G.R. Nos.

154391-92

September 30, 2004

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners, vs. Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. The children were invited by the parents to occupy the latters two lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family solidarity. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 22, 2002 Decision2 and the June 26, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP Nos. 56205 & 56467. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita one-half of the value of the useful improvements introduced in the premises prior to demand, which is equivalent to P475,000.00. In case the former refuse to reimburse the said amount, the latter may remove the improvements, even though the land may suffer damage thereby. They shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. 2. The award of attorneys fees is DELETED. 3. The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to the Court of origin for further proceedings to determine the option to be taken by Vicente and Rosario and to implement the same with dispatch."4 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts Petitioners Ismael and Teresita5 Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.6 On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children.7 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.8 Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in

order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the family.9 They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.10 The MTCC11 ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.12 As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand.13 The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it disbelieved petitioners allegation that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction materials.14 On appeal, the regional trial court15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.16 It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase the land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter situation, petitioners should pay rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate the building.17 Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated.18 Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.19 Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacate it.20 Citing Calubayan v. Pascual,21 the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.22 Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on respondents properties,23 the appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease. The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the improvements made.24 Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court.25 The Issues Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration: "1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should apply in the rendition of the decision in this case; b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed; c) Whether or not damages including attorneys fees should have been awarded to herein petitioners; "2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should apply on appearance of parties during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit;

b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (230 SCRA 164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an unlawful detainer suit; "3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to apply the Civil Code; "4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence, appropriate laws, rules and jurisprudence; "5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should be held accountable in rendering the MTCC [D]ecision; "6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw office should be held accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]"26 The Courts Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious. First Issue: Ejectment Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At the outset, we stress that this is the main issue in ejectment proceedings.27 In the present case, petitioners failed to justify their right to retain possession of the subject lots, which respondents own. Since possession is one of the attributes of ownership,28 respondents clearly are entitled to physical or material possession. Allegations of the Complaint Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because respondents based their Complaint regarding the nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter failed to prove.29 Petitioners contend that the lower courts erred in using another ground (tolerance of possession) to eject them. In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the defendants right to possess, arising from an express or implied contract.30 In other words, the plaintiffs cause of action comes from the expiration or termination of the defendants right to continue possession.31 The case resulting therefrom must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if it does not employ the terminology of the law, provided the said pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become unlawful.32 It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined from the averments of the complaint.33 In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands, petitioners "refused to pay the accrued rentals and [to] vacate the leased premises."34 It prayed that judgment be rendered "[o]rdering [petitioners] and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties x x x and remove the structures x x x constructed thereon."35 Effectively then, respondents averred that petitioners original lawful occupation of the subject lots had become unlawful.

The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners. While it disbelieved the existence of a verbal lease agreement, it nevertheless concluded that petitioners occupation of the subject lots was by mere tolerance of respondents. Basing its conclusion on the fact that the parties were close relatives, the MTCC ruled thus: "x x x [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives. Because of this relationship, this Court takes judicial notice of the love, care, concern and protection imbued upon the parents towards their [children], i.e., in the instant case, the love, care, concern and protection of the [respondents] to the [petitioners]. With this in mind, this Court is inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease agreement between the parties herein that took place in 1992. x x x. "From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement between them."36 Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and the CA) did not err in ordering the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents. There was no violation of Section 17 of Rule 7037 of the Rules of Court. As earlier explained, unlawful detainer was sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the trial. Significantly, the issue of whether there was enough ground to eject petitioners was raised during the preliminary conference.38 Not Merely Tolerated Possession Petitioners dispute the lower courts finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis of mere tolerance. They argue that their occupation was not under such condition, since respondents had invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties.39 This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.40 A summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation.41 The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.42 Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of."43 Sarona v. Villegas44 described what tolerated acts means, in this language: "Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. x x x. And, Tolentino continues, even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." x x x. Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or nonexistence of the permission."45 We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other and help in resolving family problems.46 By occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there

