believe that an issue that has been in the Labour Party manifesto since 1974 and has been referred to annually ever since has not received a great deal of thought. I am bringing it forward because I think it is high time it appeared on the statute book. I want to speak for a moment about financial provisions. One of the most frequently heard objections to an official information Act is that it would cost too much. Last summer's White Paper referred to unexpectedly high costs. Earlier drafts that were leaked to my colleagues used even stronger language, with estimates in the hundreds of millions of pounds. Let me begin by agreeing that a system of open government would cost money, but, then, a system of closed government costs money. Running the country costs money and electing people to run it costs money. That reason is seldom given for not having elections. I believe that an official information Act would pay for itself. Recent cases, such as the Crown Agents fiasco and the leaking sanctions against Rhodesia, which cost us over 100 million for a non-blockade, must support the argument that more open government could make for greater efficiency and greater economy. Let us try to arrive at a figure. In the United States the Freedom of Information Act went into effect in 1967. It was amended in 1974. The Canadian Government, who are thinking of introducing a similar Act, used United States figures to 2143 gauge what it would cost in Canada. In their June 1977 Green Paper they estimated that administrative costs would be 7 million a year, but reduced that figure to 5 million when they looked into the differences between Canada and the United States. The Canadian Bar Association went into the matter much more carefully and in its paper scaled down the 150,000 annual requests for information in the United States to 10,500 in Canada, by virtue of population and national characteristics. It nominally charged 70 per request and came up with a top cost of 1.5 million. If we scale up those figures to account for our population and our national peculiarities Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone) That is impossible. Mr. Freud When I say "national peculiarities", I mean our proneness to request information from Government Departments, which is not as yet as great as it is in the United States. If we scale up the figures, we arrive at an overall maximum of 24 million, or one-fiftieth of the loss of the Crown Agents. It is not a bad point to remind the House that the "Save It" campaign by the Department of Energy cost 3 million. In the United States there has been a continuing battle between Congress and the Executive over the cost of the Act. The Comptroller General has had only limited success in obtaining accurate accounts in recent years, with figures seriously and steadily contaminated by Departments' ingenious attempts to inflate the costs of the Act. For example, the United States Air Force treated every public request for information as a formal Freedom of Information Act application. Departments have swung the costs of their normal public relations exercises under the Act. It is worth noting that Government Departments seldom complain about the costs of communicating information that they want the public to have. The costs become

166

burdensome only when they are the costs of disclosing what Departments would rather not have people know. The tendency to exaggerate is dramatically demonstrated in the United States 2144 Government's estimates of the costs of the Privacy Act, an Act passed in 1974, which gives people the right to inspect the official files that are kept on them. The Office of Management and Budget estimated the costs at $200 million to $300 million a year. By last year the actual cost was less than 10 per cent. of the estimated figure. If we take a rough 4 million per annum cost for my measure, remembering that the budget for home publicity in 1977-78 was 41 million, what do we get? My contention is that what we get will be well worth the money. Leslie Chapman, a former senior civil servant, says in his book "Your Disobedient Servant" that greater disclosure of information prevents waste of public expenditure. Indeed, if the Crown Agents' reports on their disastrous wheeling and dealing had come before the House they would probably have got away with one-fifth of the loss that this country sustained. The rest would have been saved and would have paid for my proposed Act until the end of the century. If open government costs money, it has to be measured against the wastefulness of closed government. The costs of secrecy are also substantial. A democracy maintains an equilibrium between publicity, privacy and secrecy. Each of these elements is necessary. What has gone wrong in Great Britain is that there is an imbalance. We have reached the stage at which it is difficult, often actionable under the Official Secrets Act, to mention what is happening in Departments of State, while it is a simple matter on the grounds of prurience to publish items about a private individual that violate the rights of that individual to be left alone and enjoy reasonable privacy. We have the balance wrong. There is excessive secrecy on things that matter to us all and excessive licence on things that are trivial but matter deeply to the individual's privacy. 'Transgressions of decent human behaviour are steadily being defended as being part and parcel of an enlightened open society, which wondrously confuses the issue when it comes, for example, to the location of the Post Office tower, which is classified information, though I can see it from my bedroom window 2145 when I wake up. The fact that my address and that of the Post Office tower are in the London telephone directory is something that has been overlooked, and I expect that the London telephone directory will have to be withdrawn. We fight for the rights of free speech, which is good. We have laws that do not permit the publication of free inquiry which would substantiate free speech, which is less good. In The Sunday Times thalidomide case their Lordships ruled that it was in order to advance opinion but wrong to publish evidence. If Watergate had occurred in Britain, Nixon would have remained in power. There could have been no disclosures, because under our laws one cannot inquire into the facts of a case before it has been considered by the courts. The House knows well that one of the reasons for writs being served is so that it can be said that the case is sub judice. Often there is no intention of pursuing the case. The Official Secrets Act decrees that anything is secret that an official says is secret. It is the civil servants' chastity belt. The Home Secretary has been deep in conversation. Mr. Merlyn Rees I was talking to my hon. Friend. Mr. Freud I do not accuse the right hon. Gentleman of speaking to himself as yet. I shall repeat my previous remark. I do so because I consider it to be of some importance. I have said that

167

the Official Secrets Act decrees that anything is secret that an official says is secret and that it is the civil servants' chastity belt. I have no great relish or desire to ravish civil servants, but I share Lord Chief Justice Hewart's belief that tyranny is the accumulation of despotic powers in the hands of anonymous officials. I am against the current right of anonymous officials to have their incompetence covered by anonymity. The Swedes have free access to information written into their constitution. That has been the position since 1776. They may know what they wish to know about the mechanics of the Swedish Government other than matters concerning defence, foreign relations and law enforcement. It is not an ideal system. They have many problems, and in certain areas 2146 of government embarrassments have arisen as a result of that system. However, it is a great deal fairer than our system, which steadily penalises efficiency by excessive secrecy in both local and national government. Since the middle 1960s the Americans have had a Freedom of Information Act monitored by their Supreme Court. It is interesting to note that the first demand for information withheld by a Government Department and prised from that Department by a Supreme Court verdict dealt not with some delicate matter of defence, nuclear secrets, or the salary of political advisers, but with hearing aids for war veterans. The Supreme Court decided that the Department of Defence should publish investigations and research into the type and cost of hearing aids that were issued. In Britain we cannot even ascertain accident rates of types of aircraft. We have to ask our American friends to do so through the United States Freedom of Information Act. A distinguished United States senator said: A formidable check on official power has ever been what the British Crown feared and what the American founders decided to risk. My supporters and I invite Parliament to vote for the risk. Great Britain is firmly among that class of democracies in which the Government's privilege to conceal is valued more highly than is the people's right to know. My Bill seeks to put an end to such accusation. I stress again that my Bill is not an ultimate legislative blueprint. However, it is a firm step in the right direction, and I urge the House to give it a Second Reading. 12.47 p.m. Mr. Arthur Lewis (Newham, North-West) I am pleased to have the first opportunity to congratulate the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) on having won in the Ballot and on the Bill that he has introduced. If I may say so, without in any way trying to be patronising, the Bill was brilliantly introduced with wittisisms and seriousness. We all laughed, but the hon. Gentleman made his points. Almost every sentence that the hon. Gentleman uttered showed the stupidity of the present system. For example, we all know the hon. Gentleman is a great 2147 expert on food and dietary matters. If he wanted to obtain his own medical records but the Department of Health and Social Security wished to prevent his doing so, it would have that power. The Department has the power to prevent any hon. Member or any person from so doing. It is a ludicrous and wicked system. The taxpayer pays for all the civil servants, Ministers and the Departments that they run, but he is the last person to get the information that he requires, even about himself, because civil servants decide that it is not wise, right or proper for him to have it. Some three or four years ago I was fortunate in being able to establish the all-party Freedom of Information Committee. The committee is supported by 80 per cent. of Members from all parts of the House, excluding Cabinet Ministers. It is supported by those who are termed to be "on the payroll" and those who expect to be on the payroll

168

those whom we call Shadow Ministers, although they may come from either side of the House. It is true to say that 80 per cent. of the Back Benchers from all parties are active members and supporters of the committee. The TUC conference has unanimously voted in favour of a freedom of information measure. As the hon. Gentleman rightly said, Conservative and Labour Governments have for many years promised such a Bill but they have done nothing to bring one forward. They may have uttered words of wisdom, but they have not done anything about introducing such a measure. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), who has temporarily left the Chamber, is a member of the national executive committee of the Labour Party. With the help of our civil servants at Transport House, a Bill has been prepared. There is a Bill in the Labour Party offices as well as one that is tucked away in the secret compartments of the Home Office. There are plenty of Bills. However, the hon. Gentleman has introduced an excellent Bill. If the Bill is not good enough, or if it does not go as far as the liberal, democratic advisers in the Home Office might wish, I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Ely will not take it amiss if various proposals for improvements are 2148 put forward in Committee. I cannot speak for himhe is an active supporter of the all-party committeebut I am sure that he would not mind if the Government helped him by taking over the Bill, provided that they did not use the opportunity to water it down. Once the public get to know what the Bill is all about, I am sure that there will be resounding support for it. I have been amazed at the number of people and organisations coming forward in support of this concept. People from the Right, the Left and the Centre of political thought have supported it. Likewise, many non-political organisations, such as the environmentalist lobby, the health and social services lobby and the nuclear lobby, have indicated their support for it. All those people and organisations are asking the same question. How can people form an opinion on anything if they are deliberately prevented from getting the information which is available, and which they ought to have because, as taxpayers, they have paid for it? They are not allowed to have the information because they might come to some decision which, though correct, might be against the view of the Government of the day. There is a lot of controversy over the fluoridation of water. I do not intend to comment on whether the compulsory fluoridation of watermaking people have it whether they want it or notis good or bad. I am not passing judgment on whether a person should have the right to decide privately to fluoridate his own water by the use of capsules. The Department of Health and Social Security, on the one hand, takes the view that the fluoridation of water supplies is a good thing. On the other hand, there are many who say that it is not. What concerns me is that the Department will not publish the necessary information to prove its point on this issue. Since I set up the all-party committee, hon. Members from the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru, as well as my hon. Friends, have all taken an active part in its work. I shall not mention any of them by name, because tribute can be paid to all of them. They will agree with me that since the committee 2149 was set up we have found, even when we have tried to get information on minor matters, that we have not had the help and support that we might expect from the various Departments. It must be emphasised again and again that the taxpayers, the people who pay, are entitled to the information that is available in the Departments. When I started the committee I was accused of being a Scientologist, and I was attacked by the press and by the Department concerned. I do not know anything about Scientology but what difference would it make if I did? I am told that Scientologists support the Bill. So what? Many years ago, when a Labour Government were in office,

169

some sort of allegation was made against the Church of Scientology. I do not know what it was. The nature of the allegation was unknown, as were the people alleged to be involved. An investigation was made but no report was issued. As a result, certain people were banned from coming to this country and the activities of followers of Scientology in this country were also banned. There was an investigation by Sir John Foster, QC, a former Member of this House, but the report, which was published, has not been acted upon from that day to this. I should like to know what this Church of Scientology is all about and what it is supposed to have done that is wrong. I should like to know what accusations were made against its activities in this country. I should also like to know why people connected with it have been prevented from coming to this country. If people are thought to be guilty of something, they should be charged and prosecuted in the ordinary way. If they are alleged to be doing harm, their supporters ought to know about it, and the public also ought to know about it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) is not here, but I am sure he would like to know why some hon. Members and some ordinary members of the public are able to get information that is not available to us as ordinary Back Benchers. Many people think that the fact that information is not freely available is the fault of the Ministers concerned. It is not. Every hon. Member has had the experience of tele- 2150 phoning a Department and being refused information about something or other. When that happens and the Member takes it up with the Minister, the odds are 1,000 to one that the Minister will not get the information for the Member. It takes a very tough Minister to break down the secrecy of the Civil Service. I, like a few other hon. Members, have been in this House for a long time. In that period of 34 years I have known hundreds indeed, thousandsof Ministers of the Crown, yet I can count on the fingers of two hands the Ministers in any Administration, Labour or Conservative, who were strong enough, if they decided to do something, to get it done. The others always waited to see what their civil servants had to say about the application or request. If I went to Herbert Morrison about something, he would always say to me "If that is true, I will see that something is done about it." There was never any question about it. Something was always done. I recall once asking Fred Bellenger, who was then a Minister at the War Office, about a soldier's entitlement to special leave. His response was that he would have to see what his Department said about it. I said to him "You, as the Minister, are the man who can press the button if what I say is right". But he was not prepared to tell me whether a soldier could have compassionate leave for an extra two or three days without first going to see what the civil servants said about it. I want to have the right to ask, in a case such as the one that I have mentioned, "What information have you been given? For what reason is the soldier being denied the right to have this leave?" If a civil servant comes to the conclusion that a soldier should not have a few days' extra leave for a special purpose, surely that cannot be said to be a State secret. The inquiry might involve another civil servant, or, indeed, an ambulance worker. Why should I not have the right to know on what information a decision is based? Why should not the individual concerned have the right to know? Records are kept on children at school. Occasionally, a teacher may put something in a child's record that is incorrect or false. That record stays with the child right through his school life and goes 2151 with him right through to further education. There can be a black mark against him that is quite unjustified, but the parents do not have the right to see the record, and nor has the boy or girl concerned.

170

Many hon. Members served in the last world war. Many of them would like to know what went into their records. Thirty or 40 years afterwards, is there any harm in an exService man wanting to know what was in his record, especially if he has reason to believe that there was something against him? But, of course, this is also regarded as secret information. I understand that the Government intend to give the Bill fair weather, or at least not to oppose it. I hope, however, that what I term the "funny tricks department" will not be operating, knowingly or unknowingly, in Committee. We all know the sort of thing that goes on from time to time. I warn the public, and especially the 161 organisations in favour of the Bill, whether they be from employers' federations, trade unions or any of the political parties, that there are more ways of killing a cat than drowning it. They should bear that in mind when the Bill goes into Committee. There are many ways of killing a Bill. We have a wily Government. They may not oppose the Second Reading, but when the Bill reaches Committee there are ways and means of killing it. Let them be warned, because the TUC, the Labour Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and employers are in favour of this principle. I believe that the Government would be unwise to get their stooges from any party to try to kill the Bill by adopting the delaying practices about which we all know. If they do that, there will be a great public outcry. There is at least one Memberthere may be more who would release these details and they could react against the Government when they fight their parliamentary seats. Some hon. Membersnot myselfhave a majority of a few hundred or a couple of thousand. If, in such constituencies, 500 or 600 voters knew that the Bill in which they were interested was killed because of a manoeuvre by the Government and their supporters, they could switch their votes and Members could lose their seats. 2152 I wish the Bill well. I conclude by congratulating the hon. Member for Isle of Ely on the manner in which he introduced it. 1.2 p.m. Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone) I am sure that those of us who have signed our names to the Bill will be glad to have the support of the hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Lewis). He is a popular voice. I sometimes believe that he is "vox pop" in person. His support is valuable. Over many years I have had a peripheral connection with official secrecy and the Official Secrets Act. The admirable presentation of the Bill by the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) is likely to redeem the harm done to the nation by the Liberal Party in 1911. The 1911 Act was passed in half an hour. It was a very hot day and there were spy problems. Spies were being found under the bed. Amongst rumoured German spies there was a very distinguished ladyFraulein Sophie Buhler. She was governess to my great-aunt, Margo Asquith, at No. 10, and she later tried to teach me French. At that time the Conservative Party was in great fury and rage, and was puffing as the Conservative Party tends to do. There had been a tremendous row between the Liberal and Conservative Parties over the elections and the threat of dissolution, and so on, in 1911. Undoubtedly, stories were being circulated that the Prime Minister of the day had a German governess. The Bill was therefore rushed through in half an hour. The governess, who was one of the nicest people in the world, tried to teach me a little French, and from that point I had a vague connection with this matter. My next connection with it was in 1933, when a great personal friend of mine and of many hon. Members, Sir Compton Mackenzie, as he became, was savagely prosecuted under section 2 at the instigation of an old enemy of his in our own Civil Service. It was a scandalous case. That is one of the problems about section 2 which is now to be

171

repealed. It puts an intolerable burden on the Attorney-General, the Government of the day and the Home Secretary. 2153 Lastly, I am connected with the matter in a more personal way. I am one of the few Members who ever wrote to The Times asking to be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. It was, I think, in 1970. That request was not met by the Government of the day. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, East (Mr. Aitken), who showed great courage in fighting against this Act. Compton Mackenzie had been told by his solicitors that, as it was an absolute offence, there was no point in fighting the case. He was fined about 100, which was a lot of money in those days. In addition of course, as an author, he lost thousands of pounds. My hon. Friend rightly fought the case and was fully supported by Lord Goodman and Lord Wigoder. Other counsel tendered advice that, because the offence was absolute, he should accept the disgrace of the fine. However, my hon. Friend fought the case. The result was that Mr. Justice Caulfield, in his judgment, effectively put section 2 out to grass. I believe that the House and the country should be thankful to my hon. Friend for the terrible time that he endured. I suppose that I, too, should be thankful that my request to be prosecuted was not accepted by the Government of the day, although I should have been happy to face that sort of music. I do not have the same doubts as the hon. Member for Newham, North-West about his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. I believe the Home Secretary to be a man of honour. The issue here concerns a change in the spirit of the law. The White Paper made clear that the decision which has to be taken was that, instead of accepting a declared administrative obligation to open Government, we should make government open by statute. That is the difference between the two approaches. Unfortunately, I believe that man is secretive by nature. One of the great advantages of being a Minister or a senior civil servant is that one is in the know. The number of persons in this category has increased enormously since 1911. At that time the whole of the Foreign, Colonial and India Offices were run by 300 or 400 civil servants. Today there are 2154 7,000 or 8,000 in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Instead of controlling a small area of national life, the Government now control about 60 per cent. of it. How does one deal with the enormous fortress of Whitehall? Far from the present Act being the chastity belt of the Civil Service, I believe that it contains many loopholes. I do not know whether chastity belts contain loopholes, but I believe that the Act gives the Civil Service a totally false sense of security. Outside the Soviet Union, we have the most draconian secrets laws in the world. Yet, oddly enough, we have some of the worst spy leaks. For example, Blake, Philby, Lonsdale and Fuchs probably did more damage to Western interests than any other spies who were captured in Germany, or even those in the pumpkin mystery in the United States. I believe that the question of what are secrets is grossly exaggerated, as I am sure the Home Secretary will agree. Amongst the most important matters protected by the Bill are individual personal records. It is 14 years since I was at the Defence Department. I hope that I am not committing any crime by saying that the numbers of real military secrets possessed by the Ministry of Defence which cannot be found out by spy planes, wireless intercepts or other machinery are almost negligible. In retrospect, quite often the best information sent by spies is totally disregarded. The Americans failed to accept the information given to them by their own secret service about Pearl Harbour. The German High Command refused to look at the invasion plan for D Day which had been stolen by the British Ambassador's butler from

172

the embassy in Ankara. At a much lower level, during the war, when I was working with the Dutch secret service, we discovered a fact which almost certainly meant that the Ardennes was to be attacked. I rushed down to the great Montgomery's staff, and they said "Nonsense. Get out of the office". The amount of secret stuff which is disregarded, the amount of confusion which comes from tape recordings and the amount of nonsense created by this great question of secrecy, as I am sure the Home Secretary and others who work 2155 and have worked on the receiving end of secret information know, is great and baffling. The best example of confusion which I know was when one Foreign Secretaryno names, no packdrillmarked a copy of The Times "Top Secret". That was on the basis that he had circulated it to all in his Department because he felt that it contained an important article and that, if it had been found out, it would undoubtedly have given dangerous information to the enemy. We reach a point of total absurdity. The question of secrecy needs to be looked at very carefully by the Department. I shall be happy to give evidence, if needed, of what the then head of the CIA used to tell me about the secret parts of our military intelligence. In my view, a more serious matter arises. I refer, as I said at the beginning of my speechI think that the Home Secretary will agreeto the spirit of the law and the impact that secrecy has had on the Government. It has had a bad effect in two areas. The hon. Member for Isle of Ely referred to the enormous number of persons engaged on sending out Government propaganda or whatever it may be. "Propaganda" is the wrong word. I should have said "information". On the whole, it has been remarkably politically uncorrupt. I do not think that either of the major parties has ever allowed the machine to be turned to what I call party advantage. Much of it prevents real information from being discovered. I am about to give a namebut no pack-drill. The most distinguished and powerful military correspendent, when I was in the War Office, was undoubtedly Mr. Harry Chapman Pincher. He never went near a press conference in his life. He found out. One of the problems with this great machine which churns stuff out is that it makes our journalists, without much respect to them, extremely lazy. They do not dig for the facts. The Home Secretary had better not agree with me on this second matter, because it reflects on the Lobby. We have a Lobby system which in some measure springs from the Official Secrets Act. I believe that the Lobby is a thoroughly bad institution. Journalists depend on off-the-record, on-the-record and semi- 2156 secret press conferences. The United States has a better and more forceful political press because it has nothing like the Lobby. It is one of the things which flows from the Official Secrets Act. I am very friendly with the Liberal Party. It must be remembered that Asquith was my great-uncle by marriage. The hon. Member for Isle of Ely referred to two matters which I believe would not have emerged in this country. I do not know about Watergate. We could debate that for ever. It would perhaps be a good thing if Nixon were here. After all, he is not such a bad chap. Indeed, my father-in-law received him publicly. I think that without international action outside this country the Beira patrol and the oil scandal would not have been raised. The persons who brought these matters to light were Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and one of my personal heroes, Mr. Tiny Rowland of Lonrho. Had it not been for their action, this matter would never have come out. I hope that we are all committed to the idea of radical change. I can see by the friendly attitude of the Home Secretary that he agrees that there has to be a great change to enable the public to have more open government and to force the Government to divulge what the public have a right to know. Of course, the Bill is not perfect, but it is

173

more than ever important in this country because of the nature of our Parliament and method of government. There are some disadvantages in the United States system. Bernard Shaw said that it had the worst constitution in the world. I am not sure that it has. On this matter it has an advantage. Senator and Congressman fundamentally act like Back Benchers here. Moreover, they are far more determined to get information than we are. Here, whichever Government are in office, there are automatically 160 placemenMinisters or supporters of the Government. In the United States, all Senators and Congressmen, who are backed by 7,000 research assistants on Capitol Hill, are determined to get the stuff of full information. If they need a freedom of information Act, how much more do we? The United States has its permanent Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs and other Committees. We have nothing like 2157 that here. I believe that that is one of of the great reforms that should be set in train, especially regarding defence. On occasion, we in this House really know only what we are told unless we ring our friends in America who get it through the American system. I believe that this is a considerable day for the advancement not only of human liberty but of better Government, to which hon. Members on both sides of the House are committed. Of course there are difficulties. The Bill is not perfect. It will require change. There is the problem of classification. I am sure that the Secretary of State will agree that classification is too important a matter to leave to individual Ministers or Departments, because they would be inclined to stamp The Times "Top Secret". This is a very tricky area and it must be worked out. There are problems relating to the Court of Appeal, the Ombudsman, defence, and so forth. The Government and the Opposition have had difficulty in working out a precise way in which to approach these problems. But, once the principle is accepted, there is no better way to meet them than through the deliberations of a Committee of this admirable House. ********************************************************************** SIR ANTHONY BLUNT HC Deb 15 November 1979 vol 973 cc1529-32 Mr. Skinner On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I want to raise a matter on the revelations affecting Sir Anthony Blunt, and a statement that has been provided in the form of a written answer today by the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister. 1530 Sir Anthony Blunt is known to have confessed to having been involved in the Burgess-Maclean-Philby-and-others affair. I want to ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether you consider that this matter of security is so important that it should be the subject of a statement from the Dispatch Box so that it can be properly examined and probed by Members of the House of Commons? Is it not worth noting that it contrasts sharply with the relentless pursuit of the journalists involved in the ABC case, and Mr. Philip Agee? Does it not warrant a statement now from the Box and also a full debate on the matter in the course of next week? Mr. Speaker Order. I know that the hon. Gentleman is interested in the same question. I allowed him to make his full point of order in the knowledge that I am not responsible for national security. That responsibility does not lie with the occupant of this Chair. Therefore, there can be no point of order about that. Mr. Skinner On a different aspect of the point of order[Interruption.]

174

 Mr. Speaker There can be no point of order about national security, because I am not responsible for it. ********************************************************************** SECURITY HC Deb 15 November 1979 vol 973 cc679-81W 679W Mr. Leadbitter asked the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on recent evidence concerning the actions of an individual, whose name has been supplied to her, in relation to the security of the United Kingdom. Mr. Skinner asked the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on recent evidence concerning the actions of an individual, whose name has been supplied to her, in relation to the security of the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister The name which the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter) has given me is that of Sir Anthony Blunt. In April 1964 Sir Anthony Blunt admitted to the security authorities that 680W he had been recruited by and had acted as a talent-spotter for Russian intelligence before the war, when he was a don at Cambridge, and had passed information regularly to the Russians while he was a member of the Security Service between 1940 and 1945. He made this admission after being given an undertaking that he would not be prosecuted if he confessed. Inquiries were of course made before Blunt joined the Security Service in 1940, and he was judged a fit person. He was known to have held Marxist views at Cambridge, but the security authorities had no reason either in 1940 or at any time during his service to doubt his loyalty to his country. On leaving the Security Service in 1945 Blunt reverted to his profession as an art historian. He held a number of academic appointments. He was also appointed as Surveyor of The King's Pictures in 1945, and as Surveyor of The Queen's Pictures in 1952. He was given a KCVO in 1956. On his retirement as Surveyor, he was appointed as an Adviser for The Queen's Pictures and Drawings in 1972, and he retired from his appointment in 1978. He first came under suspicion in the course of the inquiries which followed the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, when the Security Service was told that Burgess had said in 1937 that he was working for a secret branch of the Comintern and that Blunt was one of his sources. There was no supporting evidence for this. When confronted with it, Blunt denied it. Nevertheless the Security Service remained suspicious of him, and began an intensive and prolonged investigation of his activities. During the course of this investigation he was interviewed on 11 occasions. He persisted in his denial, and no evidence against him was obtained. The inquiries which preceded the exposure and defection of Philby in January 1963 produced nothing which implicated Blunt. Early in 1964 new information was received which directly implicated Blunt. It did not, however, provide a basis on which charges could be brought The then Attorney-General decided in April 1964, after consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the public interest lay in trying to secure a 681W confession from Blunt not only to arrive at a definite conclusion on his own involvement but also to obtain information from him about any others who might still be a danger. It was considered important to gain his co-operation in the continuing investigations by the security authorities, following the defections of Burgess, Maclean

175

and Philby, into Soviet penetration of the security and intelligence services and other public services during and after the war. Accordingly the Attorney-General authorised the offer of immunity from prosecution to Blunt if he confessed. Blunt then admitted to the security authorities that, like his friends Burgess, Maclean and Philby, he had become an agent of Russian intelligence and talent-spotted for them at Cambridge during the 1930s; that he had regularly passed information to the Russians while he was a member of the Security Service; and that, although after 1945 he was no longer in a position to supply the Russians with classified information, in 1951 he used his old contact with the Russian Intelligence Service to assist in the arrangements for the defection of Burgess and Maclean. Both at the time of his confession and subsequently Blunt provided useful information about Russian intelligence activities and about his association with Burgess, Maclean and Philby. The Queen's Private Secretary was informed in April 1964 both of Blunt's confession and of the immunity from prosecution on the basis of which it had been made. Blunt was not required to resign his appointment in the Royal Household, which was unpaid. It carried with it no access to classified information and no risk to security, and the security authorities thought it desirable not to put at risk his co-operation in their continuing investigations. The decision to offer immunity from prosecution was taken because intensive investigation from 1951 to 1964 had produced no evidence to support charges. Successive Attorneys-General in 1972, in June 1974 and in June 1979 have agreed that, having regard to the immunity granted in order to obtain the confession which has always been and still is the only firm evidence against Blunt, there are no grounds on which criminal proceedings could be instituted.

