In Re: Manzano Facts: RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice

pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by then Governor. Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter to the SC stating that before he accepts the appointment, he would like to request for the issuance of a Resolution (1) authorizing him to accept his appointment and assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to it (2) that his membership to the said Committee is not violative of the Independence of the Judiciary or may be considered as an abandonment of his position in the RTC (3) to consider that his membership in the committee is a part of the primary function of an Executive Judge. However, on examination of the EOs, it was revealed that among the functio ns of the Committee is to review complaints against any apprehending officer xx who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for the appropriate action. Another function is to recommend the revision of any law or regulation which is believed prej u d i c i a l t o t h e p r o p e r administration of criminal justice. Issue: Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the Committee will violate the doctrine of separation of powers Held: It is evident from the stated functions of the Committee that it performs functions that are administrative in nature which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals fore their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, the members of the xxx courts xxx shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions. While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it cannot justify a member of the judiciary

being required to assume position xxx which are non- judiciary in character xx if he is expected to be confined to the task of adjudication. Xxx He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official. This does not mean that the RTS judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility. An RTC judge should render assistance to said Committees xxx but only when it may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. Hence, the request was denied. Angara vs. Electoral Commission Facts: (1)That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; ( 2 ) T h a t o n O c t o b e r 7 , 1 9 3 5 , t h e p r o v i n c i a l b o a r d o f c a n v a s s e r s , proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes; (3)That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office; ( 4 ) T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 3 , 1 9 3 5 , t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y i n s e s s i o n assembled, passed the following resolution:"[No.8]" R E S O L U T I O N C O N FIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQ U E L L O S D I P U T A D O S CONTRAQUIE NES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA. "Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes nose hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de lap r e s e n t e r e s o l u c i o n s e a n , como por la presente, son a p r o b a d a s y confirmadas."Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935." (5)T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 8 , 1 9 35, the herein respondent P e d r o Ynsua, filed before the

Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, beingt h e o n l y p r o t e s t f i l ed after the passage of R e s o l u t i o n N o . 8 aforequote d, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; (6)That on December 9, 1 935, the Electoral Commi s s i o n a d o p t e d a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:" 6 . L a C o m i s i o n n o c o n s i d e r a r a n i n g u n a p r o t e s t a q u e n o s e h a y a presentado en o antes de este dia." (7)That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, oneo f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s i n the aforesaid protest, filed befor e t h e E l e c t o r a l Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of itsc o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e t o p r e s c r ibe the period during which protests against the election of its membe rs should be presented; (b) that t h e aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period; (8)That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e el ection of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation; (9)That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. A n g a r a , f i l e d a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

Issues: 1.H a s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t j u r i s d iction over the ElectoralComm ission and the subject matter o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y u p o n t h e for egoing related facts, and in the affirmative, 2.Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithst anding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? HELD: (a)That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally t h e theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. ( b ) T h a t t h e s ys t e m o f c h e c k s a n d balances and the overlapping o f f u n c t i o n s a n d d u t i e s o f t e n makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c)That in cases of conflict between the several departments and a m o n g t h e a g e n c i e s thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d)That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in a c t u a l a n d a p p r o p r i a t e cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e)That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with s p e c i f i c powers and functions to execu te and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the

legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. (f)That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests r e l a t i n g t o t h e e l e c t i o n , returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g)That under the organic law prevailing before the present C o n s t i t u t i o n w e n t i n t o e f f e c t , each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the e l e c t i o n s , r e t u r n s , a n d qualifications of their elective members. (h)That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f i t s members, to the Electoral Commission. (i)That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral C o m m i s s i o n w a s f u l l , clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. (j)That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have ani ndependent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns andq u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f m e m b e r s o f t h e National Assembly, devoid of parti s a n i n f l u e n c e o r consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k)That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only s e c t i o n 1 8 o f t h e J o n e s Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,r e t u r n s a n d q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f i t s elective members, but also section 478 of Act N o . 3 3 8 7 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests

against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest (l)That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election o f a n y m e m b e r , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such membere l e c t m a y discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m)That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. Ratio: Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government . Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC

mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEAFacts: Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested

emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional

with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices. "The petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu. ISSUE: WON the protest case is a political question HELD: No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. N o r i s t h e r e a n y a c t o f t h e incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant

Casibang vs Aquino FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the e l e c t e d M a yo r o f Rosales, Pangasinan in the

thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code.

states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators." ISSUE:1 . A r e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s b y t h e respondents correct? 2.Is this case a mere political question? RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. This case is not an action against the Senate and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, it does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. The Court is also called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ..of the party having the

TAADA vs.CUENCO FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Taada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent senators MarianoJ. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal, alleging that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, and the Senate itself, in nominating then choosing the respondents, respectively, had acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution (1935): Section 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition

second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights. "The court does not only have jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the periodof its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its

whereas clauses that the peoplescontinued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interimNational Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly

in itsactive session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

DELEGATION OF POWERS Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan FACTS: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. Issue: WoN the assailed EOs are invalid as it was issued using Act. 671 A. WoN Act 671 is only valid for a limited time B. When did Act.671 become ineffective? Ruling: Petitions granted. (EOs are invalid as they were issued after Act. 671 had already become ineffective) Reasoning: A. Act 671 is only valid for a limited time. Emergency Powers only becomes justified delegation of powers only if it is temporary

Temporary or else its not an emergency. Thus, it is presumed Act 671 was approved with a limitation in mind.

