Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, :o1: DOI: 10.

1163/15700615-20120009
EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
European Journal
of
East Asian Studies
www.brill.nl/ejea
A Review of ailands Foreign
Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia:
Exploring an Ideational Approach
1
Pongphisoot Busbarat
Australian National University
p.busbarat@gmail.com
Abstract
In the post-Cold War period, mainland Southeast Asia has been signicantly marked by
peace and stability, despite occasional bilateral tensions among neighbouring countries.
Within this environment Tailand has been a primary advocate for various sub-regional
co-operation initiatives since the early 1,,os. Interestingly, these regional projects have
mainly been Tailands own self-initiated version, in which Tailand acts as the main co-
ordinator, sometimes bypassing broader regional entities, especially ASEAN. Conventional
wisdom may explain this phenomenon by resorting to the economic rationale in Tai
foreign policy. However, in some circumstances economic benet is not a decisive factor
considering associated costs. Tis article, therefore, proposes to use an ideational lens to
reassess Tailands regional leadership by focusing on the role of self-perception/identity
in determining Tailands foreign policy preferences. It argues that Tailands identity as
a leading country in mainland Southeast Asia helps sustain its active role in sub-regional
endeavours. Te Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative is examined here to
show the intervention of Tailands self-perception in the endurance of its leadership in this
regional initiative.
Keywords
Tai foreign policy; self-perception; national identity; sub-regional co-operation
1)
Te author appreciates Gertjan Dijkink, Narayanan Ganesan, Tyrell Haberkorn, Andrew
MacIntyre, William Tow and Andrew Walker for their helpful comments and suggestions
on earlier versions of the manuscript, including the Department of Political & Social
Change, College of Asia & the Pacic, ANU for facilities provided during the initial stage
of writing.
1:8 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
Introduction
Conict and co-operation are two major overarching themes in the study of
international relations (IR). Regarding the issue of nationalism, its inuence
in international politics is generally viewed as generating conicts.
2
Likewise,
Tailands relations with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbours are normally
complicated by nationalism in each country, involving antagonistic historical
narratives and disagreements over border demarcation inherited fromthe colo-
nial era. Tailands historical narratives reect its negative view towards aggres-
sive Burma, weak Laos and the untrustworthy Khmer.
3
Indochinese states are
also suspicious of Tailands hegemony, rooted in bitter experiences of Siamese
aggression centuries ago and Tailands support of foreign intervention in their
countries during the Cold War. Complicated by domestic politics, nationalism
also exacerbates bilateral conicts on many occasions, especially when border
issues are involved. Recent Tai-Cambodian conict over the ownership of
the ancient ruin of Preah Vihear Temple during :oo8:o11 resurfaced as part
of an attempt by the conservative group to insult Taksin and his allies for
compromising Tailands national interests. Tey demanded that the Abhisit
government adopt hawkish measures to reclaim the ancient ruin. In Cambo-
dia, Hun Sen also took advantage of this situation to capitalise on nationalistic
sentiment against Tai hegemony and promote popular support for his lead-
ership. Terefore, nationalism is generally viewed as a diminishing factor, not
an attribute to co-operation in Tailands relations with neighbouring coun-
tries.
At the same time, despite occasional tensions, mainland Southeast Asia
can actually be seen as largely peaceful since the decline of the Cold War,
marked by Tailands turning the battleelds into marketplaces policy under
2)
See discussion in Arjun Appadurai, Te grounds of the nation-state: identity, violence
and territory, in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin (eds) Nationalism
and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Routledge, :ooo), pp. 1o1:;
and Stanley Homann, Nationalism and world order, in the same volume, pp. 1,;:1;
Martha L. Cottamand Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: Te Political Behaviour
or Nation States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, :oo1); Douglas Woodwell, Nationalism in
International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
:oo;).
3)
Charnvit Kasetsiri, TailandCambodia: a love-hate relationship, Kyoto Reviewof South-
east Asia, No. (:oo), available at: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue:/
index.html.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1:,
the Chatichai Choonhavan government in 1,88. Since then Tailand has been
among the enthusiasts in restoring regional peace and prosperity, especially by
advocating sub-regional co-operation in mainland Southeast Asia. Te con-
ventional view would explain this development in Tailands foreign rela-
tions through the economic rationale of globalisation in the post-Cold War
period. However, one piece of the jigsaw is still missing. Tailand has been
relentless in trying to promote its own version of new regional initiatives
such as the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative, the Bay
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation
(BIMSTEC), the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation
Strategy (ACMECS), the Emerald Triangle and the Asia Co-operation Dia-
logue (ACD). Tese important initiatives have one thing in common:
they place Bangkok as a crucial player linking countries into a web of co-
operation.
Tis policy preference seems to be a rational choice of action, but this is
not always the case as it involves tremendous resources to manage and sus-
tain such co-operation. Scholars have long argued that foreign policy-making
is basically done by human beings, and so is not a perfectly rational enter-
prise. Terefore, this paper looks at the inuence of ideational aspect in Tai
foreign policy-making. Tis self-perception/identity is dened here in the for-
eign relations domain as Tailand perceiving itself to be a leading nation
in Southeast Asia, hence its aspirations to remain so. It is developed with
reference to Tai modern state-building and nationalism, and helps sustain
Tailands policy preference of assuming a role in promoting its own version
of regional co-operation. Tis perception is cultivated throughout its con-
temporary history of nation-state building. Te Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation (QEC) initiative is examined here to show the intervention of Tai-
lands self-perception in the endurance of its leadership in this regional initia-
tive.
. e Construction of ailands Self-perception
Tis article concurs with the ideational account that actors interests are not
exogenously determined. One area of common ground is that actors live
in a society and engage in the social processes of sharing and distributing
ideas and knowledge through socialisation. As Judith Goldstein and Robert
Keohane suggest, ideas can aect policy in three ways. First, ideas provide
world views in which possibilities for action are perceived. Tey also act
as principled beliefs, dening certain criteria for judging what is right or
1o Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
wrong, and as causal beliefs oering guidelines on how to achieve objectives.
Second, ideas serve as road maps to particular preferences while other possible
alternatives are excluded. Tird, ideas also help to determine the levels of co-
operation and cohesion for particular groups or to serve as focal points. Policy-
makers may resolve collective action problems and reach agreement based on
shared culture and other normative factors. Over time, some ideas become
institutionalised while the levels of interest supporting certain initial ideas may
fade or change. Terefore, ideas certainly shape policy preferences; and certain
shared ideas may dominate policy-making and generate certain types of policy
options for a long period of time.
4
An important variant of ideas is self-perception or identity that actors create
as a mental shortcut. It provides a clue to how actors should think, feel, eval-
uate, and ultimately, behave
5
in response to surrounding environments. Te
construction of identity is achieved through social interactions within a society
and with outsiders, which may produce either positive or negative aspects of
self-other relationship. Once actors have embraced a particular identity, it will
help themto dene the interests and roles consistent with that identity.
6
Tere-
fore, actors basically hold this identity when they decide what policy response
they should pursue with other actors in the rst place, mostly regardless of real-
ity. Tis is thus an important factor determining policy preference in foreign
policy-making.
7
Simply speaking, identities constitute interest and role which
4)
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: a analytical frame-
work, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1,,), pp. o.
5)
Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel, Introduction: tracing the inu-
ence of identity on foreign policy, in Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel
(eds) Te Origins of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, 1,,,), pp. viixxii.
6)
See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, Te culture of
national security: norms and identity in world politics, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Intro-
duction: alternative perspectives on national security, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) Te
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
International Aairs Online, 1,,o), available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/
index.html; Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of
power politics, International Organization, Vol. o, No. : (1,,:), pp. ,1:.