was a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between the parties. The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely "something not wholly approved of" by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as "neighborliness or familiarity." In point of fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the complete approval of respondents, who desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits. Right to Use the Lots Terminated That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period. "Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. "The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. "In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them." Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case. To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of parental love and a desire for solidarity expected from Filipino parents. No period was intended by the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so.47 Based on respondents reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use the lots, it can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.48 Thus, when a change in the condition existing between the parties occurs -- like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or animosity -- the agreement may be deemed terminated. Having been based on parental love, the agreement would end upon the dissipation of the affection. When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and the children, the purpose of the agreement ceased.49 Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause for continued possession of the lots. Their right to use the properties became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession, which was originally lawful, became unlawful when the reason therefor -- love and solidarity -- ceased to exist between them. No Right to Retain Possession Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts dismissal of their contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part of their inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.

The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent.50 Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.51 Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance "allocation." We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents debts.52 The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the latters purported purchases and advances.53 There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt,54 a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the parents. Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collection case against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).55 Thus, the formers allegation that the indebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is with their action to recover the same debt. Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the premises when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents had a title to the lots. "The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners] do not object but what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish of their dignity and honor must be given the [petitioners] for the benefits of their children before the premises will be turned over."56 As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession. Second Issue: Appearance at the Preliminary Conference Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant during the preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC should have dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written authorization from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference.57 The issue then is whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a partys personal appearance. Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference.58 Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.59 Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are valid reasons or if a representative has a "special authority," a partys appearance may be waived. As petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can indeed be readily considered as a "special authorization."

Third Issue: Rights of a Builder in Good Faith As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated or attached to the property.60 Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable -- is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code. Articles 447 and 1678 of the Civil Code Inapplicable To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced on the property, petitioners cite Article 447.61 They allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they had no lease agreement with respondents. We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner of the property uses the materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor builds on the property of another, which is the factual milieu here. In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of petitioners regarding the inapplicability of Article 1678 deserves attention. The CA applied the provisions on lease, because it found their possession by mere tolerance comparable with that of a lessee, per the pronouncement in Calubayan v. Pascual,62 from which we quote: "x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate."63 (Emphasis in the original.) As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresitas possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, a circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan. Article 448 Applicable On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448, which reads:64 "Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof." This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.65 It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary.66 From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.67

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,68 this provision was applied to one whose house -- despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of another.69 This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good faith.70 In Sarmiento v. Agana,71 the builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.72 Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced thereon.73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots. The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.74 In that case, this Court deemed the son to be in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 44875 was applied. Rule on Useful Expenses The structures built by petitioners were "useful" improvements, because they augmented the value or income of the bare lots.76 Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by Article 546, which we quote: "Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. "Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof." Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent. In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,77 this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option that respondents would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. We disagree with the CAs computation of useful expenses, which were based only on petitioners bare allegations in their Answer.78 Ruling on Improvement Justified While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the issue of physical or material possession of the property in question, this Court finds it necessary to abbreviate the issue on the improvements in relation to Article 448. First, the determination of the parties right to those improvements is intimately connected with the MTCC proceedings in the light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no dispute that while they constructed the improvements, respondents owned the land. Third, both parties raised no objection when the RTC and the CA ruled accordingly on this matter.

Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid needless delay. Both parties have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or equivocate would not serve the cause of substantial justice. Other Issues Raised Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners allegation that the MTCC judge and respondents lawyers should be respectively held personally accountable for the Decision and for filing the case.79 The insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated the issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing.80 Their contention that respondents did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was based solely on hearsay, which has little or no probative value.81 WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED. 2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, specifically to the following matters: a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate -- as their own -the improvements on the lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code; or in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent based upon the terms provided under the Civil Code b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet in the construction of the improvements on the lots c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful improvements d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of indemnity to be paid (whether b or c) e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the improvements built thereon No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178908 February 4, 2010 SPOUSES EULOGIO N. ANTAZO and NELIA C. ANTAZO, Petitioners, vs. LEONIDES DOBLADA, DIOSDADO CELESTRA, LEOPOLDO CELESTRA, FERDINAND CELESTRA, and ROBERTO DOBLADA, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 18, 2007, which affirmed the order directing petitioners to vacate the subject property. The case arose from the following antecedents: Respondents, Leonides Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra, and Roberto Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses Eulogio N. Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and peaceful possession of a parcel of land, identified as Assessors Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in Barangay Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, with an area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters.3 Respondents narrated that, in May 2003, they received a letter from petitioners, through the Panganiban Law Office, informing them that the latter had bought the property. It was made to appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly took possession of the property from petitioners. Respondents replied that they could not have wrested possession of the property from petitioners, as they were in possession thereof and that, in fact, on June 11, 2003, petitioners evicted them therefrom, destroyed respondents bamboo fence, and constructed a concrete perimeter fence thereon.4 In their Answer, petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondents through the Panganiban Law Office, but they denied that respondents had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. They averred that respondents failed to show their right to recover possession of the property. On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to possess the property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano, registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real property tax thereon. The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by Eduardo Paralejas, respondents great grandfather, who died in 1939. Paralejas had three daughters: Matea, Eufemia and Leoncia. On April 12, 1983, Eufemia and Atanacio Buesa, Mateas son, purportedly executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale,5 adjudicating to themselves the entire parcel of land and, at the same time, selling it to Guadalupe Morales Sevillano. The document bears the thumbprints of Eufemia and Atanacio, which, respondents claim, are not genuine. After Sevillano died on November 24, 1995, her sole heir, Carmencita S. Anciano, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, executed a document, denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paglilipat sa Sarili ng Mga Lupang Naiwan ng Namatay,6 adjudicating to herself the properties that Sevillano left, which included the subject property. On April 21, 2003, Anciano sold the subject property to petitioners.7 On July 2, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the complaint because respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they had prior possession of the subject property. The court a quo found that ownership and possession of the subject property was transferred to petitioners when they purchased the same from Anciano. 8 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed the MTC Decision.9 Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC, in an Order dated May 29, 2006, reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of respondents, thus: Wherefore, this Court reconsiders the Decision of Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez, dated August 18, 2005, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan dated July 2, 2004 is hereby reversed as follows: A. That the complaint which was dismissed by the Lower Court is hereby reinstated. B. That this Court finds that the plaintiffs-appellants were in prior possession of lot 112 and 113, subject of this case, before defendants-appellees Eulogio Antazo and Nelia Antazo forcibly seized possession of the aforementioned property from the plaintiffsappellants.

C. That defendants-appellees, Eulogio Antazo, and Nelia Antazo are hereby ordered to vacate lots 112, 113 situated at Barrio Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17-0765 consisting of 787.87 square meters. D. That there was a substantial compliance of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law. E. That the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay 1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the lots from the time they purchased the property on April 21, 2003 up to the present. F. The defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay attorneys fees in the amount of 20,000.00 pesos. G. To pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.10 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC on August 1, 2006.11 Unrelenting, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deleting the award of P1,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the land from April 21, 2003 up to the present. SO ORDERED.12 According to the CA, petitioners may not eject respondents from the subject property since it appears that, as between them, the latter had prior possession thereof. Assuming that petitioners have the legal title to the property and that respondents are mere usurpers thereof, the latter are nonetheless entitled to stay until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.13 The CA also deleted the amount of reasonable compensation awarded to respondents for the use and occupation of the property, ratiocinating that the latter can recover only the damages they have sustained as mere possessors.14 Both petitioners and respondents moved for the partial reconsideration of the decision. In a Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the CA denied both motions.15 Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari, ascribing the following errors to the CA: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED AUGUST 18, 2005 AND IN ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF PETITIONERS FROM LOTS 112 AND 113; II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE PRIORITY IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. Petitioners contend that respondents claim is not supported by competent evidence. They aver that when they bought the property from Anciano, the latter transferred to them possession and ownership of the subject property. They point out that, after they purchased the property from Anciano, they declared it in their names for taxation purposes and paid real property tax thereon. The petition is without merit. Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring to "possession" flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.17 Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.18 The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.19 We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force. In the Letter dated May 26, 2003, Atty. Jimmy R. Panganiban of Panganiban Law Office, on behalf of petitioners, wrote to respondents: According to my clients, they bought the above-mentioned property from the true and absolute owner sometime in April 2003. Immediately upon the sale of said land in their favor, they took possession thereof in the concept of an owner. They reported to me that they are now fencing said property. They were surprise[d] that through force, violence, threat, strategy, and stealth you

