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The

Darius divioTO,

21 March, 1944.

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From:
To:

The Commanding General.

The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Via:
Subject:

Comnandi^ General, amphibious Corps.

First Marine

Combat Report of the 3d Marine Division in

(a) (3) (C) (D) (2)

the Bougainville Operations, 1 November

28 December, 1943.

Enclosures:

Narrative of the Campaign (D-3 Report) -?\u25a0* Report D-l Section -*>. is Report D-2 Section -/>
Report D-4 3ection -p.
1

-fo

Report Division Air 'Officer -p- 53 (F) Reoort 3d Marines -r >'' (G) Reoort 9th Marines -.'-- * (H) Report 21st Marines -p./ (I) Report 12th liarines -f. i (J) Reoort 19th Marines -PZ^ (X) Report Service Troops -p.^r (L) Report Special Troops -cm (ii) Report 2d aarine *talder's -f 3^X.

7*

The Combat Report of the 3d *<iarine Division in the

at impress /tu^usta Bay, Bougainville, British Solomon
Islands, from 1 November to 26 December, 1943, is presented as
a narrative based on the Resorts of the Executive Staff Sections
and the several Administrative and Tactioal Units of the
Division, which Reports are appended to the narrative as annexes. The
annexes amplify, in detail, the incidents related in the narrative*

Operations

1.

2 The purpose df the Combat Report is to establish an

historical record of the campaign* The recommendations and
suggestions for modifications of tactics, technique, organization, ,
and materiel, which are a part of the Reports of Subordinate Units,
are herein included as an essential part of the record Inasmuch as
the cause of a recommendation is an effect of an experience in
combat. m

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DISTRIBUTION:

ComSoPac CliC VPhibCorps

(4) (10) one (1) Historical Section. (2)

IllPhibComs CTF 31 12th Marines 19th Marines 21st Marines

MC3 3d Marines 9th Marines

(2)

(2)
(2)
(4)

(4)

(&)
(1)

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3pTrs3dMarDiv

ServTrs3di4arDiv CGiZxec Staff File

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HEnDgJARTERS,

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

lURRaIIVS

OF

THE

CAMPAIGN REPORT) (D 3

Instructors Iteadinfc thi#,Doctnwnt (*%e No Sign Below

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Bougainville Island
Daitish solomon Islands
Islands

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DECLASSIFIED DKtASSIFifI)r
1975

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HEaD'^JARTZRS,
THIRD MaAIUE DIVISION, FLT M*Ai;i FOxiCS,

NARRATIVE OF THE C*MP*iaH

D-3 REPORT FOR THE OPERATION
*T EMPRE3o AUGUST* B*Y, BOUGAINVILLE, 8.3.1.

1.

PLAHHIHQ.

Preliminary planning by this Division for operations in the Empress Augusta Bay area began on receipt of verbal in structions from the First Marine Amphibious Corps. A formal directive was issued later as a Letter of Instruction dated 27 September, 1943. By this letter as corrected, the 3d Marine Division was reinforced by the 3d Def Bn, the 2d Raider Regt (Provisional) and a number of artillery, engineer, signal, naval, air and service units. The mission assigned was to land in the vicinity of CrtPS TOROKIHA. seise, occupy, and defend an initial beachhead ( to include PURU/tTA ISLiiND and TOROKIIIj* I3LhKD) between the LflUI4 and TOROKinA"*RIVERS and approximately Z2SQ yards deep from CxtPE lOROKIHA. The Division was* to be prepared to continue 1 the attack in coordination with the 3?th Inf Dlv uoon the latter s arrival subsequent to D day, in order to extend the initial beach head and establish long range radars, naval bass facilities and airfields in the TOROKIPA AREA.

Tactical planning met with several limitations immed iately. The transportation made available for the movement of the 3d Mar Dlv Rein for the initial landing consisted of eight It would thore combat transports and four combat cargo vessels. fore be necessary to transport the Division reinforced to the area in echelons. Intelligence information regarding the strength, and disposition of the enemy forces in the iQxiOKll^ jiREh was meager. Photo study revealed little other than the fact that the entire area was covered by dense Jungle. On n?E TQaOKIIa ltaelf were some signs of activity, but, due to the defiseness of the growth, its extent and characteristics could not be ascer tained. Squally obscure was the site and extent of the swamp areas immediately inland from the beaches, nor was there any reliable hydrographlc information obtainable. on BJUGAIir/ILLS. coupled with the known characteristics of the TOROKII** oAZtt. fie. the Jungle covered swamp areas, its lack of
roads) brought the conclusion

Valuation of the eneay strength and known dispositions

that whatever the defenses tho Jap they must be localized and restricted by the terrain to small detachments; that large rein forcements, such as could endanger the landing of the bulk of the Division, could not be brought to the area readily and committed, except by sea; that the enemy air power would be em ployed in force immediately on our landing.

anese had established in tho area,

In weighing these factors in light of the mission, the tactical plan had to bo based on these considerations:
(1) Include initially at the exoenae of the conbatant elements, a high percentage of noncoabatant per sonnel for airfield site reconnaissance and tho immediate initiation of airfield construction.

-1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(2) Unload the ships simultaneously in a minimum of time bo thoy could withdraw. (3) Obtain maximum dispersal of men and supplies con sistent with tactical safety for protection against air attack. (4) Be so disposed as to develop without delay a beach head in whatever direction ground reconnaissance dictated after landing. (5) Be prepared to resist immediately a seaborne and/or counter landing. (6) Provide air defonso practicable. of the beachhead

attack.,

as soon as

deolsions:

The considerations

listed dictated the following

(1) To embark three task units in the ships allotted, two to be reinforced Infantry regiments of 4 Landing Teams each, and the third basically anti aircraft artillery of the 3d Def Bn. With each of these units were assigned the detachments of Engineer, *ir, llaval Base, Signal and 3ervice Trooos whose mission was the Immediate development of the ;ir and Haval Base facilities. (2) To restrict the loading of the shloa to about 500 tons each in order to be able to unload within five to six hours total elapsod time. To land all elements simultaneously, combatant elements covering non-combatant elements.

(3)

(4) To seize a broad shallow beachhead, initially, in order to contain immediately whatever Japanese defenses had been Installed, to institute vigorous terrain reconnaissance inland for location of routes of ingress and airfield sites, and to dis perse troops and stores against air attack. (5) To be prepared to shift elements laterally without delay in order, either to reinforce, or to develop the beachhead to the direction reconnaissance

dictated*

(6) To bo prepared to organize beach and air defenses immediately on landing. (7) To transport to impress *usta Bay area the remaining echelons of the Division as rapidly as the availability of ships and distance permitted.

or toe

organization

The plan as completed divided the equipment and sullies into three categories:

Those items essential to live and fight for ten days. This included at least ten days rations, 3 units of fire for the weapons embarked,^nd^ fuel for the same period.

Btbtn SSiflE^"- - - -"->:

B

Those items required for the continuation of combat, additional munition*, rations, fuel, and the engineering tools and equipment for the development of the beachhead area and airfields*

All other items not Included in

* or B.

Category A was to accompany the assault echelon, Category B vac to be forwarded with subsequent echelons, and Category C was to remain stored with the rear eohelon on Guadal canal pending further instructions. Thus the equipment and supplies carried initiallycame within the tonnage limitation* imposed for tactioal safety of the transports.

The plan of landing was to employ twelve beaches, one per ship, eleven extending west from CLiPg MROKIHA some 8000 yards and one on the north (inner) shore of FUHU*Jp I?JUnj JP *11 elements were to land simultaneously, the 3d Mar reinforced by the Raider Regiment (less one Landing Team) in the right seotor (6 beaches), the 9th Mar reinforced by one LandlxurXoam (Raider) in the loft sector (5 beaohes), and on PUKLUIA laLiJip (1 beach). Two groups of the 3d Def Bn were to land in the right seotor and two in the left sector. Each combat team was to overrun and destroy all enemy beach defenses, seise an initial shallow beachhead and institute vigorous reoonnalssanoe Immediately to the front and flanks, meanwhile unloading the ships as rapidly as possible and installing beach defenses, and prepared to shift laterally in
either direction.

2.

REHEARSAL.

With the completion of the plan of attack, the Combat Teams began embarkation at Utt&ftfcftUab 313 October, 1943, and proceeded to ETaTE. flffl jfflHpigg. where complete rehearsal of the landing was exeouted. The Defense Bn task unit exercised at U foroes rendezvoused enroute to &EMBSUU& fffftPnfcfrftlinl
3.

The initial landing was executed as originally planned but subsequent disposition of tactioal units ashore was precipi tated by the faot that stronger resistance than expected was met on the right flank. Beach and surf conditions to the west of the KOROMOKIIU RIVER were found to be unsuitable for oontlnued use as landing beaches (some 70 landing oraft broaohed on these beaohes D-day) , and ground reoonnalssanoe disclosed that the llUM^Mlm> PIVj TiUILarea constituted the main overland access to our vital beachhead area for the enemy, as it became apparent that no immediate enemy oontaot was forthcoming on the left (west) flank, it was deolded to exeoute the redlspostlon of units as previously Therefore, the (2) planned for consolidation of the beachhead. left Landing Teams, Ist and 2d Bns, 9th Mar, ware moved in suc cession to the right (fast) sector. The right LT, Ist Bn 3d Kar, wae brought into reserve in the left sector and the oenter LT, 2d Bn 3d Mar, moved to the right of the left sector. As of 5 Hoy 43, the disposition of troops consisted of five battalions on a limited beachhead line, a battalion in reserve in the left seotor, a Aaider battalion plus one Co with Aegtl Hq in reserve in the right seotor, a Raldsr company blocking the PjVA Tftj^fc beyond the beachhead, and a Raider battalion less two (2) ooapanles

occupying

PURIUTj*

iaLnHD.

(Cont'd).

?left flank e5?

of the beachhead. Prompt developmeAt of the by X Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar, and rapid of the left tor reserve battalion (Ist Bn 3d Mar), plus the newly Bn destroyed the major portions of the enemy and completely 2l8 routed the remainder, so that by the evening of a Uov they no longer constituted a threat to our beachhead

Before the 3d Bn SwiTray, landed Initially on the the 9ZbTWav t land left,could be shifted to the right sector, an enemy estl composite battalion, transported mated as a from RABAUL in e 5J r2? er ? made a counter-landing on 7 Ilov 43, Jut beyond the

fo?ce

employment

! !*?&

Snemv arrived SeS Jet

On the afternoon of 8 Uov 43, the enemy made mnt-nr with the daider company blocking the PJV* 43 the 3d flaider Bn (less two of 2d companies in all, aaider Bn. four supported by artillery and mortars, and drove the enemy back towards Ply* VlLLa after a very heavy fire fight. Movement to the for both forces due to deep swamp on each side of the On the morning of 10 Ilov 43, the 9th Mar (less 1Bn] a close support air strike, passed through the Haiders TOTwTna in of Bns; found the enemy had withdrawn, occupied PIV* VILLAGE and

?LIL? oTt oomptnlesJ^lSs^twrcoopanle; \w attacked,

flafeTWaT^itrlcted PIvII^XL column

SiS

The poor coordination and tiaing-oTtEirenemy 8 r imme4la i; offensive reaction, caught the Japanese off J? balance, so that the threat to both or either flank was re moved irt the spaoe of three days. In both these actions artillery
CT, having arrived on 8 Nov 43, commenced r 8 K'J^S? Mar On 9 Wov the thle waa comoleted on 10 l,ov S 43. The 3d Bn 9th l^ moved to5 right flenk of the BeC 0 p Or t0 tha aUac^ of 10 Nov 43. The Mar moved i the w inland and to ri east, thus creating a center sector3d of the beachhead. On 8 i:ov 43, Ca, IM*C arrived and, at 1200, 9 Hoy 43, assumed command ofat SMPRS33 AUSL'STA BAY all forcesTrTtnat area, relieving the CO, 3d Mar Dlv as CG, SMPRS33 jkUGPSi* Attk L 2 ac t control of CO, 3d Mar 5 Div until a later date.

******

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Sf iS'r? 55 ?i^ r

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* * The 148th Inf 1 t

subsequent to which the enemy no Indication of enemy strength until 20 Hoy withdrew7"th^rT"waB During this period the main attention of the Division was 43. directed to oatroll lng, development of supoly routos under extremely difficult conditions, and the extension of the beachhead line in the Div sector to include the proposed inland air field sites which had been selected by ground reconnaissance.
i,ov

12-1^

of the 4J^ J*1 fxception Cocoanutengagement of tho 2d Bn of the the Junction in^!!Battle jy^J W^ TxUIL Orbve, near PIV iivai, J %jte of j^H, and across the

WJ^ 43,

elements of 37th Div, U3A, continued to arrive, *._ the

beachhead was extended inland with the 37th Div tne left (west) sector
and the 3d Mar Div defending the right (east) sector, extension of the beachhead in the 3d I4ar Div sector was necessarily slow due to:
*w

*!

occupying

kcussi

ED

ll^^tdwvltlGV^--"
1
(1) (2) (3)
Enemy resistance forks area,

(Cont'd).

in foroe in the entire PIVA H1V251

Extremely swampy ground unsuitable for continued occupation, located east of the PIV* aivaa and

south of the 3T WEST TiUIL and.

The great difficulties encountered in road con struction and ingress through swamps for supply routes to the troops, Special precautions had to be exercised to the ond that our forces be not advanced beyond our means of supply and evacuation*

as the beachhead was being extended* Japanese resistance was developed to the north and east of the PIVA HIYSI forks and north of the E*3T WEST TRAIL, The first indication of enemy resistance in strength appeared on 20 Nov 43. This developed into the BATTLE Cg Ply* rOrtKS which was continued on through 25 Hoy 43 by the 3d Har, reinforced during the latter phases by elements of the 2d A&lder Aegt, the 9th Mar, and the 21st Mar. artillery was constantly employed in increasing force until on 24 lloy 43, seven battalions fired the preparation for the 3d tar attack. This attack destroyed the major portion of the enemy foroe (estimated as a relnforoed regiment) and completely routed the remainder, most of whom fled well to the 6ast of the TOaOCH* RIVZR. On 25 Hoy 43 the Ist Bn 9th Mar and six companies of the 2d Haider Regt passed through the 34 Mar and, against light retiring resistance, occupied the hill mass east of the PIVA RIVKR dominating the EfJR VXBT TRAIL. Reoonnalssanoe to the TcKKSa Immediately. On 23 Soy 43, the CO, SdTlarDiv SSSM urns initiated 9th ordered the 3d and Marines to exohange subseetors, thereby allowing the latter, whloh had been only lightly engaged at any time so far, to take over an active subseotor and the 3d Mar to oocupy the relatively quiet sector on the right (south) flank of the beachhead. This exohange of sectors was initiated on 24 Uov 43 and oompleted 26 Hoy 43. The 21st Mar remained in the center eubseotor and the 2d Balder Aegt returned to Corps town; The 3d Mar badly depleted by battle casualties, sickness, and ex haustion, was relnforoed in Its new seotor by the Ist Bn, 145th Xnf (Begtl reterw) and other special units. When reeonnalssanoe disclosed that the enemy was not oooupying the hillmass Just west of the TOaaciliA RIVER, even though supply and evacuation would be most dimoult, the CO, 3d Mar Dlv, initiated advance to and occupation of that general line Hills 1000, 600, and 500, and the high ridge running westward from Hill1000. The first stsp was the occupation of an OPLR by: the 3d Parachute Bn and units of the 9th, 21st and 3d

--

Marines, pending construction of amphibian tractor routes for supply and evacuation through the dense Jungle swamp*. On 10 Deo 45 the three Infantry regiments advanced to and occupied the FBL without incident. In the meantime, however, the 3d Parachute Bn, outpostlng Hill1000 and a portion of the subsector to be oooupied by the 2ist Marines, had beoome engaged with an enemy force, estimated as a reinforced company, strongly entrenched on the east slope (nose) of HUI 1000. After repeated attacks by units of the 21st Mar, supported by artillery and dose air bombardment, this foroe was eliminated on the evening of 18 _ '_. IT^ Deo 43.
,*-

-6

DECLASSIFIED

The line above oMoffbed, with minor adjustments, became the MLR of 3d Mar Dlvs seotor of FBL. The enemy having fled to areas east and northeast of the TOROK^IjtA RIVES , and further activities being limited to local and distant patrolling, deliberate organlratlon of the ground was initiated immediately together with continued construction of roads and trails over the swamp and hills of the subs actors. These projects wore 85% complete at the time of relief of 3d Mar Div by the Amerlcal Division. belief of front line elements of the 3d Mar Div commenced 21 Dec 43 with relief of the 3d d&r by the 3d Haider Aegt and attached troops, and oontlnued as elements of tho Jtsdrloal Division arrived at TOftOKIUx. GO, 3d Mar Div relinquished command of the East Seotor to GO, *merlcal Division at 1600, 28 Dec 43. Detailed aooounts of the various operations may be found in reports by organisations of 3d Mar Div, enclosed herewith* 4. COMMSHTB. The unloading of the ships transporting and accompanying initial landings affects the tactioal plan in numerous ways. In general there is need for employing, during the unloading
period, approximately 33 l/$2 of the personnel embarked in order
to attain the maximum eff ioienoy possible and thereby to reduce
the unloading time to a minimum, Beoause a oertain percent of
this labor Is performed by naval, personnel who have no combat

mieelona at the moment, tint total result affects the combat troops to the extent of at least 2%f of the total effective strength. There are two solutions to this labor problem, the
most obvious one being to transport labor troops whose sole pur pose is to handle the details of the unloading. This is not
entirely satisfactory inasmuch as it oauses the landing of elements
which are not suitable for ground oombet at a time when they may
be a hindrance to the operation. Further, their Maintenance and apply creates an additional burden on those funotlons without
adding anything to the efflolenoy of the foroe landed Immediately
that the unleadias le oompleteoV The following solution would
also provide the vital labor. When the estimate of the strength
neoeeeary to aocompllsh the oombat mission has been determine!,
the eeatatant unite should have their strength increased tX& in
the ranks of private and private first olaae or organised replace ments should be embarked to the strength of 25^ of the oombat
troops. This additional strength would provide the shore party labor initiallywithout Jeopardising tactioal strength and unity
of ooabat organiaations. Oji the completion of the unloading this
personnel le iismediately available for replacement of oombat
losses, for garrison or other duties, or may be returned to rear

areas

in

same

ships.

When kXA's are employed with the assault echelon, the shore party organisation should be embarked in PD*s, LSD's or
LST's and accompany the assault. aKA's cannot accommodate suffi cient personnel aboard to constitute their own shore parties, and
Afta's.aay accommodate only their own in addition to the Landing
Team embarked, otherwise, the Landing Team suffers such a drain
on its personnel that its oombat offeotiveneM *4mmVrefe

mftttfflEfl
10

 wetAsstfe * ..
?"JYiJJV beachhead Justif led by providing
,.

(Cont'd).

Xan ln of i1 leaents simultaneously In any without a Division reserve oan onlybe

the least taotioal unit local
reserve, and by Baking detailed plans calculatedwith a the ex for ecution of a lateral shift of force to Beet unexpected threat. ?lans in this instance were suoh that the time interval provided *?}* JOBBltjiemt of the local reserve would permit a lateral shift of reinf orolng units to sect the situation. In the execu tion of the landing at TQBflgHa the soundness of this plan was
proved, the result being that reserve force continued to be In creased in the area of contact during the early phaees of aotlon there. The value of the early and continued employment of Bases* artillery fire cannot be overestimated. It is the one am of the ground foroee with which the eoaaandor oan influence the aetlon over his entire front without the movement of troops. The largest nuaber of batteries possible, consistent with the sue of the landing force, should be in the initial landing force,
along with the proper artillery heedquartere to Bake centralised
tiro oontrol possible*
tfhero units not ordinarily a part of the Division are
attached for a particular operation, these units should be attached
well in advance of D-Day. Shis is necessary In order that both the Division and special units asy becone acquainted with each other and execute their initial planning together.

'

!f!S!^
fare the

. Without the oonstsnt use of amphibia** an the right

(cast) ecctor of the beachhead, the devslopacnt and final ocou paucn of this sector verti have been delayed by at least two
weeks and very probably acre. Aaphlbs* were the only esjn of tr#Mort that could negotiate the ewaapy areas at all time.. Ftob DJJay on they vere in constant use tor forward displacement M *Ad oquMnt, anT?orcvittttion of wounded. To say that they were "invaluable* would constitute an understatement. In this ease they wore a vital necessity.

mm ot action usually become broader and broader and

lines beoope thin and overextended to the very Halt of safety or infiltration. Under suoh condition* in aplnsjtpenete'atlonnspsian. tgc moMVUmiiA the foiiowins found im th
euo

In the seisure

of suooescive

objeotlvee in Jungle war

J^ordinated ? 2^J?f. JJ SE^XSL*!* ?*

for the purpose of eetab itfcM MtJnA oth v *"WUIUUom. svsrything should be to the capture and seisure of the areaneoessary W ur 3r ttCh the first w?rrthe "Wlittw, Initially,with means for S priority should be J taotioal situation together 011 1 1 t* handi ftOttXd * 3Loyed for thie pur ? :, l
* *ree

* * -4~J?X Js* *!**

JTlWii ftesaslgn, the following mi found to be the was to method when contact was imminent: (a) When reconnaiesanoe discloses the pretence of enemy force out front, oontain the advanoe elements of the enemy with thin lines (division front) and
hit him Immediately with a highly mobile striking
force, well out front, strongly supported by artillery.
i

BS9SS/f/rn


EJEULftudinLU
UcpXU A BiOJC|E|IImp*IQU

(Confd).

The Jap is not a cross-country fighter. As a general rule he operate on or near a road, trail, or beach line which
afford him the easiest aeans of ingress, supply, and retreat.
* relatively small foroe oan defend a large area by blocking the trails until reserves oan be brought up, if required.

Throughout the JMPRI33 jiUftUaT* Bi*y operation the 3d Jap Mar Dlv was faced with three mot formidable obstacles forces, deep swanp, and dense Jungles. It is believed that seldom have troops experienced a more difficult ooobinatlon of combat, supply and evacuation than was encountered in this operation* From its very inception it was a bold and hazardous operation. Its suooess was dus to the planning of all echelons, and the indomitable will,courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all organi tatlone participating.

--

ffTlClirtL*

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J. a. STUaRT

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DECLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS,

flCsUl A AAm
AKD

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD. 17 March 1944> REPORT CF STRENGTH AT EMPRESS

CASUALTIE^TR THZ. OPERATIC BAY,

AUGUSTA WIA 0 2 2 20
7

30UGAl:rVTLLE.

Casualty figures for this division 1. Bougainville oa^paign were as follows:

durir^
0 3 3 26 8

the

SpTre

r~
i 4 1 1
0

KjA WO ni 0 3

0 1
0

Enl 31 30 378 125 25 49 833

C 0 0

WO 0

E,

1 1

V.O 0

Enl
35

ServTrs 3dMar 9thMar 12thKar

19thHar

0
1

5 5 79 30 30 9 9
4 4

0
0

1 1
1

55 472
158

2
0

15
3

0
0 0

2
1
0

0 0
0

2
1
0 6

3 1 41

0 0 2

1 1

4 1

35
54 1071

21stKar TOTAL B.

15

177

61 58

Total burials effeottd by this division were ac follows 0 WO Efll 511 126 1 Cemttery #1 IS. 0 0 0 0 16 Cemetery #2 0 Cemetery #3 11 1 147 \u2666TOTAL 24 1 289 1 \u2666TfceM figures include personnel of II4AC, Third Marine DiYlaion and miso#llaneoug naval units attached for the operation. Total nuab#s of patients evacuated sick were ac follows: 9. WO Snl
TO

143T

4. follows:

Total number of 0 10

patients

evacuated

wounded were as

i 0

Enl
256
throughout period of
operation:

5.

Losses in non-effectives

KZA MIA 61 2 0 Slok(Evao) 79 9 1431 Wounded( EvaoJjy^C^Sgg TOTAL 106 10 1925

tI- >? -Wh

Died of wounds reoelved in oombat:

4
0

66 for Enl

7.

Average strength present

Auth strength 938

735 S5 13676
93 18006

WO

ENCLOSURE (B)

BECLASSIFIED IS

~ altlce by cat:vory against aKra*e (1) md authorized st:\?:it:h ( 2} : (2) , foil Tot -I \\- -i 1.60 T7oB .98 THJi' .21 J.A .vac) 10..26 14.51 .48 .43 .34 .33 ok< OS 10.46 10.45 3.42 9.68 7.9E 7.93 I-ixM'ao) 1.2& --?\u25a0-\u25a0 Iny^ 1.83 1.07 1441 4 4 1.40

C. 8. WITS, LtCol., U3MC, D-l.

E!JCLO3UHE (P)

Ma^/fki

HJT/fr

^MgkM

HSAD^UARTtSS, IHTELLIOE'TCS SECTION,V>r"V MAQTVT SYIRr IRD MAQTW? DIVISION, FLSST MARINE FORC2, WARIMS TVrVTHTfiW Vt TV
i

EMP3SSS

AUGUSTA BAY OPERATION,

1.

The performance of the Divisional Intelligence Agencies during the Empress Augusta. Bay operation was, on the whole, satisfactory." In order to avoid a tedious narration of trivialities; and mattere of importance to the Division Intelligence Section only, this report will be oonfinAd to pertinent comments and r?oommsndatlons For a resume of enemy operations during the period see Annex A, "Enemy Operations. Dlv
(a) In g?nerfll the organisation of the section was Adequate; but it is considered that a reduction of p?r*onncl in two oi> see *n& an Increase and redistribution in another, bp.eed on Teble of Organisation strength (B->9B), is nble. (See following discussion). (b)
olcriopl
Intelligence

2.
3.

Pnl,t.

(1) In order to effectively carry out the n#eflsra*y and administrative funotions of the Intlllf*et Unit a total of six olerks wp found necesMry, Vht one, at present authorised, being inadt<ms.te t The distribution 9t the clerks should b? as follows: Intflligenoe Language Reproduction and PhotographyPublic Relations
not
Combpt

3 1 1 1

The four clerks at present authorised for the API unit art neoeeeary, one being suffioient. Therefore a net in crease of one clerk over the authorised allowance for th* eootlon is recommended. (2) Based on experience gained during the opera tion, it is considered that the liaison offioers are an invaluable asset in maintaining a continuous flow of infor mation between higher and lover echelons.

DECMSSIOE

DECLASSIFIED
\ %'
\u25\a0;

In Interrogating prisoners md translatingtrpnslax.a, documents. Two epptured documents, h:n gpve information as to plannrd rnsmy schemes of mnneuv-r which pernltted our forcre to take cffectlv? counter men sure e. Prior to the op-rption two rierl iSseona oy generation Jrpancse) were pp signed to the division An Additional one we assigned r.ft-r tn: ComSoPac. lpndlng. The >!isei p-rform:d lnvplupblc work km v le highly r-eoan*nded if ooepible thpt cix be eelgncd thrrc to to the division prior to future orerptions pnd be fisslgned to thf Division Intrlllgence Section Except for the r>mplpy op ch lnfpntry r?ci^irnt. one to ment of Nisei c priditionnl r.rrsnnnel where orrctlcpblc, it is consid-rsd tht the lp.nguflge r^rsonnel fluthorlzed for the Division r3 pdequpte. (4) (p) Except for the mpnnlng of Division OPs r*iich were nonoxietpnt due to th? terrain, it le con sidered thrt tho obs-rvere p.t present assigned to the Division Intelligence Section pr: Inpd^qup.to rrA vlth compr.ny out vp.lue. A veil trrined reconnaissance pttpchc-d to Division Hrpdouprters, nd under the operr tionnl control of D-2 T^nuld hpve proved lnvwlupbl?. a It In etrongly r. fiomn3 ended thpt the present observers be eliminpted pnd p^eclpl scout compftny be organized p.nd mp.de an lntegrpl pprt of tho Division Hgndouprtere Bpttnllon to o-Dcrrte under the control of 3-2 for the performing of the following epeolp.l functione. (1) Amphibious reeonnpleennce pntrole fie nec^esftry prior to the actual, operation. (2) Special distant patrol operations

(3) The lnngurge personnel performed outstandingly eneny

required.

(3) Manning Of Division OPe as reoulred. (4) As special details to assist organ isation oommrnders in the gathering, segregating and guarding of enemy documents, equipment Mid material on the scene of oombat operations until proper disposition of same can be made. (b) The light tank battalion scout company was not able to perform its normal functions during the operation; And it is doubtful if it can be used in its normal joapa.olty in the South Paoifio Area. It is recommended, therefore, that the scout company be re* organised as a speolal infantry rifle company oomposcd of a company headquarters, three rifle platoons eAoh of twenty four enlisted and consisting of a platoon headquarters And three squads; and a normal infantry rifle company yeapo ns platoon. Sufficient radio per sonnel should be included to permit each rifle platoon

-2

...

DECLASSIFIED
... #


\u25a0^ \u25a0\u25a0^F
(c)
irs

Wmluni^atlon while on patrols. The scout company ac re organised to be lnoluded ac an integral unit of the Division Headquarters Battalion; but under the control of D-2 for operations and training.
(1) It vps found that the personnel authorized for the Aerial Photo Interpretation Unit was in exoeee of that required. It la considered that tvo offioers and six en-* listed (API) plus one clerk can adequately perform the necessary photo interpretation work for the Division, (2) After the landing, one API officer was loaned to the 12th Marines and thereafter one set of each photo coverage received was forwarded directly to the Artillery Regiment as quickly ac possible* It was found that by allowing the artillery organisation to oonduot and follow through on their own interpretation of aerial photographs that the delay incident to Division Intelligence personnel determining targets and transmitting the information to the artillery was saved* It le strongly reoommended that two API officers be assigned to artillery regiments for the purpose Indicated above.

4.

&

requested

(a) During the planning phase suitable vertloals, mosaics and obliques should be made available in time for complete distribution down to and inoluding platoon leaders prior to embarkation. Photo coverage received prior to and during the operation were excellent; but an lnoreased quanti ty sufficient for distribution above le highly desirable prior to the initial landing. (b) It wae found impossible to pick up enemy positions in the Jungle from aerial photographs. Except for the de fensive positions oh Cape Torokina, at no time were any of the subsequent enemy defenelve positions determined from Artillery targets beyond the beach head aerial photographs. line were determined by noting the gradual lnoreaee in the uee of tralle and oroe sings aoroee the Torokina River. Due to the Jungle the great majority of close in *lr searches

were

neg-tive.

<o) It ie not considered that the taking of aerial photographs in Jungle areae after landing is of any value until the enemy has been definitely located In strong defensive positions. No aerial photo eoverags was reouested on this operation until D plue 20 daye due to the fluidity of the situation.

, 3

JEtIASSIFIB
fJL

DECLASSIFIED

(d) After D plus 20 days # twice weekly coverage of of the beaoh head ares .was of marked assistance In the trac ing and correct orienting of the Increasing road network within th# beaoh he*d area; and in terrain lntsrpretation. (c) The Piper Cubs assigned to the artillery for air spot missions were also used for air reconnaissance missions and as such were invaluable. It is recommended thpt Pt least ona flfflfehlblnn ol*ne be r>lrcd under ths Th?se oontrol of ths Division initially. planes Capable of operating from vne water, wouxd be avail able to the division possibly from D^day. until the estab lishing of air fields ashore, thus initiallygreatly expedi ting requests for reconnaissance and small photographic missions. During the early stages of the landing end t>rlor to the establishing of the fighter strip on Caps Toroklna, reconnaissance and photographio planes were based at such a distanoe from' the beach head and performing so many other missions that on occasions there was an Interval of two or three days between the reouest for and the fulfilling of a mission*

6.

R
(a) All combat photographers mutt be thoroughly trained, not only in the technique of taking photogt-rphaj bit alto what to take. Insufficient pictures of aotual oombat opera tions were made.
negatives should be done by the Division Intelligence Section. The regiments were not oapablo of p*ooeslng prints or developing negatives on the operation due to the lots or

,fb) The processing of all photographic prints and

destruction or their equipment upon landing. If all film processed by the Division Photographio Officer he it able li to maintain a much greater degree of supervision over the type of pioturVs submitted by the combat photographers and can issue instructions and orders accordingly. Ruining of good negatives due to poor processing would also be eliminated (o) A total of 1587 still photographs and 38,000 feet of motion picture film were taken and submitted during the
operation.

(d) Prior to the arrival of the reproduction and photographio trailers, undeveloped film was forwarded to higher echelons by the first available transportation. After the arrival of the trailers all photographio ooverags, was processed by the Division Photographio Officer. The- trailers were also used to process aerial photo film, a total of 16 rolls of 9 inoh aerial film being processed. 3,124 9 x 18 J.noh prints were made from film developed.

<*a

- *

,4

itciircsfii

correspondent e (one officer and 12 enlieted) wrote a combined total of 734 neve artlolee b/eed on various notions of the oampalgn. Seven magazine articles, including. two based on picture sequenoes, were transmitted, A total of 680 nevs pictures, with complete captions by correspond ents, have been transmitted. It is considered that the performance ejf the combat correspondents during the operation was highly satisfactory and they continually exposed them selves under fire at great personal ride in order to obtain stories of greater nevs value. Orsat emphasis vas placed on the forwarding of the initial photographs taken for press purposes vith the greatest possible apeed.

Thirteen oombat

7.

was not available until P plus seven days. As a result, the Intelligence Seetlon suffered extreme difficulty in fmnot lotting during the frequent rains of the first week, ufflt&eftt tentaf e to protect eaulpsient and essential personnel M*t be made available a* soon as possible After
landing. (b) In general., Intelligence information vas rsoelved from lover mnlts with a minimum of delay. All oomsmnloatlon agencies functioned satlsfaetorifjr throughout the operation and itit ooneidercd that the prison t agencies of oommunlca tlon are ample for normal 'lntelligence requlrments. (c) The usual local security patrols vere maintained: at all times for a distance of from 400 to 2,000 yards to the front. After the establishing of the final beaoh bead line, eeoh regiment sent a dally oombat patrol to cover the ara in front of the regimental sector for a distance of 4,000 yards. Zn addition oombat units provided 9000181 recomalssanos patrols to aooomplish missions designated by Division. Patrol reports vere In general satisfactory and in some oats* were outstanding* Zn many oases patrol leaders vere not sufficiently trained or Instructed in what to look for and hoy to rsport It vith the. result that their Information was praotioally without value. Zn jungle terrain, patrols are the only oertaln renns of obtaining definite information on the terrain to the front; and all unit intell igence offie ere and potential patrol leaders should be in doctrinated with the fact that aoeurate terrain information Is almost a vital as enemy Information, especially during

(a) Sufficient tentage

to house the office personnel

advances.

-
6

flf flttf/fl>

p{

- -^^^^fc#

number of

to the following conditions: (a) The persistent Instinct of personnsl to retain Items as souvenirs even though they had been thorough ly Instructed to the contrary *>rtor to' the landing. (b) The drain on personnel required for supply and evacuation purposes did not leeve, in organisations, sufficient personnel to collect, segregate, and guard captured material on the scene of oombrt. (o) Transportation problems ovor poor trails were so aoutc that, due to the demands of supply and evacua tion, captured material oould not be moved and therefore vpB abandoned or destroyed In the Jungle. (2) It Is considered that the only practicable method of assuring that captured material, and documents are not lost, destroyed, or retained as souvenirs is to have special units, supervised by offlocrs, right on the scene whose primary miselon Is to gather, segregate, protect from the clem ants, and safeguard captured material and doouments until proper disposition 6f same can be made. Regiments do not have suff latent spare personnel to perform the above tasks and It is believed that special units sent down from higher echelons to assist organisation tommandera in the gathering and safeguarding of captured material would prove to be of inestimable value. See discussion on special scout company under paragraph 3 above.

considered,

AMfAPvW&WBBBF cpptured weapons" turnfa^n was

unsatisfactory

equipment pnd the due, It is

jP*

Lt.cox,
>

H.

V TURSON vtv*cfccv\
0-2

uacc.

fflttH

tf

1 February,

KMJSIFIED
HJT/Jmh
I GROUND.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD. 1944 ANNEX NA tt to D-? SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
ENEMY OPERATIONS

The Cape Torolcina area was defended on Nov. Ist by the 2d Company, Ist3n, 83d Infantry plus 30 men from the regi mental gun company and T one ?smm gun, type 41. Total strength was 270. On l ov. sth the strength of this company

commander, Carat. ICHIKAWA had been wpB 63 end the company replaced by the CO of the 2d Platoon, a probationary officer. The Cape Itself was fortified with 19 pillboxes solidly constructed of coconut logs and dirt. The one piece oi ar tillery was located on the Cape. 3each Green 1 (on PURUATA ISLAND) and Beach Green 2 were defended by a platoon each and TOROKINA ISLAND by a squad which was later reinforced by a few Japs who escaped from FURUATA ISLAND. All other It beaches on T<*hlch our troot>B landed were undefended. became known subsequently that the enemy hpd based his dis positions on an estimate thpt allied forces vould attack East of CAPE TCROKINA and West of CAPE MUTUPSNA.

On D-day, 1 November, as our landing boats rounded PURUATA ISLAND on their way to 3epchee Blue 1, Green 1, and Green 2, they were taken under cross fire by machine guns on PURUATA ISLAND, TOROKINA ISLAND, and CAPS TOROKINA as well as by one 75mm gun on the Cape. 3 boats were sunk and 3 damaged. As our troops hit the above beaches they were also fired on by mortars. There were 18 enemy pillboxes on CAPE TOROKINA and the last one was not reduced until 1900, 1November. Enemy troops defending Baach Green 2 were overcome after they had inflioted several casualties on our troops. Enemy resistance on FJRUATA ISLAND was very determined and consisted of several enrolaced machine guns and well-concealed snipers* During 2 Novaaber, fighting oontlnued on PURUATA ISLAND. The remnants of enemy forces which had been on the Cape and on Beach Green 2 retired to the East.
On 3 November, resistance on PURUATA ISLAND finally eeasod during the morning. After an artillery preparation at 1315, our troops landed on TOROKINA ISLAND and enemy resistance cceed shortly thereafter.

-1

KMttS/flfl)
#>

DEMOTED

During the first 3 days, 192 enemy dead vere burled In all seotors lnoludlng thoec burled by the enemy. Ons prisoner, a Sergeant Major, wounded In the elbow was cap tured on 2 November Inland from Beaoh Green 2. Enemy aotlvlty on 4, 5, and 6, November vac confined to patrols on our flanks. 13 Japs were killed In this period.

At approximately 0600, 7 November, the enemy landed a provisional battalion on our Vest flank. This unit was
oomposod of ths following elements: HqCo, 2dn, 54th Inf Regt. sthoo,2dn, 54th Inf Regt. 6thCo,2dn, 54th Inf Regt. Ist PlAt.7thCo.2dn, 54th Inf Regt. M&Co, 2d3n, 54th Inf Regt. 6th00,2d3n, 53d Inf Regt. lPlflt. (38 men) Shipping Engineers.

