Академический Документы
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OF TEACHING
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
JAMES O. FIET
Jonkoping International Business School, Jonkoping, Sweden
Address correspondence to Dr. J. O. Fiet, Jonkoping International Business School, P.O. Box 1026,
SE-551 11, Jonkoping, Sweden; Phone: ⫹46 36 15 62 58; Fax: ⫹46 36 16 10 69; E-mail: james.fiet@jibs.hj.se
I acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Baron, Lowell Busenitz, Donna Kelly, Patti Green,
Moren Levesque, Murray Low, Gideon Markmam, Steven Michael, Atul Nerkar, Phil Phan, Mark Rice, Dean
Shepard, Page West, Andrew Zacharakis. In particular, I acknowledge the encouragement and advice of
Michael Hitt and S. Venkatraman. Errors or omissions are my responsibility alone.
These appeals for more theoretical content depend on several assumptions, which include: (1) the
improbability that students can encounter circumstances that would be similar to anecdotal lessons
learned in entrepreneurship school; (2) the existence of a process that can be explained theoretically; (3)
studying ideal types can be discouraging to aspiring entrepreneurs if they do not fit a special profile; (4)
the high failure rate among entrepreneurs makes suggesting to students that they ought to pattern their
activities after them seem illogical; (5) studying average profiles, anecdotal recommendations, rules of
thumb or war stories can only lead to average returns, given semi-strong information efficiency; and (6)
leveraging the motivational benefits of studying successful entrepreneurs may have detrimental, unin-
tended consequences, among others.
This article notes possible causes of non-cumulative theory building and suggests several opportuni-
ties to build cumulative theory. Although it acknowledges that the field of entrepreneurship currently
lacks cumulative theory, it offers a contingency approach for teaching entrepreneurship, which is actually
very similar to the scientific method used by scholars to develop hypotheses about the future. 2000
Elsevier Science Inc.
INTRODUCTION
Recent efforts to develop entrepreneurship theory have tended to accumulate separate
rather than cumulative theories. Researchers have developed separate theories instead
of building upon those that relate to each other and discarding those that are invalid
or irrelevant (Camerer 1985; Fiet, Busenitz, Moesel, and Barney 1997). Sometimes, it
appears that entrepreneurship research commences from the very beginning each time
a project is begun, as if it were the first time that a phenomenon were studied, even though
it has been studied many times before. In addition, entrepreneurship researchers may
have focused excessively on describing entrepreneurial phenomenon rather than on de-
veloping theory to enable aspiring entrepreneurs to make predictions. This phenomeno-
logical emphasis seems to predominate in textbooks and research, perhaps to the exclu-
sion of developing theory (c.f., Phan 1998). The result of emphasizing entrepreneurial
conduct in research is that much of it lacks a theoretical basis. Furthermore, the majority
of published research focuses on issues that are not interesting to aspiring entrepre-
neurs, which has impeded further the development of a body of entrepreneurship
theory.
These concerns and others were recently the subject a 3-day retreat of entrepre-
neurship scholars, which was hosted by Rennselear Polytechnic Institute. Last year, S.
Venkatraman provided the theme for the gathering, which dealt with the distinctive
domain of entrepreneurship research (c.f. Venkatraman 1997). This year, the retreat
focused more on the learning aspects of entrepreneurship. I presented a workshop on
the topic of what we teach and how we should teach it. The present article and the one
that follows it originate from the arguments that I presented at the last two Renssel-
ear retreats.
This article mirrors the structure of my workshop. First, I review the results of a
survey of the entrepreneurship courses taught by the participants. This review identifies
three possible causes for concern. Second, I share the results of a theory building exer-
cise. Third, I appeal to entrepreneurship scholars to emphasize theoretical content in
their courses. Fourth, I offer some suggestions concerning how scholars can develop
and teach cumulative, relevant theory that addresses the distinctive domain of entrepre-
neurship, which also has implications for how to conduct entrepreneurship research.