******************************************************************** **MR. ANTHONY

BLUNT

HC Deb 21 November 1979 vol 974 cc402-520 402 Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.[Mr. Wakeham] Mr. Speaker Before the debate begins, I should like to make a statement. As the House knows, it is the general rule that matters which would entail legislation must not be discussed on a motion for the Adjournment. However, as I reminded the House on Monday, I am given discretion under Standing Order No. 16 to permit incidental reference to legislative action when enforcement of the prohibition would unduly restrict discussion. I propose today to exercise this discretion in respect of the general matter of the possible modification of the Official Secrets Act. In the Prime Minister's written reply to a question by the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter), reference was made to information conveyed to the Palace. I therefore think it wise at this stage to draw the attention of the House to our well-established rule that any references to the Royal Family must be phrased in courteous language and must not 176

reflect upon the conduct of the Sovereign. This does not, however, inhibit the full discussion of any advice which may or may not have been given to Her Majesty. 4.15 pm The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher) In the early part of last week, Professor Blunt was publicly identified as having been a suspect Soviet agent. This disclosure understandably gave rise to grave concern. Last Thursday, in response to a priority written question from the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter), I thought it right to confirm that Professor Blunt had indeed been a Soviet agent and to give the House the salient facts. Today we have an opportunity to debate the whole matter. It may be convenient, therefore, if I start by setting out the facts in greater detail. Professor Blunt has admitted that he was recruited for Russian intelligence when he was at Cambridge before the war. In 1940 he joined the Security Service. 403 To us today it seems extraordinary that a man who had made no secret of his Marxist beliefs could have been accepted for secret work in any part of the public service, let alone the Security Service. But that is with the benefit of hindsight. Perhaps standards were relaxed because it was a time of considerable expansion and recruitment to deal with the wartime tasks of the service, which were directed against Hitler's Germany. Professor Blunt has said that during his period in the Security Service from 1940 to 1945 he regularly passed to Russian intelligence anything that came his way which would be of interest to them. We do not know exactly what information he passed; we do know, however, to what information he had access by virtue of his duties. There is no doubt that British interests were seriously damaged by his activities. But it is unlikely that British military operations or British lives were put at risk. Further, the story that he jeopardised the lives of secret agents in the Netherlands is without foundation; he was never in the Special Operations Executive. After he left the Security Service in 1945 and resumed his career as an art historian, Professor Blunt ceased to have access to classified information. He has said that from 1945 to 1951 he passed no information to the Russians. In May 1951 an investigation which had continued for some years caught up with Donald Maclean. It was Philby who warned Burgess to tell Maclean that he was about to be interrogated. And it was Burgess who used Blunt as a contact with a Soviet controller to help with the 177

arrangements for Maclean's flight to Russiaa journey in which he was joined by Burgess. Blunt admits that on one occasion between 1951 and 1956 he assisted Philby in contacting Russian intelligence. He has said that he has had no contact with Russian intelligence since then. The defection of Burgess and Maclean led to intense and prolonged investigations of the extent to which the security and other public services had been infiltrated by Russian intelligence. At an early stage in these investigations Professor Blunt came under inquiry. This was as a result of information to the effect 404 that Burgess had been heard in 1937 to say that he was working for a secret branch of the Comintern and that Blunt was one of his sources. Blunt denied this. Nevertheless, he remained under suspicion, and became the subject of intensive investigation. He was interviewed on 11 occasions over the following eight years. He persisted in his denial, and no evidence against him was obtained. Of course, until his confession, the authorities did not know the extent of his involvement with the Russians or the period over which it lasted. It was early in 1964 that new information was received relating to an earlier period which directly implicated Blunt. I cannot disclose the nature of that information but it was not usable as evidence on which to base a prosecution. In this situation, the security authorities were faced with a difficult choice. They could have decided to wait in the hope that further information which could be used as a basis for prosecuting Blunt would, in due course, be discovered. But the security authorities had already pursued their inquiries for nearly 13 years without obtaining firm evidence against Blunt. There was no reason to expect or hope that a further wait would be likely to yield evidence of a kind which had eluded them so far. Alternatively, they could have confronted Professor Blunt with the new information to see if it would break his denial. But Blunt had persisted in his denial at 11 interviews; the security authorities had no reason to suppose that he would do otherwise at a twelfth. If the security authorities had confronted him with the new information, and he still persisted in his denial, their investigation of him would have been no further forward and they might have prejudiced their own position by alerting him to information which he could then use to warn others. They therefore decided to ask the Attorney-General, through the acting Director of Public Prosecutions, to authorise them to offer Blunt immunity from prosecution, if he both confessed and agreed to cooperate in their further investigations. I should like to pause for a moment on this question of granting immunity, because I think that there may remain some misunderstanding

178

about it. It is not 405 unusual for the Attorney-General to be asked to authorise immunity from prosecution in return for co-operation in the pursuit of inquiries. It happens from time to time in the course of criminal investigations. Under our constitutional arrangements, the decision is taken by the Attorney-General in his capacity as a Law Officer. Mr. Dennis Canavan (West Stirling-shire) It is one law for them and another law for everybody else. The Prime Minister He takes it on the basis of what, in his view, is best in the public interest. He may consult his ministerial colleagues but he is not bound by their advice. The decision is his alone. In this case, the then Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson, decided that it was in the public interest to offer an immunity from prosecution. In fact, to this day there is no evidence which could be used as a basis for prosecution against Blunt. So the offer of immunity was made. Professor Blunt confessed. Both at the time of his confession and subsequently he has co-operated in the inquiries of the security authorities. He had provided information about Russian intelligence activities and about his association with Burgess, Maclean and Philby. After the Attorney-General's authority to offer immunity had been given, the Queen's private secretary was invited to a meeting with the permanent secretary at the Home Office and the Director-General of the Security Service. The Queen's private secretary was asked to the meeting because Blunt had, since 1945, held an unpaid appointment in the Royal Household for which he had been awarded a knighthood in the Royal Victorian Order in 1956. At this meeting, the Queen's private secretary was told that Professor Blunt was suspected of having been an agent of Russian intelligence, but that, provided he confessed and co-operated in the inquiries of the security authorities, he would be granted immunity from prosecution. The Queen's private secretary asked what action the Queen was advised to take if Blunt confessed. He was told that the Queen was advised to take no action. Any action would, of course, have alerted Blunt's former Russian controllers and others who were already under suspicion to the fact that he had 406 confessed and could well be providing information to our security authorities. After Blunt had been interviewed and had confessed, as I have already described, the Palace duly followed the advice that had already been given. I turn now to the question of how Ministers were informed. Relations between the Security Service and Ministers are governed by the directive given to the Director-General of the Security Service by the then Home

179

Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, in 1952, which is reproduced in Lord Denning's report of September 1963 at paragraph 238. When discussing and endorsing the principles embodied in that directive, Lord Denning said: The Head of the Security Service is responsible directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the Prime Minister The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has any direct responsibility for the Security Service If the Director General of the Security Service is in any doubt as to any aspect of his dutiesas, for instance, when he gets information about a Minister or a senior public servant indicating that he may be a security riskhe should consult the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary will then have to take responsibility for further action. I can tell the House that in the case of Blunt the Director-General of the Security Service followed scrupulously the procedures which had been laid down. He had a meeting with the Home Secretary on 2 March 1964, in the course of which he told the Home Secretary about the new information implicating Blunt and he indicated that he would be discussing with the Director of Public Prosecutions how to conduct the interview with Blunt, bearing in mind the Security Service's need to obtain as much intelligence as possible about Soviet penetration. The Home Secretary drew his attention to the need to inform the Queen's private secretary. On 17 June 1964 a further meeting was held between the Home Secretary, his permanent secretary and the Director-General, in which the Director-General reported that Blunt had admitted spying for the Russians throughout the war when he was serving in the Security Service. The Home Secretary of the day, now Lord Brooke, who, at first, did not recall being told[Interruption.] At first, he 407 did not recall being told, which is quite understandable[Interruption]. Mr. Speaker Order. The Prime Minister I shall start the sentence again. The Home Secretary of the day, now Lord Brooke, who, at first, did not recall being told, has been reminded of these meetings and has, with characteristic integrity, accepted that his memory must have been at fault. [Interruption.] There is no more honourable or devoted servant. It is also clear that when the Attorney-General took his decision to authorise the offer of immunity from prosecution he knew that the Home Secretary had been made aware of the matter.

180

There was therefore no failure on the part of the Security Service to carry out their duty to inform the Home Secretary of these matters. It was for the Home Secretary to decide whether the Prime Minister should be informed. There is no record on this point. Neither Lord Brooke nor Lord Home can recall discussing the matter. In the light of these events, I see no need to change the principles governing the relationships between the Security Service and Ministers, as set out in the Denning report. I think it right, however, that there should be a clear understanding among all those concerned about how we expect those principles to be applied. I have accordingly agreed the following points with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. First, the Director-General should report to the Home Secretary if he receives information about a present or former Minister or senior public servant indicating that he may be, or may have been, a security risk, unless circumstances are so exceptional that he judges it necessary to report direct to the Prime Minister. Secondly, when the Director-General has reported to the Home Secretary, it is the Home Secretary's responsibility to inform the Prime Minister or make sure that the Prime Minister is informed. Thirdly, if the Attorney-General is asked to authorise a grant of immunity from prosecution in a case involving national security, he should satisfy himself that the Home Secretary is aware 408 that the request has been made. In cases of especial doubt or difficulty, the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary, or both, may wish to see that the Prime Minister is also aware that the request has been made. The Attorney-General and the Home Secretary should always be informed of the outcome of the offer of immunity. It is the responsibility of the Home Secretary to ensure that the Prime Minister is informed. So much for the procedures between the Security Services and Ministers. I turn now to another matter. I am advised that since 1967 successive Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries have all been informed about the position on Blunt. Further, as I indicated in my written reply, the matter was also brought to the attention of successive Attorneys-General in 1972, June 1974 and June 1979. This was to inform them of the immunity that had been given. Any legal matters will be dealt with by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General when he replies to the debate. I have been asked why a day's notice of my intention to reply to a written question was given to Professor Blunt's solicitor. Had there been any question of prosecuting Blunt, of course there would have been no advance noticeand, indeed, no detailed reply either. Since there was no

181

question of prosecution, there was no question of enabling Blunt to escape justice. His name had already been published, and it was reasonable therefore to tell his solicitor that I was going to give the facts in reply to a question in this House. Clearly the public services are an attractive target for Soviet penetration, and the Security Service especially so, The service is very conscious of that danger. Indeed, in the light of all that has happened, it should be. Procedures for recruitment, vetting and monitoring members of the public services who have access to classified information have been much extended and improved. Of course nothing can be absolutely proof against penetration. In a democratic society it is always possible that a few will try to use freedom to destroy freedom. We must do everything that we can to prevent them. 409 I will sum up. First, the procedures under which the Security Service is directly responsible to the Home Secretary were scrupulously followed. After 1967 successive Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries were all informed about this case. Secondly, the immunity was offered to Blunt to get information on Soviet penetration into the public services. Neither at the time nor since has there been any evidence on which he could be prosecuted. I am advised that a confession obtained as a result of an inducement given would not be admissible as evidence in any prosecution. Thirdly, the events of this case began well over 40 years ago. Many of the principal figures concerned, some of whom I have mentioned, have long since retired, and some have died. For obvious reasons, it is therefore not possible, and never will be, to establish all the facts accurately. Mr. William Hamilton (Fife, Central) How many are still living? The Prime Minister These are some of the factors that will have to be taken into account in deciding whether there should be an inquiry, a matter on which hon. Members will doubtless wish to express their views. Fourthly, we have now put beyond doubt the arrangements for reporting to and consulting the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister on security matters. Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)rose The Prime Minister

182

May I go straight through? It is a very carefully marshalled statement. In practice my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I both make a point of keeping in close touch with the Director-General of the Security Service. Fifthly, it is important not to be so obsessed with yesterday's danger that we fail to detect today's. We know what happened to a very few of that pre-war generation who had Marxist leanings and who betrayed their country. We find it contemptible and repugnant. Our task now is to guard against their counterparts of today. 410 Finally, the Security Service, by its very nature, has to work in secrecy. Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton) What about the brother of the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery)? The right hon. Lady cannot have it both ways. There were others as well as Marxists. The Prime Minister It cannot therefore defend itself in public. That task falls to Ministers. The Government's purpose is to do everything possible to improve the morale and effectiveness of the Security Service, and to do nothing to undermine or weaken it. In that aim I believe that we shall have the support of the House. 4.38 pm Mr. Merlyn Rees (Leeds, South) One point that has arisen from the Blunt affair is the accountability of the Security Service and what part this House should play. I shall turn to that in a moment, but first I simply observe that this House will be unworthy of playing any part in security matters if today's debate develops into a witch-hunt. The Prime Minister has revealed the names of those who had knowledge of the matter. I make clear my disgust at the sordid activities of the group that have now been revealed. In my view "conscience" is the wrong word to invoke in that respect. However, it would be unworthy of this House to concern itself with political trivia in that context. I have played a part in security matters over the years and I know that for either side of the House to believe that all the problems are on one side or the other would be a mistake. I shall concern myself with three mattersthe events of April 1964, the directive given by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and the way in which that directive worksthe House must put its mind to that matterand the future. 183

It is clear that the events of 1964 have been clouded by the memories of old men, the deaths of some of the participants and the self-justification offered in recent days. It may be that the procedures at that time, despite what was on paper afterwards, were not carried out well, but we are concerned with more recent years and the present. That is certainly what I was 411 concerned with when I was Home Secretary. Confusion may have arisen about the events of 1964 because of a lack of understanding of the role of an Attorney-General. I am grateful to the Prime Minister for spelling out that role. If the present Attorney-General and his predecessor catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, I expect to learn more about that role. I have felt in recent days that a lack of understanding of that role has made understanding of the whole matter more difficult for some people. In my experience in Northern Irelandwhere, unlike here, one has a day-to-day involvement in security mattersand as Home Secretary, I have seen that Attorneys-General properly distance themselves from the Government of which they are members in carrying out their Law Officer role. I can see that because of what the Prime Minister has laid down the position could be changed. I certainly always received any information that should have come my way. In light of the role of the Attorney-General, we should decide whether the events of Apriland, as I now learn, June 1964rather than the procedures, need to be inquired into. Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East) Does my right hon. Friend attach any significance to the dates of April and June 1964, given the highly charged political overtones of that period, the background of Profumo and Vassall, and the knowledge that an election was not far away? Mr. Rees I regard them as a coincidence. When one has responsibility in this area, one is dealing with honourable men. If we cannot take each other on that basis, in the House, but instead reduce our debate to the level of some of the discussions that take place in general election campaigns, we shall never find the answer to these problems. The Prime Minister went into greater detail today than she did in her statement last week. I offer my views to the House becauses they concern considerations that a Home Secretary in this and other cases might have to take into account.

184

The Prime Minister said last week that 412 It was considered important to gain his co-operation in the continuing invesigations by the security authorities, following the defection into Soviet penetration of the security and intelligence services Blunt then admited to the security authorities that, like his friends he had become an agent and talentspotted that he had regularly passed information Both at the time of his confession and subsequently Blunt provided useful information about Russian intelligence activities". [Official Report, 15 November 1979; Vol. 973, c. 680.] That is an important factor to take into account when deciding what to do. One requires information that is not easily obtained. The Prime Minister said that the House should turn its attention now and in future to the remit given by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe to the DirectorGeneral of the Security Service, because we are not only looking at the past but trying to see what we should do in future. That remit is still the basis of the relationship between the Home Secretary and the DirectorGeneral. The principles outlined by Lord Denning in his report in 1963 are also important and I wish to base my remarks on them. The Prime Minister has already outlined those principles. The directive said: In your appointment as Director-General you will be responsible to the Home Secretary The Security Service is not, however, a part of the Home Office. On appropriate occasion you will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister. Lord Denning added: The Head of the Security Service is responsible directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the Prime Minister. We all have to be guarded in how much information we give to the House. Any glimmer of information can provide evidence that, bit by bit, can be put together by those who are interested. I am not speaking only in the context of what happened between 1939 and 1945. We live in an age of terrorism, not just in Northern Ireland but in many other parts of the world. Terrorists have methods that are far more sophisticated than I had imagined. When I was Home Secretary, in consultation with the Prime Minister, who had a major role to play, I appointed a new 413 head of MI5, following the retirement of the previous head. If we are to examine what should be done in futureI shall make some suggestions about thatwe shall have to consider not only the bare bones of the conclusions but how they are to work in practice. When I was Home Secretary I had regular meetings with the head of the Security Service on the same basis, though not as frequently, as I had meetings with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. We made changes in the Security Service in such areas as accountability and recruitment. A good deal of that information cannot be given to the

185

House, but I can say that the type of person who has been recruited in the past 10 or 15 years is completely different from those who came in from the universities during the vast expansion in 1939. Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South-East Thank God. Mr. Rees I visited the service regularly, as a Home Secretary should. I offer that information because the Home Secretary of the day has an important job in interpreting the rules. The question that I wish to pose is whether the rules should be changed. The directive to the Director-General states correctly the aims of the service. It says: The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage". That is a statement of fact, but we ought to ask whether that explanation is sufficient, given the problems that face us now and will face us in the 1980s. The directive continues: the work of the Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task. It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community". It is easy sometimes, when certain things happen, to believe that that is not the case. It is the job of the Home Secretary to see that that is done. Mr. J. Grimond (Orkney and Shetland) As the right hon. Gentleman is 414 more experienced, perhaps he can assist the House on one point. The Prime Minister clearly pointed out the responsibilities under the directive. Those responsibilities were that the Home Secretary and if necessary, the Prime Minister should be informed. The Prime Minister told the House that successive Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries were informed. However, it appears that several of them have totally forgotten the whole incident, although it involves an important man in the Palace. Perhaps there is something wrong about the way that the directive is carried out. The incident has passed so rapidly from the minds of those people that they have forgotten about it. Mr. Rees I raised that matter earlier. I did not forge tthe incident, or the full briefing that I received. I am not saying that in self-justification. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) can speak for himself and the Prime Minister has already spoken.

186

However, it is one thing to have it on paper but another for Prime Ministers or Home Secretaries to interpret what is written. Perhaps the directive was not carried out properly. It may be that some of those who participated are very old, and we all know the effects of age. There is a smile on the face of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), but he may be old one day. Mr. Hugh Fraser (Stafford and Stone) There is an element of confusion when the right hon. Gentleman refers to the Security Services. Will he make clear whether he is referring solely to MI5, or to MI6 as well? That is a point that needs clarification. Mr. Rees I have no experience of MI6, but I shall mention it briefly. Mr. Mike Thomas (Newcastle upon Tyne, East) Elucidation is required on two specific points that have been referred to by the Prime Minister. First, did the Home Secretary inform the Prime Minister in 1964? The Prime Minister's explanation was not entirely satisfactory. Secondly, what was meant by the phrase "the Palace"? Does that phrase mean that the Queen was told? Mr. Rees My hon. Friend must ask the Prime Minister about the latter point. 415 I shall return to his first question shortly, because whatever the rules were, it appears that they were not carried out properly at the time. The House must decide whether that is relevant today. In newspaper articles there has been a tendency to imply that the involvement of the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General should be changed. The Prime Minister has already given her view on that. In some instances the rules may not seem to have worked, but Lord Denning said: You and your staff will maintain the well-established convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Services in particular cases, but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issue on which guidance is sought. That statement requires interpretation by the Director-General. A Home Secretary would obviously follow the rule, but there are occasions when the Home Secretary would find out what is going on through discussion. Any issue requiring guidance demands a great deal of information. It may be asked to what degree sufficient information was given at that time.

187

In a different context, the present Home Secretary and I have both worked in Northern Ireland, where there is a security involvement. That job demands that one goes into detail frequentlyperhaps daily. Experience teaches that whatever the rubric says, one should become more involved than was possible 15 years ago, when those involved lacked experience. I am glad that the Prime Minister has not decidedwhether she considered it, we shall never knowthat the whole issue should be put in the hands of the Prime Minister. She is absolutely right not to do that. As Lord Denning said, The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime Minister himself on matters of supreme importance. Anyone with experience knows that information must be in the hands of one Minister on one side and MI6 on the other. Whoever is Prime Minister, ultimate responsibility must lie with that office. It is right that three Ministers are involved. In some of the earlier material there was talk of a Minister of National Security. That would be a mistake. It is right that the Prime Minister and two other Ministers 416 should be involvedsupreme as the Prime Minister is. I find matters concerning 1964 incredible. Perhaps I can understand the situation more easily thanks to the Prime Minister's statement. The events of 1964 gave rise to the present questioning both inside and outside the House. I have no doubt that in recent years, and beyond, procedures have been carried out properly. When a party comes into power it is right that the chop comes down quickly. Monetary policy takes over from incomes policy and Keynesian theories, and so on. Such changes take place in all Departments and no one can grumble. There is no contact from the moment that one takes over as a new Minister. Sometimes I find that strange. However, in terms of security there must be a different attitude. On 4 May I returned to London after the election result. I went to the Home Office, as the new Home Secretary knowsbecause I told himand I carried out those duties. I was still Home Secretary in name, and the following day the new Home Secretary was fully briefed about what I had done, as I had left instructions for him. It would have been stupid to say "The election is over, the Prime Minister has conceded defeat and therefore this matter must await decision until after the weekend." The present Home Secretary gave information to the Opposition that in no way corralled the Opposition, but meant that the job would be done better. New and old Home Secretaries should discuss security procedures and any issues pending. Prime Ministers should also do that, because they have a wider picture. Perhaps Foreign Secretaries should also get together, although I have no experience of that. In no way does it commit an incoming Government.

188

What might be the case is that incomersit would apply to all of us have no experience in these matters, so it is weeks or months before they become fully aware of all the implications of what is put before them. My view is that security is a matter for the nation. It should be paramount. As I have said, as much as we may disagree on a number of issues this liaison would improve the situation. The lack of it may well have been one of the reasons why, in 1964, when the information was 417 passed on, the full implications were not taken into account. I come to the question of accountability to Parliament. Under the rules that we have, the job of Home Secretary no longer raises the awesome decisions of the pastdecisions of life or deathbut there are great powers there. In terms of security I had to take certain decisions on matters of which the House will be aware, and one or two of which came before the House. Those decisions may not have been popular in all quarters. There are the problems of terrorism today. There are the decisions that are takenin my view, correctly takenas regards interception of communications. The principles by which a Home Secretary is carrying out his job should be discussed, but in my viewwhich will not be agreeable to all hon. Membersthe Home Secretary's job cannot be put into a committee, to officials of the Home Office or to this House. But it is to this House that a Home Secretary is responsible. Trust is at the core of this relationship. If ever that trust is seen to be brokenthere is no way of covering up the whole system is at risk. From my own experience in two important jobs in this respect, the job that one has to do cannot be given to committees or to civil servants. The judgment of the man concerned has to be taken. Posterity will decide, and if the man is a fool the present time will also catch up with him. It is trust that matters. Mr. Christopher Price (Lewisham, West) I agree that the job cannot be given to committees. However, if the Germans' scrutiny and the United States' scrutiny of the job can be given to parliamentary committees, why is it so disastrous to put some scrutiny of the job to a parliamentary committee in the United Kingdom? Mr. Rees Perhaps my hon. Friend will listen to what I am about to say, in terms of what I believe we should do. The Germans' experience, in their context and in the context of how their constitution is built, is one thing. I do not think that the American security service arrangementsI have to choose my words carefullyhave been exactly successful in recent years. [Interruption.] I am asked "What about ours?" There is this example and there have been others. What 418 is going on should not be bandied about from day to day. If it is, it washes back on to the service concerned and its members behave almost in the way that public opinion expects

189

them to behave. To come to this House and justify the detailed activities in what one is doing would be wrong, and it would not work. On the question of principle and the events of 1964, concerning Philby, Maclean and Blunt, I have given my view and I shall listen to what the Attorney-General says. Whatever else the House should consider, any idea of a 1921 tribunal of inquiry would be wrong. In no way could I recommend that. With regard to the directive of which I have spoken, I have no reason to say aught than that I have confidence in both Directors-General who have worked to me. If I were Home Secretary I would be considering the need to review the directives, to see whether the procedures meet the needs of the 1980s, and the role and the ministerial responsibility. I should also be considering, separately, whether the time had come to examine the question of interception as Birkett did 20 years ago. I believe that that should be done as well. The best way is for this to be undertaken by a team from the Security Commission. The Security Commission as a whole is not suitable, because some of its members are permanent officials at the Foreign Office and the Home Office. But my view is that the time has come for a review of our procedures. I conclude where I began Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles) Before the right hon. Gentleman concludes, perhaps I may ask him a question. I understand his argument about continuity between Ministers. The Prime Minister has told us the reasons why, after 1964, Blunt was allowed to retain his position and was not publicly exposed. I think that we understand that. What we do not understand is why that situation was allowed to continue until 1978 and why, in 1972, his appointment within the Royal Household was changed. Surely at some point he should have been phased out of this position. Mr. Rees I do not think that that question should be put to me. However, if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that it is worthy of investigation, let me say 419 that that is what we are deciding today. We should listen carefully to the debate and hon. Members' views. Mr. Robin F. Cook (Edinburgh, Central) My right hon. Friend indicated that he would refer to the answerability of the Minister to Parliament, but I do not think that he has done so yet. Will he accept the point that was putthat of course responsibility must rest with the Home Secretary, but is he really satisfied that the answerability and accountability of the Home Secretary to Parliament is at present adequate?

