Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology Author(s): Talal Asad Reviewed work(s): Source: Man, New Series, Vol.

14, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 607-627 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802150 . Accessed: 07/06/2012 15:40
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ANTHROPOLOGY

AND IDEOLOGY*

THE

ANALYSIS

OF

TALAL ASAD

University ofHull
This lecture discusses some of the conceptual problems involved in anthropological arise from a theoretical of treatments ideology, and argues that most of the difficulties socialcategories, human meanings-as embodied in theauthentic preoccupationwithessential actions and discoursesof given cultures.This preoccupation,it is maintained,is shared by fromeach other,and it who are oftenthoughtof as being radicallydifferent anthropologists social change.The first accountsforthe difficulties theyhave encounteredin conceptualising in and longerpartofthelectureexploresthesedifficulties some writings Bloch, Bourdillon, by to Leach and Mary Douglas. The tendency reduceanthropological problemsabout thenature to and consequence of particular public discourses thephilosophicalproblem of the originof essentialhuman conceptsis noted. The tendencyto see authoritative meaningsas the a priori of totalitywhich definesand reproducesthe essentialintegrity a given social order is also on criticised, thegroundsthatitleavesan important questionunasked:namely,how particular political and economic conditions maintain or undermine given forms of authoritative The finalpartof thelectureis devoted to a generalcritiqueof the vulgar discourseas systems. to Marxist theoryof the social functionof ideology, with particularreference the kinds of reductionismwhich thattheoryundertakes its attemptto determineessentialmeanings, in and the kindsof questionwhich it failsto consideradequately.

I when the questionof anthropology In the early seventies and colonialism was first there was an understandable beingpubliclyarguedout in thiscountry, reactionon the part of many Britishanthropologists againstthe exaggerated role attributed, some of the crudercriticisms, anthropology colonial in to as of ideology. In the excitement indignant responseit was oftenforgotten that the really interesting questions concerned the ideological conditions of and the implications theseconditionsfor its discourse, of anthropology, and not the very occasionallydirectbut on the whole insignificant practicalrole thatBritish had of anthropologists playedin support British imperialstructures. Instead intotheeffects ideologicalconditions anthropological of on ofenquiring discoursethe argumentoftendegenerated into assertions about the personal motivesor politicsof its producers.However, I do not want to addressthis problemdirectly here,but instead beginwitha generalpuzzle: themodesty to of anthropologists regardingthe ideological role of their discoursesin the determinationof colonial structures does not seem to be matched by a correspondingscepticismregardingthe role of ideology generallyin the determination social structures of which are the objects of their discourse.
* Malinowski Lecturefor 1979, given at the London School of Economics on 6 March. Man (N.S.) 14, 607-27.

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And by so Their scienceas discourse, it is said,is not determined social reality. yet the social realityof which that science speaks is typicallynothing but paradox I should like to explore in what follows. discourse.It is thisapparent a word of warning.What I say about anthropologyhere is not But first intended as an empirical generalisationof the work of all self-styled anthropologists-or even of that of the majority.For a long time now enquiry, a has anthropology ceased to constitute coherentfieldof intellectual and My commentsrelate and its present unityis institutional not theoretical. which seem to me strands withinsocial anthropology therefore particular to pattern thathas in ways,forminga recognisable to hang together significant and development, one which it would be worth become an obstacleto further examining more closely. I repeat,this patterndoes not definethe unityof that and to becauseit relates a numberof assumptions tendencies anthropology sharedby all textswhich would exclusiveto it,nor forthatmatter are neither be called anthropological. II and and society, classification socialstructure, concepts Questionsconcerning rules and social behaviour have always been of central concern to social In impetushas been given to suchquestions yearsa fresh anthropology. recent derivingfromthe studyof language.This new impetushas occasionallybeen and linesof battlehave as represented a radical break,a New Anthropology, of for been drawn on what are alleged to be matters profoundimportance the theory and method of social anthropology.However, it is very doubtful a or whetherthefresh developments represent totallynew departure, whether whichare as different theyhave sometimes as thelinesofbattledefine positions been claimed to be. and concernsof more recentwriters In fact, many of the basic assumptions influenced the studyof language can be tracedback to Malinowski, not by only of those writerswho have been happy to acknowledge the connexion, but also of many who have not. Malinowski's critics, rangingfromlinguists for such as J.R. Firth(I957) and Langendoen (I968) to the publicists a New Anthropologylike Ardener (I97i), Henson (I974) and Crick (I976), have One is oftengiven to largelyseen in Malinowski a failedlanguage-theorist. that despite his commendable emphasis on the importanceof understand for Malinowskihad no realunderstanding nativelanguages fieldwork, learning like of advanced language theory.He is dismissedby anthropologists Sahlins or by linguistslike Lyons (I976) for his crass utilitarianism, noted briefly (I968) as someone who contributedthat quaint but not entirelyvalueless notion,'phatic communion',to semantictheory.That Malinowski'stextson theoryof culture(which is not,by language also containan anthropological the way, to be confusedwith his theoryof basic and derivedneeds),has gone generallyunnoticed.Not only in his explicitlylinguistictexts,such as 'The problem of meaningin primitivelanguages'and Volume 2 of Coralgardens, such as his famousessayon myth, there but also in some of his otherwritings is presenta notion of cultureas an a prioritotalityof authenticmeaningsto

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which action and discourse must be related if they are to be properly expression as explained. It is thisnotion, itfinds ' understood theirintegrity and that in the writings more recentanthropologists, I shallbe questioning. of on But I do not want to give theimpression-especially thisoccasion-that I am adding one more criticalvoice to the long processionof Malinowski's and Malinowski was notjust a splendidfieldworker, an amusing detractors. polemicist rather than a good theorist,as the received version in social on but has interesting writings language anthropology it.His untidy extremely do not only reveala problematical theyalso show signs conceptionof culture, to of attempts breakaway fromthatconceptionand to searchfornew ways of discoursewithin the contextof social life.2 representing and understanding My concernherehowever is not with Malinowski'stexts-but with thoseof who are stillverymuch alive. anthropologists An emphasison 'meaning' is to be found,whetherimplicitor explicit,in with identifying and writing.A preoccupation much recentanthropological of a constituting prioristructures human meaning is shared by a range of writings that are otherwise very different-thosedealing with cultural codes and communication, image categories, symbolic representations, is both etc. rationaltransactions, And thepreoccupation present management, and of the in the rationalist perspectives thoseconcernedto assert universality of of and perspectives systems, in theempiricist priority culturalclassification thoseconcernedwith what theytake to be the ultimatedatum of flesh-andwithinthe real world. This interest bone individuals, interacting intelligently in meaningis not itself new, althoughthereis perhapsa new self-consciousness meanings, about that interest. Anthropologicaltextswith titleslike Implicit Transaction and meaning, in Rules and meanings, Explorations languageand of 'The management meaning','Form and meaningof magicalacts', meaning, 'The politicsof meaning',seemto be somewhatmore evidenttodaythanthey were a generation ago-and from authors who might be described as and or and even as rationalist empiricist empiricists as rationalists, sometimes at one and the same time. It is worth notingthatLeach (1976) has recently of character two majorperspectives social in written about thecomplementary which he regardsnot as anthropology,the rationalistand the empiricist, to opposed but as eminentlycompatible.3However it is not my intention as suggest reassuringly, Leach appears to want to do, that rationalistand in are producinga sum of understanding empiricist anthropologists together of which what is lackingon the one side is made up by the achievement the I other.On the contrary, want to tryand indicatesome thingstheyhave in and common, to suggestwhy and to what extentthesethingsare a source of weakness. theoretical present to One aspectof thisweaknesscan be seen in what is oftenadmitted be the to repeatedfailureof social anthropologists produce a viable theoryof social proposed,that'real' change.The reasonforthismay not be, as it is sometimes of factors social changeare manyand complex,which is a practicaldifficulty, but rather thatthe way the objectof changeis itself makesthe conceptualised if of possibility such a theorydifficult not impossible. In the writingsof both empiricistand rationalist then, anthropologists,