deprived them of possession. The saddest part of it is that you timed the deprivation after they have already paid a worker for one week fencing activity. They have already bought fencing construction materials such as gravel[,] sand, steel, wires, and others. They could not understand why you are doing this thing to them because they know that you have no legal basis [for] putting up a bamboo fence at the frontage portion of the said property. Accordingly, FINAL DEMAND is hereby made upon all of you to remove the bamboo fence and to restore my clients possession within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. If you [fail] to comply with this demand, I shall take it that I am at liberty to file an ejectment case against all of you in order to protect the rights and interests of my clients. The RTC correctly concluded that it would have been unnecessary to write the letter if petitioners were already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear petitioners are demanding that respondents restore possession of the property to them. We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents allegation that they constructed a concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the allegation amounts to a judicial admission. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.21 No other proof is necessary. While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property prior to respondents and that the latter were the ones who forcibly evicted them therefrom, such statement is clearly self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. Verily, this information, assuming that it is true, is not relevant to the resolution of this case. This case involves respondents cause of action against petitioners for evicting them from the subject property which was in their possession. It is immaterial how respondents came into such possession or by what right they did so. Even usurpers of land owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.22 Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who first forcibly dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have given petitioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands.23 Petitioners would have had a right of action against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass and chose the easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose to resort to appropriate judicial measures. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The CA Decision dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated July 18, 2007 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

JULIANA SUDARIA, G.R. No. 164305 Petitioner, Present: QUISUMBING, J., - versus - Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and MAXIMILLIANO QUIAMBAO, VELASCO, JR., JJ. Respondent. Promulgated: November 20, 2007 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION Tinga, J.: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Juliana Sudaria (petitioner) assails the Decision dated 8 March 2004 of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75560 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2004 denying her Motion for Reconsideration. The antecedents follow. On 11 October 2001, respondent Maximilliano Quiambao filed a Complaint[5] for unlawful detainer against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Miguel, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 2557. Respondent stated that he was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 354 sq m situated in Barrio Sta. Rita, Bata, San Miguel, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113925. He also averred that in 1965, by virtue of a Kasunduan, his predecessor-in-interest, Alfonsa C. Vda. de Viola, leased the said piece of land to petitioners late husband, Atanacio Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later increased to P873.00 per annum in 1985. According to respondent, in the same year, petitioner, who took over the lease after her husbands death, stopped paying the rentals on the property. In April 2001, respondent made a demand[7] for petitioner to pay the overdue rentals and vacate the premises. However, petitioner refused to leave the premises despite the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period given by respondent. Because no settlement was reached at the conciliation proceedings before the barangay captain, respondent was constrained to file the ejectment case. In her Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[9] petitioner averred that the subject property was previously owned by Alfonsa C. Vda. de Viola and later inherited by Leticia and Asuncion Viola as evidenced by an agricultural leasehold contract. She claimed that she had not been remiss in paying the lease rentals, as the payment for the years between 1980 and 1999 were evidenced by receipts except that the receipts for 1998 and 1999 were withheld by respondent. Petitioner also maintained that she refused to pay the lease rentals to respondent because he was not the registered lessor, and that as bona fide tenant-successor of her deceased husband, she was entitled to security of tenure, as well as to the homelot which formed part of the leasehold under agrarian laws. She further contended that the MTC could not have taken cognizance of the case as there had been no prior recourse to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council as provided for in Section 53 of Republic Act No. 6657. Finally, petitioner asserted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an agrarian dispute. In a Decision dated 10 May 2002, the MTC held that there existed a tenancy relationship between the parties and that since the subject lot was petitioners homelot, the instant controversy is an agrarian dispute over which the courts have no jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 reversed the decision of the MTC. The key portions of said decision read as follows: To begin with, it bears stressing that the 354-square meter residential lot covered by the KASUNDUAN riceland covered by both the Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Exh. 1) and the Kasunduan Buwisan Sa Sakahan (Exh. 3) are separate and distinct from one another; they are parcels of realty differently located. (Exh. B) and the 1.076-hectare parcel of Having been originally established in December 1979 (Exh. 1), the agricultural leasehold relation between herein contending parties, specifically with respect to a home lot, is governed by pertinent provisions of Rep. Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) which took effect