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 3
SURVEY RESULTS
Retreat participants shared 18 of their syllabi, which were analyzed topically. The analy-
sis found that the 18 syllabi encompass 116 different topics. More striking was the finding
that they only overlapped on about one third of the topics. Although there were no
clean categories, the 18 syllabi include enough different topics to create six and a half
different courses. This finding does not indicate anything about the quality of individual
courses. It does suggest, however, that members of the group teach very dissimilar
courses, which could be a warning for the field because of its implications for pedagogy
and curriculum development.1
These differences in course content were surprising considering that each respon-
dent specializes in teaching entrepreneurship. As a group, either we did not agree on
a paradigm for teaching entrepreneurship or perhaps we are searching for one. The
content of our courses varies so much that it was difficult to detect if they even have
a common purpose. The next section describes the leading topical coverage areas.
1
The differences in course content could only be partially explained by individual differences in
course design.
4 J.O. FIET
more than 25 years of studying entrepreneurs, it is time to begin to make our own contri-
butions to what we know about what entrepreneurs should do to succeed.
There are clearly many influences on the diversity in content of these courses. Three
possible influences that should concern entrepreneurship scholars are academic autobi-
ography, lack of theoretical rigor and entrepreneurship textbooks. Each of these is ad-
dressed in the following sections. Afterward, I defend an appeal for more theoretical
content in entrepreneurship courses. This defense will include an examination of the
assumptions underlying what we should teach.
Academic Autobiography
One possible cause of course differences is academic autobiography. This term describes
a compulsion to view the world from the perspective of one’s own training. It also suggests
an unwillingness or inability to view the world through other lenses.
The convenience sample of syllabi does not prove conclusively that academic auto-
biography guided course design. However, it was interesting that many of the teaching
choices were highly correlated with the training and research streams of individual re-
spondents. To the extent that academic autobiography dictates what we teach, we could
subject our students to a narrow view of the entrepreneurship world. One way to ensure
that our views are not biased by academic autobiography is to learn and teach paradigms
that are outside of our personal training. This is not an argument for including all possi-
ble paradigms in our courses. However, we should strive to be highly informed before
concluding that an approach used since graduate school is the best or only way to teach
a particular concept.
in our research, which is “why should others care about our findings?” As teachers, we
should also ask ourselves if we are answering the “so what” question in our classes. If we
will interpret findings within the context of an existing theory, if possible, there should be
less difficulty answering the “so what” question. If we teach students to apply entrepre-
neurship theory to their special circumstances, they will be able to answer the “so what”
question for themselves.
Textbooks
Among textbooks, there were no clear favorites. Eighty-three percent of the respon-
dents used reading packets, which suggest some dissatisfaction with current texts. How-
ever, there was no agreement on what should be included in a course readings packet.
It is possible that a general lack of theoretical rigor in many texts is a major cause
of the indicated ambivalence over textbook preference. Why should entrepreneurship
texts not be as theoretically rigorous as an economics or finance text? If they were, it
would indicate that the field was reaching a consensus on answers to important ques-
tions. A lack of theoretical consensus may result in the entrepreneurship field having
a reputation for low rigor, superficial courses.
Theory-Building Exercise
The participants at the Rensselear Retreat were divided into five different groups and
each group was assigned the same four questions to answer. The questions were selected
on the basis of how they could be classified on three different dimensions. It was neces-
sary that a potential question be evaluated positively on each of these dimensions before
it was included. These dimensions were (1) whether or not a question fell within the
distinctive domain of entrepreneurship, (2) whether or not it was interesting to scholars,
and finally, (3) whether or not it was interesting to students? If a question fell outside
of the distinctive domain of entrepreneurship, its answer probably would not satisfy
external critics. If a question were not interesting to scholars, its answer would probably
fail to contribute to advancing entrepreneurship theory. If a question were not interest-
ing to students, its answer would probably fail the “so what” requirement, which is really
a question of relevancy. Based on these criteria, the following four questions were se-
lected and assigned:
1. How should entrepreneurs discover economically lucrative opportunities that oth-
ers miss?