7)
Michael Brecher, Blema Steinburg and Janice Stein, A framework for research on foreign
policy behaviour, Journal of Conict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1,o,), pp. ;1o1; Alexan-
der George, Te operational code: a neglected approach to the study of political leaders
and decision-making, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. : (1,o,), pp. 1,o:::;
Richard Herrmann, Te power of perceptions in foreign-policy decision making: do views
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 11
inform possible actions.
8
For a state, foreign policy is thus an important tool
because it reproduces the states identities that ensure self and other dier-
entiation.
9
For this reason, self-perception is worth studying as a signicant
variable explaining a states international policies and actions.
Tis section traces the origin of how Tai elites understand and perceive
themselves and their countrys relational position and role vis--vis outsiders.
It depicts the inuence of the socialisation process since the advent of modern
Tai nation-building and its impact on shaping Tailands identity, especially
in its relations with neighbouring countries. Tis identity propounds the view
that Tailand is of higher status and hence should be the centre of regional
political economy, resulting in the foreign policy preference that Tailand
should lead the co-ordination of regional development.
1.1. Te Emergence of Tailands Self-perception
Tailands self-perception is closely associated with the emergence of nation-
alism sponsored primarily by the Tai state as part of its statecraft or nation-
state building. Nationalism has been used by political elites in dierent peri-
ods but always with the same purpose in mindto form national characteris-
tics and knowledge shared by dierent groups of people residing in the newly
demarcated territories or, to use Benedict Andersons words, to shape an imag-
ined community.
10
Tis imagined Tailand was constructed mainly through
Bangkoks promotion of so-called ocial nationalism. Tis version of nation-
alism underscores royalty as one of the supreme national pillars: the nation,
religion and the king.
of the Soviet Union determine the policy choices of American leaders? American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. o, No. (1,8o), pp. 818;; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misper-
ception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1,;o).
8)
Chris Reus-Smit, Te constructivist turn: critical theory after the Cold War, Working
Paper No. 1,,o/ (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of
Pacic and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1,,o); Wendt, Anarchy is what
states make of it.
9)
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1,,8); Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity and
Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (London: Routledge, 1,,o); Christopher Hill,
Te Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, :oo).
10)
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 1,8).
1: Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
To consolidate the Tai nation-state building project, Tai elites since King
Chulalongkorn (181,1o) have employed various strategies to enforce, pop-
ularise and imbue an ocial nationalism into the Tai people.
11
Bangkok has
pursued overt national consolidation policies, as evidenced by the case of the
Siamese court forcing other smaller kingdoms both militarily and voluntar-
ily to accept Bangkok as the sole sovereign for modern Siam. Tis resulted in
Tailand engaging with Western powers to demarcate its physical territories in
which the new map was the encoding of desire.
12
Te new mapping created
a geopolitical vision of the Tai state which helped shape ideas of its own
identity and relations with others, resulting in a collective mission or foreign
policy strategy.
13
However, it was the enforcement of socialisation processes that embed-
ded the imagined Tailand among Tai citizens. Within a new reality of
a Western-dominated international system where Tailand was in fact sub-
ordinated, the nation needed to be reassured of its relevance and signi-
cance. As Tongchai asserts, the Tai elite did this by resorting to building
the concept of siwilai (from the English civilised) so that Tailand was able
to measure up to other races within the new Siam, and to other nations in
the region, on the same Western scale.
14
Various modernisation projects can
be seen emerging through this vision, such as Western-style military train-
ing, legal system, modern transport and buildings, as well as the Cultural
Mandates established under the Phibun government to promote a uniformed
civilised Tai-ness according to the states denitions
15
between 1,, and
1,:.
According to this view, Tailand was more civilised and modernised than
its neighbours who had succumbed to Western colonial rule. Popular educa-
tion was a key instrument in the socialisation of this idea, and has continued
its emphasis on Tailands superiority in Southeast Asia, its past victories and
11)
Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Tailand (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, :oo).
12)
Tongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1,,), p. 1:.
13)
Dijkink, National Identity, p. 11.
14)
Tongchai Winichakul, Te quest for Siwilai: a geographical discourse of civiliza-
tional thinking in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Siam, Journal of Asian
Studies, Vol. ,, No. (:ooo), pp. :8,.
15)
Piyanat Bunnag, Modern Tai History: From the Bowring Treaty to the 1, October 1,;,
Incident (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, :oo;), in Tai.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1
its expansion into present-day neighbouring countries,
16
a version of history
that is still being taught in Tai schools even today.
17
Tis nationalist sen-
timent became crystallised in the regional vision of the Tai elite, especially
within the military circle of the 1,os1,os, becoming widely known as the
Suvarnabhumi concept that continental Southeast Asia should be under Tai-
lands leadership.
18
Tis version of royal-nationalism has been so hegemonic
that other versions of nationalism, if they existed at all, have survived only
briey, such as the nationalism promoted by liberal intellectuals during the
1,os in the aftermath of the 1,: Revolution, the leftist nationalism of the
1,oos1,;os and the social movement of the 1,8os.
Tailands identity was also reinforced by the external environment. Expe-
riences during the Cold War not only rationalised the tangible security threat
perceived by Tailand towards its neighbours but also deepened the sense of
Bangkoks regional centrality. Tailands role as an American ally and a regional
frontline state against communism during this period mirrored its struggle
for inuence over mainland Southeast Asia. Te perception of Tailand as
a centre of Southeast Asia was also rearmed by Tailands major security
patron, the United States. Edwin F. Stanton, former US Ambassador to Tai-
land, expressed American concern regarding Tailands security threat in the
aftermath of the Geneva Conference of 1,. He stated that Because of her
geographical and strategic location, Tailand is the heart and citadel of the
region
19
and should thus be preserved from being overtaken by neighbouring
communist countries. He further proposed that the US government should
provide assistance to maintain Tailands participation in the free world, and
should base its defensive system for Southeast Asia in Tailand. He said, If
Tailands freedom and independence can be preserved, the heart and much
of the body of Southeast Asia will have been saved.
20
Terefore, it can be seen
16)
Warunee Osatharom, Tai school textbooks and Southeast Asia our neighbor: a
reection of hidden agenda of Tai nationalism, in Kanchanee Laongsri (ed.) Laos and
Tailand: What Do We Learn? (Bangkok: Alpha Publishing, :oo1), in Tai.
17)
Tongchai Winichakul, Nationalism and the radical intelligensia in Tailand, Tird
World Quarterly, Vol. :,, No. (:oo8), pp. ;,1; see p. 8.
18)
Tobias Nischalke, Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea
of regional community, Te Pacic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (:oo:), pp. 8,11;.
19)
Edwin F. Stanton, Spotlight on Tailand, Foreign Aairs, Vol. , No. 1 (1,), pp. ;:
8; see p. ;:.
20)
Stanton, Spotlight on Tailand, p. 8.
1 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
that US military assistance during the Cold War and its political support
21
were
partly due to its perception that Tailand was the critical fortress for the free
world in this region.
Te creation of ASEANcan also be seen as part of US support for Tailands
role in the region. Despite the conventional belief that ASEAN was created
by like-minded Southeast Asian nations, a US archival document reveals the
possibility that ASEAN may in fact have been an American idea but without
the overt involvement of the US. A memoir from Dean Rusk to President
Johnson on 1 May 1,o; mentions that US objectives were to foster Asian
regional co-operation with Tailand playing a leading role.
22
It suggests that
the US perceived Tailand as a key actor and wanted to support its role in this
regional arrangement.
Te Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1,;8 also sensitised Tailand
to an historical enemy that had always challenged Bangkoks sphere of inu-
ence.