upon its approval on August 8, 1968, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) which took effect upon its approval on September 10, 1971. Having taken effect upon its approval on August 30, 1954, Rep. Act No. 1199 is not applicable to herein parties leasehold relation (Bunye v. Aquino, 342 SCRA 360, 369). xxx With the aforecited provisions of prevailing agrarian laws to go by, it becomes all too clear that the 354-square meter residential lot aforementioned, located as it is outside the 1.076-hectare landholding, cannot be considered a home lot inasmuch as the same has not yet been expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform for resale at cost to herein defendantappellee. By such token, the instant controversy falls under the jurisdiction of civil courts to the exclusion of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.[14] Consequently, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The denial of the petition was based on petitioners failure to attach clearly legible copies of the judgments of the lower courts and of the pleadings and documents material to the judicious consideration of the case, in violation of Section 2, Rule 42[15] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Even on the merits, the appellate court held that the petition must be denied as petitioners occupation of the subject property was in the concept of civil law lease and had no reference at all to agricultural lease.[17] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but the same was denied. She insists that since the subject property is her homelot, she is entitled to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, whereby she asserts that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC and ruled that the civil courts did have jurisdiction over the instant case. For his part, respondent maintains that petitioner occupied the subject property by virtue of a lease agreement and not by virtue of any tenancy relationship with its previous owner. The petition must fail. First, the procedural aspects. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for failure to attach clearly legible duplicate originals or photocopies of the MTC judgment and copies of the material portions of the record, specifically the Kasunduan dated 21 March 1965 which is integral to the complaint (Annex B thereof). The case of Atillo v. Bombay[22] reiterates the mandatory tenor of Section 2 (d), Rule 42 with respect to the requirement of attaching clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of the lower courts. As for the phrase of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition in the same provision of law, the Atillo case likewise tells us that while this contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner, such discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is not unbridled, to wit: The [Court of Appeals] has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of documents which should accompany the petition, it shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.[23] In any event, petitioners contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in her favor. It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[24] The Complaint[25] filed by petitioner alleged these material facts: Cause of Action 3. Plaintiff is the owner of that certain parcel of land situated in Bo. Sta Rita, Bata, San Miguel, Bulacan, with a total area of 354 square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT No. T-113925 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. A copy of the said title hereto attached is made on (sic) integral part hereof as Annex A. 4. On 21 May 1965, the said piece of land was leased to the defendants predecessor-in-interest, her late husband Atanacio Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later increased to