The unit had oomc down from RABAUL on 4 DD1 and had landed In 21 boats and barges along the beach from Just Vest of our left flank up to ATSINIMA BAY. 20 of them were killed oros sing the LARUMA RIVER by our outpost which was near the mouth of the river, After the landing, this foroe, moved to the East and contacted our troops holding the Left flank, 90 of them were killed during the dayl s fighting. Our foroes ambushed a part of this force at dusk at a point on the beaoh 500 yards Vest of the per imeter and killed 29 more. Meanwhile on the right flank, a oopany of Japs attaoked the PIVA ROAD blook and 8 were killed beforo the rest withdrew. 3 more were killed by a patrol Just off the PIVA TRAIL. On 8 November, on the Left flank, our troops attaoked along the boaoh to the Vest at 0915 after a 15 minute ar tillery preparation. They killed 100 Japs during the course of the day* s fighting. On the Bight flank, the enemy began adjusting mortar fire on the PIVA road blook at 0330, One enemy battalion was reported dug in just Vest of PIVA No, village* Our foroos attaoked and killed 200 Japs* On 9 November, on the Left flank, one Jap was killed. On the Right flunk the Japs attaoked, at 0600, our positions Just Northoast of the PIVA ro*d blook. They were stopped, and dug In, 100 yards In front of our positions. After an artillery preparation of 800 rounds, our foroos attacked nt 0900, The onemy put up a very stubborn resistance and wlth drow slowly towards PIVA No. 2 leaving 100 dead behind him. Re was using the usual tre? snipers, Ufl}'s and 90mm mortars.
-2

ftOttSfflE
tf

on both flanks. Hastily abandoned bivouac areas extending for 2200 yards along the NUMA NUMA trail North of PIVA No. 2, were estimated to have contained a battalion. Abandoned gear included demolitions, grenades, personal pa ok 8, l-75mm mountain gun (Type 41). l-37mm "Rapid Fire gun, 1 heavy ma oh ine gun, several light machine guns, 80am grenade dis chargers, and small anas* The enemy* e first serious effort to oounter-attaok our beachhead wns thus defeated by vigorous attacks of our forces whenever and wherever oontaot was mads. He lost 561 killed in the 3 days of fighting. The ertmy scheme of ma neuver was as follows: The provisional battalion which landed on our Vest flank vas to go inland and harass our perimeter on the loft flank and In front* Vhile they at tracted attention to the Vest and North sectors of the per* lmcter, the East flank was to be hit vigorously at 0600, 9 November, by the Ist and 3d Bne, of the 23d Infantry sup ported by Field Artillery, the Regimental Gun Company, ana a Light Trench Mortar Company. This foroe was to attack South and Vest from an assembly area near PHCO (Northeast of HOPARA) and effeot a Junction with the foroe on our Left flank In tha vicinity of PIVA No 2, Another foroe (else unknown) was to make a landing Immediately Vest of TOROKINA RIVER, and a platoon of 40 men and 1 officer Just East of TOROKINA RIVER, The enemy estimated our beaohhead wi fur ther to the East than It actually was and his estimate of our strength was 6-10,000 troops. There are tome Indications that the enemy planned to send further echelons down from RA3AUL but was prevented by 9.8*Naval and air action. The two landings scheduled to be made East and Vest of the mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER were not carried out*

10, 11 pnd 12 November: The enemy wns contacted only In small patrol actions resulting in the killing of 24 Japs.
13 November: A strong enemy position was established
South of the Junotlon of the NUMA NUMA and East-Veet traUe.
Strong resistance was offered to our troops who finally broke oontaot for the night, U. S. foroe s attacked again the next day, 14 November, using tanks. Bf 1545 the eneoy had withdrawn leaving 25 dead behind* 6We had been cap tured by our troops.
15, 16 and 17 November: were killed on the 17th.
ing out

Miner patrol activity. 2 Japs

The enemy was patrolling aggressively feel A Jap Lieutenant and 8 men were killed. The offloor was carrying a sketch which indicated the positions of the istn, 23d Infantry to our Immediate front. 18 November:

our

positions.

\u25a0

-3

ft.

19 November: 100 enfljy^ftxholee in close proximity to our front lines were found to have been Abandoned during the night presumably as a result of our artillery fire. 1? dcd Jap wore found* 20 November: At 1230, an enaay company attacked our troop e Just Cast of the East branch of the PIVA RIVER (196. 2-219.6). The attaok was be*ten off and enemy casualties were thought to be heavy. About 1200 yards South of this point, 18-20 enemy positions and some machine guns were

locrtod.

21 Novembcrt As our troops AttAOked along the last-Vest trail, the enemy gave ground slowly fighting stubbornly All tho time. Maohlne guns were smplaoed to the North of the trull with fire lanes out to cover the trail* 76 dead Japs were found* Sporrdic 75mm enemy artillery fire was ro* oolved during tho day in our Artillerypositions in the general art* (154*2-214.2). A company rotter of the Ist Co, 53d Infantry was found* The 6th 00, 53d Infantry had been idantifiod on the Left flunk 7 November* and 3d Bns, 23d Infantry were displaced in dtpth North of the East-Vtat trail* k>ohlnt gun Had laog+jar fir* mm: tta> tlnous all day* One ooopany tut located on biaji gpound la tho general area (136. 3-820. 3). Shortly tHjp apon. ,.. ary fire was reoelyed on the TOHMC2NA tttt*af* no** till our 155am gun positions* One gn notltlon a* Mi aad ** on fire. Bone 156 mm shells exploded*
during the day apparently probing for weak spot a,

2 November:

Tho oneay AttAOked with r+lnforoed platoons

the let

no further fitting oownred. me MilmMm&mm Hm Infantry wtro ldtotifijd in this tottor. It Itbelieved that survivors of the 7 November attaok on oo loft flMifi had oomo overland to {# rtfht fluslu A mm* Hm batttr eT nrtraUtsd"by mt amU*^ Jm da; A ofptured etttay sketoh lndloiitla th tsWQr as3eyW.a nsuver stkovsd a 9 pronged attasli talion headquarters posinon North pTthp^ti[<Mti Siu

>

talaf

(Rtgiamtal headquarters iaditii^d to tfem> tmsl talion hoadmiarttrt)! one oa * North flas* om*m

ist

v?BS

-4

NUMA NUMA trail to & point due North of CAPS TOROKINA and thence South toward? tho Cape; ono '.-Jest along the East-West trail, thence South alonp the FIVAv.NUMA NUMA trail to the vicinity of the bench; and one swinging South find West in p. wide eves^p to Join tho previous ftttnok nonr tho beach. 25 November: An attack by our forces ran Into strong resistance in the area (136.2-219.1) and vac held up all day; but the enemy withdrew during the night. Imnydi&'-ely South of this area the enemy fired sporadio urchin* ;u.i fire into our lines during the dry. At 1845 enomy artillery, both 15od. and 75mn, started shelling our artillery positions on CAPS TOROKINA, the division dumps on Beach Blue 1 nnd ar tillery positions Northeast of CAPE TOROKINA. This firing continued t Intervals until doming of 26 November nhen all enemy activity quieted down. The second large- scale attempt to break up our beachhead had been defected after 6 days of heavy fighting. The enony had lost 1196 dead in this attempt. It la estimated that 450 of this number hrd been killed by artillery fire and the balence by Infantry, A prisoner of wpr, orotured 27 November stated that tha 23d Infantry had suffered at least 40 t>er oent oaeualtiee end the Regimental Commander had been killed. Units identified vere as follows: 23d Inf (less Cd3n and 9th Co, 3d3n) 7th Co, 2dn, 23 Inf. lstn, 13th Inf. 2 Go's, 45th Inf. 6th Engineers One lOoa. platoon. lstn, 6th FA. (2-2 sun batteries) 2d3n, 4th Heavy FA. [2-2 gun batteries) 3d Light Mortar Bn. (less Ist Company) sth Co, 54th Inf. 6th Co, 54th Inf. 6th Div. Signal Unit. Ist Co, 53 Inf (t) (Co rotter only evidenoe)

87, 28, 29 and 30 November: No enemy aotivity except

for 20-25 15cm shells vhloh fell in tho general vicinity of
GAPE TOROKINA on 29 November. A gasoline dump was ignited
vhloh burned out a nearby 15 Seam gun position.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 December: exoept for small patrol contacts.

'

Mo enemy aotivity

9 December: While one of our companies was advancing as part of a plan to straighten out the lines, they ran into an enemy foror, eetimat^d to be ono company, in tho vicinity of Hill10C0 (15?. 5-219. 3) at 1530. Another company whloh was suppoccd to advance with them did not do so bcoause of patrol pant acts on their immediate front. Snemy snipers penetrated the gap between the two oompanlos. The enemy broke off the fighting at IJJO.

So

#>

MttASSIFIED
altions* Of tht TORdCZMA XXTSU

11, 18, 13 and 14 Dtotnbtrt Thert vtrt minor eklrmlehee vlth tht rennantt of tht 3dn, 23rd Inf vho were holding potltlont in tht general vlolnlty of mil 1000 (139.6-C19.2). Tht tntmy foroe oontltttd of about 800-300 troops During thlt ptrlod our Northeaet ttotor rtoelved eporadio ihtlllnf from 75mm art ill and 90mm aftratart at try wtll at 50mm mortar and machine gun firt.

16 Btoambtri After a preparation by artillery and dive bombart our troop e attacked tht Jap p el tlone on Rill 1000 and by dark had oooupltd tht vttttrn part of tht Jap po

16 Dtotnbtrt Tht enemy gtvt up all tht higher ground after further attaoke by our foroee and vlthdrev into a pooktt optn to tht Morta; but turrowndtd by our troop e on tht Meet, South and Eatt, A Ftinforbed platoon madt ton taot vith oat ojf our patxolt on tht baath Satt of tht mouth

e^aouattd,
ttrtral
nolalty

o%'ff%

fern* bt|tt H>trt

nejrt

fxmmd ant ft%lont-e>f

patfol tmntattt in tht *b#y and 9 Japt

18

T^enamjptrt

of 'ItoaJipm N Hap%jgU
'

'imr-%pe)am

4|KjHbeMfeft BBes

I*^ Thprtwirt^SeWiimmt

mammgi \f 4e vBBHeImV

***^ vSj fti V7 r**

<e

tflf 4flmam%^KNm^ VVBl&ttWl

it,m and q. Pttembm

ooatottt vtrt aadt

WBBIOII

fin ma laid dew potlttona*

mm)

m !*%* fee tat* oa thla

tt OejataWrt At 1000. oat of tar combat patrtlt aadt toataat with Jape> oaaapflnf ootarti paiatftntt an till 800A. An attack by a ooapany failed to eUaUdft thorn. Tht taamjr mt using light mortal* and at ltatt 9 aaohint omm, Owr otapany vlttdrtv btfort XtOO aaA. at 1000, MO loajei of artillery flrt varo pXaaaft on tht Jap positions

-.

3>

.-. _ _ If \u25a0"^TeotmbTr: A platoon patrol ran Into Jap prepared po ... sitions nsar (140.50-211.85; at 1000. The point was a marine with a military dog. As coon as tne dog alerted, the Japs opened fire, killing 4 (plus the dog) and wounding 10. Our patrol withdrew while an Qlmm mortar concentration was laid in. Reinforce* by another platoon, the attaok was re eumed but was unsuocecoful and our troops withdrew Ueut aoross the TOROKIKA RIVER. The Jape were dug in arciml the bases of trees and had 1 heavy mpyhine gun, 3 light machine guns as well as 60mm mortare. Another unsuoceecful etJtaok was made on the Jap positions in the saddle of Hill 600A.
*_

_:

24 Deoember: Patrols on Hill 600 A reported the eneay had withdrawn to the No~th. About 30 covered emplacements were found. The Jape were reported to be organising a de fensive position extending from the North end of Kill600 A on a2O degrree azimuth for 500 yards. One of our patrols had a brief fire fight at (140.6-219.8).

26 and 26 Deoembert Minor patrol oontaots were made and on 26 Daoeoibar. Fire from enemy 76mm. lOoa artillery and COmm mortars was reoelved in different parte of the division sector.
27 and 28 Deoemberr There were minor patrol oontaots. One oompany oroe fed the TOROKINA going Sast and North of the old Jap position "and attacked it from the last. 10 Japs were killed and 10-20 fled into the bath. Our troops wired the positions for demolition before withdrawing to the ve S t aoross the TOROIINA RIVZR.

1600, 28 December: Oommand of the Division sector was turned over to the Amtrtoal Division commander. There were no enemy forces In oontaot with our lines and no known enemy Vest of the TOROXINA RIVER. The Third Marine Division and attached units had killed 2,111 Japs.
II NAVAL ACTION: l ember: At 0760, 2 heavy orulsers, 2 light cruisers, Nov and 6 destroyers were reported heading Northwest at 26 knots

about 70 miles West of 3CTKA PASSAGE.

2 November: At 0248, CTF 39 reported that he was at tacking on enemy surface force of cruisers and destroyers at 6-208, 164-308. At 0438, the enemy had been defeated and fled to the North leaving one cruiser and four des troyers sunk. A transport group, oomposad of 3-APA's (Hunter Liggett, Aaerloan Legion, and Oresent City) and 1 AKA (ALCHI3A) had not been able to complete unloading all gear and equipment on D-day and was waiting offshore for daylight to return to CAPE TOROKIHA to oomplete their un loading. This group was only 35 miles from the scene of the battle. Task Foroe 39 was heavily attacked by 100 enemy planes at 0824 tfiioh probably diverted a similar attack from the transports.

-7

DECLASSIFIED
32

\u25a0eT.P^^'^^ovomDef: too onemy provisional

landing a

succeeded In transporting and battalion on the Woe t flank of our beachhead during the night of 6-7 November. Four destroyers wcr: used for this purpose. 25 November: At 0145, 6 Japanosc destroyers were inter 2 enemy destroyers were oeptod by 4of our destroyers. sunk by torpedoes, 1 by torpedoes and gunfire, and 1 by to
gunfiro alone. Tho romaining 2 destroyers were chased within 100 miles of RABAUL. At 0435, our forces broke off
the chase reporting that one of the remaining destroyers was damaged.

ThT"suocees of the CAPE TOHDKINA operation was ***}/ dependent on the maintenance of supply lints from GUADAa*FAL and the prevention of sea-borne attacks
with troops from RABAUL. This task was executed perfectly with the exception
the of the relatively email foroe (450.t*oope) landed on that tne Captured documents indioato night of 6-7 November. enemy had plans to land muoh lamer forces from,"** of naval by a and destroyers (supported area); liberal application abandon but was forced to gunfire on the beachhoad these plane because of tho excellent protection given V our naval forcoe plus tho losses cf nsrehipe sustained in heavy U. B. air raide on lUBAUL on ft and 11 Bovember.

11 *

The beachhead aree vac straf* at 0746 by enemy fightere. During the day and early hours of darkness The convoy was forced
three bombing attacks. tneri art
unloading and put to eea tvioe-onoe to stop again at 1300. There were a few casualties from theee attacks but no serious
damage. 7 November: Betwesn 0100 and 0330 numerous bombe were
dropped. 1-260 Kg. (5601b5) boab was dropped in the division command poet killing one war correspondent^and one marine enlisted; and wounding another correspondent, one marine officer, and five enlisted. 8 November: There woe an air attack on APe Oiioh were
unloading. A 250 Kg. dud hit the JACKSON and "e^tnrown
over the eide by 6 membere of the crew. The FULLER was hit by a bomb *falch killed 6 and wounded 20 men tut wae able to continue
unloading. 13 November: Summary for first 12 days -52 alerte,
10 bombings, and 1 strafing attack. November:

wIS

grog

15 November: Right after dawn enemy fighters oame in low over the mountalne and out of the eun to boeib and strafe the area. -8-

iftusflnn

33

ISLAND

DECLASSIFIED

i 9 November: From 0130 to 0515 there wero four alerts. 27 bombs were dropped killing1 marine officer and 4 :nwas l-75m= pack tovitser listed end wounding 12 enlisted. battery
galley and switchboard put out of action and one were destroyed.
20 November: There were several alerts between 0030 was PURUATA and 0657. A larpo fire In the dumps on fighters knocked 5 Jap by one string of bombs. started cane over for early down by our fighters as the Japs picked up and nade a PW. morning strafing. One pilot was night. 21 November: There were seven al:rts during the Two enemy pianos were shot down In an
early morning fighter battle.
23 November; Number of bombs dropped during the night some being 20 minute delay type* 26 November: There have been 86 alerts from D-day to date. *or the first time a *faole night passed without any alert. 1 December: During Hovcmber tho CAPE TOROKINA beach head had 90 alerts and 22 bombings. These caused 24 deatht and 96 wounded* 6 Deoember: One enemy plane was shot down by a night fighter during an alert.
During the night there were 6 alerts 14-15 December: 2010-0536. At least 6 bombs landed in the area between of vhloh 2 were duds. Some damage was done in DSIO Headquartore and the fighter command camp area. One twin engine bomber was shot down. 16 Deoember: At 0111, one single engine twin float
monoplane was shot down by an P4U night fighter.

There were alerts from midnight to 0119 18 Deoember: from 0139-0236. 40-60 bombs were dropped, the ocntor and of impact being between CAPE TOHOKINA and PURUATA ISLAND. 3 Casualties were 1 dead, 10 missing, and 28 wounded. danagod. were LCVP and 1-LCM were sunk and 6-LCVP and 7-LCMnot get off Our nitfit fighter had engine trouble and did the ground until 0210 after the bombing. 19 Deoember: 10-16 planes were over and dropped 25-30 bombs. One hit near tho fighter strip, one on PURUATA ISLAND, and one Just off shore. There was no damage but 3 men were wounded. About 15 planes oame over in 4 waves and 20 December: -9*

DECLASSIFIED
si

DECLASSIFIED
25 December: 27 December: 28 December:
Surnnnry:

dropped 25-35 bombs In various parts of the beachhead area. 2 men vere killed And 9 were wounded. One Jap plane was ehot down by a night fightor.

24 December: The enemy dropped 2 small bombs 1 nonr the boat pool nnd lon PURUATA ISLAND. One piano straf 3d the TOROKINA fighter etrip. 135 alerts to date since 1 November. One alert but the bogey did not close. For the whole period 1 November

2Q December inclusive, there wore 136 nir nlerts. Bombs were dropped during 27 of these plerts. Approxtnrte casualties were 28 dead, 10 missing, And 136 wounded among all forces located in the beach head area. One APD oarry ing Marines from the 3d Division was sunk by an onemy torpedo plane on its way to CAPE TOROKINA and 38 Marines were lost. Damage was rolntivoly small and was confined ohicfly to dumps on PURUATA ISLAND and boats in the boat pool.

LtCol. UBMC
D-2

H. V. TURTON

10-

>

Bttussma

HJT/fr

THJRD_IUttnMIIBION,

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,

FL'ST MARINE FORC2,

ufcyLnvSii \u25a0tU'
General Plan of 1.

x rcbruKry>
Defences.
Cape

1944

Appendix 1 to Annex A, Enemy Operations

Enemy Toroklnj

2.

In gcnerpl the Cnpe Torokina defense a wore oomposed of a defense in depth consisting of mutually supporting bunkers, trench systems and individual rifle pits so sited as to cover all approaches to the Cape from the sea. The bulk of the defensive system vas sited so rs to cover the water approaches from the west. One 75mm RoglmantfJL Gun type "41" (1908) was omplaccd in a bunker on the west side of the Capo near the bass of the neck and was sited for antl boat defense. For further details on the enemy defenses refer to Combat Report of the Third Marines (Reinforced). For the general plan of the enemy defenses see sketch number 1, appended. All bunkers were of log construction covered with sand, debris and vegetation for protective and camouflage purposes. (See appended photographs). Defensive installations were of the following types: (a) Single 3unkers (See sketch No. 2). Built to Accomodate
(b) Twin Bunkers
i'

(See

one or two machine guns. sketch No. 3).

Built in pairs with a connecting trenoh and oontaln ing one machine- gun
(o) Personnel
and
StorAga

Bunkara HSae sketoh N0. 4).

Some of the bunkers hod firing ports and openings through which fire oonld be deliver ad. (d) Rifle Bunkers (See sketch No. 5). Not bunkers in the true sense; but rather revetted rifle pits with an ovsrherd covering of small logs or sapling 8.
(c) Individual rifle pits (Sec sketch Ho. 6).
throughout the oape area sited in groups to cover water approaches, or singly or In small groups to cover approaches to bunkers.
Generally scattered

#*: St^
Lt.Col. USMC. D-2

DECLASSIFIED


GENERfL DEFENSIVE

.*

SKETCH NO I
SCHCM Of CAPE TOROKINfi

<i

w^-

ccMMUfttcmm tmmcnl
o&enspve

5 n

fmmomL

Bumm.

ewmns

fa*muamn

mm

I i
!

37

SINGLE BUNKER LJ/TH TUO MACHINE GUNS MEUCf\r\Qi\TLhGtvUfr// SffA/DC, SPROUTING COCONUT 6

6KETCH NO I

FIRING OPgNINQS 4PP#OX- ZO ID 30 DEGREES

FhnhiT l/7f/ /
t

ENTRGNCE

THIGH

I'U/OE

BERCH

QNGU OF F/RE

m r m3

i%

SKETCH MO S
TLJMBIinKERA EGCH QUMKER FROM 8' TO /Q'HfGH uell cnnouFtAGta ljth debris a vegetat/cu

Trip

wfi.j

Oh BUMMER.
EWNZyiEL'.._

kkv

z mz
M

$1

SKETCH NO 5

COCONUTS

MOWS OF COCONUT LOGS FO* KOOFHV&eOVERJEO vim sfmto

9 LOGS HtGH ON ALL SIDES

SgWN&LUfTH SM/U.L HOUINfkDniFOfL RiFUMmiok oseftntt

3'Deep
~TnpYiF_s*i

/UFLE BUNKER. HODS OF

AQNZJu^ut

Hvi I"* I<W3

*l

SKETCH A/0 6
IWIW/>U/?L RIFLE PITS tfLOA/G BE/9CH AW fiMOUG BUkIKERS. SCATTERED THROUGHOUT UERE LIGHT MOCHIUE GUU& MO C <UKO Oft.ACS

t'DEEP
h*-Hh

I
i

*-H
\u25a0

BERQH-

L'DEEP

-5-5

I'DEEP

Z'

MCV 2HO2H0 1943

<

HEADQUARTERS,

THIRD MAPIIIE FLEST KAftiNE FORCE

DIVI^N,
29'7a;&M^, l'J*J*
MARINE DIVISION

1.

PLANNING.

Third Marine Division participation in the DIPPER o^era. tion commenced October 4, 19 W with the submission of an embarkation plan for the movement of the Division reinforced by 3d Defense Bat talion, 2d Marine Raider Regt {Pro -lJional) , Ist 155 mm Arty Bn, IMAC Naval Construction Bn, Detachment CuMAIRUORSOLS, Advance Naval Base Unit #7, ACORN 13, Branch #3, 4th Base Depot, Advance Echelon Head quarters IMAC, let Echelon H&S Bn lIAC and let Echelon Ist Corps Signal. Bn. This plan (based on the shipping available together with certain restrictions on the amount of cargo that could be carried) called for some 13,900 men and 6,GO tons of cargo in the first s echelon of eight APA's and four A&A! for the D day landing, followed by five LST echelons five days epart, eaoh carrying approximately 3000 troops and 5,500 tons of cargo * The organization of the 3d Marine Division, reinforced, for this operation ie shown in Annex "A*.

COMMENT: This plan, with the addition of echelons to the 3?th Division ana with minor changes to meet the situa tion as it developed, was successfully carried out substantially as planned. The AKA'e were formed into a separate transport group. Buch a group has an excess of cargo over personnel for combat loading and has no place In a landing against possible enemy opposition. It is recommended that AXA's to be used on D day be fitted into other transport groups in aooordanoe with the tactical plan rather than
transport

being formed into a separate

group.

SBPPLXKt. The embarkation plan contemplated that the first echelon would carry three unite of fire for troops embarked (except two unite for heavy AA units), ten days landing rations, ten days B rations and ttoft days fuel; and that svoosedlng echelons would carry similar amounts for troops embarked plus additional quantities lntonded to bring levels on hand at D plus 90 days to five units of fire and thirty days of other supplies. Eaoh combat team was also furnished a thirty day supply of malaria control and medical items. OQNMEHT: This scheme worked satisfactorily but for future operations such items as malaria control and medical supplies should be Intrusted to the combat teams only, in amounts to mee immediate requirements, the bulk of such supplies should be shipped later after division dumps have been established* Also replenishment s in equipment and clothing (TBA Oroup 12) should be scheduled for ship ment at intervals beginning about D plus 10 days. 3.

SHIPMENT.
The equipment of the division was divided into three cate
Category kx

gories as indicated below.

Equipment required to live and to fight for a limited period in a limited space. Category B: Equipment necessary for the continuation of combat and extension of the combat zor.u. Category C: Equipment for which uo need was contemplated within the first 30 days, (to be sent forward on call). Equipment ism assigned to the several categories axter consideration of the the terrain of the proposed theater and the minm mtmjmfi 03#ecJLpd. These same principles

W^wf

were applied to the formation of the battalion landing teams to lar.* on D day (for example, no tanks or antitank units were attached to
these landing teams). of these rules produced a rcin could be acebmodated on one A?A necessary with a load limit of 500 tone (category A equipment with supplies), with the remaining category B equipment and units to follow in successive ochelons. This plan worked satisfactorily but bo applied only when the several echelons are closely spaced. can Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and bags, cots blanket roll being embarked as organisation baggage (sea any ccnelon). and pads were classed as category C and not embarked In For future movements it is recommended that the knapsack be lei u behind as category B equipment.

COMMENT: The application forccd'tjattnllon landing team which

4.

shore

parties.

party Each APA was required to furnish a complete shore of oome 550 officers and mSn, of which lj wore for work in ship, 60 were used as "boat riders" and 200 on the beach "j^tn the being sole duty of unloading cargo from boats"; remainlngpersonnel used for shore party fieadquartors, pioneer work, vehicle fivers, oorsonnol, teach party and dunro supervisors, communicators, medical supposed furnish 120 men for work at inland dumps. Each AKA was to work in the holds, 50 men to ride the boats and 200 on the beach boats. with the sole duty of unloading cargo fromnecessary As the AKA'sthe to make up carried only 350 officers and men, it was (in addition to the regular difference by drawing men from the APA's APA shore party). Each AFA was Joined with an adjacent; APA, the APA shore party headquarters supervising the work on both beaches. COMMENT: The application of those rules meant about 40# of the entire landing force was initiallyengaged on shore party duties. It Is believed that this number is excessive. and that with proper organization a shore party composed of 30% of the landing force should be sufficient (450 for an average APA). It is also believed that the personnel capacity of the AKA's to be employed on D day should be lnoreased so that an AKA can unload itself without the need of drawing additional working details from the APA's.

J-'C

Jo

5.

FIRST PHASE.

Twelve ships unloaded simultaneously on D day (November Ist) a front of 8000 yards. Difficult hydrographic conditions caused on the lose of some 86 boats on their initial trip. Difficult terrain inland (swamps) made the formation of inland dumps impracticable and all cargo was placed on the beach itself, Just above the high water mark. Heavy surf caused the abandonment of the three western beaches after the personnel had landed, all cargo originally intended for' those beaches was diverted to other beaches. The loss of large numbers of boats slowed the unloading; this condition was aggravated by frequent alerts which caused the ships to cease unloading and put, to sea. Eight of the twelve ships completed unloading on D day, the remaining four returning on D plus 1 to complete unloading. COMMENT: Regiments gradually assumed control of their beaches and consolidated their dumps but it was not until November 12 that division was able to assume control of the supply of rations, ammunition and fuel. During this period organl rat ions and unite obtained tholr supplies from the nearest shore party dump. Tc pcrrcit the regiments to perform this function, many units remained attacn^u. to the rogimonts that would normally have reverted to organic control earlier. For example, the dates on which certain units reverted to organic control is indicated below: Nov 3d: CB Battalion (to construct roads) Artillery battalions Nov 4th: Nov 6th: Pioneer Bn (for permanent shore party to handle
succeeding

echelons)

Engineer Battalion
Nov 9th: Nov 11th: .Mec'icaX Companies
Nov 12";h: Service & Supply Platoons of S&S Co.
Nov 17 ch: All remaining reinforcing elements.

The long delay Indicated by the above table vac ca'.uod '\\ the lack of roads Inland which made it necessary (in ao far ac eupyly and evacuation was concerned) to leave the problem in the hands of the regimental commanders until the situation clarified and the ro qulrod supply routes could bo devoloped.
6,

ROADS.

Initiallythere were- no roads. (The one native traM leading inland on the right flunk broke dorvas soon as it wan sub jected to heavy traffic.) The beach itself was used, as a rosxi for all lateral traffic and amphibian traotors wero used for the nov ment of supplies and for the n\ acuatAon of wounded; track layli'f^ C&lffht trailers pulLed by traotors wh*c aXco used where practicable. een track laying trailers wi 5h rt -9 traotors had been obtained .e^ec lally for this operation). Tho front linos gradually advanced in land across the swamps until dry ground was reached. A division inland dump was then established vDump No. 2, three miles by road inland from tho beach). Until a road was built supplies were trans ported to ,thiB dumo by amphibian tractors; joeps and trailers were also porto-ed forward by amphibian tractor for local distribution from this forward dump. This procua6 was repeated at- a.later etap:e of the operation to raoet a similar condition, i.e. the front lines advanced again across swanros beyond the existing road not. The table below show 8 the various stages.
Supply from boaoh dumps. Bupply via amphibian traotor trail to dump Ho. 2. Nov 26 to D# 8: Supply by truck to Dump No. 2. Supply by truck to Dump Ho. 2 thenoe by Deo 0 to 23: amphibian traotor to Dump No. 3 (Sir miles inland from Dump No. 2) Thereafter: Normal supply, by truck to regimental or battalion dumps, thenoe forward by Jeep, track laying trailor or hand carry.

Nov 1 to 14: Nov 15 to 24:

COMMENT: On November" 13, the date on vhloh the first major movement of supplies by amphibian traotor oommenoed, there were 64 (XINovember 86, the date the road amphibian traotors available. opened and amphibian tractors were relieved by trucks, there were only 28 amphibian traotors still in operation. By December 9th, 48 amphibian traotor e had been repaired and made serviceable, but by Deoember 23rd only 12 remained In running condition. It la obvious that amphibian traotore are special instruments for special opera tions and cannot bo depended upon for hard servioe over extended _ periods. _\u25a0
It was notedvthat the 2* -ton oargo truck oowld negotiate
roads that were impassable to Jeeos. The track laying trailers previously mentioned were reloaoca *so regiments for use In moving supplies forward beyond the head of navigation for B*-ton truoks. The Jeep was a useful supply vehicle only whon conditions were good; in.mud and rain the Jeap cannot move and recourse must be had to 2i-ton truoks, traok laying trailers, anrohlblan traotors or hand
_.

\u25a0

carry.

7.

AMMUNITIONEXPENDITURES.

Ammunition expenditures for the two month period are in dloated in Annex B.
COMMENT: It should be noted that in actual rounds fired the artillery expended considerably more than three uiilts of fire per gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle and the 60mm mortar expended Just three units of fire, while alj other weapons averaged a much lower rate. (AA expenditures are n^t included ih'tKls list; such weapons were under corps control the majority of the time). It is bclloved these figures should be cneldrA in Planning re-suoply to meet expenditures while retaining the policy of landing three units of flro with the troops on D day.

8.

LOSS OF

ESJIPMEUT.

losses must bo expected under difficult campaign conditions. To mc3t this fact, salvage operations should be started early and plans should provide for the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 rays, of replenishments in all typos of equipment. This equipment should be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day replenishment allowance should be provided for c ach 30 days of active
operations.

A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation. This matter is being handled by separate correspondence. COMMENT. In spite of all that can be done, tromendous

9.

EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT WITH ARMY.

The relieving Army Division left in rear areas, and this Division delivered in the combat area such items of heavy equipment as were common to each organization. This included machine guns, mortars, 105mm howitzers, l/4-ton trucks, water trailers, cargo trailers, water cans, some tentago, some pieces of engineering equip

ment.

COMMENT: The exchange was limited to items for which spare parts were regularly provided by each organisation and only Considerable shipping space was serviceable items were exchanged. saved by this exchange. However, neither division was entirely satisfied with the equipment they received. 10. RELIEF.
Departing personnel embarked in the sane APA's and AKA's which brought the incoming, relieving echelons, taking with them only light equipment (maximum 50 tons per ship). The remaining heavy equipment, guns, vehicles etc, were brought back on returning LBTs.

COMMENT: 11.

The relief was accomplished without

moi dent.

EVACUATION.

Evacuation of wounded, while difficult, was executed in normal manner. Hospital companies were kept dose behind the regi ments, patients being evacuated to the Division Hospital, thenoe through beach evacuation stations for evacuation to rear areas by. ship or plane. The main difficulty was the lack of roads.
satisfactory

COMMENT:

The one ton or 3/4-ton anbulanoe than the Jeep ambulance.

proved more

12.
results.

AIRPLANE EROPS.
Supply by air was tried on several occasion* with fair

COMMENT: Supply by air from distant bases, especially where the supplies must be dropped in thick Jungle, does not appear to be a reliable means of supply.

-4-


13.
operation

CONCLUSION:

This report covers only selected Important points of the which are believed to have a boarlng on future operations. No attempt is mado to report on matters of supply and evacuation which, while difficult, require no special solution. a!:itsxe3:
nnB M of 3D uarine division reinforced. AJfftJHITIOH SXPSUPTTUrSS DURING DI^ER OP^ATION. "C" EMPRESS AUGUSTA SAX 19TH MaRII-^S !IAP, BUD "DI?IO!T 1:20,000 V^TH ADHI'TIST^ATr^ IiS7AL LA?IO!TS Am ROAD ! ST AS <^P 20 15CSH3SR 1940 lIPOS3D TH^RSon.

"a"

organization

-T

Colonel, USMC D-4

*'.

C. KALL

50

! y
Re

ANNEX "A"

14 00-,., 1944.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,t FORCE IN TH2 FIELD.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO LTR CO, 3D MAR DIV DATED 14 OCT. 43.

Ihird marine
ik"DIPPER
-43.

division

MOVEMENT.

1. The 7 harine Dlvielon, ment.

the organisation of the Third Taik Unite for the DIPPER Move

2. Unlete otherviee indicated, all cargo is in Category "A" (referenoe "A" to basic letter). That is, only equipment and euppliee neceesary to live and fight fotf c limited period in, limited epaoe. 3. Category B (referenoe "A" to baaio letter) at indioated, inoludee substantially 1/2 of all transportation, oertain boabat equip ment, and substantially 1/2 atss personnel plus other oargo vhoae ; early forward moTetnent it anticipated. 4.
Cr|ranit*tion into task unite.

Oat He*, 12th Marinee

40

Det 8W Co 3d Sir Bo H*B *ed Bn 2d Balder Regt (leee 3d Bn) Ooa Unit rr (late det) et AOOW 15 Det Br*noh 3. 4th B Jipot Det Adr IfT Base Unit #7 Rat lone, fuel, and anounitlon

I?
100
78

tf
109 76
84
0

15 75
4 AFA's
13 Oot, 43.

<5

Transportation : Data of departure:

(v\

9JttiSi Unit A_2

Ttmt. hah lfith Marines Det HAS 12th -lUplnae Ist oh Comd Op plus 3d Hqn (less dets). 3d In 9A Haider Regt 3d Bn, 8d Haider Rest Det Adv eh, Hq, MAC **M# Co E. 3d Mcd Bn m Dst B*B, Mftn plus 4th Plat Co D 3d Tk Bn (Soout). Rations, fuel and ajsnunition
<

Mm

*n* "wiii

\u25a0'

\u25a0

42 395 1046 20 54

11
'

|3
68

10 0 0 1937

<W

^W .

W*

mm

SCSS
rfflpiwnft

(c)

TjpjgAat
750 40
54

Btryl.MDefn Btry Ht 34 Def Bn

90am

VOTSrK (lsss^SLs MMfJr* '* 'TMrM/ / A 4th Pl&t Btry A 3d SpMln/l/ Det Hq. Con Air ol|#]r7 #jfJf j* f Ut fll /-fcj> 603 Radar Team, XMAC ft 1J

**

10 115

51

(c)

Taak Unit A-3 (Cont'd)

CCMPOSITION;

PS^SONNEL "
48

Det Con Unit #7 Co A, 3d i*mph Trac Bn Co E, 3d Mcd Bn Det NCB IKAC Det 3d Marines Det 9th Marines (Incl 33 personnel. 40 tons, fr let Hat Btry H, 3d Spl wpne) Jet 3d Sig Co. Det Hq Co. Hq Bn Det 3oat Fool #11 Rations, fuel, and ammunition.

TOSNMHE \u25a061

136 25

300 10 19
87

11
3

41

49 12
8

36
15

91 1400

50
637

2195

Transportation:

Date of departure:
(d)

4 AKA'e

86 Oct, 43. PERSONNEL 90 521 iia 176 152 122 390 250 100
*

Task Unit B.
COMPOSITION;

TONNAGE

Ist LT, 21et CT Det Com Air N Sols 4th Bn, 12th Marines H&3 Co, 3d HT Bn Ist Ech, Sig Bn, DUC XT Ist Ech. Hqn, IKAC (pl\j*i Co iKkC) Det 3d ie Co # Det NCB, iWc Det ACORN 13 Det 75th NCB Co D, 3d Tank Bn (Scouts) less 4 Plats. Rations, fuel and ammunition.

541
70

216 199 220 465 70 400 234 0

"SOT

tea 5110

Transportation: 8 LST's and 8 APD's

Date of departure: 8 LST's begin loading AM D-day, depart AM D plui 2.
8 APD1 begin loading AM D plus 2, dpt FM plus 2.

(c) 3d CT Category B 9th CT Category 2d LT 21st CT H&S Btry, 12th Marines (less Det 'a) H&S 3d Amph Trac Bn 3d Def Bn (less 90mm Gp and Btry I) Det NCB, IKAC 2d Hdr Regt Category B Det 75th NCB ACORN 13 (lees Det 1 *) Rations, fue-1, and ammunition

Co C, 3d *tph Trac Bn

PERSONNEL 80
60

TONNAGE
257
50
143
266
100
250
50

417
417
546

1593

81 51 691 100 0 375

ft! 9

480

3628

6^5

Transportation

Date of departure:

8 LBT's and 8 APD's 8 LST's begin loading AM D plus 5, depart AM D plus 7 8 APD'i begin loading AM D plus 7, depart PM D olue 7

- 2

f>

52

K&S Co, 19th Marines Category B H&S Etry, 3d Spl Vpn Bn Category B Btry a, 3d Spl Wpn Bn (less 3d Flats catecory B) H&S Co, 3d Tk Bn H&S Co, 3d Tk 5n Category B Co D (Set) 3d Tk Bn (le6B 3 plats Category 3) 3d. acrv 3n, Cetegory B od hodical 3n (lees Co C) Category B Det KC3, I^*C Dct 3ranch yo, 4th 3cc Depot (lcs6 Adv eh). Rations, fuel and ammunition.

M&^H 1?^
21 33 40

TC VVAGE 577 150 30 ?3

77

53

19 154

7
114

12

68
375 0 810

22 413
10 4&08

3032

Transportation:

6 LST's end 6 APD'b 6 LST's begin loading AM D plus ?0, depart AM D plus 22. 6 APD's begin loading aM D plus 22, deoart PII D plus 22. of 3d Marine

present bases in Category "C" (ref crencej^ pared to move r-ersonnel, supplies, and c.

5. Remainder

Dlvision^^relnforc'ed,,* remains at pr L.to basjc letter) preo

orv&rd on call.

(f) C '.".- '"5l~IOil: 3d CT 'Zi tt;ory n Sth CT, crtc^ory 3 ol LT, 2lst CT 4th an, 12th Larlnee Category B 21 ~cn Corr.d Gp f 3d fear Dlv D.t KaeS uo, oa oerv Bn l^l r.sco Co, 3d Serv an. Dct rort Pool #11 tool #11 75th i::= (loss Det'e) Dlt 13 Ist 155:.:;;. Hoy 5n 11-inC (leee Det'e) an 11-IhC (less Det'e) Ist rift od l-.F Co rlc't Nations, fuel r.nd ammunition. md

PRSO:iriL 36 58 1491 20 33 50 450 309 538 26 g. 0 3084

TOWAGE
325

2Z3 541 38
1 0
?5q ?50 050o 50
c 5j.5 >"! 5

" 405 3 ?3?1 54?7 ?4?7

Date of departure:

Transports Ion:tIon: Transports ttlon:

7 LST's and 7 APD'e 7 7 LST's begin lording AM D clue 10, depart Alf begin tdlus io, D plus 12. 7 APD'e begin lording AM D plus 12, depart PM APD's begin lording D plus 18. tdlus 12.
PSRSOMNSL 162 162 83 83 164 164 147 91 91 181 181 250 250 P2 22 194 73 80 80 27 50 10 10 15 45 45 15 15 0 150 150 79 79 30 104 0 0 2007
g5 25

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Task Unit E

COl-j-OSITICN: COI-j-OSITICN:

Co a 3d Tk Bn a Btry C, Gel Spl Wpne Bn Bn 9th CT Crtegory B 21st CT, Category B B H2cS Btry, 12th Marines Crtegory B Ksrlnee Category 4th Bn, 12th liprines Category B H&S Co, 19th Marines (lees Det'e) H&S (less Det'e) 3d Hqn, Category B H&d Btry, 3d Spl Wpn Bn H&d Btry h, 3d Spl Vpn Bn (lees 4 plate) stry . 8&S Co, 3d Serv Bh (lesa 2 det's and 8&S (less 3 plats minus bakery and Sal Sees) Sel Ordnance Co, 3d Serv Bn (less 3 Kun Sees) Hq Co, 3d Serv Bn Hq Bn H&g Co, 3d MT 3n ( Category B) H&8 K&SCo, 3d Amph TrBc Bn (Category B) H&SCo, B) 3d Jef 3n (Category B) 3n, IMAC Det 155 nun nov Bn, IMAC Det *idv Naval 3aeb Unit #7 Jet Com Unit 47 *7 Det 75th NCB NCB Det Com^irlCorSols Category B Com^irl'orSolB B Rations, fuel and ammunition. fuel ammunition

Co C 3d Tk 5n C 5n Btry 3, 3d Stol V.'pns Bn Btry.3, Vpne

l 3d C-l Category B "B

TONNAGE 250 63 0 278 "si 81 170 43 105 149 110 no 24 33

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7 0 q 0 117 29 188
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200 200 493 40 2845. 2S& 542k!