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human meaningsare seen almosteverywhere. More precisely, basic social the or in object (called society, social structure social order)which is presented the is discourse of such anthropologists constructedout of essential human meanings. Societyas therealmof conventionis generally opposed to natureas In the realm of necessity. extremecases,as in Sahlins'smost recentdialogue with Marxism, thereis a tendencyfor even natureto be represented the as product of human action and cognition,as inert raw matterordered by constitutive human meanings.In a striking passage,which mustsurelystand as one of the most lyrical expressionsof the humanistproject in modern and reason writes: anthropology, Sahlinsin the conclusionto Culture practical
... natureas it existsin itself only the raw materialprovided by the hand of God, waiting is to be given meaningful shape and contentby the mind of man. It is as the block of marble to the finished statue;and of course the geniusof thesculptor-in thesame way as the technical developmentof culture-consists of exploitingthe lines of defraction withinthe materialto his own ends. That marbleis refractory; thereare certainthingsone cannotdo with it-such are the factsof natureand the action of selection.But it is the sculptorwho decides whether the statueis to be an equestrianknightcontemplatinghis victories[.. .] or a seated Moses contemplatingthe sins of his people. And if it be objected thatit is the compositionof the thatthisblock of marble which compels the formof the statue,it should not be forgotten marble was chosen fromamong all possibleones because thesculptorsaw withinit the latent image of his own project(I 976: 2 I0).

This bold celebrationof man's creativepowers, with God complacently occupying the rank of unskilled labourer, may not be to the taste of all However that may be, thispassage fromSahlins does raise anthropologists. in the sharply questionofhow thebasicsocialobjectpresented anthropological in texts is constituted those texts,and the question of what some of the theoreticalconsequences might be of the fact that the essentialdefining of elements thatobject are human meaningsand humanprojects. My concernis not with the questionof whetheror not the anthropologist in shouldacceptuncritically reproduce and directly hismodel theexplanations producedby thepeople he studies. The arguments betweenso-calledsymbolists and literalists as betweensoft, (sometimes represented a confrontation nostalgic liberalson the one hand, and clear-sighted, unsentimental on modernists the to after arguments aboutthecriteria be usedfordetermining other)arestill, all, thesenseofwhatpeople in othersocieties and do. On thisquestionone may say to note in passingthatthe attempt make a rigiddistinction betweensymbolic and literal meaningsis coming to be seen as a distinction that raisesmore it have problems than solves.4 Recently, Sperber (I976) (I975) andSkorupski in theirdifferent the createdby theanthropological ways discussed confusions are addictionto notionsof the symbolic.That theirown treatments not free offurther difficultiessomething cannotconsider is I now. In anycase,mypoint herehas to do not withtheproperinterpretation words,gestures, things of and in theircapacityas signifiers, with the preoccupation but thatdifferent kinds of anthropologists have with humanmeaningsas such. My concern in the first place is with the natureof the basic social object constituted within anthropological textsthemselves. And I want to arguethat in anthropological textsthisobject is typically constituted with reference a to

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notion of ideology whose social significancederives from its being the expression an a priori of system essential of meanings-an 'authentic culture'. I shall try to explore brieflythis conceptual object constituted human of meaningsand to criticise as I proceed-not by pointingto a brute reality it whicheverysensible personmustimmediately but recognise, by interrogating I the texts.In thecourseof thisinterrogation shalltryto takenote of the very different models that structurethe sense of 'meaning'-the aim of a speaker/actor, rulesof linguistic the (and stylistic) conventions, contentof the an experiencing, construing mind,and the processof conceptualunpacking and re-presentation occurs throughobjectivediscourse-because part of that my criticismwill focuson the troublesthatarise fromthe combinationof what are oftenincompatiblemodels in the anthropological attempt define to authentic cultures. III That thecentral objectof anthropological discourse primarily is constituted in termsof human meaningshas very recently been reaffirmed Maurice by Bloch in his I977 paper'The pastand thepresent thepresent'. in for In thispaperBloch is concerned specify to reasons theperennial difficulty that anthropologists have had in formulating adequate theoryof social an change.Bloch pointsout thatthe conceptof social structure anthropology in refers to of and essentially an integrated totality social classifications meanings, a system of social rules and roles which can, in one widely accepted senseoftheterm, called ritual.Now ifthisconceptof social be anthropological is structure linked to the doctrineof the social origin of concepts(the social determination cognition)itbecomesimpossible specify of how socialchange to can occur. This is because,so Bloch argues, system meaningful a of categories, ofsharedconcepts thatmakescommunication whichis none possible(a system otherthansocial structure) cannotexplain thecreationof new concepts.5 Bloch believes thatthe Marxist theoryof determining infrastructure and determined is because: superstructure no answerto theproblemeither,
the infrastructure seen as externalto the conceptsof the actors.[And] forit to be a source is of criticismof the social order it means thatpeople mustapprehendit in termsavailable to them and which are different from and incompatible with those of the dominant social theory. This means terms not determinedby it. Otherwise the infrastructure, however to contradictory the dominantsocial theory, never transformed action and just carries is into on in itsown sweet way, totallyirrelevant the processesof history(I977: 28 i). to

Bloch's own solution is to propose that the different conceptionsand perceptions criticism theexisting of requiredforan effective social ordermust be determined thatwhichis otherthansociety-in otherwordsby nature.6 by Now Bloch's emphasison the importance ideological argument(which of has its roots in some fertile made by Leach in Political suggestions systems of a highland Burma)is certainly move in the rightdirection-and I will come back to it later.But even in sucha discourse 'social structure' presented a is as total integrated of system sharedsubjectivemeaningsand conventions. Even theMarxistnotionofinfrastructure isdeclaredto be 'irrelevant theprocesses to