2. How should entrepreneurs identify the most attractive industries?
3. How should entrepreneurs marshal the resources to launch an entirely new business?
4. How should entrepreneurs create competitive advantage?
The assignment was to identify and be prepared to explain at least three theories that
help to answer these four questions. Each group was also assigned the task to suggest two
additional questions and three theories to explain each of their questions. The results of
this theory building exercise are contained in Table 1.
A couple of observations stand out from the results in Panel A of Table 1, which
summarizes the group’s suggested theories for addressing the assigned questions. First,
just as there was no consensus concerning what to include in course content, there was no
consensus on the much narrower issues posed by this exercise. Second, it is not enough to
6 J.O. FIET
2. Why are some industries simply more attractive than others are?
Dynamism Recency bias
5 forces model (2 votes) Punctuated equilibrium
Commitment theory (economic, psychological, Stakeholder theory
social)
Industry structure (S-C-P) [Industry struc- Information asymmetry
ture⇒firm conduct⇒firm performance] (2 votes)
Product life cycle (wrong level of analysis) Public choice
Resource & suppliers sophistication IO economics
Industry life cycle Fun-ness: Preference theory
Resource-based
3. How should entrepreneurs marshal the resources to launch an entirely new business?
Networking Alliance building
4 F’s: friends, family, finance companies, and Agency theory
fools
Resource-based theory Network theory and social capital
Capital markets Require fewer resources
Social capital/networking Knowledge
Institutional theory Liability of newness
Social skills Network theory
Social exchange theory Self-efficacy-enactment (Weickian)
(continued)
specify the research questions, if our purpose is to make progress toward building a
general theory of entrepreneurship. Scholars must focus purposefully on building cumu-
lative, relevant theory. Otherwise, progress is much less certain.
Panel B of Table 1 contains the questions that the retreat participants viewed as
being important. Notice that there was no consensus view. If we assume that the answers
to the suggested questions were included in an entrepreneurship course, they would
probably not be very interesting for students. If we assume that the answers to the sug-
gested questions were not included in an entrepreneurship course, have we not lost a
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 7
TABLE 1 Continued
PANEL B: Group-Volunteered Questions and Responses
• Why do some people engage and persevere in entrepreneurship pursuits
Heuristics, biases Cognitive psychology
Financial theories
• How do we get out of an entrepreneurial venture and when do we get out?
Financial theories Escalation of commitment
Succession
• What functions are inside the entrepreneurial firm?
Agency theory Social network theory
Personality, traits and attidues
How do entrepreneurs recover from failure?
Transaction cost economics Learning
Change theory
• How to turn current failures into future success?
Learn Adapt
Decisiveness
• What is the process of entrepreneurial emergence?
Behavioral theory Person-fit
Four Ps of Marketing
• Why do some choose to become entrepreneurs whereas others do not?
Birth order Career theory
Need for achievement Locus of control
Self-action
* The only purpose of the columns in Table 1 is to facilitate the presentation of the responses. They do not represent
separate categories or have any other meaning.
major audience for the dissemination of research results? The lack of consensus regard-
ing course content may result from often failing to develop cumulative, relevant theory
within the distinctive domain of entrepreneurship. The next section is a concerned ap-
peal to reconsider what we teach.2
2
The issue of how to teach entrepreneurship will be considered primarily in the next article.
8 J.O. FIET
will be highly important to them in the future. We should teach students how to apply
theory deductively to their special circumstances.
Why would students want to know about what entrepreneurs do, if ordinarily they
fail to survive five years? If students study how entrepreneurs fail, they may be alerted
to pitfalls that they should avoid, which may improve their chances for success. How-
ever, even the “avoiding pitfalls” argument is a theory that we should test. If such a
test were to find support, we could then teach the theory of avoiding pitfalls.
that we can learn much from studying those who survive because of mediating factors
such as luck and bias.