190

 Mr. Rees I think that it is the best system. If my hon. Friend has ideas on how the principle can be discussed here without what is being done being bandied about, I shall listen to them very carefully, but before we go any further, let me say that my view is that we should use this occasion not because anything that I found was wrong but to review the existing principles to which a Home Secretary has to apply himself. This country needs a Security Service. I know it to be vital. The events of the last week have undoubtedly caused concern. We have to ensure the continuing efficiency of the Security Service. An inquiry into the procedures and control would do much to reassure the community as a whole. The events of the last week have led people to question matters, perhaps unnecessarily, but a review of the procedures is now necessary. 5.7 pm Mr. Robert Rhodes James (Cambridge) One of the first major debates that I attended in this House was on 7 November 1955, when, in an atmosphere of embarrassment and unease, the whole question of the defections of Maclean and Burgess was debated. It was a very strange experience for me recently to re-read that debate and to be reminded of the atmosphere of that occasion, which many of my right hon. and hon. Friends will remember. There was a very profound willingness in the House on that occasion, almost exactly 24 years ago, to believe that this was the end of an episode that had done very great harm to our national reputation, to that of the Foreign Service and the secret service and to our relations with our allies, particularly 420 the United States. Alas, it was not the end of that episode. The House, 24 years ago, was also obsessed by the problem of balancing the duties of the State, in a dangerous world, against a menacing and powerful enemy, with the rights of the individual in a free society. That dilemma also remains with the House today. I remind the House of some of the words said by the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Harold Macmillan, in that debate: Action against employees, whether of the State or anybody else, arising from suspicion and not from proof may begin with good motives, and it may avert serious inconveniences or even disasters, but, judging from what has happened in some other countries, such a practice soon degenerates into the satisfaction of personal vendettas or a general system of tyranny, all in the name of public safety."[Official Report, 7 November 1955; Vol. 545, c. 1487.] That same dilemma, as I have said and as the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) emphasised, remains. Let me say at once that I fully recognise why it was that members of that generation in the 1930s, and not only in Cambridge, repelled as they

191

were by the menace of Facism, by the pusillanimity of the then National Government and the irrelevance of the then Labour Party, should see in the Soviet Union and Communism a force against that Facism, and a force sanctified, or apparently sanctified, by a form of intellectual respectability. I understand that. However, there are differences between those and others, who, having taken that view and joined the Communist Party, saw the realities, first, in the cynicism of the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War and, secondly, the events of September 1939the pact with Nazi Germany, the invasion of East Poland, Finland and the Baltic States. At that moment most of those involved recognised the reality of what they had been flirting with. But there were, alas, those who not only retained their idealistic faith in this evil creedas evil and undistinguishable in its evil from that of Nazi Germany against which we were fightingbut maintained it and furthermore, remained as agents for that nation. The House hardly needs to be reminded of the fact that for nearly two years, between September 1939 and June 1941, 421 the Soviet Union was the warm ally and assistant of Nazi Germany, against which we were fighting for our very survival. For different reasons these men remainedduring the war and afterwardsin the service of an enemy nation that was only temporarily, and very reluctantly, our ally. Maclean, Burgess, Philby and Blunt were among their number. Mr. Joseph Dean (Leeds, West) What about the Russians killed in the war? Mr. Rhodes James Does the hon. Gentleman blame anyone except the then Soviet Government for the deaths of those Russian people, because of the folly, ineptitude and incompetence of their flirtation with Nazi Germany? Was it the fault of the poor Russian people that they were then invaded by that Nazi ally? Mr. Dean Has the hon. Gentleman forgotten the 20 million Soviet people who were killed beating Hitler? Has he conveniently forgotten that? Mr. Rhodes James The hon. Gentleman did not answer my pointit is a fundamental pointand say why so many people who had been supporters of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Union ceased to be so, particularly after 1939, in spite of the fact that for a period the Soviet Union was

192

indeed our ally in a common conflict. After the war the loyalties of some of those involved remained. Let us not be mealy-mouthed about the matter. Some of my constituents have told me that it is unworthy to pursue an old man who has confessed and who should now be forgotten. I hope that my constituents and those of the hon. Member know me well enough to realise that I would have no part of a witch-hunt or vendetta. But a traitor is a traitor is a traitor. I ask those who try to exculpate Mr. Blunt to think just for a moment what their attitude would have been had he been discovered to be a German rather than a Soviet agent. On the question of immunity, I fully accept that it must have seemed and no doubt wasthe best answer to the problem and the national requirements in 1964. It is not fair to say, as some of my hon. Friends have alleged, that the Government broke their side of the bargain. Blunt was found out by an exceptionally 422 intelligent and persistent biographer and journalist. His identity was known throughout Fleet Street. In these circumstances I have no doubt that the Prime Minister had no realistic choice but to make a full and complete statement. To those who say that this event will in future deprive the Security Service of the weapon of immunity, I say only that no Government can offer a traitor complete immunity from treachery. That is what occurred. As for the questions of responsibility and future action, I wish to state with very particular emphasis that the operations of the Security Service must be the responsibility of governmentand government alone. To quote Mr. Macmillan again, from the debate of 24 years ago: Ministers, and Ministers alone, must bear the responsibility for what goes wrong. After all, they are not slow to take credit for anything that goes right." [Official Report, 7 November 1955; Vol. 545, c. 1484.] A particular initiative was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, East (Mr. Aitken), who suggested, in effect, a permanent Committee of this House monitoring or investigating the Security Service. It seems to me that of all the proposals that have emerged, that one is least likely to be of any assistance whatever in the pursuit of the national security of this nation, which is the concern of us all, whatever the enemy may be. As the right hon. Member for Leeds, South reminded us, this is part of the defence of the realm an unpleasant part, perhaps, but a necessary one in all its aspects. Ministers and Governments must bear the responsibility. Mr. Blunt has hadand still hasimmunity. He has lived serenely in a free country, enjoying the privileges of an open, tolerant and decent society. His life has been lived in an atmosphere of liberal scholarship, civilised behaviour, friendship and libertyall of which he and his friends imperilled and betrayed. Let that be his epitaph. 5.15 pm Mr. S. C. Silkin (Dulwich) 193

The purpose of my intervention is not to follow the remarks of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Rhodes James), very important though the points that he raised no doubt were, or the many issues which 423 were raised both inside and outside the House. It is to place the facts, as far as they are relevant and within my own knowledge, before the House for the assistance of the House, in considering those issues. I have seen newspaper reports, some of which referred to my part in the affair in erroneous and misleading language. That of course adds to my concern to be as accurate, as full and as clear as I can in what I say to the House. As the events, as far as I am concerned, fall within a fairly narrow compass, I hope also to be fairly brief. My first knowledge of the Blunt case was in June 1974, some three months after my appointment to the office of Attorney-General. I understood that that knowledge was imparted to me at the request of the Cabinet Office, for reasons which I shall explain. The Prime Minister has spoken of the original grant of immunity from prosecution given to Mr. Blunt in 1964 with the authority of the late Sir John Hobson, as Attorney-General, and of the confession which was made upon the assurance of that immunity. The immunity was given in the widest possible terms. The right hon. Lady also referred to the occasion in 1972 when my immediate predecessor Sir Peter Rawlinson, now Lord Rawlinson, was informed of the position. Lord Rawlinson, so I understood, had been asked to advise whether, in the circumstances of the confession obtained upon Sir John Hobson's promise of immunity from prosecution, a prosecution of Mr. Blunt could none the less be launched in the future. He advised that it could not. When the Government changed, those concerned in the Cabinet Office wished to satisfy themselves that the incoming Attorney-Generalthat is, myselftook the same view as his predecessor, and, if not, what advice he had to give. Mr. Phillip Whitehead (Derby, North) Did my right hon. and learned Friend seek to inquire at that time why a similar courtesy had not been extended by these officials or their predecessors to Sir Frank Soskice, later Lord Stow Hill, the Home Secretary in the Government between 1964 and 1966? 424 Mr. Silkin No, I did not ask that question. If I may give the facts as far as I was aware of them, I shall continue.

194

The Cabinet Office wished to satisfy itself that the incoming AttorneyGeneral took the same view as his predecessor and, if not, what advice I had to give. I was aware of no new evidence or new event unknown to my predecessor, but it was clearly a sensible precaution, in my view, for the Cabinet Office to ensure that there was no conflict of legal view on the effects of Sir John Hobson's grant of immunity. Having carefully considered the matter, I reached the conclusion that a prosecution of Mr. Blunt could not, in the circumstances disclosed to me, be launched, and I so advised. I was asked to do no more than that and, with one exception, I did no more. That exception was that I observed that of the four Attorneys-General in the period between 1964 and 1974, only one, Lord Elwyn-Jones, had apparently not been informed of the decision in the Blunt affair, although he had become Attorney-General some four months after Mr. Blunt's confession and had held the office for six years. By 1974, of course, when I was consulted, he was Lord Chancellor. I thought it desirable that he should be informed of the decision which Sir John Hobson had taken; and I so advised. That advice was passed to the Secretary of the Cabinet, and he sought approval for its implementation. Later I was told that it had been approved. I assumed that that approval had been given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson), but of that I have no personal knowledge. So far as I knew, the events of 1974 ended there. I mentioned that last point, not because it had any special significance in itself, but because one or two organs of the press have stated as a fact indeed, as some sort of criticismthat I failed to inform the then Prime Minister. But, given the source of the request for my advice, the Cabinet Office, and the subsequent report from the Cabinet Secretary that my suggestion had been approved, I certainly had no reason to suppose that the Prime Minister was unaware of the matter. My right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton may wish to catch your eye later, Mr. Speaker, but I 425 have read what was announced in the press yesterday and I do not think that my right hon. Friend suggests that he was not aware of the matter. I emphasisethis is a matter of importance to Law Officers generally that to inform the Prime Minister of a matter of this kind is within the responsibility of the Cabinet Office and perhaps the Home Secretary, as has been said, but not within the responsibility of the Attorney-General. I heard no more of this matter until about a year ago. It was then raised again, so I understood, because it had then become known or suspected that publication of Mr. Boyle's book was contemplated. It was expected that events would take such a turn that a public statement, on lines similar to those of the statement made by the present Prime Minister, might become desirable. The Cabinet Office accordingly asked me if I

195

would reconsider and confirm or amend the view that I had expressed in 1974. On this occasion I received a fuller account of Mr. Blunt's pre-war activities and associations than I had received in 1974, and I studied a draft statement prepared in the Cabinet Office. Having reconsidered the matter, I remained very firmly of the opinion that there was no prospect of the Crown embarking upon a successful prosecution. I also formed the very clear view that, even if there had been such a prospect, Sir John Hobson's grant of immunity would have created an unshakable impediment to a prosecution. There could not be a successful prosecution, because I was assured that when Sir John Hobson dealt with the matter, the only evidence against Mr. Blunt, or likely to become available against Mr. Blunt, was his own confession given after 11 abortive interviews, and that confession was inadmissible in evidence against him because, it having been obtained in consequence of the inducement of the offer of immunity, it was not a voluntary confession as understood by the courts. That, indeed, is trite law. Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton) Was the immunity granted only in respect of offences to which Blunt had truthfully confessed, or did it extend to offences which might be discovered in the future and which had occurred before the 426 immunity was granted but to which Blunt had not confessed? Mr. Silkin As I was informed, the immunity was granted in the widest terms. If there is any doubt about the matter, no doubt the Attorney-General will deal with it more fully when he winds up. On that occasion in 1978, in view of the need to draw up an agreed, careful, full and accurate statement, I gave my advice in person to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who was then Prime Minister, and he accepted it, although with a very natural distaste which, indeed, I shared. The book had not been published by the time the Labour Government went out of office and I was not called upon again to advise or reconsider my advice. No doubt that task fell to the present Attorney-General who, I understand, will wind up the debate and will doubtless follow the story to its conclusion. It would be quite unfair for me to pass any view on the action taken by the late Sir John Hobson. He is not here to defend himself. I do not know the full extent of the information upon which he acted or what inquiries he may have made. What I can say, with the fullest emphasis, is that,

196

once he had made that decision, and once immunity had been granted and a confession obtained on the strength of that immunity, none of his successors had any alternative whatever but to adopt the course that each one has adopted of advising that Mr. Blunt's immunity from prosecution must be accepted as unimpeachable. Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman understand that the legal immunity to which he has referred also extended to protecting Mr. Blunt from any disclosure of the treason that he had committed? If that were so, would it not have committed Ministers to being untruthful about him should the matter ever be raised in the House, which quite properly did not happen in the disclosure made by the Prime Minister? Is that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's understanding? Mr. Silkin The legal immunity that was granted was immunity from prosecution. What might follow as a matter of 427 policy from that legal immunity would be a matter for the judgment of Ministers. Mr. Mike Thomas I accept what my right hon. and learned Friend has said about immunity, but can we be quite clear about what he said earlier, that whereas the Attorney-General in the Conservative Government of 1964 was apprised of this matter, his immediate successor in the Labour Government of 1964 was not? Is that what my right hon. and learned Friend was saying earlier? Mr. Silkin Yes, indeed, that is what I said. That is the reason why, when it came to me and I observed this fact, I took the view that it would be right for me to set in train the events which eventually led to the information being given to my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor. Those are the matters of which I am aware and with which I have been concerned. I have no doubt whatever that the advice that I and other Attorneys-General have given on this matter is correct. Whether it likes it or not, and whether it finds it distasteful or not, the House must proceed on the basis that that advice must be followed. Several Hon. Membersrose Mr. Speaker Before I call the next hon. Member, I should inform the House that a very large number of right hon. and hon. Members have indicated a wish

197

to catch my eye during the course of the debate. I shall be grateful if hon. Members do not come to the Chair. We shall do our best to be fair, but it is more difficult when approaches like that are made. I shall follow the rule of not calling two Privy Councillors immediately in succession if they are in the same party. 5.30 pm Mr. Edward Gardner (South Fylde) It is right to say that the case of Blunt, and the debate that we are having now, must have exhausted the vocabulary of outrage. Perhaps the cry of "Damn his conscience" sums up all that needs to be said about him. I was happy to hear from the Prime Minister that the proper procedures, set out in the Maxwell Fyfe document of 1952, were followed in this case. One can say with confidence that the disclosures 428 that have followed this case will do nothing to harm the morale and efficiency of the secret service. It is difficult to know just how effectively and successfully the secret service performs its duties. As learned counsel in a number of spy cases, I was most impressed by the number of spies who were caught as a result of the skill and determination of the secret service and who expressed astonishment and admiration at the way in which they had been trapped. This case raises three supremely imporant questions, all dealing with official information. First, there is the question of how the Prime Minister in a particularly difficult and delicate case should be informed of what is going on. That aspect has already been dealt with by the Prime Minister in her opening speech. The second question is what we should do about restricting information so that we can be certain that the interests of the State are not injured by improper and damaging disclosures. At the moment that is decided by the terms of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. I doubt whether there are many hon. Members who regard section 2 of that Act as a satisfactory or acceptable conclusion to this problem. At least this case has brought to light what might well have been a defect in the new legislation which the Government were quite properly considering to replace section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is the third question which causes the most concernthat is, not what information should be restricted but what information should be disclosed, not only by the Government but by local government and bodies much as new town corporations. It is too much to ask that precise legislation be introduced at this moment, but I hope that the Government will look again at the report made by "Justice" which suggested that there should be a code of practice which would make it possible for reasonable and practicable ways of releasing information to be devised so that the 198

Government could show themselves predisposed towards letting be known what can safely be known, and distinguishing between what is essentially a secret matter in the interests of the State and what should be released in the interests of the public at large. 429 5.35 pm Mr. William Hamilton (Fife, Central) As this story has unfolded in the course of the last week or two, I am sure that many hon. Members, and millions of people outside the House, have shared my feelings of outrage. In all my years of public life I have never felt so sick, angry and frustrated. Many of us must have experienced a feeling of infuriating helplessness as this squalid conspiracy in high places has had part of the mask torn from its ugly face, not by the Government or the Prime Minister, but by the courage and diligence of Mr. Boyle in writing his book. These feelings arise from the terrifying fact that whatever is said in this debate from whatever source, or whatever is done subsequently, we in this House, and still less the people outside, will never ever know the truth. We are fishing in the deep and dark waters of what is termed "national security", and we are battling against the fierce determination of what I call the Establishment to protect its own. [HON. MEMBERS: "A Communist?"] At every stage in this story vital decisions appear to have been taken by faceless men in security services and the Civil Service without the knowledge or consent of accountable Ministers. The Prime Minister referred to the history, of this episode dating back to the 1930s. How did Blunt get his appointment in 1945 in the first place? The Prime Minister posed this question but did not attempt to answer it. How did a known Marxist get such an appointment in the security services and who judged him fit? Was his homosexuality known at the time? That is a very relevant point which I shall come to later. In her statement last week the Prime Minister talked about Blunt leaving the service in 1945. She suggested that, because he had left, he was no longer in a position to supply the USSR with classified information. But according to The Sunday Times last week this was not sohe was still in a position to obtain it. He continued to work part time, clearing things up, in MI5 up to 1950. Is that true? Could he have obtained classified information between 1945 and 1950? He was apparentlyaccording to The Sunday Timesin a high position in MI5. He 430 was number three in charge of administration. In early 1950 he became involved in section Q of the Foreign Office security service helping to trace a major leakage from the British Embassy in Washington. Therefore, he had not washed his hands completely of the British secret service after 1945.

199

Despite the record up to the 1950s and then up to 1964, successive Attorneys-General decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute this man. We have to believe that. Were all the Prime Ministers up to 1964 informed and advised of the position? The Prime Minister said that they were after 1967. I presume by inference that those up to that period were not so informed. In April 1964 a confession was made by Blunt after he had been promised immunity from prosecution. The Prime Minister has explained the position up to a point, but was the Prime Minister at that time informed? Was he acquainted with the contents of the confession and the immunity that have been referred to? The then Prime Minister, now the noble lord Lord Home, and the then Foreign Secretary, now the noble lord Lord Butler, have denied that they knew of the Blunt affair at the time. I knew the Attorney-General of that timeand I do not wish to speak unkindly of Sir John Hobsonbut he was not a prominent politician. He may have been a very experienced lawyer, but he was scarcely known in this House. He was the Minister who took the decision. It seems to me to be quite wrong that a decision of that kind did not have to be accounted for to this House or even to the senior Ministers in Sir John's own Government. That is scarcely a credible position and I find it extremely difficult to believe that other Ministers were not acquainted with the situation at the time. Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South-West)rose The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. William Whitelaw) If the hon. Gentleman had listened to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, he would have heard her say that the noble lord Lord Brooke, the then Home Secretary, was informed of these matters. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman is wrong when he says that Ministers were not informed at the time. 431 Mr. Hamilton I am sorryI meant to say that. We now know that Lord Brooke was informed. What I want to know is whether the then Prime Minister was informed. The right hon. Lady did not make that point clear this afternoon. I pose that as the sort of question that needs to be answered. Sir Charles Cunningham, who was the permanent secretary at the Home Office at the time, said that the then Home Secretary was advised. Another civil servant said last weekend that there were different ways of informing Ministers without actually telling them anything. Quite clearly there is a 200

lack of liaison between top civil servants and Ministers who are accountable to the House. That aspect of the affair needs to be cleared up. Whatever Ministers were, or were not, toldand we have in the past fortnight had as many denials as we would find in the Bible, including that of Pontius Pilatethey have all said that they knew nothing about it. They have provided their alibis. Whatever the truth of that, I come now directly to the Queen's private secretary. The Queen's private secretary, Sir Michael Adeane was told. There could be only one reason for telling him. He was not told because he was Sir Michael Adeane, the Queen's private secretary. He was told because he had no other role in this context but to act as a messenger boy to Her Majesty the Queen. He had no other role at all. All reasonable men would, therefore, assume that Her Majesty the Queen knew of Blunt's confession, and of his immunity, early in 1964. I noticed that the Prime Minister, whenever there was a danger of embarrassment, referred to "the Palace" as distinct from "Her Majesty the Queen". "The Palace" means the Queen, just as "Her Majesty's Government" means the right hon. Lady. I want to put some questions to the right hon Lady and to the Government, though I do so without hope of getting any answers. Was Her Majesty the Queen told the full story? Was she given all the reasons for the granting of immunity to Mr. Blunt? Was she told the full nature of the confession? Assuming that Her Majesty the Queen had all that information, did she then, or subsequently, advise 432 or warn her Prime Minister? That is the constitutional role of the Monarchy, according to Bagehotand who am I to criticise Bagehot? Lord Home was then the Prime Minister. He has said that he did not know of the affair. Did Her Majesty the Queen know that he did not know? Did she warn him, advise him, or even ask him if he knew? All these questions are running through the minds of people outside this House. Did Her Majesty approve of all this? Did she approve of the immunity granted to Blunt? Let us not forget that by 1964assuming that Her Majesty the Queen knewMr. Blunt had worked, no doubt with great distinction, at Buckingham Palace for 19 years. Indeed, in 1956 the Queen rewarded Mr. Blunt with the KCVO. That was a personal honour for services rendered. There was Mr. Blunt, a knighted ex-public schoolboy, a known[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] This is very important and relevant. Here was a knighted ex-public-school boy, a known homosexual and a traitor for over 20 years, within the Palace gates. When the Queen was toldif she was toldof the manifold qualifications of this man, her artistic adviser, in 1964, she must have been deeply shocked, very angry, greatly alarmed and highly embarrassed. When, nevertheless, she was advised to keep such a

201

creature in her employment, the reasons given to herif reasons were givenfor so doing, must have been overwhelming and irresistible. What were the reasons that compelled and persuaded the Queen to say "All right, we know that he has got all these characteristics, but nevertheless the State thinks, and I am accepting advice to this effect, that it is worth while for me to keep him in my employment." That is one possible scenario. But perhaps Her Majesty was never told these things. Perhaps she was kept in the dark along with her Prime Ministers all those years up to and beyond 1964. Perhaps when Mr. Blunt's confession was made and immunity was granted to him the Queen was not told about that either. Therefore, in her innocence, she had no valid reason for dispensing with his services. If the security authorities thought that Blunt was still useful as a double agentthat is the only inference we can 433 drawand as a "squealer" perhaps the authorities thought that his continued employment at Buckingham Palace would give him a superb veneer of respectability and credibility as he went about his dirty work. That is also a possible explanation. If that were the case, I ask whether it is right that the Monarchy should be deliberately abused in that way. These are the questions reaching me through the post and I will try to reply to them. As far as Buckingham Palace is concerned, the situation is very obscure. I have here a photocopy of what appeared on the tape machine in the Lobby last Friday. It says that statements emanating from the Palace on these matters were absurdly obscure, and that it was time that the wraps were taken off. Here is the statement from the tape: The Queen's Press Secretary, Michael Shea, today commented on a Press Association report that Buckingham Palace had said the Queen was told in 1964 of Anthony Blunt's confession that he had spied for the Soviet Union. He said this afternoon" this was Michael Shea the Queen's press secretary 'The statement from Buckingham Palace carried by the Press Association was indeed made by a Buckingham Palace spokesman in response to a question from the Press Association. It was a personal interpretation made by a member of the Press Office'. He went on, and I quote his words directly as they appeared on the machine: 'Our position'" that is, the Palace position 'remains as set out in the Prime Minister's statement yesterday. Exchanges between the Private Secretary to the Queen and the Sovereign are confidential'. The Prime Minister's statement to which the press secretary referred reads as follows: The Queen's Private Secretary was informed in April 1964 both of Blunt's confession and of the immunity from prosecution on the basis of which it had been made. Blunt was not required to resign his appointment in the Royal Household".[Official Report, 15 November 1979; Vol. 973, c. 681.] That, coupled with the press secretary's statement on the tape on Friday, conveyed nothing remotely near the truth as we want to ascertain it. Immediately following the Prime Minister's statement, the knighthood was withdrawn from Blunt. On whose advice or instruction? Was that

202

done purely on the decision of the Queen and advised by the Prime 434 Minister? We should like to know. Was there any consultation with the right hon. Lady about it? I should like to make a few comments on the Prime Minister's statement. Reference has been made by some Labour Members, and in the press as well, to the liming of the Prime Minister's written answer. In the view of many people it was sheer political opportunism on her part. It put the 17 per cent. minimum lending rate and other things off the newspaper headlines. That is not only my view. I quote what The Times said on 17 November: Mrs. Thatcher's formal unmasking did not have to come out the same day as the Chancellor shocked the business world with his three per cent. jump in MLR. It could have come the day before or the day after. On Monday last, the Leader of the House, as is his wont, poured lavish praise on his political mistress. He said that she had been more forthcoming than any of her predecessors. She had. But why? Again, I turn to The Times, and not the Labour Weekly or anything like that. Mr. Ted Leadbitter (Hartlepool) I respect my hon. Friend's views, and I conclude that he has made his statement after reading the press. But the truth is that I insisted on an answer on that day, and the Prime Minister co-operated after only a first request. Hon. Members Withdraw. Mr. Hamilton My hon. Friend should not be so nave as to assume that, because he insists on a reply from a Minister on a particular day, he automatically gets it. I have never known that during all my time in the House. Mr. Robert Atkins (Preston, North) On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for an hon. Member to attribute a point of view to someone else when a member of his own party has told the truth? Ought you not to advise him to withdraw that remark? Mr. Speaker Order. Everyone in the House will make his own assessment of what has happened. Mr. Hamilton

203

I again quote The Times: a traitor has been allowed by successive governments to remain at the heart of the establishment, imperilling the reputation of our Queen, and yet" 435 [Interruption.] I do not understand why Conservative Members should laugh, because it is no laughing matter. This is the Establishment talking about the Establishment tipped off by the Government before the announcement so that he could decently retire from unseemly questioning. It defies belief". Therefore, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) remarked on Monday, the Prime Ministerhowever she excused herself todaychose to adopt the role of political nark by telling this man 24 hours before she was due to make the statement that she was about to do so. The Times continuedhow grateful we are for its return: You will search in vain in Mrs. Thatcher's statement for the word traitor; treason is still a hanging offence and Mrs. Thatcher is an ardent advocate of the return of hanging. Mr. Michael English (Nottingham, West)rose Mr. Hamilton I am sorry, but I must get on, otherwise I shall take too long and I still have a lot to say. Mr. John Heddle (Lichfield and Tamworth)rose Mr. Hamilton No, I must get on. Mr. Speaker has asked for reasonably short speeches, and mine will be fairly long anyhow. The Times added: At the same time let it not be believed that this was some venture in open government. Professor Blunt had been flushed out by an author, formerly a distinguished BBC producer and also named in Private Eye." He was not flushed out by the author, he was flushed out by Private Eye, and we must pay tribute to that establishment paper as well. Mr. Heddlerose Mr. Hamilton No, I shall not give way. The hon. Gentleman must contain his impatience. The Times went on: We might expect the Prime Minister after all this to be a little more prudent before setting the law onto journalists as her first reflex". That brings me on to saying just a few words about the obnoxious Protection of Official Information Bill, which has now been dropped. There is no merit in the Government dropping that Bill. It probably would not have got through the House anyway in view of what has happened 436 in the last fortnight. They were wise to do so, but what will they put in its place? Do they have any ideas in mind?