Transportation: Date of departure:

7 LST's and 7 APD'e APD's 7 LST's begin loading AM D plus 15, depart AM begin D plus 17 7 APD's begin loading AX D plus 17, depart PM AM begin D plus 17. 17.

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Hep or t of Diroot *lr Support Report of Direct Air Support Report of Direct Air Support Report of Direct Air Support Report of Direot Air Support Report of Direot Jiir Support Report of Direot Air Support

3trllte Strike Strike Strike Strike Strike Strike

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10N0v43. 13N0v43. 14N0v43. 14Deci3. 15De043. 18Dec43. 25-6Deo43.

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i

1,

Three officers (restric

ted aviators) and six ennAWlJjPJidiomen reported to the Third Marine Division from the First Marine Aircraft Vingearly in August, 1945, to be formed Into three air liaison parties for the Third Marine Division, Inasmuch as officers and men had not
been trained to function as air liaison parties a Third Marine
Division Air Liaison Party School was orgsnlsed and conducted
by the Division Air Liaison Officer. To this school came "i/e
Army Air Foroe aviation officers end ttn enlisted radiomen who
had reported untrained to the 25th Army Division to form five
air liaison parties for thrt division* To school the lnfflr.try
unfrts. of the division In the potentialities of rlr eupport, md
to assure the maximum employment of thet support in pny operation
that the. Third Marine Division might participate, the Commrndlng
General, Third Marine Diviuicn, further ordered an officer from
the Three Beotlon of each battrJlon md regime ntf.l headquarters
to attend the school. By training an eir liaison officer for
each infantry battalion and reg'.aientd headquarters those units
oould be assured of having et lerst one officer present to rdvlee
the unit commander on matters concerning close rlr eupport.
2. PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF DIRECT AIR
PPORT IN JUNGLE TypA TK. /Pi'lor to the convening of the school
thorough study had been mrde or the employment of rjlr in
direct support during the campaigns on Gjadrlcmal end New Georgia*
It waa ftlt that rlr in direct support had not been utilised
to tht fullest possible extent* Ground troops wrnted. end real.
iMd they needed, close aerial support* Their felth in air,
however, had-been shaken, when, after oalllng for resistance,
thay thaaaelves had been bombed by the air they had *sked to
strife* tha enemy. Ground troops fsit lnseoure in using white aortar smoke alona to mark a target rrea. Airmen claimed heeltat ion and doubt of target resulted when the enemy shot back whits mortar saoke to confuse our airmen* The ground troops t%Xt that suooessful direct air support in Jungle terrain would have to bt a raal jfa support a support by accurate bombing
as oloss to tht friendly troops as safety voull permit* New
Georgia had shown that Jungle terrain <Ud not offer an opportun ity for aueh movement, that the enemy tended to advance whenever
our troops withdraw to oreate a. safety margin to permit the
dropping of large bombs, md thet on effeotlve bombing on dug
in personnel in Jungle would have to be *ns that would plough
tha anaay up and under. The school starts* with the intention
of developing a teohnique by vhioh the enemy could bs bombed
with aaxlaum aocuraoy a minimum distance from our own forces.
TRAHTMfr OF AIR LIAISON PARTY PERSONNEL, cgp 1536 3#3 # furniahad tha dootyina bj^whioh the air liaison parties were
to b# traioad. Praotiee with the provided radio equipment gave
aaah liaison party coomunlcatlonel proflcienoy. Experimerto oondueted in conjunction with Strike Command, ConAlrSola. furnished a knowledg* of the effect of different weight boobs vit^. various fuses on known types of targets offered by the Japanese. Field exercises, with aircraft of Strike CocmenK,

pftE FySONNEL. HfIMM

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_Bs>lt- *OuaT&3 o'ojoreatht positionS^HyTu6 to indloate
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colored smoke hmd ground .'?) of forenoet friendly troopa relative to the target, nnd white oortar (WP shell) or artillery acioko (VP shell) to nnrk the target, developed the technique thrt later was to be employed by the Third Marine Division in the Bougainville campaign.
uiirxup.

vllle campaign requested air to perform ten strikes in <sV.*.* support of ground foroes. Ail ceiled for bombs to be **"">vpe l within five hundred yprda, of friendly foroes three strikes dropped at five hundred yaidi, vhrae at two hunr* yardc, one at one hundred twenty yard*, one ai: hundtwi yards, and tv/o at seventy fire yards. Tho *.nly vam.iA?.t\9S to own forces occurred on one strike at two hundred yi*rdc when one plane of a flight of six negligently dropped boraos **.;< hundred yards from the wj,\lMrjjflT IB?kt Barked urrgvw on >% battalion command poet killing two men, wounding nix, * nu shocking six.
(

BIPLOYMEHT OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT DURINQ THE BOIWAIN. Aim tnira Marine Division during the Bouffr in ird naruic uiviion auring tno onup' i.i

5.

Q9SUffII2HL-Q2. W^ Al^y?!^t-&g238.4M
except
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liaison party enlisted men shou'ic. bje trained from person iwi of the division. The regimented air liaison offioer should "^e the assistant R-3 The battalion air liaison officer should be the battalion Gas Offloer. It is felt that ground troop pcresnnel are generally auoh more familiar vita aviation problems than aviation personnel are with grmrd troop problems and thus can be more easily trained to function as o!.* liaison parties. It,* FMrclfTnent of riroo* Air suoport. The tendency hot te use air in direot support- jf irfar.-ry un a target vhen It. ran normally be. hit by artillery enouM be discouraged. It hae been shown in the Boutin?:; Me CLcpal^ thet air oan be employed oloee to friendly tro..pe aj accarrtely es artillery* and will, when employed with su.*priee, distract end confuse the enemy* ' A ReouoPt for Direot Air Support. Request for direct air support in addition to describing the target as tc else and type, its location, nd the time period during which nn eir attack is desired, must include inf^wtlon pb to tne lcoatlcn of forenost friendly ;^.ops relpr:ive to the tercet anl method thet willbe uee* to aark that locctlon oo veil the as the target. When the bcee e*rdroae is distant care mue-. be taken, because of plrne endvrar.^e llruitPtione, to rec*ue9t the airowft on station Just prior vc the time tne strike is rctuelly desired. Aircraft overhead for c l^ng'period of time prior to a strike willlessen the e?erua' of eurprlse essential in m attack. A reooocendaticn ehoulf. bo svads In eech request a> to tbd velgh. of bomb end lengtn of fuse desired used In the ?tr2>v. Jt is not desirable to request Lcmblng of r target nearer tren
-2

for the Division Air believed tha^ division fron aaaig.ne.'* i. It iswho isregimen VIto theLiaison officers aviation, ffloer. and *\r infantry battalion and

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seventy five yards t;o rrftWAP^roops , The one hundred pound bomb should be reoommended In ell requests for bombir.fr in direct support oloser then three hundred yards to friendly forces. The 4*5 seoond fuse In Jungle elope direct support vlllperult the pilot to approach very close to the target before dropping his bombs and allow the bomb to penetrate veil Into the ground before exploding. Dug In eneny must be ploughed up and vr.de-. A. Coordinating Direct Air Sunnort, Successful employ, ment of air In direct suppo.a of ground troops Is dependent upon positive coordination betvsen air and ground. Air, as well as the ground unit It Is supporting, must understand the VAIIS* port it Is to play in the tr^ilodl situation. It Is better that pilots acting In tfcpport be biiafe<*. by an officer familiar with the situation, but, successful briefing can be accomplished by dlspatoh, A direct air suppo.** mission can be successfully exeouted without radio communl cotton between plane and fir liaison party on the ground iJ t'w pilots are thoroughly briefed tlie period of attack is definite, md She marking of frlenlly Xlnes and target is executed exaoJly on tlae, Best results however, dan be expected wwn the planoo and the air liaison party are able to oommunic&f .U.^est with each other* The air liaison party then oan direct the planes into position for tn# attack, ohange oourses of bombing runt, s necessary to fully oover a target, ohange a target, xncreaae or decrease snoke marking as requested by the plcnes, and modify or cancel any previously made arrangements Dads for the support.
mVAM B Wi

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'JOHN T. L. D. OABBERT

61

The CO 3d Mar Dlv at 2000 43 requested "13 TSF's on station 10 Nov ut 0915 over 133.?- 213.2 with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with lnstanta* eous and one tenth second fuses to precede an Infantry attack. A line parallel to and ahoud. of our infantry front willbe marked with artillery smoke and bombs willbe dropped on course 75 degrees from the center of this line to PIVA village. Also request 4 TBF's with same loadings on same station at 1015 to ancwer culls for direct support. Flight commanders report in on station to Able Love Peter 9".
.CTIOIJ ON REQUEST As modified by Com Air Bols 12 TBF's reported in on station to Able Love Peter 9at 0915. Able Love Peter 9 instructed Flight Commanders to bomb from white smoke markers to PIVA "illaftc cover ing area fifty yards on both sides of trail but not to bomb trail. Bombing attack was completed and infantry attack moved off c\t ICIS. White smoke markers hed been lcid 100 yards ahead of friendly troops by artillery. First bombs were dropped 120 yards from friendly troops und designated target area well covered. Japs had evacuated and loft equipment, ammunition, and rifles. Attacking troops reported 30 to 40 dead Japs in vicinity of PIVA village killed either by artillery, or air, or both.

Flight of 18 SBD's reporting in on station at 1015 to jtblo Love Peter 9 were returned to control of Com *irNor Sols who ordered them to bomb J*Bjt urea.
y*

63


BSaUE^T
one
FOR

DIRECT *IR. SUPPORT J.OR 14H0V43

The CO' 3d Mar Div at 1745 13 Nov 43 requccted "v minimum of squadron" TF 1 b with maximum lo^d 100 pound bombs with tenth second fuses report on otction fourteenth at 0730 Love ; t :3. J>,4 r 217.9 to ible Love Peter 9. Target will be dug in personnc.-. en a line running nor.th south 300 yardo east of aforementioned station point or on a line oust and west 300 yc.rda north of .station point. Target to be bombed willbe marked with white mort. r cnoke. Do not bomb unless contact is made with *ble Love Peter 9. BomMng attack willprecede c.n Infantry attack. Be prepared to atrafe with

bombing"

iiCTION ON REQUEST 18 TBF's loaded as reque3ted reported on station at time requested. Patrols had been r.cnt out to locate the enemy und returned to designate the northern target as that to be hit. attack began at 0850 and wa3 completed at 0900. Infantry atlaok followed bombing attack and area was found to have been hastily abandoned and much enemy equipment left behind. The planes wore credited with 95# hits in the designated target aron. Ho report made as to number of enemy dor d found in the area after the bombing but a report was made that the enemy left the area and crooser the PIVA river In great haste and coniuslon lm.nediately following the oonbing. Tho bombs were dropped 100 yards from friendly forces with no casualties to our own forces.


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:R SUPPORT FOR 13DE'

8 Btrlke originated ac a request made of oa Mar Div in the early afternoon result Dec a43 for direct by CG of 13 air support for 14 Dec. The CO FM*C suggested that the three 8BD s and three TBF's available locally at TOROKINa airfield be employed during the afternoon of 13 Dec to harass the target requested hit on 14 Deo. The CO 3d Mar Div requested the pianos to strike the suggested target with one hundred pound bombs with ono-tenth second fuses. Target area was to be marked with white mortar smoke.
,1

i 8i

ACTION ON REQDE3T The six planes, loaded with bombs as requested, began attack on mort&r smoke marked targot at 1846. Pour planes dropped bombf Plfth Plan troop* ?JL target# north and westdropped bombs negligently on friendly did 000 yards of smoke marked target. Sixth plane not bomb.

*T&

REQUE3T FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR 14DEC4,

M CO 3d Mar Dlv requested at 1300 13 Deo a minimum of one squadron TBF'e with maximum load one hundred pound bombe with one tenth seoond fueee report on station at 0800 14 Dec at TOROLIKA. Report In to Mine Base who will In turn turn flight over, to Able Love Peter 21 when ready. Target willbe dug In enemy with autoTarget to be bombed will be matic weapons on nose 139.8-219.3. marked with white mortar smoke. Friendly troops are on a line running north and aouth two hundred yards west of target. Position of foremost friendly troops willbo marked with violet smoke. Request bombing runs be made from southerly to northerly direction. Bombing attack will precede infantry attack. Be prepared to strafe with bombing".

TION Oil REQPES

17 TBF's loaded with bombs as requested, landed at Torokina Airfioldlto be briefed prior to the strike. Foremost position of friendly-troops relative to the target was marked with colored grenade smoke. Target was mr.rked with mortar smoke shell. Planes attacked in three echelons jf six, five, and six planes, respectively, in column. Friendly force line and target were smoke marked for each echelon. Planes bobbed parallel to friendly line from n southerly to northerly direction. 9O# of bonbs dropped hit targot area and'lOjt were either short or long in range.

oo

04 weit ***area troops will be marked with oolored will be marked with mortar smoke. northerly to southerly parallel to

r Dlv rtou et <* 1500, 14Deo, \u25a0minimum of * squadron 22Jf* with maximum load one hundred pound bombs one TBFs with one tenth eeoond fuaes be made available to bomb dug in enemy with automatio weapons on nose 139.8-819.3 at about 1100 15Deo. friendly troops are on a line running northerly to southerly two

3|

**

Tff*!!

\.f

itlon of foremost friendly smoke. Target to be bombed Request bombing runs be made friendly troop line. Requost

Airfield on sohedule with requested li?*?' Ll8?*^L1 * rlk *?*^ Torokina Officer and ground troop offlSer 01* 525i2?2!^i J f bJ?2?2S Jlf!J H *!? to bt *"** Pilots were oioarly ke iS\ 352 ?Ll^? Btri.?? ePatloni Offi^ a^ pound officer . . --0 'oremost friondTy troops was s^LS^-SilSMK^*?^!0!.!
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CO 3d Mar Dlv requested at 1900, 17 Deo "one squadron TBFs with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with 4-5 second fusee be available on call Toroklna Field 1200 to dark 18 Dec to bomb as requested dug in enemy with automatic weapons on nose 129.0 219.3. Position of friendly troops on a line running northerly to southerly seventy five yards west of target area. Position Target area of friendly troops to be marked with colored smoke. to be marked by white mortar Emoke. Pilots land Toroklna Airfield to be briefed by Strike Operations Officer and ground officer.
ON

Six TBF's, each carrying twelve one hundred pound bombs with 4-5 second fuses, landed at Toroklna Airfield and were briefed by Strike Operations Officer and a ground troop offloer representing the supported troops. The first strike started at 1200 and was completed at 1245, the position of I'orcmoat friendly troops was marked by colored smoke and the target area was marked by mortar smoke. Each plane made throe individual runs and dropped four bombs on eaoh run,' The Strike Opexations Officer and the ground troop offloer flying an SBD over the target directed individual bombing runs by- radio, 100 hits in target area. No casualties to own forces. Five TBF'e participated in the strike that started at 1600 and was completed at 1625. 36 one hundred pound bombs were dropped 24 with instantaneous fuses uid 12 with 4-6 second fuses. 3 planes mude three individual runs apiece dropping four bombs on each run* All five planes made straffing runs on the target and executed dummy bombing runs as friendly troops advanoed and captured the hill. The Strike Operations Offloer and the ground troop officer observed and directed the bombing and straffing runs from an SBD over the target are*. 90* bomb hits in the target area. No cas ualties to friendly forces*

' y

II


[UE3T

FOR DIRECT *IR SUPPORT FOR 25DEC THRU 27DSC

CO 3d Mar Dlv at 1200 24 Dec requested "minimum one squadron

TBF's at Toroklna Airfield prepared to start bombing at HOG 25th
and continuing as frequently ac possible during daylight hours
thru 27th numerous enemy installations varying from slit trenches
to splinter proofed emplacements. Pilots will be briefed here on
exact looation eaoh target. Targets will bo marked with white
mortar smoke. Foremost friendly troops willbe about 500 yards
from nearest target. Friendly positions will be marked with
colored amoke. CO 21st Marines is authorised to arrange partic ulars direot with ComAirHor3ols N

lON ON REQUE3

Id TBF'e w made available. After briefing by strike operation officers and ground troop officers planes made one attack during morning and one during afternoon of 25 Doc, and, one during afternoon of 26th. Used 500 pound bomba with instant aneous and one tenth second fuses and one hundred pound bcaba with instantaneous and one tenth second fuses. Object of tne attacks were to dear out area reported by patrols as building up to a Japanese position. After bombing of morning of 26 Dec patrols investigated area and found it abandoned by the Japanese, Trenches and installations in the area indicated the possible occupation by about 800 Japanese. Area was completely covered ba leavln rew trees standing und few installations intact. xoo> hits in urea* No casualties to own pobltion or friendly troops was marked by oolored forces.and Foremost roa target smoke was marked by mortar smoke. Strike Operations Officer and ground jroop officer in SBD led strike of morning or 25 Dec. Strike CY>Ai*tlon A<fUM. I**othr tiro Atrlko.

?Xn*

of

ft

>*\u25a0

COMBAT
OF THE

Third Marines
Reinforced
in the

30UGA/NVUE CAMM6N
l,November-25y

Dcembe^49A3
\

Paw One

-Operations

UEfi A*%

Tvto fij*&*AT -Tactics <

Tgchmque
\

"A/ctosuE F

PORIiO R D

The Combnt Report of the 3rd Marines, Rein 3rc Harlne Division, in the Bougainville Campaign, 1b presented in two parts: the first is p narrative ac count of the Operations of the r egiment from the tine it left its Base at Guadalcanal on 13 October until it re turned on 27 December, 1943; the second is a corr.xentnry or. the Tactics pnd Technloue of the Raiment In battle md reviews its experience in a landing against opposi tion and in %wo months of cornbpt in swp.tp -~nd Jungle.
forced,

1.

2. purposes:

The Combat Report is intended "^o serve three first, It is the historical record of the Campaign; second, it is the basis on "hich the Officers and lien of the Regiment may evaluate the i>orth of the continuous pnd. progressive training for Jungle Warfare which they received in nearl- nine months in Samoa, two months in New Zealand *nd three months in Guadalcanal, third, It is a guage by uhlch the standards of tactical excellence and technical -rcficiency demanded of the skilled Jungle Fighter may bo set md by "hich the relative importance of the several phases of traini.if; for combat in similar theatres my be measured.

GOVQ/lep

20 January, 1944.
Guadalcanal, 8.5.1.

<l

PART

0?:3

0 OF2RA T IT S

The Landing pt -Impress Augusta Bay Th? Battle of Cape Torokln** The 3ttle of the Kormoklnw The Battle of. the Pum Wunw Trll The Battle of the Piva "orks The Defense of the Eastern Sector

So

1 14 11 1110 <***); Company "C", of the Third Modloal Battalion; detaohments of Hotor Transport, Amphibian Tractors and the Band; a Soout Platoon, and, the Headquarters of tno Second Raider Reglmtnt (Provisional) and the Seoond Raider Battalion. A number of detaohmente of Division and Corps troops wore attached for transportation and were a part of the Shore Party during the Landing.

Attack at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, 8.5.1., by the Third B5t!?1B5 t 11 Howltiers); a Composite Battalion ?2i. * **

The Third Marines were relnforoed for the Landing

SliJ^n ?^

!?

<***

T l lnant orgonliad In four Landing Teams, embarked is 5?J 5* 1943, from Tetere, Ouadaloanal, In the Combat October. Transports U.S. s. President Adams (litin.. Reinforced), ftpoeldont Jookson (2d Bn., Relnforoed: Regimental Ooaraand -nd Transport Division flag). President Hayes (3rd Bn., t e V** *iBalder Bn., and 2nd S10 R elnent SlOa*iuarierr. ft* oargo aoooapanylng eaoh t S wasHllcltod to 680 -<r # c Lanalng Tcan tons. The Trrjasport plvislon proceeded to Ifate, Mow Hebrides, ro to the 80th of Ootober, the Regloent on-
Anphlblous Erolsos which terminated In a two-day
in ? probleu eavolying taotlcol situations slnllar to those to be Qxpqot4d in the Bougainville Landing.
i* on

&w Imi ^f Js J??

sro?5

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the Oomoandor. Transports, and the Counandlng Oorori.*, First Marine Anphlblous Corps, In the Oeor^o Clyaer. 85ort Division rendesvouseC with the balanco of tho TVS -/n/nForce on 31 October. Attaol- i *'Ti Transports arrived on station off Puruata Island eak of x Hovenber. the ships approaching In eolunn v f ? C^ 7t^ tc*.-r; the ;ilne Sweepers and flankod by the Destroyors. Tho : ceta-aiTticn of the troops was executed under the cover of Air Suppoi-t and during tho firing of the Maval Gunfire Preparation. Tho Landing BoheCule of the Reglnent provided for the simultaneous landing of the four Landing Teams on beaches fron Capo Toroklna to the Koromoklna River, tho Ist Battalion landIng on Capo Toroklna, tho 2nd Raider fiattallon to the west

ok

i> Octobor so

SlTltion then stood oS J^wrtv&en It proceeded to by at isplrltu Santo 9 tobor Ouadaloanal to enborfc

81

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the 2nd Battalion to tho west of the the Koronoklna River Battalion, attached Gonbat Team, was to land on Puruata Island and destroy Antfc-Doat Defenses whioh night do ooplaoed there.
ic.lj.orc and the 3rd Battalion between ark. the 2nd Bnttalion. The 3rd Raider to anu under the oontrol' of another

of the lot battalion,

Si. i?? 4^* Sr^

wi

As tho several Boat Groups approaching their beaches' Prosed the western tip of Furunta Island, they were subjected tc a her.vy volune of fire froo Japanese oaohlne runs whioh hcid as yet esoaped the Raiders. Fortunately, casualties wire llrht, but LCP's whioh wire employed as Boat Group Commnder's because of their distinctive appearance as eonparod with LCV'b, easily identified as Ooonand Boats mad were veil workod over while in range of the eneoy guns. c lnltlal v of th 2nd and 3rd Battalions reached \u2666V, their beaches without opposition other than fron a light fire 7? 8 a5d aaohlne gunt froo enooy Obeervation Posts, The* 2nd Raider Battalion landed in the face of two bunks* jlosfc. tions and a aorles of cntronohosnts occupied by a rolnfcreed platoon but quickly oveross* this reslstanot. The Ist Dattal lon ran into serious opposition! Oape Toroklna m defended Dy a foroo of 2?0 offloors and non who were deterained to make 116 P^lac anti they had oonstruotod and whioh in 8 25 h av loc nd twl4 buntors, ono of whioh a *! X. 75dd Mountain Ckm. fhe nell oonoealed bunkers worehoused nutually support inp and the approaches to then oovered by series of rifle pits and interlocking bands of naohine gun fires.

J?

**

2L.n

tho ttM ut Cattalion Oape Toroti y boate of *4*otA to enemy approachedgun fire, this aaohlne asttln tV^J I Positions on Torokina Island to their richti still o2f^01^?*" 3** 2ut n? the Landing11^04 I*> for a now the 78 en dun began to fire at Graft, and time the situation appeared to though ortr fifty SLnS! !S^8i * *hell, itthis rjun fireddotroytof or 1 f lgh succeeded 2 ?*loiw Qf our boats, and in Landinc con I2S?? 1^ J^^^S S11 ^c ?f? the MnJSS r!!1101*; ?' -,Th# ?*** did. howirer, blow up the. Boat 116 fl^S aQn<lei\? Doat **LOP> **P tho Approach FoSr^i.?SSn *fesfcsu jt;ing in the landing of the Issault Units in on lt i2 0 1 11? the " of that planned. As the boats ?* th with their Srs *onfenethe beach**Sn# Japanese opened firefire was inf?n n^ onln but the density of oo4l o JnJj the tOPv 8t0P of SJS into Ik vBbrush. thll^0411^ of the Marines across theboach and In spite the disorganisation of units and tho woundins early in the attack of theattalion Connan effoPt i^nA^^iL0L0fdren *ited that soon destroyed tho con'ires and insured the successful coaplo Jr^J Jlt *?

*******

tion of the Landing,

.
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82

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In tho meantime, shortly after H-hour, Japanese air craft appeared, and tho Transports temporarily withdrew to sea. Although the onooy was soon repulsed by our Air Cover, a number of his planes suoceoded in straffing our beaches, but infliotod few oasualtios sinoe the troops in the Shore Forties hud prepared Slit Trenches immediately on landing. The oo3t serious coneoquonoo of this air attack anc". several more whioh followed during tho day was tho resulting delay in the unloading of the ships: howovor, before dark and well within tho five hours of working tine whioh haA been set as a standard for the task, the Transport Division had been un loadod. In spite of a htsvy surf whicli ran on two of the Roglnent'e boaohes to such a degree that they were subsequently olosod to snail boat traffic, the debarkation of equipment and supplies was completed without the loss of a single boat from other than enemy aotlon.

The Scheme of Maneuver of the Division called for the landing on beaches within the Third Marines Seotor of Enrl noor and Antiaircraft Artilloryorganizations fron Combat Cargo Ships whioh rendetvousod with the Transport Division during the approach to Bougainville. These landings were successful and Antlr-Alrcraft defonsss were established on the boaohes before tho debarkation of equipment and supplies was
ooapleted.

On Cape Toroklna, as bunker after bunker fell to the assault of squads and platoons, oontrol was gradually re establishod over the Landing Toam, the Rifle Battalion was ro organizod and on advanoo begun whioh by evening terminated in the occupation of tho proposed initial Beach Head Line. With the Bonding out of the first patrols, it became ovldent that with the oxoeptlon of two avenues of approach to Cape Toroklna, the Landing Toons were heoned in by swapps and tho most dense and rugged Jungle that the non had ever soon. With each Landing Team on its final objective for the first day, it was only by Superhuman effort on tho part of tho Communicators that even lateral command lines between Teams could be laid bef oro dark: patrols from the 2nd Raiders and tho Ist Battalion, pushing through swanp and tangles that held their advanoo to a fow dosen yards an hour could not make oontaot. To plug the gaps and olose tho possible avenuos of approach of Japanoeo reinforoenents whioh, fron documents discovered on the bodies of the dead in the bunkers, were known to be north of Piva Village, Company "E" of tho 3rd Marines and Company *L" of the 3rd Raidor Battalion wero shifted to the Capo Toroklna Sootor and put in position to covor the flank and rear of the Ist Battalion, now nearly a thousand yards from its beach*

84

$4

3ut the 2nd Raider battalion had clone its work well and, before the encny could dotoralne on a course of action, was eeourely established aoross the line of advance of whatever reinforcements the Japanese night have wanted to send to Cape Torokina. k counterattack against our position on Capo Toro kina never materialised. Company "E", 3rd Marines, was re turned to its battalion on the 2nd of November when the Ist Zattalion, 9th Marines, was shifted to the Cape Torokina Beo tior to reinforce the Ist battalion, 3rd Marines.

The daylight hours of the 2nd and 3rd of November were devoted to the sending out of flank oontaot patrols and re connaissance patrols to the front, in establish in- the "each Defenses and in reinforcing and Improving the defenses of the Cape Torokina Sector. Torokina Island, from which a small but determined band of Japanese harrassed the Cape Toro kina beaches with machine <^uns for two days, was finally, neutralised, marking the end of initial resistance to the
landing. At 1800, 3 November, control of the Cape Torokina Sec tor passed to the 9th Marines, who on the 2nd and 3rd had had two battalions shifted to the area: the Ist Battalion, 3rd Marines, went into Reserve under control of the 9th Marines at that time and remained on Cape Torokina until the 6th when it reverted to the* 3rd Marines and was moved to a Regimental

Reserve fositlon east of the Xoroaokina River.

and the 2nd and 3rd 3attalions, 3rd Marines, had be<run an advance inland through the swamps, "he general course of the 2nd Battalion was to be north and to enable it to maintain contact with the Haiders on the right, Company *k* of the Ist battalion, 3rd Marines, was attached to the 2nd Battalion from the 6th to 11th of November. The general course of the wad generally north and then east, alone: the ?hi. perimeter of the Division B.each Head: the 3rd Battalion was assigned the task of locating the route of a lateral road from the left flank to the right.
On the morning of the 7th of November, a Composite Battalion of the Japanese from Xavleng and Rabaul landed out side Qt the Division Beach Head west of the Kororaoklna River and moved against the Third 3attaJ.ion, 9th Marines. The initial landing was made by. about 75 men: over 400 more were observed to land at intervals throughout the moraine* at various points alone the beach. However, the enemy was

In the meant ins. the 3rd battalion, 9th Marines, in a position on the left flank of the Division 3each Head, with its flank on the sea, had been attached to the 3rd Marines,

35
#
85

distributed over so wide a front that his full stren -th could not be assembled quickly, and unless he were to delay so lon as to lose the initiative, he had only the alternat ive of attacking with but a portion of his force. The enemy chose to attack at once. Although his attack was most a..: reeslve, the enemy's strength Was insufficient to carry hie; through our position. When the advance of the enemy had been checked, the Ist Battalion, 3rd Marines, less Conroany "A", was ordered to pass throu.-h the left flank company of the 3rC Sattalion, 9th Marines and attack the enemy, now numbering 200 or more, in his position. Ey nightfall, the offensive power of the enemy had been destroyed althou-h clurln- the nir-^it the remnants of the Landin- Force kept nov m up in an attempt to restore the Japanese position. At dark, the Ist Battalion went into,, defense west of the Koro fcokina River: two platoon patrols operated in the enemy's rear throughout the ni;4it and caused the Japanes considerable trouble.
Early on the 7th, the Ist Battalion, 21st Marines had

-.

been shifted to the Third Marines' Sector and had boen placed in ne mental Reserve. It was now planned to finish off the enomy with an attack by this unit on the aomin^ of the Bth During the nijvht, a coordinated Infantry-Tank^Artillery-Air attack against the Japanese position was arranged, and soon after daylight, following a Pire Preparation by five batteries of artillery, several j*nti-Tank Weapons, and the Machine ouns and Mortars of the Ist Battalion, Third Marines, the let Battalion, 21st Marines, accompanied by light tanks, passed through the Ist Battalion, Third Marines, and advanced to a Laoon 1500 yards west of the Koromokina River where, opposed only be a few shocked survirors of a force completely shatter ed by the fi^htlnc of the past twenty-four hours, it went into perimeter defense and sent out Oombat Patrols to the north through the swamps *nd west to the Laruma RJsrer. The results of the patrols were negative and It was evident that the Japanese effort against our Left Plank had been destroyed by the attacks of tba 7th and the Pire Preparation of the Bth.

On the 9th, co insure that the Koromokina La^oon-Lamma River Area woulrf be cleared of any possible concentrations of survivors, * Dive comber Strike bombarded and the beaches, Junriee and swamps from our lines to the strafed Laruma River and f*r three hundred yards inland. Patrols later found the bodies of many Japanese who were caught by the strikes trike as they retried to the area from the refuge they had taken in the bac 1 country.

87

$1

activity

The Air Strike of the 9th permanently ended all enemy on the west and at noon on that day the Sector and the control of the Ist Battalion, 21st Marines, passed to the 37th Division of the *rmy. The 3rd Tattalion, 9th Marines, reverted to the 9th Marines and was shifted to the Cape Torokina Sector. The Ist battalion, 3rd Marines, re turned to its position in Re-iinental Heserve. With regard to the disposition of the units which had been attached to the 3rd Marines for the Landing on 1 Novem ber, almost all organizations reverted to the control of their own Regiments or to Division control soon after the completion of the debarkation of equipment and supplies. The Scout Platoon was the only organization to remain attach ed throu /hout the entire campaign: the Raider Resident passed to Division Control on landing; artillery batteries soon passed to artillery battalion and then to ArtilleryRegimen tal Control, and by the 12th of November the Engineer Troops constituting the Regimental Shore Farty had reverted to the 19th Marines and the Regimental Shore farty had been dis banded. After the detachment of these reinforcing units, Engineers, Service and Supply troops, Motor Transport and amphibian Tractors were attached or placed in support of the Regiment as the situation, from time to time/ might require. The 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, was In direct support of the Regiment throughout the campaign and Company "C" of the 3rd Medical Battalion maintained its Field Hospital in tho vicinity of the 3rd Marines! Command Post during the first month of tho operation.
tiokina, documents were found on the bodies of the dead re vealing that the purpose of the landing- had been two-fold: first, to make a diversion on the west and create a favor able situation for an attack against our eastern flank by the Japanese 23rd Infantry which, less one battalion was in readiness in the hills north of Piva; second, the attack of the 23rd Regiment having been successful, to make a Junction with that force and establish and cover a Beach Head east of
As one of the consequence 8 of the Battle of the Koro

the Lauma River for the landing of additional New Britain and New Ireland.

forces from

The entire scheme was ruined by the quick destruction of the Landing Force, and when the 23rd Regiment moved to the attack to carry out its part of the plan, it found its way blocked by the Raider Regiment. So, as it was later found, the enemy withdrew again to the hills and began the construc tion of defensive positions east of the East Branch of the Piva River and the setting of road blocks and ambuscades on the Numa Numa and East-West Trails thereby preparing a base for further operations along other lines.

88

When the noneral locality of the enemy's main force had been established by our patrols, the rate of advance of the Third Marines, the speed with which the Lateral Road was bein run in and the number and range of oombat and re connaissance patrols was stepped up to the limit of endur ance of men and machines. Neither Jungle or swamp interrupted the steady advance to the north and oast to the vicinity of the Junction of the Numa Numa Trail with the East-West Trail where, if no time wore wasted, it was anticipated that a main action could be fought with the enemy before he could oomplete hie defensive installations. On the 11th of November, the 3rd 3attalion, cutting in the Lateral Road, orossed the front of the 2nd 3attalton whloh then advanced a thousand yards north of the road and oovered itand the Interval between the 37th Division and the left flank of the'Third Marine Division now covering the Numa Numa Trail. On the 12th, the Ist 3attalion, Third Marines, began a movement through the Jungle whloh on the 15th put them in a position south of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, vhiob was oovering the Trail Junotion of the Numa Numa and East-Vest Trails. On the 16th, the 3rd Battalion broke out of the Jungle at the Trail Junotion and connected its Bupply Road from the. vest with the Numa Numa Trail which had been Joined with Amphibian Traotor Trails from the east. The supply of the Regiment In further operations was assured. The Third Battalion took a position north of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines and west of the Nuna Numa Trail. The 2nd Bat talion, 21st Marines, now passed to the control of the Third Marines. The Regiment was now in position to begin the exten sive patrolling and development whioh finally located the enemy's exact position and brought about a decisive aotion with the Japanese main forces. as a result of patrol activity on the 17th and 18th. an enemy road blook was discovered on the Numa Numa Trail one thousand yards north of the 3rd Battalion's position, and a Japanese outpost was located on the East-West Trail in front of the Ist Battalion, 21st Marines, half way be tween the East and Vest Branches of the Piva River. To release the 3rd 3attalion for an attack on the Numa
.Numa Road Blook, the 3rd Raider Battalion, now attached to
the Third Marines, moved into the line.

89

tf

On the morning of the 19th, the Third 3attallon, 3rd Marines, accompanied by light tanks, advanced In a Contact Imminent Formation towards the enomy. Tho Japanese Road Block was by-passed and struck on Its flank: the enemy, a relnforocd company, after a ohojt resistance, withdrew. The 3rd Battalion occupied the position and established a perimeter defense. On the morning of the 20th, the same Japanese company that had withdrawn the previous day. re turned and attaoked the 3rd Battalion in Its rear but the outcome was never in doubt. As tho survivors fled to the east, the 3rd Battalion followed* On the morning of the 21st, the 3rd Battalion encountered a Japanese defensive position of 150 foxholes to its front: without delay the Battalion attaoked, carried the position and occupied a mass of high ground overlooking the main Japanese position which was now determined as being east of the East Branch of the Piva and astride the East-Vest Trail. In addition, the position now held by the 3rd Battalion cut the Japanese line of communica tion between the Numa Numa Valley and the Jaba district. As for the East-West Trail Outpost, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, released from the left as the 37th Division extended its lines to the northeast on the 19th, approached behind the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, and on the morning of the 20th, passed through our lines and reduced the enemy
position.

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, then continued on across the East Branch of the Plva in a Reconnaissance in Force which fixed the exact location of the Japanese defenses and resulted in the occupation of a commanding ridge from which artillery oould be precisely adjusted on the enemy positions.

While the 2nd Battalion was still across the West Branoh of the Plva, the Ist Battalion, 3rd Marines, which had been withdrawn from the right to a position in reserve on the 20th, now, on the morning of the 21st, advanced to the west bank of the East Branoh of the Piva and, reinforced by machine gun squads from the Regimental Weapons Company and by Company "L" , 3rd Raider Battalion, established a de fensive line from the left flank of the 21st Marines Sector to the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, includ ing the ridge which had been seifced by tho 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, now reverted to the control of the 2lBt Marines and moved to the south*

90

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On completion of its Reconnaissance on the 21st the 2nd Battalion returned through the Ist Battalion's lines to an Assembly Area in rear of the Ist Battalion and south of the East-West Trail, but not without a fight: the enemy, with a strength of two battalions, reinforced, did his beet to prevent a disengagement.
Then, wiiA^o the cna Battalion's movement to its *i*uti. while uw 2nd ei<i<aiiga'i movement uo lw Assembly Area was in progress, the Japanesei&ddal&yaatttmfrt ed a double envelopment of the Ist Battalion's newly oooupied

positions. Unfortunately for the enemy, his oolumns followid the obvious avenues of approach and his effort was des troyed in front of the maohine guns that had been sited against Just such an attempt. While the aotion wms in pro gress, a Combat Patrol from Company "A",2lst Marines, came up and Joined in the Sight. Thereafter, and until the 21st Marines advanced their lints abreast the Ist Battalion, 3rd Marines, this Combat Patrol remained in a position covering the right flank of the Ist Battalion.

On the morning of the 22nd, the plan for the destruc tion of the enemy had been formulated: as the first step In exeoutlng It, the 2nd "elder Regiment, nov coming under control of the 3rd Marines, advanoed and relieved the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, in position. By the evening of that day the 3rd Battalion. 3rd Marines, had been moved to an assembly Area In rear of the Ist Battalion, abreast of the 2nd Battalion, but to the north of tht East-Vest Trail. The Regiment was now in position for the attack. The enemy positions, consist ing of rifle pits and small bunkers, and supported by artillery, had been found to be disposed as if to resist an attack from the south towards the hills. But the Plan of Attaok contemplated an attaok from Vest to fiast # enfilading the Japanese lines and paralleling the hillmass the enemy thought we would attempt to occupy. The 84th was set as the date of the Attack. The Scheme of Maneuver was that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, following an Artillery Preparation, would advance abreast, pass through the lines of the Ist Battalion, and attaok to the east for a dlstanoe of 800 yards beyond the Cast Branch of the Piva, Hie East-Vest Trail was to be the boundary between Battalions.

92

The day of the 23rd was spent in completing the re connaissance of unit commanders; the Artillery Forward Ob servers plottod in their targets and adjusted their batteries, and the Ist Battalion moved every available ma chine gun into the line, even including several Nambus and Hotohkiss oaohine guns which had been oaptured from the enemy
By dark, all was in readiness: seven Battalions of Artillery, four of the 12th Marines and three of the 37th Division, wore prepared to fire 0600 rounds of 70 and 105 mm High Explosive in 20 minutes Into an area 800 yards square; batteries of 155 mm dune and Howitzers were ready to fire on distant targets; the Ist Battalion had sited 44 maohine guns and coordinated the fires of 12 81mm and 9 60mm mortars for a Fire Preparation aero ea the front that was to be oovered by the attacking Battalions.

On the morning of the 24th, right on time, the Artillery fire with the heaviest concentration that had ever been delivered before an attack by Marine a: the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced to the line of Departure to the aooompaniment of a continuous rattle and roar of maohine guns, mortars and artillery. At the Battalions entered the Japanese lines, they were met with silence; the destruction of the enemy's positions within the beaten tone of the Fire Preparation had been complete. But, gradually, as the ad vance continued to its objective, the enemy rallied his sur vivors and oommitted those reserves who had e soaped. By the tide the left battalion, the 3rd, had moved forward about 500 yards, the enemy was ready and launched a oounter-attack against our left flank. The 3rd Battalion met the attaok in full stride and oontinued its advanoe in a han6Vto~aand, tree- to-tree struggle that ended with the complete destruc tion of the enemy's flanking force. As the 2nd Battalion neared its objective, it too, dosed with Japanese reinforoe men te coming forward to make a stand. The Battalions re mained on their Initial Objectives only long enough to re* organise and reestablish oontaot: again they started forward, this tine to a final objective 350 yards to the front. The Japanese here taada a desperate effort but as the leading elements of the Third Marines oame up to a line 1150 yards in front of the original Line of Departure, all resistance came to and end. The Japanese 23rd Infantry, leaving 1107 dead on the field, was destroyed.
opened

This battle, known as the Battle of the Plva Forks, marked the end of serious opposition to the occupation and development of the Empress Augusta Bay Area as an American Air Base: the enomy, with the esoeptlon of sttall detach ments and patrols, was driven east of the Torokina River.