23
Te Tai elite felt threatened by rising Vietnamese inuence, and thus
designated Tailands role as one of defence against Hanoi, as it had done
before. Tailands calls for support from the great powers and the international
community in this episode placed Bangkok under the world political spotlight
in the Cambodia conict. Tailand played a central role in brokering a series
of peace talks as well as shaping an environment and policy to end the con-
ict. Te conclusion of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian
issue both elevated the esteem of Tai policy-makers relative to their countrys
centrality in the region.
Tese historical experiences not only helped to develop the idea of Tailand
as a leading player in mainland Southeast Asia, but also invariably encour-
aged the Tais to cultivate a negative image of other nations, particularly their
neighbours. Tailands neighbouring countries and their peoples are generally
portrayed as uncivilised, subordinate, treacherous or untrustworthy. Tais thus
21)
Natthaphon Jaijing, Monarchy under the eagles shadow: American psychological strat-
egy and the strengthening of the monarchy as the national symbol, Fa Diao Kan, Vol. ,,
No. : (:o11), pp. ,1oo, (in Tai); Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy
and Tailand Military Rule 1,,;1,;; (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1,88), in Tai.
22)
Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, Tai Politics During SaritTanom Regimes under Global
Power Structure (Bangkok: o Years Foundation, Bank of Tailand, :oo;), p. 11, in Tai.
23)
Ralf Emmers, Security cooperation in the Asia-Pacic: evolution of concepts and prac-
tices, in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds) Asia-Pacic Security Cooperation: National
Interests and Regional Order (Armonk: East Gate, :oo); N. Ganesan, Tailands relations
with Malaysia and Myanmar in post-Cold War Southeast Asia, Japanese Journal of Political
Science, Vol. :, No. 1 (:oo1), pp. 1:;1o.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1
tend not to view themselves in close association with their immediate neigh-
bouring countries despite their sharing of cultural, historical, linguistic, reli-
gious and ethnic roots. Te nation-building and socialisation processes have
resulted in the formation of a self and other dichotomy in which the self is
superior and the others are inferior. In other words, Tai self-perception was
formed around the core idea of Tailands higher status, and from this came
its role, as deemed by its policy elites, as a regional leader. Tis self-perception
also interacted with the structural environment in the Cold War time frame,
resulting in Tailand dening its national interest as protection of its security
from communist neighbours. Policies grounded in distrust therefore domi-
nated Tailands foreign policy behaviour throughout the post-war era.
1.:. Globalisation and Tailands (Re)Emerging Regional Aspirations
Te decline of political contestation and the rise of economic globalisation at
the end of the Cold War involved both material and ideational changes in Tai-
land. As stipulated by ideational theories, agents and structure are mutually
constituted,
24
and the decline of Cold War tensions and the internationalisa-
tion of the Tai economy certainly had an impact on the adjustment of Tai
policy-makers cognitive aspects, and hence on its foreign policy behaviour.
Te Tai economy was further transformed, particularly after the Plaza Accord
in 1,8 when the rise in the Japanese yen forced a new round of Japanese
investment in Southeast Asia, including in other East Asian newly industrialis-
ing economies (NIEs) at a later stage, to escape the increasing cost of produc-
tion.
25
Tailands economic structure and policy changed from import substi-
tution to export orientation focusing on low-end and low-value-added elec-
tronic industries, textile and other consumer products.
26
24)
Chris Reus-Smit, Constructivism, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Deve-
tak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, MatthewPaterson, Chris Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (eds)
Teories of International Relations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, :oo).
25)
Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill, New Hierarchies in East Asia: Te Post-Plaza
Division of Labour (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National
University, 1,,:); Christopher M. Dent, Te Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, :oo:); John Ravenhill, Japanese and US
subsidiaries in East Asia: host economy eects, in G.H. Marcus and M.J. Marcus (eds)
Te MIT Japan Program: Science, Technology, Management (Cambridge, MA: Center for
International Studies, MIT, 1,,o).
26)
Pasuk Phongpaichit, Te New Wave of Japanese Investment in ASEAN: Determinants and
Prospect (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1,,o).
1o Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
Not only did the internationalisation of the Tai economy shift Tailands
production structure into an export-led economy, it also facilitated change
in the political structure. A more globalised Tai economy brought about
the expansion of the capitalists and the middle class. Tis socio-economic
change also meant that the political landscape was more open to their direct
involvement in politics, a change which eventually resulted in the decline of
the political system led by the military and the reintroduction of a civilian
regime a long decade after the short-lived civilian government of 1,;1,;o.
Te Chatichai government was a turning point in Tailands political economy,
with the government enjoying civilian rules with support from businessmen.
As Anek Laothamatas argues, the increasing role of capitalists transformed Tai
politics frombureaucratic polity to liberal corporatism.
27
In this type of state,
international competitiveness replaced security dilemmas and became another
important raison d tat indicating the Tai states interest, policy and strategies,
including the ideas of competition, co-option and co-operation.
However, within this environment the core of Tailands self-perception as a
leading actor in the region stayed rm. Since Tailands economic and indus-
trial policy had already been transformed to accommodate the competitive
mentality of the globalised world economy, the nal vanguard of the Cold
War was found in security and foreign policy. Terefore, it was not surprising
to see Chatichais attempt to change the countrys policy towards its neighbours
by announcing the turning the battleelds into marketplaces policy. Tis was
to open more economic opportunities for the emerging Tai economy.
Tailands self-perception started to develop into a more co-operative mode,
while its core element relating to its self-appointed sense of superiority
remained intact. In other words, the Cold War antagonistic perception towards
neighbouring countries gradually became outmoded in the post-Cold War era.
Yet the view of Tailand as a leading nation in Southeast Asia remained an
important operational idea among Tai policy-makers. Teir identity was still
centred on the idea of Tailands leading position in the region, but it was
linked more closely to a co-operative approach than to the power competition
of the Cold War. Tis resulted in Tailand seeking to exercise its regional lead-
ing roleits so-called regional aspirations. Tis characteristic has arguably
been sustained throughout the post-Cold War period as an important element
in Tailands foreign policy.
27)
Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Tailand: From
Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1,,1).
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1;
Interestingly, parallel to the embracing of globalised economy, various sec-
tors in Tailand began to search for the authenticity of Tai cultures by looking
outside Tailand. In the late 1,8os, Tai academics, pioneered by Chatthip
Natsupha, regained their interest in the trans-historical elements of authen-
tic Tai cultures among other ethnic Tai/Tai in Laos, Myanmars Shan state,
southern China, parts of Indias Assam state and western Vietnam.
28
A large
number of academics, businessmen and state ocials travelled to these areas
and made proposals to link the Tai/Tai brotherhood within Tailands orbit
through various programmes including the promotion of tourism, transport
and economic projects.
29
For example, the governor of Chiangrai Province,
accompanied by local businessmen, made a series of visits to these areas in
1,,1 to promote trade links with Tailands northern provinces under the Five
Chiangs strategy encompassing Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Chiangtung, Chian-
grung and Chiangthong.
30
Tis idea was later incorporated into and promoted
under the Quadrangle Growth initiative in 1,,. At the same time, the promi-
nent Tai scholar Chai-anan Samudavanija, among others, also lent his support
to the development of this sub-region. He argues that this idea reinvigorated
old trade routes in this sub-region, which had been constrained by the Cold
War conict.
31
Reynolds contends that these attempts gave a meaning to Tai
national identity itself. Te underlying idea is similar to the pan-Tai state con-
cept, emphasising the dominant role of the Tai race in mainland Southeast
Asia as advocated by the nationalist elite in the 1,os.
32
1.. Tailands Regional Aspirations and Its Foreign Policy Behaviour
To put Tailands post-Cold War foreign policy into the aforementioned con-
text, it can be seen that it was largely occupied with regional agendas after the
Chatichai administration (1,881,,1). Chatichais foreign policy of turning
28)
Tongchai Winichakul, Nationalism and the radical intelligensia in Tailand.