204

In view of what the Prime Minister said, I need only say that in the past 30 years our history has been littered with scandals and misjudgments about security. In almost every case the public have been amazed and indignant as they gaze with an awed fascination on the corrupted glamour of the characters involved. But the public are always frustrated, because the authoritieswhatever Government are in powernever come clean. As I said earlier, we shall never get at the truth. How many public servants in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s were suspected of treachery, actual or potential? The Prime Minister today referred to men long since dead. How many are still alive and roaming around? We do not know. She did not refer to that. What was done to those men? We can never be given the answers to some of those questions; and I, as well as anyone, understand that. However, the names of the fifth man, the sixth man and the nth man will continue to float to the top. The Blunt case is one more instance of the long-lived conspiracy of British Governments against the governed in this respect, a conspiracy to keep this House, and still more to keep the people outside, in the dark. The Prime Minister made no suggestions as to how that might be ended, how to bring more accountability of the security services not only to the Prime Minister but to the House of Commons. The House feels strangely impotent in these matters, and we should seek to devise some machinery to reduce the frustration and fear inspired by cases such as this. We have the right to demand a far-reaching inquiryperhaps a public inquiryinto this case. It is no use saying that this is history, that we must sweep it under the carpet and be concerned only for the future. Unless we can learn lessons from the past we are unlikely to get answers for the future. A whole lot of other questions need to be asked, but I confine myself to making one point to the Prime Minister. We have had to endure from her for a long time all the jibes about Reds under 437 the bed and about the Labour Party falling under the influence of people who would seek to create the kind of society that exists behind the Iron Curtain. Let me give the right hon. Lady some advice and let me answer her in kind. If she wants to initiate searches for the fifth man, the sixth man and those after him, she does not need to look for them in the Labour Party, in the trade unions, in the comprehensive schools, or even among the British Leyland shop stewards. Let her look for them among the expublic school boys, those with homosexual propensities, those who voted Tory at the last election and those in social groups 1 and 2. Let her perm any three out of those four and she will be on the right track. When she is looking in the public schools, just let her look in the one bed, not under the bed, and she will find them both there.

205

I say those things because we take great exception to the right hon. Lady's jibes and attacks on this party. We have fought for democracy in this country, and against the people that she represents. The case of Blunt far transcends the question of security. This is a battle between the Establishment and the people. Let me conclude with a quotation from the leader in The Guardian this morning: So the issues for today's debate become clearer. How can a country which gaols trivial traitors and throws away the key allow gentlemanly traitors to parade in Buckingham Palace? When, if at all, was the Queen told? I repeat that question. Was the Queen told? We do not know. The Prime Minister has not told us, and we may never get to know And how, in future, can our elected representatives get a better grip? I do not believe that we shall ever get the answers to those questions, and so this kind of scandal will go on. Those who think that it is not anything other than a great squalid conspiracy of the Establishment should simply reread Denning and they will see exactly what we are up against in this debate. 6.5 pm Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton) In the 19 years during which I have been a Member of the House I think that I have often heard the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) make the same speech. It is purely a matter of conjecture as to what will be the next event 438 to which he will attach that same speech which seems to be such a deeply held obsession with him. It is now so widely known on both sides of the House that his comments come as no surprise to any of us. Out of the events that the House is debating today arise certain useful lessons for the future. The first concerns the borderline between the responsibilities of a Minister and the responsibilities of a civil servant. The two are not the same. There is a similar distinction that can be roughly drawn between the functions of the Attorney-General as a Minister and his functions as a non-Minister. It is clear that the Attorney-General has a non-ministerial function in the general supervision of prosecutions in criminal law, but I suspect that I am not alone in this House in believing that when those functions are to be exercised in the restricted and specific category of potential prosecutions for treason or espionage, he is not the most appropriate person to make that decision. After a lot of thought, I believe that the decision to grant immunity for reasons concerned with national security ought more appropriately to fall to the Home Secretary than to the Attorney-General. The reason for that is clear. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the former Labour Home Secretary the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) have described it, it is to the Home Secretary that the Director-General of the Security Service reports. It is the Home

206

Secretary who decides whether he should draw a matter to the attention of the Prime Minister. There may therefore be much information in the possession of the Home Secretary, but not automatically in the possession of the Attorney-General, germane to the decision whether immunity from prosecution should be granted in security cases. It is predominantly not a legal matter, but is predominantly a matter of judgment of advantage and disadvantage in the sphere of national security. As my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Leeds, South reminded the House, that task is now, and has been for some time, constitutionally the function not of the Attorney-General but of the Home Secretary. I turn now to the question of the scope of immunity. We have not been told 439 the scope of the immunity granted to Blunt. Why he should be referred to as "Professor", when to the best of my knowledge he has not had that emeritus title conferred upon him, is not immediately clear to me. Whether the immunity was for events past only or also for events in the future is highly material. It is important that any immunity ever given in these cases should be contingent and not absolute. Immunity should be contingent upon full disclosure. If the immunity carries into the future as well as relating to the past, the person concerned is at liberty to conceal information because of a desire to protect those for whom he feels emotions of loyalty. Immunity should not be afforded to a person who is not prepared to make a full disclosure. Moreover, if there is blanket immunity, immunity in the "widest possible terms", presumably that covers future acts of espionage as well as past ones. Mr. Ronald Bell (Beaconsfield) Why? Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop If it does not, it is not in the "widest possible terms". If the words "widest possible terms" are taken literally, they cover future events as well as past ones. Mr. Ronald Bell If there can be immunity in the "widest possible terms" relating to all past actions, surely there could also be immunity in narrower terms relating to past actions. Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop Yes, certainly, I agree with my hon, and learned Friend. But I did not hear "in respect of past actions" uttered in the House. That is why I

207

intervened when the right hon, and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin), the ex-Attorney-General, was telling us how he had examined the terms of the immunity and had advised the Cabinet Office that there could be no prosecution. We do not know the circumstances in which the question was put. Had there been suspicion that, since the granting of the original immunity, Blunt had committed further treasonable acts? If so, were those acts covered by the "widest possible immunity"? We do not know. Although we are told that the then Attorney-General informed the then Home Secretary, we are not told that he sought the agreement of the Home Secretary 440 to the terms in which the immunity was given. The Home Secretary may well have been told that an appropriate offer of immunity was to be made; but if the Home Secretary was not aware of the specific terms of that immunity, his belief as to the terms of the immunity might have been materially different from the actual terms in which the then Attorney-General gave it. I do not know the answer to the question that I have posed. I do not even ask to know the terms of the immunity. There may be good reasons why that should not be revealed to the House. The important issue is that no immunity should cover non-disclosure. Full disclosure should always be a part of the contingent grant of an immunity. I do not believe it to be appropriate that in cases of this sort advice to the Sovereign should be given by a civil servant. I believe it to be appropriate that advice to the Sovereign should be given by a Minister. If I interpreted correctly what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, the advice to retain the services of Mr. Blunt in the Royal Household may have been in the national interest. I am not in a position to form a judgment on that. However, I form the judgment that that advice should have been given not by a civil servant but by a Minister. It is the duty of Ministers to advise the Crown, and Ministers are answerable to the House. I do not mean to imply that Ministers are under an obligation to disclose to the House the advice that they have given to the Crown. However, Ministers who no longer retain the confidence of the House are dismissable on a motion of censure, while civil servants are not. That is why I consider it to be an important constitutional principle not that a Minister should subsequently accept responsibility for the action of a civil servant but that advice should be tendered by a Minister and not by a civil servant. During the debate and in public discussion there has been some blurring of the difference between accepting responsibility and making a decision. The two are not the same. There are decisions that need to be taken by Ministers on the basis of information that is as full as possible. Merely to place something on a Minister's file in the expectation that 441 he will not see it may technically fulfil the requirement of informing the Minister, but it does not fulfil the function of enabling the Minister to

208

take a decision that is appropriate to a Minister and inappropriate to a civil servant on the basis of the full disclosure of information to the Minister so that he may take that decision. There is a tradition in Parliament that Ministers accept responsibility for the actions of their civil servants. Therefore, in terms of conventional ethics a Minister is bound to state that he has been informed of something by his civil servant, if the civil servant has placed it on the file for him, even though the civil servant does not intend the Minister to become aware of it and, indeed, the Minister has not become aware of it. The difference must be drawn between fiction and fact. It is important that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gives clear instructions, which will continue to exist unless and until those who come after her in office alter them, that when security information is supposed to be communicated to a Minister, the Minister should initial the minute to indicate that he has read it. The disparity between formal communication and receipt of information will thereby disappear. Mr. English The hon. Gentleman is skirting around what is commonly called the previous Administration rule, namely, that Ministers are not allowed to see the papers of their predecessors who were members of a different Administration. As I understand it, that rule does not apply to foreign affairs. That is logical. I hope that it does not apply to national security. I hope that it will be made clear from the Government Front Bench whether it applies in the Blunt case. Whatever else it applies to, it should not apply to national security. Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop That point is a different one, but I agree with what the hon. Gentleman says. He has made a point about successors in office having access to security information. My point was about information actually being received by a Minister rather than it merely being formally placed at his disposal. That is different. Learning from these lessons, there is further action that my right hon. Friend 442 needs to take: first, to give a positive instruction that immunity shall be granted by the Attorney-General only on the instruction of the Home Secretary and in terms approved by the Home Secretary; secondly, that on any matter involving securityit might well be more general than thatany advice tendered to the Crown should be tendered by a Minister of the Crown and not by civil servants; and thirdly, that there should be a clear distinction between acts that have not yet been committed by a person to whom immunity is granted and acts that have been committed in the past.

209

I want to place on record my conviction that it is important that Parliament should retain the right, which it undoubtedly has, to proceed against malefactors, employing its own rarely used criminal jurisdiction where there is reason to believe that the criminal proceedings that ought to be taken in the national interest are barred from process in the normal courts by a wrongful act of immunity by an Attorney-General. I am not alleging that in this case there has been a wrongful act by an AttorneyGeneral but, for instance, if the Prime Minister gave the instruction that I have recommended and, notwithstanding that, an Attorney-General gave a nolle prosequi in terms that have not been approved by the Home Secretary, Parliament might then wish to proceed against a malefactor, particularly one who had continued treasonable activities after the grant of immunity. If anyone cares to look up the history of the process of impeachment and attainder which is set out at great length in Hatsell's "Precedents of Parliament" he will see that in his commentary Hatsell draws particular attention to the importance of retaining these procedures where the existing processes of law are for some reason blocked. It is therefore important that, little used though they are, we should be aware of the continued existence of these procedures, as should those who might be subject to them, to guard against a belief that an immunity unwisely given can confer upon the person to whom it is given the right to commit future treasons with impunity. 6.24 pm Mr. Arthur Bottomley (Middlesbrough) I think that the hon. Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) will 443 agree that the British public have been led by recent events to believe that there is one law for them and another, much less harsh, for those of the Establishment. At the time that Mr. Blunt was engaged in his treacherous activities I was a trade union officer attempting to recruit members of the newly formed civil defence force into my organisation. I was, however, forbidden to do this by the so-called Ministry of Home Security, a department of the Home Office. Subsequently, the general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, Ernest Bevin, led a deputation to the Home Office, where we met Sir Wilfrid Eady, the Under-Secretary in charge of home security. He told us that the civil defence force was equivalent to the Armed Forces and that trade unionism was not allowed in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Then, in an aside, he said that there might be unreliable elements in them. I recall Ernest Bevin thumping the table and saying that Quislings were not to be found in the ranks of the trade union movement and that they belonged to Sir Wilfrid's class. The Under-Secretary promised to report to the Minister. In due course, we were able to recruit members of the

210

civil defence force into the trade unions. At that time the Establishment was more concerned about patriotic trade unionists than the real enemy. As Secretary for Overseas Trade and then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations I could not escape having contact with the secret service. The head of the Diplomatic Service and permanent secretary at the Commonwealth Office, Sir Saville Garner, now Lord Garner, kept me fully informed about security matters that were concerned with my responsibilities. On one occasion, Sir Saville Garner brought the head of security to see me personally. I cannot believe that others were not so informed. If they were not, the civil servants concerned were not doing their duty. As Secretary for Overseas Trade, I was asked by the then Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, to host a party of members of the British and Dutch secret services who co-operated together in the war. The reason for getting them together was to assure the Dutch that it was inefficiency 444 and not evil or wilful intent that had caused the death of their comrades. It was vital that the British secret service should be seen to be completely reliable and dependable. Allegations have now been made that raise doubts about these unfortunate incidents. It is most important that these doubts should be removed. It is understandable that if a spy is uncovered the intelligence services should wish fully to exploit the situation in order to gain knowledge for the benefit of the country. We have a right to know the facts concerning the present case. It is essential that the public should know that double standards do not operate. We must remove all doubts about sending Dutch agents to certain death. Other right hon, and hon. Members, as well as the media, have given good reasons why there should be a full inquiry into this unhappy business. I make my own strong plea that the full facts should be brought into the open. 6.29 pm Mr. Jonathan Aitken (Thanet, East) I begin by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the measured and largely reassuring speech with which she opened the debate. After listening to her I felt that there was not much more benefit to be obtained from raking through the embers of what is, after all, a very old and rather distasteful story. I regret only that some of the decisions taken in the course of the Blunt saga have given some people, such as the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton), the opportunity to direct mischievous criticism towards the Royal circle. Before I come back to that matter, may I turn to the general themes of the debate? I think that some anxieties remain, particularly about procedures and accountability.

211

The basic case that I want to advance is that I believe that the time is coming when the security services must be made more accountable to Parliament. I believe that the best way to do that would be for the House to set up its own Select Committee on security and intelligence. It would consist of a few senior Privy Councillors, meeting in closed session and playing a watchdog role. That idea may deserve more careful consideration than perhaps is generally 445 realised, in the context of the entirely new position that appears to have been created by the procedural reforms that brought about the setting up of our new Select Committees. Once the Government decided to establish those new Select Committees to monitor Government Departments, they placed at the disposal of those Committees machinery to investigate any aspect of those Departments, including certain aspects of security. For example, there is nothing to stop the new Home Affairs Committee from sending for persons and papers and inquiring into such subjects as the activities of the Special Branch, which is the arresting arm of MI5. I should not mind betting that the leading lights of that CommitteeI think of the hon. Members for York (Mr. Lyon) and for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk), for examplewill not tarry long before they turn their busy hands in precisely that direction. My point is that the option may no longer exist for us to fall back on the familiar argument that monitoring security matters is far too serious a question for Parliament and must be left exclusively to the highest echelons of Government. Like it or not, no area of Government is now sacred and able to escape the inquiries of those Select Committees. Indeed, I do not think that it is too fanciful to foresee the day when a Foreign Affairs Committee in a different Parliament, perhaps dominated by Left-wing Back Benchers, will decide to take a serious look at the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service, or when a similar Defence Committee will decide to look at the activities of MI6. Against that background, the Government should carefully consider whether they want to risk seeing the activities of our security services probed by the new Select Committees, which will inevitably include some of the more controversial characters from the Back Benches, or whether they would rather see a quiet monitoring job done by a senior and more cautious committee of Privy Councillors, who, it is to be hoped, would always put their patriotism before their politics. This is a new dimension of the problems of accountability, to which sooner or later the Government will have to turn their mind. 446 Mr. Leadbitter

212

I am rather surprised at the hon. Gentleman for drawing those conclusions. We have recent experience of a Privy Councillor betraying his responsibility to the House and the country. Secondly, will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it took a question from me in the House before we were able to debate the matter today? Hon. Members of all parties together have a relationship in matters of the defence of the realm and of security. Through the Select Committee procedure we could have a probing role which would be of service and help to the national Security Service itself. Mr. Aitken My answer to the hon. Gentleman's first point is that one black sheep among Privy Councillors does not prove very much. The answer to his second point is that one debate and one written answer do not add up to adequate and continuing scrutiny of the Securely Service. There is nothing to fear, and much to be gained, from a Select Committee on intelligence. I refer the House to an encouraging precedent set on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1976, following disturbing revelations about failures by the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Senate set up the Senate Intelligence Committee, charged with the duty of monitoring the FBI, the CIA and the national security agencies. The committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Birch Bayh and the vice-chairmanship of Senator Barry Goldwater, has had the good effect of reassuring the American public that the CIA is fully accountable to the democratic institutions and is not a law unto itself. In the light of some of the Blunt revelations, similar reassurance would not come amiss in Britain. [Interruption.] Some of my hon. Friends appear, to judge from their sedentary interruptions, to think that the committee has Mr. Raymond Whitney (Wycombe) Is my hon. Friend aware that, whatever else the committee may have done to reassure the American public, the moves have effectively destroyed the American intelligence services? Mr. Aitken My hon. Friend is uncharactistically misinformed about the committee. If he looks at recent history and the dates, I am sure that he will 447 agree with me that among the major factors that have weakened American intelligence are a series of well-publicised failures in Chile, at the time of Watergate, and others. They all happened before the committee was set up. Secondly, any of the other changes most usually criticised have emanated from the massive personnel changes made at the top by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Turner. Those have not been matters for the committee.

213

In fact, it is said by many senior members of the United States intelligence community that that Senate committee, which normally meets in secret sessions, has, far from compromising or weakening the United States intelligence effort, to some extent strengthened it, simply because it has made useful recommendations and has voted and appropriated certain funds for special operations. But perhaps we should not look too hard at United States precedents. After all, the Blunt affair is a peculiarly British scandal, in which it seems that too many of the decent chaps decided not to sneak on the old school spy until, unfortunately, those beastly rotters, the journalists, came in and debagged him. I say "Thank God for Mr. Andrew Boyle and for the other journalists who followed in his wake." Without them Blunt would never have been unmasked, and without them a despicable traitor would still be basking in a place of honour in the Royal household. Something is wrong with a system in which it took one author to get the Soviet mole out of the Palace circle. Much harsher questions should have been asked earlier, especially the key question whether the advantages of not scaring Blunt's contacts were really worth the risk of involving the Palaceit subsequently happenedin an operation that the public will inevitably see as a cover-up. It is for that reason that I am rather surprised that the Prime Minister of the day was not informed, even though the Home Secretary was. That may have been a mistake of accountability. However, I am not interested in the accountability of the past. It is to the accountability of the future that the House should direct its attention. Whether we like it or not, open government is 448 growing in this country, and accountability to Parliament of all Government Departments and all aspects of Government is growing, too. I should be the first to recognise that the security and intelligence communities should enjoy special and privileged treatment under such parliamentary accountability, but I cannot believe that they will go on enjoying what is virtually total immunity from such accountability. 6.38 pm Mr. Ted Leadbitter (Hartlepool) I must confess that when I raised this question last week I did not envisage the extent to which matters would develop in so short a time. A number of people have asked me what prompted me to table the question. There have been some assumptions, which I understand, but I must place on record, because I respect those concerned, that I posed the question after I had thought about the problem myself. I consulted no one, and no one sought to consult me. Therefore, I was surprised and impressed when on my approach, first, to the Home Office, and, secondly, to the Prime Minister's office, I found 214

that there were circumstances in which I could expect a considered answer. Of course, the Prime Minister's office did not intimate the nature of the answer, so I informed that office much later the same day that I had firmly decided to table the question, and that all that I required was an assurance that its answer would be available on the date when in fact it was given. I have given my explanation. Although my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) is not present, I shall address myself to his remarks and say that I respect the conclusions that he reached. The press has given the impression that there was another objective. Therefore, I neither criticise my hon. Friend nor do I feel that there should be any doubt about how the question arose or about the date and timing of the statement. The whole country has been saddened by the affair. It is right and proper that in the conduct of the business of the House we begin by asserting that such matters do not serve the purposes for which we aimthe establishment of a national Security Service which is efficient and, without question, capable of doing 449 its job. We should seek to do that in the best way, pursuing the idea that it would be most unhelpful to impugn anyone's reputation in the pursuit of that objective. I accept that Prime Ministers and Attorneys-General in the past have genuinely believed that they were not informed but, upon reflectionno doubt on advice from the Cabinet Officethey agree that, in some way, they were informed. Therefore, I accept the extent to which [Interruption.] I remind my hon. Friend the Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Radice) that this is no laughing matter. By no means do I consider it to be a laughing matter. I accept the extent to which the Prime Minister was able to go in this regard to clear up the question of whether those in responsible positions were informed as far as they could be informed. The country must be sad and anxious today. I have looked at the press reports with great care. One editorial in the Evening News read as follows: The Establishment won another round yesterday and the honour and the dignity of the country was lost. It continued that Anthony Blunt was: permitted to twist truth around his little finger unchallenged. That was with reference to the so-called press conference. I examined the press reports for any deviation from that sort of conclusion. I do not approach the matter with any sense of criticism. The editorial continues: That old tradition of appeasement appeared to be alive and well at The Times yesterday. So it seemed to be. The conclusion of the editorial is dramatic: The Blunts get their cigars and their smoked trout while those outside the magic Establishment circles, the Blakes and the Vassalls, are locked in jail. It can only deepen the damaging cynicism with which people regard those who rule us and those who seek to lead us. In the calmness of today's debate, I hope to persuade the Government Front Bench to set up an inquiry.

215

Comments have been made in the press. It is beyond doubt that there is bad feeling in the House. Those of us who have served for a long time in this place and those in high officeirrespective of political conviction have sought to do 450 our duty by the nation, and we have been misled. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to seek some form of inquiry. The Blunt affair is only like a pea on the top of a mountan or, as The Sunday Times described it, the "tip of the iceberg". We need to know much more. I consider that the defences of the realm are in danger. Security, even at NATO level, is now subject to hazardous risk. I do not accuse anybody in the House, but we are dealing with a development which has grown to a point where it is not supervised. Hitherto, when questions have been asked about security, even when no security matter has been involved, there have been no answers on the basis that "This is a matter of security." I understand the difficulties that any Government would have in taking the step of setting up an inquiry to seek the best way to root out the remnants of the Blunt circle in high places. They are still thereBlunt himself admitted that yesterday. Some are in office, others are out of office. When Anthony Blunt finished his fulltime service with M15 in 1945 he retained a part-time relationship. The Prime Minister was right to say that he was not in a position within M15, at that time, to supply information to the enemy. However, he was in a position to obtain it, He and his friends were closely knit together, not only in business terms but in terms of their responsibility. Also, in social terms they behaved in the most peculiar way. I return to the Prime Minister's statement in an effort to illustrate some of my concern. It appears that the Prime Minister's statement in reply to my question last week was specific. I took it for granted that it would not be comprehensive. There may well be good reasons why that could not be so. Frankly, it was made clear that Anthony Blunt had actively recruited talent for the Russian intelligence service in the 1930s, and that during the war he had passed information to the Russians. There is no point in suggesting that the Russians were our allies. Eventually that relationship developedin a way in which the peace of the world could eventually be established and fin, war brought to an end, But, before Russia was our potential enemy, Herr von Ribbentrop had 451 signed a pact with the Russians. Earlier we had troops ready to embark to deal with the threatened Russian invasion of Finland. We are considering a treasonable wartime activity, an offence for which two men were subsequently tried and hanged. The Prime Minister went on to make it clear that with the suspicion under which Anthony Blunt was beginning to work, inquiries followed in later years after the defection of Maclean and Burgess.

216

I come now to the question on which we cannot get answers. In 1964 an event happenedthat is how it is describedand information was received that directly implicated Anthony Blunt, and he decided to confess. The point I wish to illustrate is that the Prime Minister's statement is considerably different from that of Anthony Blunt at his so-called press conference. If one analyses his statement, one sees that he went no further than to seek how best to describe the protection of his conscience and the protection of his friends. Even then, there is no sense of remorse or of being sorry that he had been found out as a traitor. Indeed, he picked on the idea of feeling that conscience was more important than loyalty to his country. That brings me to an interesting question to which the House might address itself. Bearing in mind the statement of Anthony Blunt and the statement that the Prime Minister made just few days before that, why did the Cabinet Secretary spend the reported hour of his time examining the statement with Mr. Blunt's solicitors? Let us be frank. There was not the scintilla of an infringement of the Official Secrets Act. No one with any legal background, in or out of Government, could sustain an argument to the effect that it was necessary for the Cabinet Secretary to look at the statement. I can give another reason. Mr. Blunt had a close working relationship throughout his time in high office and in the higher echelons of the intelligence service with those in similar positions in major Departments of State, who have spent their lives being cognisant of the conditions of the Official Secrets Act. That gave him and those associated with him a special knowledge of the workings of 452 that Act. How, therefore, did Anthony Blunt suddenly come to be in need of the Cabinet Secretary's advice about what to put in his statement and what to keep out? I repeat that there is nothing in the statement from beginning to end. Why was the Cabinet Secretary interested? I put my point even more forcibly. We have here a man who for 40 years successfully contrived and conspired to keep as far away from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as possible. His normal working relationships in the pursuit of his nauseating objectives required him never to be near the Cabinet Office. Why, then, have that rather interesting meeting, and why did it take an hour to look at the statement? I read the damned thing in two minutes. I shall say some things shortly which I hope I will not personally regret. Why was it but a few days before the meeting in the Cabinet Office with Mr. Blunt's solicitor, and literally but a few hours after I had tabled my question, that Mr. Blunt was warned that a statement was to be made in the House? Whatever else is said, this hon. Member who tabled the question had not heard the answer and neither had the Parliament of which he was a Member.