93

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Battle
2V-26MovM6tR19

PVA FORKS

OP THE.

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and the high ground which he had hold and not only controlled the Bite which was to Boraber Field but also froa which he could the entire Beach Head was occupied by our

from which nc
bccoae tr.c Plvn.
have harassed
forces.

The 25th and 26th of November wp.s socntln ccnedlic> tlnp the new position and in advancing the Division's lines
to the flanks of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

On tho 27th, the Sector vp.b turned over to the 9th

Marines, the Raiders were detpched and ti.e Rcrrincr.t was shlf tod to thp Err.t where it took up a position in defer.be, fro:.
the so* on ltc rlf'ht flank to Mil50C on its left. The
Rcplrr.cnt hrd now completed a transit of the entire ~e.-\ch
Ko"d; ron Ope Toroklna and XMe mouth c." V":Fivn t; the

K-M-OMo'^lrvi nr.d then thorough thF Jungles

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fc

:\u25a0.;;<..

t'-'arro '^.c':

to

11: itr, of the patrcls of the fli-nt two dr.yu.

the wof,: :y-r:. -r:. of the Torokina at It mouth, mC tr.e ba?.ar.ce

3 of the wcvjr C canary of the 3rd T?.n>. ?.ittjf.icn
were attached.
"'J cf f-.e l?r.h Ilf.rlnco, a Somoit Zn oinecr C-r.-'cir.y,
hud b, ,r l-: nupo:rt elnco oeforo the actio: 4 s or. the . ' r.= "urm Trrll, bulL'r.'; ..rd rjc.ir.tdin In: hospital f^.cllit.'cg a v supply :*(,,,\,t . :o *he or.zzi^ f.ooltiene, pccorrnr.ni^: l tic i".cji . tnci.t li'r ; J^ntor; An Anti-T^nk 3nttdrv of ti:o S-vri-l
\lor.p-j.\ i r-:-v'.i.Mo". rupportcd the 2 ach c Defenses on tho iJit
i
y

Willie the Ac,;lnont was in tho Ec.ster.-. Sector, the Ist

Battalion, l'sth Infantry, which r.r.lntained rr.d outpost on

Conr^.t.;

'

flai *.

Tn crier to . fford the Fl.fle Battalions an oc^o-^v.rlty to re-*o ?.i\\ isc;\Miw thair troops who had been on f-.- ro
for t./\ n -i t vt.i vcr.^ocvitJvc days, a Composite was c; r I 1n..i aa ,xi. r -.c Re -incr.tal .'faTsc:^ 3?.tta \.n~
-u Cc:-;..-\
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T.i- S:;-or boiderod on de?p ewarroc, f^.n-err, of '.'rich cv. acr:. PB u.e su.-rly routoo: t;-c pro*); cas :sro i..c?Lr. ccr torcu ......,v rniiualrup the W In potltior. Tnliu-h r.umer o-f I- i 3 LV^vcreec the gw~cPkj aily n"' Pt^^'" tt
r :iine, t: n. cvi-
-*T Toro>:lna i::ve^ fr^ tine a.rc-e .jir> c .l^covercd thr.t tbo Ja^ar.cse lntfirc-'d to So no. c x..-n tne Sector undoT obscrvrtlon. A number of

d^/' .-.SVv

-XI
/

95

n* \u25a01 R '' \ eherp skirralsliee v.re fo-Aht totve^.i c-'iuqll pt "is ' K-l". cprae u .on eac. other ir. the cp.v-f i'led p"prrc: in t It. ; thj rivc-r cr. cr.viray stopped Bending his parties pcrcss tested '.irnself with p* tempts to rnir.tfi". Observation For*r on tnc icpcl: Rcroae the '"orokir.0

9 On th^ 22nd of December, thj ?.eg:lr. -r.t "ps r li^--:' ir. po.sltion by the 2nd Rplder Repir.^.t, reinforced '.*..-. Ppracliut' Bpt*-llon, went into 'lor; s ?.? serve, ":::/ it

re-.no ined until It embprked on the co'h in the "oT.b^- "r-r.P Crcscsr.t City Tor _.ortB U. S.S. George Clyracr, FVI:-r
return to Tetcre, Gudrlcpnpl.

ooOoo

-XII

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DEFENSE
OF THE.

EAST SECTOR.

?7


PART

TWO

TACTICS AVD VLCHniQ.UK

A Review of

Conbat

Experiences

9i

"

tacsics a: :sc or the 1Bn7TQA^!"<7ILLE. &fe bEfIEI^BER. the I3LA? 'IwT^'M^T'T.fl SOLOL'O?: 1943T" noVE'SEA
coin v-ts
J

vuiques

of

operatic:^
T

DTT

5R1713V

c? the DS FRCI'

TC

This connentary on the Tactics and Technique of the Third Marines on Bougainville, British Sojpnon Islands, froc 1 IToven ber 1943 to 25 December, 1943, reviews the experiences of the

regiment

in a landing against the Jungle.

opposition and in operations

in

In matters which, in discussion, were subject to differences of opinion, the findings which are presented represent a concen sus of thought of the battalion and company command** and pla toon and squad leaders of the Third Marines and are based on their experiences in both conbat and in fourteen months of pro gressive combat training in Samoa and Guadalcanal for Jungle

Warfare

In consideration of the fact that different conditions of

combet require different solutions for the sane problem, various
subjects are presented in the order In which they cane into pro minence during the several phases of the car-paign.
1-3 HOVE-3ER. 19437 TACTICS

While the eneny situation prior to the landing was obscure, it was evident that enemy resistance to the landing of the division would be localized by the terrain and restricted to relatively snail detachments. However, it was anticipated that Cape Torokina would be defended with the principle defensive strength being disposed to face the west.
The rirst 3a ttalion, Reinforced, constituted the Landing Tean assigned to the assault of Cape Torokina. The Landing Team Operations Order presented a plan in which a penetration of the eneny 'B defenses was to be nade by the landing of two rifle companies, reinforced, abreast, in two waves of eight boats each, following which the conpanies were to follow diverging zones of action: .thus, on the one hand containing the defenders on C ppe Torokina, and, on the other hand, blocking the avenue of approach of possible reinforcements fron Buretoni Mission. However, upon

ft

99

the early arrival of the reserve conpany, landing in the third and fourth waves, on it 6Initial objective, the interior flanks of tho diverging assault companies ''ould be covered and the battalion well disposed wltn three companies in line for con tinuing the attack In the most propitious direction. This de centralized attack on a broad front, which subsequent events pi'oved to have great merit, was car led through successfully because of thorough preparation by all units and the exceptional
aggressiveness

of individuals.

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

The orders for the landing wore presented in detail by the Battalion Conr.iander and his staff to every officer and senior non-commissioned officer in the Landing Tr am, several days before the landing. These In turn held school for the nen of their units until they were certain that every nan understood not only the mission and the purpose of his own squad, platoon and company, bu: that of every ofcher conpany. The Shore *arty was informed of the duties of the ABsaultA 8 sault Echelon and the Assault Echolon of the duties of the Shore Party. Each man was provided with a nineograohed copy of a terrain sketch which was In sufficient detail to insure that wherever a man wound up, he could find his way to his correct position, and, by referring to hi sketch, be able to determine 6 the location of supoorting units. This thorourh preparation proved to be of vital Importance to the success of the landing inasmuch as few units were able, because of the effectiveness of the beach defense, to carry out the mission originally asrign od to then. EXECVTIOIT OF THS ATTACK At the moment of landing, cner.y defenses succeeded in breaking up entire organizations. Platoons and companies were thrown out of position by being landed on the wrong part of the beach; oven squad leaders found it difficult t o retain con trol of their squads. This condition, brought about by cannon

fire from the beach defenses directed against the landing craft, emplaced and coordinated machine guns from well protected bun kers covering tne beach and by the thick, dense, b:-"ush from seven to eight feet high, which grew to within a few feet of the water line, might have resulted In the destruction cf the attacking force had it not been for the unusually large number of men present who were trained as leaders, knew the mission and were ready and willing to take charge in a crisis.

/O O

100

10 1

Schematic Diagram of Proposed LANoina The op

the
aT l Battauow

Cape

Torokina

on

&SI3

N
/
J3clie J3c lie

cc

AEb

f'KJO^s lO>

Because every man, to the last private, was thoroughly briefed on tho entire naneuver and even though he landed in the wrong plrce, it r.ade no difference because he knev the mission of men landing in that sector, and he vent or. to accomplish that' mission in spite of the mix-u->. Thus, there was the condition of unity of effort with apparently an absence; of control in the early stages of landing.
dipq-:ca:
t

ee cr small

uiiit Tenure

The extreme importance of Small Unit Training, particularly in Rifle S^uad and Platoon Tn ctics, vas denonstrated in this landing. Until the beach defenses and its supports were over come, the battle was one of small groups, composed of men some times not even of the same squads but in every case taionln charge by some man whose instinct for leadership enabled him to take over. Ke was able successfully to dlroct his grout) as an organized firo tear.) because thorough and progressive srwill unit training contlnuod over a long period of tlno, had indoctrinated every nan in the tactics and technique of tho iquad in the attack. Bocauso the attacks by these snail groups were in themselves well coordinated, well lod and well executed, they succeeded. As a consequence, the survivors of the landing eventually reached tho battalion's objoctivo where, without dolay, units alnost auto matically became reorganized and either shifted position to that soctor originally intended for then or nade an exchange of responsibilities with the consont of the Battalion Commander.
SYBTKK OF TRAI KIHG
~f-

lined in tho Fort Bennlnr Conference Courses. ?TP?-4 and 4-1 to 4-13, inclusive, but vith additional streas on Squad and Platoon Tactics and on Technique of Fire with the various infantry wea pons. Ho modifications In these courses were necessary except to adjust the exercises to suit Marine Corps organization and to set time and space factors to conditions as they exist in the Jungle. The total time devoted to the various subjects averaged 200;^ of that prescribed in tho Conference Courses for Individual Conduct and Squad and Platoon Trxtics and 125f> for other phases. The standards of excellence required in tactical training "ere thoso prescribed in the Fort Bcnrlnr Tactical Train inp Inspection Directives. D-l to D-4, inclusive. Two rules for leaders which were repeatedly stressed in training and which were considered most important were: "Every man must become qualified for the next higher rank before this regiment is trained for combat", and

Tho system of combat training followed by this regiment in preparation for the operation followed the regular courses out

-3

10$

"Tell your nen everything you know about the situation and the mission and everything that is going to be done about it."
Amphibious Training, following closely the Fleet Training Doctrines, included two series of landing exercises, one on UPOLTT in April, 1943, preceded by a 36-hour course for officers and twenty-four hours of special instruction for the men, and one in SPATE in October, 1943.

DESCRIPTION OF

EHBg

DEFEIISES.

The defenses of Cape Torokina consisted of twenty-five bun kors disposed in depth and mutually supporting, llinc Bunkers faced the west side of Cpe Torokina and covered the west beach. Six bunkers faced on and covered the east boach. Eight bunkers, fron fifty to one hundred yards in rear of the nine facing the west, covered the intervals between the bunkers facing the beach. Two additional bunkers covered the approaches to the rear of the inland bunkers and those on the east beach. E*h bunker was surrounded by a series of rifle pits con nected by narrow, deep, slit trenches which led, finally into the rear door of the bunker. The purpose of the rifle pits was to cover, not only the approaches to the particular bunker they surrounded, but also the approaches to adjacent bunkers. Machine guns within the bunkers were sited to fire diagonally along the beach or across tne front of lines of ppobable approach, cross firiny with guns of adjacent bunkers. Generally, two guns were placed in a bunker and each gun laid on' a Fixed-Line I n no case were pairs of guns employed on the sane line. The fire bays of the bunkers were close to the ground and extremely sqall, liniting the use of the machine guns to Fixed-Lines only. From twelve to twonty-two Japanese soldiers were stationed in or around each bunker facing the west to resist the landing.

The bunhei'S wore con true ted of Ironwood and Coconut logs, from 13 inches to 24 mci: os in diameter, fastened together with the standard staple designed by the Japanese for the pur pose The log frame, an la?t;e as fourteen feet square and seven feet interior height, was then covered with a dome of sand sufficiently hiph u.e.t three to five feet of sand covered the roof at the eaves. Uithin the interiors of some bunkers baffle walls were constructed of sund'c^-_;c to neutralize the efi'cct of explosives wiiich night be fired or thrown into the bunker.

\u26 6

o*\

IoS

Front View Of A Typcal Bunker

a

On

Cape

ToROKIHA

BUHKER DE.^CHES
RiPie ph C

6EHERAU Plan P

lO^>

For car.ouf la&c, er.pll pains end clur.pe of Barnuda {.rcss vero set Into tho sr.nd covering the bunhers p.r-.d the natural un derbrush wh'ch covered Cane Toroklra left standing. At first inspection, it Boenod that the Japanese had seilousl;- erred In not removing this underbrush. I other words, It v/culd appear n that '.he underbrush vould restrict the field of fire of the Hoveve:*, once one to k a position In a bun':er or a defenders rifle nit, it could bo 6oen that che ener.r had r.;ost cleverly pre pared a field of fire by stripping the bushee of their branchee fron eight to twelve Inches above the ground, thus making it possible for the defender to observe the feet of an encroaching at'eccker. Because of the high bushos, the supporting bunkers could net be seen fron the beach and their nrcsonce vas detected only by their fire when the attackers broke through the beach defense line and attempted to oa6s Into the rear area.
r

The key to the defense of the west beach was an onplrccd Sevonty-fivo Mllllnotor Regimental l.our.taln Gun, I.EIJI-33 (19C), hnvinc n weight of 1200 pounds, noa3urir.g 13^ feet ovorr.ll and with r. 5O n barrel. This gun has p. naxlnun effective range of 210 Cyards but Its traverse Is United to six dogrces. The gun was sited within five yr.rds of high water for Anti-3oat Defense and its enplaccnent veil protected by two ncrrby tvo-nan bunkers and the usual rifle pita and slit trcnehos. Two hundred rounds of r.igh explosive shell had been stacked ready for firing within During the landing, this gun fired approximately the euplccenont fifty rounds but. duo to its Halted trnvoree and the poor gunnery of its crew, it sank or seriously danafcd only six of our landing craft.

The dof&nse force assigned to C*pc Torokina was the Second Conpnny, Keinforced, of the Japancso Twenty- third Infantry.
Fron corning reports captured fron the eneny on 5 Hovcaber, 1943,
it was dctorr.lnbd that the strength of this conw.ny on 1 I'oven ber, 1943, was two hundred and soventy.

The B^.all ems which were used In tha defense .were: Th? 6.5 Tiilllneter !'-1905; the 9 Millimeter Luger Pistol; the 6.5 I'lllineter !TAI3U! T A13U Light !>. chine Oun, K-1922; the 6.5 Milii neter "otchlciss-Bren Light Machine Gun, T"t>e 96 (193c); the .iBB Heavy Machine aun (H-1932); Heavy Gre 7.7 !illlinoter Hotch v nade Thrower, !.odel S9 (1929), firing tho :fodel S9 High L'xploeive Shell and, finally, the Grenade, hand, fragmentation, Lodel 91 (1931).

-5

id

uv

ATTACM" 0? BVITE? PCSiriO! T S

Frcr: r study of Jnnancse bunker installations on Icy: O^or:la by officers of the Third 'Irrines, I*. wns discovered that r.^ardless of any r.rran.-,enenv of bunkers for r/.utual s^poort, there is alw.ys a blind spot' In tnc defense, oarticv.lrrly if the rifloner, in the rifle pits ere clininr.ved' by gun c :i or The key to the attack of a bunker position is t .c find Lrer.rde. ing; of tals blind spot
r

3ased on t.iis idea, a technique was devised r.nd practiced by all nen in the regiment before leaving Guadalcanrl. In enoral, the 6ysten i follows: When a fire tean (of three r,r as 6 noro ner. with one of nore r.utonr.tic weapons) discovers r bun ker either fron observation or bcint, fired upon, all hands tr c cover. The leader then reconr.oiters t..e position until he lo cates the blind spot; thot is, a point near r fire bay or r door vhich apparently is not eubject to the fire of rare nine gune sited on Fixed-Lines fron the bunker under study or rdjacent bunkers. The leader then looks tc sec if the blind spot is covered by riflemen and, if so, where they are located. The leader then returns to his tean and olacos his autonatic wea pons to cover the fire ports of the bun" '.or by firing diagonally into then. He places other members of his toan in r position fror. which they can killor drive to cover the rifleccn \tho rre covering the blind soot. One or cvo P.en nr-.-.ed with sub-nrchlne guns or rutonrtic rifles and eronrdce or bonbs then take posi tion so that, at the right tine, they can charge up to tre blind spot between the lanes of their own supporting firos. On sig nal, all hands open fire and when it is observed that the blind spot hre been uncovered, the sub-nachine gunners and grenadiers nove ur> to the blind soot and apnrorch r.s close re practical to the fire bay or door and throw In several frenrdes or benbs. Innediately follox/ing the explosions, one or both of then npy with sono safety, enter the bunker and complete the destruction of the defenders by gun fire. With the neutraliza tion of one bunker, it Is generally found that Adjacent bun kers are uncovered at several polncs, r.r.kine possible f. quick reduction of the entire position by reoee.^int; the performance. There is, of course, great danger to the sub-nrchine gunn ers and grenadiers of being struck by the fire of their own nen or by ricochet tes. Therefore, it is essential that such an evolution be practiced over and over r.galn in training so that theio willbe tear; work and those that fire willknow when to cer.se or s,\ift tnelr fire to keo1 fror. endangering their con ) rades v/l:o are clccint in on the bunker. It io obvious that only food r.r .v.snen can er.f ely be assigned to fire in m attrc 1 on a : bunker position.

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Machine <;unc wer diversion inst fire frorr. the bunkor doors.

froaucntly emplo." rt tofuraleh th. ports nci to keep the defenders m-my

While ooemlriijly p daring nn<?. dangerous evolution, this method of attack vra6 found in ctuni practice to be less costly, when executed aggressively *nd the attack b:gun the moment the" b^-.kere. are detected, and before the Japanese cn dotormln. the location of the attackers, thn any other method tht cpn bo employed by riflemen, the use of Florae Throwers md. Pole Charges of Dynamite and TITT would unaueetionably facilitate the r.duction of bunkers, the method of p>.pro*ch v/ith ouch wcpons vould be elrailpr.
RelPtivcly few casualties w;rc sustrln^A by the pttckcre In the reduction of fifteen bunkers by the methods described above; 153 J*pncse dod woro found in and round these

P^rticul^r bunkers.
?he totl time renulred for the reduotlon if theso fifteen bunkers, plus five on the o*Bt bec): which \^ere but lightly de fended, *?e two hours nd thirty minutes. The five reminlng bunkers were destroyed by AJ> Shot fired t the clofie ring of fifteen yn.rde from tvo 75mm Self-Pro polled Tnk Dcetroyere. This *tt"ck pnoraily co"1lapsed the bunker
pnd crushed,

the defenders.

bardment which preceded tho bunkers. Tin defuse

It is questionable tht the Nvl Oun Fire and Aerial Bom the landing had ny material effect on

or

th^ sector

With the destruction of the dofense force on Cpc the problem of defending the socotr presented no unusual opects. Tae bttllon procedod to its initial objective, dvncinjc approximately six hundred y*rde from the bech, nd hvlng es tablished a defensive line sent out patrols for the purpose of establishing contact with friendly troops to the west nd to discover avenues of approach that rair*ht b: avnllnbl* to th^ wncmy md such natural barriers as might exist.

In setting up the defonse, the necessity of 11 officers, whether infantry or artillery, being familiar with the Sfndin f Opertlnb Froceduree which re set forth In the Field l!nuls on Ac the Tctlcs nd Technique of Infantry ws well illustrated. > the first dy came to *n end, nd, subsc-'ucntly on the fo"!Tovinp days, gr.t numbers of unrclted unit wore sent Into the Cpc

109

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Toro^ina Sector for the purpose of setting up anti-aircraft and sea-coret defenses and to begin certain engineering projects. With these diverse nrne and servioes concentrated within a snail area, it was esr-entlal for the safety of all that the unit con nanders understand the principles on which the infantry conrr.an der was basing his defense. Such an understanding apparently did exist In this case, and the infantry connander had little difficulty in coining the Intelligent and efficient cooperation of all unics in preparing and coordinating the local defenses.

It Is noteworthy that in tr.e djfenso, each unit, yen the established itself in a perlneter defense. That le,r.n all-around security for the night. This principle was observ ed by the entire regiment throughout the campaign, and, on more than one occasion, was Justified by the results In repulsing Japanese attenpts to raid our positions. C r the first night, the necessity of oalntainlng this close security, even in the battalion connand post, was proved to all nost forcibly when it became necessary for the battalion conroander, his executive
officer and tho battalion surgeon to repulse, with knives, the
threat of a Japanese roconnal seance patrol which had success fully passed through our linos and killed one cocnunicator and
wounded another before anyone becane aware of their presence.
squad,

In a pcrluoter dofenee, it was custonary for three r.en to occupy one foxhole so that during the usual twelve hours of dark ness, each would stand a four hour watch and still have eight
hours of rest. On setting up the perimeter, it was always re quired that autonatlc weapons, including autonatic riflos, be
cited on fixed lines and coordinated with adjacent units.

However, it was also a standing rule that weapons never be fired at night, exceot to repulse a major night attack. The reginent had long been advieed, for the sake of safety to thenselves and their coarades, and to prevent revealing their posi tions and the location of their autonatlc weapons, to resort only to the knife or bayonet in taking care of snail infiltrat ing parties which eight pace close to their foxholes; others were to be left unnolested and allowed to pass, on the oresump tion that they would be taken care of by the others within the perlneter or the following nornin* by gun fire if the party re mained within our lines. During the canpalgn, there was very little night firing and only on one or two occasions were the positions of autonatlc weapons rover.led by lnproper firing.

110

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111


-oia-iui'iCATiou

or

defense

One feature of night defense which \*as considered ex tremely important, and which not only on the first but pra tically every night during the campaign more than Justified the trouble of setting it up. was the system of communications es tablished within the battalion during the night hours by pooling the communication resources of the Battalion Communication Platoon and the SlMmlllmeter Mortar Platoon. Thus, it was possible to have a telephone in the command post of each platoon in the perimeter as well- as at each company command post. The. platoon telephones were hooked up only to the company command potts in the company command posts to the battalion. All phones were on an open circut and connected so that any word passed on the phone was heard by all. In the case of front line battalions, there i was'oontafe6uei..open line to the regiment. It was required that every telephone be manned continuously frost dark to daylight. The continuous" open air circuts obviated the necessity of ringing the tele phone in order to call a particular party* this was extremely' important in view of the faot that company command posts were, of necessity, practically in the fron lines and battalion command posts seldom as much as one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the forward companies. Furthermore, by this system,

whenever something occurred during the night, all leaders within the battalion instantly became acquainted with the situation. It waa customary for each telephone to check in to the next higher echelon at irregular but prearranged times, with nick names used for identification* Whenever it was necessary to pass information, a sort of double-talk was used whioh, though readily understood by our officer and men, was certain to be confusing to the Japanese. Although it was definitely established that the enemy tapped our lines on several occasions, it is unlikely that they received any rewards for t.eir efforts.

In connection with communications, although it was cus tomary to stand continuous radio wr tones at night, it was a standing rule not to start the generators except in case of dire neoosslty. An occasion for night radio transmission from a for ward command post never arose, inasmuch as satisfactory tele phonic communication was almost continuous throughout the campaign.

112

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ARTILLERY
Shortly after she inltal landing on Cooq Torokina, It came evident that the battery of artillery attached to the be First Battalion would have little employment if it remained in that particular area. It was therefore displaced to the left flank of the regimental seotor. However, the artillery forward observers assigned to the First Battalion remained with the First Battalion and were suooassful in adjusting the fire of another battery in front of the First Battalion's defensive posi tion early on the first night. This was the first of many examp les to follow of the efficiency of the present system of artillery fire direction.

It is worthy of note that, in training, all officers in tiie regiment attended a series of lectures on Infantry- Artillery aotion, and several Artillery-Infanfcry firing problems were con ' ducted by the third battalion, Twelfth Marines and the third Guadalcanal, As a result of this training, Marines in TSatioa and in the absonce of artillery forward observers or to supplement their work, rifle company commanders of ton successfylly adjustfcd the fire of the artillery.
It is further noteworthy that, Although it had been in practicable for the Artillery to establish a Fire Control 'Circut between the Fire Direction Center and the First Battalion, Third Marines, Forward Observers by the night of the first day, no difficulty was encountered in registering and controlling the Artillery. The Third Marines' has established a Command Circut

from the Regiment to the First Battllon'on Cape TorAkina and had received a line from the Third Battalion, 12th Marines, who had a battery in a position on the left flank from which it could fire The several ifLisEorLLtho *iret Battalion. MarinesMarines,sufficiently ac Swittanboard Operators of the Third were quainted with the communications requirements of the Artillery that there was no delay in making a line available from the Artillery Forward Observer to even the gun battery whose fire he was directing. Whenever an outside party attempted to cut in on a circut, it was interesting to overhear one or another of the switchboard operators speak up quickly and say, "Stay off this line, it is reserved for a fire mission, This close coopera tftion between Infantry and Artillery communications, as evidenced by their reactions in emergencies of this type, was of inestimable value thoughout the campaign.

*****

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13


XJT STICB OF ?!

defehde:

stand. The squad barracks, built of bamboo and palm fronds after the Fiji Island! fashion, were found to be well policed and their equipment neatly laid out in a uniform danhbrj The officer's quarters were especially well constructed, and the doctor's orfloe was completely stooked with a first olrsa assort ment of medications and surgical equipment* The Japanese had oleared a email parade gfound within the coconut grove and had mounted a numbe* of dummies for bayonet drill* Two large ware houses had been constructed and one stooked with foods of high quality, including smoke* salmon and canned tangerines, the other with munitions* That the atony was exceptionally indus trious was indicated by the exoellont work he had accomplished in constructing his dc/ eases in the short time the organization had been assigned to the sector* It appeared that the soldiers were highly literate for the effects of the Japanese all con tained "large stacks of letters, books and pamphlets* The majority had Japanese-English books which appeared to be well used* Each non- commissioned /offleer and commissioned officer had a large copy book filled with sketches of the Impress Augusta Bay Area and various solutions to tactical problems* Other documents revealed that the officers and non-eommiseloned off JU oera were required to use these copybooks as part of a formal course in taotios* However, a complete lack of consciousness regarding Combat Counter-intelligence was lndioated lnasmuoh as complete sets of Situation Maps and Operation Orders, not only of Cape Torokina and Puruata and Torokina Islands but of the entire Empress Augusta Bay Area, were found on the bodies of several officers and non-commissioned officers* The Japaoeae were extremely gas consolous; they carried their gas masks to their batt 4a "stations and, when during the attack of one of the bunkers, a smoke grenade was inadvertently thrown into the bunker, the defenders lmmerged Immediately on the run and wearing their gas masks* The moral of the Japanese w?s unques tionably high in view of the fact that, in spite of the over whelming

The Japanese soldiers who defended Cape Torokina appeared to be first-class troops. Approximately one-half of them wero big mature men and apparently had been in the service a long time* The remainder represented the usual oonceptlon of the small size Japanese* They were found to be dressed in spotless ly clean, and well pressed uniforms and wearing their rank marks and sorvloe ribbons. Inasmuch as' the enemy was aware of our impending attack for at leaat one hour and forty-five minutes before the landing occurod, it is not likely that they dressed in their best uniforms for the occasion of making their

11+

114

force they could see approaching from the sea, not less than num 202 of them remained at their posts to the end; this is the ber of dead found on the field after the action had come to a
close.

CASUALTIES IN LAUDING OPERATIONS The casualties sustained by the landing force were extremely low considering the density and the organization of the As a pure school problem, it would not Cape Toroklna defenses. to Judge that the defense could not be have been unreasonable overcome by a force the size of the one sent against it. This lot; casualty rate is due to two factors:
First, errors of ommlssion or poor technique by the Japanese and, secondly, acts.
of special preparation by the landing foroe. While each point
in itself might seem insignificant, each may have saved a life on the side of the landing force and cost a life on the side of Therefore, each is important and, collectively, the defenders. they make up the difference between the outstanding success of the landing force in an operation which, theoretically, Bhould have been repulsed or resisted with great loss of life to the attacker.
Among the deficiencies in the Japanese defense was poor Anti-Boat Gunnery. The 75 mm field gun, the key to the beach defense, was emplaced in such a position that in spite of the fact that the gun could be traversed but six degrees, three decraft crees' on either side of center, practically every landing the line approaching the beach was forced to pass across or along of fire of this gun. Although the lateral angular speed of the targets was slow and the velocity of the gun high, in fifty rounds fired, only six landing craft were seriously damaged or sunk and the' casualties inflicted on the landing force so few as to have no effect on the outcome of the landing. There is no doubt, howover, that the field gun we the direct cause of the diversion of boats from their proper landing points with the resulting dieorganization of units on landing. The Japaneeo. probably be cause of lack of available oauipment, used single gune instead of double guns on fixed-lines from key positions in the beach defense, thereby resulting in intermittent breaks in the defense fires, permitting the attackers to pass through into the roar areas. This, of course, was the beginning of the end for the system of defense. It was bad psychology for the Japanese to construct their slit trenches connecting the foxholes covering approaches to the bunkers, so that they led into the bunker:
t

115

15


When the pressure

became

"bunker-minded", abandoned their rifle pits and took reHad they not had fuge in the bunker where they vere
trapped. the opportunity so open to them to take cover in the bunkers,
but had been forced by necessity to remain in their rifle pits,
even then the result of the assault might have been in their

favor.

got bad, too many of the Japanese

soldiers

Among tho preparations and acts of commission of the land ing force that contributed to the low casualty rate of tho attackers were the following: during the approach of the boats to the bpach, and while in line of the fire of the field gun, tho boats were kept in lino and on such course that they were not enfiladed at any time. Thirty-throe percent more boats were used in tho landing of each wave than had been customary in the Transport Division from which the troops wore landing. This threw a greater number of troops on the beach over a far wider front than otherwise would havo occurred.* Debarkation of boat teams was extremely rapid: on two occasions t/hen the ramps stuck and wore slow to fall, the troops went over tho side at almost Boat Teams were ob tho instant the boats touched the beach. served to deploy with oxtreme rapidity and, crouching low vith weapons held at tho ready, to rush across tho beach through the Deaoh defense fires and into the brush without a moments hesita tion, iunong the preparations which probably contributed in hold ing down casualties, once the troops entered the bush, was the uso of camouflage uniforms and equipment and groen vegetable stain on the face and hands. In preparation for Jungle opera tions, this regiment, in the absence of an adequate number of regular oamouflagc uniforms, or in some cases in preference to them, had painted utility uniforms with camouflaging patterns of light green and yellow paints. Similar patterns \/erc applied to all items of equipment including leggings, cartridge belts, packs, and burlap helmet covers topped off with 'netting. In the absence of theatrloal grease paint, green, sand, and black, which is considered more desirable because of its durability, the' men were provided with a vegetable povder vhlch, vhon mixed vith water, stained the skin light green. Having had consider able practice in Individual concealment, the troops were able to In connec conceal themetlves in the brush to an amazing degree. it tion with camouflage or painted-up uniforms in the Jungle, all was subsequently agreed that after a few days in the swamp uniforms finally acquired the same appearance, but that if in the first stages of the operation they saved even one life, they were vorth the trouble of providing them. As to helmet covers and nets, there is no particular agreement as to their desir ability or necessity considering the most recent type of finish.

116

(o

For one thing, it is customary among the men in the field to use their helmets as wash basins and stew pots* Thoreforo, the hel met covers and nets soon become lost. However, on the initial landing, the burlap helmet covers and nets provided a noto of uniformity whioh was important in the identification of friendly troops. Although some Japaneso woro nets, none were similar to ours and none wore covers over tho brown metal. This mark of identity might well bo worthy of preservation in the ecrly stages of an operation inasmuch as a notebook of a Japanese offieor la ter killed w&s found to contain a notation to warn his men that the uniforms of the AmerioAns were exactly similar to thoir own Jungio uniforms and might causo trouble for them. In individual contaot&, the marksmanship of the Marines was far superior *nd the Amorloan a far moro aggroetive. Marines had better flro dle oipline than tho Japaneso and, in spite of the laok of visibility, in the bush ana te milling around of groat numb ore of men during tho attack, it did not appear that any of our men were killed by gunshot from cur own weapons. It was further noted that our men oxhibltod aoxo patl o than the Japanese during the fighting on one Cape Torokina and tho subsoquont dofoneo of tho sector.
k

These factors then, together with sound planning and su perior leadership, individual oonduot and 'tactical training of th* attackers, aocount ot a considerable extent for the rclativo ly lev o&sualty r*to in the Cape Torokina landing.

+*

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THE BATTLE OF THE KOROMOKINA 7-9 NOVEMBER. 1943 The outstanding features of this battle concerned matters of a technical nature which wore broufjht out forcibly durlng_an attack by what, at tho time tho First Battalion, Third Marines moved against tho enemy, probably was a numerically inferior force in a frontal attack on an ontrenched position. KARKMANSHIP The number of Japanoso who toado tho stand against tho attack of the First Battalion, Third Marines is uncertain. How ever, from the number of foxholes later found in the defended areas, and from accounts of offlcors participating in the action, it is likely that tho enemy numbcrod about 29, of which about l&O, at 1500 on ? November, yore in foxholes and tho remainder in an assembly Aroa as a counter-attack force. Tho total num ber of riflemen in tho assault probably did not exceed 180. Tho Japanese positions wore organized as squad strong points, with one man to a foxhole and each group closely support ing adjacont groups. The Japanese wore armed with an unusually large proportion of automatic weapons, there being one t-UIiBU, 6.5 millimeter, or one HOTCHKIBS-BREN Light hachlne Gun for caoh group of four men. In general, the NAMBU3 wore fired from em placements on the ground and_ffih covored by a HQTCHKISB-BREN Light Machine Gun mounted in a tree in roar of, or slightly to one side of the NiihU. In addition, there wcro a great number of flcavy Grenade Throwers, M-89, each proteotcd by a cordon of rifle pits. Tho foxho-cs of the Japanese, dug in sandy but firm soil, vrere mostclevcrly constructed to give a maximum of protection Subsequently, it was found that it was and concealment. irapossiblr to detect tho location of a single one of these fox holes fr-"n a distance of ovon ton yards by moans of the unaided
eye.

tv-rouh dense, tangle

Tho

our lines to tho Japanese positions was tropical Jungle with thp intervals between trees of vines and bushes. It Tould bo unreasonable.

approach from

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to Buppoeo that an advanco through such a thicket could bo else but noisy, giving plenty of warning to the Japanese of the speod For the attacker, and direction of advance of the attackers. nocesaity of holding hit fire, beoauso of the uncertainty of the the exact location of the enemy's position and th irregularity of formations due to tho vegetation, forced our men to advance completely at the meroy of the enemy until they could hunt him out and fight him at close range. At tho moment our advanoe began, it vas, of course, ob served by those light machine gunners who had taken station in the trees. At onoe, and until they closed with the enemy, our men were subjected to a terrlfio firo from machine guns and rifles, fired at a rapid and continuous rate* With all these advantages of cover, concealment, positions, automatic weapons and probably numerical superiority, the Japanese lnflicated an unbelievably low number of casualties* The marksmanship of the Japanese was so atroolous as to be Inconceivable, considering tho exoellent tactical training and courageous leadership oxIt is certain that no Marine say a hibited by these Japanese* Japanese soldier until he yes within ten yards or less of him, with the Japanese having heard hi* approach, seen him first and fired his weapon before the Marine even booaae aware of his presenoe* However, whereas with but few exception* the Japanese missed, the Marines seldom did* After the battle, it vas found that not lees than 135 Japanese in the forward areas were dead from gunshot wounds of the head, neck and upper chest.
fallacy of the theory that dispersion of a high volume of fire will tnke oare of battle field hits or of the truth of the state ment Miat superiority of hits per minute, regardless of number* engaged, may win a battle.

'.
V

iV
1

\
X
s

1.

Perhaps never before had been demonstrated

so forcibly the

Tl:e superior marksmanship of the Marines who withheld their firo to keep from endangering their comrades until they were certain of a target at which they could fire a deliberate and precisely placed shot, stopped the advanco of the enemy against the Division's left flank.

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'x'ECT OF
SI

ARMS TIRE I!

JUkOLE

It had been brought out In teste In Samoa end Guadalcanal, In firing through thick Jungles or the Saw Grass which covers open fields in the Solomons, tlmt the probable mr.xiraun range vUlch could be obtained with the oartridge, ball, calibre .30. from 200 to 250 yards. pi Coconut and Iron Wood Trees up to oO or more incnos in diameter offer no protection whatever ' froia this cartridge but would protoct against cartridges of the type of the cartridge, carbine, calibre .30, M-l. and cartridge, ball, calibre .45, h-1911. The buttresses of Iron Wood Trees offer no protection frora the rifle or the car tt.no cartridge but sofeeti&cs dofoated the pistol cartridge at 35 to 40 yards. While two thicknesses of sand bags would defeat the rifle cart ridge, rifle bullets were often observed to pass through four consecutive cooonut trees in a grove. OBSERVATION O:
U

The only practical means of observing and adjusting fire is by tracer* Th]e danger of revealing positions by the use of tracers was well recognized, but, considering the extremely short range at which the fire fight must, of nocossity, begin, it was agreed that the rapid movement which would follow the opening of the attack on an enemy position would prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the revelation of our gun positions. Even in a purely defensive situation, the nodorqto use of tracers to insure hits scorns more than. Justified, in view of .the fact that any putomatio woapQn can beat be located in the Jungle by fallow ing the sound of its firing*
ICKIiIQUE OF

The characteristic* of snail aras fire in Jungle' described above, wore carefully considered in plane for the Application of Tiro in Jungle fighting. With the rifle ana automatic rifle, the distribution of fires was exeouted .as would be normal in open terrain. Fire Orders, however, were issued by the leaders before ' the troops moved into the line, and no attempt was made to give a fire order when contact was made other than the order "Commence firing". Extensive training in Technique of Fire insured in telligent application, distribution and control by what amounted to Standing Operating Procedures. Fire .Discipline, throughout the campaign, was excellent.

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With the machine gun. In tho oonduot of firo preparations. r d botter t0 aB in a sector to each gun through which it would 2 traverse on a given elevation, which would overlap those of one or more guns on either hand than it would be to fire guns by seotion or platoon on fixed lines or other technique, inasmuoh as seotions or platoons might then fire "to gether into an impenetrable thicket, perhaps only a few yards in front of the guns. Seemingly suoh a situation should be avoided by reoonnaissanoe preliminary to sltta** the guns for the delivery of a fir preparation. However, because of the range limitations of the Jungle and tho faot that the fire preparations were often to be fired on targets no more distant than fifty yards, the furthest advance of those wao planned the firs might be limited to the line tvom which the guns were fired.

4?!iII ?2

Sector

In this battle, and subsequent operation* in the Jungle, there was no opportunity for tho use of machine guns in dis tant support or to deliver fire by overhead or indirect Hovevor, the clinometer and ooapaps wore neoessltlos in methods* laying guns for fire preparations or on fixed lines on defense. Xt was always necessary to plaoe direct support smehino guns directly in the front lines. Break through guns oould not bo sited, be cause of the Jungle, to over Intervals between front line guns but were concerned primarily in the defense of oosnaod posts and supply routes. However, it is oonsidored vitallySeoeVsary that machine gun platoons be trained and ready to fite overhead rjad Indirect fires in hilly oountry even though itbe covered with
Jungle*

Bight endanger

and maintaining the fire until suoh time as rloochetting bullets

An interesting application of the heavy machine gun in support of a Jungle attack was the custom of raising the fire of tiw guas to the tree tope fifty to one hundred yards to the front at the moment <* the paaeage of our lines by the attacking troops

our men. This practice resulted in many casualties to tho enemy who ouetoaarlly took stations In trees in the attempt to overlook our position** Light maohine guns, of course, because of limitations of their elevating mechanisms, are unable to dellvor suoh fires.

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The Jungle presents no obstacles to the use of the 60 and 81 mm Mortars that cannot be successfully and quickly over come* ftortar leaders, from squad to plctoon, must, or coureo, exhibit unusual initiative, ingenuity and skill and mortar crews trained to the peak of perfection. Equipment and demolitions for topping trees or othervise clearing fields of fire nuet bo available to the mortar squads, but the best nortarmen will,by vigorous roconnaissance, frequently locate clearings from which one of more mortars may oe fired, particularly if the highest rather than lowest number of Increments is usod, in far less tine than would be required in clearing a field of fire. Not infrequently, when mortar fires were urgently required, a test for arak clearance was made lay firing a shell from which the af ct; pin -had not been removed: If the shell wont clear, the concentration was delivered without more ado.