This analysis suggests caution in using entrepreneurs as guest speakers if our pur-
pose is to teach students what they should do to be successful. Guest speakers can work
exceedingly well if we use them to illustrate theory, which means that we should thor-
oughly brief them in advance so that they understand the specific purpose of their partic-
ipation. Students who are not prepared in advance with theory may be influenced unduly
by personal success stories. Students could unknowingly pattern their careers after an
entrepreneur who is about to fail or whose circumstances are quite different from what
the students will encounter. Thus, the entrepreneur’s formula may (will) not work for
the students.
Students must learn theory in order to understand the future consequences of their
entrepreneurial decisions. Thus, it seems improbable that adjuncts can effectively teach
the course. Teaching theory is rarely a strength of adjuncts. However, adjunct or clinical
faculty (as they are sometimes called) have proven to be very effective in team teaching
with tenure-track faculty who have theoretical training. The tenure-track faculty mem-
ber teaches theory. Afterwards, it is illustrated by the mature adjunct from his or her
entrepreneurial experiences. Third, the tenure-track faculty member summarizes what
the students should have learned about theory. Finally, the tenure-track faculty should
help the students to interpret the adjunct’s experiences using the theory introduced in
the session.
Studying average entrepreneurial profiles, anecdotal recommendations, rules of
thumb or “war stories” can only lead to average returns, given semi-strong informational
efficiency, which assumes that economic actors respond to historical and public informa-
tion (Fama 1980). Although information efficiency varies across markets (Fiet 1996),
and the actual level in a particular market is an empirical question, there is support
for this level of efficiency in public equity markets. Entrepreneurial profiles, anecdotal
recommendations, rules of thumb and “war stories” consist of general information that
is readily available to others because it can be transferred at a very low cost. In the short-
run, first movers who formulate their strategy using general information will divide any
profits that they could make with others who have similar ambitions and information.
This occurs because others enter the market. Entry continues until all entrants are earn-
ing average returns. Under this scenario, no aspiring entrepreneur would take a risk
to earn the same as anyone else.
It follows that to earn above average profits, economic opportunities that are un-
known to others must be discovered. Thus, entrepreneurial success is typically an indi-
vidual accomplishment. If it could be fully described, it would be imitated, which would
result in average returns. Books that attempt to describe how to get rich quickly by
following a particular formula will in the long-run only lead to average profits. These
conclusions are based on the theory of market efficiency and rational expectations
(Copeland and Weston 1988).
Inductive or cross-sectional research cannot detect opportunities for wealth creation.
Each of these is limited in its effectiveness if we assume that wealth creation is the result
of unique, costly to imitate discoveries. This is one reason students often find it boring
and irrelevant when we teach the results of such research. Even case study research may
not be valuable because discoveries are often dependent upon arbitraging intertemporal
differences that may be ephemeral and path dependent. The pedagogical value of re-
10 J.O. FIET
search about how entrepreneurs succeed is that it may provide illustrations for teach-
ing theory.
There is no apparent reason to study irrational behavior if our purpose is to teach
students how to succeed. Even if entrepreneurs do not act rationally when they launch
a business, we will not suggest to students that the way to be successful is to act irration-
ally. Such observations as, “the only reason that they succeeded is because they did not
know what they were getting into when they started, otherwise they never would have
done it,” concede the argument that we do not have much to ameliorate the problem.
Leveraging the motivational benefits of studying successful entrepreneurs may have
detrimental, unintended consequences. Clearly, there are motivational benefits to study-
ing successful entrepreneurs. The danger in leveraging them is that they may beguile
students with uninformed zeal. Uninformed zeal could lead to the destruction of entre-
preneurial wealth over time. Students rarely lack the motivation to be entrepreneurs.
What they need is direction, a code word for theory.
Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of the appeal communicated herein, which
is based on the need to teach theory if we expect to deliver the content demanded by
increasing numbers of new students. The next section discusses the value of using theory
as a guide for students.
it is to predict outcomes using theory. One way to justify the prevalence of descriptive
research is to label it as “exploratory.”