217

Here is a man known to be a spy and known for his guilt. Yet he is given notice that a statement is to be made about him. I ask the Front Bench to consider the anxiety, even of reasonable people like myself, about that sort of procedure. There was no doubt about the man's guilt. To say the least, it was most imprudentand at this stage that is the only criticism that I offerthat the Cabinet Office should have been involved on those two occasions. Mr. Cormack What possible damage could have been done by that piece of information? We have heard, and we know, that there was no question of prosecution. There was no question of a man fleeing the country to escape his just deserts. What possible damage could have been done by the extension of that small courtesy? What do we know about the information given by Mr. Blunt in 1964? It would appear that it might have been fairly valuable. Mr. Leadbitter There is no doubt about it. I do not foresee any damage. 453 All the damage has been done. My question is what good did it do, and where should the real courtesies lie? Surely the answer is to this House of Commons and its hon. Members. Mr. Michael Brotherton (Louth) Will the hon. Gentleman be assured that there are hon. Members on this side of the House who do not believe in extending courtesy to traitors? Mr. Leadbitter I think that the House is well apprised that all my comments take into account the genuine feelings on both sides of the House. Where there are exceptions, the majority of hon. Members will take note. Courtesy to the House should be a greater priority than courtesy to a man who has betrayed his country. I wonder whether a further conclusion of mine would at least lead the House to feel that there is some credence in the conclusions that many people are beginning to draw. In the light of other activities in the past few days, not least the VIP treatment that this man received in The Times offices, farcically described as a press conference, there is a suggestion of a cover-up of the cover-up. It is no good laughing about it. Too much has happened; and no one can afford to laugh. The reputation of a number of people whose names we have not yet heard may be at risk. There is evidence of an attempt to cover up the 15 years of cover-up. Let us not offend the House or the country by suggesting that 15 years of unholy silence can be condoned. Senior

218

officials and others involved in the play have been falling over themselves to say either that they did not know or, on reflection, that they might have known. We are dealing with people who are used to the disciplines of public life. There are bound to be suggestionsand I put it no higher than thatwhere there are areas of doubt, hesitancy, haste or a shifting of feet. I am trying to get the House to respond to a feeling in the country. Let us for a moment forget about ourselves. Our responsibility is to the people of the country. The suggestion is that there has been a cover-up or a tendency to cover up the cover-up. Mr. Blunt's rise and fall is on the record. Pursuing him further will not serve the ends to which we must commit 454 ourselves in our examination of the operations of the Security Service in recent years. Our purposes must be to consider the Service in a wider context. The punishment for Mr. Blunt's treachery, which he has avoided for so long, is a thousandfold greater with his exposure at such an old age. Let the blame for that lie at the door of his friends and all those in office who preferred silence to the ringing words of truth. Let it be clear to any holders of high office, Ministers or Prime Ministers, and any officer involved in matters of national security that they have no special privilege to grant asylum by inducements or promises of immunity to enemies of the State. There may be some who wish to pursue a twisted, legalistic thoughtprovoking exercise on what is meant by inducements and immunities. That may be interesting in relation to some offences, but inducements and immunities should never exist for an enemy of the State, and no one should argue this qualification, because they have been granted to only one man. Mr. Anthony Blunt is the only man, to our knowledge, who has been given such immunity. It is important for the House to recognise that no Minister, Prime Minister or person given the honour temporarily to hold office should accrue to himself the privilege of saying "I am the law. I will say who is immune and who is not." Let us understand also that the assertion of that sickening man Sewell that the withdrawal of immunity would mean that spies would not be so ready to give themselves up is nonsense. Once we suggest that immunity may be offered to those in prominent positions, it will be a reason for them to spy. They will know that they will be safe. Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton)

219

The hon. Gentleman said that Blunt is the only person who has had immunity. Would it not be more correct to say that Blunt is the only person who we know has had immunity? Mr. Leadbitter Indeed. That sort of thinking will help us get nearer the truth. I qualify what I said. Blunt is the only one of whom we know. That may be a further inducement to the House to think 455 that there needs to be a more positive examination of the Security Service. As far as I am concerned, that is the end of Blunt. We must now concentrate on the Security Service and the need to establish an inquiry to examine how the scandals of the successful defections of Burgess, Maclean and Philby, the long years of treachery by Blunt, and the acts of treason of others, were made possible, and what new arrangements can be made to provide a more efficient form of national security. The importance of inquiring more positively and scrutinising the history of our Security Service arises from the interesting list of trials for treasonable acts under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act. They are of paramount importance. In 1946 Dr. Allan Nunn May passed information to the Russians on the first atomic bomb test. In 1949 Klaus Fuchs, who worked at the Atomic Energy Authority, passed reports on tests to the Russians. In 1952 William Martin Marshal, who worked in a Foreign Office branch in Moscow, passed information. In 1961 Lonsdale, with Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, Peter Kroger and Helen Kroger, worked in the military underwater research department and passed information from that establishment in Portland to the Russians. George Blake, a member of MI6, received a long prison sentence in 1961 for his crimes. In 1962 John Vassal, a secretary in the office of the naval attach at a British embassy and in the naval intelligence division of the Admiralty, passed to Russia information about radar, torpedo and antisubmarine trials. Also in 1962, Barbara Fell of the Central Office of Information passed information to Yugoslavia. Frank Clifford Bossard of the Ministry of Civil Aviation passed information to Russia about guided missiles. In 1965 Percy Sidney Allen of the Ministry of Defence passed information to Iran and United Arab Republic embassies. In 1968 Douglas Ronald Britten, an RAF technician, passed information to the Russians, and in 1972 David James Bingham of the Ministry of 456 Defence passed information to Russia on submarine and torpedo warfare.

220

I do not suggest that they all belonged to what is known as the Blunt circle, but the cases are a measure of the Russian penetration not only of our national security and our security and intelligence agencies, but into major Departments of State involved with security. We can only conclude that, if there is a communications system between this country and Russia, the general lines of communication cannot be too different from those employed by Blunt and his far more specialised group. The House may not be unaware of the magnitude of the problem, but given what has happened and the revelation that others may be involved, I sense that we had better be on our guard. We had better watch out. I suggested that all those I named were not related to Blunt, but there is a list, which must be known outside the House, of those who are vulnerable and who are committed in their sympathies towards Russia. In the light of Blunt's statement and his answers to questions yesterday, the House would do well to consider how deep is the penetration in the offices of our State and in our Security Service. The Sunday Times has described the revelations as the tip of the iceberg; and that alone calls for an inquiry. One or two comments of recent days may interest the House. Many hon. Members will have read them, but it is important to put them on record. Some Conservative Members seem to be showing impatience. I hope that their constituents get to know about that. The whole nation is asking for everything to be on the record. I want my part to be on the record, in order to show that I am concerned. Sir John Langford-Holt (Shrewsbury) The hon. Gentleman is talking about penetration. I do not wish to make a political point, but will he not recall the case of an hon. Member giving information to the Czechs? Will Owen was his name. Penetration comes right through to the Chamber. Mr. James Wellbeloved (Erith and Crayford) Withdraw. He was found not guilty. 457 Sir J. Langford-Holt I am sorry; and I accept what the hon. Gentleman says. If he was acquitted, I withdraw my statement. Mr. Leadbitter I am glad that that point has been made clear, because there was a complete acquittal. Sir John Colville, formerly private secretary to Sir 221

Winston Churchill, has recently made it clear that: A top civil servant one of the best brains in the Foreign Officeworked secretly for Moscow by passing information to Burgess. Sir Charles Cunningham, permanent secretary at the Home Office in 1964, said on 17 November that he knew that a contact had taken place, and thought that he would probably have told the Home Secretary. There has been an uncanny repetition of the words "someone probably was told" or "they might have been told". The imprecision about whether information has been provided is an alarming feature of recent events. John Wyndham, who is now in another place, said that when he was private secretary to Harold Macmillan he urged The Sunday Times to consider Philby as just the tip of the iceberg. The comment this week in The Sunday Times makes that point clear: With the revelations about Anthony Blunt another few inches of the iceberg is revealed. But most of it is hidden still. Bearing in mind those comments, the list of those tried for treasonable acts, and the knowledge, derived from other sources, that there is continued activity in some of our Departments and in the Security Serviceparticularly by people who have, or who had, associations with Bluntthere is a need to look into the extent of any damage. This morning I received a letter that has also been sent to the Prime Minister. The letter comes from someone who has held high office in the international department of NATO. He says: There has been talk about doing nothing to reduce the efficiency of the Security Services. The fact is that they are grossly inefficient, as can be expected of Services which have no supervision and use cloak of 'security', when usually no 'security' is involved. The author goes on to enumerate in detail questions that pinpoint lapses in security. Those lapses are highlighted by two traitors, one of whom defected. That man was named Volkov and he was eventually executed. Nothing apparently was done 458 by the security services about those men. The letter also indicates the damage that has been done to NATO. Mr. English I understand that as a Back Bencher, my hon. Friend is not obliged, as a Minister would be, to lay a document in the Library if he quotes from it. However, it is a matter of courtesy to the House to do that. Does he propose to put a copy of the document in the Library? Mr. Leadbitter Yes, I am referring to the letter because much of the material was published in The Sunday Times of 26 November 1976. I would not have referred to it unless it had been necessary, because of the nature of some of the comments in that letter. An allegation has been made in that letter that so much damage was done because of the lack of security in NATO that 100 million was allocated for the relocation of missile sites. As a result of an investigation, NATO did not have the courage to admit to any damage, although the Russians knew about it. Instead, it carried out its normal policy of hoodwinking the public.

222

 Mr. Cormack Who is the author? Mr. Leadbitter The author is Mr. Louis Smith. At least I am more open than the services that I am criticising. I am more open in my concern for the safety of the nation than the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Mr. Hamilton), whose laughter imputes ridicule. Accordingly, I shall conclude in a manner in which I had not intended to conclude. An inquiry into the history of the national Security Service, MI5, and the secret intelligence service must involve the relationships of all those concerned with Blunt. That inquiry must also deal with accountability, monitoring, vetting and responsibility for recruitment. Steps should be taken to ensure that those who go into that service do not all come out of the same social pot. This is a responsible and important matter and the whole country is alarmed about it. The only political point that I shall make is one that was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, Central in a striking and forceful speech. Some people and some parties have spent many years criticising the party to which I belong. Those people talk about Reds 459 under the beds, and they create a lack of confidence. I accept that any man is entitled to hold whatever political views he choosesMarxist or otherwisebut that is very different from betraying one's country. I received a telephone call on Sunday that made it abundantly clear. Mr. Archie Hamilton (Epsom and Ewell) Mr. Smith again. Mr. Leadbitter The hon. Gentleman must stop. I do not know what the hon. Gentleman did during the war, but I lived through that war and many of my compatriots died. They did not die in order to see the hon. Gentleman laughing. It is no small matter. There is only one jester and one fool around the place from time to time. Does not the hon. Gentleman think it is important that we deal with the question of accountability once and for all? We should say that we have enough evidence to show that it is not the ordinary working man, nor the person who seeks to represent people in constituencies such as mineor those in constituencies represented by Conservative Membersnor the trade union movement, nor the Communist Party of Great Britain, who betray their country. Those that have betrayed Britain to such a great extent are those that I have listed. These are the people who have committed a crime against the nation. As I have said, when I tabled my question I was not aware of the extent to which matters would develop. But what I was aware of was that the

223

people that I thought would be involved could come only from one class structure and from one situationand so they did. In conclusion, therefore, this House[HON. MEMBERS: "Too long"] Since I raised the matter, anyway, I am entitled to some extra time. This House should demand an inquiry. If the Government do not give us one, certain hon. Members can get together to force one. I say from past experience that if the Government do not use their judgment properly to seek to have an inquiry, politically they will regret the day, because there are plenty of rats among those about whom I am talking who are ready to spill the beans on their friends to save their own skins. Some of the letters that I have received have 460 surprised me. I thought that even among those who have had it good for all their lives and have come from the same public schools there would have been a loyalty to each other, but I have found that when they are in a corner they are ready to spill the beans. Members of Parliament who are determined to set up a group in this House to make themselves available for information will be acting properly and reasonably in a way conducive to dealing with the national Security Service, so that it can have removed from it the kind of people who have served this country wrongly. The Security Service deserves to be made efficient. In that sense and for that purpose, if such a group can take the place of the duty of a Government, so be it. 7.21 pm Mr. Edward Heath (Sidcup) I want to make only a brief intervention. The first thing that I should like to do is to agree with the words of the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), when he emphasised the care and attention paid by those in positions of responsibility to security questions. This has been doubted by some speakers, including the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter). As Chief Whip in 195559 I was responsible for advising two Prime MinistersLord Avon, or Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was, and Mr. Macmillanabout the handling of security questions in this House, because of the interest of the House in such events as occurred. From 1960 to 1963 I was in the Foreign Office as Lord Privy Seal and had experience, therefore, of the overseas services, which the Leader of the Opposition has also had. As Prime Minister, from 1970 to 1974, I was naturally concerned with all the security services. First, I know of no questions that are dealt with by people in positions of authority with more care and attention, and are treated more seriously, than these matters of security. I hope that the House will accept that from someone who has had over 20 years of responsibilities, in one way or another, for dealing with these matters. 224

Secondly, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out very clearly the rules that were laid down by Sir David 461 Maxwell Fyfe originally governing the relationship between MI5 and the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister. All that I want to say about that is that in the period 197074 I found that those rules worked satisfactorily. There were occasions when the head of the service, who knew that he had direct access to me, took the opportunity of that access and came to discuss particular problems with methe Home Secretary, of course, always knowing, and sometimes being there and sometimes not. The head of the service had complete right of access to the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary informed me of what he considered to be major questions of which the Prime Minister ought to be aware. Of course, it is possible for a Home Secretary to make a misjudgment as to which problems ought to be referred to the Prime Minister. It is possible for a head of a Government Department to make a misjudgment about a question that afterwards he would think he ought to have referred to the Prime Minister, and sometimes a Prime Minister has matters referred to him by the head of a Department which he thinks that the Minister ought to have dealt with himself. These are matters of judgment, and one uses one's human faculties in dealing with them. I am glad, therefore, that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has again publicly laid down the rules that apply in this matter. Working with Home Secretaries from 1970 to 1974 and with the head of the service, I found that the rules functioned satisfactorily. Within the limits of human frailty, I believe that this is so. Mr. Skinner On the face of it, what the right hon. Gentleman is saying sounds good and comfortable, yet Mr. George Young, who, I am told, had something to do with MI6, spoke on the radio at the weekend and said that what happens in practice, as distinct from theory, is that busy Ministers, inundated with work and with answering parliamentary questions, can be informed without realising it. It is the way in which they are informed that matters. I may have got it wrong, but I sensed that what he was saying was that it is possible to shove a piece of paper under the Minister's nose when he is thinking about the way in which he should reply to next week's 462 parliamentary questions, and the thing never gets dealt with with the kind of seriousness that the right hon. Gentleman implies. What the right hon. Gentleman should address his mind to is the question whether his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has today drawn up a set of guidelines that will ensure that there exists a fail-safe mechanism, which makes it possible for the Prime Minister of the day and important Ministers to know these facts. I got the impression that the Prime Minister had not achieved that.

225

 Mr. Heath I am sorry, but I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I also disagreed with the broadcast, which I heard on Sunday. First, the speaker was never head of the service, and therefore the opportunities that he was likely to have had of dealing with Ministers were slight. Secondly, I do not accept for one moment the speaker's accusation that when the head of the Security Service talks to a Minister what he says goes in one ear and out the other. The amount of time spent by senior Ministers in dealing with these questions is very great indeed. I repeat that I am very glad that my right hon. Friend has laid down these rules again and that they are publicly known and can be carried out by Ministers. I come now to the questions that arise from the Blunt case. Here, I want to deal with some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton), who said that those in responsible positions had denied that they ever knew anything about it. That certainly does not apply to myself, and I noticed that the Leader of the Opposition shook his head in disagreement also. I was informed about this case. Perhaps I may add here that I was informed when I became Prime Minister. I was fully briefed by the services, and I was informed of the current problems with which they were dealing. I therefore have no criticism of the services for that. In February 1973 I was informed in detail about this case, because of certain other matters associated with it that had arisen. I therefore had to consider the matter from various points of view and judge what action should be taken. Perhaps at this point I may deal with one or two of the points raised by the 463 hon. Member for Hartlepool. I did not have to consider the question of immunity, because that had already been granted. As we have heard today, all the Attorneys-General who have considered the matter believed that the right decision was taken. Let me deal with the points raised by the hon. Member for Hartlepool. If he is saying that this is a cover-up he is saying that no immunity should have been granted. He has overlooked a point that was emphasised by the Prime Minister, quite rightlythat in this case there was no evidence on which a prosecution could have been brought. In all the other cases that the hon. Member described, with some of which I had personally to deal at different times, there was evidence, and a prosecution could be brought, and was brought, and the penalty was paid. In this case there was no evidence. That is presumably why the AttorneyGeneral of the time, Sir John Hobson, concludedagain on the advice of securitythat if immunity was granted, a great deal of information

226

would be obtained. That was information about the damage done to this countryand also about the enemy's network. I ask the hon. Gentleman to ask himself a question. Put in this situation, would he say that no prosecution should be brought but that no immunity would be granted, and therefore insist on forgoing the information that was available and that continued for many years? That is a decision that the Attorney-General has to take. I fully understand the argument that these cases should not be left entirely to the Attorney-General but referred to the Home Secretary. I take the view that the Attorney-General, with all his activities and responsibilities, should not become involved with the political side of government. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that he could discuss with and consult colleagues. I would prefer that he did not even do that, as it is very difficult for him not to be influenced by political considerations that may be in their minds. I do not entirely agree with the proposal that he should do so only in consultation or agreement with the Home Secretary. Mr. Leadbitter I agree with the right hon. Gentleman on the views that he is 464 expressing. If he will recall, I deployed a great deal of understanding about the decisions that had to be made. However, it is still a matter of public concernand, of course, concern to the Housethat the immunity carried with it the promotion to a prominent employment in Buckingham Palace, with the knowledge, on top of that, that Mr. Blunt had received a knighthood some years before. When the matter became public the knighthood was taken away. That led the country to believe that the immunity and the activities were all right provided that the public did not know. Mr. Heath Yes. But I ask the hon. Gentleman to weigh once again those factors, which he quite rightly enumerated, against the benefit of having information that is vital to our national security and to the operation of the security services. The Attorney-General at that time took the view that I, looking back, believe was absolutely justified. The information that was obtainable was valuable to us. We would not otherwise have had it. Mr. Alan Clark Surely there is an inconsistency that might be further illuminated, to the benefit of the House. If, as we are told, Blunt stopped spying in 1945, it is reasonable to infer that the quality of information that he gave in 1964 and thereafter was not very relevant, or of urgent merit. If, on the other

227

hand, he was capable of giving information that was relevant, urgent and germane, surely it cannot be the case that he had stopped spying in an effective sensethat is to say, that he had stopped communicationsas early as 1945. Mr. Heath I repeat that the information that was obtained was valuable. Until immunity has been granted and we hear the information that is provided, we cannot judge whether it is extremely valuable. We can work only on what is a suspicion about what has been done. However, it is of immense value to be able to confirm it and also to obtain the additional information that is available. If we change the situation of the person who decides to make a confession, we immediately warn everybody that there has been a change. Looking back, this obviously was what the service tried to avoidand did avoid successfully. As for immunity, we always must weigh up that question. 465 There is another reason for the Attorney-General's handling the matter. It is not only on questions of national security that the AttorneyGeneral must deal with immunity. There are other questions, in criminal matters of other kinds, in respect of which immunity is granted, for the similar reason that what we receive in return is, we believe, valuable namely, the convictions of others. That is another reason why I should prefer to leave the matter to the Attorney-General. Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley) The right hon. Gentleman is talking about a particular instance of great significance and importance. Is he not alarmed that the Prime Minister of the period when the immunity was granted claims that he did not knoweither because the Home Secretary did not tell him or, more importantly, because the Director-General of the Security Service did not exercise his right, under paragraph 4 of the general list of instructions, to use his right of access directly to the Prime Minister? Should there not be a more positive instruction, so that the Prime Minister, the head of the Cabinet, is informed about such matters? Mr. Heath Looking back on the matter, we can each form our own judgment. One may judge whether the Director-General, having told the Home Secretary and had discussions on several occasions, as the Prime Minister described, should then have said "I am now asking for my right of access to the Prime Minister to tell him directly". That again is a matter of judgment. Looking back we may say "The Home Secretary would have been wiser to tell the Prime Minister of the day". One could also say that the head of security should have exercised his right. However, the fact is

228

that the first part was carried out correctly. The Home Secretary of the day was told fully and discussed the matter on, I think, two occasions. He himself took the judgment. He did not tell the Prime Minister. I have dealt with the question of immunity. I did not have to decide that when I saw all the papers, as the matter had already been settled. I had to look at the particular circumstances of the time. What is meant when it is said that there had been a cover-up by successive Prime 466 Ministers? I can speak only for myself. It means that when I saw the papers I should have said "There will now be a public announcement". What would have been the purpose of that? I knew from my discussions with security that the information was still of value to useven though my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) may be surprised. Therefore, the only way in which a charge of covering up could possibly hold good would be if the information were no longer of value to us and it was a matter that should deliberately have been made public. In February 1973 I did not come to that conclusion. From a personal point of view I do not mind whether there is to be a public inquiry, as I shall take exactly the same view. I was justified in saying to my advisers that this was not a matter to make public at that momentnot that they suggested it for a moment. The only way in which there could be any accusation of cover-up is if, at a particular point in time, a Prime Minister, looking at this matter, had said "The time has now come to make all of this public". Therefore, I ask the hon. Member for Hartlepool not to persist in the accusation that people who were responsible for dealing with such matters were covering up. Mr. Leadbitter I should like to make one point. I did not say that Prime Ministers were involved in covering up. My remarks were directed completely towards those who were anxious to have a cover-up. It does not follow that Prime Ministers are told everything. Mr. Heath I am sorry if I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman. I withdraw my remarks at once. He said that people in positions of the highest responsibility should recognise that we demand the truth. I was mistaken in thinking that a Prime Minister was in the position of the highest responsibility. I at once withdraw that. This is an important point. The hon. Gentleman rightly emphasised the interest of the public in this matter. What I am saying is that the word "cover-up" is not applicable and should not be used to mislead the public. Mr. Whitehead

229

I have one further point on concealment and accountability. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree, with hindsight, that it was regrettable that the 467 officials responsible and the Security Service did not inform the incoming Government in 1964 and that there was no further information for the Labour Government until two general elections had elapsed, in 1967? Mr. Heath I cannot comment on that, as I had no responsibility at the time. I am not acquainted with the history. It may be that the Leader of the Opposition, who I understand will wind up the debate, will be able to enlighten his hon. Friend on that matter. One can always say, looking back, that it would have been advisable if somebody else had been informed, or if something else had been done. That is a matter on which I cannot comment. I now come to the point about what should be done. The hon. Member for Hartlepool said that this was just the tip of the iceberg. I want to utter one word of caution. Quite rightly, there was a very loud reaction when one of my hon. Friends made a point about a former Member of the House who was acquitted. Many suspicions are bandied about in the world of security, and many of them appear in books. Most people do not bother to deal with them. We cannot put ourselves in a position where, because there is a suspicion that may have come from an unknown source and gone on for a long time, we say that such-and-such a person will be excluded from these areas. That, to my generation, goes back to McCarthyism. It is guilt by association. The last thing that we want in this countryI am sure the public do not want to have itis guilty by association. I fully agree that the security services should continue to make the most strenuous efforts to deal with people who are traitors and who convey information. It is rather a sad aspect of the security services that they can never be given credit for success. There have been occasionsI recall at least twowhen the head of a security service has said to me "We have had this success; can we not possibly let it be known?". I have had to say "I am sorry, you cannot. This is an inviolate rule. When you have a success it must not be made known because it immediately gives information to the enemy which we do not want the 468 enemy to have." In fairness to the security services, one must point out that they do have successes. I remind those who speak or write from time to time in the tone of the hon. Member for Hartlepool that in October 1971 we sent 105 spies back to the Soviet Union. It was the first time that that had ever been done by any country or Government. Naturally, we did not want to break relations with the Soviet Union because of it. My right hon. Friend the then Foreign Secretary said to Mr. Gromyko on a number of occasions "Look, this is the situation. We know it exactly. You must be able to