DJU3?!I^NT OF 1
In Jungle fighting, communications must be provided for the 60 cur Mortar sections at well as for the 81 mm Mortars: the observers for these weapons must take station in the Front Lines or evon in front of them as do the Artillery Forward Observers, and it is seldom that any control oan bo exercised except by phone. Radios are not practical at tho b*slo means of fire con trol ?omiaunioations. It was customary to draw on the communica tion facilities of the Battalions for Sound Powered Telephones for tiie 60 raw ho rtar a. There should be an allowance of two . bound Covered Telephones for each 60 mm Kortar plus: one addition al for the section leader so that these extremely valuable wea pons In Jungle fighting may be used in any desired combinrtion or distribution.
\u25a0H was soldom that the mortars could be adjusted 'oy vlsurJ. observation. as a rule, they were adjusted entirely by pound. could
b.)

90

a- i.lf.-i"i wnen the flash of the exploding shell coulct fronven^iy b? tee.: On nore than one occasion during the day time, confus ion vaa erected by simultaneous firing of artillery and mortars becauso of the similarity in sound of the exploding shells. However, this difficulty was readily overcome since the Artillery Forward Observers and the Mortar Observers were usually .close together and could agree between themselves as to who would shoot now and who would shoot later.

As wltb artillery, the most precise adjustments

made

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ab a general rule, exept In hilly country or swamps, there was little advantage to bo gained by the Observers climbing trees in r.n attempt to get a clearer field of vision. However, Mortar Observers had provided themselves with Tree-Climbers and they were of value on several occasions in locating targets or

clearings.

Although the Jungle restricted observation of artillery and mortar fires, it had advantages in that, because of the densenose of the vegetation, artillery and mortar concentrations could be brought much oloser to our own linos than voukd bo practicable under other conditions. On this and many future occasions, 60 mm Mortars were adjusted with complete safety to our troops to within 25 to 36 yards of our positions: 75 ram Pack Howitzers and 81 mm Hortars to within 60 to 75 yards, and, 105 mm Howitzers to within 150 yards. This close adjustment wn6 considered the answer to the report that the Japanese fre quently moved forward tox/ards our lines when normal barrages Were firod.

EFFECT OP HORTAR3 AMP Affi; In this battle, the fire of the 60 mo Mortnrr vrs extremely aocurate and highly effeotiva against exposed personnel. The 105 inu Howitzer shell was particularly destructive, and over 100 Japanese were torn apart by its explosion or killed in their fox uoies uy the blast during a 15 minute concentration covering three squares by three batteries. The effect of the 81 mm light and medium shells and the 76 mv Howitser shell was entirely satis factory in this action and produced the results which has been expected as a result of Jungle firing tests during training. 37 miv Cannister wr.s of value in this riction and accounted for a number of the enemy. Several Japanese were killed *rhen knocked out of Iron Wood Trees by the explosion of 37 mv liigh Expletive 3hell fired into likdly parts of the tree trunks. As an indication of the dens eness of the Jungle, it le pointed out thfit i'mi-Trnk Guns could, on this oocaslon, with eo'npprative erfety, be rolled up to a point no more distant than 50 yards fiTifn the cn^my nnd prepared for firing In support of an infantry assault

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IDENTIFICATION OF LANDING CRAFT

Training in the identification of landing craft is an essential subject for personnel of a Regimental Weapons Company. The initial landing of tho Japanese was effected without opposition, alt -joughunder the" guns of an Antl-Tank Platoon sited in beach defensd, because the Officer in Charge failficl to r<. cognize the boats as being Japanese In the Regimental Weanons Company of the Third Marines, nearly as much time as was devoted to Anti-3oat Gunnery and Boat Identification was {jiven to Anti-Tank Gunnery and Tank Identification because it had been anticipated that one of the primary assignments of the Anti-Tank Platoons in an amphibious oporation would be In beach defense. This type of training is also of extreme valftc to light anti-aircraft gun batteries which frequently are sited on the beach and should form a part of the Anti-Boat Defense.

tfl> LIAISON The system of pttaehing an Air ufficer with a Communica tion Team to an Infantry Regiment, to make recommendations and arrange for the employment of Aviation in support of infantry was demonstrated during this battle" as being highly effective. The jungle is no obstacle to the employment of Bomber Aviation particularly when our own lines, or targets discovered by ground reconnaissance, can be marked by smoke pots or smoke shells, Air-Ground communication *n the Jungle depends on radio alone, inasmuch at there is never adequate clearings for the use of Air-Ground Panels, nor can pyrotechnics always be successfully employed because they may be obscured by tho high trees.
TaITKS

The Jungle is no insurmountable obstacle to tanks. The use of them, of course, is somewhat restricted by the vegetation which materially reduces their speed and manuverbility, but there are many important missions that may be assigned to them in support of an infantry attaok through the Jungle. Among these is the task assigned in the Battle of the Koromokina of running down and crushing machine gun positions. Because tanks are stone blind in the Jungle, and their gunfire generally masked by friendly troops, it is essential that the infantry escort for the tanks in Jungle fighting remain close to and surrounding them ever instant. This is difficult and, aside from the great courage and stamina demanded of their er-corts in keeping to

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powers and limitations.

their posts, It cannot be successfully accomplished until Tank-Infantry teams have practiced together in several Junil: eater cises and have bcobmo thoroughly acquainted with e~ch others
'

HIC-HT OPERATIONS Alth'ou h the Third Marines had devoted over 100 hours in tr/ining to practical exercises in Nlpht R&ide, Night Approaches, Nl.^iit Reliefs and Night Attacks, the only opportunity during the 3ougainvlllc Campaign for ni^ht operations was presented on the ni^ht of 7-8 November, 1943 on the Koromr.klna. On this occasion, two separate platoons were able, as a result of their training, effectively to raid the enemy's rear area and not only inflict c serious number of easualtles, but uoset the enemy's scheme of def en80 If only to make possible the results of these two ntr_:ht raids, the long hours of practice and crroful supervision neces sary to make the regiment proficient in fcipht operations, would have been more than Justified. As a matter of Interest, it was found that a piece o:' ccuip ment almost as essential to the success of night operations ns the oofipaes wac a tun foot pl'coe of one-quartvr inoVropc.-iaarrlcd by each officer and man for use as a guide line which, when not in use, was called and attached to the pack.
CTSRTSTIOS OF THE ENEMY AT THE KOROMAKINA

Aside from the serious deficiency in weapons training which has been previonsly discussed, the Japanese troops who attacked our left flank, appeared to be well led and well trained in tac tlce. They were extremely aggressive and determined and aroudcci admiration for the speed with which they moved from their landing points to the scene of action, carrying their heavy packs and wea-oons.
their

The rapidity and skill with which the Japanese constructed foxhole was interesting. Almost without exception the top diameter of the foxholes was no larger than thft necessary for the man to get into the hole and the spoil so cleverly distributed that it was most difficult to detect the hole from even a few yards distance. The bottoms of tho holes were belled out ot under cut so that the occupant couli lie down to sleep or rest. In some cases the foxholes were cut back under trees so that the occupants body was actually under the tree trunk
itself.

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Anong the ltcne of equipment carried by the Japanese into action voro a nunber of expensively rarde periscopes and battery coniv.ar.de r181 8 telcscopoa tc bo used for the purpose of observing fron foxhole* without oxpofllr.fl tho hoftd. Opera: ion Orders

"he foolish error cf offloors carrying Situation !.aoe r.nd wag repented by the Japanese in this tattle. Within fifteen minutes after the advance of the eighth of I'ovcm ocr iir.ii begun, our IjotelUgencc had cone into possession of the scheme of r.:ancuvor, not only of the Koromofclna action but of the operations planned against our entire beach head, Snail groups of Jr. nano a e were extremely active during
the nit'.hto of the 7th and Bth, and sono succeeded in passing
re far as'llOO yF.rds behind our lines. In one case, a Japanese \'rb successful In killing two sentries within twer.ty f\va feet of the Division Hospital for the purpose of etriopir.* ;.ie..i in the effort to identify American units in the area.

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i-.OVEhEHT TO The) NORTHERN SECTOR 9-18 NOVEMBER The outstanding features of this phase were concerned with the problems of supply through swamp and Jungle. The Third Battalion led off on this ooveoent soon after the initial landing and began breaking trail in a trek to the north and east, gener ally following the line of the Division Eeach Head. The Third Battalion was subsequently followed by the First and Second Eattallons until the movement finally terminated in the Battle of the Plva Forks. Although the novement of the Regiment as such included only the dates from 9 to 16 November, 1943, the Second and Third Battalions actually spent 17 consecutive days travers ing the swamp. SUPPLY The difficulty of supply of the battalions through the swamp cannot be adequately described by words: Suffice it to say that day after day the men moved through water and slimy mud often waist deep, sometimes to the arms pits and seldom below the knees, their advance barred by a tangle of thorny vines that inflicted painful wound 8 when draod across the skin; nt night, machine guns were lashed to the trunks of trees and men slept sitting up in the "flter. In the sultry heat and stinking nuck of this Jungle swamp, fin advance of 300 yards in a day was no mean feat and wouldteet the strength of the most powerful acn. Of course, any thought of food or dry clothing was out of the question. Had it not been for the amphibian tractors, it is certain that the maneuver, as planned, could not have been successfully cr.rricd out. As it was, the amphibians were available in barely 6ufficxcnt number to keep the men supplied with emergency ra tions and anuuntion. The work of the Amphibian Tractor Companies and the skill ful devotion to duty of their personnel is one of the outstand ing highlights of the Bougainville Campaign. Breaking trail through this terrible swamp and keeping the troops supplied dur ing, their approach to the northern sector made possible a con tinuous and steady advance of the regiment at such a rate that the

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refluent was able

to locate and ci^a^e the eneny In r. aaln ac tion before the Jnpanwee "ere able to complete fortifications thej plftui.ed to include in their defenses.

During the advance through the s^amp, each battalion es tablished a base of operations on the beach to the regi ment allocated and delivered supplies. A proportionate nunber of amphibians was assigned to each base and the Battalion Supoly Sections completed delivery of the supplies to the troops. As the battalions advanced. Forward Distribution Points t.,ore established on islands in the o*-amp and an attempt t.as nadc to build up a supply level at erch Distribution Folnt of three days rations and Wo unit's of fire. The supplies in the Forward Distribution Points .rere successfully leap-frogged forward from time to time.
cohku^iCATioaa

Telephonic communications between the battalions and the ueginent '.ere kept continuous throughout the advance and because of the heavy rains and continual dampness *ero relied upon as the principle source of couunicntion. In addition, telegraph lines accompanied the Advance and t.erc oxtromcly valuable on several occasions.

BAGGAGE
The clothing of the troops *as brought ashore as Baggage in the Knapsack and an attached Horseshoe Roll. The Knapsack and horseshoe Roll ere stacked "at the Battalion Dunns near the ocr.ch. In the landing, the non *ore the Marching Fack contain ing a standard liet of items considered necessary to unlntr.ln the nan's health and oouf6rt In. opubat "Xor.petoiode of th^eo to five day 8.

ite&s: Poncho; pair of socks: suit of u*ider..ear; toilet arti cles, Including so ap and stall toel; Atabrine Tablets-; Sulpha Fcders and Tablets; Aspirin; Salt Tablets; lodine for cute and bottle \u0084ater purification; Vitaain Pills-; ..ekpon cleaning eear: ; of insect repellant (head net ..as carried in the helmet) ; toilet paper; spoon; HBat Tabs and Tripod; extra shoelaces and
and, six meals, preferably foJlr WK" ration meals broken"do..n and t..0 HD"- ration meals. It ..as invariably found that ..hen men attempted, to carry more than these items,, such as a shirt
r

Tne contents

of the Marching Pack Included the follo..ing

letting laces; **atcr proof container for matches or, lighter fluid and extra lighter. flint for mechanical lighter; tobacco,

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or a blanket or a aheltor half, they sooner or later discarded them. The basic Items listed above were kept to the end. To each pack was attached the ten-foot ptoco of rope previously mentioned; each Dan carried a knife, preferably of the broad bladgd Marble Hunting type, and an entrenching tool. Many carried long ma che t tee and carried light work gloves to protect the hands from thorns and insocts.
Due to the"dlfflcultlee of transportation and the scarcity of equipment, few of the knapsacks and rolls could be delivered to the men before the 16th to 16th day after the landing} ovon then, eatlfactory deliveries could not be mado because rolls had becoue separated from knapsacks, lashings had cone undone, and markings had become" obliterated by the rain and mud. Fortunately the Supply Section *ras able to make a gratuitous issue of socks, shoes and trousers to men requiring them during the interim.

lile the gratuitous issue helped materially, it did not solve the problem. The problem stoms from the ffct that the men do not *ant, and should not be made, to carry more than the mer est essentials into oombat. Assuming that the items previously listed constitute the ideal "combat pack", then steps must bo taken to supply the items which the men eventually must have to sustain his health. For example, the mosquito net, which most men would not dare use during the first few nights on the offen sive because it restricts their vision a..d confines their move ment. Yet, on going into a quiet sector or in reserve, the &en need and want tnelr mosquito nets. Again, the blanket} the vert will tnroV'it eway because of its bulk or because it becomes Wet and muddy hen carried in offensive combat, yet it is needed Hhen shelters are constructed, it is agreed that the seabag is the most practical device for packing these items for delivery to the nen, alien action permits, for these reasons: (1) It "reduces the bat;.ae to one piece per man; (2) hen packed only with the items necessary to sustain the nan's health, as those items prescribed for the knapsack and roll, it ie not as bulky as the pack and roll, 1b easier to handle, and is more readily stacked; (3) When narked \u0084lth lar^e characters along the side and bottom, the b ea-'
bat -is certain
to be more identifiable because its soooth un broken surface
8 permit larger characters, less likely to be Wash ed off by rain and obscured by mud, and because the characters can be readily seen when bags are stacked in piles, and, with the pack and roll and the creator ease of handling, there would be a material reduction of labor, and some in transportation, as wen as in time in making deliveries.

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\u25a0Pig COIIPASS

The nioat valuable piece of equipment during the advance was the Lcnsatic or Prienifltic Compass which had been ispucd in r proportion of one to very four mon. Many: oenwiu. officers that if it cane to the have stated, with all seriousness, they choice of polng without their compass or their weapon, rather fight the Japanese with clubs than to attenmt to would It would be advisable to fight the Junple without a compass. issue a Lensatic or Prismatic Compass to evory officer and nan in the Rifle "eginent: ovon cooks nay need them in delivering food to men in defensive positions.
CLOTHIII&

During the advance through the swamp, a number of interesting thoughts were observed to become crystallzed on the subject of clothing. For example, the Army Mechanics Cap was praised ar thw most practical head gear that had been made available and the troops were highly pleased with it,both from the point of view of comfort iiuiu^^ppeiaiiei: they greatly disliked the Army's Fatigue Cap, that is, the cap with an all around brim, of the grounds of appearance. While pleased with the field parachute trooper's boots far superior shoe, they thought th3 and considered that they would materially reduce foot and leg injuries. Everyone considered the wool sock as essential and exprcnocd the wish that it bo thicker, of:& higfcer wool content, and linger in the leg. In the absence of the parachute-trooper boot, the legring *as considered a desirable item but a liking legging rather than the llarino wr.a oxpressed^for the short Corps type, as to underwear, the *hirdMarines had dyed their uiiJa^shlrts prior to going into combat, but the lack of proper chemicals had resulted in a conglomeration of colora. However, it was considered that a properly dyed undershirt of green color would be worthwhile, a great many men objected to the drew strings on the side of the drawers on the grounds that they it was ie ev3ituu3ly caused tropical ulcers on the hip bones: sir^a t.-at elastic insets, similar to those found on "Cooper's lion Yana" underdrawers, be substituted for the draw s*rinsse, that the legs be made shorter to conform with modern etvling and that drawors be made of a broadcloth rather than the ctcrial now used. Such matters are of extreme importance to the nen be cause they invariably stop wearing and dispose of itcr.e of clothing which are uncomfortable or do not satisfy tiicir 6ense of coufort or usefulness: for example, they cc.upietjxy ui cardec. the Garrison Cap in favor of the Army lieciianlc'a Cap for wear with the UtilityUniform.

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With Utility or Camouflage Uniform designated hs the Combat Uniform, Khaki should not bo taken in the baggage. The result ing mixture of uniforms is undesirable, and serves no useful or doirablo purpose: the baggage space should be saved or used for additional suits of utility or camouflage clothes.
As to camouflage clothing, previously discussed under \u25a0casualties" , it provided, they should be issued in the amount of two full suits per man. Zt is not desirable to have some men in one uniform and others in another: there is value in

uniformity.

its a protective measure, offioers invariably wore their rank insignia ujader. the oollar tabs, and wore the enlisted men's pack in combat. Apropos of this, offioers and non-commissioned officers of units predominantly armed with the rifle were ob served to dleoard their oarbines and oarry rifles in battle The elimination of outward marks of distinction undoubtedly saved many leaders from receiving special attention from the enemy in the olose oombat of the Jungle. Mo difficulty was experienced by offleers _in exercising their authority over even attached troops: Command" Presenoe in an officer was more effective than rank marks.

water
During the advanoe through the swamp, it was practically to supply an adequate amount of drinking water in water cans: most of the drinking water was obtained from swamp holes and individually purified with iodine or other chemicals which were supplied by the corpsmen. Previous thorough train ing in this matter was found to be Inasmuch as there wre but thirteen oaeee of dyeentaryeffective. in the entire regiment dur ing the first twenty-eight days of the operation and five oases during the last twenty-eight days.
impossible

RATIONS In the matter of food, the serving of "B" Rations was generally not practical since it was necessary to set up the kitchens at such a distance front/the troops over such terrain that it was impossible to deliver the meals while still hot. Furthermore, under such conditions hot water could not be fur nished for the purpose of properly cleaning mess gear. There fore, the troops subsisted during this period entirely on "C",

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"D;\ "X", pnu UJ" Rr.tlonB, sulolcnentcd by cms cf fruit m.d fruit jjuice. "hen r. bivouac .ns ;.ipuo on nn islnnd in the B*.t&Zip, it mAB noted, ne mentioned before, that ROuC nefl used their hcluete as 8to. pots and repared very tasty stcs.s of *C Rntion, bo4Llon ponder fron the "X" Rntior. nnd cms of tGcatoes or tomato Juice. The *J" Ration as r\ supplement to the "C" or HK" vGB extrenely popular. The "D" Rr.tion ,rs "ocular only \u0084,hen uncle into r. hot drink. The "X" Ration Biscuits ,erc unpopular nnd almost lnvarir.bly discarded. 4icn it -.r.B pointed out by the ueulc.nl officers thAt the rtK* Rntion Biscuit \u0084tTB essential to the blanced diet, the uetl still refused to crt tneu in belief that the vitnuin pills \u0084Jiich they enrried ^oulu aaXe up the deficiency. It .rr.s \u0 84 onerr.lly custounry mont the ueh ~tien issued MX* Rations to be cnrrleu in their pneke for then to brook do*n the ration ana sto,, only the can of vent, candy unit, beverA^e and olfarettee in their pfveks, dlecardinf the rest.
hAT TAfcS

Fe* iteas of equipaent act vlth nore diverse reception than Keat^Tabs and tripods. ^lth the thleJc, heavy, eantoon cup the ac a container, aoont those units hich attenpted to use HeatTabs as directed on the box, that is, burninr a single Heat-Tab at a tine, the nen t aye then up quickly in disgust. Anon*, those units \ahoro-Ban discovered that burning WO Heat-Tabs at one tine *ould quickly brinf a canteen cup of *ater to a boll, the Heat-Tabs beoaue the uost popular piece of equlpuent in their packs. Aoonf the ne%*er uen, there *as an unfortunate lack of l&a* lnation on their part In attecpting to hoat C" Rations or *X" Ration aeat oans over Heat-Tabs; the older cert, .<ho throu.h their foraer experiences in the Sa&oan Junfle, kne the trick of opening the "C" Ration afld heating "half the contents of the can at p tice in the can to which fe^ spoon sfull of *ater had boon audedj had no trouble in heating their food without burninr it or themselves.

m^higgpg
During

is oustonarlly attached to ecch Landing Teac, trrinin^ *ith the Rifle Battalion, was oado apparent. As the Battalion advfjiceu, engineer officers accoopanied the screen, continuously searchln t out possible routes for the construction of Jeep trolls.

ast, the extreme loportanee of the Composite Engineer Cocnnny.,

the advance of the Third Battalion to the north r.nd

132

13>

By keepin L tue aavance of the Third Battalion bordering on the cut * of the &*aiap And because the cnfiruer% by training \u0084,ero Able to.accompany tne Battalion, a Joop trail froa the loft flank of tne Division Boach head was opened for the supply of the Re ( inent on the very &ny that contact t*as nave vith the nain Japanese forces. Durlru this Advance, it t&s, of course, necessary for the engineer troops to take station in the Battalion's forcntion in the Approach March \u25a0-hen Contact Is Xoainent". For the Engi neer carrying an axe or peavy in one hand it #as essentlnl that

he carry a rifle in the other; on nore than one occasion, toull dottr drivers had to quit their nnchines Jille a sklrnish ~*s be ln decided around about then. It is interesting to note that t the engineers which perforoed the feat of running in the Jeep road at a C,B. platoon which had trainod M ith tho Third Eattalion for Wo and one-half nonths In Saaoa, preparing for Just such an evolution;' The Pioneer Platoon of this Coapoelte Conpamy had beta withdrawn to "the Division Shore Party and the Coabat< operating la the Ret'loontal Short Party. Inj.lneer Platoon

133

33

BATTLE OF ThS BUMA-HUKA TRAIL 17.21 NOVEMBER, 1943

7hc Gutstandlnt feature jf this buttle, developed frou a I.cetin. En, a* caent, follo.rln* vi, orloua reconnaissance nnd com bat i>rtrollin.jby eiy.ll unite, ere the tests of the efficiency .f ei-r.ll patrol foroations as practiced in the Third Marines rr.^ of the Er.ttrlion Fcruatlon kno,n as "Contact Inuinent", r formation designed for the Advance of a battalion throuth the Jun. lc durin* the Approach March ,*hen Contact It Inninont.',

CO.TaCT IkKLxEKT "Contact I-^lnent M ,*as devised to Insure the steady con troller fiv.vnce of a bAttrlion through a Junrle, in n riven direction, r.t p. definite spaed, covering the ..ideit front rrc tlcrble under t ivon conditions of visibility, not subject tc de lay by BL.nl! parties, yet sufficiently flcxltlo tc perclt chan, cs in direction and rr.pid deploycent for ooubat to the front, flanks or roar.
Although the battrJLlons ueveloped vnrlations in their Contact L^ilnent foruAtlons, there ore certain slallaritles md roqulreuents. itiucnt the principles to b observed in Contact I^inei-.t, rjiw in Pntrols here npollcnble, sre: coveaonts bo established &ust bo frlT fiiVJ trfiiiai couaunlcatlons.Bust thrtfuihcut tho forantion at the instant of haltinf or hen con tact is aade *ith the cneny; distnncos traversed oust be kept track of; in the absence of a definite terrain feature as a Phase Line, arvouont nust be regulated on a tine schedule ; direction cust be controlled by several agents; the fcraation aust tc sufficiently flexible to oemlt the inclusion of Tanks Engineers cr Re, loental capons in a covored position; outboard elements cust be ready to flrht at any ooaent; uoveuents oust be silent and every can in the fcraation aust luu,. *here every ether vnn and unit .*as in relation to hie and *h&t their aotlons to be in a f iven situation.
During tn6 transit of the Beach Head by the Third Battalion, tnis fcruatlcn ..rft c ntinually employed; the advance of the First Battalion tc their second objective east of Cape Torckint *ns in Contact Icxilnent, lose one coop any, and companies on

134

13^

csubat or reconnaisspnce nieslons invariably moved in a reduced scale of Cent Act Imminent. Because of thle and because euall patrols followed the saao principles, the Japanese never succeed ed in ambushing a Third Marine formation; on the contrary, in ft uczen situations, the Marines detected the enemy positions and -' rt tacked theo on a flank before the Japanese became fware of their presence, cr by-passed then without detection at the of the ler.der.

Imminent, ccniluni cat ions .ere maintained by lines cf combat *ire durinr the march; a *,ire party in the screen let out the ...ire and another in the rear reeled it in. On halting, all unit ccmnanders clipped Sound Pow*ed .'-Telephones to the axial ires and checked in tc report their positions and reoelve instructions for the next nove frcn the Battalion Ccuuander *ho marched at the head cf his Reserve* In this manner, the sltuaticn within a buttAll could be checked on in frcn three to five minutes. Distance as measured by marking the ccubat T.ire ,lth tape tc indicate the length cf lre played out on the axial lines during a L lven aarch. In the ab sence of Phase Lines, advances rre t enerally Halted to fifteen alnute intervals. Direction as controlled by the Officer In Char, c cf the Screen; in teaas of four, each tean check ing tne direction Independently cf the other teaos.
In C.ntact
p.xlol

runr.lnt

OF

jkDVAIJ

A Battalion in Contact Innlnent could be expected tc ad vance thrcurh the J untie at a rate cf 500 yards an hour. The Re inent in Contact luclnent, \u0084,lth tho three battalions fcrc inL a .red, c, could advance nearly as fast as a single battalirn, but althcu, h considerable attention .as {.lven tc perfecting the Re. mental F< ruation in training, nc opportunity arose for uslnf it en Boufanvllle. A reinforced rifle company, operating as a coabat patrol, cculd be expected to uove eross-ccuntry at the rate cf 750 yards an hcur.

It r,r.s oustcinary for Local Security Patrol*, operating up tc 500 yards in front of cur positions, to be couposed of five uen t an officer or platoon sergeant, an automatic rlflenan and three rlflensn. It *.r>s expected that such a patrcl .^uld ccver 1500 yarus and hcur.

135

3^


100 250 |^ 1^ /j 'yjjJjjjjjj
j/j i/MjMM3/j s^i

CONTACT IMMINENT IN THE JUNGLE

/MjMM3/jj ' r rrrrrrriiytiimmfi s^ ?f\ \

Reoonnaistanoo r eoreon

Elemcn

f/JJ

[/aJ
l

fX/J

Combat Element

" 8
yy
1

I >- I

icS^^ysn-^^y

"*

Fllk tt^^y

Rear Ouard

The prlnolplet of the Formation of the

Battalion. in

The

Maroh Hhen Contaot la Xwwlnent

AllRifle Company Weapons Squads attached to the Rifle Platoons and the Heavy Machine Gun Platoone attaohed to the Rifle Companies

* Frontage

and Depth depend on visibility.

3t

fiit:-*3a:is

Srcl! Combat Patrols *nd most of the R* conn o lBB*ncc patrols were composed of rifle pltoon, rrinforced by on. or t^o 11 hr machine gun sounds *n<?. sometimes 60mm mort rr enud. Such o potrol vps expected to cover 1000 yards n hour. Tho basis of All small patrols was generally the "Four Fire Tem M (Throe rlflcmon nd one automatic rifloman) In * either the wedge or the box formation. For example Reconnaissance Ftrol might form * wedge or box of wedges of four men och, with the ledr of coh tem In tho oonter. In combat, *ihen oontct ve mdc.by one of thos>" tepms "lth tho enemy, tho ldo< wps tht the ?utomtlo riflemen would covor tho t*reot, one rifleman would cover the putoaptlc riflemen nd the other tifo move In immediately to flnnk tho target: the epoed of reaction of the tem goner#lly measured th-: degree of ouceepn of tho ptt^ck. Another Important feature of the ttck thlch ws o*xiofully obtorvod w^e tht the p*ir of flankers moved Inboard of their formations so thwt their lino of fire would be pwpy from other flro temt In tho formation.
!{n
\r

'

The only matter of unusual lntorost in connection "lth which when tot on trails on^ thousand yrds or more, in front of our lines wore so successful *>s to gln the Information which led to tho battles of the Num !*um ?r r llnd the irlvp Forks, ws the cptc with which fire pl*ns ver agreed upon by the men in the pmbush when they h^d tken their positions. The ide* of tho fire plpn we to rrwigc p distribution of fire so th^t ?11 hf>nds would not concentrrto oh p. single m*n but would bring down the maximum number of the enemy nt the first speoifl ptrol of 1? wps fire. By such careful planning, eucoeBsfully blc to ambush a Jpjaese vorking prty of over 100, kill at loi8t 9 of them, definitely "ounr any mor.^, p n<?. effect n escape to our lines without a slnprlc mn belnp: hilled.
or

mbuBcpdes

t
4

i
137

137

BAT

OF T
INOV

;va roRKS 4

The soundness of the trotleal doctrines described in the Field tfanuals for the Rifle Regiment find its subordinate units nn:l speolnl weapons were tested and proven in the Battle of the Pivn Forks and found to be direotly and invariably applicable to Jungle flnhtinft. While no deviation from principle was ever necessary, n considerable aaount of common sense, good Judge ment nnd experience in the bush was called for in adjusting time and epneo factors to the limitations of the Jungle and the swamp*
TjjCTICaL TRAINIHQ

as nn indication of the scope of taotioal training necess ary in preparation for Jungle fighting, the following lists the evolutions of the battalion and Regiment whioh wcro required by the course of battle during the operations on the Plva Porks: The Apuror.ch iiarch; The Solection, Occupation and Security of jtstoubly Areas and Bivouacs; Reoonnaistanoe in Force by a Battal ion; The Attack, Attack through Woods. Passage of Lines, Pre paration of Fire Plans, including Artillery Support: Battalion in Reserve, including Preparation of Plane for the oxocution of nil nornrJ. tilesions of the Reserve; Combat Outposts; Hasty Defense, Defense on a Vide Front, Defense in Woods; Relief in Position, and, Urylltht Withdrawals. These evolutions were executed aoobrding to the principles set forth in Field Manuals 7-80, "The Rifle Brttrlion", and 7-40, "The Rifle Regiment",
HEADQUARTERS AllD SOT/ICE QOIiPAHY. IHFANTRY REQIi'EH'
During the advance through the swamp, itbeoane increasingly evident tht the organisation of the "eadquartere and Service Company, Marino Infantry Regiment, was dofiolent. During the brttlo of the Pivn Forks, the deficiencies asvumed serious pro- portions. The nMidquarters and Service Company does not include Service Troops in a number to permit the execution of certain necessary and essential services to the Regiment and its present
acaoqunrtorsa

or^nnirntion obsoures the functions of the Aoadquartcrs Personnel, Tho ca0qunrtors Company, Rifle Regiment, as described in Field Lnnunl 7-25, and the bervico Company, Hifle Regiment, as des cribed in Field lianual 7-30, have certain prescribed funotions and

138

13^


The R
O
O

Man Fi

Team

o o

o o

*]*

The Teom Advances

oo
AHcfes on wnbush soA'er*

I
oo o

/
o p^

Q&- on 4h flank of our formotion. up Q& Attacks r> Enemy PahfO^ coming

AHocA.6 a Burner

lM

Company when operating in the field, this doos not solve tho problc \u25a0>. rocqucntly, the proatest cervice of the '->up>ly Pintoon is rcn.lercd vhen the troops arc in bivouac: in ccmnnt the team i:irk of the Service Platoon vith norwnl Headquarters and Service personnel r.ep.suros its value. Regardless of the cou petoncy r.nd t'llllnrness of the personnel of the Service Platoon, unless ol^y f;re a part of and continuously with the Regiment, thoy a: v"^ unable to* aprp >r and anticipate the needs of tho Re{rir.io;it r:id perfoi\r. those duties which are expected of them wiohout; a ssr^oue wretj of tir.o, effort and van power. Similar ly, tnc "'.celt o.' a Ti-rnsport Platoon is oorely felt in maintain ing thj up>l; of tiie I^ijiKcnT, the tewporrry attachment of a : t*\jt>r 1' "Tipc^L Liilt doos not rlleviate the situation created > by t^vioir, ch < r rj":jcii3ib*lity for a necessary service between two x3krb, li.rvcforc, it is greed thr.t tho organization of tho P-eedquaroui'3 anO. rfcrvlce Coopany, Marine Infantry Regimont, should ne c'ir.nf;ci to provld3 both a Headquarters Company and a Service Co-p^y viti'. y rations, personnel and responsibilities oomparable to ti.jsp of tho Hetndquarters Company and tho Servioe Company of tho .*lflc Rafcjiuent of the Army.

dutioe in connection with the problems of Administration and Supply of r. regiment which in no way differ from the Administrr Although the tivo nnd Supply Problems of the Marine Repjlnent, Service nnd Supply Compnny of the Division Special Troops attaches n plntoon t j the Regincntrl FtoadquartcrG r.nd Service

JgftDgJAHTEF3 COI^PaIIY. INTAIfTRY BATTALION

The JSeadquartere Company of the Infantry Battalion was also found to be deficient in the.*: no agenoy is provided to perform those essential services described in Field Manual 7-20 which in tho Army are the function of the Ammunition and Pioneer Pla toon, Gm-vmy, Riflo Battalion. The services wMch nrc performed by m kmnunltion and Pionoer Platoon are at extent? al and necessary in the Marino Battalion as in the Piflo t?t tailor, ,-f tnc Army: the work must be done* In the Marine Brttallon.. t^e only source of man power to do this work is tho conbi.t units rr.d fvci) *;hcm are drawn tho

personnel required to mair.*-.i-i the arr.uniticn rr.d ration supply an^. to construct and rainur^r. r.inor, but cte3iitial, engineering projects. so engaged, at the Coincidentaiiy th* number of expense of conbnt units, t &.s '.hat of the >JT>r.inltlon r.nd Pioneer,

140

Ho

Platoon of the Amy. It la agreed that an Ammunition and Plo noor Platoon with personnel and responsibilities comparable to thoeo nreecrlbod for such an organization In tho Amy be In cluded in the Headquartore Connnny of the Mnrlne Infantry Battalion. com:a:id
posts.

During the entire Bougrlnville oncratlon and especially during tho Battle of the Plva Forks, it was found necessary for the Conrr.nd Posts of the Battalions to be situated close to thel assault or front line conpanlea: as p rule, Battalion Command Posts wero froo 75 to 150 yards in rear of their front lines sc that oonnanders could, by personal oontaot, keep themselves well informed, aot quickly in case of emergency and maintain security for their conoand posts without unduly draining the strength of their reserves. If the situation Indicated that special security aoasuros were necessary, it wps customary to establish Connr.nd Post Security with a Support Platoon of an assault or front line company whan defending on a wide front, or, to uso nil or part of the Reserve Conpany for the purpose. The Support or Re serve thus remained close enough to the likely scene of action to pern it its commission, when and if necessary, without undue delay. In the dense Jungle there is no true front line, con tinuous in Its 'security and observation. Therefore, Command Groups mutt ever bo ready to defend themselves to the same ex tent as might be expected of any unit of similar size and arr.a nent, and it was felt by all ooonanders that tho further forward the Command Post would be, the nearer to being under the guns. as it were, of our own troops as well. as of the enemy were it to be located, the better the ohance of tho oonmander being able to control and Influence the course of battle.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary to operate all Command Groups, including that of the Regiment, in at lee.st two \u25a0echelons : the commander vnd his Operations and lotelllper.ee Officers forward in what was termed tho "Battle" or "Forward Connand Poet" (observation post would have been a r.isnocer), and the Personnel and Supply Officers in what was torr.ed tho "Roar Command Post". The Executive Officer and Communications Officer found it necessary to divide their time between both stations. In addition, it was necessary during a considerable part of the car.paign for the Supply Officer to maintain a "Base" near the beach, complete with communication and r.cssing facilities.

-36

\*

It was

vihen a Connand Group coulc. be brought together into* one Cor.nand Post, and It was because of thle cir cumstance the.t the necessity for a Headquarters Conr>any ar.d r. Conpany, sinilar to those of the Ajsy, and of an Acr:unX Service tion and a Ploneor Platoon for tl.e p ttallons, bccar.e so evident.
'exceptional

The custonary location of the P.egincntal Forward Connand Post was in the Connand Post of c. Front Lino Bat-allon and the Rcglnontal Hoar Connand Post, together with the attached Medical Conpany, in the vicinity of the Regimental Forward Distributing Point, nornally fron 400 to 800 yrrds in rear of the center of tho front lines. At one tino, the Battalion 3aees were fron four to six niles distant fron their Battalions through swanp and Jungle; during this period, an anphibian tractor could be expected to nake no noro than one and ono-half round trips per day between tho Bpsee and tho Forward Distributing Points. In oonnoction with adnlnlstratlon in the field, the Adminis trative Echelon, operating in the Division's Base Can? at Guadalcanal, was onlnently successful in carrying out its functions. coKiamiCASiors Instantaneous and continuous telophonic connunlcatione is a proroqulslte of a sound defensive position in Jungle warfare and is essential to the control of a reginent in an attack. Cooounicatlon installations should novor be considered complete until cultiple trunks have boon installed between the Reginont and the 3 Attcdlone with cross-lines along different routes laid bctvrecn Forward Connand Posts and Roar Connand Posts fron one Battalion to anothor. Artillery Tiro Control Lines should never Darnllcl Infantry Connand Linos, go that danoge to one will not necessarily cause danage to the other, but Infantry Connand Lines nust be nado accessible to Artillery Forward Observers. Switchboard operators throughout the installation nust be, not only thoroughly faniliar with all of the possible conblnatlons. that nay be resorted to in order to conplete a circuit from any one station to another, but also with the requirenents of tho Artillery Forward Observers in handling fire missions over the telephone. The great need for flexibilityin connuni cat Jons wrs brought out repeatedly during the 3ffttle of tne Pivp. as p result of eneny artillery and nortar activity which was successful in tearing up long sections of wire on nany occasions, creating situations which, had it not been for the systen of multiple trunks r.r.Cl cross connections, night well have been disastrous.

142

4->

'?

:.

*
"he greatest burden on Conr.unicptlone Fereor-.rl .urinf lyir.^ o. the bp^l* nnd throughout the campaign ws the -r.r nor*-:r*l wire. It hnd b~en predetermined in trains? thv carry .no parties would be Insufficient in numbers to virs lopd through p lor* cempplgn: therefore, addiMonrl ner. wcr Ac It turner ou., made pvall^bl.-1 to the "lro Sections. 100,1 lncrea.se In pereor.,-:! would not '\u25a0 vc been c-xecseive. Telephone Wire *-130 vrps too ll.'.ht for th? Jun~;li <=nd ir^ wos used only for lntl?l "nd temporpry installations. V-110 wb entirely e*tlefpctory pnd coul<?. be :\*.n?.le& readily when mede up into three-hundred yprd coils. Almost ll failures of wire comiaunlcatlon "ere ceased by vehicles running off the tmils or by rond building machinery pushin-: trees p.croee the lines. Overhc*** lln?s pvc most deslrnbic, nd too much rmphflsl6 cannot b~ placed .eep the lines off th: on Indoctrinating wire parties to v ground nd pwpy fron vei:iculpr trolls *nd oth^r person" 3l to wir: lines from dnnwge.
Rpdio wae secondary to th.' t-lephonc in this c^n^ign. Tho TBY found no d*n>loynent other thpn in- Shore to Ship 70S, communications; the ?*X wae very satisfactory, *nd the though limited by the few top/s, with Its gret r- serve of

power pnd epse of optrptlon, v/ps especlplly vplu^blc for fast voice clrouits. There vcro ft*" failures In the TBX ?nd 70S, pII of which could be rspfired nuickly by the Rcgi-n.-.ntfll maintenance personnel.

Message Reglmont.
wps

Cnter procedure we
n^coeeity

nlwrys

etpndrd throughout the for thoroufhly trained mceeengrrs

evident.

havo been suff 4 .clDnt for the entire * l*rg number -?f codos carried, messogeswere r2ceivod encoded in accordance "lth *n SOI p copy of which h*d not b?cn Issued to the Hcgi^nt. CQUBod undoubtedly by the. great, nd perhaps excessive, number of SOI 1 s in use in the *i*ep, might hve r suited In serious trouble.
oporptlon: yet, in epitc of

?hr.-e Codes

A HegLmentPl Supply Dump *nd Repair hop ws nmintp'r.cd t the ReglrucntPl Rear Cor.ciwnd Post under the? supervision of the AfiBlstp.nt RcglmontPl Communications Officer. This was r>n

-3?a

)f3

invaluable nd essential
a

service: there w^s ppproxlmst^ly in telephones throughout tho Hegi raunt as n result of the r^ins and hrd service, but seldom was. dwange Incurred th*t ould not be remedioc 3 nuickly In the Repair Shop.

100*2

weekly turn-over

WZA?O! T 3 AI'TD MUNITIONS

Aside from the great care required in maintaining: self' loading weapons in op em tin? condition in the end, mud >n<s dampness, nil weapons performed their functions moat satis
factorily.