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of history'unlessit can be reducedto the experiences and aims of individual actors.The problemof social changeis thuspresented being a problemof a as changeof concepts, conceptsavailable to 'real flesh-and-blood the individuals' thatcan at once defineand transform essenceof society. the with Bloch's argumentis this: the propositionthat The main difficulty universallyvalid concepts(or new and betterformsof understanding) are essentially generated man'sencounter by with nature(which is to be thought of as being a kind of 'undeceiving' object) and not by his encounterwith of society(which is to be thought as being a kindof 'mystifying' object) may or may not be acceptable.I would maintainthatit is not. But even ifit were, it would not explain how people, who are presumablyall in directcontact come to have verydifferent with the same nature, conceptswithinthe same society, and how theyare able to engage in ideological arguments about the of in basic transformation social conditions which theyall live. In otherwords,epistemological questionsabout the ultimateoriginor the of and forms knowledge(so beloved of many of finalguarantee socialconcepts are anthropologists) really quite irrelevantto this kind of problem. They kindsof ideological about the reasonswhy different cannot tell us anything position come to be held in social life,or about the ideological force or of effectiveness particular politicalarguments. (That is not to sayas some social theorists both here and in France have recentlydone, that epistemological but and problemsare in themselves completely valueless, thatit is unnecessary, to worse thanunnecessary, drag in epistemological questionswhen discussing of want to call problems regardingthe constitution what anthropologists or and the partthatsystematic social structure, society, ideologiescan play in the reproductionor transformation that object.) In this respect, of Bloch's mistakeconsistsin making the assumption, which is by no means unique to a of him,thatsociety-and so too socialchange-is essentially matter structures which are at once thecollectiveforms experience, of structures and ofmeaning, of the social pre-conditions communication(cultureas language); and that social criticismis not merelysometimes necessary but always a therefore, a for sufficient pre-condition social change. Thus anthropologists have presented basic social objectsin theirtexts the ('social structure') such a way thattheyinevitably in proposeforideologyan essential and determinate function-so thatideology is not only written as in the basic organisingprincipleof social life,the integrated totalityof shared meaningswhich gives that societyits unique identity(its culture),but also to changingideologiesare said to be essential basic transformations. In a recent issue of Man (December I978), there appears a perceptive commenton Bloch's paper by Bourdillon.In it he observesquite rightly that the equation Bloch makesbetweenritualconcepts(or religiouslanguages)on theone hand,and hierarchy exploitation social structure) theother and on (or is far too simple and therefore unacceptable.7 However, Bourdillon has no of quarrel with the essentially ideological constitution that anthropological structure. the contrary, insists On he thatsocial structure object called social about society whichenablesus to bringtogether diverse ofthinking a 'is a way into a manageablesystem, and which expresses continuity setof relations the

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in any process of social events' (I978: 595). As against Bloch, Bourdillon for system roles,rulesand ritualsis essential of maintainsthatthisintegrated which can and notjust a sourceof mystification any formoforderlysocial life, and should be done away with. Bourdillon is here of course echoing the of far argument Douglas (1970) thatthe dissolution structure, frombeing by But is therationalaim of revolutions merelytheempiricalcause of rebellions. he does not ask himself, he mightwell have done: is the systemwhich is as or speculatively, for and speaking(whether supposedto be necessary thinking withwhatis necessary force)about sociallifeto be identified withauthoritative forliving in it? The ambiguity here is between what is supposed to be the way the actually thinksand speaks aboutsocial life and the way the anthropologist is are people the anthropologist studying supposedactuallyto thinkand speak is In intheir sociallife. otherwords,theambiguity betweentheanthropologist's of and thatis itslived culture) discourse, thediscourse thesociety(thediscourse definitive text (an which is supposedto be reproducedin the anthropologist's reflective discourse).This ambiguityis not concernedmerely interpretative, with the question mentioned previously of the degree to which the providedby thepeople may or mustdraw on theexplanations anthropologist as to literature theproblem studied-sometimesreferred in theanthropological of the informant's model versus the anthropologist's model. The question the other way being raised here is really concernedwith the relationship around.And the formwhich thatquestionmighttake is this:to what extent do anthropologicaltextsconstruct essential an systemof meaningsin their of to the of attempt present 'authentic'structure social lifeand of discourse the people studied? example. this Let me first illustrate point with a familiar

IV
of Some years afterPoliticalsystems highland Burmawas firstpublished, to Gellner(i958) wrote a paperdrawingattention thebook as:
of perhapsthe most lucid statement a certainkind of Idealism that I know, and teachersof as use philosophycould profitably a selectionof his statements a means of explainingto their students what such Idealism is about (I958: 202). Leach in effect sees other as Functionalists holding a kind of Platonism.Only the staticis properlyknowable, it is merely approximated by the empiricallyreal. [...] Leach's own variantto thisis a kind of Hegelianism: realitychangesbecause it is in conflict, conflict the is a conflict embodied ideas,and the change and conflict knowable by means of concepts of are in in thatare themselves conflict a parallelway (I958: I93).

but Gellner'spaper containedsome usefulpointsof criticism, I believe he was mistaken in his philosophical reading of Leach's text. Besides, the a Burmarepresents view thatis of propositionthatPoliticalsystems highland of described Hegelian cannotbe sustained a careful as analysis by appropriately thattext.But thatis all by theway. The interesting thingwas Leach'sresponse

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There, you may remember, in his Introductory Note to the I964 reprint. Leach wrote as follows:
off comment,Professor Incidentally, a friendly in Gellnerhas written my whole argument but it seemsto me thatin as one of 'idealist error'.Truth and errorare complicatedmatters suggestingindirectlythat the Kachins have a rather simple minded philosophy which by fromthatpostulated presumes relationship a between'idea' and 'reality'not verydifferent Plato, I am not arguing thatPlato was correct.The errorsof Platonismare very common errors which are shared not only by anthropologistsbut also by the people whom anthropologists study.

This attribution Leach of the Platonicdoctrineof formsto the Kachins by to is quite astonishing-not because the Kachins are too simple-minded hold a one, and thereis no it, but because the doctrineis essentially metaphysical in evidencein thetextof Kachin metaphysics thissense.Whateverthe'errors of Platonism' may be, they are not the errors of everyday political and of economic life(which is what thebook deals with) but theerrors systematic philosophicalspeculation. that Such is the awe in which philosophyis held by anthropologists, Leach terms. And to feltconstrained replyto a philosophical chargein philosophical a yet therewas no need forthiswhatever.Gellner had attributed particular philosophicaltheoryof meaningto Leach,8and it was in thiscontextthathe criticisedhim for assuming that one needed changing concepts to know changing reality.But Leach's text is not based on a specificphilosophical of theoryof meaning at all:9 a basic argumentof Politicalsystems highland socialconcepts Burma(likethatofBloch'spaper)is thattheremustbechanging could have forsuch a thingas social changeto occur. Now such an argument been countered-by pointing,not to a faulty philosophicaltheoryabout the relationbetween 'ideas' and 'reality' (as Gellner did), but to an ideological it conceptionof social change.More precisely, could have been counteredby which to of theory culture-the theory drawingattention a veryquestionable to of meaningsupposedly sharedby giveslogical priority thesystem authentic an ideologically-defined of community, independent the politicalactivity and of and economic conditions itsmembers. is Political by regarded manyanthropologists systems highlandBurmarightly of as a most important and its failure originality text-although its remarkable have rarely been adequately appreciated.But note how argumentsabout can into discourse be easilyshifted systematic conceptswithinanthropological anotherkey-and thusstopped,by an appeal to the discourseof the natives 'out there'which theanthropologist witnessed recorded. has and Since Gellner did not respond, can perhapsassumethathe acceptedLeach's authority we in thisargument. However thatmay be, on thisoccasion,as on othersin which an anthropologicaldiscourseseeks to re-present authenticsystemof human fromone historical moment which define, meanings(theenduringcategories to another, who 'the Kachin' are),no nativewas available to contest system the thenat leastto the'society' being imputed-if not to him or herindividually, which was supposedto be authentically or hers. his Here is one example, then, of the way in which the anthropologist's discursiveobject comes to be presentedas a reproductionof the essential