230

confirm it. If you are prepared to deal with it we will not tell the world, because we want to maintain relations with the Soviet Union. If you are not prepared to do anything it is very doubtful whether it can be other than world news. We fully appreciate that you may then break off relations, but the initiative for breaking off relations will not come from us." How could we have sent 105 Soviet spies back to the Soviet Union unless our own security forces had been doing their work extremely well? I give credit to the security services. Like everything else, they have failings, and those who have had to deal with the security services know perfectly well what they are. But they also have great successes. In a general way one can pay tribute to what they have achieved. Their hand should be strengthened. I do not believe that by having a Committee of this House or both Houses we shall strengthen the position of the security services. My hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, East (Mr. Aitken), who represents my own home, spoke about the American system. What happened in the American security services caused the gravest anxiety throughout the whole of the Western world. The example of the Federal Republic of Germany has been cited. One has only to recall that the downfall of the Chancellor was brought about by the fact that the Russians had penetrated his private office. I ask the House to be a little cautious. Do we really think that we can make the security services more effective, more efficient and more accountable for their moneyafter all, the money spent on the security services is minimalor under better supervision from the point of view 469 of the work that they do. The fewer people who know about the operations of the security services, and the higher those people are, the more effective the control can be. Those who occupy those positions of responsibility must see that control is properly carried out. After I had studied all these papers when they were quite properly put before me, I gave instructions about the action that should be taken. It was taken and I was satisfied with it. That, for me as Prime Minister, was what I felt was right. 7.44 pm Mr. Tony Benn (Bristol, South-East) The whole House is indebted to the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) for the way in which he balanced the problems of security with the rights of freedom and the avoidance of witch-hunting. This debate, which will be unusual in that three Prime Ministers will be speaking in it, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition will be winding up the debate, is essential because it provides the House with one of its rare opportunities to discuss our political liberties and how they should be

231

maintained and protected from enemies at home and abroad, and whether Parliament has any role whatever in upholding those rights and liberties. Having been in office for over 11 years, always very much on the fringe of security matters but never directly involved, I discovered that it was impossible for any Cabinet Minister with responsibility for the Post Office, the Ministries of Power, Technology, Aviation or Energy, not to be enough on the fringes to understand some of the points made by the right hon. Member for Sidcup. I believe that the House would be making a great mistake if it contented itself with the measured memoirs of three or four people who have held the highest responsibility asking the House to accept that that is as far as it should go in examining these matters. I shall give my reasons. We are really debating not only the security services but our liberties and how they may be maintained by military defence against those who might try to invade or infiltrate our country and how to safeguard ourselves against guerrilla or terrorist attacks and to secure the effectiveness of our security and military services 470 by maintaining secrecy around their operational work. The first question that the House must ask is: is anybody asking for details of the operational work of the security services? To my knowledge, nobody is asking for those details. What we are concerned about is the policy upon which those services operate. Certainly the defection of Anthony Blunt revealed a weakness in those defences. The secrecy which the right hon. Member for Sidcup properly said is necessary to cover the operations of the security services also covered a serious failure by them in allowing Blunt to remain for so long. The second aspect of our civil liberties depends upon much more than national defence. It depends upon our being satisfied that we are governed by Ministers who are elected by the people and accountable, through Parliament, for all the major policy decisions that they take, including those on defence and security matters. What the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds. South (Mr. Rees) and the right hon. Member for Sidcup are all agreed about is that there can be no true accountability in this sensitive area of security. We are talking not about operationsnobody in the House is interested in thatbut about the policy on which the security services rest. We are entitled to be sure that the defence and security services, and the civil servants who work in them, report directly, immediately, fully and truthfully to the Ministers responsible. What has been really interesting to me, observing this debate, is that Minister after Minister has either said "I was not told" or "I was told." Nobody has said "I demanded to know what was going on in the security services." Ministers are not passive people to be told or not told. If a Minister is in charge of the security services, his first duty is to satisfy

232

himself that they are efficient. Where, in any of the speeches that we have heardI understand that the winding-up speech will come from the third Prime Ministerhas there been an explanation that the duty of an elected Minister is not to wait for the Director-General to come and see him, but to call the Director-General and say "What is the position?" 471 That is the sort of problem that arises because a Minister is not accountable to Parliament. After all, if one can ask a parliamentary question about health, housing or education, an angry Minister, hounded in the House, goes back and raises hell with his permanent secretary. A Minister involved with security, who cannot be hounded in the House, gets into a cosy relationship with the security services. I am not making a personal attack on anyone. I am making a constitutional point. The reason that democratic self-government works in Britain is that Parliament presses Ministers, and Ministers in turn must press officials. Take the pressure of Parliament off a Minister, and before he knows what is happening he becomes part of the Establishment that he was elected to control. Mr. Heath The right hon. Gentleman is making a great deal of a small point. This is not a constitutional matter. When I became Prime Minister I arranged with the Secretary to the Cabinet to be briefed on all those matters which I knew were my responsibility. These matters included security. I was properly briefed. The right hon. Member also forgets that the Prime Minister must approve the budget of the security services, and this gives him complete control over them. When he is dealing with the budget and changes made in the expenditure, he can examine every aspect. Mr. Benn I hope that nothing that I say seems to be critical of those who have exercised these high responsibilities. I simply ask the House of Commons, before it lets these matters go, to ask itself whether it is prepared to accept the soothing argument that conies from those who have held these responsibilities so that at the end of the day's debate we can go away and leave it to those who hold such responsibilities. The right of Parliament and of the people to know the policy under which the military and security services operatenot the operational detailsis basic. If we did not know the budget of the defence services, or the policy under which they operate, that would be held as a denial of the long-established rights of Parliament. Mr. Wellbeloved Can my right hon. Friend explain whether he considers the 472 decision taken about Mr. Blunt to be an operational or policy decision? Does he agree with me that the policy covering the security services is laid down

233

not only in the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum but in a number of reports to this House which set out the whole process of security vetting and other matters? Can he define exactly what he means by "operational and policy matters"? Mr. Benn I am drawing the same distinction as that which is drawn when we discuss defence matters. Defence is much more publicly discussed than security. We have a White Paper every year on defence policy. Even the Birkett figures on the number of telephone interceptions recorded in 1957 has never been updated. We do not know today how many telephone calls are intercepted or how many letters are opened. Is that a matter of operational secrecy, or a matter of policy that the House should know? How many people are on a police dossier? How many people are on Special Branch files? We do not know. The degree of supervision of the security services cannot be a matter of operational secrecy. The third point is the right of the citizen, alone or with others, and of the media, to probe the conduct of the Government, to report on it and to criticise. It is a coincidence that the Protection of Official Information Bill, which would have clamped down on studies such as the one Andrew Boyle published, should have come at the time of Blunt. Those people who exercise the very responsibility of running the security services are also those who are most keen on tightening up on security. By that I mean that they are most keen on the "Protection of Official Information Bill" which has the advantage of covering their own conduct, as well as covering the legitimate secrecy of the security services. The Blunt case has thrown serious doubt on the conduct of the services, the control exercised by Ministers, the effectiveness of Parliament and the extent to which Whitehall might not like to see the press in some way muzzled by new legislation. It is known that Whitehalland I am talking about the highest echelons of the Civil Servicehas been uneasy about an Official Secrets Act which was so uncertain and absurd in its provisions that it could not be prosecuted 473 and used against people. In fact, Whitehall wished for an Armalite rifle, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South said, to pick off some real cases. The other issue is the legal aspect of our liberties. Democracy depends not only upon national security and self-government but upon the maintenance of certain legal rights, including the right to know that the law will be applied impartially. When hon. Members say that if their constituents had been guilty of these offences they would not have been treated in the same way, they are making not a class point but a legal one. There must be one law for everybody, and not a different law for those who have friends in high places. That is a matter of legal rights, upon which our liberties depend. Also, the courts must be kept free from political or administrative pressure. There is nothing that can so

234

influence the courts as to deny their right to prosecute or judge a man because he has been covered by a pre-empted immunity. Mr. Christopher Price This is why our judges have condemned the immunity given to some of the "supergrasses" recently. They can see what a poison this immunity can be if it spreads across the legal system. Mr. Benn My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) and I are trying to widen this discussion on our liberties. It is not just a matter of a strong Army and a big MI5. It is a matter of strong accountability and an independent judiciary. All these institutions are only important because they protect the most precious freedoms of allthe freedoms which differentiate a libertarian society from the dictatorships of the Right and the Left; from the Hitlers and Mussolinis or the Stalins and Mao Tsetungs, and the massive tyrannies which span the world. What are these differences? This is what the whole thing is aboutthe absolute right of any person to choose and hold any religious or political faith and opinion that he believes to be right, without committing an offence. The right hon. Member for Sidcup went back to the McCarthy period. Perhaps we have to be of a different age group to recall it. That was a terrifying period when people were guilty as of opinion and not for what they had done or not done. Another freedom is the right to 474 express opinions freely and without harassment by the authorities and the right of conscience to be respected. The fact that Blunt has tried to justify his treason and his spying by reference to conscience must not lead us to say what the Daily Express said today about "damn your conscience". Ultimately, conscience is the basic safeguard of our liberties. It is hard to say this in a debate today when a man who is a spy and traitor has pleaded conscience as justification, but it must be said. The laws are man-made and men must have, and have had historically, the right to refer to matters of right and wrong. The hon. Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) said that he would like to go back to impeachment and State trials. If he goes along the corridor behind the Speaker's Chair he will find volumes on State trials four a year from 1640 to 1669on treason. Take, for example, the freedom of Catholics. They were once treated as agents of an alien Pope, but later, in Catholic emancipation, they were allowed into the House of Commons. There was the right Bradlaugh won as an atheist to sit here. It was as serious a matter to be an atheist 100 years ago as it is to be a Marxist today. There are the rights of the conscientious objectors who, in the war, were allowed to pursue their faith. We hanged the Germans after

235

the Nuremberg trials because we said that conscience must come above an order from the duly authorised officer. If there is to be a public outcry against dissidents, against men and women who claim conscience, homosexuals and Marxists, we shall endanger the very liberties that this House is today trying to maintain. If a nation were to be hounded by public hue and cry or, worse still, to contribute to it, it would find that it had lost what it had sought to uphold. What, then, should we now be doing? I question the value of inquiries, for I fear that if we had an inquiry it would lead to the naming of two other personsboth of them deadand we should be no further forward. If there is a desire for that I should not wish to say that it is wrong, but I do not believe that it has much to offer us. The central question for the House of Commons today is how to secure the 475 democratic control of our security services. Why is that? First, it is to be sure of their efficiency. The Blunt case suggests that they are not efficient. Secondly, it is to be sure that they are accountable to Ministers. The Blunt case throws serious doubt on that. Consider the contorted convoluted descriptions about who should talk to whom. Should an official speak to the Attorney-General, should the Attorney-General have told the Home Secretary? Our former Attorney-General said that he had discovered that his predecessor had not been told 10 years ago. He went to the Cabinet Office to ask if he could tell that man who was then Lord Chancellor. For heaven's sake, democratic control lies in the collective ministerial responsibility in this area. The one thing that should come out of this affair is that Ministers should not handle these matters alone, but should do so by collective discussion among their colleagues. Is it too much to ask that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister, the head of the Security Service, the Attorney-General and the Lord Chancellor should meet so that they do not have to depend upon whether they have a minute which has been pushed through the file? The second point is to assert the right of Parliament to satisfy itself on the policy and the control in these matters and to open up the issues raised. Reference has been made to the United States. I was interested to hear that my right hon. Friend the former Home Secretary said that the United States security services were in a mess. Someone else said that they were demoralised. But at least information about what they did has been published. If anyone wants to know what came out of the inquiry, let me quote Vice-President Mondale who, after all, is in the White House today as Vice-President. He said: Perhaps most terrifying abuse of power during the period was what the FBI called Cointelpro. That ugly little acronym would have been at home in any police state it meant illegal investigations targeted against America law abiding individuals in groupsand punishment administered not by a court but by a government agencythrough harassment and tactics designed to break

236

up marriages". All right, I have no knowledge of what happens in our security services 476 because not one word has ever come out. I am trying to make an all-party point. There is a need for an inquiry. The right hon. Member for Sidcup dismissed what Mr. George Young said on the radio on Sunday. I heard it, and I obtained the transcript five minutes ago. He said: There's a curious convention in Whitehall, you can inform the Prime Minister without telling him. Mr. Young was asked about Lord Home and he said: This may have happened or it may be that Sir Alec was rather dim, I can't remember. That is a statement from the deputy head of MI6. He was asked about my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson). The deputy-head of MI6 said: I would be rather hesitant to have informed Harold Wilson". Then came the key passage: The higher reaches of the Civil Service undoubtedly make most of the decisions for Ministers. They put them in front of them and say, Ministers, do you agree? The ethos of the higher reaches of the Civil Service is not one of stirring up hornets' nests, particularly if some of your best friends are hornets, but in my experience of dealing with Ministersand I've met a fair amount off and on over some 12 yearsthey don't hear what you say; you tell them something, it goes in one ear and it's out of the other and they are busy thinking up the next Parliamentary answer to the next Parliamentary question. I am not confirming Young. I have never met him, but it is one thing to hear the former Prime Minister saying that he was in charge and another thing to hear the voice of the man who was under the control of the former Prime Minister giving his view about what happened. The reality is that the House is entitled to know. We need a freedom of information Act which will exclude operational secrecy. We want to know the budget and the staffing. We are entitled to know the names of those who are in charge of MI5 and MI6. We need to know the policy, the number of dossiers and the names of countries with which we have intelligence links. Did we have intelligence links with Savak when we had a relationship with the Shah? Did we have relations with BOSS in South Africa? I do not know. All I know is that intelligence links are part of foreign policy, and the House of Commons is entitled to know with which 477 foreign intelligence agencies our intelligence officers exchange information. We are entitled to a Select Committee which would look at these policy matters. What is important here is the issue of accountability. We cannot entrust our liberties to a State within a State, with its own policies, its own prejudices, its own friends, and its own enemies; with unlimited powers of surveillance, of scrutiny, of black listing or of granting immunity. The freedoms that we are trying to defend are too important to be trusted to the security chiefs or the secretaries to the Cabinet, however high principled they may be. Sir Norman Brook, Sir Burke Trend, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Maurice Oldfield are all distinguished public servants, but they were not

237

elected to run the system that safeguards our liberties. They cannot be removed for what they do, and we do not know what they do, because everything that they do is behind the tightest secrecy that covers their failures, their successes, their friendships and their prejudices. This debate requires us to reassess the freedoms that we are seeking to uphold. It also requires us to reassess, as a House, the control that we believe we should exercise on behalf of the people, of the means that we use to protect them. 8.7 pm Mr. Archie Hamilton (Epsom and Ewell) I welcome the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in this debate. It demonstrated a new and refreshing candour and revealed the self-confidence of her Government. One could say that this is in marked contrast to the previous Government, because I do not believe that the previous Administration would have had the courage to make such a full and frank statement to the House. We are discussing Mr. Anthony Blunt, who conspired, in the name of Marxism. His recent apologia has indicated that his Marxist treachery went under the guise of anti-Fascism. Plus a change, plus c'est la mme chose. That means, for those xenophobic hon. Members on the Opposition Benches, that however much things change they remain the same. Is it not under the guise of anti-Fascism 478 that so many people operating as Marxists strive to destroy this country? Many of those who claim to campaign on behalf of our liberty are, through their dedication to Marxism, intending to deprive us of those freedoms that we have today. How sad it is that Blunt did not share the fate of Burgess and Maclean and end his days in a dreary block of Moscow flats with nothing but a bottle of vodka for company, with no freedoms and no opportunity to hold press conferences to explain his position to the world at large. The very freedoms that he set out to betray guaranteed him a congenial and comfortable life. Those freedoms recognised his undoubted talents and tolerated some of the less orthodox aspects of his life. The debate should be concerned with freedomfreedom to speak, freedom to know and freedom to share in the decision-making processes that affect people in this country. That is the privilege of a successful society, and it is also indispensable to it. These freedoms must be enshrined in legislation. The Government must recognise that people need to know, in the interests of democracy and of better government. At the same time, we need to protect our freedom from those who indulge in excesses. In their desire to know, they do not care how much they destroy.

238

For this reason it is welcome that the Protection of Official Information Bill has died. It is a good thing that it has lapsed. In the form in which it was originally drafted it would have been difficult to find wholehearted support for it from the Conservative Benches. However, I believe that we need a revised section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is essential that at the same time we have a freedom of information Act as well, which gives people access to information that concerns them so that they can share in the decision-making process of our democracy. We now have a Government who are intending to reduce the numbers in the Civil Service, as well as the money spent on it. It is only through freeedom of information that we shall be able to get the accountability from the bureaucracy that we now need. We must show the country that we have good and self-confident government. If we have those 479 things we do not have to hide behind unnecessary official secrecy. 8.11 pm Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) It is an ill wind that blows nothing any good. The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Mr. Hamilton) was one of many voices who during the course of our discussion on this sad and miserable case have spoken up for a freedom of information Act and a quite different attitude than was involved in the Protection of Official Information Bill. That is welcome, and it is a point to which I shall return. I do not often find myself in agreement with the Daily Express, but in one of its comments today it set the right note of reaction to the extraordinary self-defence of Mr. Blunt. It said that: The British deserve better than this load of phoney humbug". That aptly sums up the reaction of most people to the press conference that he held. There is a deep public outrage at the actions of Blunt; at the fact that for reasons good or ill he was able to get off scot-free; at the fact that he of all people, with that background and those crimes against our country, should have been so closely involved in the counsels of the Sovereign over a considerable period; and that in the end he was tipped off as a matter of special courtesy a day before the truth was revealed. I am inclined to the view that the Prime Minister shares much of this feeling of public outrage, and was herself probably taken aback and rather shocked to discover what had gone on. That makes me the more surprised that her office should have indulged in this particular piece of special courtesy and assistance. However, I do not think that hon. Members, in the security of this place, should forget that the public's reaction involves the belief that people who have the right accent, the right friends, and the right background, and who are seen in the right places, get off more readily from crimes of this kind than do others. We must see this against a background of spy cases in which the professionals get very big sentences, although in some cases they never serve them. George Blake got 42 years, although he was 239

not there for very long. The Krogers got 20 years. Vassal 480 got 18. Bossard got 21 years. Even the smaller fry, such as Bingham in the 1972 case, got 21 years. Bingham's wife got 2 years. The public can see that the State rightly exacts penalties for this kind of treason, but it views the events in this case with great concern when all that this man lost was a knighthood and a quiet life. Mr. Cryer Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that there are other examples that perhaps raise even greater ire amongst libertarians, and that concerns people who collated already published information and were then visited by the whole panoply of the law? I think of the "ABC" trial, where two journalists and a social worker were accused of breaking the Official Secrets Act. Mr. Beith I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I believe that he touches upon the absurdities of our secrets legislation, to which I shall return. Of course, questions arise from the very circumstances of the Blunt case about which it is still hard to be satisfied. For instance, should the immunity have been given at all, and did the Prime Minister of the day know or not know that it had been given? There is another question that I posed in an earlier intervention. Was Blunt, as he now seems to suppose, given an undertaking that he would be protected from publicity for as long as the immunity would last, namely, indefinitely? He seems to suppose that he was given such an undertaking. But for him to be so assured, successive Governments would have to be committed to concealing that fact from the House when they were pressed about it on subsequent occasions. The Attorney-General shakes his head, and I am reassured by the indication that he has given. Perhaps he will make this point clearer when he replies. Clearly, the Government did not owe such an assurance to Blunt. Immunity from prosecution ought to have been benefit enough for whatever services we received. Another question relates to the Palace, and why Blunt's involvement there was allowed to continue over such a long period. There still remains some doubt about who was told what and at what stage. When the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) suggested that Blunt's presence at the Palace over such a long periodit should be remembered 481 that it was renewed in 1972 with a further posthad tainted or damaged the Palace, he did not get a warm reception, no doubt because he is known to be hostile to the monarchy and has made no secret of that hostility. It must be said that although others of us take the view that the monarchy is a desirable and proven institution in Britain, and that the Queen herself has made an enormous personal contribution to its value, we feel that the presence within the Royal Household for so long a period of an acknowledged and known spy is a matter about which we

240

ought to be concerned. The suggestion which seems to emerge, that the Palace is an appropriate place for people to remain in covert occupations while they are of some vague use to the security services, is not one that we would want to encourage. The two major issues that emerge from this case relate to the secrecy and accountability of the security services. The belated revelations have at least brought about the abandonment of the Protection of Official Information Bill. Never was a measure so dramatically torpedoed as that. I criticised it because it enabled one Minister to pull the curtains of secrecy around anything he chose without any check. It would have enabled Ministers to conceal this case. Indeed, if the existing Official Secrets Act had not been shattered by the courts, we might never have got the information that led to this case being pursued. We must now start to work from the principle that is enshrined in the Bill brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud)that the public are entitled to know, unless we can show good reason why particular information should be kept secret. Where reason has to be shown, there should be some process of check on that decision. We cannot simply allow one Minister, let alone one public servant, to make that sort of decision. I believe that the obsession with secrecy has harmed the security services in two ways. First, it allows incompetence and corruption to go on undetected for very long periods. If Ministers are not subject to some occasional questioning on the broad issues affecting the security services, it is highly likely that they will not pose questions to the security services on those matters. In saying that, 482 I do not accuse Ministers of any wish to conceal, or of any laziness in office. It is a fact of life, as many ex-Ministers will acknowledge, that they tend to be most assiduous about things in regard to which they are under pressure from the House and their parliamentary colleagues. There is no doubt that the likelihood of a strong parliamentary attack is one that compels civil servants to move rather more quickly in dealing with certain matters. I believe that the absence of a parliamentary pressure in any effective way helps to ease the security services and frees them from the kind of scrutiny that we believe to be necessary if Departments are to be made effective and if inefficiency and corruption are to be rooted out. The recruitment and employment of Blunt, like that of Philby, Burgess and Maclean, reveals that there was this long strain of incompetence in the security services. I believe that the lesson of recruitment was learned a long time ago. These people were recruited a very long time ago, but other mistakes can be made in the future, and we must have means of scrutiny. There is a second reason why I believe that secrecy and the extent to which it is pursued has harmed the security services. I believe that it has

241

made impossible proper public acceptance and discussion of the value and importance of security services. We need intelligence services. It is important for us to know, for example, the scale and nature of the Russian arms build-up. It is important that we investigate whether the sanctions applied against the Rhodesian regime were being applied, or were being contravened and by whom. We also need counter-intelligence in order to protect this country from the sort of things that have emerged in this case. Yet we go on pretending that the services do not exist. We pretend in the formal documents of State that the Security Service is not voted money. We bury the vote for its financing to prevent Members of Parliament from discovering how much is spent on it. There was a time when D notices were applied in respect of the naming of the head of the home Security Service. We try to preserve the fiction that in this country we do not have security services. It is only by things having gone wrong and through 483 reports such as that from Lord Denning that the facts of the matter have been brought out. From where has anyone quoted the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum in today's debate? It has been quoted only from the Denning report, which was the report of an inquiry into something which went wrong. If we treat a part of our defence system as though we were ashamed of it, and if we do not think that its existence should be admitted, we cannot be surprised if its value is not appreciated and if from time to time its standards fall. A more serious and practical recognition that we need security services and that we must subject them to some suitable scrutiny is an essential prerequisite of their existence and their effective operation. Much of the work of security must, of course, be carried out in secret. That makes it even more important that accountability to Ministers is successfully carried out. I do not believe that the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum ever provided a sufficient basis for that. Let me quote the operative passage from paragraph 6 of that memorandum. You and your staff will maintain the well-established convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular cases but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issue upon which guidance is sought. The implication of that memorandum is "You let us know when you want our advice." There are far more circumstances in which Ministers need to be informed of what is going on in the Security Service. There are many more in which they are than are listed in that memorandum. There are others in which they ought to be. Mr. Cryer