29)
Craig J. Reynolds, Globalization and nationalism in modern Tailand, in Joel S. Kahn
(ed.) Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Singapore, and Tailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1,,8).
30)
Chiangtung, Chiangrung and Chiangthong are names used by Tai people in Tailand
for Kentung, Jinghong and Luang Prabang, respectively. See also Arun Narongchai, How
did the ve angle strategy come about? Public Relations Oce Region , Chiangmai, in
Tai, available at: http://www.prdnorth.in.th/article/a:.htm.
31)
Chai-anan Samudavanija, Bypassing the state in Asia, New Perspectives Quarterly,
Vol. 1:, No. 1 (1,,), pp. ,1.
32)
Reynolds, Globalization and nationalism.
18 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
battleelds into marketplaces was partly intended to stimulate economic activ-
ity by bridging economic opportunities between Tailand and Indochinese
states through border trade. Tis strategy was later supported by the expansion
of transport infrastructure that linked inner regions to seaports on the east coast
of Tailand.
33
Tis signicantly impacted not only economic development but
also security and politics in Southeast Asia. Tailand was playing a leading role
in paving the way towards peace and development in the region, with histor-
ical foes becoming friends. Te rapprochement with Hanoi may have been
an impossible achievement under previous governments because Vietnam was
regarded as the foremost threat to Tailands security. Tis policy also left its
legacy in ASEANs practice of constructive engagement with authoritarian
neighbours.
Chatichais successors continued foreign policy objectives in a similar vein
by searching for ways in which Tailand would become a key regional player
in constructing developmental regionalism. Te Anand government (1,,1
1,,:) successfully pushed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) forward in
1,,:. It was also Anand who formalised and advocated Chatichais idea of
constructive engagement as a major guideline for Tailands policy towards
its neighbours, with a particular focus on Myanmar.
34
Tis policy also had
regional repercussions, as it became a common regional practice with a broad
reference to a general principle of non-interference in ASEAN members inter-
nal aairs. During the Chuan government (1,,:1,,) the promotion of
sub-regional economic co-operation was one of its major foreign policies. Te
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was proposed to co-ordinate
development projectsmainly with respect to transport linksamong Tai-
land, China, Myanmar and Laos, and placed Tailand at the centre of the
project.
35
Te Chavalit government (1,,o1,,;) attempted to assert Tai-
lands role as an epicentre of mainland Southeast Asia through its Indochina
33)
Chuan Leekpai, Policy statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Chuan
Leekpai delivered to Parliament on Wednesday, :1 October 1,,:, National Assembly Report,
1/:,,, (Bangkok: Te Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 1,,:), in Tai.
34)
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation (Lanham: University Press of America,
:oo).
35)
E.C. Chapman and Peter Hinton, Te emerging Mekong Corridor: a note on recent
development (to May 1,,), TaiYunnan Project Newsletter, Vol. :1 (June 1,,), available
at: http://www.nectec.or.th/thai-yunnan/:1.html; Kusuma Snitwongse, Tai foreign policy
in the global age: principle or prot? Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. :, No. : (:oo1),
pp. 18,:1:.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1,
policy. Chavalits foreign policy highlight revolved around the exercise of Tai-
lands inuence over ASEANs admission of Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos,
including ASEANs economic programmes aiming at expanding transport
links between countries in Indochina and the other ASEAN countries, for
which Tailand was a major hub.
36
Chavalit also wanted to link South and
Southeast Asia under his Look West policy, facilitated by a new forum of
the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-
operation (BIMSTEC).
37
It can be seen that Tai foreign policy fromChatichai
until before the 1,,; Financial Crisis focused on nominating Tailand as a
centre of regional dynamics. Tailand envisioned its leadership as being recog-
nised, and therefore invested extensively in its regional policy throughout this
time. Former Ambassador Kasit Piromya also conrmed this vision that Tai
leaders from Prem, Chatichai and Anand onwards shared a similar vision of
Tailands regional leading role in the early post-Cold War period.
38
Te Asian Financial Crisis, which hit Tailand in 1,,;, was a sign of
Tailand losing its competitiveness, and hence seriously aected its condence
to continue in the leading role. Although Tai foreign policy during this
time was understandably framed within its relations with external powers and
nancial institutionsnotably the US, the European Union, Japan, the IMF,
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
39
its aspirations
for regional leadership did not totally disappear.
Tailands proposal of Flexible Engagement during the second Chuan
government tried both to preserve its material interest and to manoeuvre
foreign policy to emphasise Tailands identity as a regional leading player.
Te proposed initiative was to radically adjust ASEAN members traditional
non-interference in each others domestic aairs by allowing frank discussions
36)
John Funston, Tai foreign policy: seeking inuence, Southeast Asian Aairs 1,,
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1,,8).
37)
BIMSTEC website, available at: http://www.bimstec.org/.
38)
Interview, 1, December :oo;. Kasit Piromya was Tailands retired senior diplomat. He
was later appointed Foreign Minister in the Abhisit government between December :oo8
and July :o11.
39)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Te preliminary assessment and observation on ideas and
position towards Tailands Flexible Engagement after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
in Manila, July 1,,8, No. Athen Embassy 8o/:1, (Bangkok: Archives and Library
Division, 1,,8), in Tai; Prapat Tepchatree, Vision in Tai foreign policy in the new
millennium, in Corrine Phuangkasem et al. (eds) Collection of Articles and Speeches on Tai
Foreign Aairs from the Past to the Present (Bangkok: Tammasat University Press, 1,,,), in
Tai.
1o Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
on domestic issues which would have implications for other members and the
group. It was rejected by most ASEAN members, which had previously been
anticipated by Tai foreign policy-makers, according to the interviews with
former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan,
40
former Ambassador Kasit Piromya
41
and former Ambassador Surapong Jayanama.
42
Te rejection had a positive
eect on Tailands leading status in the group. In Surapongs words, Tailand
wanted to play a leading role in Southeast Asia. We had the potential to do so.
It was the politics of identity-making and we needed to show clearly that we
could lead on democracy and human rights issues.
Te foreign policy of the succeeding Taksin government (:oo1:ooo) like-
wise clearly demonstrated a further attempt to illuminate Tailands role in
the region and the world. Taksins Forward Engagement initiative revolved
around new regional initiativesthe Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Eco-
nomic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Asia Co-operation Dialogue
(ACD), complemented by bilateral economic co-operation.
43
It was bold,
assertive, unconventional and controversial, and departed from business-as-
usual. It sought to utilise Tailands geopolitical leverage to strengthen exist-
ing international co-operation while further engaging new partners on an
equal basis.
44
Tus, this proactive foreign policy certainly aorded Tailand
the opportunity to enhance its leading role, albeit with varying degrees of suc-
cess.
At this point, it can be conceptualised that Tailands foreign policy dur-
ing this period has developed into three major characteristics. First, foreign
policy has become an integral part of the eort to advance Tailands compet-
itiveness in the international economy. To achieve this goal Tailand needs to
secure and search for comparative advantage. Second, Tai policy elites thus
40)
Interview, , January :oo8.
41)
Interview, 1, December :oo;.
42)
Interview, 1: January :oo8.
43)
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmesh-
ment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order, IDSS Working Paper Series (Singapore: Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies, :oo); Titinan Pongsudhirak, Tailands foreign policy
under the Taksin Government, EurAsia Bulletin, Vol. 8 (JulyAugust :oo), pp. o.