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discourse a whole society. of be (Although, it noted,it is nottheKachin butthe anthropologist who actually writes.) The examplemaybe unusualin substance but perhapsbecauseof thatit servesall thebetter raisethe questionof how to anthropological textsconstruct a whole society, even fora groupwithin for or it, a total,integrated semanticsystem, which defines thatsocietywhat its for essential identity is. Let me pursuethisquestionwithfurther reference Leach'sPolitical to systems The significance Leach'stextderivesnot fromthefactthatit illustrates of a simple philosophicalerror(idealism)which should be replacedby a sounder epistemologybut fromthe factthatit is a rich and complex statement a of particular anthropological problemand itsproposedsolution.The textis not of simply the reflection an essentialphilosophy.It is the productionof an anthropologicalobject. I cannot here discussthis work in the detail that it but to deserves, will draw on an aspectof it which is relevant my theme. The starting point of Leach's study,of course,was the questionof Kachin identity. The problem was thatthe so-calledhill peoples of the north-eastern Burma frontier regionwere rather diversein theirculture, lived in contrasting ecological settings,spoke a number of quite distinct (often mutually unintelligible)dialects, and were organised in local communitieswhich apparentlyheld to very different political principles-varying from the Shan princedoms theoftenrather comparatively rich,autocratic to poor, and relativelyegalitarianKachin gumlaovillage domains. Leach's answer to this basic problem was that Kachin identitywas based on a common 'ritual language', an ideological systemwhose primaryorganisingcategorieswere political. Leach's notion of a common ritual language enabled him to rationalise in apparentlocal divergencies the Hills Area into conceptualmomentsof the 'same' social structure, and apparenthistoricalchanges into elementsof the This solutionto an empirical transformational ofthatstructure. rationalist logic of the of problem was thusin effect construction a system human meanings as (a 'grammarof ritualaction' Leach called it) which was thenidentified the oftheKachinsessential the languagethatdefined politicaleconomicintegrity and in terms of which the Kachins must speak if they are to remain Kachin. In this way Leach's text defineswhat can and what authentically of cannotbe 'correctly'said in thepoliticaldiscourse theKachins. in Of course Leach allows forand refers his text to ideological argument describedrevolve in generalaround among the Kachins. But the arguments the abstract of versusequality,and Leach relatesthe way principles hierarchy in which theauthoritative Kachin rituallanguageis usedto claim one or other of of thesetwo abstract which are at once theprinciples prevailing principles, social conditionsand the principlesof meaningfuldiscourse.The resulting have observed,is thusan accountof account of social change,as manycritics as of an eternalcycle-better described a process ideologicalself-reproduction. here is not thattherecannot be argumentand criticism of The difficulty if social arrangements thereis only one language which is 'determinedby The difficultynotthatLeach shouldhave looked moreto 'economics is society'.

Burma. ofhighland

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and politics'(whereallegedlyMan is in directcontactwith Nature) and lessto the origins of Kachin concepts of ritual and religion in order to identify Reality.The difficulty residesin the very notion of a 'grammar' which is at and also once theprinciplethatdefines anthropologist's the objectof discourse and defineKachin political thesystem conceptswhich is held to integrate of of and economic lifeas a whole. This ideologicaldefinition theKachin system misses the question of whether there are not specificpolitical economic conditions which make certain rhetoricalforms objectivelypossible, and For authoritative. when Kachins become Shan, for example, the process involved is not merely a matterof the mental or behavioural change of of and but subjects, ofthepartialundermining a givenformofdiscourse, ofthe of production and re-affirmation another form,within the very different The question materialconditionswhich Shan politicaleconomy articulates. is that we might ask, therefore, whetherthereis a 'grammar' that always definesfor the population of the entireHills area what are the politically ones. correctutterances actions),and what are necessarily (or meaningless The unsatisfactory state of such anthropologicaltheorisingcomes, I am fromthefactthatthebasic social objectit presents constructed is out arguing, of of an integrated system 'sharedmeaningful ideas', and so fromthefactthat statusis given to thatsystem(otherwiseit would not be a closed, definitive 'integrated'or 'shared' fromone generation the next), and all thisin the to attempt to reproduce an authenticculture. What makes that system of meanings'authentic'is this very re-presentability fromthe past'0 (froman original generationto its authorisedsuccessors;and from the moment of graspingit in the fieldto the momentof embodyingit in the text).Thus the political discourseof particularsocieties(as opposed to theirknowledge of and Reality) is assumed to be self-defining self-reproducing. Because of this recentcommentators like Bloch cannot see any way out of the assumption, Leachean impasse other than by reducingthe problem of the authority of political discourse(which definescertainmeaningsas essential)to the very different problem of the epistemological foundation and growthof objective of knowledge('Man's experience Nature,direct/indirect'). in thisway an And anthropologicalquestionis answeredin philosophicalterms.Neither Leach nor his later critics make any attempt to explore the systematicsocial connexionsbetween historical forcesand relations the one hand, and the on formsof discoursesustainedor underminedby them on the characteristic other. In case it should still be thoughtthat I am merelyconcernedto criticise structuralist authorsfortheiridealism, me remindyou thatLeach'sPolitical let Burmais in itsown way as materialist as actor-oriented systems highland of and as arethemorerecent texts self-proclaimed or by materialists transactionalists. V But perhaps thisargument be made morestrongly we turnto Douglas can if in her most recent,transactionalist mood-I referof course to the booklet

Cultural bias. entitled

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PraisingCicourel for his attackon sociology and ethno-science, Douglas comments:

as Everything writesabout our colleagues strikes he thisanthropologist good clean fun,but at it is a pitythathe never writesanything about Englishsocial anthropology all. For we are how meaningsare generated, hisnaturalallies.We also believe thatour work is to understand caught and transformed. also assume that meaningsare deeply embedded and contextWe bound. We are also stuckat the same fencethathe has baulked. Like him we cannotproceed very farwithoutincorporating real live culturesinto our analysis.For the cognitiveactivity of the real live individual is largely devoted to building the culture,patchingit here and trimmingit there,according to the exigenciesof the day. In his very negotiatingactivity, their each is forcingculturedown the throats his fellow men. When individualstransact, of medium of exchange is in unitsof culture(I978: 5-6).

I thinkwe should not be distracted thesevivid images of threatened by who are authority-of horsesthatwill not take the fence,and of prisoners forciblyfed. What Douglas wants to know is whethercultureis capable of and herconclusionis thatit is not.In orderto establish being radicallyaltered, on of she a this, attempts specification therangeofconstraints individualchoice of and exchange,and thisshedoes by theapplication what shecallsgrid-group well-knowndistinction of analysis-an anthropological offspring Bernstein's codes. The resulting between elaboratedand restricted morphologyof four and basictypes socialcontext, their of of formthe supporting types cosmology, his experiences settings withinwhichthe'real live individual'makesdecisions, or her environment, transacts and valueswith others. Douglas produces ethnographic examples from a wide variety of societiesfor each of the four main anthropologicalstudiesof non-capitalist for all the types are also provided from cultural types. But illustrations industrialcapitalistsociety,such that 'individualism',for example, can be culture',as inscribedas a basic defining componentof 'middle classindustrial well as that of highland New Guinea culture. And this is not without for significance, she claims thatone of the meritsof her approach lies in its abilityto 'cut acrosstheclassstructure'. of as Douglas is quiteclearabout thefutility whatshedescribes classanalysis.
Ever since [the eighteenth has century]Europe's self-knowledge consideredsocial change in termsthat are based upon stratification, economic and political,and upon occupational has hierarchical perspective not lent categories.For the anthropologist's project,the stratified itself sayinganythingvery usefulabout the relationbetween cultureand ideology on the to one hand or between culture and formsof social organisationon the other. The present kind of slice into social exercise in understanding cosmologies is intendedto cut a different reality(I978: 54).