1946 (assailed EOs were issued without authority of the law). Quezons biography call for special session to enact Act 671 came about when it became evident that the country was completely helpless against air attacks and it was most unlikely the Phil. Legislature would hold its next regular session. Thus NA delegated its powers/abdicated its powers to the President only when it was clear the NA would be unable to meet. The enactment of Act 671, which is destructive of the foundation of democratic institutions, could only have been made in circumstances where there is a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government.

The assertion that a new law is needed to repeal Act 671 does not make sense either as the repeal may not be approved by the President and the Congress may not override the veto. Also, this would create the anomaly that would make it easier for Congress to delegate their powers than to take it back as delegation of power occurred by simple majority and a recall would need 2/3votes. Sec 4 is silent regarding the repeal of authority in the face of express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it is a clear manifestation that the NA believed there was no necessity to provide for the former. If Executive continues to exercise legislative powers, Congress and the President could (as Aranetas case) mutually nullify each others actions.

Notes: Court did not decide on which department is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. In this case, the Court merely applied the law. On the contention that Pres. has the exclusive authority to say the war has not ended, not legal principle can be found to support this. PRESIDENTS AUTHORITY (IN THIS CASE)IS PURELY STATUTORY, NOT DERIVEDFROM CONSTI

Language of Act 671 itself restricts the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the way Sec 3: Requirement that President report on his issuance once Congress has convened.

Intent behind Act 671 also evident in Quezons autobiography He was the one who called NA to a special session to enact Act 671 He stated that it was only for a limited period, and a new law is needed to keep it alive.

Even in times of extreme peril, the legislation is preserved for Congress. Actually, it is in times of peril that the various branches of government are (more than normal) called to act. Votes: 4 concur with ponente

B. Act 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25,

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919] Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein nonChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary

measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance

with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be

taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS (1916) G.R. L11216 Facts: COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power,

invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of clerical work. ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands? Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law? RULING: The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State

requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we

think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed. nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants.

Rodriguez vs Gella FACTS: Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by thePresident due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in thesense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. People vs Vera FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera

has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system

of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint fordamages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Linesquestioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the

discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its

delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority Facts: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent

complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature? Held: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;

and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. OSMEA vs. ORBOS 220 SCRA 703 GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993 " To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy." FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power

to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) of the exercise of the power of taxation HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.

Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows: Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Counci lof State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this ActAng Tang Ho was charge, was tried, and then found guilty in violation of such act. Ang Tang Ho appealed to this court questioning the validity of the said Act. Issue: Whether or not the Governor-General can fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price. Held: No, the Governor-General cannot fix the price nor make it a crime to sell it in a higher price. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No.2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and

Title: United States v. Ang Tang Ho GR 17122 February 27, 1922 Johns, J. Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the

some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. PEOPLE VS. MACEREN FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. HELD: This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and

cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51). In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra). The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking,

killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof." Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properly enforced HELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e S t a t e t o r e gulate liberty and property for the p r o m o t i o n o f t h e general welfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez GR 78164, 31 July 1987 En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987 FACTS: In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture b y the government, to be distributed to c haritableinstitutions and other similar i nstitutions as the Chairman of the Natio nal Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving f a r m e r s t h r o u g h d i s p e r s a l a s t h e Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.O n J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8 4 , P e t i t i o n ers 6 carabaos were confiscated by the p o l i c e s t a t i o n commander of Barotac

FACTS: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the

Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUES1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, and undue delegation of legislative power? RATIO 2: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes that deal with subjects that are complex and technical.

- Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission penned by Justice Laurel, the Court held that there was a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of legislative power due to the growing complexities of modern society, and that there was an accompanying trend of acceptance by the courts.- Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held that the standards set for subordinate legislation may be explicit or implied. In the case of an implied standard, it can be deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set by the Acts objectives, considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7 of the same Act, and taking into consideration the body of the Act itself.

OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) vs Drilon FACTS: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement(CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988.1)For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 P200 to each coveredemployee.2)For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each coveredemployee.3)3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to each covered employee. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, in sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a c ollective bargaining agreement again s t s u c h w a g e increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on

payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two(2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages aboveP100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00);and 2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 19 8 7 , r e p r e s e n t i n g 2 0 8 emplo yees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivityof R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND ANDFORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00). ISSUE: The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. HELD: As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640,w h i c h p r o h i b i t s t h e e m p l o y e r f r o m crediting the anniversary wage inc r e a s e s p r o v i d e d i n collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations

adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory. Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary FACTS: On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of

local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." Emmanuel Pelaez v. The Auditor General GR L-23825 December 24, 1965 Concepcion, J. Facts: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on

November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case. Issue: Whether or not there is the law is valid. Held: No, the law is unconstitutional due to invalid delegation of powers. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by thedelegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his

authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.