44)
Surakiart Sathirathai, Tailand: the path forward, Asia Society, available at: http://www
.asiasociety.org/speeches/sathirathaiony.html; Taksin Shinawatra, Forward Engage-
ment: the new era of Tailands foreign policy, inaugural lecture at the Saranrom Insti-
tute of Foreign Aairs, Bangkok, 1: March :oo, available at: http://www.thaiembdc.org/
pressctr/statemnt/pm/sifao1:o.html.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 11
view mainland Southeast Asia as Tailands pivotal sphere of inuence and are
willing to exercise Tailands leading role in this area. Tis can be symbolised
by the visit of the King of Tailand to Laos in 1,,, his rst overseas trip
in :; years. It indicates Bangkoks serious attempt to weave the Mekong sub-
region into its sphere of inuence through boosting these linkages and close
contacts. Te success of this campaign further ensured that Tailand would be
able to regulate economic activities and become the centre of gravity in main-
land Southeast Asias overall economic development eorts. Tird, however,
Tailands relatively limited structural power requires it to utilise multilateral
approaches to regional co-operation. Depending on circumstances, Tailand
regards its role in regional co-operation primarily as a bridge, a facilitator or
a co-ordinator in broader regional co-operation. Tis feature in Tai foreign
policy can be seen throughout the post-Cold War era under dierent govern-
ments and their regional implications. Te next section will use an empirical
case study of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative under
the Chuan government in order to illuminate the role of Tailands regional
aspirations in foreign decision-making.
. e Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) Initiative: Crystallising
ailands Regional Aspirations
Te QEC initiative is particularly interesting in its own right for several rea-
sons. First, this initiative was Tailands earliest attempt to rearrange the
regional setting in mainland Southeast Asia based on a multilateral approach
after the Cold War. Prior to this initiative, its strategy was based on normal-
ising bilateral relations inherited from Chatichais policy of turning the bat-
tleelds into marketplaces. Te QEC was thus Tailands attempt to enfold
the socialist countries into a market-led system and to prepare them to engage
in wider regional order. Second, this initiative did not oer self-evident ben-
ets for Tailand in material terms relative to the potential costs in the eco-
nomic, political or security sectors. Te fact that Tailand proposed this initia-
tive and determinedly sustained it regardless of its ambiguous potential for
success leaves space for observing the role of identity in its policy-making.
Tird, this initiative was also one of the earliest multilateral forums in mainland
Southeast Asia in which China participated. It oers another lens in under-
standing the dynamics of the interplay between Beijing and other regional
actors.
1: Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
:.1. Te Background of the QEC in Brief
Parallel to the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project under the Asian
Development Bank, the QEC initiative was one of the rst regional initiatives
proposed by Tailand in the early post-Cold War period and comprised China,
Laos, Myanmar and Tailand. Tere is a misunderstanding that the QEC
initiative was a brainchild of the ADB; it was actually proposed by Tailand.
45
Te ADB was involved at the beginning as Tailand requested its assistance
in feasibility studies, but its priority at that time was limited to the East-West
Corridor development. Tus, regardless of the ADBs presence, Tailand was
still a major player in the initiative until it lost interest and the ability to
maintain this project through the Asian Economic Crisis, which started in
Tailand in 1,,; and later spread to other Asian economies such as South
Korea and Indonesia.
An inadequate regional infrastructure, especially in Laos and Myanmar and
to a certain extent in Yunnan Province, was seen by the participating countries
in the QEC, and by the ADB, as the major obstacle to expanding economic co-
operation in this sub-region. Terefore, the major projects under this initiative
focused on linking four countries through two major highways (RA and
RB). Te discrepancy in nancial capacity of each country made tangible
progress dependent on the intensity of each countrys policy commitment. Laos
and Myanmar felt that the QEC mainly beneted China and Tailand,
46
and
they could not nance the proposed projects unilaterally. Terefore, most of the
funding and progress was driven by other actors. For instance, it was reported
that the completion of :;km of Route RA in Laos could not be achieved
without the nancial assistance of the ADB, China and Tailand. Tailand
also contributed directly to the progress of the QEC, especially during its early
development. Tailand oered to connect its roads to Laos by building 8okm
of each, while persuading the ADB to give a soft loan to the Laos government
to construct the remaining ;okm.
47
Tailand approved a loan of US1:
45)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacic, Economic
cooperation and regional integration in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (:oo8),
available at: http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/swp:o8.pdf.
46)
IMF in the midst of Asian nationalism, Manager (11 May 1,,8), in Tai Ministry of
Foreign Aairs, Projects for the Quadrangle Growth Promotion, No. Io;o;:;ooo1
1o1 (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, 1,,8), in Tai.
47)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Telegram: the role of Yunnan Province in ASEAN-China
framework, No. KMG :8/:, 1 December :oo: (Bangkok: Archives and Library
Division, :oo:), in Tai.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1
million to Myanmar in 1,,o to improve a 1okm road from Tachilek to
Kengtung, which was part of Route RB.
48
Other projects were also discussed during the implementation of the initia-
tive. Expanding trade and investment opportunities within the QECcountries
were to be achieved by proper adjustments in trade and investment regula-
tions. Tailand addressed the need for better currency-clearing arrangements
and a reduction of tari and non-tari barriers. Moreover, issues of legal frame-
works to facilitate the movement of people were also raised, especially in cus-
toms, immigration and travel procedures. Tourism was viewed as having much
potential for co-operation and as being more convenient to implement. Te
meeting in 1,, agreed to facilitate this activity by exploring ways to simplify
travel formalities such as visa and customs procedures, promotion of invest-
ment in service sectors and facilities, and expansion and improvement of air
transport services.
49
In connection with this, Tailand hosted a meeting dur-
ing ,1o August 1,, in Chiangrai on tourism co-operation among the four
countries. Later that year, a friendship caravan, travelling from Tailand to
Myanmar and Yunnan during 1o December 1,,, was sponsored by Tai-
lands Tourism Authority and the Chiangmai Tourism Business Association.
Te tour involved representatives of leading Tai travel agencies and aimed
to promote potential tourist sites and routes between Tailand and Myan-
mar and Yunnan Province.
50
Air transport links also constituted an important
part of the tourism venture. Tere were discussions about improving poten-
tial airports in the sub-region to facilitate an increase of ights and tourists. In
August 1,,, Bangkok Airways started its service from Chiang Mai to Man-
dalay. In addition, Tailand also requested China to allowmore ights between
Bangkok and Kunming, with an increase from ve times a week to one a day.
51
48)
Chiangrai Province, Letter to the Minister of Foreign Aairs, No. Io;o;;oo
1o;o1, :o April :oo1 (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, MFA, :oo1), in Tai.
49)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Agreed minutes of the Quadripartite Meeting on Subre-
gional Transportation Linkages, Bangkok, Tailand, :;:8 May 1,,, No. oo;:
;ooo1;/o1 (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, 1,,), in Tai; Ministry of
Foreign Aairs, Draft concept paper of Quadrangle Economic Cooperation (ChinaLaos
MyanmarTailand), No. Io;o;o;oo:o1;o1 (Bangkok: Archives and Library
Division, 1,,), in Tai.
50)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Quadrangle economic growth amongst MyanmarLaos
TailandChina (Southern), No. oo;:;ooo1o/o1 (Bangkok: Archives and
Library Division, 1,,), in Tai.
51)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Quadripartite meeting (ChinaMyanmarLaosTailand)
on tourismco-operation, No. oo/1, 1; Ausgust 1,, (Bangkok: Archives and Library
Division, 1,,), in Tai.
1 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
Tailand also proposed helping Laos improve its regional airport in Luang
Prabang. Te rst phase of this project was completed in January 1,,; but the
second phase was postponed owing to Tailands economic slowdown during
the 1,,; Asian Financial Crisis.
52
As China was another key actor in this co-operation, its commitment to
fullling the initiatives goal was also critical to its progress. However, the
initiative was limited mainly to the interests of Yunnan Province. A Tai
ocial complaint pointed out that Beijing focused more on expanding trade
opportunities with its major Western trading partners than with its small
neighbours in the south.