For Douglas, culture represented a structured ofauthentic is as field meanings on which individualexperience, are socialinteraction, collectivediscourse and all in different ways parasitic.The total culture,which mediatesbetween and ideologyand social organisation, at once thecollectiveprecondition the is long-termresidueof meaningful choice and experience.And because social in facts represented terms theshapeand content subjective are of of experience, modes of rationalismand empiricismbecome, in her text,complementary accounting for the origin of those facts-a typical piece of reductionist sincetheparticular of individual reasoning. Furthermore, pattern meaningful

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interaction, and the patternof collective cosmologies,togetherdefine the of the ultimateformation social conditionsin theirfourcontextualvariants, experiencing, transacting individualhas reallyonly one oftwo options:either to adjust to a given integratedcontext (like learning to use a language for correctly)-or to leave it altogether a more congenialsocial context(or language). And this is so because,in her own words, 'Each positionon the cosmology [typological]chartis presented an integralunit incorporating as structure' 4I). (p. and social experienceas a singleclose-meshed or of is Thus for Douglas, the transformation social structure impossible, impossibleto understand, because thereis no social object that is specified like and of of independently a system humanmeanings, becausesucha system, of a given language, has the functionof renderingthe structure cultural the experience and of political action isomorphic.As in Natural symbols, for as culturaland politicalpre-conditions sayingand doing things, well as the and actionsproduced in those conditions, neatly are statements meaningful fusedtogether. Nothingcan be said or done withmeaningifit does not fitinto an a priorisystem, the 'authentic' culturewhich definesthe essentialsocial is of the people concerned. The process of radical transformation being so of meaning'-and quite rightly if as describedquite literally 'an emptying culture. is the re-presentation essential of meanings themarkof an authentic of There is no spacein Douglas's textfora conceptofforms sociallifewhich have their own material conditionsof existence,their own relationsand and whichcannotbe relations tendencies tendencies-thatis to say,conditions, reduced to the origins of human meaning, whether collective cognitive The conceptof mode of production, categoriesor individualsocial activity. and therelatedconceptof classstructure, of courseprecisely are suchconcepts. These conceptsare not 'slices of social reality'.They are not the'true objects' of human experience.And theyare not the ultimateorigin or guaranteeof everydaycategoriesor of languagesor of ideologies. Such conceptsare for the systematic historicalaspectsof social forcesand relationsby theorising which the materialbasesof collectivelifeare produced-forces and relations fromthatof individual meanings, whose existenceis distinct intentions and actions.I need not elaborateon thispoint hereexcept to note in passingthat and of relations mustbe historicised, otherwise theorisation conceptsof forces in terms of modes of production is bound to become legalistic and/or idealistic.'2What I want to emphasise thatsocial lifeis not simplya matter is of of systems meaning(whetherconventional intentional), or even ifit is true that communicationbetween human beings is necessarily presentin every domain ofsocial activity-thatsociallifeis notidentical withcommunication, to structures althoughcommunicationis necessary it. The logic of historical based on theforces and relations production quite different of is fromthelogic humanintentions, specific of humanlanguages, ofspecific and forms ofspecific of human understanding.'3 Not only is the logic of ideological structures different fromthe logic of on but the former also, in complex ways,dependent is modes of production, thelatter.14 moreconcretely: 'individualism'ofhighlandNew Guinea Put the cannotbe assimilated, Douglas tries assimilate to thebourgeois as to societies it,

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'individualism' of the middle classes in advanced capitalistsociety. The parametersof the bourgeois ego are definedby an authoritative discourse different fromthosethat which is rooted in materialconditionsprofoundly of sustainthe relevantdiscourses highlandNew Guinea. For,to take a crucial discourse:it is only in particularkinds of social and aspect of authoritative material conditions that given forms of performativeutterancecan be to it thattheybe effective.'5 But fortheseutterances be effective is necessary kinds and acceptedin appropriate kindsofsituation appropriate understood by of person.That is to say, given formsof effective performatives presuppose can kindsof performative be effective certaintypesof ego,just as particular The difference between the only in the rightmaterialand social conditions. not New Guinea Big Man and the bourgeoisego is therefore merelyone of degree. tendencies which about all theseanthropological What can be said,in short, accord a criticalpriorityto systems human meaning is that they leave of come to be materially forms discourse of unposedthequestionofhow different produced and maintainedas authoritative systems. And, of course,once this as the of status sucha system a priori, questionis seriously addressed, theoretical as mode withinanthropological and itslatent function theorganising discourse, are also called into question.

VI some popular misunderPerhapsthisis the place to considervery briefly of about the relationof ideologyto the standings Marx's famousformulation In kinds materialconditionsof existence. thiswhole area too many different of question are often confounded,by defendersand critics alike of that in Let formulation anthropology. me try,however sketchily, sortsome of to themout. Take first forms sociallyconstituted of ideology as systematic knowledge. The Marxian proposition materialconditions the for thatthereare specific existence specific of ideologiesin thissensedoes not necessarily implythatthe ideologiesare simplyeffects reflections thoseconditions. or of Thus if we say thatthedomainsofsystematic discourse withinwhich specific are knowledges produced, testedand communicated,are dependent specificinstitutional on conditionsand relations, thisdoes not requireany commitment the view to that the knowledges reflect those institutional conditions-that there is an isomorphic relation between the structureof knowledge and that of institutional conditions.If we say thatgiven social conditionssustain, and at become obstacles thedevelopment scholarly to of certain stages understanding, thisdoes not imply thatthe conceptof objectiveknowledgesis nothingbut illusion.If we say thatparticular modes of systematic discourse can be and are used forfurthering classinterests, does not imply thatall such this particular modes of discourseare essentially nothingbut an 'expression'of the positions thatare supposedto definethoseinterests. much may be familiar So enough and acceptableto manyof you.

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But where the notion of ideology relatesto notionsof politicsand social function becomes more problematical. it on Discourse which seeks to reflect the nature of social conditionsin a acted upon, contested, systematic way can, in the processof being re-stated, for of have some critical consequences givenconditions sociallife.But ideology because to determinate function, as suchcannotbe saida priori have a universal, or what verbal discourses(as well as othermodes of communication)signify do can only be determinedby analysingthe concretesocial conditionsin which they are produced. It is no accident,for example, that attemptsto in set specifya determinate of rulesfor defining performatives English-let in all languages-have not succeeded.'6Because thedevelopingmaterial alone of the conditionsof social lifealways determine force,if not the occurrence, are events.And theseconditions not merelythoseof theface-to-face discursive occur (as many speechevent theoriestend to encounterin which utterances of assume17)but thoseof thepoliticaleconomic structure societyas a whole. of My pointis notthatwe will onlyhave a viable theory ideologywhen we have can develop a proper scienceof the symbolic,as some anthropologists be of which argued.'8 It is thattherecannot a generaltheory ideology,a theory and of will specify universal the pre-conditions, significances effects discourse. not a novel argument.'9But it mustbe said thatit This is, of course,in itself but is one thatstands opposedto thepositionnot only of manyanthropologists also of manyMarxistson thisquestion-although not thatof Marx himself.20 do, It is all verywell to say,as manyMarxistsand anthropologists thatgiven of formsof social organisation given relations production)always require (or to given ideological (or cultural)systems maintainand reproducethem.But sucha statement In appearsextremely problematical manyreasons. thefirst for place such a formulais eithertautological-as when ideologyis said to define is of so relations property thatwhat has to be maintained identicalwith what is supposed to do the maintaining;or it is reductionist-as when particular are utterances said to have a predetermined minds' impacton the'interpreting of thosewho uphold basic setsof social relationships, theirsensebeing thereby from these equated with their effect.What we can deduce, incidentally, as and is difficultiesthatsometimes ideologyis treated socialrelation, sometimes and as systematic utterance, thatin both itsguisesit is sensedas being mediated in and structured, an obscureway, by authorising discourses. When the questionarisesof specifying, concretecases,what the crucial in the ideologicalsystems theanthropologist are, responds postulating presence by of an authenticsystemof meaningsas the key to the discoursenoted in the in and essentially reconstituted thefinaltext.It is thiskey thatis used to field, and to identify particular utterances mererepetitions the same discourse, as of as determinefor them a mental effect the crucial part of theirmeaning.In other words, in order to establish the determinatefunctionof a given isolates what was said from its 'meaningful' discourse,the anthropologist rhetorical context, and separatestendencieswhich might support given conditionsfromthosewhich mightcontribute theirundermining-taking to his theoretical for separations reproductions the original.In thisway, the of text the and ambiguities anthropologist's suppresses tensions (consciousas well