It was evident that the Carbine, Ml, should not be considered as a substitute for the Hifle because of its lack of penetration and shocking power. This w.-*pon vps particularly difficult to keep in operating condition.
Tho Automatic Rifle, in spite of its weight, ie mpat \renpon in Jungle fighting, e nd it was agreed tn>t there should be three automatic rifles in the twelve-man Rifle Squads, particularly in the interest of the Four U*n

necessary

Fire Teac,

previously

discussed.

*he most important characteristics of*the small yes cartridge in Jungle fighting are: great penetration; high velocity; heavy weight and, terrific shocking power. Flashless powder and the non-corroeivo primer would afld materially *o security and to th? durability of the weapons.
It is agreed tht, for the Jungle, both 60m- n<! Qlmn !lortar shell of all typss should be fitted with *> uniVcrs*! Super ?uick-Short Delay Fuse so that Tree or Ground Bursts cortltTbe obt'aTndd t will *nd as tho situation reauired.
TRACTOR TRAILERS

The Caterpillar Tractor *nd the Athey "riler were extremely valuable in the movement of oaulpmcnt nd supylloe during the Battle of the J-lve Forks. Over muddy, unimproved when all other forms of transportation oxcopt Amphib roade^ ian Tractors failed, the Tractors and Trilcre were able to get through: as a matter of fct, the brod tracks of ths trailers often served to restore sections of rods that hd become? so rutted as^to be lmpBSPble to 1/4 Ton Trucks.

I'M

144

HiiRACTIRISTICS OF T
Bpttlc of the

JGSS

who plmost lnstpntpnrously dsetroyed It counter-bpttery fire. ?ha ecprclty of pmmunltlon *nd the. difficulty of transporting It through the Jungle rendlly pecounts for the short duration of Jpppnese rtillary flrce but ther^ is no reasonable explnnrtlon for the Jppnncsc re peptcdly plpclng their guns or. the forward elopes of hills under our obeervption md then firing them even at twilight or nl^ht when the muzzle flashes of the puns fixed their posi tions ps surely "8 if they hpd turned spotlight on them.

The outstanding characteristic of the Japanese in the Fiva Porks we.6 hie ama*lnr in'ntncss In the tactical use of artillery. Hie pur. nary excollent but the placement of hie batteries was so poor that, without exception, they wcrs aocn detected and destroyed pnd rlvnys within > fe* hours ">ftcr thoy h*d begun thair ajuetm^nts. ""heir concen trations wer of but short durptlon: the srreptest number of rounds fired oh p single trge vas fifty, "fired by p four-fain bpttery whloh wp.s detected by Its mur'.le blncts by one of our
f

Forward Observers vltl:

The Japnnese mpde frcnuent use of their 9Grar. mortars during the period 1? to 5 November, "his wcr-on 10,I 0 t*xt the cost potent of ny in th^ Jpn?e3 prmpment, evt>n In cluding their 15 centimeter un when used as n nti-r,orson n^l wopon. "he 90mm shell contlns pn explosive hnvin^ such a terrifically high velccity of reaction pc to be incompre hensible to one v..0 hs not been subjected to ite force. Al though the 90mm mortar was usuwlly flrod in series of only fiv. rounds at *> given target "nd while probably not over 150 rounde of this shell waf fired Into the Regimental 3ttle roeition, it Is not unlikely that rsor^ thr. one-fifth of nil battle casualties suffered by this Resident were \nfllctefl by the bipst or the fragments of 90mni mortr she"1 Is.

00000

-38

DEFZ^ST OF TH/S EASTSR1 T SECTOR

27 NOVZMBSR22 D3CZII3SR. 1943

The principle features of Interest In connection with the defense of the Eastern Sector, from Hill 500 to the mouth of the ""orokln* River were: the wide frontpge which woe pssigned for defense; the expedients r sorted to provide a re*Bon*bly sound defense, nd, the difficulties encountered in the supply of the troops in position.

tactics
Although the area was, for the (greater part, deep swamp dense Jungle, it could not be considered impassable, but it was certain thpt large forces could not advance pny consider able distance through it without being detected by one or more of the many patrols which were kept moving back nd forth through the ewpmp during the daylight hours or by the Listening Poets which were maintained during the nlpht. *2very possible Bttle Position plon,? the front w*s hevily wired p-.d mined. The Pln of Defense was based on the premise that Japanese forces approaching from the east could not redh our wire be fore our troops, warned by our patrols, could be moved into * position to oppose the advance of the enemy into our Beach Head. Ag It developed, from the report of frequent patrols sent across the Toroklna, the Japanese apparently had no plans for the area other than to keep it under obaervatlon.
pnd

Th3 rules in connection "lth this typo of countor-pptroll ing which were very much to the point during this time wer.i: First, do not move over your own trails the second time (emphasizing the rule to stay off trplls always) nnd, Second, do not heckle the same Japanese Outpost %wlce unless prepared to fight p full sople war on the second go-round. Do either of these things *nd the Japanese willba redy and waiting.

146

1^

3UI-FLY As in the "dvnr.ee tnroufh rhc s^mp earlier In the- cnr:. '.."ijn, the troops coul'"1 not ;.pvc been oup ; lied in the jtoritionf c xhorbit^nt .xper.dlture of mrnpower they occupied "'ithout h d It not b. en for the ->mphit>l r)n tractors.
ri

position, l)rcd w.?s supplied by r Bakery Unit of the Service v-.d Supv.ly Conprny which wpe set up In the vicinity of the

Fr :..:; the first of Dec.nb^r until the rei?ltr.r\it left its

Re?-. lrr.cntpl

Co:Tnd Fot. Bre.cl wp.s b^ked d-lly in thf? form of F-^n Rolls, vith two lr?rge rolls provided for cell ra-^n In the Roglr.cnt lte rclnforclnr units. The rolls were considered to bo f?r more satisfactory th-n lo^f brrpd considering the pro m h,- uniformly blems of delivery pnd dlatribution. hi^h qupllty work, done by this Bakery Unit ptteste to the pdeauflcy of of tiic the equipment furnished nd the Industry "n<?. skill of the bnkcjrc who operated It.

00000

147

KISCELLAKSOUS O*BSRVATIOrS
t r^i;:-::tal \u25a0'satons

coi'

Ths Regimental Weapons Company found vniu.^ble employment in the nttpck of -bunkers on Cape Torokln, in bech dcfer.ee during mor_ thn Blx wooks of the campaign p-.d In reinforcing T.d extending the defensive instllfltlons during the 3**tlc of Plvp Forks nd the Defense of the Upstern Sector.
v;hich rnpke

T.-.e 37m:n gun, H3AI on the M4AI mount ho characteristics It most suitable for nnti-bo^t gunnery, nnd this weapons wrs nvpllable In sufficient numbers to permit the establishment of p formidable defense on p wide front.

The Truck, r. prirae movor for tr n llo becpuee of 4 :; 4, would have

advrntr-ge

been Batisf pctory.

Ton, 4x4, wee not considered odciupte *s the M mount over tho muddy Junrlc Jeep 4 its low ropd cleprflncc: the Truck, 1 Ton,

The low silhouette of the M Ifount vroe p distinct >-*ls 4 in the dense, he*d-hlgh brush crpeting the Junjrl."} vhich so limited the field of fire of the gun pb to mhe it extremely difficult to locnte sult^blo positions from vhich to deliver defensive fires. For this reason, it we con sidered tht the Mo Mount with * hlphcr silhouette, higher plrne of fire nd erenter mobility thn the M4 with the prims mover is the most suitable wepjon of Its tyro in dense
Jungle.
The 75mm gun, H3, was extremely vlunble in the ott-*
"gainst Cape Torokln'* nd thereafter formed the key of
These /cnpons defenses of bcchss asslened to the Regiment *re versatile: On one occasion they delivered CCX u-p.to flr^ t p rpnfcc of 6900 y:rdB on p. suspected Jflpnnese Obp^rvmtlon Post located on MAOIN2 ISLAND.

During the tr.^inin'v of this company, consldcr^bl: time to the supjieniont-ry subjects of Bort Iden.iric* tlon, Demolitions, Attack of Bunkere -nd th tcchnlnue of Mwchine Guns on Oround llotfnts. As result of this, t<r number epons of proficient demolition sounds from the Important ecrvlcrs, not only * Cnpc "orokin Corr.pnny rendered wher.- they were solely r. sponelblr for the destruction of Az^in, sev;rl bunkers, but throughout th.? entire cpraprign. on the Pivp Porks nnf. during the Defer.se of th.: "Zoster sector

we devoted

148

\u2666

whors. the terrain .r the nt of tkt. -r.U-t ' 1 i-: . ~ n' ;_unc, tlij corr.^ny efficiently l 1\u25a0> c^^' r.ij. * result of "hlcl erWly machine tjuns.- ~a lines vfr extended r.n^ strengthened.
1

It is considered th^t th 71.-nc "hro v'3rc "hlc!- ~r no" -c1c1 to th, carried by the "Insincere should h. r.t"l ''c^pone Company nd their number increased to t'rol^'G per "'lfl
RCfjinient.

MZDICaL SSRVICI
Since -.he inception of the reci;nrnt, th? medical p.vsonr.el hnbitu-^lly trainer in the field '-'lth the units to "hich t- cy wer,, pttnehed p.rtlclptlnc in -11 problrmc undor^'oin the trcticnl tr^lnln. of their unite. ?hi#, in addition to the cxcfcllc-nt professional tt"inmente of the doctors "nd corpora^n resulted in excuptionri. ly efficient medical service during combat.
\u25a0

The procedure in the collection, treatment nd ev^cu^tion of the sick md fo"'10' r ed^the principles set > forth In Field !>nul ?-?O, "Service Company nd l!rc'lC'''l "De 4 :", modified tachment (Supply "nfi ?ifle necessary to suit the orcnipntion the ?'"rln<" ment nd the Iledlc^l 3pttllon.

In the trlnlnL of me-dicnl personnel, special rraphneie I Plrst Aid; Adminietr- tion of Pinsra*, vritli pctu^l practice to insur." the ic^ulrln of skill in ven-puncture; the keeping; of simple but st"ndr di7cd records of casuplties in combt *nd. the functl^nr of the B p tt"lion pnd lied3c "1 "octions, the Collecting Sections r>nd the liedicpl Company. It "^s considered vitally important for oil mcdicpl personnel to be skilled in th. use of the compass.

wns placed on the follo^ln^ subjects:

Corr.pr.ny "C", Third !!cdic^l ?*ttlion "hlch served i'lth the detriment in Srrao, supported the Thirc? !Inrino during: ooth b"t on Bougainville. The mutual underBt n n<?lnc nnd cor;.r..on in r terests hlch bound these t"o or^ni?^* ionso ns =? result of thtir lonp service- together' vr^s nrn^or factor in the- efficiency of the- medicl service.

'

\u2666

\u26 6\u25a0

149

It le neceaapry th*t all of the installations of the Field Hospital, including Wprds pnd Opor^tin^ Rooms be dug In. There vns no place within the Bench He*d whore n hos pitpl could be set up *nd expect to be spfe from enemy Action. Aa p mpttcr of fpet, due to the terrain nd difficulties of tr Q neportp*ion, it was necesepry for the Field Hospital to b? eBtpbliBhed close to the front lines. Ther^ arc insufficient personnel in the Medloal Company to dig in the Field Hospital, therefore, whenever displacement is contemplated, Engineer Troops must be made available to the Medical Company to assist them.

as an indication of the difficulties un*.cr vhlch the surgeons were expeoted to, and did, perform mft.ior surglcl operations, bombs, mortar shells nd artillery freauently fell within fifty yprds of the lnetellPtlone, pnd on one occpslon it was necessary for the nedlcpl personnol to nwkc p et^nd p.gpinst the approach of a Japanese -petrol which h^d euoceee fully pdvanced over on* thousand yards within our lines. of the Bougainville Campaign were the numbers Actually ongaged nt points of contot, thr fact that the enemy wa* emplaced in a defensive position with all the advantages of the terrain in his f*vor In each engagement, the high proportion of automatic weapons employed by the enemy, and the great number of casual m ties inflicted on the defender by the attacker. hie latter figure was all out of proportion to normal combat experiences. Tot less th*n 1,696 Japanese wrre killed in action In contacts with the Third Marines, Reinforced: the battle cpsul ties of the Third Marines, no attached troops Included, were
extremely light, considering

The battle casualties

follows:

150

SD

<) November 1 to 26 Inclusive (Battles of Cape "oro kin*, Koromokina, Numa Numn Troll and Plva Forks)

Killed in Action Missing in Action* Wounded In Action Extremities

He?d Chest

Abdomen
Back

Blast Concussion

Includes
Toroklna.

16 missing from Landing Craft off Cape

Seotor)
0 0

(b) November 2? to December 22 (In Defensive

Killed in Aatloft Misting in Action

bounded Vi Aotion SxtrtaitiM Cht*t BXait Coaocioa

151

f)

151

Non-battle casualties
Malaria.

were 27

p.b

follows:
25

Nqv l~yO y

Nov 28-Dec

Total
194

417

80 ill 16
13 46

114
306

Filarlasis
War Neuroal

11 5
10

27

18
56
32
267

\u26 6

Dysentery
Fungus Infection Injuries

25 247
Igj,
659

Comba.t Fatigue Other Diseases

20 672

1331

With respect to Combat Fatigue, it vas discovered tht few of these casualties later developed signs of Fllariatis, nd it mey be that the fr^igue and exhaustion which resulted in evacuation for Co**^ Fatigue may have been a prodromal manifestation of Fllarlisis: statistics on this point fire not available.
quite a

152

15 >

EAC/cm
SECRET From: To i
Subject:

CO

CO,

9th Mar, 3d MajWiv, FHF FIELD, IN Tr I 5 FeY 'vary, 1944

3d Mar Dlv.
9t~ Marines, Nov-Dec, 1943.

Report of Operations,

Referenoe;

(a) Letter', CG, 3d Mar IVy, ALB/crw, dated Jan 4, 1944, (A) Overlays, No's 1- 1 B) Report of Engagement of Ist Bn, 9th Mar.
G) Report of Engagement of Co X, 3d Bn, 9th Mar

Enclosures:

1* In accordance with rafei -oe (a), the following report, covering the CHERRY 8L0330M operation, is submitted: 2. Nov 1:
The following lists the Operations of this Regiment: 9th CT, consisting of tie following units
9th Marines,
3d Rdr Bn. 2d Rdr Rigt,
Ist Bn, 12th Mar.
Det HAS Btry, 12th Mar,
Ist Bn, 19th Mar (ltss Cos B C) Co D, 19 th Mar,
Co 0, 19th Mar,
Co A, 3d MT Bn,
Oo A, 3d Mcd Bn.
Co I, 3d Mtd Bn, Ist Plat, MB Co, 3d Serv Bn, Det Mun Sao, Ist Plat, Ord 00, Ist Band Sco, DLv Spl Trs, Ist a 4th Plats, Co D, 3d Tk Bn, BAS Co, 3d Tk Bn , 3d Hg Co,
Dat HAS Co, 19th Mar.
Dtt Oo C, 3d Aaph Trto Bn, 3d Mr oa,
Hq 00, Hq Bn. 3d Mar Div,

\u25a0o

*,

I*WI **l

\u25a0.

WVk *W%fc Bttl

landed MBiwhiiRed.l,l UMlati. I*Bwith ths aitslon of Mlftlng ObJ 0-a and funashing pvbt^tion and *rt yartlofl fdjr ahe zellow 3*4, prepared for furtfetr operations ashr%, (8e Oirim o. 1).
H-hour was 0730. By 0780 signals i^ad been ndi b allmmul
units indloaUng that they hadlmw uooessfuliy. a! 0Mtv laaohta Rd 1, B 4 3, and *ello% 9 4 f tmtnf td by a fotmtloft of thy Zeros. One offloar was Ilk aad flffc enlisted men VIA fro* the 94 Iff as a result of these strafings* Aa a fafslt of heavy surf nnnii tii^pis thaa Btmohda, a total of 70 Boat*J?roaehed and wx+ put out ot W9>Tioa during D-day* The landln^W'Siaehes Red 1, 2*3, and Yallov 9*4 wer aada without opposition. 3d Rdr Bn, with 9tiMa* RagKl Vpns Oo (less 9 PUts), Atend, la%n on Baaoh Oraan 1 (Puruata Is land) aat opposJ,tioo oonsl sting of jl R Plat, Reinf. Plghting oontiautd until 1800. 2 RRotv t when Puruata Xaland was secured* Oar ecaoaltiaa ww 6 KIA and 18 WIA. By 1900, ObJ 0-1 had been secured, contaot estalv lished between all Bnt and with the 3d Mar on the right. The terrain was Mostly dens* Jungle and swaap. Patrolling out to Halts of Fwd Roc * and V to the Laruaa River started at 0990. Laruaa River patrol ra ported no enemy eontaot and set up an outpost in vioinity of Ft (1W.3 ZIA,6). Due to bad surf conditions and hostile air attaeka, unloading of transports was not completed, \u25a0hips departing after dusk. Alllines dog in for the nlgit. Ragtl OP at (12**4 216*8).

AdV Sin, Bq ImAO,

aiCLOBURi
(1)
*

port*

to 3d Mar Jr Ooa*at

aa

153

Nov 2: At daylight, in accordance /ith prearranged plane LT-2 ' started drawing in its left flank to t ,. in to the W limit of Beach -ted 2 preparatory to the shift of LT-1 to Beach Blue 1. Two Btrys of Ist Bn # 12th Har registered on the Larutia River. Transports returned to anchorage and resumed unloading supplies nnd equipment to Beaches Blue 1, Yellow 14 2. At 0830, LT-1 commenced withdrawal and movement to Beach Blue 1 by Amph Trace, completing the movement at 1730. LT-1 went into bivouac vicinity Beach Blue 1 under operational control of 3d war prepared to relieve Ist Bn, 3d Mar on Nov 3. Patrols to JV? li mit of Ren and to the Laruma River reported no enemy contacts. At 1600 3d Rdr Bn reported Puruata Island clear of Japanese. Movement of sup plies and equipment from Beaches Red 2 and Yellow 4 to Beach Yellow 1 was started. Orders for the relief -of the 3d Mar Sector by 9th CT were received. Nov 3: During night of Nov 2-3, >A Sdr Bn on i>uuata Island re ceived sniper and MO fire. Since island had been cleared on the pre vious day it was believed the Japanese oame from Torokfcna Island*. LT-2 was withdrawn from Beach Red 2 and went into position in rear of 3d . Bdrs who had established a road block on the Piva Trail. LT-3 ex tended its left flank to W .limit of Beach Red 1 and was transferred to operational control of 3d CT. LT-1 relieved Ist Bn, 3d Mar and extend* ed beachhead 1500 yds of Cape ToroWna with patrols to Piva River and inland. LT-1 established contact v_th LT-2 prior to darkness. Ist Bn, 3d Mar went into. Regtl Res under operational control 9th CT. At 1300, two Plats of the 3d Rdr Bn were Landed on Toroklna Island after a 15 minute Arty preparation by Ist Br, 12th Mar. This landing was sue cessful and the island promptly secure^. No casualties. All unit* dug 215.3) (See Overlap No. 1), in for the night. Regtl CP at (133.2 Nov 4: Continued active patrolling; LT-3 to Laruma River, LT-1 to Torokina River and both these LTs to limit of Fvd Ron. LTV-2 reported enemy sniping at their lines. No casualties. Laruma River patrol re ported 1 Japanese seen on Laruma River. AllRdrs except 1 Co at Puru ata and Toroklna Islands, withdrawn from those Islands by authority CG, 3d Mar Div. 1 Co, 3d Rdr Bn holding Piva Trail road blook. Rdr Regt Jltchd to 9th CT until further orders. 3d Rdr Bn reverted to d Rdr Regt by CO, 9th CT. Co G, 19th Mar reverted to 19th Mar control and Co A, 3d Mcd Bn reverted to 3d Mcd Bn control* 1 Co, 2d Rdr Regt patrolling Pwd to select airfield site* 9th CT supply dumps organised and functioning at Beach Blue 1. At 1300, Toroklna River patrol fro* Ist Bn, 9th Mar killed 1 Japanese near Beach on V tide of Piva River* Nov 5; At 2200,. road blook attacked by enemy forces. Ho oasual ties. Some Japanese killed* Seoond oontaot at 2030. No casualties. Beach Blue 1 was bombed by an unde&e ruined number of Japaneee planet. Nov 6: Patrol from Co 0-. 2d Rdrs returned having Bade oontaot with enemy forces during night of 5-6 Not and having lost one officer and nine men and inflicted similar casualties on Japanese. Continued aotive patrolling to front and to Laruma and Toroklna Rivers. No con tacts reported. Co A, 3d MT Bn reverted to Div control* Ist Bn, 21st Mar placed under operational control of 9th CT, relieved Ist Bn, 3d liar, which reverted, to 3d CT* Nov 7: Sub-sector bombed during early hours of morning* Japanese foroes landed at daybreak on V flank of 3d Bn, 9th Mar* engagement continued all day* At 0760, Ist Bn, 21st Mar was ordered to report to 3d CT and moved by boats from Beach Blue 1 by 1050. The Laruma River patrol and Beach patrol V of 3d Bn, 9th Mar were out off by enemy lane ing. Regtl Wpne Plat and Co X, 3d Bn, 9th Mar heavily engaged' all da near Beach on left flank of Div BHL and suffered 5 KIA and 12 VIA, tv of these dying.gf wound* at a later. date* Ist Bn, 3d Mar passed through the lines of 3d" Bn, 9th Mar after a five hour engagement. Beach patrol from Co M,. 3d Bn 9th Mar engaged Japaneee force flQjranolnt from direction of Atsinima River suffered one officer and one man voui ded and. killed twenty Japanese* Patrol was extricated from position between Jap foroes by boat. (See finclosure 0 for detail* of notion on V flank) Rdrs holding road blook were Atkd by unknown number of Jap anese. Mortars from 2d 3n, 9th Mar in direct support of Rdrs. Ist Bn, 19th Mar organised Beach Def on Beach Blue 1and plaoed in sub-seotor Res for the night* At 1400, patrol from Ist 3n, 9th Mar omptorvd one POW in swamp V of Piva River.

'

154

15+

bomber 8. . . Nov lit Line A to occupied. Ground organized for Def, Contact with 3d Bn. 3d Mar, on the left by, patrol. Regtl CP established at (135.3 215.5). Supply by Amph Tr*s very difficult. No other type of vehicle was able to negotiate swampy trail from beaches. (Por dispo sition or unite, see Overlay No. 4). N.9*.9* tf,: Improving front line positions. Extensive patrolling for N enemy activity, mapping, and gathering trail information. NQY..Ig-14i At 0600, 2d Bn 21at Mar passed through our front liner up Numa-Numa Trail and at 0930 beoaae heavily engaged with Japanese forces 2000 yds PWd of our Unes. 3d Bn, 9th Mar captured one POV. Sup ply situation critical due to bad trails and swampy Much of this period was spent in hand oarrylng supplies, the terrain. and break making ing of supply routes and in evaouation of casualties of 2d Bn, 21st dar through Regtl Aid Sta. Nqy Sfrt Advanced Regtl line to position generally N-S on W bank of Piva River. 3d Bn, 9th Mar relieved of Def of Beach Limit by 3d Def Bn and took position tying in on R flank of Regtl Line. Regtl Tfyn Co was Atchd to 3d Bn, 9th Mar. Continued organization of supply and construction of roads and trails, (Tor disposition of units, See Cfrer lay No, 5), .

J v 8 At 1400, Rdr Co passed through road block and Atkd to N. fo 4th Flat, Regtl Wpns Co with 2 Tks was ordered to Reinf the road block. At 1600, 2d Rdr Regt, having committed 2 Relnf Cos to action and being unable to advance, withdrew behind road block for the night. At 1600, Ist Bn, 148th Inf reported under operational control 9th CT, and was assigned mission as Sub-sector Res. Orders were received from CG, 3d Mar Div for 9th CT to organise Atk and clear Japanese from front of road block commencing at daylight, Nov 9. 3upply to 2d Rdra and to 2d on, 9th Mar, was very difficult on account of swampy tralle. Nov 9! At 0800, CO, 9th CT, went Fwd to coordinate Atk on Japan ese positions Fwd of road block. 3d Rdr Bn Atkd with 2 Cos abreast a stride Plva Trail after a 15 minute Arty preparation by Ist Bn, 12th liar, 2d Bn, 9th Mar In support. 1 Sec of Tks and 4th Plat, Regtl Wpns Co in Res. Atk advanced slowly at not more than 100 yds per hour. Flanking maneuvers were restricted by swamp. 3d Rdr Bn advanced to vi oinity of (135.0 214,4) and dug In for the night. At 1430, 3d Bn, 9th Mar reverted to 9th CT having been relieved by 2d Bn, 148 th Inf on Dlv left flank. At 1800, 3d Bn, 9th Mar designated as Dlv Res. Laruma River patrol from Co X, 3d Bn, 9th Mar returned at 1000 with one of ficer and one man WIA after having been In contact with Jap forces throughout Nov Bth & 9th. let Bn, 148tl Inf reverted to parent organi zation. 9th CT was ordered to pass through 3d Rdr Bn and continue Atk and capture Piva Village tomorrow morni i, Nov 10. Patrols to Torokina River and to the E reported no contact. Patrol from 2d Bn, 9th Mar, suffered seven men KIA or WIA when caught by Japanese advance agalnet the read block. (For disposition of unite, ccc Overlay No. 2.) Nov 10: Plan of Atk: At 0330, 9th CT to .pass through 3d Rdr Bn in column of Bns, 2d Bn, 9th Mar, In assault, Ist Bn, 9th Mar, in support, 3d Bn, 9th Mar remained in Div Res oocupylng R flank of Div BH. 3d Bn, 2d Rdr Regt, was assigned mission of protecting left (NY) flank of Atk Atk to be preceded by 15 Minute Arty preparation froa 0910 to 0925. At 0925, 1 Squadron (12 planes) to bomb and strafe sides of Piva Village ' Trail and Piva Village.
bombing run was marked by Arty smoke when planes arrived
Site of on station at 0900 (planes acknowledged target at 0920). H-hour was held up for ten minutes to allow Rdr patrol to withdraw .from the area Pwd of L/D. At 0945, planes made bombing run and 2d Bn, 9th Mar, Atkd. At 1100, Plva Village was occupied by 2d Bn, 9th Mar, which organised a perimeter Def around Plva Villa**, and dug in. Ist Bn, 9th Mar, dug in astride Numa-Numa Trail BSO yds to the N of Numa-Numa Trail Piva Trail Junction. Regtl CP established vicinity of Pt (135. a 214.6) (See Overlay No. 3). Supply Dps -were organized on 'Piva Village Trail with Amph Trace bringing up rations and Am. Co A, 19th Mar, re-attacb* to 9th CT. Orders were received from GO, 3d Mar piv, to occupy and or gan! *f the line A to E commencing at daylight tomorrow, BqvU, 2d Rdr Regt detached 9th liar and plaa*Tin Div Res. (Bee Overlay HoT*)* Be tween 2130 and 0100 received repeated bombings by relays of Japanese

- -

155

iSS

of the ground and active patrol, h<>Btile activity and for route n* terrain information. Bridge crossing sites reconnoitere ge r rOBB Pl ya Hiver cone "oted in preparation for adOn tl v no '> }7th > P atrolits Co C, . n Bn, 9th Mar had contact with enemy 500 yds in front of oompany .-ea; two men XXA and two others WIA (one of these dying of the wounds c.c next day). Other minor con tacts reported by patrols from 2d 3n, 9th liar.
Nov 21.,:. 9th CT advanced to general N-3 line 1000 yds E of Plva
River occupied and commenced organism,: this line for Def. Tied in on beach on R flank and with 21st- Bar on left flank. No enemy contact* during advance, (For disposition of units, see Overlay No. 6). ffov ?3-23;, Continued organisation of ground with intensive pa " trolling to the front at all points.. 4; Reserve. 3n (Ist Bn,.9th>Mar) ordered QY to Relnf 3d Mar Sec tor at 1430; reported thereat and went under control 3d CT at 1730. (See Overlay No. 7). Nov ? 5.\ let Bn, 9th Mar committed to action by 3d Mar and engag ed with enemy forces in vicinity o? Pt (136,2 218.7). (For detailed report of action, see Enclosure B). 3d Bn, 9th Mar was ordered under control 3d Mar and uoved to 3d Mar Sec. Ist Bn 145th Inf relieving t 3d Bn, 9th Mar at 1410. (3ee Orerlay i .', 8). Nov 26 1 Ist Bn, 9th Mar continued Atk at daybreak and reached 4fc its Ob J by 1000. 3d Bn, 9th Mar relieved 3d Ba,3d Maj% let Bn, *3d Mar in Res under control of 9th CT. 3d Mar and .9th Mar exchanged commands of eub-aeotore at 1600. (See Overlay No. 9). ftpv 3?j 2d Bn, 9th Mar was relieved by 3d Mar and relieved 2d Rdn of positions on left of Regtl Sector ("cc Overlay No. 10). Nov fift; 9th Mar advanced to new line (FOX) with let Bn, 9th Mar and 2d Bn, 9th Mar in assault, 3d Bn, 9th Mar in Res. Regtl Wpns Co, 9th Mar was relieved by 3d Spl Wpns Bn and assigned AT Def of Regtl Bee. (Por positions occupied, see Overlay No. 11).

?. -2 5 * vlLl i?
;'^

linoof

!?' !i a ? Continued ?dvn e Vht

rOB

organization

lva Rlver fl

?o?S

g g

'

Kov 2ft-3Of Continued organisation of the ground and intensive pa trolling, to the front. Several minor contacts reported by patrols. Pee 1? Continued normal patrols t the front. Reconnoltered final perimeter defense line. Peo 2: 3d Bn, 9th Mar sent 15 man patrol to high ground (Hill *

AOOO/

\u25a0

Pec 3>4: All units oontinued patrolling Pwd of their lines. Road construction to present unit position, continued at slow rate 'due to swampy terrain. Peo 5{ d Bn, 9th Mar patrol had oontaot with Japanese; two KIA and two VIA. Jap opposition totaled. 10 Japs with light Mtfs who with drew after a few bursts. 3d PrcKt Bn passed throurfi our' lines to oc cupy Hill1000. Pec 6; R-2 and 40 man patrol left to reconnolter area 6000 yds forward of front lines* Deo 7: 3d Bn, 9th Mar moved from Regtl Res to a position extend ing from the R flank of 2d Bn, 9th' Mar and the left flank of Ist Bn, 9th Mar, respectively, to.a Pt near Hill1000 where they tied in with the 3d Proht Bn. All units oontinued aggressive patrolling. 3d Bn, 9th Har reported Japs; in front of their, lines. Our Arty shelled enemy occupied area- within 50 yds of our front lines. (See Overlay Mo. 12).
Pec a; R- patrol returned having killed one Japanese; also re ported having seen unoccupied Japanese positions in vicinity of (141. 220.4). 3d Bn, 9th Mar reported finding 7 enemy dead in area shelled by Arty in front of their lines yesterday. All units continued normal

Deo 9: Co B, Ist Bn, 9th Mar moved up to take position in gap be tween 3dn, 9th Mar and 3d Prcht Bn. At 1546, Prcht Bn was hit hard by Relnf Co of Japanese. At 1620, remainder of Ist Bn, 9th Mar and a Bn of 21st Mar were ordered to~leave their positions and move up to a bivouac area preparatory to reinforcing or; relieving the 3d Prcht Bn. (For dispositions of our units, see Overlay No. 13). Dec 10: Ist Bn, 9th Mar and Ist 21st Mar relieved 3d Proht B on Hill1000. 3d Proht Bn attached to 3th Mar as Sub-eeotor Ris (For disposition of our troops, see Overlay No. 14)."

patrols*

156

|st>

\u2666

Pec Hi All units conducted normal patrolling. Pec 12 ; Ist Bn, 9th Mar reported oemy Arty registering towards evening. All units conducted norunl patrolling. Pec 1?,? Ist Bn, 9th Mar reported 23 Arty shells landing in Bn area during morning and resulting in injuries to some of our troops. Ist Bn, 9th Mar reported friendly plans bombing and strafing its po sitions during evening, killing one and injuring several of our men. gee 14: All unite oontlnued aggressive patrolling. Some Japanese mortar shells fell in Ist Bn, 9th Mar area. Dec 15- 16-17- 18-19: Patrolling continued. Dec 20: Preparations made for the evacuation of WAM Category feear and personnel on Dec 21. Deo 21-22: Japanese Arty shells landed in Ist Bn, 9th area, uur Arty placed heavy concentrations o.i suspected Japanese Mar positions. Deo 2 9i Land nine exploded in Ist Bn, 9th Mar area and killed one Lt and one enlisted man and Injured four other members of Co A. Dec 24-26: Normal patrolling. Deo 26: Enemy Arty estimated to b^ 3 Btrys shelled Evaneville nr^ in the evening. Our Arty conducted-u iter-Btry fire during night. Poo &?' All unite relieved or fro. t line positions in the morning and moved, to bivouac area preparatory to embarking for BEVY tomorrow. ddProht Bn detached from 9th CT and was Atchd to 164 th Inf. 9th Mar CP closed at 1200.
Deo 28 ; 9th Mar embarked for BEVY.

(a) Intelligence: Maps and Aerial Photographs furnished for this operation were found to be inadequate in that they failed to how the true terrain conditions, particularly as regards swampy areas,
information of the terrain Jwd of our lines was obtained almost en tirely from patrol reports. Information gained from these patrols, as a whole, reliable. The terrain In general followed the sketches
was
which ware brought back by patrols. Distant patrolling was conducted by this Regt but the information gained was generally of more uee to the higher echelons ac it did not pertain to conditions to our Immed iate front.
The use of trained, dogs to operate with our patrols wae found
helpful and gave patrole confidence. Numeroue dooumente were captured and forwarded to higher echelon for examination. Prisoners captured gave" information of some value ns to Identity of unite and condition of onemy troops. Generally speaking, Japanese tactics in the Jungle followed the pattern previously reported in numeroro documents and bulletins dis seminated to thie organization during course of training. It was noticeable on numerous occ aions that the enemy would oc cupy previously dug emplacements for ? limited period, only to with draw and re-occupy them at a later dat^. Japanese methods of marking trail3appeared very efficient. Trails were found to be marked by vines sttached to trees three feet above the ground. These were apparently us<Jd for night guidance. Also used were previously reported Japanese take markers with name of trail written on face of stake. In one instance, in the vicinity of the To rokina Hiver, it was -noted that bamboo strips were used to indicate the Junction of a' trail with the river bed (thick vegetation along bank of river prevented quick detection of trail opening when observed from Japanese held bank). In general, Japanese emplacements found in the Empress Augusta Bay Area followed closely the patterns described in previous Intelli gence Bulletins. Most common type of individual emplacement were onenan foxholes, dug into the side of hills under large rocks and betweer roots of giant banyan trees. In one instance a large dugout capable of protecting a soall CP was dug under rock. (b) Tactical Phases : Our standard tactical dootrines proved to be adequate and sound. Our attacking formations were well a dapted to the ground. The Atk was ordinarily made in Contact Imminent Formation with two Bns abreast, Bne with two Cos abreast, with Cos in Plat columns. The use of supporting weapons, particularly HMOs and Mortars, wae rather restricted due to lack of observation and natural fields of

3.

COMMENTS:

157

57

mediate front. Reconnaissance for the bomber strip found that the only suitable site was a considerable distance inland and as a result it was neces sary to establish a long BHL immediatel./ with the troops available. Such frontages as had to be assigned, tx erefore, created great diffi culties in supply and evacuation as well as communication and security measures which placed an extra burden upon the subaector defense force, These difficulties were overcome by careful planning for each contin gency, intensive patrol schedules, and the construction of numerous roads, trails and communication facilities. Patrols, In general, consisted of one officer and twenty men with a high percentage of automatic Wpns included. The BAR is considered an Invaluable weapon for patrolling. The use of machetes on patrols must be limited since no sound travels as far in the Jungle as a chopping
(c) Specific Srueatf ements : (See Enclosures B & C). (d) Movement: This organ Nation landed on the left flank of the Oiv with 3 LTs abreast. It was r ved in successive echelons to the right flank of the Dlv Sec. This me ement was accomplished by AmpL Traos and marching. Kuch difficulty was experienced in maintaining sup plies and organizational equipment in n state of combat readiness, particularly during the early phases o* the operation due to the fact that the bulk of our supplies and equipment could not be landed on assigned beaches behind Bns, but were landed some miles away behind another organisation. This was necessary due to all boats broaching on the original landing beaches assigned to us. However, as a consequence much property was lost and never recovered. No night movement of large forces was made at any time. Movement forward in advancing the BHL was usually through the aoet difficult terrain consisting of virgin Jungle, swamps, rivers and mountains. The Anph Trace proved Invaluable both In ferrying troops from the left to the right flank of the BHL when that move wad "made as well as transporting supplies forward through swamps that were impassable to any other type of transporta noise.

fire. Arty supporting flrea and aircra. t support were excellent. Air support le not only feasible in this type of terrain but also invalua ble, both from the standpoint of morale of our own troops and for its ability to inflict heavy damage upon hostile dispositions to the im

(c) Supply: Paragraph 4(b) of this report contains re pertaining to supply. (f) Evacuation: Due to unforseen oircumstancee, the Mcd Co which normally operates with this Regt was unable to function with this organisation during the early stages of the operation. During the latter stages a new Mcd Go was assigned to the Regt. The evaouatlon of the slok and wounded, and of the dead, from the front lines to the Regtl Aid Sta was normally carried out by littersover swamp and difficult terrain* The evacuation from the Regtl Aid Sta was usually accomplished by Anph Ti ics, which again proved their great value In this operation*

tion*

oomnendatlonB

Aerial photographs, particularly o bllques, taken at low level and in sufficient numbers to provide at least one set for each Plat, should be supplied prior to the landing. Similar photographs of terrain over which advance is intended like wise should be made available. Photo maps showing definite terrain conditions are essential* Xt is recommended that intensive instruction in Ren patrolling be given all Inf Units* (b) Supply; (l) Rations: The emergency rations as issued gave suf ficient food value for periods when hot food could not be provided. For continuous supply of a week or more in stabilised positions, where galleys can not be set up, the 6-in-l rations is considered superior to the "JB ration. The "J* rations, in either case however, should be added over and above any regular emergency ration in sufficient quan tity to provide additional variety to the men. This Regt had to sub sist three Bns for one month during which rations were manhandled from
(a) Intelligence:

4*

RCOKMNOATIOHS:

\u2666

158

IS*


one
4

workw

(4) Supply Routes; aoh Inf Regt must have attached

at least one Combat Engr Co, with at least 2 TD-9 Bulldoters, in or der to function at high efflclenoy in this type of terrain. Any other
arrangement lessens combat efflclenoy and movement of the organiza tion. The construction of oorduroy ro& - beds should be avoided when
other types of roads are capable of being constructed. During this
operation it was noted that 6B Bns wit:, their heavy road making e quipment oould construct a two-way, all purpose road, at a much faster
rate per day, rain or shine, than core roy could be cut and laid for
temporary roadway. Corduroy took many iore aanhours per road foot and
required personnel in suoh large numbers as to hinder other necessary

to tvo miles over difficult terrain. One 3n had to manhandle all Its rations and supplies for a period of eight d'iys through swamps during the enrly stages of the operation. In this connection It was found th*a the ration raoat easily tra .i >orted In bulk, by hand, Is the "B" ration* It v."\s found that nore ana v . ttcr food could be furnished using the type "B" rfttlono, considering even the extra burden of bring ing up the galleys and fuel, and with less strain on carrying parties than If the concentrated loads In whl' the emergency rations are boxed were used. On this operation, gpiley equipment itnown as the "out fit cooking pack", was found adequate. Stoves are too bulky and add little to a field cook's ability to pr duce palatable food under the conditions of supply and types of food vailable. (2) Amnunltlon: "Where :;jaunltlon has to be manhandled
over difficult terrain for long dlstan :es. It is recommended that the
small arms amnunltlon box sites be halved as this willfacilitate the
handling even in the rear areas.
(3) Clothing: Clothlnf. of the type issued was adequate. It is recommended that the issue of or. camouflage suit with large pockets be made standard for combat op 'rations. The transport pack containing extra olothing was not a satisfactory medium of supply for the individual during this operation. It is impracticable for a man to be loaded with a transport pack while engaged in combat. Transport packs, hastily dumped in assembly areas, are subject to weather de-. terioration, rear area bombings, pilfering and lons. If clothing can be issued by the 414 as opportunities are afforded by the combat situa tion, the transport pack with its consequent deficiencies nay and should be eliminated. Fresh clothing must be issued at frequent inter vals to prevent spread of "Jungle rot" and infected feet. Smaller sizes in olothing, especially trousers, should be sup plied. The present system of clothing sites does not work. At least 70# of the men wear no larger than a sige3d waist after a short time in actual oonbat. The nay. Array ooobat boot with 5 inch top should be .\u25a0-. issued in lieu of our present field shoe*.