53
Te route through Tailand was not Chinas only
option for reaching the sea: routes through Myanmar and Vietnamwould serve
the same purpose. Terefore, QEC projects sometimes lacked strong support
fromBeijing while other projects were given more urgent attention, such as the
western Kunming-Bhamo road, completed in :oo:, rather than the southern
R route (Jinghong-Boten).
54
:.:. Costs or Benets?
Tailand justied the QEC mainly on the rationale that growth areas are
designed to exploit the existing natural cross-border economies and socio-
political links, with the intention of extending the range and scope of activ-
ities.
55
With Tailands advantages in skilled labour, entrepreneurs, infras-
tructure and regulatory settings, and its strategic location in the heart of
mainland Southeast Asia, Tai policy-makers anticipated that Tailand would
reap substantial gains. Its disadvantages in terms of the shortage of natu-
52)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Te visit to Laos PDR of the Ministry of Foreign Aairs,
No. ;/:1, 11 June 1,,8 (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, 1,,8), in Tai.
53)
IMF in the midst of Asian nationalism.
54)
Asian Development Bank, Greater Mekong Subregion, available at: http://www.adb
.org/GMS/default.asp; Ministry of Commerce, Peoples Republic of China, Xishuang-
bannas investment environment, available at: http://xsbn.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gzdy/
:oo81o/:oo81oo8;o.html; Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Telegram; Wang Shilu et al.,
GMS economic corridor construction in Yunnan: progress, problems and policy implica-
tions, Mekong Institute Research Working Paper No. o/:oo; (Khon Khaen: Mekong Insti-
tutte, :oo;); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacic,
China: project prole of priority projects along the Asian Highway, Transportation Divi-
sion, available at: http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/TIS/AH/les/proles/china.pdf.
55)
Pushpa Tambipillai, Te ASEAN growth areas: sustaining the dynamism, Te Pacic
Review, Vol. 11, No. : (1,,8), pp. :,:oo; see p. :1.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1
ral resources and expensive labour would be complemented by its rich well-
resourced neighbours. Te result was expected to be a win-win situation for
all parties. Although there were concerns regarding this co-operation, Tai-
land still pursued it actively. Te question arises as to whether economic and
other benets were so great that they led Tailand to assume a leading role for
almost a decade. If not, what can help explain Tailands willingness to sustain
the co-operation?
Road network expansion within the sub-region was expected to increase
trade opportunities for Tai exporters, especially in the Chinese market. How-
ever, the Chinese market was fragmented and infrastructure in Yunnan
Province was not fully developed at that time, resulting in the likelihood of
increased price per unit in shipping. Moreover, Yunnan Province was one of
the poorest regions in China, with per capita GDP less than US1,ooo in
:oo;
56
thus, it was possible that its purchasing power would not be able to
absorb Tai exports in the medium term.
57
Although it was expected that this
problem would be resolved when the Chinese economy became more mature,
this was a long-term forecast and full of uncertainties.
Instead of increasing the ows of Tai products to other countries in the
sub-region, the removal of natural trade barriers allowed cheaper Chinese
products to penetrate markets not only in Tailand but also in Laos, Myanmar
and Cambodia, where Tai products had already dominated.
58
Tailand was
competing with China as another signicant trading partner, especially in
the consumer goods area.
59
At the same time, cheap agricultural products
from China, Myanmar and Laos such as onions, garlic, soybean, corn, rice,
vegetables and livestock also competed with the Tai farming sector, especially
in the north where farmers produce similar crops.
60
More convenient water
56)
Chi Hung Kwan, Regional Disparities Have Gone Beyond Acceptable LimitsTe Path to
an All-round Well-o Society Remains Distant, China in Transition Series (Tokyo: Research
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, :oo).
57)
Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage between Tailand and Southern China, Dis-
cussion Paper No. oo1 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1,,), in Tai.
58)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Considerations for providing assitance to Myanmar for
the improvement of Tachilek-Kentung road, No. oo/;8::, :8 May 1,, (Bangkok:
Archives and Library Division, 1,,), in Tai.
59)
Poon Kim Shee, Te political economy of China-Myanmar relations: strategic and
economic dimensions, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol. 1 (:oo:),
pp. .
60)
Oce of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Strategic
1o Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
transport along the Mekong River brought a similarly negative result in terms
of the inux of cheap Chinese products to southern neighbours. Moreover, the
promotion of tourism through the Mekong River would end up as a one-way
movement from Tailand to China, since the costs were still high. At the same
time, the Chinese were able to control navigation on the Mekong River as
they had been active in surveying and developing river navigation knowledge
and expertise for quite some time.
61
Overall Sino-Tai trade trends revealed
that Tailand suered an overall trade decit with China. Tis remained
unchanged even after the implementation of the Sino-Tai free trade agree-
ment in :oo1.
62
Other social and security problems were also of concern to the Tai author-
ities, especially trans-boundary issues. Adisak Tanyakul, Deputy Secretary-
General of the National Security Council, expressed Tailands concerns on
opening borders under this initiative, especially regarding Chinas power expan-
sion and its competition with other regional powers, lifestyle changes among
people in the Mekong Basin, and opening a connection between possible
transnational crimes in China and Southeast Asia.
63
Te development of trans-
port and increasing economic activities could also increase political competi-
tion among regional powers, especially between China and the US. Chinese
inuence in the sub-region had already raised security concerns in smaller
countries. Myanmar was also worried about increasing American political
interference because of open borders and foreign direct investment. Terefore,
Myanmar did not want to see rapid progress of the initiative.
64
In fact, the
transport link between Tailand and Myanmar intensied security concerns
among Tai security agencies. Tailand had to directly confront Myanmars
central authority on their common border as well as indirectly facing Chinese
inuence in adjacent areas without obvious buer zones.
Plan for Economic Co-operation in the Mekong Sub-region: Te Final Report (Bangkok:
NESDB and TIS Consultants, 1,,), in Tai; Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Link-
age.
61)
Evelyn Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and Regional Security in China
Southeast. Asian Relations, Adelphi Papers 8; (London: Routledge, :ooo).
62)
Bencha Silarak, Ginggorn Narithonkun and Nantha Sithiratch, Sino-Tai trade: who
harvests the benets?, FTA Watch Group, in Tai, available at: http://www.ftawatch.org/
autopage1/show_page.php?t=,&s_id=o&d_id=o.
63)
Interview, :o January :oo8.
64)
Myanmar ignores the Golden Quadrangle due to worries of US intereference in the
country, Krungthep Turakit (1o May 1,,;) in Tai.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1;
Convenient transport facilitated ows of people from the sub-region into
Tailand, and this also produced some negative consequences. Despite bene-
ting certain sectors, the inux of foreign migrants exacerbated other socio-
security problems, such as drug-smuggling, prostitution and trans-border dis-
eases. Costs accruing from the labour movement to Tailand were incurred
in areas of law enforcement and health services, as Tailand needed to allo-
cate its nancial resources and security and health personnel to manage these
migrant movements. Te estimated number of foreign workers emigrating
mostly from Tailands neighbours, particularly Myanmar, into Tailand in
1,, was approximately one million people.
65
It rose to around three million
in :o1o, of which about two-thirds stayed illegally.
66
Ultimately, trade and economic development in the region was likely to
aect environmental and human security in the lower Mekong countries,
especially through Chinas hydropower plans as well as through other projects
in the downstream states. Tese projects would aect the food chain of 8 per
cent of those living in the lower basin, as the lower level of downstream water
would deplete sh supplies, biodiversity and soil fertility and would generate
toxic waste. Tis would result in a weakened irrigation system and lowered
agricultural production as well as exacerbated poverty and reduced nutrition
quality for over oo million people.