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in of historical as unconscious) thatobtainwithina givenfield discourse specific conditions, and thussuppresses also the processby which motives,rhetorical are and It devicesand forms comprehension constructed reconstructed. is of of which they of and courseprecisely theseambiguities discourse, theelaboration call for, that make political argument possible. Yet even when the text presents two or more 'competing ideological systems' anthropologist's is and reducedto something (official unofficial, say),actualdiscourse generally social role which can be definitively else-something thathas a determinate in established a neutralfashion theanalyst. by with the doctrine of the There is another (not unconnected)difficulty as maintenance function ideology.When ideologyispresented theculturally of inheritedlens of a given societyby which external realityis filteredand internalised itsmembers, as thesystem symbolsby which theirdirect for or of experience is rendereduniquely communicable,a well-known paradox is text the created.For in doing so theanthropologist's claimsforitself abilityto thatexternalrealitydirectly, to reproducethatinnerexperience or represent through very different symbols which are neverthelessassumed to be lack. In appropriate-abilities which the exotic peoples studied necessarily are discourses typically such an anthropological exercise,historically specific social mechanism, reducedto the statusof determinate partsof an integrated and an epistemologicalparadigm which purportsto definethe problem of objective knowledge is passed off as a sociological model for analysing ideology. is It may be suggested herethatthepossibility sucha reduction locatedin of of the absence,in anthropology, an adequate understanding authoritative of foundeddiscourse which seekscontinually prediscourse-i.e. of materially to and so to preventthem from empt the space of radicallyopposed utterances being uttered.2' For authoritative discourse,we should be carefulto note, neither authorises 'Reality'nor'Experience'butotherdiscourse-texts,speech, visual images,etc.,which are being structured termsof given (imposed) in and reproducedin termsof essential Even when actionis meanings. concepts, it thatsuchactionestablishes authority. action its The authorised, is as discourse is read as being authorised, the readingand the action are not identicalbut thatis why it is always logicallypossibleto have an alternative reading. wronglyformulated The problem of understanding ideology is therefore when it is assumedto be a matterof predicting what 'real' or 'experiential' social formsare necessarily producedor reproducedby it. And thisis so not becauseforms utterance neverhave systematic of consequences (performatives are and accepted)but because do, given thattherelevant premisses understood of is the effectiveness such utterances dependenton conventionswhich are viable only withinparticular materialconditions.

VII One consequenceof what I have been sayingof course is thatthe vulgarMarxistview of ideologyas a coherent which maintains of system falsebeliefs

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of a total structure exploitationand dominationcannot reallybe sustained. at This is because,as I have alreadyimplied,such a view attributes once too and much to ideology and also too little:too much because the maintenance set is continuity a totalsocialformation supposedto dependon an integrated of of concepts,and too little because the discourse in which ideologies are which univocal significance as articulatedis identified having an essential, This view at as and as social determinant. establishes once itsstatus falsebelief, but of is not centralto Marx's own analysis capitalism, it does have a certain currency among some Marxists. however,thatthisview ofideologyis peculiarto It shouldnot be imagined, social like On vulgar-Marxists. the contrary, the conceptionof the integrated have been theorising formation which many FrenchMarxistanthropologists for (and which I have criticised some years)thisview of ideology is a central doctrineof functional anthropology. of Gellner'sdiscussion barakaamong the Muslim Berbersof Morocco22to take a well-known example-is very much in line with this particular in view of ideology. His analysisis concerned, his words,with showingthat a 'There is here a crucialdivergencebetweenconceptand reality, divergence which moreover is quite essentialfor the working of the social system' of how a distinctive minority Berbers,called (1970: 142). Gellner describes and arbitrators among the feudingtribesaround Saints,who act as mediators a a themare believedto possess divinequality, baraka, qualitywhichis thought But althoughthe Saintsare and influence. to be the origin of theirauthority so believed to be selectedby God forthisoffice, Gellnerargues,the realityis to themselves who, by resorting because it is the tribesmen quite otherwise, in thesemediators, effect selectand accordthemtheirauthority-but without knowing that this is what they do. In Gellner'smemorable phrase,'What appearsto be vox dei is in realityvoxpopuli' (I970: 142). By which we learn appearances of thatcertainIslamicreligiousdoctrines essentially are mystified politicalreality. This whole styleof anthropologicalanalysisis based on what might be of called theWizard of Oz theory ideology.Like Dorothy,theanthropologist tearsaside the veil of a seemingdiscourseto disclosethe essential reality-an old Even so, you will ordinary-looking man busilyworkinga hand-machine. rememberthe Tin Man reallygets his heart,the Lion his courage and the howeverabsurd, shown to have itssocial is StrawMan his brain,so thatbelief, But perhapsmore important, function. all you will also rememberthatafter the whole episode is Dorothy's dream-that the essentialrealitywhich is a By of revealedis itself phase in thenarrative Dorothy'sunconscious. which, that'reality'is insubstantial, only that but of course,I do not want to suggest the uncoveringof 'essentialmeanings'is itselfa productionin discourse.In otherwords,I want to remindyou thatGellner'stext is the place where the essential and meaningof barakais revealed/constructed, so to pose thequestion of thecriteria which thatmeaningis established. thequestionthatarises For by of their hereis this: Why do thesurfaces Berberreligiousconceptsnot reflect why do the Berbers fail to see the political meanings? Alternatively, commonsense reality (the essential meaning) to which Gellner so easily

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in penetrates? is not much help to answerthatGellneris trained philosophy It and thatthe Berbersare not, for thatmerelyshifts the and in anthropology as problem fromGellner as the writingsubjectto anthropology the fieldof a authoritative discoursereproducing othercultures, disciplinewhich defines the certaintextsas competent. And bear in mind thatthe mistake Berbersare supposed to be continuouslymaking is about the everydaycommonsense in politicalconditions which theylive,and not about some finalphilosophical betweenthe Reality.Partof mypointhereis thatthereis an obvious difference notionofmystification directv. indirect experience epistemological (implying of Reality) and the notion of mistakesor deceptionin everydaysocial and politicallife-and thatit is not veryclear which notionGellneris deploying is of and why. But my main argument thatin eithercase,theauthority Berber religious ideology is left entirelyunexplained.For baraka is not simply a but conceptwitha constructed 'disclosed') meaning, a partofauthoritative (or and it is no explanationof such discourseto say Berber religiousdiscourse, simplythatpeople believein it.23And stilllessis it explainedwhen we aretold a thatin essencethe conceptrepresents delusion.24 Of course we can and should enquire into the political and economic implicationsof religious discourse and argumentfor particularhistorical which make such discourse conditions,and into the materialpreconditions We to instances particular possibleand authoritative. can even attempt establish as ofpoliticaldeceptionand error, and when theevidenceallows. But we need not thinkthatin doing thiswe are uncoveringthetruepoliticalor economic essenceofreligiousideologies.Thus we do nothave good groundsforarguing, as many Westernwriters modernIslamic reform on movementshave done, discourse not religiousbut is forexample,thatthe'real' meaningof reformist Islamis not reproduced suchdiscourse.25 stress I in that political,thatauthentic the thisis not a plea for respecting true meaningof religiousdiscourse-for that the 'real' meaning of said in Nuer religion, saying,as Evans-Pritchard objectsbut religiousconceptslies not in the externalworld of commonsense to in the innerworld of religiousexperience.It is not at all my intention try of On What to rescuetheultimate integrity personalexperience. thecontrary. I am arguing here is merely that the whole businessof looking for and of discourse(its'authentic the society's reproducing essential meanings another far thanit has been in social culture')shouldbe problematised moredrastically outside anthropology-justas,indeed,it hasalreadybegunto be problematised The search for essentialmeaningsin anthropology social anthropology.26 in of fashion(either invariablyresults thetreatment ideologyin a reductionist by reducing ideology to economic political conditions,or by reducing economic political conditions to ideology) and in confoundingit with issues. of And it is thistreatment ideologythatis so characteristic philosophical in the offunctional definitively authentic anthropology itsdesireto reproduce cultures of other peoples. Instead of taking the production of 'essential societies discourse)in given historical meanings'(in theformof authoritative takesthe existenceof essential as the problem to be explained,anthropology meanings(in theformof'authentic discourse')as thebasicconceptfordefining and explaininghistorical societies.

