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C. Requirements for valid exercise: 1. Jurisdiction -Globe Wireless Ltd vs.

Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269 Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category. -PCGG vs. Pena, 159 SCRA 556 As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power and authority of the Commission, it exercises quasijudicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other." The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. But as already indicated hereinabove, the Court of Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. -Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 417

Furthermore, paragraph 6 merely states the reason why CCM Gas withheld payment of its April 22-May 22, 1984 electric bill. Paragraph 8 gives the reason why CCM Gas is asking for damages and an injunction, namely, to

seek redress for "the unilateral and arbitrary issuance" by MERALCO of a notice of disconnection when it had failed to give the information demanded. Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies," but the regular court's power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. - Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212 Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. -Mario, Jr. Vs. Gamilla, G.R. No. 132400, Jan. 31, 2005 Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Consequently, matters over which they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. While the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, this should not deprive the courts of justice their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply. In their complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any relief under the Labor Code but the payment of a sum of money as damages on account of respondents alleged tortuous conduct. The action is within the realm of civil law and, hence, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. 2. Due Process -Utto vs. Comelec, 375 SCRA 523

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. -Garcia vs. Pajaro, 384 SCRA 122 In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. -Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635 xxxx The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration." (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary

to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)" (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.) (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,

and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. -Domingo vs. Rayala, 546 SCRA 90 (2008) [i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. -Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43 "In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case." -Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378 ". . . The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is a purely legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in disregard of due process. The rule does not apply

where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy." -Omb. Marcello vs. Bungubung and CA, G.R. 175201, Apr. 23, 2008 ..The fact that no formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, which requirement was afforded Bungubung. -Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008) Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of evidence presented before it. 2.1 Exceptions to requirements of notice and hearing i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. Summary Abatement of Nuisance per se Preventive Suspension Padlocking of filthy restaurants, theaters, etc. Cancellation of Passport of accused Summary distraint and levy Grant of Provisional Authority