The underlying justification for exploratory research is that not enough is known
to formulate testable hypotheses. If we substitute the word “hunch” for “hypothesis,”
there are very few instances when we do not have a hunch about the results of even
the most preliminary research. Often our hunches are based on our understanding of
theories that have generated satisfactory research outcomes for us in the past. If no
known theory can assist us to develop insight about a hunch, we are free to propose
a new one. Proposing a new theory when we cannot interpret a research question with
an existing one is better than conducting atheoretical research. All that we do when
we propound a new theory is tell a story. Theory building is no more than story telling
(Daft 1987).
6
Space limitations prevent providing an extensive analysis and comparison of each of the theories re-
viewed in this section. Those wishing more information about particular theories than is provided in this
section or in Table 1 should consult the references in this section.
7
Some minor changes were made in the actual questions to make them editorially consistent in
this article.
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 13
rizes possible groupings of theory. The discussion that follows illustrates how divergent
perspectives provide insights into different aspects of each question.
Informational Economics
It is the study of how entrepreneurial discoveries should be made, not necessarily how
they are made. It assumes that not all information is equal in value when it comes to
making entrepreneurial discoveries. Information that is related to the time, place, or
special circumstances of a potential deal is more valuable in making an entrepreneurial
discovery than general information (Fiet 1996, in press; Gifford 1992, in press; Hayek
1945). It suggests that information, like any other commodity, can be purchased at a
price, however, ex ante, its acquisition is partially a gamble on its unknown value. Never-
theless, entrepreneurial discovery is viewed as a rational investment process that can
be understood and mastered.
Decision-Making Theory
Busenitz and Barney (1997) argue that entrepreneurs often substitute biases and heuris-
tics for well-reasoned analysis and investments in specific, risk-reducing information
about a deal. They do this to economize on decision-making effort in the face of the
many choices that they encounter when launching a new business (c.f., Kahneman and
Tversky 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
We would know much more about how to discover lucrative opportunities if the
insights from informational economics and decision-making theory were integrated. For
example, when is it optimal to invest systematically in the acquisition of risk-reducing
information and when is it acceptable to circumvent this rational process by using short
cuts, such as biases and heuristics?
Austrian Economics
It assumes that entrepreneurs possess heterogeneous resources from which they can
earn Ricardian rents (Rumelt 1987). In addition, they can earn quasi-rents through capi-
talizing on innovation and then utilizing isolating mechanisms to forestall competitive
imitation (Rumelt 1987). Entrepreneurs also have a high level of uncertainty because
of incomplete or inaccurate information. Finally, entrepreneurs may not know how to
duplicate each other’s strategies without suffering from a cost disadvantage. The as-
sumptions of Austrian economics are actually the opposite of the equilibrium assump-
tions of such neoclassical economists as Walras (in 1874) and Marshall (in 1890). Indus-
trial organizational economics is actually derived later from the least stringent
assumptions of Neoclassical Economics (c.f., Kirchhoff 1997).
Game Theory
This theory identifies different games that are played by competitors (Grimm and Smith
1997). These games are zero-sum, positive-sum/growth, negative-sum/decline, and
change to positive-sum/growth, among others (Nielsen 1988). The rules of a game spec-
ify the ways in which competitors are allowed to compete in a given industry. Competi-
tors have little power to change the rules of a game in which they compete. Positive-
sum/growth games enable competitors to increase their sales while merely maintaining
market share, whereas for a negative-sum/decline game, competitors must increase their
market share to hold on to their existing sales. The most promising way for rivals to
improve the outcomes from their game is to cooperate with each other to stimulate
primary demand. Unless competitors cooperate to change the rules of their game, they
may be consigned to a competitive equilibrium in which none of them will really prosper.