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VIII Let me try to statein a few words the generalposition which underlies much of what I have been trying say (a dangerousthingto do, but even so, to probablynecessary). is an old position, one which bearsre-stating It but given the presentself-consciousness about ideology and about meaning.However muchwe might, professional as talkers writers, and wishto affirm profound the importanceof systematic discourse, is difficult avoid the obvious,but by it to no means trivial,conclusion that political and economic conditionshave developed and changed in ways that are rarelyin accord with systematic Or discourse. let me put it anotherway: it is surely neither power ofsocial the nor the relativestrength competingsocial ideologieswithinthe criticism of societiesstudied by social anthropologists Asia, in Africa and in Latin (in America) which explains why and how they have become basically but transformed, the historical forcesof world industrial capitalismand the way thesehave impingedupon particular politicaland economic conditions. Of coursepoliticalarguments be important can if (and especially theyhelp to mobilisepowerfulsocial movements) perhaps but neverin theway,nor to the extent,thatwe flatter ourselvestheyare important. Given thatthisis so, the main troublewith much colonial anthropology-and with much contemporary anthropologytoo-has been not its ideological servicein the cause of imperialism, itsideological conceptionof social structure of culture. but and
NOTES

for that 'It is thistotality whichMalinowski to refers whenhe writes example, 'Sincethe withthelevelofculture, withgeographical, wholeworldof"things-to-be expressed" changes the of socialandeconomic conditions, consequence that meaning a wordmust always the is be a of an gathered, from passive not contemplation this word,butfrom analysis itsfunctions, of or as of withreference thegivenculture. to Eachprimitive barbarous tribe, well as eachtype the civilisation, its world of meanings...' (I923: 309). Accordingto Malinowski, has of because unlike latter, is to the view ethnographer's oflanguage superior that thephilologist's, and he or she has direct accessto thisessential totality can therefore correctly interpret the do meanings whichit imparts people's and utterances. to acts 'What "meanings" existin any I a concept of embodied thebehaviour in culture? "meaning"understand given aspect native By of thenatives, their or Thustheconcept magical of for in interests, in their doctrines. force, exists thevery in of instance, waythey handle their magic.[ ...] But theproblem ascertaining of in for the force embodied native is behaviour in their and that, instance, concept magical to of that have wholetheoretical approach magic;andthen ascertaining they certainly no term forthis and of concept can onlyvicariously express it-this,in spite itsnegative quality, the is
real problem of ethnographic linguistics' (I935, II: 68).

, Malinowski's has the explicit preoccupation withlexicography grammar diverted and of his attention manyof his anthropological critics (especially thosewho approach writings from Saussurian a his to of perspective) away from attempts deal withtherhetorical aspects It language. hasbeenleft largely theworkofexceptional to literary critics, Burke(I950), like to drawourattention, to side albeit very briefly, this ofMalinowski. 3 Thus,'thetwo anthropological as whichI haveheresummarised "empiricist" viewpoints as rather thanright wrong' (Leach or and "rationalist" to be regarded complementary are
I976:

philosophy:the case from literalmetaphor', (mimeographed), Linguistics Department, of University California, Berkeley, I979. a it to at because is difficult see whysomeof the S 'This seems first sight strange problem cannot this is actors a certain at in point thesocialprocess say: system no goodat all,letustake a fresh at thesituation buildup a newsystem. reason look and The whythey cannot, within the of theoretical framework discussed, in theunanalysed lies notion thesocialdetermination of

'Toward an experientialist 4See the interesting and M. Johnson paper by G. Lakoff

6).

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look are a by if and thought. Simply, all concepts categories determined thesocialsystem fresh (Bloch is mouldedto fitwhat is to be criticised' sinceall cognition already is impossible find universal at someof which constrains least society in concepts, so] itissomething theworldbeyond [and ourcognitive categories' (Bloch I977: 285). 7 Bourdillon also surely language-views Bloch'sviewson 'formal' in is right criticising and in to language oratory traditional at in whicharedeveloped length hisIntroduction Political in (See But society. he couldhavegonemuchfurther hiscriticism. below,mynote2 I.) 8 'Roughly of a that [sic], systems propositions describe Leachbelieves language, speaking, in wordshe believes what of it sense, other in literal in reality virtue reflectingin somefairly This of the theory meaning. iswhatwe needknowofhisphilosophy. might called parallelism be in in reflects society whichit occurs a the that he As a matter anthropology, believes ritual of 9 Gellner's of is for in wrong theory meaning clearly assertion Leachbelieves a parallelist that a claims present cultural to own discourse placeLeach's reasons. In thefirst (i) thefollowing As literal sense'. we 'in of whichreflects Reality somefairly not grammar, a system propositions that is simply it in as re-presented is shallseelater, grammar presented authentic, thesense this the and is to in his text.This cultural grammar intended helpus understand heterogeneous book of a of changing socialconditions theKachinHills Area,in theway thata grammar and in (2) of language. As us the helps understand processes speech writing that foreign language for that their he myths, of themselves, argues analysis thediscourse theKachins of forLeach's controversy' 85-97),andsince (pp. in be example, must seenas 'a language whichto maintain 'is to of in in hisview thetruth untruth whatis uttered thislanguage quiteirrelevant' an or can of it to of understandingitsmeaning, isdifficult seehowsucha conception language be said 'ritual' when of to be founded a parallelist on theory meaning. Furthermore, Leachdefines (3) status a social as to the which'serves express individual's as that of any aspect almost behaviour for himself thetimebeing'(pp. i o-i i), he is in in system whichhe finds person thestructural ofsociety. is function constitutive but not society', that signifying its ritual asserting that 'reflects in to parallelism are in at sight invoke Leachseems first there places thetextwhere (4) Finally, of of (e.g; of of his elucidation the meaning ritual-as in his analysis ceremonies sacrifice function virtue such ceremonies a mnemonic have by here pp. I 72-82). Leach's argument isthat shouldbe. what idealsocialstructure of thefactthattheyrepresent theparticipants their to or in here notethat whatissaidto be themeaning isnot'society' 'socialreality some However, In words, whatLeachis of sense'-but ideasin theminds theparticipants. other fairly literal reflects in of is the proposing not is that meaning ritual to be found thewaytheIdeaitembodies Gellner alludes butin theway to) theory like wouldbe rather thephilosophical Reality (which that of theceremonial evokes certain ideasintheminds theparticipants-and isnota parallelist to philosophy. of at linked an idealist theory meaning all,noris itnecessarily 10Cf. Walter Benjamin's seminalessay'The work of art in the age of mechanical in (I970). reproduction' Benjamin 11 MarvinHarris in whenhe praised book forits that (I969) was notmistaken hisreading aboutitsidealism materialist notwithstanding. method-Gellner's judgements 12 An a-historical of of has to approach theconcept modeofproduction beencharacteristic who them. and like sociologists follow theworkofFrench anthropologists Godelier, ofEnglish and who have beenstrongly influenced thisworkare often by Anthropologists sociologists British resemblances betweentheirwork and old-fashioned quite unawareof the strong functional anthropology. 13 Semioticians France, a to themselves the taskof formulating in who have addressed Marxist of havesometimes takenup whatseems be a contrary to position. theory ideology, in embodied Thus Veronwrites: activity inevitably is that 'One mustunderstand semiotic as is the concerned described the, ofwhether order form socialorganisation-regardless of every independently etc., the the the "economic", "political", "cultural", "ritual", i.e.whenitistreated is of its signifying activity, formof social organisation no aspect.Withoutthissemiotic difficulties the which to the quiteright stress serious conceivable' (I978: I4). Veronisofcourse for superstructure engenders an adequate Marxistmodel of economicbase and ideological of thathis insistence the ubiquity on of but understanding ideology, it is not at all certain a resolution these he though goeson to warn semiotic of difficulties-even activity constitutes society capable is activity running through thereader 'This is notto saythat semiotic that this in in of of the described itsentirety terms a simple ofbeing coherence-quite principle internal and between discursive thenon-discursive the For aspects contrary'. in placeofthedistinction ofsociallife, was intended, however unsatisfactorily, whichthenotion basis/superstructure of
similarway' (Gellner I 9 5 8: I 89).
I977: 28I). 6 'It is in contexts that contact withnature we wheremanis in mostdirect