(o) Transportation! Thlf. headquarters recommends the

following additional -motor transportation be assigned to combat teams
as a result of this operation: 1 Athey Trailer Platoon in lieu of the same number of Bi-ton truoks in the M? Co. It is further recommended that half of the Jeeps allotted to the Inf Bns be replaoed with oneton trucks. Those trucks can negotiate terrain where Jeeps will bog down. Amphibian Traotore and A they Trailers with tractor prime mover were the only types of transportation that were suitable in this
operation until suoh times as roads were constructed. We need more of
them. (d) jftracuatlon! It is reoommended that the reg ularly assigned this Regt for training be always assigned Mcd Co to this or ganisation in combat. It is recommended that prompt designation of cemeteries be made. Only in extreme oases should itbe neoeesary to inter remains and then remove them later to a cemetery for final burial. _, c) foflMltWn? Field sanitary measures were well handled in most Instances and as a oonsequenoe flies were not a prob lem. In some oases enemy dead were not burled deeply enough with the result that maggots cane through the ground and flies started to bxeec
._

<

(\u2666)

rf

necessitating re-burial with a deeper jrave. For lon^ periods bathing and washing facilities were not available and the skin condition known as "Jungle rot" appeared on a lur^e percentage of troops. It is recommended that the Field Bath and St-irilizitlon units of the Div be pooled and made available to units at specified times. In this way troops will, be enabled to get a hot bath and have their combat suits sterilised en masse when they are in a reserve area or con be spared from the front lines. (f) Puns. 75mm Anti-Tank. Self Propelled: These vehicles did excellent work in knocking out enor.iy pillboxes on Puruata Island. However, four members of the crew were Jellied and a number wounded by grenades thrown from trees and from th ground while thus employed. It is recommended that some form of anti-grenade netting be fitted to these vehicles to protect the personnel operating the gun in Jungle warfare. Experiments along this line are being conducted by this Regt. (g) Field Fortifications: A standard tyoe of foxhole suitable for both protection from the laments and eneoy fire should be evolved. The tendency among many of the men was to get overhead protection from the rain rather than construct a real defensive po sition. Where the position is to be held for some time the standard foxhole should be suitable for improvement into a standing fire trench with living space and overhead cover. A board convened within this. Regt la now studying this matter.

(h) JPostoffloe Facilities; Postofflce facilities which would enable men to send and receive registered letters and money orders should be provided at the earliest practicable date after .getting settled ashore*

160

100

+
\u25a0fejfcj^
H* Ist

an,

9th Mar. 3d Mar Div, FXF. ,

3 January>

Cvi flC^fWf*
Subject:

1944#

Aooount of shfllKWient with Japanese oh 25 November 1943, in Cape Torokina Area, Bnpress Augusta Bay, Bougainville Islani, British Solomon Islands.

On 21 November, 1943. this Bn was occupying a position 1. in Regtl Res near the Fiva River. At 1500 a warning order was receiv ed plaoing the 3n on th* alert to mo- -c out on 30 minutes notice. At 1600 the Bn was ordered to move N alcag the Piva Trail and Nuoa-Numa Trail with orders to report to CO, 3d xiar, under operational control <nt 200 yds S of the 3d Mar CP of 3d Mar. At 1730 the Bn reached a and was ordered to an assembly area 1 the night and to be prepared to move into front lines as soon aftt daylight as possible.

During the night the B. "eoeived orders to move out at 2. > a position on "Civic 0715 on the morning of 25 Nov, 1943, Rid^e" ocoupied by Co L, 2d Rdr ?egt and Re* n'pnn Co, 3d Mar, from this position to Atk on a front of 400 yd direction of Atk 80 Mag. , obJeotlve to extend the left flank of e3d Bn, 3d Mar. The 2d Rdr Regt to Atk on our left flank on fro: of 800 yds. The distance to final objeotlve was estimated at 800 yds. Arty support on distant noses to front from H-15 to H-5 and mortar support on olose areas from H-5 to H-hour was to bs furnished by 3d Mar.

3. It was neoessary for tha Bn to reach the initial posi tions on "Civic Ridge" by a very sttsp trail and by proceeding in single file this was accomplished at 0930. guides being furnished by the 3d Mar. from the position on "Clvo Ridge" a good view could be obtained but no observation of close-in terrain. neny information was meager* The Ist Bn launched the Atk at 1000, Co A on the left, 4. Co C on the right, Co B in Res to follow on order. Atohd MO Plats supported aaoh Co. Mortar positions were seleoted on "Clvio Ridge." Attacking down the steep slops* of "Civic Ridge", Cos A and C came under fir*of enemy automatlo weapons and the assauit platoons were quiokly held up. Both Co Comdrs maneuvered their Res Plats to develop the enemy positions and a fleroe flrt fight developed that lasted un tillate evening. A rough sketch of the enemy position is shown be low":

Ihe enemy was well dug in, in a complete all-round defense of the knoll and it is estimated that there were 90*70 Japanese in the po sition with four HMOs, 1 LMOs (Haobua), and plentifully supplied with grenades. The assault Cos tried on all sides to knock out the
Page 1, nol (B)

COthMa,fPaJ|

p6Hsf DtLk

1S

pel at distances of 5-50 yds and it waa found that mortar fire vas impossible as It frequently tell too near adjacent Plats, In the main c f iahtwas conducted by use of rifles, BARs, and grenades and all around the hill Marines fought to within a few yds of the crest of the hill and many of the lower dug outs were destroyed, The Ist Plat of Co A reached the left rear of the Japanese position and fought its way up the Japanese trail nearly Into the position. In this action they killed 14 Japanese and severed en emy communication wire, nil the other rlats had the same success but were unable to reach the top of the hill. The Japs threw a large num ber of grenades until the men refer to this action as "Grenade Hill," At 1530 it was decided to use Co 3 to close the gap between the right of Co C and the left rear of th^ 3d Bn, 3d Mar. This was affec ted by dark, but several Japanese groups were encountered and close ty ing in of the lines was impossible, Co B digging In for the night along the East-West Trail. During their action, they killed two Japanese and silenced several MGs, fighting -until after dark. On the morning of 26 Nov., scouts reported that "Grenade Hill" had been evacuated and it was quickly occupied by Cos A and C. At 1015 the Atk continued, Junction was effected with Co B and final ob jective reached which turned out to be a small ridge astride the ast-

West Trail.

This action was chiefly llstingulshed by the fierceness 5. of the Atk by our Plats of Cos A and C With no support they sucoeedec in killing32 Japanese in a strongly i rtlfled position and foroing his withdrawal. Co 1 killed 2 Japanese and undoubtedly all units caused some other damage. 12 LMGs of tha Naubu type were destroyed*

by land

mines

In addition, one offioer and two enlisted were wounded

exploding while moving to the line of departure*
for medals and Letters of Coanendatlon*

Outstanding exanples of conduct and leadership on the

7. part of offloers and men of this BrTtrra covered by separate letters

of recommendation

//

CA. RANDALL. C. A. RANDALL,

>

o**0 **

3dMa;Oiv.

Ih
ST

'

JfHO. II f%M

3d Bn, 9th Mar. 3d Mar Dlv. FHT, IN THE FIELD.

From: Tc : Subject:

Foroee by 3d Bn # 9th Mar on Bougainville, from 1 Nov 28 Deo., 1943, On 7 Not, at 0600, two i<.p boats landed about 400 yd* 1. of the Div left flank. Co X, with 3d Mat Regtl Wpns Atohd vm the left flank Co of the Div, The Japs moved into the Jungle and then t toward our line. Initially thty were estimated aa 60 to 60 men. Mor tar and Arty fire waa placed on the aesumed looatlon of the Japs* There being no Res available then, I was ordered to Atk Weetward Co from its defeneive poeition. The Atk waf launohed at 0620. The left Plat hit the Jape who were digging in about 160 yds from the Div MLR, very heavy fighting eneued, mainly MO and rifle flrt. The center and right Plats of X Co turned S and Atkd the Jape. Many Jape were killed but little advance wae made by ue ac the Jape were being reinforced from boats further down the beach. About 1316 B Co, 3d Mar oroeeed the MLR on the left and moved up Just uehind C Co, 3d Mar wae supposed to Atk on Be right and ohelone KOe*eleft. d to the roar but they did not contact X Co except later back in the defeneive position. When X Co reported that B Co wae in position. Z ordered I to with Co draw to lte defeneive poeitlon which they did, Caeualtlee were 6 k*< and 13 wounded. The next day 136 Japanese were found dead in the are*.
2. On 7 Nov about 0600, approximately a Bn of Japs landed near the mouth of the Uruma R. X Co had a patrol of one nit m Ifae river. This patrol came down the river., ran into the Jap* on th* 1 bank, killed eeveral in a eklrmieh, and eeeing that the Japs wore ooav ing up both sides of the river, the patrol moved baok up stress, am bushing eeveral Japa who were following, and then movsd Eastward into the large awamp. During the action the patrol Leader was wounded and one man le still missing* The patrol came through the ewamp to I Co lines in 30 houri. About 0616 a Jap Co (estimated) moved from the mouth puma R and rftn into tb M Wat M Co plus a Flat he of Sl Bn (Scouts) iAtchd, a patrol, which was dug In between tfaa Co E 3d Tk She/^S aetan and a swamp. The Jape were surprised and a lot were klUsd in the i nitlal action. The fighting was fairly heavy, the Japs using rifles, MOe and Mortara. Our patrol had an Arty FO party tat Its radio did no work. The Arty officer got baok to the main lines and oalled by tele phone for a concentration which fell exaotly on the Japs. About 1000 the patrol withdrew to euooeaaive delaying posltlos* near the bsaoh. They ran into the Jape facing X Co but were soon taken off in boats and returned to Bn. Marine oaeualtles, 2 KXA and 2 wlA* Estimated 26 Japaneee dead.

Report of actiWls with Japanese

/^*

3. About 1630 on 7 Deo 43 a party of Japs approached our lines on the ridge one mile M of Hill1000. We opened firs and pinned them down on a email knoll about 76 yds M of I They attempted to Co. advance but our MO, rifle and mortar fire e topped them. The firing stopped about 1900. We plaoed harrasslng firs with Arty on the knoll
throughout

the night. At 0700 the next morning a two-squad patrol in some Jape. 61 and 60mm firs were placed exaotly on that spot and a Plat of X Co advanced under oover of 60mm firs to take the knoll. The Japs had Jumt retreated and could be heard down the hill in the Jungl Mo further oontaet was m4/BtKJO Jap foxholss were found on the knoll and 7 dead Jape on and Vo Marines were hurt*
vestigated the knoll from the Vest elds and found it still oooupled b

& T3Km^jl*fc^_ ?
l

End (C) Co9thMar Ltr CO,

3dMarDi7r \u25a0 *b# glfi*fJfefl

mti
Aid "\u25a0 BS

off

111

WMSSiHfIi
From: To :
Subject:

Eg, 21t Marines In the Field.

31 January. 19UU

The Regimental Commander.

The Commanding General, Third Marine Division.

Operations on Bougainville, report of.

Enclosures:

Annex A., Situation Overlays. Annex B, Operations of Ist Battalion, 21st Marines
Battalion, 21st Marines Annex C, Operations of 2nd Bat 12-lU Yovember, 19U3.
Annex D, Medical Report.

7-lW November, 19U3.

1, The following is a report of operations carried out by this regiment daring the Bougainville campaign, 6 Hevember, 19U3, to 9 January, together with comments and recommendations for changes which it is believed these operation* revealed are necessary.

19^.

Combat Teas 21 moved to Bougainville In three echelons for participation in operations on that island. The first echelon, consisting of the regimental advance aommand group and the Ist Lending Teas, arrived on 6 lovenber 19U3 OHS). Attached speolal and service troops, engineer, and artillery a.
mite of the T-eV Team reverted to control of parent organisations after landing, and the Ist Battalion (let Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company attached) was attached to the 9th Marines, then occupying the right seotor of the beachhead, and placed in reserve in the Torokina Point area* The regimental advance CP was established in the same general area. 7or disposition, see Annex A.

2*

9oMmary

of Operations.

4^g

On 7 Bovomber, 19U3, the Ist Battalion (Use Ist Platoon, Regimental b. weapons Company) was detached by division order from the 9th Marines and moved by *ir*f craft to the left of the beachhead where it was attached to the conducting 3rd Marinas for operations against Japanese foroes general area,harassing attack* attached to the The Ist Battalion remained in that in that area. , until 3rd Marines, and subsequently the lUftth Infantry,report Ik November 19U3. when of operations of the Ist it reverted to control of the 21st Marines, for Battalion from 7-lH Hovember, 19*3 (lnclusiTe), cc Annex B, Operations of the
Ist Battalion, 21t Marines, 7-lW Bovtmfeer, 1943. the regimental advnnee command
group remained in the Torokina Point area, la close liaison with division head
qpArtera, planning for the bivouacking of the weeond echelon of the regiment.

The second echelon, consisting of the regimental rear oommand group an? the 2nd landing Team, arrived a** landed shortly after daylight on
11 loves*er, 19*3. Attached special an# service troops, engineer, and artillery
unite of the 2nd landing Team reverie* to their parent organisation* and the 2nd
Battalion (less 2nd Platoon. &eglme<*l Weapons Company) wae moved north along
the Ttnmr. >nma trail to its selected Uvouae area. The regimental CP displaced ** Hegimaatal Weapone Company (less
forward at the came time to the *\u25a0 two platoons) remained in the 'rokina Point area. A regimental rear echelon,
consisting of the regimental juartermaster section plus representatives of the supply section of the 2nd iWtaUon, remained In the Torokina Point area to regiment as it wae landed. A OJf clerk was stationed on assemble the equipment of

>

*T!S

Puruata Island to look out for regimental equipment lnndod there. For dis positions of tho regiment (loss two battalions Mid two platoons. Regimental trcapons Conpany) at the close of operations 11 Uov U3, see Annox A, Situation
Overlay.
On 12 Nov I+3, tho 2nd Battalion was moved to a bivouac area d. farther north on tho Numa-Nuraa Trail, about UOO yards in roar of tho 9th Mp.rinos' front lines, in order to make sufficient area available for the Ist Battalion whose return was anticipated. There was a definite lack of suitable terrain for bivouac aroas throughout tho area owing to the swampy nature of the terrain. On the afternoon of 12 Nov U3, the regiment was directed to send, at 0630, 13 Nov U3, a patrol of one company up the Numa !Tuma Trail to its Junction with tho East-Vest Trail and to reconnoiter beyond the Junction along each trail for a distance of 1000 yards with a view to the later establishment by division of a strong outpost in that area. Tho 2nd Battalion was directed to send a riflo company on this mission. Company "2" was assigned this mission. Tor dispositions at the olose of operations on orders ware 12 Hot U3, see Annex A, Ovorlay. During the night of 12 Vov received from division to increase the patrol for the following day to at least two oompanies with a forward observer party and suitable command group and establish an outpost at the Junction of the Vuma-Vuma and last-Vest Trails. Orders were Issued for the 2nd Battalion to nova out the nest morn ing as soon as the forward observer party arrived.

At 0730 on 13 Vov U3, whon it appeared that the 2nd Battalion

a. would be~dolayed in its departure by the late arrival of the forward observer
party, division ordered that one company clear the front lines and proceed
Orders ware issued the 2nd
to the Vuma-Vum* and l*st-Vest Trail Junction. Battalion to this effect and Company "1" claared the front lines at QfOO. Che 2nd Battalion (laaa "1 Conpany) cleared at 1100. At 1105 Compaay "1* , nude contact with a superior Japanese force in position at the Coconut drove about 500 yards south of the Vuma-Vuma and last-Vest Trail Junction. Oompany "X* attacked to develop the enemy situation, reporting the situation to the Battalion Commander, than, with the remainder of the Battalion, moving north astride the Bum*-Varna, Trail. Proa the report of the messenger, the Battalion Commamiar beUevod Company J to be U a serious situation and moved his re taining ooapnales up rapidly and committed them to a piecemeal attack. The
battalion was unable to drive the Japanese from their positions, and at I*lo
withdraw a short distance and organitad a perimeter defense for the night. ?he Battalion Commander estimated the enemy force to consist of a reinforced
rifle ooapany. dug In, with numerous snipers in trees and several machine
Tins. At I*3o the 2nd Balder Battalion of the 2nd Balder Begimemt was attach od to the 21st Marines and sent forward to secure the Una of communication
between the perimeter and the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marinas, along the BuaaVuma Trail. Bo action other than occasional sniper fire, was taken by the enemy daring the night. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Karlnes, in direct support cf the 21st Marines, placed harrassslng fires around the perimeter of the 2nd Battalion. 21st Marinas throughout the night, for dispositions of the see Annex regiment and attached units at the close of operations 13 Vov
A, Overlay.
At dawn on Ik Vov I*3, enemy snipers were again active against
f. the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, The Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 21st
Karlnes, pushed reconnaissance patrols forward to determine the enemy dis positions, preparatory to laxmohinc mk attack. Pive light tanks, requested
by the regiment the night of 13 Vov k} moved forward from the beach area at
t 05U5, reporting at the regimental CF. They were directed to move forward
r.long the Vuma-Vuma Trail and Join the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, to which
they ware attached on arrival.

-2

fl

15^5*

The litBattalion, 2let Marines, was detached from the lUBth Infantry in the vest sector, reverting to 21tt Marines control pud closing in a bivouac area Twenty TBF's, carrying 100-pound just south of the regimental CP at 0900. l/10-second delay fuso "bombs, wore on station over tho beachhead at 0700 and were ordered to attack the enemy position at 0905. The attack was carried out p.b directed "between 0905 nd 0910. The 2nd Battalion was not prepared t-> launch nn attack at this timo because of several factors, rod the planes <rere unablo to remain on station any longor. The artillery marked the front linos with smoke shells prior to launching tho air attack. At 1135 th *rtil lory begm a preparation which lasted until 1155 when the 2nd Battalion launched an attack following a rollingbarrago "by the artillery, and support ed by the five tanks. No serious opposition was encountered and the battalion h-rd captured, the Aima-Ifaaa and 2ast-West Trail junction and organized a Enemy forces had withdrawn r.crimeter defense around that Junction by from contact, apparently to the east along the East-Vest Trail. Disposition cf tho regiment and its attached units at the close of operations on lU Hoy U3, are shown on Annex A, Overlay. Tor a detailed Account of the oper ations of the 2nd Battalion to secure the Ifaaa-Buma East-West Trail junction, see Annex C, Operations of tho 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, to se

cure tho HumaJfuma

last-West Trail Junction, 13-IU,

Hoy

U3.

At 1000 on 15 Hoy U3, tho 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, vas . attached to the 3rd Mar ins s when 'the .rfweer- Boaohhead line was advanced and tho 3rd Marino s occupied the sector which included tho position of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines. During this period, 18-21 soy U3, units of tho 2nd Battalion took part in numerous patrol actions along the Sast-West Trail east of the Piva Elver to develop tho situation on the 3rd Marines' front. i'he Ist Battalion, 21st Marl es, moved forward and occupied the bivouac area previously occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines. The regimental CP "r.s displaced forward to the sane area and the Begimental Veapons Company (less 3rd and Wth Platoons) was moved up from Torokina Point to an adjacent iirea. Tor dispositions, see Annex A, Overlay.
On 17 Boy the convoy bearing the 3rd Landing Team was jb>. vttackad by hostile alroraft off the Sspress jaigoatfeay area and the TJSS !!C X3AV, an' APS in which was embarked Company "I", 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines, was hit and sunk at o*loo. As a result, 3 men from that company wore nissinc. The 3rd Battalion landed at 0600 nod was moved to ita assigned rivouae area. The Jrd and Uth Platoons, Begtmental Weag>rns Company, ware noved forward to the bivouac area of the Regimental Weapons Company. Dispos ition*of the refluent (less 2nd Battalion) at the cloaa of operations on 17 Ifov U3, were aa shown on Annex A, Overlay.
wounding six. At 0830, in accordance with diviaion orders , the let Battalion was noved frosi lta bivottac area to a position in r^mm in rear of the 3rd Ilarines and attached to the 3rd Marinas. The Ist Battalion waa released to the 21st Marines and closed in its foraar bivouac area at 1530. Patrols vere sent out to the new forward beachhead Una (line "Basy") to make a terrain re connaissance and mark limitn*- points on that.line. i

in the-

On 19 Vov U3, during a hostile air attack, boribe vwre dropped U 3rd Battalion bivouac area, killing five, including one offloer, md

The 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines, was moved on 20 Vov U3, to an in rear of lta tone of action for the advance to Line Baay. A reinforced platoon fro* the let Battalion was aoved out to the regimental left limitingpoint on Line Baay as combat outpost and to assist in establishing contact between the 3rd Marines, on the Ift, end the 21st Marines when the rdvance waa aada to Line Sasy on the 21at. Tor dispositions at the close of operations on 20 Boy k}, see Annex A, Overlay.
assembly

4. area

180

\<to

k. The ,idv\nce eleinonts of the Ist and 3 rd Battalions crossed

d
the Piv?>~River rt 0730 on 21 Hoy k}, passing through the Ist BnUr.li'-n, Marines ?nd the Ist Battalion, 9th Marines, and arrived on the new line at
1U25. Both battalions moved forward in the center of their zonos of action
in a compact, easily-controlled approach march formation and extended to tho
right and left to their limiting points on arrival on Line 3i.sy. At l*+2s
the 3rd Battalion w^.b in contact with tho 9th Ifrrinne on tho right, but thoro
was no contact between the Ist and 3r< Battalions, or the Ist Battalion and
the 3r Marines on tho left. Ho enemy interferonco was encountered during the nnve. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, was released by the 3rd Marines at IOUS and closed In its former bivouac wren in the regimental reservo at lUOO. Tho regimental CP displaced to a position near the Piva River. On this day the reinforced platoon of the Ist Battalion (Company "A") in position at tho left limiting point of the reginent was attacked by a c^nsidorablo Japanese force. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy and important documents were obtained from a dead Japaneso officer. JPor dispositions at tho close of operations on the 21st, see Annex A, Ovorlay.

3^

Contact was established botwoen the Ist and 3rd Battalions on 1. 22 Hoy UJ, but patrols revealed a considerable gap oxisting between tho. Ist Battalion and the 3rd Marines on the left. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to send a company forward to reinforce the Ist Battalion to enable it to extend to the left to contact the 3rd Marines. Ho contact was established by dark, 22 Hoy U3.
At 151*5, 23 Hoy I*3, contact was established by the Ist Bat m. talion with the 3rd Marines. The frontage then occupied by the Ist Battalion was found to be greater than it appeared on the map, owing to inaccuracies in tho map. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to extend to the left I*oo yards to reduce the frontage held by the Ist Battalion. ?or dispositions at the close of operations on 23 Hoy U3, see Annex A, Overlay.

On 25 lov I+3, the line was advanced 500 yards to the east a* n. a result""of an Attack by the 3rd Marines. The 21st Marines were ordored to close tho gap thus created between tho 3^* Marines and 21st Marines, and a reinforced company of the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move into this gap. The line to be occupied by this ooapeny (Company "B") was in deep svnmp and thick jungle, and the company was unable to completely close the gap until the morning of the 26th. Tor dispositions at the close of operations on the 26th, see Annex A, Overlay.

W3, the -TbreeA Beachhead Idne was extended farther 9th Marines, then on the left of tho 21st Marines, and the 21st Marines shifted their sons of action to the left and extended to the east to tie-in with the 9th Marines. The 2nd Battalion la reserve was
to tho east (Line Tox) by the

o.

On 28

Hoy

A, Overlay.

shifted to a bivouac area at the a&st-Vest Trail crossing of the Piva River, and the companies attached to tho Ist Battalion ("S" and \u25a0!) were released to it. Tor dispositions at the close of operations on the 28th, see Annex

Patrolling to the east to the Torokina River on the 29th re . vealed no enemy to the west of the Torokina, On the 30th a detached poet. consisting of an officer and 21 men with a TBX radio, was established on Bill600 overlooking the Torokina River. This post was increased to a rifle platoon reinforced by a rifle company weapons platoon on 1Dee U3, la accord ance with division ordors. On 3 Dec I*3* authority was granted by division to reduce the detached post to its initialstrength. This was requested by regiment on the grounds that the post was operating as an observation post and the smaller the group the less the changes of discovery. Meanwhile, wire was run from the Ist Battalion to the Hill600 post to supplenent the TBX radio. Ho ammunition or supplies could be transported to the detached post except on the individual owing to the poor onnditlon of the trail.

181

t\

#>

q. In accordance with the division plnn to place the final Torec Beachhead 4ine (Lino How) along the high ground overlooking the Toro kina Rivor nnd to make the next move to that line, division issued ordors on 5 Dec U3, to increase the strength of the dotr.ched post on Hill600 to a rifle company, reinforced "by a machine gun platoon and rocket platoon. The rifle company and machine gun platoon were sent forward from tho 2nd \u25a0^attplinn *nd the rocket platoon was attached from Corps Troops, On 6 Dec lj -3. in compliance with division ordors, the remainder of the 2nd Battalion wps orderod forward to a previously reconnoitered outpost line along the Tnrokina River, just oast of Hill 600. Uo enemy opposition was encountered \t any timo during the operations in the vicinity of Hill600. An amphibian tractor trail had been completed across the swamp west of Hill600 on 6 Dec ; t3, permitting supplies to "be "brought up to the line of the Torokina River, thus making it possible to move the battalion forward. A parachute battalion had been moved forward to the high ground north of Hill 600, on the left of the 2nd Battalion. n 7 Dec U3, a 37mm gun platoon (less 37n a guns) of the Regimental Weapons Company was attached to the 2nd Battnlita. It was Im possible to get the 37ram guns forward at this time. For dispositions at the close of operations on 7 See U3, see Annex A, Overlay.

r. On 9 Dec W3, division directed that one company be moved for ward to the vicinity of Ivans vi lie and bivouacked, preparatory to the move ment forward within Its assigned tone of action of the remainder
of the regi ment on 10 Dee W3. Company "C", Ist Battalion, was moved to SvansTille,
The 3rd Parachute Battalion became heavily encaged on this date with a
strong
enemy force on their front and requested reiaforeeaente to strengthen weak
Company "C" vat ordered attached
points In their lines caused by casualties. to the 3*d Parachute Battalion at 1700 and moved Into pot ition on tho line.

of the let Bat tax: s. In accordance with plans, the remainder of the let Battalion Xn accordance plane, moved forward from Line Vox the morning of 10 Dee W3, to occupy the left sector of the regimental sector on Line Bow. She battalion sored la ooluaa along the Bast-Vect Trail, followed by tho 3*d Battalion, which wae to be in regimental reserve west of Hill6CO. It wae leaned la a reconnaissnoce of the 3rd Parachute Battalion sector by the Bogimental Ixeeutive Officer and the Coaaandinc Officer, let Battalion, prior to tho arrival of the let Battalion, that the enemy wae still active on tho mediate front of the Parachute Battalion, and the Oeaasndlac Officer, Parachute Battalion, waa re quested to call for an artillery concentration on the area of eneay activity prior to tho relief. Thie was done, but wae apparently ineffective, ac occas ional fire m still received fro* that area, the onony, however, appeared to be dug i&nearby, and was not active, so it was decided to go ahead with the relief. The relief was completed at 16U5. Tho 3rd Parachute Battalion had been unable to push their lines completely forward to Line Bow beoauee of 3, eneay otspoeitlon, tor dispositions at the do so of operations on 10 Sec V see Annex A* Overlay.

Prom 12*18 Deo I*3, operations were carried out to drive tho t. enemy from hie positions in front of tho Ist Bettailon so that tho battalion could, occupy and organise its assigned portion of tho fftsjSd Beachhead kino (Lino Hew). Reconnaissance and a epatured situation asp revealed that tho enemy occupied a well-*ug-in, allaround defensive position strong in Machine gone, on a spur of tho ridge occupied by tho Ist Battalion, 00unplug tho positions of the let Battalion, and about 100 yards froa tho loft of tho Ist Battalion lino. Tho captured asp indicated tho caeny strength to bo 235 and wae eetlaated to be a reinforced eoapany. Oapturod enemy docuaonts revealed tho eneay fores to be froa tho 23rd Infantry. Ispoatod infantry supported by artillery attacks wore launched during tho period 12-18 Doc and In four eases by air boablng. On tho evening of 18 Doe H3. following two air attack*, tho Infantry eolssd tho ridge. Units of both tho Ist Battalion and tho 3rd Battalion (reglaental reeerve) wore oaploysd in attacks on this ridge. Tho lines of the let Battalion wore pushed forward to the lias of tho Xagec Elver on tho aoanlng of 1$ Doe W3, d work was begun on the organisation of tho line for deliberate defense. Tor dispositions on 19 Dee see Annex
A, Overlay.
A t
182

?2

patrol activity between the Sagle and Torokina Rivers. There was consider -ible Japanese Activity in thi9 area during the period, but no offensive action was Pttonpted by tho enemy. Sevoral throo-day reconnaissance patrols were sent "beyond the Torokina River doo? into enomy territory. During the period the enemy periodically ehclled the roinont.-.l sector, using 75ran gun* *nd

v.

From

19 Dec U3,

to 1 Jan UH, operations consisted largely of

nvrtr.rs. Tho fire w^c i^.offoctivo and fow casualties resulted. Tho bulk of the encny firo foil in tho vicinity of 2v>nsvillo whoro supt>ly installations vrro located. On ?.l Dec V-j, p. reconnaissance patrol contacted a forco of lU to 18 Japaneso en HillbO^-A .-a.." rc.turnod v;*.th tho report. A combat patrol c-nsistin of a rrir.T'orreu r o'r.tirr. < f l"io ~nd 3r.ttp.lirr was sent out to attack . the uncay force. Tho pr J,r 1 t.-u10 o^.tT' vj\h :h^ on:r.y on tho top of Hill $00-A it 15^'5 and 1-vn ~hed ra m'h:;, cVriv^.n,,- t'.c r,r,r"iy fron tho hill. The \u25a0patrol had <^nc nrn i-illcd nr.d <":io viundcl. it ".vltV.o.row '-ithin nur linos prior to dr.rk as ordered. A3 r. ro^ilt r..f *;hi3 -iC^i^n. division orders were issued to establish and maintain, Va: lur the hours of dayM^ht, 'beginning 22 Doc U3, a detached post c^nsistir.ft of r reinforood platoon, with nn artillery forward observer party on Kill600-A. The 3rd Battalion (regimental reserve) was directed t" pro-zide this detached post and selected a rifle. platoon of Conpany "I", roinforced "by a hoavy machine gun plAtoon. Thit force A, nnd wiu met strong enemy rosistanco when it nep.red the top of Hill unable to advance. Tho enemy oc cup lei cnvorad onplacomont* at the foot of a roverse slope en the sharp crest of tho r?.dge line. Wire communication had been established to the jrd Battalion, and tho situation was reported to the 3attalion Commandor and thenco to Vno Kefimental Commnndor. The 3rd Battalion was directed to reinforce tho units In onatact with the remainder of Company "I". The company comnandor racvod out nnd attempted a double envelopment of where he estlnatod tho enemy position to be without verifying the situation with the platoon leador in contact, pud, as a result, his onveloping platoons noved into the platoon in contact rathor than the flnnks of the enomy positions. Heavy fire, including machinfc gun, was received from the enemy nosition and the company withdrew and brought down n& artillery concentration on the enemy position. This failed to dislodge the enemy and the conpany returned within the linos at dark. On 23 Doc U3, Company "X", reinforced by a heavy machine gun platoon moved out to attack the enomy position* One platoon wae sent forward along the narrow, steep ridge to determine the enemy vitiation. Heavy fire was received fey thie platoon. The platoon wae withdrawn and a thirty
minute artillery concentration placed on the enemy position. Artillery fire,
had appeared to be Ineffective owing to the many Urge treee on the ridge,
causing tree burite. One platoon wae sent forward after the artillery con

?orar.

600*

centration, met strong resistance, waa withdrawn, and a ten-aUn*caortar and

artillery concentration was placed on the enemy position. Tollowing thie, the company attacked, enveloping one flank but met heavy machine 9m fire and could not advance. The company wae withdrawn within the lines prior to dark. On

2h Dec U3, several roconnaieeance patrole cent out to Hill600*Afrom several different directions toward the enemy position, found the position unoccupied,
severed engagements
on Bill600-A

the enemy apparently having withdrawn during the night. Inspection revealed there were about 25 covered emplacements, some of which had been destroyed by artillery fire. One dead Jen woe found* Total casualties suffered during the
*ere

**

killed and 8 wounded.

On 1 and 2 Jan UU, the regiment was relieved by the 182nd In v. fantry, IX. 5. Army, and moved into corps reserve in the rear area. The regi ment remained in this area until 9 Jan W, when it wi embarked and returned
% 9 Jan Uk,
t- Guadalcanal. Tor dispositions during the period 1$ Dec see Annex A, Overlay.

-6

oi


3. Comments.

a. Tactics. (1) Qonarw.l: Sinco the enemy forces encoutered confined themselves entirely to delaying tactics, mostly astride the fluaa-lluma And East-West Trails, .-\nd on narrow fronts, the tactics of this regiment consisted of approach marches, loc.il attacks of units no larger than a battalion, interspersed with periods of icfo&so while positions were consolidated and supply routes improved or construc ted. The standing operating procedure adopted by this regiment prior to the Jnu^ninvillo campaign, which wr.s basod on a study of report* and recommendations r:.iy and mnrino units previously in coribat in this theater, was found to fee sourcl. (2) Movement. (a) Route marches : A number of route marches were made by units ildo regiment in enraging positions behind the beaohhead line. The roglnent
\u25a0>\u25a0\u25a0 -ns route march as a unit from the corps reserve area to the beach for em-
or./::vtion. Battalions moving from Line Tox to Lino Bow, well covered to the front
rong outposts, moved along tho last-West Trail in route column, files on either slit of the trail, and ooverod by an advance guard. Movement in an approach march formation astride the trail would have been praotieally impossible due to swamp. Inoraovor, speed was essential in this movement. lone of the route marches presentoO any problem as far as anti-aircraft security was concerned, since they were made in daylight, and hostile aircraft were inoperative over tho beachhead In daylight except for the first few days of the operation. (b) Approach marches t Approaoh marches wore made by all battalions. The Ist Battalion in advancing outside the beachhead toward the Laruaa River on 9 November 19^3 employed the "box" formation, which is one of the approach march formations called for in the regimental etandlng operating procedure, this formation provides all around security, it easily controlled through the wire com munication set-up, and facilitate* rapid/entry into action or a psrlaster defeat*, as the situation call* for. The battalion is covered by one oompamy, isbftah retains freedom of maneuver for the remainder of the battalion should the covering: company become engaged. The other two rifle eoapenle* follow behlad the flanks of the covering company at 100-200 yards distance in a oolumnar formation, with the weapons company closing the box in the rear. Battalion headquarters move* In the oenter of the formation. The 2nd Battalion in its advance up the 9mm ttirnw Trail toward the Junction of that trail with the last-Vest Trail oa ljlovesfcer, 19^3, used a modification of this formation, since it was lots on* rifle company, astride the trail. In the advance to Lin*iasy th* l*t and 3rd Battalion* employed the fBox" formation, moving up th* o*nt*r of th*lr son** for action, and extending to th* right and left after arrival on th* lin*. Interval* b*tw*nbattalion* were covered by combat patrols in this latter oaa* (3) Of*ulT Tactlot. (a) Battalion: Th* attack of th* 2nd Battalion against enemy positions south of th* Junction of th* Voaa-Jhuut and Xa*t-V*t Trail* on 13-lt November 19U3 was th* only battalion attack mad* by this regiment. This attack was definitely a piece-meal attack, compaal** being committed to action suc cessively without prior reconnaissance or ad*quat* knrwl*dg* of th* *n*sqr situation. It was unfortunat* that Company 1was ordered to mov* out co far ahead of th* remainder of th* battalion a* to b*beyond close supporting distance vhen it contacted th* enemy. Bsports reaching the 00 2nd Battalion, than 1200 yards to the south, that Company S was being cut to pieces, lnflusaeed him to nush his remaining companies forward sucoessively as rapidly as possible, resulting in their becoming engaged prematurely and without definite plan. Th* battalion commander on seeing the situation himself, ehos* th* b*st oours* of action open to him at the time by withdrawing all eoapani** and breaking off contact, Th* attack on Ik Hovember was well planned and well controlled. Bad th* battalion on 13 November been moving as a unit in aarapproaeh march formation, w*U covered, to the front by scouts and small patrols, and oa a broad front astrid* th* trail the enemy situation could have been developed without initiallycommitting a large force and a coordinated attaok could have Veen lwnnnhed following an artillery

184

I%^

nnd/or
nnd

sololy to anti-sniper work. The purpose of the snipers is to protect the ground Positions agaiast troops working up dose to them, and they are most effective. (b) Company and platoon: Moch of what was said about the battalion in attack applies to the company and platoon. Companies of this regiment launched rttacks against an estimated reinforced company of Japs, well dug- in with overhead cover in all around defense, with ample sniper cover from trees, oa a narrow steep ridge. There wae not sufficient space on the ridge for' the maneuver of a cntpany and company commanders worn forced to push one platoon frontally with a partial envelopment by another platoon. The muoh-written-about Jap rcveree slope Position was encountered here; foxholes at the foot of & knoll with a ten-yard field of fire to the top of the knoll. The undergrowth was thick and attacking ' troops could not see the Jap positions. As they cut their way through the bush over the top of the knoll they were taken under short range automatic fire from tho positions at the foot of the knoll. The Jap had a cleverly organised Fire system of bands of grasing automatic weapon fire covering all approaches. lanes could not be seen until the men were in thorn. The 60am mortare of our corapwxiee were invariably used to support the attacks but they were ineffective. They doubtless inflicted casualties but they did not pack the punch to make the neither holes for the infantry. The use of the Slmo mortar was extensive, and against could each it put the infantry across. Two oompanles were finally employed, one end of the ridge, like a nut craokor, in order to bring more troops, nad thus aore fire power, to bear. Both companies were pinned down by heavy automatic fire from the all nround defense as they neared the Jap positions. Although the Jap position was so cleverly eelected that it wae partially masked from artillery fire by tall trees in our front lines, such artillery ac could be brought to tear, plus repeated air bombing attacks brought the Japs to the surfaoe of the grounc pud paved the way for the selsure of the ridge by the infantry. In fact, they practically blasted the Japs off the ridge. Oace the Jap hae been rooted out ot his foxholes he can be readily dealt with. Yo changes are recommended in standard tACtics of companies and platoons other than that there must be specific personnel in squads, or squads in platoons, assigned the sole task of dealing with snipere. It is believed that anti-sniper personnel willbe more effective if they follow Snipers focus their attention on leading elements working in rssault elements. close. Anti-sniper personnel from concealed positions in rear can more effectively search out the sniper and deal withhim. The automatic rifle ie very effective Tho idea that prevails in many quarters in "spraying" trees containing snipers. that you can "throv the book out the window" in jungle warfare ie definitely erroneous. Th*t has been demonstrated by platoon and company commandere who did "throw the book out the window." Jungle tactics aeroly call for a common eenee application of standard tactical principles aad methods to this type of terrain. Snnhasis must be on direction, and control with consequent reduction of distances and intervals and a suitable communication system. lvry company and platoon of this regiment that attacked had wire communication back to the battalion CP which

all-around defense. The Jap refuses to be turnod out of his position, as he can bring fire to bear in all directions, the flanking attack offers no more advantage than the frontal attack, other than enabling a larger force, rjnd consequently more fire power, to be brought to boar on the position. Small groups of three or four men working in close to Jap positions with hand grenade* seems to be about the best solution, though it is hasardous work for the small ,;roups. It is essential, also, that selected individuals or groups be detailed

The artillery preparation ia important, for with the Japanese method of all around defense, well dug-in, concealed, covered foxholee with a large proportion of automatic weapons and covered by snipers In trees, all invisible, severe losses are going to be sustained by attacking infantry, regardless of the sise of the force, unless their attacks are prooeded by artillery preparations, 81mm mortar preparations, air bombing, Xa this particular action the 81mm mortars were not employed. Flanking attacks have little effect oa the
preparation.

and/or

Japanese

185

S5

was laid as the unit advanced. Companies hud wiro communication to platoons during tho attack. This system was Invaluable In maintaining control. Tho V-130, or msault, wire was used. Platoon leader* must know mnro About the employment of ei^ht nachine goat and 6On mortars. Platoons of this regiment employed as combat patrols wero invariably reinforoed with a light machine gun seotion, nnd somotimes a 60mn mortar section, Where the Jrp was emp laced in a strongly constructed, niutually supporting pillbozos, it is believed that a definite procedure must be used in the attaok. In the platoon, an assault ggroutp t armod with a flame thrower, possibly a "basooka", nod demolitions (pole charge) should be used to work In close, preferably from the flank, covered by the fire of a holding group to the front, another group, or squad, should be held in readinoss as a oaneuvcr force, while nnother group should be detailed solely to the mission of destroying sniper* covorint; the pillbox. The use of smoke to blanket the pill box should be given careful consideration. Companies attacking mutually supporting pillboxes should engage each pillbox simultaneously la order to prevent them firing in support of each

(c) Artillery support 1 Artillery support proved to be vital to all wits of this regiment In the attack ef Jim? positions, the system ef forward observers In use was exoellent. A forward ebeerver party accompanied ovary unit sent out on an offensive mission, and their work was excellent. Both Infantry and artillery wire wore laid on theee oeoesltoct forward observers were haadl canped in the registration of artillery fire by the lack of visibilityin the thlok Jungle terrain. Sseke shall and sound ranging methods were employed with very good results. The lSfjs* hovitsere, which wore employed on one occasion by this regiment (Hsllsapoppln tldgo). wars the most effeotive since they have the weight end power to blast out trass and clear the Jungle growth so that tho in fantry, wad also supporting alroraft, aan better see the hostile positions. The 105 mm howltser is also effective for this purpose. Both the 105s and the 155s are effeotive against covered piaueats. The 75am howitser is too light to elfeer clear the Jungle or knock cut oovered emplacements, the high trees, necessitated placing fire at least 300 yards la front of our lines to avoid getting tree bursts among oar own troops. Delayed action fuses ware much more effeotive against amplacsejente aat rsttoca tree sarcts. It ms fooad that since Artilleryfire had to be placet wall In front of infantry troops on account of the high trees, artillerypreparations preceding an attack were not as effective as they normally should be einoe after the preparation it took the infantry considerable time to advance to the enemy positions through the thick under* growth, thus losing the full shock effect ef the preparation. Iven when the reparation can be placed the minimum dlstaaoe of 200 yaria in front of our troope, the time soaowmsrt by the lnfaasry advance would be too long to obtain maxismsi effect. It is oafs to say that the artillery waa the dominant factor in driving bade Japanese forces. (d) Air support 1 Air bombing was used en five occasions la cloee support of attaeksTy units of this regiment and was found to be vary effective. The final air attack delivered on leUsapeppin Ridge en IfBee was made 75 yard* in front of front line troops using 100 lb *$ sooonfl delay fuse bosks raft broke enemy resistance on the ridge. Attacks were mad* in succession by individual planes from tree-top height with strafing oosftlaem with bombing, lam* were aMLo parallel to our frent lines, plaaee dropping one to four bombs on each na\. Our front line* were marked with colored grenade smoke and the target by mortar smoke shell, both easily visltls from the air. Prior to the two air attacks of IfBee. an infantry officer ffllllar with the sltuatlem aad the location ef hostile posltteea, toicihsi with the air Ualooa officer, met plaits en the airfield. Ac iaflatry officer briefed pleats on the eltuatien using map aad aerial photos, "*^ff stereo pairs of the area. The plan ef attack was outlined by the squadron leader end the air lialeom officer returned to the position of the troops being supported. The air liaison officer, using a ffOt Jeep ratio, was in oommuloatlon with the plmee at all times throughout the operation, the infantry officer aeeesyasle* the ecuadron leader, a few minutes prior to the time eat for the attack, the smoke marking

other.