67
Furthermore, it could lead to changing
patterns of river owand aect natural border demarcation, especially between
Laos and Tailand, a concern expressed by the Tai military.
68
Terefore,
future border disputes could erupt between the two neighbours should the
river change its course, suer bank erosion or incur blurring thalweg.
69
Tis alarming perception of Chinese inuence appeared in a condential
policy document circulating in 1,,: within the Tai Ministry of Foreign
Aairs (MFA).
70
Te paper reects on China more pessimistically than was
65)
Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage.
66)
Pramote Prasartkul and Patama Vapattanawong, Transitional point of the Tai popu-
lation, in IPSR Annual Conference (Bangkok: Institute for Population and Social Research,
Mahidol University, :o1o).
67)
Goh, Developing the Mekong; Lawrence E. Grinter, China, the United States, and main-
land Southeast Asia: opportunism and the limits of power, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Vol. :8, No. (:ooo), pp. ;o; Jerey W. Jacobs, Te Mekong River Commission:
transboundary water resources planning and regional security, Te Geographical Journal,
Vol. 1o8, No. (:oo:), pp. o; Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage.
68)
Goh, Developing the Mekong.
69)
Talweg is the line dening the lowest points along the length of a river bed or valley.
70)
Division of Political Aairs, Recommendations for proactive policy direction toward
18 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
publicly known. It states that Chinas intention was to secure its own eco-
nomic interests and to build a Chinese sphere of inuence in Southeast Asia so
as to deter other major powers direct inuence in the region. Tis southward-
looking approach would aect the signicance of Tailands role in mainland
Southeast Asia. In the long run, competition, especially in economic growth
areas, might undermine the Tai-Sino relationship. China was perceived as
a security threat to Tailand as it could manipulate Tai policy-makers and
business in favour of its own interests. Chinese diplomats and ocials had
established close and solid contacts with high-ranking Tai ocials and over-
seas Chinese associations, resulting in a sympathetic attitude towards China
among Tais. Te document recommends that, although Tailand inevitably
needs to maintain close ties with Beijing, it should also use this relationship to
limit negative implications.
:.. Tailands Self-perception and the Sustainability of the QEC
Tailands decision to pursue and sustain this initiative gives rise to several
questions regarding the survival of the project, particularly as explained by
realist and institutionalist approaches. First, the increasingly direct inuence
of China in mainland Southeast Asia denitely challenged the sub-regions
traditional power structure, which was dominated by Tailand and Vietnam.
Tailand could have chosen to limit co-operation with China, through which
the latter would have gained relative economic and political advantages. Tis
security awareness would have resulted in a less co-operative environment.
However, the opposite policy option was chosen: instead, Tailand tried to
engage China in this co-operation.
In fact, co-operation with China was chosen as a means to maximise eco-
nomic benets from a big market or bandwagoning for prot.
71
Still, co-
operation would have lasted until Tailand thought Chinese gain had exceeded
an acceptable level. Such a break-o situation could result from Chinas con-
struction of dams while ignoring the concerns of the lower Mekong coun-
tries over water supply, environmental impacts and boundaries, which would
directly threaten Tailands economic and border security, hence impeding
China, No. oo/1, 1o March 1,,: (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, MFA,
1,,:), in Tai. Declassied by the authors request in :oo8.
71)
Ann Marie Murphy, Beyond balancing and bandwagoning: Tailands response to
Chinas rise, Asian Security, Vol. o, No. 1 (:o1o), pp. 1:;.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1,
further co-operation. However, the slow progress of the QEC resulted not
from political tension between China and Tailand but from other technical
problems.
Moreover, the dierent positions between Beijing and other lower ripar-
ian states in dam-construction projects could have brought Tailand to sup-
port the downstream nations against Chinas actions. In fact, this did not
aggravate tensions between the two countries. In contrast, Tailand tried to
persuade China to co-operate further within the Mekong River Commission
(MRC).
72
Tailand was nally able to persuade China to reach a multilateral
agreement among four countries over river navigation, despite Chinas initial
reluctance and preference to pursue bilateral agreements with individual coun-
tries. In April :ooo the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-
Mekong River was signed by four countries. Tus it can be seen that although
Tailand and China were taking dierent positions on this issue, Tailand was
able to persuade China to reach agreement.
Facing the possibility of Chinas increasing inuence in this geographical
area, Tailand could have pursued a balancing strategy by seeking closer co-
operation with external powers at the same time. However, it is not clear that
Tailand acted this way, or that any other players were active enough under the
QEC to balance Chinas inuence. Te ADB and perhaps Japan, including
the MRC, ASEAN and other individual Southeast Asian countries, may be
seen as constraining forces to Chinas ultimate objectives. However, they never
really challenged China to the point where Beijing needed to reconsider its
position, for example on its Lancang-Mekong development projects. However,
China was nally able to secure nancial approval from the ADB without
Japan, as the major donor in the ADB, voting against it. Tis accommodating
approach taken by regional stakeholders towards China suggests that the logic
of geopolitical competition cannot fully explain the intention of this initiative.
Te creation of a regional institution as a set of rules or a regime may increase
levels of certainty, trust and economic interdependence:
73
it is not certain that
the QEC can play such a role. Tis sub-regional scheme included a series of
meetings and had no real guidelines for participating countries. It is dicult to
72)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Te development of water transport in Mekong River
amongst four countries (ChinaMyanmarLaosTailand), No. oo/1:,, :; August
1,, (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, 1,,), in Tai.
73)
Robert Jackson and Georg Srensen, Introduction to International Relations: Teories and
Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, :oo); James N. Rosenau, Te Scientic Study
of Foreign Policy (New York: Nicholus, 1,8o).
1o Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
conclude that institutionalisation of this co-operation was a primary objective
of its members. Terefore, this case may not fully illustrate that institutions
have an independent impact on strategies and outcomes
74
as the main actors
and actions in the QEC initiative were still state-centric.
Te issue of cost-sharing to sustain the co-operation was also a puzzle. A
state turns to collective action only to compensate for imperfection or when it
cannot pursue policy objectives unilaterally or bilaterally. Yet collective action
should not eventually impose greater cost on states, otherwise the arrangement
should cease.
75
Tis was the clearest rationale for Tailand to initially seek sub-
regional co-ordination inclusive of China. As a regional power, China would
have been expected to play an active role and be willing to bear a greater cost
of the co-operation considering its foreign policy of maintaining good neigh-
bourliness with the surrounding states in Southeast Asia. However, in this case
Tailand did not contribute less nancial assistance than China. Tailand and
China oered roughly equal nancial assistance to Laos for building roads
and bridges to complete the R routes. Tailand also extended unilateral assis-
tance to Myanmar to complete the project, considering the latters diculty
in accessing nancial support from the international community owing to the
state of its human rights record.
Regarding concerns about a Chinese threat, these have not waned in South-
east Asia in the post-Cold War period although various co-operative projects
have been initiated. Te QEC can be a means by which Tailand and other
small states employ constraints and engagement with China, hence cultivat-
ing economic interconnectedness, regional norms and institutionalisation.
76
However, the basic question of why Tailand wanted to play this role is still a
legitimate issue. Considering its weaker power vis--vis China, a more rational
option for Tailand would have been to invite more members into this initia-
tive, especially from ASEAN and external donors, or to give way to a bigger
project from the beginning. On the contrary, Tailands attempt to promote
co-operation within limited membership in mainland Southeast Asia, instead
of within the GMS project, still leaves some room for questions.
74)
Robert O. Keohane, Institutional theory in international relations, in Michael Brecher
and Frank P. Harvey (eds) Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, :oo:), p. 1;.
75)
John G. Ruggie, Constructing World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization
(London: Routledge, 1,,8).