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'grammars'), i.e. of principles (distinctive to articulate, proposes heterogeneitydiscursive he a whichin industrial capitalist societies situated the are on contradictory principles discourse of by represented thisarticle level of class conflict. There is alwaysa dangerin tendencies withnothing it in will (interesting ingenious and though is) that theendevenMarxists be left political whilehistorical but 'real discourse', 'real people' who producethatdiscourse, and or economies bracketed one side as beingno more than'abstractions' 'theoretical are on concepts'. 14 Voloshinov's and philosophylanguage, published years first Marxism the fifty ago,is still of it and of discussions thisproblem, although leavesmanydifficult one of the mostfruitful to a of it questions unanswered, reveals sensitivity thecomplexsocialfoundations discourse on subject today. whichsurpasses muchofwhatis written this coinedtheterm'performative' thenabandoned and the 15 See Austin(I962), who first recent of Graham hasforcefully that argued the In study Austin, (I977) concept. hisinteresting of should retained, forthevery be and reason led that defined, concept performative, properly of through a sharp it, to the latter's givingit up-namely, the impossibility establishing, in of between way. conceiving itin a particular separation acting theworldandmerely 16 I refer theattempt 'Whatis a speech act?' (I965)-reprinted in Searle that to began-with involvedin chapter for some of the problems 2, Giglioli (1972). See Coulthard(977), and (or acts) in English.As for other identifying classifying performatives illocutionary and Ravenhill writes Bauman Sherzer Philip who, M. [I974: 468]) that languages, K. Foster (in and of the morethananyoneelse,has explored strengths weaknesses thisnotionforcrossan of has argued against uncritical application performative cultural comparison, 'effectively whichis The to basedon English, other languages (andcultures).' workof Ravenhill analysis, whichI have, not is paper unfortunately, beenableto secure. citedbyFoster a mimeographed 17 Such an assumption perhaps remarks theeditors that of in is evident thefollowing by '. of in ethnography of speaking:. . theethnography speaking valuable collection, Explorationsthe of created theneglect anthropological record the linguists by by fills gapintheanthropological and in of and thesocialuseoflanguage bythelackofinterest ethnographerspatterns functions of to cuts of ofspeaking. importance theethnography speaking anthropology fardeeper The on as for for focus speaking aninstrument theconduct sociallife of than this, however, a careful nature social not determinedthe the to by institutional of structures,rigidly brings thefore emergent created performancethestrategic goal-directed in and but structure thesociety, rather largely by of Thisnotion (Bauman& Sherzer I974: 8, myemphasis). manipulationresourcesfor of speaking' and whichgenerates historical the transaction communication it that is thelevelofindividual of is it is one of thethings structure societies also proposed Kapferer by (1976: I 5-I6)-and that it In against whichI am arguing. thiscontext, may be worthstressing thedistinction and of does but of between conditions thepolitical the economy those discourse notparallel cuts norms. between distinction across anthropological the juralandstatistical 18 Forexample 208-9). Geertz (1973:
20 It is no accident Contrary to a theory ideology. of that Marxdid notputforward general he theassumption he did notfind timeto develop the sucha theory before died,it can be that and that there no placefor inhisanalysis thecapitalist is it of modeofproduction, in his argued commitment theclass to struggle. whichM. 21 Authoritative with'formalised language', discourse shouldnot be confused in society. Blochhaswritten aboutin hisIntroduction Political to language oratory traditional and Bloch(I975: I2) seesformalised by as speech 'a kindofpower'whichis employed traditional formalisation language of withitsaccompanying leaders coercefollowers to ('the extreme of exercise poweris characteristictraditional of by authority situations defined Weber'),and as contrastswith it and which, being flexible, allowsfor disagreement opposition. everyday speech It is notveryclearwhether and case is Bloch'sargument logicalor psychological, in either it Is seems untenable. it that speech acts'even crucial things cannot saidin 'formalised be certain ifonewants saythem? that to In to style? case, what prevents speaker the from resorting another Or is it perhaps thatspeakers lulledintoaccepting are things theyare whentheyemploy as 'formalised In whatgives initiator immunity which respondent the the an language'? that case, lacks? The difficulty this with kindofargument of resides thevery in vaguenotion 'formalised legal disputation to from symbolic logic through language'whichmightincludeanything authoritative discourse. authoritative discourse nota kindofsocialpower, is Strictly speaking, of one will over another, a discourse himself or whichbindsevery ego who recognises but (See and the herself it-regardless which theinitiator which respondent. Arendt in of is [I958], fora provocative discussion theconcept authority classical of and of in Greek Romansociety.)

19 Thus in his more recent work, Roland Barthes has abandoned his early attemptsat a establishing universalscienceof semiotics.Compare Barthes(I967) with Barthes(I974).

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22 I refer and in as and 'Concepts society', printed Emmet paper to here theinfluential entitled Maclntyre (I970). 23 Woulditmake 'luck' if to argument we substituted or'socialand anydifferenceGellner's of delusory character theconcept In is words, theallegedly skills' baraka? other for political of for 'essential theworking thesocialsystem'? baraka really Foucault to problem, 24 In a slightly but context, one stillapposite the present different of religion be the may of is delusion a function thesecularizationculture: . observes:'. . religious of the no permits assimilation of as of belief insofar theculture a group longer object delusional I976: 8 i). content experience' of (Foucault in beliefs thepresent or religious mystical 2 See for (I966). Kedourie example 26 See for Hacking(I975). example REFERENCES

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