Deciding which of these industry descriptions (theories) is the most appropriate
indicator of industry attractiveness is an empirical question. It seems apparent that Aus-
trian economics describes most industries. However, the other two are also plausible,
as are others that are not reviewed here. Ideally, each of these could be integrated in
one theory that could provide contingent insights.
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 15
Agency Theory
It assumes that resource suppliers and entrepreneurs may have divergent self-interests
(c.f., Eisenhardt 1989; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1994; Jensen and Meckling 1976).
If entrepreneurs are to succeed in acquiring needed resources, they must provide re-
source suppliers with incentives to compensate for their different interests. Agency the-
ory contributes greatly to our understanding of incentive alignment problems, such as
those associated with venture funding. It suggests that entrepreneurs can substitute
monitoring for bonding, if they lack necessary capital, and vice versa, if they do not
wish to be monitored (Barney, Fiet, Busenitz, and Moesel 1996).
Resource-Based Theory
This approach attends to a firm’s heterogeneous collection of resources, which are
housed internally (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986; 1997). These resource
bundles (or capabilities) enable a firm to generate quasi-rents, which are an attribute
of the resources. Barney (1997) suggests that there are four major criteria that these
resources must satisfy to serve as potential sources of sustainable competitive advan-
tage. These criteria are (1) valuable, (2) rare, (3) imperfectly imitable, which includes
both non-duplicatability and non-substitutability, and (4) the degree to which a firm
is organized to exploit a resource. The implication of this approach is that entrepreneurs
can chose strategies, which are consistent with their resources, to gain a sustainable com-
petitive advantage for their firms.
Hypercompetition
This reframing of Austrian Economics by D’Aveni (1994) argues that all competitive
advantages are temporary because of increased and increasing competitive rivalry.
Therefore, rather than attempting to protect their competitive advantage, entrepre-
neurs should continually strive to obsolete them before they are used by a competitor
as a platform for creating the next innovation. Alternatively, a competitor could attempt
to destroy a competitor’s advantage, which would also serve to protect the distance be-
tween competitive products or services. The correct approach, according to D’Aveni,
depends upon the perceived stage of competitive rivalry.
Resource-based theory and the theory of hypercompetition use differing assump-
tions about the viability of a strategy intended to generate a sustainable competitive
advantage. In fact, they do not even agree that the generation of such an advantage
is possible or even advantageous. Should a firm continually innovate to obsolete its own
advantages and those of its competitors or should it invest in protecting what it already
possesses? These are the questions posed by these two theories of sustainability.
All of the theories summarized in Table 1 provide plausible premises that instruc-
tors can use to teach entrepreneurship theory.8 Entrepreneurship students can utilize
8
There is some disagreement about whether each of these “theories” is in fact a theory. Because they
originate from different disciplines, it is quite difficult to arrive at a consensus about what constitutes a theory.
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 17
them also in certain circumstances if they are careful to follow the recommendations
in the next section. Problems develop when students assume that these theories can be
applied generally without taking into account various contingencies. Moreover, these
are only some of the theoretical platforms that we can use.
Some may feel more comfortable referring to them as “perspectives.” For the purposes of this article, synthesis
is more important than definitional precision.
9
All that is needed to substantiate this contention is to compare how entrepreneurship was taught
twenty years ago with how it is taught today. Twenty years ago, entrepreneurship education consisted of drills
in the fundamentals of running a business, anecdotes, successful entrepreneur guest speakers, and war stories.
Today, we have several publication outlets for theory-based research and forums where we can debate what
and how we teach.
10
The selection of these illustrations is not intended to elevate particular theories above others that
were omitted, or to suggest that those that were omitted offer less insight. They are provided for illustrative
purposes only.