76)
Goh, Developing the Mekong.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 11
Terefore, politico-strategic motives may not fully explain why Tailand
assumed an active role in the QEC or why this role was so persistent when
material and strategic interests were reduced or worked against Tailands inter-
est. By incorporating Tailands self-perception as a leading actor in mainland
Southeast Asia, a clearer picture can be obtained of how Tailand sees its role
in the international arena, and hence its policy options and preferences.
Te promotion of Quadrangle Growth was Tailands national agenda.
Its leadership in the QEC signied that Tai foreign policy no longer con-
formed to the conventional view of bending with the wind and that Tai-
land was determined to eect change in Southeast Asias political and eco-
nomic environments despite China and other regional actors. As an emerging
regional power, China could certainly make or break the QECinitiative. How-
ever, Tailand did not allow its destiny to be placed in the hands of Beijing.
Although Bangkok was willing to share leadership in this initiative to some
extent, it was extremely proactive in its own right, as is seen in its investing
nancial resources and co-ordinating eorts to allow and encourage its smaller
neighboursLaos and Myanmarto participate in the project.
When the co-operation began in 1,,, Tailand persuaded the ADB to
fund the feasibility study for the R route project, valued at USoo,ooo.
77
It also successfully urged the ADB to pay attention to programmes in the
QEC. After the ADBs feasibility study in 1,,, Tailand oered US1.
million assistance to Laos to appoint an engineering company to design the
road. Coupled with the ADBs nancial assistance for the roads construction,
Tailand proposed to nance :o per cent of the total cost.
78
With regard
to Myanmar, the Tai government also approved US1: million in loans
initially at per cent interest, to Myanmar for the R route. Tailand later
perceived that Myanmar was increasingly cooperative and committed to this
regional development,
79
and so lowered interest rates to 1. per cent with fewer
conditions attached.
80
77)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Proposed transport network projects linking Tailand
IndochinaMyanmarChina (Southern), No. oo;:;ooo1o/o1 (Bangkok:
Archives and Library Division, 1,,), in Tai.
78)
Oce of the NESDB, Strategic Plan for Economic Co-operation.
79)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Outcome of the rd Mekong River sub-regional economic
co-operation (o countries), No. oo/,oo, :8 April 1,, (Bangkok: Archives and Library
Division, 1,,), in Tai.
80)
Oce of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Greater Mekong
Subregional Economic Co-operation Project Amongst Countries (LaosCambodiaVietnam
ChinaMyanmarTailand), February 1,,o (Bangkok: NESDB, 1,,o), in Tai.
1: Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
Tailand also did not allow its role to be totally overshadowed by regional
actors or institutions. Although the ADB and ASEAN were also involved in
the initiative, they did not lead the project decisively. Even during the Financial
Crisis in 1,,;, when the merging of the initiative into the GMS project seemed
to be economically rational, Tailand refused to relinquish its primary role in
the QEC initiative. Tai policy-makers initially rejected the idea of merging
the QEC into the GMS and persisted in maintaining this stance for quite
some time afterwards. Te idea of reviving the QEC started during the second
Chuan government. In :ooo, Tailands Foreign Ministry proposed realigning
the project to make it more ecient and to separate it fromthe GMS. Te MFA
believed that integrating the QEC into the GMS framework would result in
the QEC being unable to capture sucient attention. Te MFA document
indicated:
Projects under the QEC should have been pushed for progress faster than it is at the
present stage. Te main obstacle is that many programmes are increasingly dictated
by the ADB and donor countries Terefore, Tailand should be able to pull
them back and build a separate and clearer strategy to promote this framework by
itself.
81
Te QEC initiative continued from its commencement in 1,, until the
early :ooos, mainly owing to Tailands ambition to maintain its role in this
sub-region. Te promotion of transport linkages in this initiative became an
important instrument for Tailand in persuading other participating coun-
tries that they shared a common interest in its success. Two major routes, the
RA and RB, were proposed to link the member countries, with the inten-
tion of facilitating trade, investment and tourism in the sub-region. However,
considering its size and power, especially compared to China, it is interest-
ing to observe Tailand as willing to lead the co-ordination and sometimes
equally sharing nancial responsibility in the scheme. Apparently, limited eco-
nomic benets, competing projects of the same kind (particularly the GMS
project) and poor co-ordination between the Tai public and private sectors
in realising the economic objectives of this initiative weakened Tailands abil-
ity to sustain the QEC. However, most stakeholders still supported the prin-
ciple of Tailands leading role in this regional project. Ultimately, the life
of the initiative could have been shortened, and it would not have lasted
81)
Ministry of Foreign Aairs, Adjustment of the Quadrangle Growth framework,
No. oo/:1, 18 April :ooo (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, :ooo), in Tai.
Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,, 1
for almost a decade without Tailands regional aspirations driving this for-
eign policy calculation. Although Tailand relinquished its active role in the
QEC, such regional ambition did not disappear. Ostensibly, the very simi-
lar regional interest was renewed and expanded in Taksins administration
under the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy
(ACMECS). ACMECS was initiated in :oo and continues until the present
with various active programmes.
82
Conclusion
Tis paper has demonstrated that Tailands self-perception as an important
actor in Southeast Asia produced a regional co-operative foreign policy in
the post-Cold War period. Tailands identity was constructed, sustained and
adjusted through the socialisation process in Tai society and in the context
of economic globalisation. It has resulted until today in Tailands attempts
to establish a leading position in regional politics. In other words, a general
policy preference of shaping a co-operative environment in the region by which
Tailand is a key player has been institutionalised in Tailands post-Cold War
foreign policy.
By adopting an ideational approach, the paper helps broaden our under-
standing of Tai foreign policy beyond the conventional wisdom of bam-
boo diplomacy heavily based on a realist/materialist framework, under which
material interests and survival are taken a priori. It oers an alternative view
as it shows that Tailands post-Cold War foreign policy can no longer be
decisively labelled reactive. Tailand has aimed to change its external envi-
ronment on its own terms and its foreign policy behaviour has gradually
become more proactive. Tailand considers its leading position as a catalyst
for change in regional aairs, especially in mainland Southeast Asia, or as a
bridge between various levels of regional co-operation. Te QEC was a test-
ing ground for this approach. Multilateral co-operation emerged as a Tai
policy preference and gained consensus within Bangkoks policy-making cir-
cles.
Starting from Prime Minister Chatichais turning the battleelds into mar-
ketplaces policy, Tai foreign policy has been consistent in its regional aspira-
tions. Tis continuity is well captured by former prime minister Anand Pan-
yarachuns remarks:
82)
See projects under ACMECS: http://www.acmecs.org/.
1 Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS 11 (:v1:) 1:;1,,
Our approach and style may be dierent but, basically, we will continue with the main
thrust of the policy of turning battleelds into marketplaces as seen in the larger
context of bringing peace and stability throughout the whole of Southeast Asia.
83
Trough advocating its own version of sub-regional co-operation in mainland
Southeast Asia, Tailand was able to ensure that the rearrangement of the sub-
regional political economy after the Cold War would work in its favour in both
cognitive and material aspects. Tat is, Tailands promotion of sub-regional
co-operation in mainland Southeast Asia would allow it to be a primary bene-
factor from untapped resources within its neighbours. More importantly, it
resurrected and rearmed the Tai policy elites sense of regional leadership.
Tailand, a more modern or siwilai nation compared to its backward neigh-
bours, once again became a centre of regional gravity that would determine the
course of regional development in the new era of the post-Cold War.
83)
Anand Panyarachun, Address of the Prime Minister Mr Anand Panyarachun to the
Foreign Correspondents Club of Tailand on Tursday, : April 1,,1, Tailand Foreign
Aairs Newsletter, AprilMay (1,,1), in Tai.