P873/year in 1985. A copy of the lease contract is hereto attached and is made an integral part hereof as Annex B. 5. Defendant took over the lease of the said property after her husbands death. 6. In 1985, defendant stopped paying the rentals for the said property which, as of 4 April 2001, amounted to P13,095.00. 7. On 4 April 2001, plaintiff sent [to] defendant a notice to vacate and demand to pay but the defendant refused, and still refuses, to vacate the leased property despite the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period given [to] her. A copy of the said notice is hereto attached and is made an integral part hereof as Annex C.[26] It was clearly alleged that petitioner unlawfully withheld possession of the land despite respondents demand to vacate the premises, which demand respondent made after petitioner had failed to pay the rent. Based on the averment in the complaint, the MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Petitioners naked claim in her answer that the subject property is her homelot is not sufficient to divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The court could not be deprived of jurisdiction over an ejectment case based merely on defendants assertion of ownership over the litigated property. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.[27] Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[28] On this point, the pronouncements in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[29] are enlightening, thus: The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is whois entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession. Anent the issue of rightful possession, it is clear that it belongs to respondent. Petitioner failed to show that the Department of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in her favor as her homelot. Instead, the clear preponderance of evidence is on the side of respondent. He presented the Torrens title covering the lot in his name. It must be stressed, however, that the Court has engaged in this initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute only for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 8 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75560 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005 GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR CALACALA, SOLOMON CALACALA, FELICIDAD CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and SALOME CALACALA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C. MARQUEZ, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners urge us to annul and set aside the resolution dated 31 October 2001 and the order dated 2 July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan which respectively dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 1239-R and denied their motion for reconsideration. The material facts are not at all disputed: The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case then pending before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in said case. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI ordered the bond forfeited in favor of the government, and, following the bondman's failure to produce in court the body of the accused, rendered judgment against the bond in the amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of Execution[1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy on the subject parcel of land and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the bond. In compliance with the writ, the deputy provincial sheriff issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy [2] addressed to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan who, on 19 August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188. Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on 24 September 1982, at which respondent Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale[3] was issued in favor of the Republic as the winning bidder. On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on TCT No. T21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year therefrom within which to redeem their property. Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994. Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint[4] for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to Branch 53 of the court, petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said entries as null and void. To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to Dismiss [5] grounded on the (1) complaint's failure to state a cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners' right to redeem. In their Opposition,[6] petitioners contend that when respondent Republic moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically admitted all the allegations therein, specifically the averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years, respondent did not secure the necessary Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus submit that the Republic's rights over the land in question had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived. They add that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondent Republic likewise admitted the allegation in the same complaint that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the subject land and paying the realty taxes thereon. In the herein assailed resolution[7] dated 31 October 2001, the trial court granted the Republic's motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed petitioners' complaint. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the same court in its equally challenged order[8] of 2 July 2002.

Hence, petitioners' present recourse, it being their contentions that I. THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE ON TCT NO. T-21204, FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, RGIONAL [sic] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 53, ROSALES, PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER REMEDY. II. THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION. III. THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT PRESCRIBED. IV. AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT PERFECTED ITS TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION. In the main, it is petitioners' submission that their complaint a quo sufficiently states a cause of action because they are still the owners of the subject parcel of land despite their failure to redeem it within the 1-year redemption period. They premise their argument on the Republic's failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the same property within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982. Prescinding therefrom, they thus argue that the Republic's right over the property in question has already prescribed or has been abandoned and waived, citing, in support thereof, Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is petitioners' thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect its title. On the other hand, it is respondent's posture that its rights and title as owner of the same property are already perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one (1) year from the registration/annotation of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in accordance with Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As we see it, the only question which commends itself for our resolution is whether the trial court's dismissal of petitioners' complaint for Quieting of Title was proper. It thus behooves us to determine if, in the first place, petitioners have a cause of action in their complaint. We rule for respondent Republic. To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:[9] Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure 'x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, 'x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx (Italics supplied). Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads: Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:

Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property. It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA, [10] we ruled: It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independent writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent Republic cannot stand. For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's failure to do anything within ten (10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale cannot give rise to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its right of ownership or that it has prescribed, 'for prescription does not lie against the government', nor could it 'be bound or estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees' . Quite the contrary, Section 33,[11] Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that '[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the facts of this case transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et al., [12] to wit: Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom. Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.:[13] Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely

confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact. (Emphasis supplied) With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case. For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October 1982. On this score, the second requisite of an action to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent herein. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution and order of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152115. January 26, 2005 NIMFA USERO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR, Respondents. G.R. No. 155055. January 26, 2005 LUTGARDA R. SAMELA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR, Respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before this Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 152115, filed by Nimfa Usero, assails the September 19, 2001 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 64718. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 155055, filed by Lutgarda R. Samela, assails the January 11, 2002 decision [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP NO. 64181. The undisputed facts follow. Petitioners Lutgarda R. Samela and Nimfa Usero are the owners respectively of lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Golden Acres Subdivision, Barrio Almanza, Las Pias City. Private respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land at no. 18 Anahaw St., Pilar Village, Las Pias City, behind the lots of petitioners Samela and Usero. Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water filled with floating water lilies; abutting and perpendicular to the lot of petitioner Samela, the lot of the Polinars and the low-level strip of land is the perimeter wall of Pilar Village Subdivision. Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of land rises and the strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of respondent Polinars. Frustrated by their predicament, private respondent spouses, on July 30, 1998, erected a concrete wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-rapped the soil on that portion of the strip of land. Claiming ownership of the subject strip of land, petitioners Samela and Usero demanded that the spouses Polinar stop their construction but the spouses paid no heed, believing the strip to be part of a creek. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, the Polinars offered to pay for the land being claimed by petitioners Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences. On November 9, 1998, petitioners filed separate complaints for forcible entry against the Polinars at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City. The case filed by petitioner Samela was docketed as Civil Case No. 5242, while that of petitioner Usero was docketed as Civil Case No. 5243. In Civil Case No. 5242, petitioner Samela adduced in evidence a copy of her Transfer Certificate of Title, plan of consolidation, subdivision survey, the tax declaration in her name, and affidavits of petitioner Usero and a certain Justino Gamela whose property was located beside the perimeter wall of Pilar Village. The spouses Polinar, on the other hand, presented in evidence their own TCT; a barangay certification as to the existence of the creek; a certification from the district engineer that the western portion of Pilar Village is bound by a tributary of Talon Creek throughout its entire length; boundary and index map of Pilar Village showing that the village is surrounded by a creek and that the Polinar property is situated at the edge of said creek; and pictures of the subject strip of land filled with water lilies. On March 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Samela: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering the defendants to vacate and remove at their expense the improvements made on the subject lot; ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the portion encroached from the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated; and to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit. [3] In a parallel development, the Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, issued an order on February 29, 2000, directing petitioner Usero and the Polinar spouses to commission a professional geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey and to submit the report to the trial court.

On April 24, 2000, Mariano Flotilde, a licensed geodetic engineer, conducted a relocation survey of Usero's property covered by TCT No. T- 29545. The result of the said relocation survey, as stated in his affidavit, was as follows: 1. That I executed a relocation survey of Lot 2, Block 5, (LRC) PCS-4463 covered by TCT No. T-29545 registered in the name of Nimfa O. Usero; 2. That according to my survey, I found out that there is no existing creek on the boundary of the said lot; 3. That based on the relocation plan surveyed by the undersigned, attached herewith, appearing is the encroachment on the above-mentioned lot by Spouses Herminigildo and Cecilia Polinar with an area of FORTY THREE (43) SQUARE METERS; 4. That this affidavit was made in compliance with Court Order dated February 23, 2000 of Metropolitan Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch LXXIX. [4] On August 25, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of petitioner Usero: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering them: a) To vacate and remove at their expense the improvement made on the subject lot; b) To pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the portion encroached from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated; c) To pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit. SO ORDERED. [5] The Polinar spouses appealed the decisions of the two Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 253 which heard the appeals separately. On December 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, deciding Civil Case No. 5242, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It confirmed the existence of the creek between the northwestern portion of the lot of petitioner Samela and the southwestern portion of the lot of the spouses Polinar: Finding the existence of a creek between the respective properties of the parties, plaintiffappellee cannot therefore lay claim of lawful ownership of that portion because the same forms part of public dominion. Consequently, she cannot legally stop the defendants-appellants from rip-rapping the bank of the creek to protect the latter's property from soil erosion thereby avoiding danger to their lives and damage to property. Absent a lawful claim by the plaintiff-appellee over the subject portion of that lot, defendantsappellants are not duty bound to pay the former compensation for the use of the same. As a result, they may maintain the said improvements introduced thereon subject to existing laws, rules and regulations and/or ordinances appurtenant thereto. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision rendered by Branch 79 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Las Pias is REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant complaint is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. [6] On March 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, also reversed the finding of the Municipal Trial Court: From the foregoing, defendants-appellants may maintain the improvements introduced on the subject portion of the lot subject to existing laws, rules and regulations and/or ordinances pertaining thereto. Consequently, no compensation may be awarded in favor of the plaintiffappellee. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-mentioned Decision rendered by Branch 79 of the Las Pias City Metropolitan Trial Court is REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant complaint is DISMISSED. From the adverse decisions of the Regional Trial Court, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Samela's case was docketed as CAG.R. SP 64181 while that of petitioner Usero was docketed as CA-G.R. SP 64718. Both petitions failed in the CA. Thus the instant consolidated petitions. The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the disputed strip of land, allegedly encroached upon by the spouses Polinar, is the private property of petitioners or part of the creek and therefore part of the public domain. Clearly this an issue which calls for a review of facts already determined by the Court of Appeals. The jurisdiction of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings

complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. [7] This is obviously not the case here. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the assailed decisions are founded on sufficient evidence. That the subject strip of land is a creek is evidenced by: (1) a barangay certification that a creek exists in the disputed strip of land; (2) a certification from the Second Engineering District, NCR-DPWH, that the western portion of Pilar Village where the subject strip of land is located is bounded by a tributary of Talon Creek and (3) photographs showing the abundance of water lilies in the subject strip of land. The Court of Appeals was correct: the fact that water lilies thrive in that strip of land can only mean that there is a permanent stream of water or creek there. In contrast, petitioners failed to present proof sufficient to support their claim. Petitioners presented the TCTs of their respective lots to prove that there is no creek between their properties and that of the Polinars. However, an examination of said TCTs reveals that the descriptions thereon are incomplete. In petitioner Samela's TCT No. T-30088, there is no boundary description relative to the northwest portion of the property pertaining to the site of the creek. Likewise in TCT No. T-22329-A of the spouses Polinar, the southeast portion which pertains to the site of the creek has no described boundary. Moreover the tax declaration presented by petitioner is devoid of any entry on the 'west boundary vis-a-vis the location of the creek. All the pieces of evidence taken together, we can only conclude that the adjoining portion of these boundaries is in fact a creek and belongs to no one but the state. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Concomitantly, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; The phrase 'others of similar character includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. [9] Being public water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. Accordingly, the Polinar spouses may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the erosion of their property. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby denied. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 64181 and CA-G.R. SP 64718 are affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004 FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on August 15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein. The pertinent facts are as follows: On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00. On July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex with firewall on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora and her husband Wilfredo declared the property for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property. On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8404. Respondents alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisas children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas. In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support her minor children; that Narcisas claim was barred by laches and prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within the prohibited period. On April 2, 1997, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the

sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was without objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code. Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is equivalent to 78.8857 square meters. In all other respects, the same decision stands. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated January 14, 2003. Hence this petition for review on the following assigned errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF THE PROPERTY. IV THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH THE RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.1[13]

At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was thus error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible error. The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal? (2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the land subject of the sale? Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate. In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds, she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr. A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence rule. The so-called parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is contained in a notarized document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses Sevilla, et al., it was held that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex was made of strong materials, the roofing being galvanized sheets. While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00 consideration was paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the presumption is that there was sufficient consideration for a written contract.

The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property. Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the property within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al., it was held that: xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition aforestated. Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court. While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well as the Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344; the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. is valid.

2)

Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the purpose of determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon by the respondents. SO ORDERED.