18
TABLE 4 Assumptions of Selected Theories Utilized in Entrepreneurship Research
Human and/or
Theory Primary Domain Key Idea Unit of Analysis Level of Analysis Environmental Constraints
J.O. FIET
Agency Relationships in which prin- Principal-agent rela- Contract between Usually individual but Self-interest
cipal and agency may tions should reflect principal and agent relationships can chris- Bounded rationality
have partially differing efficient organiza- cross the entire economy Risk aversion
goals and risk prefer- tion of information
ences and risk-bearing
costs
Procedural The reward process in Rewards will be meted Wide variety of exchange re- Usually individual, but like Humans want to be treated
Justice exchange relationships out on the basis of lationships agency theory, rerla- fairly
the perceived fair- tionships can chris-cross Self-interest
ness of the exchange the entire economy Bounded rationality
Transaction Cost Markets, hierarchies, and Promotes efficient Transactions, both inside and Functional, business or cor- Bounded rationality
vertical integration transactions as a ba- outside the firm porate Opportunism
sis of organizing Information
impactedness
Asset Specificity
Uncertainty/complexity
Small numbers
Power The sources of power Focuses on the effi- Sources of power Can occur at personal, func- Self interest
ciencies that can be tional, business and corpo- Opportunism
achieved based on rate.
power that can be ex-
ercised.
Resource-based Firms Firms are composed of The resource or capability Resources are at the func- Some of each person’s
heterogeneous re- tional level and capabili- knowledge about his/her
sources, which in ties are at the business resources remains private,
proper combination, level which could serve as a ba-
if exploited, could be sis for a sustainable com-
a source of sustain- petitive advantage
able competitive ad-
vantage
Social Embeddedness Exchange relationships Repeated exchanges so- Repetition in exchange rela- Usually individual, but like Humans can be trusted
cializing the ex- tionships agency theory and proce- Well-founded trust is eco-
changers into being dural justice, relationships nomical
trustworthy can chris-cross the entire
economy
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 19
ship among exchangers can also prevent opportunism, as is explained by the procedural
justice perspective.
It is important not to attempt to integrate theories by combining ones with different
underlying assumptions unless these assumptions are modified to make them compati-
ble. For example, trying to combine agency theory with transaction cost economics is
not appropriate without modifying some of the basic assumptions of each. Because one
approach assumes market efficiency and the other market failure, although their human
and environmental constraints appear very similar, these subtle efficiency differences
generate markedly different predictions. According to transaction cost economics, firms
are launched when markets fail. In contrast, agency theory suggests that firms are
launched in part to resolve the problem of shirking during team production (Alchian
and Demsetz 1972). Because some markets are inefficient and fail,11 agency theorists
have occupied most of the last 20 years identifying conditions that explain observed
market inefficiency.
It may be appropriate to integrate separate theories when their assumptions are
complementary. For example, Fiet et al. (1997) found that agency theory and procedural
justice theory could be used jointly to understand venture capitalist-initiated dismissals
of members of a new venture team because their separate insights were complementary.
They found that clearly signaling the consequences of an undesirable behavior could
reduce the incidence of dismissals, according to agency theory. Procedural justice entails
more than signaling the negative consequences of an undesirable behavior. To act in
a way that is perceived as procedurally just, exchangers must be concerned about the
capacity of survivors to be productive. Procedural justice does not foreclose negative
incentives, as long as they are perceived as being meted out fairly.
Table 5 compares the decision-making criteria used by entrepreneurs, given the
assumptions of the six different theories in Table 4. If an entrepreneur is interested in
evaluating the sustainability of a competitive advantage that could be generated by de-
veloping a strategy based on proprietary resources or capabilities, he or she should con-
sider the resource-based theory of the firm. If an entrepreneur is interested in under-
standing those factors that will affect the birth and survivability of his or her firm,
transaction cost economics should be consulted. If an entrepreneur is interested in
knowing whether he or she should be concerned about possible opportunistic behavior,
he or she should consider the assumptions of both transaction cost economics and the
social embeddedness view. The question of which of these approaches should be used
to determine the probability of opportunistic behavior depends upon the next question.
11
The informal market for venture capital is an example of one that fails because its business angel
investors constantly complain about not having enough deals to review. Interestingly, angels are part of this
problem because they have a desire for privacy and wish to preserve their anonymity (Fiet 1995a).