242

Does the hon. Member agree that the Prime Minister's statement basically contains simply a reiteration of the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum from the report of the Denning committee and that the point that I raised earlier, that the Prime Minister in 1964 was not informed, has not been met because the report has not been updated or changed to ensure that there is accountability? 484 Mr. Beith I disagree with the hon. Member in one particular. I think that the Prime Minister has updated the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum in one point that she made. She made it clear that cases where immunity is granted should be referred to the Prime Minister in future. That is going beyond the Maxwell Fyfe memorandum, but it is only locking one stable door after one horse has bolted. The Prime Minister has to go further and indicate that unusual operations of any kindand the granting of immunity is only one of themhave to be referred in this way, just as departures of policy and changes in the direction of the work of the Security Service have to be reported. A far broader measure of reporting to Ministers is called for than is remotely suggested by that memorandum. I would expect the Prime Minister to go beyond cases that happened to parallel the one we are now considering in her assumptions about what she will need reports on in future. I do not doubt that, having gone through this experience, she believes that the situation needs a great deal of tightening, but I do not believe that what she said today goes far enough. I have dealt only with accountability to Ministers. I want to see more accountability to Parliament, although I realise some of the problems involved. Ministers should surely answer to Parliament on the basic functions of the Security Serviceon its existence and on the scale of its operations. The service finds that it has to report when things go wrong, as the Prime Minister has required in this case, but I think that she should be more interested in asking the service to answer questions about the basic nature, purpose and activities of the service. If we were to go beyond that, Parliament would need a more sophisticated device. That is where I believe the Select Committee system could be usedperhaps involving a sub-committeein order to have more extensive scrutiny of the work of the Security Service. That may be more important than inquiries into the Blunt case. There may be very little more that we can learn about the details of the Blunt case, but there are vital lessons to be learnt from it. 485 We should get rid of two particular attitudes to the Security Service. One of them I caricature slightly as a soft Left attitude. It is the attitude that all this is unnecessary, that we do not need security services, that this 243

is just a lot of people playing at James Bond and that we could dispense with them. I do not accept that. I think that the threats that exist to this country, its people and its freedoms require the operation of intelligence services. We should make that clear and not be ashamed to admit it publicly. Equally, there is a hard Right attitude not peculiar to Members of the Conservative Party, but which is quite widespread. It can be broadly summed up as "Our boys are doing a grand job and we do not need to ask any questions." That is not right either, because it was that attitude that made it so easy for men like Philby, Burgess, Maclean and Blunt to flourish for so many years. We must be realistic about security services. We must recognise the dangers that are involved. We must ensure that the service is accountable to Ministers and that Parliament exercises some scrutiny over it. 8.26 pm Mr. Michael Neubert (Romford) My interest in this story began with the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951. Their take-off point in Tatsfield was not much more than two miles across the valley from my boyhood home. It taught me that the face of modern espionage is often mundane, commonplace and even familiar. That a man could show his season ticket at Victoria, take a train home, and that night leave on a journey for Moscow never to return to his country, made a great impression upon me. That impression was further underlined by another experience 10 years later. Two aspects of this question have intrigued me from the start. They still seem highly relevant. I offer them not as a complete case but as a contribution to discussion. My first question is: why should these spies apparently be exclusively centred on Cambridge, the university to which I went 20 or so years later? The second question is: why were these spies able to remain unsuspected and unrecognised in spite of the most damaging evidence of their personal unreliability? These doubts were doubly reinforced by the unmasking of Philby and 486 further intensified by revelations about Blunt. Let me take up the first of those strands On Blunt's admission yesterday there were and possibly are many more like him Some may be alive and some may have been neutralised by the Security Service, while others may be neither. It seems that it would be a mistake, however, to concentrate only on the Cambridge connectionwhat the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) described as the "one core". There is a danger in our being too introspective by concentrating on matters of immunity and parliamentary accountability. We should surely take a wider perspective, because Blunt, in an area of ambiguity between two interviews yesterday, claimed that he was not recruited at Cambridge 244

although the Cambridge link was crucialor at least that there was no spymaster there. The pernicious idea that Communism was the only defence against Fascism swept through a whole generation. It was not confined to the Cambridge clique. In "My Silent War" Philby wrote it cannot be so very surprising that I adopted the Communist viewpoint in the thirties: so many of my contemporaries made the same choice. So, why not Oxford? I ask that question in all seriousness. At a time when public servants were almost exclusively, and certainly predominantly, from Oxbridge, is it likely that Oxford undergraduates were not similarly affected and penetrated by the Soviets? Mr. English They were cleverer. Mr. Alan Clark No, heterosexual. Mr. Neubert General Krivitsky, who defected to the United States in 1937, believed that there was an agent in the Foreign Office whose background was an education at Oxford. He was probably mistaken in that belief. He probably had Maclean in mind. However, there was a presumption by a high-ranking Russian intelligence officer that at least one of his agents could have been from an Oxford background. I contend that Cambridge is not necessarily the common denominator. Mr. John Stokes (Halesowen and Stour-bridge) I was at Oxford during the 1930s. Some of my more misguided colleagues, unfortunately, went to fight for the Communists in Spain and got themselves killed, but there were very few of them. 487 Mr. Neubert That is common knowledge. Mr. Alan Clark Perfect cover. Mr. Neubert The most astonishing aspect of the current revelations is the failure to recognise the face of treachery despite the most damning evidence. There 245

appears to be a congenital weakness in our defences, a chronic inability to recognise the face of treason. The case of Burgess is the most notorious. He was given to lurid episodes of flagrant behaviour. That was countenanced even by the Minister of State in the Foreign Office under the Attlee Government. How could Burgess survive for so long? That question has still to be asked, because the answer may still be relevant. By comparison, the case of George Blake was more comprehensible. In the early months of my marriage my wife and I lived in a house previously built for the Prince Imperial, son of Napoleon III, when exiled at Chislehurst. The house has now been converted into flats. George Blake and his family were neighbours of ours in those flats. When we returned from a holiday in Turkey in 1961 it came as a serious shock to discover that the man living next door, with whom we exchanged greetings as we went on our respective ways to work, was a Soviet spy who had sent possibly many hundreds of British agents to their death and had been sentenced to 42 years' imprisonment. I am therefore under no illusion about the difficulty of recognising traitors in our midst. When we consider Philby's case we are asked to believe a quite improbable story. First and foremost, the improbability lies in the switch that he made from one end of the political spectrum to the other in a short time. Philby left Cambridge in 1933 a Communist. He engaged in a year's illegal activity among Socialists in the slums of Vienna. He married a woman called Litzi Friedman. She was described by Gaitskell in 1934 as "that young Communist girl". That was on 24 February 1934. Philby returned to England in May of that year and started attending functions of a pro-Nazi organisation called the Anglo-German Fellowship in white tie and tails. If the face of a traitor cannot be recognised in that amazing volte-face, how much more difficult it 488 must be to recognise treachery in a more plausible move, perhaps only a few degrees across the political spectrum, when the dissociation is much more discreet. The implausibility of Philby's background survived a series of disasters. Against all the evidence, he remained an active agent in the heart of the Establishment for 30 years without discovery. It may be that there are others still in high places. Now that a spy has been unmasked in the Royal Household it seems that there are no limits to the heights that such infiltrators may attain. These people may well have a chequered record of errors of judgment for which the only rational explanation is a covert commitment to another cause. We need to remain on our guard in respect of the pre-war generation to which I have referred. Burgess may not be the only example to combine intellectual arrogance with heavy drinking. Blunt may not be the only example of a flirtation with the Communist Party combined with an interest in aesthetics.

246

If we apply such a psychological template, it may fit others who are still active and influential. Should we assume that service to the Communist cause takes only the form of active espionage? Is it not at least possible that the Communists have sought other ways of advancing their cause when, even today, more than 60 years after the revolution, the paid-up membership of the British Communist Party stands at about 20,000 somewhat fewer than the crowd that Chelsea can attract to Stamford Bridge on a wet night. I also urge the House not to underestimate the enduring strength, in certain cases, of the original commitment. Witness Philby's own quotation of Graham Greene from his novel "The Confidential Agent" You choose your side once and for allof course, it may be the wrong side. The continuing work of investigation and vetting must be the responsibility of the security services. We cannot expect to know anything of it. In my view, no case for an inquiry has been made. Such an inquiry would only give aid, knowledge and comfort to our enemies. The idea that the security services should be accountable to Parliament is preposterous. 489 One might as sensibly attempt to store cognac in a colander. Much information would spill out at once, and the rest would evaporate slowly into the outer atmosphere. One would have thought that, above all, the secret service is entitled to err on the side of secrecy. This is not the end of the story. It is just another chapter. There will be several more. 8.36 pm Mr. James Wellbeloved (Erith and Crayford) The idea that there has been a conspiracy from Buckingham Palace downwards against the national interest to protect a traitor and a Soviet spy takes some believing. The more the debate proceeds, the more this theory is seen to be the patent nonsense that it obviously is. Two main issues have to be considered. The first is the squalid activities of the traitor Blunt and the Soviet spying system in this country. The second and perhaps more important, for the future, is the control and the accountability of the Security Service. The Security Service is a major element in the protection of our democracy and our national security. It is those very freedoms that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) so eloquently put before the House that the activities of our security services are fundamentally designed to protect and preserve from treachery and treason. I do not believe that the security services in this country are much different in their make-up from any other organisation. A survey of the security services and of Members of Parliament would probably reveal at least as much integrity, sanity and dedication in the security services as was found in Parliament. Some would fall short of the views and 247

standards that we believe Members of Parliament should uphold. Likewise, in the security services, there would no doubt be one or two who fall below those standards. I would guess that, overwhelmingly, like other organisations, they are composed of loyal and dedicated people who sincerely try to perform a difficult job. The Blunt case is a further example of the whole squalid business of treachery. This is a man who, by his own admission, betrayed his country on the pretext 490 of conscience and loyalty to his friends. When confronted with possible exposure, and perhaps even eventual arrest, he found that his battered and tattered conscience could be betrayed, along with his friends, in order to secure his immunity from any further prospect of prosecution. That is the essence and nature of treachery itself. There is no loyalty to anything. It is a travesty of the word "conscience" to pray it in aid as a reason why someone becomes a spy and a traitor against his own country. The passage of time may have lessened the whole impact on our security of the Burgess, Maclean, Philby, and now the Blunt, disclosures. I do not believe that the passage of time has eroded the danger that we still face from foreign espionage in this country or the danger that continues through the fomenting of the idea in the mind of the general public that the Blunt case is a conspiracy of the Establishment. We cannot leave the Philby-Maclean-Burgessand now the Bluntcase as it stands. There must be an inquiry. There are innocent as well as guilty men still under the shadow of suspicion, and it is time this unsavoury episode was laid to rest, if laid to rest it can be. I am clear in my own mind that there should be an inquiry to try to clear this matter up as far as is humanly possible. I know that a number of my hon. Friends are very much against the use of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. I believe that that would be precisely the right avenue along which to pursue the MacleanPhilby-Blunt episode. It would clear the air of the stench of treason committed by that small clique of traitors. Lord Justice Salmon's report on tribunals and commissions of inquiry comes down firmly in favour of tribunals of inquiry under the 1921 Act to deal with matters of this importance to the nation. Contrary to what some people believe, that is really what Salmon saysthat it is the avenue that should be used in matters of national crisis and national confidence, and particularly in matters of security. I hope that the Government will, without waiting to be pushed into it, concede some form of inquiryit may not be the 1921 form; they may find some other 491 wayinto that sordid episode so that we can at least try to end that nonsense.

248

There have been major changes in security matters since 1951. They are all published and on the record. Numerous reports have been presented to Parliament setting out clearly the policies under which the Security Service operates. I give one illustration. The whole business of vetting, which has been adequately reported to Parliament, cannot ensure that another nest of traitors will not emerge, but at least the possibility is minimised by the system that now operates when people enter the public service. There are some peopleI count myself among themwho say that the system of positive vetting should include politicians when they take certain offices. It should not be applied when they are elected to the Housethat would be intolerablebut we should accept when a politician goes into certain areas that there must not be one rule for those whom he governs and contols and another for himself. I hope that the Government will give consideration to that matter, in joint talks with other parties in the House. The public and Parliament are entitled to an assurance that the security services are under proper control, and that the rules laid down by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and confirmed in the Denning report, and now further adjusted and perhaps improvedI have not had a chance to study the full implications of what the Prime Minister said about the three or four extra provisions that she is introducingare being applied and are adequate to meet the present situation. I do not believe that we can simply leave the matter at the end of the debate, saying "We have these one or two additions that the Prime Minister has outlined." We need further deep consideration of this matter. It must be separated from the inquiry into the Burgess-MacleanPhilby business, which stands on its own, to be dealt with on its own. There must be a separate inquiry into the question of the future and the control of the Security Service. I am not in favour of a Select Committee's dealing with these matters. I believe that the Security Commission already established could, given fresh terms of 492 reference, be the body for the Prime Minister to ask to review the rules, their application and their adequacy. The first question that must be examined concerns a point partly touched on by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East. It is whether all the security services, whatever Department of State they may happen to fall into, should be brought under one centre of Government control and ministerial responsibility or whether we need a small ministerial security committee composed of appropriate Secretaries of State with varying degrees of responsibility. Should we have a senior Minister of State attached to the Home Office under the present laws whose prime function would be the day-to-day oversight of the Security Service? He would have regular and frequent meetings with the heads of

249

the Security Service and its operational chiefs and would be able to report direct to the Home Secretary. If we seriously wish to improve governmental and, therefore, democratic control of the Security Service, we should consider these questions. I believe that a Security Commission with new terms of reference should examine the problems. We should consider what value there might be in the Commission's being charged with a continuing responsibility for the oversight of the application of the policies and, in some cases, the operations of the Security Service. Are we satisfied that the existing arrangements which have developed from 1952 are sufficient? Is the crucial role of the Home Secretary acceptable, and is it the best way of proceeding in this highly sensitive and secret area? Public interest is such that it is not possible to leave matters where they are. We should give detailed and careful consideration to the future. I believe that the best way to conduct that review is under a Security Commission with new terms of reference. I hope that that proposal will be acceptable to the Government. Treason and subversion are not figments of journalistic imagination. History, both ancient and modern, has proved that. Treachery, treason and subversion have been with us since almost the beginning of time. The Security Service is an essential factor in the defence of democracy. Those members of it who serve the nation 493 are entitled to the understanding and support of Government, Parliament and the public. For that understanding and support, and for the efficiency and morale of the Security Service, we need clearer rules and proper accountability to a democratic Parliament. As much as anybody else, the Security Service is entitled to the reassurance that can come only from a review of the rules, methods and policies under which it operates. 8.47 pm Mr. Raymond Whitney (Wycombe) I am happy to follow the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) in his analysis of the lessons that should be learnt from the Blunt affair. His proposal for a Security Commission inquiry is worth examination, particularly if it will increase the level of public confidence in the Security Service. I feel that the whole flurry of the Blunt affair has been fastened on to by the media and by the House to a far greater extent than the people in the country, who readily accept the need for the Security Service and its contribution. There are other lessons that we can learn from the Blunt affair. First, we should realise that these Marxist, homosexual, publicschool and Cambridge-educated young menthe elite of the early 1930sdid not simply walk into an unbaited trap. The bait was put on the hook for them. There was a conscious recruiting drive by the Soviet Union against what it believed to be a vulnerable section of society. The 250

Soviet Union perceived with considerable accuracy that that section of society would shortly achieve positions of power and influence in the country. It scored a bull's eye. That is the first lesson that we should learn, and it has application for today. Secondly, of course the security services were appallingly incompetent in their recruitment 40 years ago. The war was one of the reasons for that, but there were mistakes which must never be allowed to occur again, and I do not believe that they will. However, we should give credit to the fact that, although it took a long time, the traitors who we know of were at last brought to book. It is a "Catch 22" situation. One of the snags of the game is that if the traitors are not caught no one knows and one is in trouble. If 494 they are caught, everyone knows and one is in trouble. That is a paradox that the security services have to suffer. At the end of the day they did what was necessary and they followed the rules laid down. The political control was kept in play. The Maxwell Fyfe rule seems to have been observed. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, my other right hon. Friends and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, with the high offices that they have held, confirmed in their various contributions that the rules of the game were played to an encouraging extent. Those lessons are important and should not be forgotten. The situation that we face today is what matters. To a certain extent we should let the past bury its dead. I believe that everyone in the House will agree that there is an increasing need for good intelligence services and security. The military position is moving against us. Anyone with military experience knows that the more inferior are one's forces, the more one needs intelligence services. Technical means are not of significant help in determining the intention of a country that may have designs against our interests. We need our intelligence services operating overseas. Those services need to operate in many parts of the world. Our interests, for example in oil and raw materials, are worldwide and our services cannot be limited to countries behind a particular curtain. We cannot rely on our allies. Despite what the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) and my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, East (Mr. Aitken) said, the American security services have suffered grievously. We have a need for our overseas intelligence services. We are frequently reminded of the attack on this country and the West in general. It has been reliably estimated that about 40 per cent. of Soviet citizens working overseas in an official capacityand there are 12,000 outside the Soviet Unionare linked with the security services. To use a phrase that has perhaps been ridden to death, that is just the tip of the iceberg because they are the people who run the agents. That is the real sad world.

251

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said, thanks to 495 the security services we discovered the 105 in 1971. However, it must be reasonable to assume that, with the best will in the world, some of their replacements have crept back into the country. Only last year we had a bitter reminder of that when the Bulgarian defector, Georgi Markov, was killed on Waterloo bridge, by, it would appear, Bulgarian agents in London. That is the extent of the threat. It cannot be supposed that those Soviet spymasters or their successors, who so brilliantly identified the targets in the 1930s, are not operating in the same way today, identifying the targets. They are being identified and the agents are working at them, although the targets may be different and it is not the homosexual Marxist in Cambridge who is the threat today. What should we do about it? I believe that from experience overseas it has been proved conclusively that we should not follow the pattern in West Germany or the United States. The intelligence services in the United States and their political masters were largely discredited by operations at home, such as Watergate, and overseas, such as what is alleged to have happened in Chile. I would not defend that sort of action for a moment. I do not believe that any Home Secretary, any Prime Minister or any Director-General of the Security Service would consider doing anything remotely like that. The other development that has threatened the Americans and, to a considerable extent, neutralised the efficacy of their intelligence and security services, has been the imposition of a deep and penetrating degree of political control which has reached the point where the services are almost non-existent. The so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment would require all covert operations to be approved by eight Senate committees. We all understand that that could not work. The question comes down to whether we are satisfied with the present arrangements. I submit that over the years, our security services have proved to so many right hon. Members, many of whom have graced our debate, that they obey the rules and are susceptible to democratic control. The right hon. Member for 496 Bristol, South-East suggested a parliamentary Question Time so that hon. Members could ask what the DirectorGeneral of the Security Service was up to last week. Mr. Christopher Price My right hon. Friend did not say that. Mr. Whitney

252

He came close to it. If we had some sort of White Paper, it would be very white. It would be blank unless it revealed so many valuable secrets that the whole operation was rendered highly dangerous. We must make sure that we do not allow the Blunt affair to do any more damage to the standing and morale of our security services. If there were ever a time when we needed our security services to be efficient and democratically controlled, and to have a high morale, that time is now. 8.57 pm Mr. Robin F. Cook (Edinburgh, Central) I listened with great care to the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath), who almost convinced me that everything done in regard to Mr. Anthony Blunt in 1964 was entirely reasonable, straightforward and almost inevitable. My only reason for cavilling at that interpretation is that we have so many invidious comparisons, some of which the right hon. Gentleman referred to, in the list given by the hon. Member for Berwick-uponTweed (Mr. Beith). There are so many other cases where considerable sentences were imposed on those who were brought to book, many of whom are still inside our prisons. It is not simply that Mr. Blunt was not prosecuted in 1964. I am most grateful for the statement of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin), who made clear that the reasons why Mr. Blunt was not prosecuted were entirely legal considerations. I am also grateful for the additional information provided on that aspect of the matter by the right hon. Member for Sidcup. Not only was Mr. Blunt not prosecuted but he was retained in a high and honoured position in our society, which involved giving some advice to our Head of State. I find it difficult to believe that it was necessary to keep him in that position 497 in order to conceal from the Russians that he had confessed. Blunt had refused an instruction from his control 13 years earlier. The Russians must have known that deeply implicated as he was by the defections of Burgess and Maclean, he was doubly implicated by the defection of Philby. It is inconceivable that the Soviet secret service could ever have come back to Blunt or that the British Security Service could believe that the Soviets might return to him. I find it unconvincing that not only was Blunt not prosecuted, as a decision of policymy right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich made that point fairlybut he was retained in society and his treason was concealed. There is no other way of putting it. Mr. Blunt was not prosecuted, stripped of his knighthood, or dismissed from his position. The extent to which our security services were penetrated by 253

foreign agents during the war was concealed from the British public for 15 years. It would still be concealed from the public had it not been for the American Freedom of Information Act, which has been referred to in scathing terms. The way in which the affair was handled in 1964 has proved very convenient to the security services. They had a potentially damaging piece of information about themselves, which they concealed from the British public. However, that information was not concealed from the Russians. I am sure that they knew about it. The House must therefore address itself to the question whether the answerability and accountability of the security services are sufficient. Perhaps the security services did play the game by the rules, but are those rules adequate? In answering that question one must turn to the legislation governing the activities of the security services. My hon. Friend the Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) was scathing when he attacked the Government's withdrawal of the Protection of Official Information Bill. I grudgingly give credit to the Government for having the courage to withdraw that Bill. It was clearly unsatisfactory and would have extended even greater protection to the operations of the security services than they receive under the Official Secrets Act. 498 The present Official Secrets Act gives the security services too much protection. I am sure that I am not the only hon. Member to find it absurd that during yesterday's press conference a man who had admitted giving every secret that came his way to the Russians whilst he was in the security services should then plead, in response to a journalist's question, that he could not answer because of the Official Secrets Act. The information that the journalist required was about how many people Mr. Blunt had recruited. Blunt's reply to that question was that he could not answer that question because he had revealed the information to the security services and therefore it had become an official secret. It is bad enough that facts that originate from the Government may be secret, but if we accept that any fact that becomes known to the security services becomes an official secret it will be intolerable. The Act is being used to keep secrets not from the Russians but from the press and from the British people. The case for political accountability is far greater now than it was in 1945, when Mr. Blunt was employed in the security services. I listened very carefully to the opening words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees). He referred to the Maxwell Fyfe directive. He quoted from part of it, and I hope that he will not mind if I quote from the bit that came afterwards. The directive states quite clearly that one of the functions of the security services is to protect the realm from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the

254

State. Nowadays we are concerned not only with preventing foreign espionage but with monitoring subversion in Britain. Questions of great political sensitivity and delicacy therefore arise. It is not sufficient for the House to say that it is a matter to be left to the discretion of the security services. If we are to have a Security Service that monitors subversion in the political and industrial scene, it must be debated openly. However, if we leave to a closed and isolated security community the definition of a subversive action, we run a grave risk. I am not satisfied with the arguments that have been put forward about why we 499 cannot achieve greater accountability. It has been said that the Home Secretary gives great care and attention to these issues. I am sure that he does, but he is not answerable to the House. I have tried to table questions to the Home Secretary on security, but every time I have been defeated. When the Government produced the Protection of Official Information Bill, I discovered that an interpretation clause defines security or intelligence as meaning the work of the security or intelligence services. I went to the Table Office and said "I wish to ask the Prime Minister to list the security and intelligence services which are referred to in clause 15 of the Bill", but I was not allowed to table even that question. Again, we do not debate the secret Votes. By conventionadmittedly it is a convention that has not been challenged in modern timesthis is the one item in the Consolidated Fund that cannot be challenged on the Floor of the House and cannot be debated in any Committee of this House. It may be that there are good reasons why we cannot table parliamentary questions on the security services. There may be sound reasons why we cannot debate that item on the Consolidated Fund Bill. But I refuse to believe that there is any compelling reason why we could not have a Select Committee of senior Members of this House who could meet without the press and without the public present and produce for the House a report in exactly the same way as the defence Select Committees have done over the years: a report which is censored and expurgated, but which, nevertheless, gives us the information on general policy and general budgeting that we need if we are to maintain our defence policy. After all, every police authority in Great Britain has an annual debate on the policy of its police force, even though at no stage can it touch on operational decisions. I accept the case for having a Security Service. I accept also that that service inevitably has to be the most secretive part of the Government's arms. However, having said that, it is an impossible irony and a logically untenable position to say that we require a Security Service to protect our democracy but that we cannot make that service answerable to 500 democratic control and democratic structures. If we retain a large Security Service responsible not simply for looking at the Russians and the Albanians but for looking at us and at shop stewards at British Leyland, without making the service answerable to democratic

255

structures, we run a risk that the service will pose a greater threat to democracy than many of the comparatively harmless Communist front organisations which it watches. 9.7 pm Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton) I am most grateful, Mr Speaker, that you have given me the opportuinty to put three questions, very briefly, to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, so that he may exercise his judgment as to the degree to which he thinks that the House should receive an answer. Of course, no one wishes to undermine the Security Service. That would be the very last thing that any Conservative Member would intend to do. But one might ask to what extent the morale of the Security Service is assisted by the granting of immunities and dispensations to those who have betrayed it. I feel that it is relevant to ask this question: what was it exactly that Blunt did? Surely, at any rate, we can be told what Blunt did in the period up to 1945, when we are told that he actually stopped spying. Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop The Russians must know. Mr. Clark As my hon. Friend says, the Russians must know. There are obscure, distasteful and slightly sinister elements still attached to this case. We understand that conscience may decree the imparting of military information, of plans, designs, formulae and so on. But the quartet, the Blunt-Philby-Burgess-Maclean association, was not necessarily connected simply with the imparting of information. These people were actually putting the finger on our agents or on the agents of our allies in foreign territory. It is a long way from the civilised conversation and vintage claret of the Travellers' Club to the interrogation cells, but there is a direct link between these 501 people and those who were tortured and executed because they were acting as our agents, as our soldiers, defending the values that we cherish here. I fully accept what my right hon Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said in his answer to me when, very courteously and without any equivocation, he said that the information that Blunt imparted was of such value that the immunity had to be sustained and that he had to be kept in office.

256

This is a man who had been so highly trained in the techniques of interrogation that on 11 occasions he was able to resist those who had also been trained in those techniques. This is a man who, we are told, was still in touch with his Russian controller 30 years later. It was not the same controller. Anyone who knows anything about the KGB will verify that the Russian controllers in Kensington change every two or three years. Therefore there is an assumption, is there not, that this man was a traitor of very much more significance and was in very much closer contact with the Soviet Union than is implied by the very slight element of information which has leaked out regarding him? It is said that it was all over in 1945, and then he was just a dear old thing helping to advise Royalty and occasionally doing other work. It is either one or the other. Either he was a highly dangerous individual or he was a relatively insignificant spy whose activities stopped in 1945. If he was the former, it does not seem to me that it could possibly have been anything that he could have given us that merited the immunity, the dispensation and the effect on the morale of the secret service. If he was so important, two supplementary questions are attached. If he was so important, and therefore so wicked, why was the Queen not told the full extent of his infamyor was she told? Finally, there is a trivial point that has upset a great many people. If Blunt was so wicked, and had committed such betrayals, why was it necessary to save him discomfiture by extending to him what one of my hon. Friends called the courtesy of advising him that we in the House were to discuss his case? 9.12 pm Mr. James Callaghan (Cardiff, South-East) The hon. Member for Plymouth, 502 Sutton (Mr. Clark) asked some very pertinent questions, which I think I can say must have concerned everybody who has looked at this case at any time since 1964. I do not wish to take the view that it has been easy to decide or to reach conclusions about everything in this case. The Attorney-General will no doubt try to answer the questions put to him by the hon. Gentleman, but they are proper questions, which concern many of us. The atmosphere of the debate has bezn very rational and calm. However, we must not forget, as a House of Commons, that this announcement, which was properly made by the Prime Minister, came as a very great shock to the British people. They asked questions whether Ministers knew. I must say that Ministers, or former Ministers, have not always helped themselves about that matter. The public are asking whether Ministers were lax. They are asking whether there is a separate group above, beyond or outside the Government which can take decisions of which Ministers are not properly made cognisant. They have askedand do askwhy Mr. Blunt was allowed to re main at the Palace.

257

I ask another question that has concerned me very much. Would Mr. Blunt have had the same treatment if he had been a humble corporal in the RAF? I beg hon. Members not to think that those questions have been absent from the minds of many of us, including those of us who have had to deal with them during the years when we were responsible for them. It is right and I am very glad that the Government decided to give a full day to debate this matter, as I believe that a number of misapprehensions and red herrings have been got out of the way as a result of the debate. I should like to deal with two or three questions. One of the principal questions that has come out in speech after speech in the debate is the relationship between the Security Service and Ministers. The questions of secrecy, scrutiny and responsibility to Parliament also arose. Should more be done in view of the serious penetration of MI5 that has taken place? Was the approach in the Blunt case, and his treatment, proper? Are Ministers and Law Officers or the Security Service to be faulted because of the treatment received by Blunt? Those are the kinds 503 of questions that the House has a right to ask, and those of us who have had some responsibility should seek to answer them and not sweep them aside or brush them away. I thought that the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) put questions that need very careful answer. He said that Ministers are most alert when they are under parliamentary pressure, and that when they know that they are to face the House of Commons and answer questions that is when they will be most on the qui vive and will inquire into the matters upon which they are to be questioned. The hon. Member went on to say that secrecy allows incompetence and corruption to thrive. I accept that. I have been a Minister for many years and I accept that when one is under pressure from Parliament one undoubtedly responds. Therefore, there is a special responsibility when one is not under pressure from Parliament to take a very careful and positive interest in these matters. I disagree totally with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn), who seemed to think that Ministers were passive about these matters and waited for somebody to come and say to them "Look, we want your advice". That does not happen. Indeed, he prompted meno, tempted meto go out and look up a particular area from which I want to quote some examples of the way in which Ministers can and do behave on such issues. I should like to come to the question of responsibility straight away. Although today's debate has arisen out of recent disclosures about Mr. Blunt, I remind the House of what I think has been just beneath our consciousness all day. Blunt is merely one part of a highly complicated case that the Security Service has spent many years and many man-hours seeking to unravel to find the truth.