20 J.O. FIET
informant. He found that when exchanges of information among informants were fre-
quent, as in the case among venture capital firm investors, trust was high. In fact, trust
among venture capital firm investors was higher than among business angels, who com-
plained about inadequate requests for funding, as well as less frequent contacts with
informants, which could have developed greater trust. Fiet’s (1995b) results suggest that
each theory is valid, depending on the number and frequency of exchanges that occur
among the informants.
A more recent study by Fiet et al. (1997) compared the validity of predictions made
about the dismissal of new venture team members (NVT) by venture capitalists. It com-
pared predictions made by agency theory, procedural justice and power theory. They
report the following results:
Poor performance is associated with NVT dismissals, as predicted by agency theory.
However, the actual occurrence of dismissals seems to be moderated by the power
of the board of directors (i.e., the smaller the size of the board and the greater the
number of VC-controlled seats) and the necessity to act in a procedurally just manner
so NVT survivors will not feel threatened (p. 363).
This study found that each of these theories provided an incomplete explanation of NVT
dismissal. However, when their interpretive insights were integrated, it found them to
be complementary and synergistic.
These studies by Fiet and his colleagues suggest that each of the competing theories
tested by them is at least partially valid.12 However, their individual validity was contin-
12
Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel (1998) studied the effects of strategic intervention by venture capital firms
on the performance of their investee firms. In their longitudinal study, they contrasted the predictions of
TEACHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 21
gent upon the circumstances of the encounter. Given the partial and contingent nature
of only these conclusions, it is important to be willing to accept other explanations for
phenomenon. If we are willing to be open to other explanations, we will probably be
surprised and delighted by unexpected outcomes. Until we arrive at a general theory
of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs may obtain valuable insights from considering the
predictions of multiple theories, which will be useful for ensuring that they are asking
pertinent questions about the future effects of their decisions.
Two requirements for building a general theory are that its assumptions be both inter-
nally consistent and valid. It would be quite rare that a theory could survive the peer
review process and yet still have internal inconsistencies in its assumptions. Thus, if we
wish to understand theoretically generated predictions, our primary concern should be
to check for contradictory evidence that could invalidate a theory. For researchers, con-
tradictory evidence means that we must ask ourselves the following question: “Can this
theory’s assumptions be modified to correct for contradictory evidence?” In addition,
entrepreneurs can modify a theory’s assumptions to correct for biased and inaccurate
predictions. The process is similar for both groups because in reality, all that entrepre-
neurs are trying to do is construct a theory about the consequences of their decisions.
Can we teach aspiring entrepreneurs to predict the future using research-generated
learning assistance theory, agency theory, and procedural justice theory. Learning assistance theory was not
supported, agency theory predictions were actually found to be negatively related to actual performance,
and procedural justice theory was supported. This study is important because it not only pits three theories
against each other, but it does so using 6 years of longitudinal data.
22 J.O. FIET
theory? Probably not yet, but we can at least teach them to be systematic as they go
through the same assumption-checking process as researchers. In addition, if they at-
tempt to do it without the assistance of theoreticians who have already done most of
the pioneering work, it will be a much more difficult and time-consuming.
Should researchers conduct atheoretical research? They can but they still need to
ensure that their work does not contradict received assumptions so that it contributes
to the eventual development of a general theory of entrepreneurship.
As scholars, we have the responsibility to teach aspiring entrepreneurs the value
of theory. We also have a larger institutional responsibility to the field to move it toward
a general theory of entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, we can teach aspiring entrepreneurs
to use what is known on a contingent basis. We do not have to promise more than our
theory-building efforts can presently deliver. We should be able to admit theoretical
limitations without becoming apologists that current entrepreneurship theory repre-
sents unfinished business. In this sense, we have a great deal in common with entrepre-
neurs. The business of our separate endeavors is to construct a more accurate, general
theory about the future.
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