258

 Mr. Skinner To cover up. Mr. Callaghan I despair of ever persuading my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) that anyone has any motive other than one of deceit or cover-up. Perhaps one day he will believe that there are other motives at work in people. 504 The morale of the Security Service has suffered greatly as a result of what took place when there was a deep penetration during the 1930s and 1940s. It has been a matter of the deepest anxiety and the Security Service has never given upas I know, because I have had intermittent connections with this matter over a number of yearsthe task of seeking to identify those whose names have come to light. It is probably true to say that because of the effluxion of time those concerned in that penetration of the service have passed, or are passing, out of active service because of age, ill health or death. But the matter has never been fully cleared up. I think that the House is aware of that. I must say to the House, and even to some of my doubting hon. Friends, that I do not think that the matter ever will be cleared up. The truth of the matter will be known only in the deepest recesses of the Kremlin despite the effort that has been made. I think that I speak for all those who have held officeI am sure that we all approached such matters in the right waywhen I say that our aim, in the light of the knowledge which was given to those with responsibility, was to ensure, as far as a Minister humanly could, that the Security Service is now clean and that there is no risk of information being passed on to the Soviet Union or indeed to any other country. In the nature of things I do not believe that it is possible to give the House an absolute and categoric answer. We all do our best, but it is not possible to say that at no time will there be penetration. After all, there is a steady flow of defectors to the West from the Soviet Union. People come across its fontiers at all times. It would be wrong to assume that there is no penetration. However, I think that I can say that the heads of those services, and those concerned in the Security Service, who are in some ways deeply ashamed at what has happened, have taken special care to try to rid themselves of the taint that befell them. I was fortunate enough to see the relations between Ministers and the security and intelligence services in three aspectsas Home Secretary, as Foreign Secretary and as Prime Minister. In relation to the Home Office, I confirm what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member 505 for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees). The Maxwell Fyfe directive certainly guided me, and the same kind of approach guided me as Foreign

259

Secretary between 1974 and 1976. It is true that paragraph 6 of the directive said: Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular cases but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issue on which guidance is sought". That could be regarded as a weakness. It depends to some extent on personal relationships and the sense of responsibility of those who hold these offices. I do not think that at the end of the day any rules are likely to make that situation much better. I welcome the clarification that the Prime Minister has given today about the relationships. I would have said, and I hope she would agree, that broadly the situation that she has now put out in the form of a new memorandum is one that has endured so farperhaps not in 1964, but certainly subsequently. I do not think that the third point has been said specifically before, namely, that if the Attorney-General is asked to authorise a grant of immunity from prosecution he can satisfy himself that the request has been made. That is a useful addition. However, I cannot conceive in modern times of anything else happening. I see that the Home Secretary is inclined to agree with me on that point. Let us look at the relationship, because this is what interested the House. When I was Home Secretary and then Foreign Secretary I took a number of decisions on operations that were put to me by the heads of the services and which I did not communicate to the Prime Minister of the day because it seemed to me that they were of such character that I could legitimately take responsibility without bringing him into the picture. At times the heads of the appropriate security services would ask to see me, and at other times I would ask to see them. But if it was a major matter and this is where the discretion comes inof course I would inform the Prime Minister. We cannot alter that kind of relationship. In the end it must be a matter of judgment as to whether the Home Secretary thinks that something is of such deep significance that he should not reach a conclusion 506 without informing the Prime Minister. I do not see how we can ever escape from that if Ministers are to have any responsibility at all. The same relationship existed when I became Prime Minister. I would ask to see the heads of the two services. Alternatively, they could and did ask to see me from time to time. The same relationship applied between Ministers and myself and between the Home Secretary of the day and the Foreign Secretary of the day. I give the House an illustration of how I think the Prime Minister can conduct his affairs in this matter. I give it not to be complacent but because I think it genuinely illustrates how a Prime Minister carries out his or her work. There was an occasion when I was Prime Minister when, for certain reasons that are not related to Mr. Blunt, I called a joint meeting with the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Director-General of MI5 and the head of MI6. The four of us sat down with my private secretary

260

at No. 10. I reminded them that there was no room for complacency in view of what was going onthe attempted Soviet penetration, which still existsand I reminded them of the past record, which is at the forefront of their minds all the time. Although I said that the matters that constantly weighed on their minds had originated several years earlier, nevertheless I wanted to go over the ground again. We went over that ground on my initiative. I did not wait for them to come and see me. I thought that this was an occasion on which I should do it myself. They confirmed to me what I said to the House a little earlier, that in their view those who might have been concerned with acts of treachery had, for the most or greater part, reached the end of their active life. They had either resigned or retired. That was the first point we examined. Secondly, we discussed, once again, as I had previously done with them individually, the nature of the procedures for positive vetting. We discussed their thoroughness and whether they were adequate. These procedures had been changed since the time of the earliest incidents in 1964. That was the second area that we covered. We then went on to the question of the management and recruitment of the two services. I can tell the Housethere is no reason 507 why it should not have been said earlierthat my right hon. Friend the then Home Secretary did change the nature of recruitment into the Security Service and the way in which it was conducted. I think that it was necessary so to do. We discussed to what extent that method should be applied to MI6 and whether we should make certain changes there in order to achieve a better balance. That was the third item. Fourthly, we discussed the question whether any of the recent Soviet defectors who had come across had been planted, and what we thought happened to particular people. Finally, we went over once more the most important question of all, which was whether grounds existed for continued suspicion in the Security Service, and if so, what we should do. That was not a passive attitude of sitting back and waiting for something to come to one. That was an example of the positive role that I am sure all Prime Ministers have played. I quote that example because it was suggested that we waited to see what came up, gave advice to someone, sent him away, and forgot all about it. That is absolutely untrue. I think that what I have described illustrates, from one meeting that I called, the way in which the subject can be approached. Subject to my earlier remarks, it is never possible to give an absolutely categorical answer. I do not believe that much, if any, of the earlier conspiracy remains alive and active today. What is true, I believe, is that there are people who have remained undiscovered and unknown so far who are still alive, though probably inactive.

261

So much, then, for the control exercised by the Prime Minister and Ministers. There has, I repeat, to be trust between the Prime Minister and her Ministers and between the Prime Minister, Ministers and the heads of the two services. The relationship between them cannot be the same as the relationship between the Minister and his permanent secretary in a normal Department, if only for one physical reason. They live in separate places. Therefore, there is not the close intimacy that exists in a Department where a permanent secretary walks three doors along a corridor, knocks on the door, walks in and says "Look here, I would 508 just like to tell you about something that is happening", and gets advice. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the heads of the two services is much more an arms-length relationship. It is much more formal when the head of the Security Service or the head of MI6 comes to see the Prime Minister. That places a special responsibility on the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary to see that they are themselves active in these matters. From what I know of my predecessors, I believe that the heads of the Security Service and MI6 came to Ministers. They came to me when they needed decisions of major importance, quite apart from any initiative I myself might have taken. From what I have heard today, I think that that situation has obtained all the way along the line. As far as it concerns the responsibility of Ministers it is a fine matter of judgment whether or not an operational decision should be put to the Home Secretary by the head of the Security Service and put by the Home Secretary, in due course, to the Prime Minister. At the end of the day it will be the judgment of those who apply the rules that will prevail. Having said that, I come to the question of an inquiry. However, I will first say a word about Blunt. The nub of the Blunt affair is that insufficient attention has been paid todayit may have been paid by one or two hon. Membersto the atmosphere of the 1930s. That may be because not every hon. Member was alive, active or grown up in the 1930s. However, at the risk of incurring anyone's displeasure, I should point out that there was a terrible feeling in the 1930s that we were facing a prospect of either Fascism or Communism, and that people had to choose. I was never bitten by the bug, but I can understand those who were. At the risk of incurring the displeasure of Conservative Members, I must say that it was the craven attitude of the Government of the day, in the face of the Nazis, which led people to reach that conclusion. Had there been a different attitude towards the Nazis in the 1930s by the Government of the day, I do not believe that some of these people would have gone where they did. When I watched Blunt on television last night, it was like the rustle of dead leaves 509 underfoot. I could hear those accents of someone from the 1930s. Having said that, there is nothing that can condone his treachery, whatever his beliefs. I am sure that no hon. Member believes

262

that I am doing anything of the sort. I am merely trying to paint the background against which these people reached that position, and I trust that we shall never reach that stage again. The net was closing on Blunt. I believe that is why he eventually confessed, because as the Prime Minister said, information became available in 1964. He did not know how much more would become available, and so in the end he confessed. I accept the view that the immunity offer was made to him honestly and genuinelyit is a matter of judgment as to whether or not it was misguidedin order to secure further information from him. I accept what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) said. He said it to me when I was Prime Minister, and he said it again today. A prosecution could not have been launched at a later stage in the circumstances in which the immunity was given. However, looking back, and without any sense of recrimination, I think that the advice at the time about his being allowed to stay was wrong. I do not know what decision I would have reached in those circumstances. None of us knows. Those who took the decision are now gone. But since this was almost bound to come out in due time, and however good the intentions of those who reached the original decision, I regret it. Of course, I have been a party to it, like seven other Home Secretaries, four Attorneys-General and four Prime Ministers, excluding Lord Home. Therefore, I am sorry that this has happened. I am bound to say that I think that there has been a tendency to treat Mr. Blunt with kid gloves. That is not my view with hindsight; I expressed it as Prime Minister and was minuted to that effect. Once one is committed to a particular course, one must sometimes go on on that course, whatever one may think. I think that all of us found ourselves in that position. Should there be a further inquiry into the Blunt conspiracy, as my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. 510 Wellbeloved) suggested? Frankly, I think not. We shall never know the truth now. The security services have done all they can. Innocent names will be bandied about. Indeed, they have already been bandied about. Actions have been attributed to some of us that are totally untrue. I have not corrected them. There is a story in the newspapers today about inquiries that I am supposed to have ordered. I have checked with No. 10 Downing Street and have discovered that it is totally false. This kind of rumour is bound to go on, and I cannot see any particular prospect of a further inquiry into Blunt and what happened being successful. I believe that if the security services could have found out, for their own pride they would have found out who had penetrated and how. So far they have failed to uncover that. However, I do not think that we should leave the matter there. I am in favour of an inquiry into certain aspects of this case.

263

I believe that the questions which have been asked by the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed and my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Central (Mr. Cook) need an answer. None of us should feel too proud about what we did or should feel that all wisdom resides in us and that this matter should not be examined. I discount some of the propositions that have been advanced, but it is worth looking again at the relationship that exists between Ministers and the Prime Minister and between Ministers and the heads of the services, to see whether improvements can be made in that matter. The question of ministerial co-ordination is important. It would be possible for consideration to be givenwith a report to the Prime Ministerto the question whether Parliament can be brought in on this matter to any greater extent. I have always found Parliament to be pretty responsible about this, and it would have to be denied, if not the question, then at least the answer from the Prime Minister. I urge the House to reflect on how far we shall get. We could ask the head of M15 every year whether he had observed the rulesthe Maxwell Fyfe rules and the new procedure laid down today along with any new procedures we might deviseand we should get the answer "Yes". 511 At any rate, that procedure might remind the head of MI5 that the rules exist, and that might be the value of it. At any rate, I should like to see the subject examined. Therefore, I urge the Prime Minister, within the limits of what I am discussing, to consider whether it would not be worth while, in order to satisfy the proper curiosity of hon. MembersI do not use "curiosity" in its narrow sense, because they have a right to be satisfiedto set up some kind of inquiry to be conducted by Lord Diplock or someone of that calibre. We could discuss how it were done, what its terms of reference were and who would conduct it. It would report back on whether any change were needed in relations between Ministers and the heads of the services, or whether Parliament could be involved more, not in the decisions, but in the rules and the way in which they were applied and observed. I conclude by saying that this has been a very sorry story in our history. It is one in which no one can feel any sense of pride. I wish that it had never happened. I fear that the morale of the service was damaged. I would not wish to see it damaged further, and one can damage the morale of a bad service as well as of a good service, as we know. It is our task, since this intelligence and security is required, to see that these services are given the fullest help to do their job, that they are kept under proper ministerial control in doing it, and that, as far as possible, Ministers should account for themselves to Parliament on the way in which these great and grave responsibilities are carried out. 9.38 pm The Attorney-General (Sir Michael Havers) 264

Before attempting to deal as fully as I can with the main points made in the debate, I should first, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister foreshadowed, like to deal with the question of immunity, a matter at the heart of this affair. The granting of immunity is a promise that a man will not be prosecuted, and it is given when the public interest in obtaining the man's cooperation is judged to be sufficient to forgo the opportunity or possible opportunity of prosecuting 512 him. It mayand this is more usually the case nowadaysbe a more limited affairthat is, limited to saying that a man's confession would not be used against him, but leaving open the question of his prosecution based on admissible evidence from sources other than his confession. In that kind of case any confession given becomes unusable as a matter of law because no statement is admissible unless it is voluntary; and it is not voluntary if there has been promise or inducement. In the case of Mr. Blunt, the immunity was not so limited because that was a situation in which there was no admissible evidence against him and little, if any, prospect of ever obtaining any. His denials had been firm over a number of years. What was given to him, therefore, was not merely a promise that his confession would not be used as evidence against him, but in return for his co-operation and his giving of information useful to the Security Service he was given a promise that he would never be prosecuted for his previous spying activities. One of the issues that has been raised is whether the immunity should have been granted. I shall summarise what happened when Professor Blunt was interviewed by the Security Service on 23 April 1964 at his home. He was told of the new information to which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has referred. He maintained his denial. He was offered immunity from prosecution. He sat in silence for a while. He got up, looked out of the window, poured himself a drink and after a few minutes confessed. Later he co-operated, and he continued to co-operate. That is how the immunity was given and that is how Blunt responded. In my view, events have clearly justified the decision that was taken by Sir John Hobson in 1964. If the House is troubled about the extent to which immunities may be given, I shall say a word or two about who may give them. Immunities may be given by the Director of Public Prosecutions who, I remind the House, carries out his duties under the superintendence of the Attorney-General. Alternatively, immunities may be given directly by the Attorney-General or on his authority. In serious cases they 513 would not be given by the Director without reference to the Attorney-General. The authority for the giving of immunity to Blunt in 1964 was given, as the House knows, on the authority of my predecessor Sir John Hobson, after the matter had been referred to him by the then Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions.

265

There is no specific legal statutory authority for the giving of immunities, but what is meant by immunity is the promise not to prosecute, and that promise can be effectively honoured by the Director and the Attorney-General. Some offences may be proceeded with only with the consent of the Attorney-General. Offences under the Official Secrets Act fall within that category. Other statutes require prior consent to be given by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and sometimes by the Attorney-General. The Director has a power to take over cases and offer no evidence. Ultimatelyperhaps it is the most important powerthe Attorney-General may enter a nolle prosequi, which will stop any prosecution on indictment. That is how an immunity can be effectively carried out and implemented. The decision of an Attorney-General to authorise the granting of immunity such as that granted in the Blunt case is a decision, like many others in the area of law enforcement, which the Attorney-General takes without the prior approval of his ministerial colleagues. The constitutional position is clear. An Attorney-General may seek from his ministerial colleagues information that may be relevant to the public interest affecting his decision, but the final decision is his alone. Whether he should inform his ministerial colleagues of such decisions is another matter. As has already been made clear, Sir John Hobson, when taking his decision, was told that the matter had already been brought to the attention of the then Home Secretary. My position in this matter as Attorney-General, and that of my immediate predecessorsthe Attorney-General in 1972, now Lord Rawlinson, and the Attorney-General in 1974the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin)has been to agree that Blunt's confession obtained as a result of the inducement would be inadmissible in criminal proceedings. That was made clear in the 514 useful intervention of the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich. We are agreed that Blunt could never now be prosecuted in respect of matters about which he confessed, even if evidence, apart from the confession, existed to sustain a prosecution. In the event, no such other evidence has ever existed. However, the position of successive Attorneys-General must be that they honour the undertakings given by, or on the authority of, their predecessors. In saying that, I am not to be taken as implying that I would have taken a different decision from my predecessor, Sir John Hobson. It is not now a decision for me to take. It was taken at the time on the basis of material properly put to him and on which he was in a position to balance the public interest in favour of the granting of immunity. I have already demonstrated to the House how effective the offer of immunity turned out to be. It is equally clear that once an immunity has been granted in wide termsthat is, that no prosecution will be launchedto retract it later could only do damage to the public interest. It would inevitably diminish,

266

if not destroy, the purpose for which it was granted. No further offer would be likely to be relied upon by another suspected person. It also seems to me that, although the immunity is in respect of prosecution, its usefulness in future, for other cases, would also be diminished if publicity were given to the confession that followed it, even when any security grounds for maintaining silence had disappeared. The publicity in this case followed directly from the priority written question to my right hon. Friend which itself arose from the book and the press comment on the book. Generally, apart from the question whether it would be right for the Crown to take the initiative in naming a man as a spy when there was no evidence on which to prosecute him, it seems to me that anonymity should usually be inherent in the granting of immunity. This would not apply in an ordinary criminal case where the super-grass or one of the defendants is called as a witness for the Crown, because everyone would then know what had happened. Mr. Beith What should then happen if Ministers are questioned in Parliament about that person? 515 The Attorney-General I have noted what the hon. Gentleman said. I intended to deal with the matter later. I will deal with it now. If a Minister is questioned, the truth will come out. He must tell the truth to the House. There is no question about that. Mr. English The right hon. and learned Gentleman will recollect the debate on the Select Committees. I pointed out that it was odd that the Home Secretary would be capable of being questioned by the Home Affairs Committee but that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would not. The right hon. and learned Gentleman could be questioned on the Floor of the House but not before the Select Committee. There may be reasons for excluding the Lord Chancellor in his judicial capacity, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman, even when he does not consult his colleagues, is not a judge: he is actually performing a professionally, legally advised executive act but cannot be questioned by the Home Affairs Committee that could investigate this matter. That must be wrong. The Attorney-General The whole matter was debated. The hon. Gentleman made a speech at some length on that occasion. I do not think it is relevant to this debate. Mr. James Callaghan 267

I apologise for interrupting, but the Attorney-General gave an absolute answer that, if a question was put in Parliament, then the name would have to be given. If he did not say that, I hope he will make clear that this is not what he means. There could be cases in which the national interest would be ill served by giving the name at that time. What he is required to do in the House is not to tell a lie to the House. The Attorney-General The way in which the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) put the question was: Would that force a Minister to tell a lie? Of course, it would not. But there would be occasions, I agree, when one would have to reply that in the public interest, it was impossible to answer the question. I would like to go back for a moment 516 Mr. Skinner rose The Attorney-General I have not time to give way. I should like to go back for a moment to the priority written question and the squalid speech made by the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton). There is no doubtI have checked thisthat the rules require that in the case of a priority written question of which due notice has been given, as it had in this case, the answer must be given on the day for which that notice has been given. So any attempt to allege that this was done deliberately by my right hon. Friend in order to try to provide different headlines is not only unfair but completely untrue. I should like now to deal with some of the matters raised in the course of the debate. I wish to make clear right at the beginning one point about the position with regard to the Palace and information that is known to Her Majesty the Queen. All communications between Her Majesty and her private secretarythis is a longstanding traditionare absolutely confidential, and must remain so. Therefore, it is quite wrong, and impossible, for any Minister to answer questions as to what was said between Her Majesty and the private secretary. Mr. William Hamilton Did she, or did she not know? The Attorney-General

268

The first speech following that of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was that made by the right hon. Member for Leeds. South (Mr. Rees). I was delighted to hear him say that he was against any form of 1921 Act tribunal. I agree with him that it would be quite inappropriate in this case, and also that it would not be right for any Select Committee to look into the matter or look more into the whole of the Security Service. I accept, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary also accepts, what the right hon. Gentleman said about the Home Secretary's responsibility in these matters involving secrecy. He suggested that the Security Commission should look at the problem. But one wants to know what the problems are. They have been identified in various ways. One would also have to consider what terms of reference would have to be put before the Commission. 517 I am sure that the House was very grateful to the right hon, and learned Member for Dulwich, who gave a clear account of what happened during his term of office. I have no disagreement whatsoever with the right hon, and learned Gentleman, because it is clear that the practice adopted during his four or five years in that office is the same as was adopted both before and after it during Conservative Administrations. The right hon, and learned Gentleman made the position very clear, and I am very grateful to him. I have referred to the squalid speech of the hon. Member for Fife, Central, which I suspect was written before he had even listened to the opening speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Mr. William Hamilton I should like to ask the right hon, and learned Gentleman a very simple question. He has talked about the private secretary to Her Majesty the Queen and the private secretary's relationship with Her Majesty. Will he state why the information was given to the private secretary, if it was not for conveying to Her Majesty? The Attorney-General I was not in office at the time, and that is not a question that I can answer. The hon. Gentleman finds it so easyhe has done it a number of times in the Houseto attack the "faceless men" in the Civil Service and say that they are not accountable. He had to be corrected by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, because he appears completely to have overlooked what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister saidthat the Home Secretary of the day knew, so there was somebody who would have been accountable to the House. I want to emphasise that it is

269

untrueI do not know where the hon. Gentleman's information came fromthat Blunt worked for the Security Service after October 1945. Mr. William Hamilton Part-time. The Attorney-General There is no evidence that he obtained any classified material after that date. The hon. Gentleman went on to say that it was quite wrong that only the Attorney-General should take the decision. First, the Home Secretary knew the facts. Secondly, as I have already pointed 518 out, it is a constitutional duty of the Home Secretary to take that decision by himself. Mr. Whitelaw The Attorney-General. The Attorney-General Yes, the Attorney-General. Need I remind the House of the consequences of the Campbell case in 1926, when the first Labour Government were brought down as a result of an instruction to the Attorney-General? I do not think that that is something that any Government wish to have repeated. My hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) speculated about the immunity, and especially the widest possible terms. Immunity could not include immunity in respect of future acts, and it never did. It was immunity in respect of Blunt's shying activities before he was seen on 23 April 1964. My hon. Friend continued by saying that immunity should be given on the instructions of the Home Secretary. No Home Secretary can govern the actions of an Attorney-General. A decision to grant immunity is made only by the Attorney-Generalthough, of course, he is entitled to consult. The principal reason for that is that it is only the AttorneyGeneral who can bring to a halt any criminal proceedings by entering a nolle prosequi. Mr. Cryerrose The Attorney-General

270

I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman as I am very short of time. [Interruption.] Mr. Speaker Order. The Attorney-General My hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, East (Mr. Aitken) wanted to have a Select Committee to overlook the work of the Security Service. I take the same view as the right hon. Member for Leeds, South, the previous Home Secretary, about that matter. I am sure that the House was impressed by the contribution of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath). It is clear that, during the time that he was Prime Minister, the rules were carried out satisfactorily. He was clearly in constant and effective touch with the Director-General, and the Home Secretary of the day kept him in touch as was necessary. He told us that he 519 was informed throughout. He said that if publicity is given to something, everybody is alerted to what has happened. I have already dealt with that important point. He pondered upon whether he should have announced that there was a cover-up. He said that he was told by the Security Service that it was still of value. That indicates the importance of the secrecy that was preserved at that time and it is one of the reasons why the silence was maintained. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) spoke of Ministers being passive. The Leader of the Opposition dealt effectively with that matter from his point of view when he was Prime Minister. As Attorney-General, I was briefed within a month of entering office about all the matters that the Security Service felt I should know. When I have had any queries they have been dealt with promptly and efficiently. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East suggested that immunities were granted because there is a special law for some people. It may interest the House to know that in these matters of secrecy one immunity has been granted since the warthe one in the case of Blunt. There is no question of what the right hon. Gentleman described in a rather offensive phrase as "pre-emptive immunity" for special people. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) asked why Blunt was kept in office at the Palace. That question has been dealt with partly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup, and it is partly explained by the reasons of lack of publicity and the inherent immunity that should apply in such a case. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton felt that there was nothing to merit immunity. Nevertheless, there was nothing which would have led to the prosecution and conviction of Blunt. By granting immunity, the Security Service achieved a bonus that it would not otherwise have had.

271

The Leader of the Opposition spoke of the relationship between the Security Service and Ministers. I agree with him that the matter will never be cleared up fully. Too many people are out of reach either by reason of ill health or death. I am not sure what form he would like the inquiry that he referred to to take. 520 The Prime Minister today spoke of the new safeguards that have been put into effect. When the Attorney-General is asked to consider granting immunity, as a matter of course he will now inform the Home Secretary. That safeguard would not have been lacking in 1964 because the Home Secretary had already been informed. I pose these questions to the House, Js there any need to hold an inquiry? Is it worth while in 1979 to inquire into whether the investigation into Russian intelligence penetration of our public service, following the defection of Burgess and Maclean, all of those years ago, was as thorough and effective as we would wish? We have to remember that the Blunt confession itself is now 15 years old and any necessary action has been taken. Are the procedures that we now operate sufficient to guard the State against a repetition of anything that might have gone wrong? Surely this debate has demonstrated that no inquiry is needed. Mr. William Hamilton rose in his place and claimed to move. That the Question be now put. Mr. Speaker The Question is. That the Question be now put. As many as are of that opinion say "Aye". Hon. Members Aye. Mr. Speaker To the contrary "No". Hon. Members No. Mr. Speaker Order. I did not quite hear that answer. I will put the Question again. Question put and negatived. **

272