186

|$(o

the front lines was set off and the 81m mortars started placing single rounds of amok* aha 11 on tha tarcat at intervals, front llna infantry troopa had been previously wall da* In with overhead cover. During tha attack tha infantry offioar vita tha squadron leader "spotted" tha planes on tha target by means of tha pinna radio. Thla la believed an Imports** adjunct to tha tta* of aortar anoka Ho 11 alaeo it wat found tha mortars were not always oa tha tarcat. Thia nathod of eloaa coordination between aircraft md supported infantry troopa la highly effective aad la recommended for future uaa. Za previous air attacks, 100 1b Instantaneous fuse bombs were ueed aad were aot nearly aa effective aa tha delayed fuia bombs, particularly against organised enemy defenses. The 100 1b *f-5 aacond delay fata bmb la recommended aa tha idaal boat for close support of Infantry troopa. It M also found that after the planes had droppad thalr bombs, if they oontiaud to make, paceee at the target, the Jepa would remain down la thalr holee and emplacements, faellltatiag tha advance) of the lafaatry against tha raaalning

opposition.

(a) Qomcralt Pcfcalve taotioa employed by thia regiment oonalatad largely of occupylag and orgaaitteg deliberately for defense, sectors on successive beachhead Uaee. The froate^e of theae regimental eeotora was great, sometimee UoOO-5000 yards. As a result, though a regimental roaerre of one battalia* was held out in each oaae, the two froat line battalions were forced to oomolt their eatire streagth to paeltloae oa the beachhead line without supports or reserves, with the exoeptloa of the final beachhead line the organisation of defensive posltloas was aot complete. One strand of wire with booby traps strung along it was placed aeroea the froat. la aome sections, double apron fence waa installed. Nan occupied shallow prone three-man firing treaohee. Machine guns were sited along final protective llaee by sections where practicable, but in many cases It wae neeeesary to uee them singly la order to cover the front with machine gun fire. Za many cases heavy machine guas and light machine guns were paired together in sections la order to spread the heavy maohiae guns across the wholo froat. 81mm mortars were placed la positions 1000 to 1500 yards In rear of the froat llaee. This facilitated ammunition supply aad afforded protection while allowing ample range in froat of the lines. In the final beachhead poeition the defense was completely organised with oovored rifle nad machine gun emplace ments, eoaanalcatiag taeaches, aad a complete band of double anron feace aoroaa the froat with platoons la most eases wired in with protective wire, fields of Hv were very short la most eases raA were not cleared, only lanes cut for machine gun flaal protective lines by removing a few twigs and loaves. It is believed, la the deliberate defense, however, that thero le much advantage, where there are adequate nachlae gone. In dearlag completely the foreground of the position to a dlataaoe of 79 to 100 yarde to the froat. Thie improves observation, preventing the enemy from working tip under cover to within hand grenade range of the front linee. The location of the position is disclosed by this cleared area which would mnke the nosltl<m subject to artillery fire and air bombing, ifthe enemy has Adequate artillery aad is nble to bomb la the daytime. Zafantry attacks across this cleared area would be impossible with well organised machine gun fires. The success of the Japaneee defeaslve organisation as it wasJboad in this operation on the other hand, was due to the inability of the attacker to locate the enemy positions. His foxholos aad emplacements were cleverly camouflaged and sited, and he did no cutting of the undergrowth except to make narrow, difficult to see, lanes for his machine guas. He fielde of fire were, of oouree, very ehort. Most marines killed, were killed within 10 yards of the enemy positions, aad the ratee of killed to wounded wae high. Miriaes felt ac though they were fighting a phantom. AM they put it "you can't hit what you can't ccc". The Jap method of defense is believed suitable for a email force opposed by a large force, but whare a Urge force with heavy fire power takes up a dellverate defense, it is believed better results can be obtained by clearlag fields of fire la froat of tho position. Our troops must learn more about field fortification. The tendency ie to build large etructuree la which the men live and fight ac well, fighting positions must be constructed on the defense line with living structures to the rear connected to the fighting positions by communication trenches. Our troops ars aot

(k) Defensive Tmotlosn

187

\u2666
r\t all camouflage

conscious, and, in fact, aro very c\rolo In this rosnect. ?t"mt lins ditoipline it noor on the average. Watches are not kept on guns, non do not wear helmets, Mid there it * general l*ck of aloatnets. It i bolievoA we met give aore consideration to defonto in depth. On tho finr.l borchhead line thie regiment orgrnised its da in lino of resistance with two brttnlions and a Begimental Isservo line with tho third, in order to get snino depth to tho < ofones. The reserve battalion prepared positions nnd si tod machino guns in on the Begimental Bseorve line. Tho battalion was held in rear of tho regimental ro scrve line in mobilo reserve prepared to either counterattack or occupy and defend tho Bcglmental Isserve Line. On these two linos, hovevor, there was no denth. vith the single dofense line usually employed in beachhead defense great danger to the position exists in ease ef a breakthrough. Mobile reserves enn not bo rowdily moved to noot threats al*ag a wide front In this tyne of torrain. It is Relieved that the beet defense le with supports and resorves, from platoons on *m, organised in fixed defenses in depth with all units wired in all around dovn to include the squad. This is, or course, the normal system of defence, and it is believed that at least a modified version should be used in beachhead defense.

cal. .30. Kit The similarity between oarblno and Jap fire was confusing to inexperienced troops. The carbine, with nresent sights, is not considerod a very accurate weapon, it tends to rust more rapidly than other weapons and reoulree greater care. In the case of the gunner end assistant gunner of the machine gun squads the carbine hindered then in carrying the gun and tripod and in tone instanoes reeulted in the carbine boing abandoned. Zt is believed that they should be armed with a smaller weapon. (2) Blflo. cali .30. Kit This weapon performed in a highly satisfactory manner and was preferred, by the using troops, to the carbine. (3) Bit. cal. .10. HX9IBA2I The automatic rifle la considered the most effective weapon in Jungle warfare. It Is light enough to keep up with advancing troope, can be plnced la action instantly, and le oonsidered by some off}ocre to be superior to the LM> in the attack. The BAB wae used extensively la defensive situations to deliver fixed fire in areas mot covered by machine gun fire, By mems of the steck root and bipod the gam it capable of delivering *utomatle fire along a predetermine Urn* under eny condition of visibility. Very few stoppages ocourred that could mot be reduced by Immediate ao%1os (*) li. eel. .30. MiqiqiMt The LMO is preferred to the heavier vater-ooled gsn in attmok becmeeof ite mobility, low eilhouette. Amd tho s^ad with whioft it ami be placed In action. 1% wae nmmi extenelvely to roiaforoo rifle platooas sent out as casfcut patroU ll (5) > cal. .17, ffltfj Considered to be too heavy and to have too
high silhouette for use in attack la JmgU operations but vital in dofenoive

"eapoaa. (I) Carbine,

.25 caliber

(S) H. cal. .30. ML M2. QrmmA: this weapon is much too heavy for Jungle operations, >oth from tho stjtftdpolmt of tho gun itself and of ammunition stroply. %celmdlmg morthemisea target e, waioh wore act encountered la these oT>eratlon, 1% it considered that the .50 caliber gaa le ao more, ifnot less offeotlvo against risisommsl than tho 30 ealfbr mmmMww gun. Xa a boneh dofense it lo oonsidered bo bo a very valuable sailboat gaa. (7) 37mm omm. KUI. ATt Bao to swwsp, deaee Jungle, and rugged terrain thio womrioa eoalA not kom up with tho infantry mad could only bo employed in stabilised situation*. Inglneerlng aeeletamce wa reoulred to get tho guns into "ooltloa. They wore not fired during theee oporatioao. la view of tho diffi oultloe encountered U movement, it is etrongly rscoameoded, for Junglo oporatloae of thie typo, that several 37mm gune, M 1916 bo pUood in each Infantry regiment, rumeroue eltmrtions aroee whore tho 37an #an, At oould have boon effectively omployod ifoapnbU of being moved la*o position. Tho 37mm gun, K1916, because of its light weight (17* lbs. ) oould have boon aoved by hand d effectively
omployod.

situatlfme.

(f) 7*jsb Qua IP (halftrack) i in the typo of torrain encountered in those operations exteaelv* enclnor assistance wao requirod to movo those weapons into position. They wore mot fired.
188

ttaot,

in inaccurate fire. (11) U. Ohealcal Mortar t A platoon of these mortars (from the 82nd 2 Chemical Battalion, TTBA) executed two missions for this regiwnt using RB shell, one against annlaooment* and one oounterbattery mlsftlon whioh was qpxite successful. Effect of the fire on emplacement* wae undetermined as artillery was firing at the same time. The large amount of explosive contained in the shell makes it a very effective Wjwnoa in Jungle operations, capable of blasting out treoe and Jungle growth and reducing emplacement*. (12) Tlame Thrower. Portable. Ml: Used en Hellsapoppin Bldge after the enemy had been driven from their empiaoements and wae reported to hare a very sing effect on the withdrawing enemy. demo rail (13) Baaookat This weapon was used on Bsllsapoppin lldge but the crews were unable to got oloee enough to impUs saints to mmjluy it effectively due to heavy near fir*. After tho enemy had wiindrawn from their emplacements they were used effectively against pereetmel. (I*o lookott Aa Ixporlmontal locket Platoon was attached to the regiment
during the BoUsopoppln liage Mgagsaiit. Theeo wtaaoai are inaccurate agalnet
small aroa targets, leave a tell-tale trail of smoke aad are extremely noisy servin
to giv* away their poaltiona en* thoee of aanroy troope.
(19) flnnmiojtfaptost Tho fragnemtotinn hand grnnads with adapter attaahod when ismasVel Irom the 10003 Hfliwaa vary effeotlv* and waa extenelvely '

2: (9) 6pmm Mortar. M Ths 60mm mortar was not considered effective against Japanese positions encountered because of the euperquick fuse (causing tree bursts) Mid tho small ejsount of oxploslvo charge in its shell. Xt can be used effect lvly against troops above ground or in tho epos. (10) I*bMortar. Ml: The 81m mortar, using the heavy (11 lb) shell, is a very effective weapon in olose support of the infantry. Xt is capable of Aallverlng heavy volume of accurate firo. Use of the delay fute eliminates tree bursts and enables the El shell to act effectively. Although thie weapon was not offectlve la reducing the enemy positions on Bclltapoppln Ridge it is believed that this was due to reduced visibility and lack of suitable obeerration points resulting

%.

() meaannataoanao mjhfiXt fme i^aomaeAooanoe patvol proved to ta# [uttsjalfai tJSSktj rmilAUio iaa wdnt for tho ooUoatloa of enemy iafowaHa* Us nan paiHols wa*o mom offovtiwiy for nnvaly fwanaaioaanoo \u25a0iaafflM. fhia n*o1 U aaall onmigii to clip Jomgh omosn; twit%iff vniotoetod n4 am wiVJsintw me** vaniily than a oavgar yatrol tf attaofead. Itmao atronfth eaoaga to naafal itaolf linUa angWai in wtthAffoMng. Ooe4 yatrel leader* wore ssarrn Met nilor*osmel.*Mt %a jHom noro inatMatien in raawnawiiiwnie patf*Uing fntool lender* wora not properly trained in what to look tor mA how to ronort it. fhay amat be inattvetad in making *impU eke tehee, a rmnaalniens platoon la th* BaflMafid I Oompony would hw*boon of groat aaaiatamaa la tale sTtW. fho manre battalion waa oooylately uaM up ia

banana Otawamjr war* laawaat at tie* lafi%n\ CT, not Wing rsamtrot an other iatief at the tin*, mm! a yUteon of tho aaast aoawwaj wa* attwshii mA located at the the ofarwttin. tin**It ananot W aaaanat mI n aaoat vlntoon will always bo at taohai, or temt th* lejiaaitel anponj will sat bo onfmi* in onrrying out ito noraal nioolan, or thud H rooorv* omttailoa, if tiara la ona. wiU bo avaUaala to funlah yatiala. It to Wlloroi that tho rsgiasatal oanmilir should bo nroU*a with an aganajr far tho narpnss %t msiimiag rauwniaHiaiiu* doop in enony territory ia hit nrlwr or mm of action*

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(b) Observation Post: Although commanding terrain was available in several instances, observation posts were ineffective). Observers in alovatsd could only look down on a carpet of tree tops and no hostilo ground

could be observed. (c) Observation Aircraft; Tor the same roason as given in (b) above observation from aircraft was ineffective, Aorial photos wero of value to this rogiment only for information of the terrain. In this respect they vrero extremely useful. (d) Prisoners and captured documents; Ono prisoner was captured vithin tho line* of this regiment but the information obtained from hit was believed unreliable. A number of map* and documents were taken from dead Japs which ware of great value. Most Japs carry documents of various torts, including diaries, on their persons. Dead officers were usually found to have a situation sketch on them showing their dispositions and what they believed ours to be. In the beginning of the Hellsapopvln Ridge engagement a sketch of the hostile dis positions was taken from a dead Jap officer. This sketch proved to be quite accurate and wpb very helpful. () Captured material; Very little captured material was turned in by subordinate units of this regiment although it is known that considerable fell into our hands. This condition is due to the fact that the men willnot turn in articles they capture because they want then for souvenirs and are afraid they willnot be returned to them. These fears were Justifiable in this operation as nothing was returned. To overcome this oonditlon It it necessary to indoc trinate men with the importance of turning in all captured material, and to institute a system whereby the man turning in cap.tured material who wlthet it at a souvenir 1b assured of having it returned to him. The Jap saying "the American fights for souvenirs" is quite true.
(1) Routes; In the forward areas, the "Jeep" Trail, out by a bulldoter and a platoon of engineers or pioneers with hand toole willmeet the supply and actuation requirements of an infantry regiment. Bridging over small strams and corduroy over ewaapy areae can be dome by an engineer or pioneer ooapany. laying corduroy la a slow, laborious undertaking. However, it le the only known practical method of crossing swamps, unless a major engineering project with heavy equipment is undertaken. Ixperlenoe hat shown that a combat engineer imTany oan lay about 130 yards of corduroy per day, provided timber It available on the site. It la believed that insufficient attention was paid to striot traffio oontrol daring the current operation. This operation confirmed the need of an engineer or pioneer company at an organic unit within the infantry regiment. Regiments should be given rear boundaries; the men end equipment to do the work; and then held responsible for construction and maintenance of roads and trails within their respective areae, including traffio oatrol over thete routes. (2) Transportation t Jeeps and trailers willmeet the regimental supply and evacuation requirements, provided trails over which these vehicles can
o-oerate are feasible. Otherwise, eight operating amphibian tractors willmeat
regimental requirements under average supply dittanoes to be expected in a landing
operation. The full allowance of Jeeps and trailers should be taken initially la
category "A". The 3/^ ton trucks should be substituted for the 1 ton truck, at a
vrime mover for 37mm guns in the Regimental Weapons Company. Vhen not uted for
this purpose it willbe available for hauling bulk supplies In rear areas,
including water trailers. A motor maintenance eeotion should be Incorporated
in the Regimental HftS Company to maintain the vehloles of the regiment in
serviceable condition.
(3) Rations: Two hot meala and one emergency ration were fed daily,
exceptions. All kitcheat were operated In a rear bivouac area under
with few iirect control of the Regimental Commissary Officer. All trantporatlon was pooled
lo this train bivouac area, the bivouac amt under no and of the Baglmsmtal
This installation functioned la a highly tatitfaetory manner.
feuurtenatter.

.*

190

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A minimum of 5 Jeeps and trailers per battalion or one Jeep and trailer per company willhandle ration* "between the kitchen* and troop*. Unless water is available locally to the troops, these vehicle* will not be available for any other ervice. CO Water: Wator was not a serious problom at any tine during the operation. All defensive positions wore on or near stroams which simplified this problem. Purification units were operated in kitchen bivouac aroas. Individual or group chlorination was employed by front lino units. (5) Ammunition: The supply of thi* item presented littlo difficulty under the conditions of operation. It is ostimatod that a mmiBum of four (U) Jeeps and trailers per battalion willmeet tho normal ammunition supply require ment* in an attack situation. (6) Post Exchange Supplies: Gone rally tho so were furnished in ample quantities. Toothbrushes appeared to be tho only item in which a shortage existed. (7) Clothing: One issue was made during tho operation to "all hands", of all essential items. This appeared to be adequate (8) Other supplies t It is believed that oithor division or regimental quartermaster should carry a replenishment supply of items of individual equipment. One company of the regiment which lost all equipment where a destroyer on which they woro being transported was sunk, had eonsidarablo difficulty in obtaining

essential items in this

category.

. Uvacuatlon: It i* considered that pre*ont Division SOP which attache!

collecting sections of medical companies to infantry battalions violatos the
established principal of "impetus from the rear" in medical evacuation, further, that all jeop ambulances should remain under
control of tho modioal eollocting sections. The medical company supporting an infantry regiment should sot up one
or moro collecting stations bo twoon the battalion aid stations
and the hospital. This installation should have a medical officor in chargo; sort and rendor
tor additional first aid; sand forward lit boarors and ambulanoos
to clear battalion and regimental aid station*; and evacuate tho seriously wounded to tho supporting
hospital. This rogiment required all battle nourosis and fatigue oasos through
the Regimental lidStation. This method was highly successful and returned many
men to their units within a fow days without hospitalisation.

U) Much oquipment was lost by units of this regiment during this

operation. Men throw away oquipmont and lose it. Inspection of blvouae areas
aftor departure of units revealed much abandoned oquipmont.
So regularly organisod and trained salvago soction exists In the infantry regiment. Bad
thoro been one, it is boliovod much oquipmont could have boon reoovored and much
of it ropairod, or at least passod on to division salvago for repair.

(l) Rpgimontal B&S C< It was found that this company had
inadequate porsonnol to properly move, sot up and organise tho Bogimontal GP.
Allenlisted porsonnol In the company, with five or six exceptions have specific
spocialist dutios to porform. It roquiros an organisation of "roustabouts" to
proporly movo and set up a rogimental GP: an organisation trained for this specific purpose and with additional duty as GP dofonso unit. This unit oould not be used as a roconnaissance unit and carry out it*duty a* a GP dofonse unit also, sinoo patrol* aro sont out for two or threo days. (2) Battalion Headquarters Company! A pioneor and ammunition section should be addod to this company. This section is required for setting up and moving tho battalion CP, augmenting the CP dofonso, performing light pioneer work in tho battalion, and assisting in amnunition supply. Tho so men could also be trained in tho use of the "bazooka", flamo-thrower, and demolitions, to bo used as a pool from which they could bo attached to unit* r or specific tactical tasks.
rrom which bo units f h. Hodlcal: (Soo Annox D, Modical Report.)

Salvago:

k.

Boconondatlona. That a sorvico platoon bo included in tho Regimental Headquarters

191


pnd

Service Company composed of five eetion as follow*: (1) an office seotion composed of the quartermaster clerical force; (2) a receiving and distributing ooction for rations, clothing and equipment, etc; (3) A munitions section for the handling of ammunition; (U) a salvage soction for the collection and minor repair of pbandonod and unserviceable equipment; (5) a motor maintenance section for the repair and maintenance of regimental motor vehicles (Ist nnd 2nd echelon maintenance).

platoon be included in the Regimental HAS Company provide the regimental commander with an agenoy which he does not now hvo for conducting distant reconnaissance in his sector or tone of action.
in

order~to

b. Jhnt a reconnaissance

c. That a OP Defense
Platoon be incorporated in the Regimental HAS Company or the purpose of setting up and moving the CP, acting as HP's for local
traffic oontrol in the regimental area, for CP defense, and for all the other odd J^bs that come up in the field around the regimental CP.
r

d. That a wioneer and ammunition section be added to the Headquarters Company o"f the infantry battalion for setting up and moving the CP, performing light pionw work in the battalion, assisting In lunejaltttmaeopply, raid forming a pool of trained "baiooka", flame- thrower, and demolition personnel for attach ment to units for specific tactical tacks.

c. That the present distribution of carbines be reconsidered with a view to furnishing personnel of crew served weapons with a weapon more adaptable to the carrying of a machine gun tripod, machine gun, or Slam mortar.

A. E. BDTUST

192

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ANNEX Bi
regimental

7-lU November, 19U3. 19^3 and wa attached

Operations of Ist Battalion, 21st Marine*

The Ist Battalion landed at Bougainville 6 November to the 9th Marine, until 1100, 7 November 19^3. At the* time the let Battalion mored by boat to the west flank, was attached to the 3d Marines, and placed in

reserve.

On the morning of 8 November 19U3, the Ist Battalion launched its Initial attack passing through the 3d Marines 1 lines after a 20 minute artillery prepara tion, from H-5 to H-hour 81mm mortars and machine guns also laid down a barrago. (Tor LD and direction of attack see sketch #1. for formation uaod ccc sketch f2.)

At 1300, 8 November 19*13, enemy resistance had been broken and the battalion On 9 November 19^3, the battalion having no ooa* tact with the enemy e*st4amtd the advanoe in approach march formation. (8m Bke toh #3.) At IU3O the battalion halted and established a perimeter defenae. (See sketches k and 5,)
went into a perimeter defonoe.

On 10 November 19U3, the Ist Battalion was attached to the lUth Infantry, USA and operated under control of this reglmtnt until Ik November, 19^3.

On 13 November, 19W3 Oompany B (Beinferoed) moved out toeitablish a combat outpost at the mouth of tat Laruma liver moving along the ooaet in ay proaoh march formation. (See sketch f6.) Oontact vm mmdc with the eneogr by the oovering platoon, and a brisk fire fight star tod. (too sketoh #7.) tao artillery was called oa to register oa enemy poeitioa, tat ooomnaloaUoas went out aad no oonoentration oould be laid down, A feav mortar ooaooatsaUoa was then plaoed oa enemy poeitioa after whloh rooonnalaoaaoo patiols vox* sent forward. Patrols made ooataot aloag a 200 yard froat mat fliayeaj' 1 (Balaforood) took up ape rimetor tefeaeo for he night, (toe akotoh ft*) The next morning reoonaaloeanee patrole were soat foswaid ami mo oomtaot mm made. Previouo eaamy pooltloao aad route of wilhdnmml now Aval, (too sketoh ft.) fho litBattalion loot 2 killodaad 1wouadod la the omeraUeao oariag thlo period.
fho lot Battalion was relieved oa lU Yovoaber 19f3, aad tojolaod the 21et

Marinee.

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DJSTANCt BETWEEN mpn APPROX. 5/OS /^TRVAL BfTWSEN FILI3 APPfMX. fOYD%

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No, 5 APPROACH M\RCH

rOR^fATIONrOR^fATlON 9 No v. 43

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the Numafrom the CO,

Operation* of the Tnd Battalion, ?l?t Marines to Secure Numa-laet-Wet Trnil Junction, 13-lU November, 19U3.

On 12 November, 19U3 the <^lst Marines (Loos Ist and 3rd Battalions and dot.-ichmenta Regimental Weapons Company) as Division reserve, was In bivouac In iv. r of the 9th Marines sector of the T3L (See Tigure l). The situation on i c FBL was quiet, action being limited to patrolling. A survey party of the
t Battalion, 12th Marines had been ambushed near the Junction of the Numa :au-East-Vest trails.

At IUIS ths CO 21st Marines received the following order 1L rind Division:

3d

"Patrol NUMA-NUKA. Trail to such distance as patrol can reach and return prior to dusk but not before 1730 unless driven in by enemy. Depart bivouac area prior to Strength, of patrol one donpany, weapons platoon nay be omitted, leconnoiter Junction NUMA-HUIIA Trail with ATSIHIMA-MOAVIVIA (lst-West) Trail each way for a distance of 1000 yds with a View to establishing later strong outpost that locality. Note signs hpstile activity not previously reported. See Amy Air Toros Hap He. 7 l/25O ( OOO. 21st Marines submit full report with overlay on patrol not later than 1000, Ik Hovember."

0630.

In order to accomplish the assigned mission the the following order to the 00 2nd Battalion at 1800:

00 21st Marines

Issued

"Surrey party of Ist Battalion 12th Marines ambushed (135.6-218.0)

today. Strength of ambush unknown. 1 aarlne dead and 1 wounded,
2nd Battalion willpatrol H34A-HUHA Trail 13 Hoveaber to such
distance as patrol oan reach and return prior to dusk but not before
1730 unless drltwn In by enemy. Depart bivouao area prior to 0630.
Strength of patrol one Aompany. Weapons platoon may be omitted.
Beconnolter junction HOMa-Htttt. Trail with ATSINIMA-HQAYTYIA (last-
Vest) Trail each way for distance of 1000 yds with view to establishing
strong outpost that locality. Rote signs hostile activity not pre viously reported. See Army Air Tore* Map So. 7, 1/250,000. Partic ular attention to east portion of ATSXHMa4IOA7XTU (last-West) Trail. 9th Marines reports this well traveled jeep trail. Confirmation desired. Contact 9th Marines for latest trail details. Submit report with overlay to this Headquarters prior to 0600, lU Hovember.

"

The GO 2nd Battalion selected Company 1to carry out the patrol operation
and made the decision to include the weapons platoon.

At 2100 the Division Chief of Staff directed the 00 21st Marines to incroase the else of the patrol to at least two companies with a suitable oomnand group and artillery forward observer party and to establish an outpost to hold tho trail Junction, The 00 21st Marinos informed tho Chiof of Staff that in view of the importance of the mission he (00 21st Marinos) would send the entire 2nd Battalion. As a result of telephone conference with the Chief of Staff, the 00 21st Marinos made tho following decision: To have Company I novo out at 0630, 13 Hovember and proceed to an assembly area In roar of the front line of tho 9th Marines, remaining there until the remainder of the battalion moved up. 2nd Battalion then to proceed as a unit on the assigned mission. Oral orders to carry out this plan were telephoned to 00 2nd Battalion at 2130.

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**"""

Oo^any I oloaroa tho W$L at 0000 follovod *y tho raaaladtr of tho battalion at 1100. (tho departure of tho roaalaior of tho battalion had boon dolayod by difficulty in drawlac aanmltlon and rations, and by tho lato arrival of tho artlllory forward oboervor part/).
Oojqpany 1, proooodln* alone tho Wii Wii trail* & aabuahod at 110$ by an enoay foroa looatod about 200 yards south of tho trail Junction. (For formation of Coapany 1, 000 Tljuro 2.)

#\

At 1200 a runner reported to CO 2nd Battalion that Company had aado contact with tho onomy, was receiving heavy machine gun and mortar flro and had aoToral casual tio 8. At the time of this roport tho 2nd Battalion was about 1200 yards south of tho trail Junction in tho formation shown In Figuro 3

Acting on this Information CO 2nd Battalion roduood flank socurlty units to a minimum and movod tho battalion forward along tho trail as rapidly as possible loavlng one platoon of Coapany I protoct tho artillory viro party. to
At 12U5 tho battalion was in position 200 yards to tho roar of Coapany 1, At this point CO 2nd Battalion roooivod information that Coapany X was pinnod down by hoavy flro, was slowly bo ing annihilated, and relnforcoaont was noodod lanodiatoly. Tho only inforaation 00 2nd Battalion had of tho oaoay location was that an onomy foroo was loaatod south of tho trail Junction.

00 2nd Battalion assonblod company coaaandors and issued tho following oral ordorsi Coapany 0 (attaehod Hachino Oun Platoon) prooood forward, contact Company X and givo such assistanoo as tho situation roquiros; Company H (lots ono Hachino Oun Platoon) oaplaoo aortars and preparo to support tho attack, aortar platoon loader with obsorvor roport to CO Coapany 0 and onploy aortars as noodod; Company T (loss ono Jlatoon) assomblo in battalion rosorro. Sho CO 2nd Battalion ordorod his Ixocutive Offloor to go forward with tho artillory forward obsorvor, contact CO Coapany I provent onomy froa maneuvering by laying artillory con and centrations whoro noodod. On arrival at tho position of Company X tho Battalion Xacocutivo Of floor reported to 00 2nd Battalion that onoay firo was vory hoavy, Coapany X was pinnod down, had many casual tios and assistance was nooded. Bo further reported

222

an

that the Wriest fir*appeared to oone from the east In th direction of tho Piva River. (Artillery fire wi pronptly placed on thle position.) 00 2b lattalion, harlng received auy eoafllctln reports on the situation, decided to displace hie OP forward and try to obtain more aeeura^ft information, Th GP was displaced forward into & eoooaut grot* the VujsaHTw* trail. At this point CO 2nd Battalion was informed by thealone Battalion Baooutlvo Offloor (telephone) that Oonpany 1needed help laaodlatel?. After a quick reconnalsaaneo 00 2nd le>ttalioa aaoeabled the iimsjibiij consanders of Coaqpanies I J and ordered Oos^any 7 (attaofcti. Me^Vf Ooa and Platoon) to pass throng H**By1far oaoo* to allow Oe^tany 1to withdraw, reorcanlio and protect the battalion rijht flank. Ooe^any a was ordered to hold
its present

position.

At thle tiao 00 2nd Battalion eatlaatod the eney troagth to bo apprwdmte ly a relnferoed eoq>any disposed generally east and west astride tho troll.
Oompany X harinc withdrawn and roorfanlsod on tho battalion r^ht flank, 00 2nd Battalion asroaed hit disposition was as show* in Tlforo U.

F/GUPE 4

Tlttro 5.

jsbj I Booeirlnc reports that no contact had been established with H and that the Battalion liecut ire Officer was wounded, 00 2nd Battalion dlepatohei staff offleers to locate Gonpanj 7 and to check tho battalion lino. A a result of this oh*ok 00 2nd Battalion dUeorsred that Oosyeny r old not bo found and that the battalion wao In a r*ry danfltrouo poeltlon at omowa by ,

-U

223

V.

N
"V

\u25a0^*.A ~1
_

4
t

,">,

00 2nd Battalion immediately ordered Company 1 (attached Machine fan Platoon) to move forward, contact Company 0 and establish a line to protect the battalion front and rifht flank. Company 0 was ordered to ahlft its line to tie in with Company 1.

At 00 2nd Battalion decided that in view of the heavy casualties, loss of contact with Company J, lose of comsunications with the legimental CP and art 11lory, and the late hour, further efforts to develop the situation would be unsound and ordered all companies to dif in for defense.
At 1700 Ounnery Sergeant from Company T reported to 00 2nd Battalion that Ooeyany J had penetrated the enemy lines, suffered heavy caeualtios, was die orcaaised and tho cooq^any cosnander wae misting. 00 2nd Battalion ordered the Ounnery Sergeant to return to Conpany T and lead them around the enemy flank to a position in r#ax of tho battalion line. (See figure 6 for aoveaents of o*pany7.)

1630

r> l>9
n
f

'

%A

At 17U5 Coi^pany F had arrived within the battalion lino 3. for disposition of 2nd Battalion for nicht of 13 November.)

(See Figure 7

-f

One M.G.Pfaf of'W'CcK -fa ectc/f rtffa CosVPANjf

F/GURE-7
At 1830 eonmunioations. Voro reestablished with the regimental GP and the artillory and the artillery vras ordored to register on the north* east and west sidos of tho porimotor. The 2nd Balder Battalion (attached to the 2181 Marines) was movod forward to protoet tho supply lino between the 2nd Battalion and the 7BL. CO 2lst Marines directed CO 2nd Battalion to send out patrols in tho morning and prepare to attack supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft*
ITo action othor than fire by enony snipers took placo during the night.

On tho morning of tho lUth all companion established outposts 75 yards from tho perimeter and oont out patrols. At 0810 friendly aircraft appeared overhead and CO 2nd Battalion was informed by CO 21st Marines that they were roady to bomb and strafo the onemy positions. They had enough gasolino to dolay tho attack until 0915. CO 2nd Battalion was much concerned because It was ostimatod that all his patrols would not be in by 0915, his water supply was oxhaustod and none had boon rocoivod. His decision was to recall the patrols, roqueet tho air attack and dolay the Infantry attack until water arrived.
At 0903* all patrols having returned and Company X withdrawn to a position in roar of battalion front lino, tho artillery marked the eneoy positions with smoko and the friondly aircraft (20 TBF1 with 100 lb l/lO socond delay bombs) attacked very effectively. Immediately after tho air attack Company X movod back to tho battalion front lino.

CO 2nd Battalion aseomblod all company commanders, artillory liaison offlcor and tank offloors (Tank Platoon attachod to regiment) and issued tho following oral order:
given to all Company Oosnanders, Tho Battalion willattsjek tho enemy position on a frontage of 200 yards, with tho mission of driving tho onoqy to the north beyond tho trail Junction, sol so tho trail Junction and organise aa

"Available information

outpost.

&5

Bovadaryt

BuMHfoaa Trail.

Gopanles nd t in the assault, supported by Winks and artillery, Oosqpany ? ta the right, Ooqaany 2 an the left. 0 and B oosp*nieo 1$ reserve.
Una of Departure* fee sketch.
Vernations See sic* toh.
Qentaett To the oenter. Active patrolling in front of

sdraAoln^ trops.

HHourt So % aanouaosd mt tr the arrival sf vtr, Co^>aoy t will attack on tbs frontons of 100 yurds on the oast sido of ths trail la battalion ono of action, Arivs Mm nony to ths north sol so objsctiwfliil In Its tono of aotlon, and bo pro* pard to sot up a battalion perlnster on ordor. will Company I attaok on ths frontage of 100 yards on the woot side of the trail in battalion sone of action, drlv the enony to the north, seise objeotiye Ok In its son* of aotlon, and bo propared to sot up a battalion perimeter on order. Ooapany 0 vith 3d Machine Qun Platoon Coapany B attached, follow the attaok at 150 yards in rear in center of battalion sone of aotlon. Be prepared to mop up in rear of advancing eleaente, pro tect the battalion rlfht flank with one platoon and protect the battalion left flank vith one platoon. Coss>any B be prepared to support the attaok with nortars and nachin* guns. Tank platoon support the assault coispanles as shova on sketch above. and support the attack vith a rolling barrage. Period of preparation and technique of rolling barrage to be deolded by 00 2nd Battalion 12th Marines, AidStation followOP and bo prepared to set up in vicinity of
Artillery furnish artillery preparation

Just

prior to RB*-^Bour

trail. Oossaunic&tlons in accordance vith Battalion 807 <S-Seo sketch. 1

Jungle formation,

Tor sketch to ace<Mspany oral attack order ccc Tlgor* 6.

C-c

G rev c

I
/

-v

X&

10^5

for the "battalion and H-hour was set for 1100. At commxxaication with the regimental & and tho artillery was lost and tho attack Vas ordered delayed. At 1115 communi cations wero reestablished and CO 2ad Battalion conferred with CO ArtilloryBattalion. It was dooided that H-hour vould be. 1155 preeedod "by a 20 minuto preparation and followod "by a rolling barrage. Allunits wero informed of thia plan.

M1015 Vater arrived

Battalion, believing the panic to bo duo to tho noiso of tho rolling barrage, anipere and loss of control by tho tanks, moved forward to tho assault troops sad gave orders to coase firing and stop the advance. The enemy fire also stopped, (XTote: Orders to ceaso firing were not very effectivo but ridicule, sarcasm, soorn and humorous remarks wore and all troops suddenly realized how foolish
they had been.)

At 1135 the artillery preparation began and at 1155 the attack jumpod off
according to plan. The onemy oponcd fire with machine guns and "by snipers.
\a ths attack moved forward the tanks opened fire on tho friendly troops
and saveral aea wero run over. Two tanks on the left lost direction completely (one Ranged dlreotion 270). 'or a poriod of 5 nvinutos thoro was complete panic and wild shooting. There was no tendency to rotroat tut control was lost. 00 2nd

00 2nd Battalion ordorod all companies to hold their present positions

and sond ovtt patrols to a distance of 100 yards north of the trail Junction
and roturn. The tanks woro ordorcd to asscmblo la rosorvo. (Two tanks had
boon rondored unserviceable, ono by a land mino and one by an AT grcnado.)
At this tine it was discovorod that tho assault troops had reached tho onony
positions, aad sono onemy woro still prosont in dugouts. Thoy woro dotootod
by a trained dog from tho fiaidor Battalion. Tho so onoay emplacements wero
knocked out by rif lemon with hand grenades.

By I*4oo all onoay resistance had boon overcome and tho patrols had Mtus&ed and reported no contact. At IUIS tho advance was rosumed and the ofejeottvo Mlod without rosiatanco at 1530. Apo rime tor defense was organised ( for tbe vA&X. (ffoo Tlguro 9.)

Figure

3*l


\u25a0

CO i'ru? Battalion estimated that the nrirrny i\tren^th was at leant a reinforced cor^>any. The enemy dead appr aj-"".L to 'lave been killed by rifle fire and hand cxonndea, indicating that the ton: 1 r.^ an 1 shell inc had bet-n ineffective or the cnetiy had evacuated or buried hir. dead.
The enemy pocitions ver*- very extensive and well organised. The nuneroua
i-tclilne (^in ponition were well conotructed and moet of the dugouts wer^! deep
{ til ,'jood overhead cover.

Althou/-^i a careful count of enemy dead wa not made, an analysis of curate reports indicated an estimate of about Uo enemy killed. Marine losseg -. ero 5 officer*, 15 enlisted men killed in action, 39 enlisted men wounded in action.

228

>.


AT.SX

Dt i-EDICAL REPORT.

1. GENERAL: This report covers the various phases of medical int>root ar.d
responsibility during the period November 6, 19U3 to January 3, 19UU, inclusive.

a. INDIVIDUAL;
Further indoctrination of the individual, both officer and enlisted man,
in the fundamental principles of field sanitation is needed.
A higher sense of individual responsibility in the prevention of di sense must
be ingrained in the military conscience of each individual, Many violations
of the essentials of field sanitation on the part of many individuals were

2. SANITATION.

encountered.

b. WATER: (1) Water for bathing, drinking and cooking was readily obtainable from (a) rainfall, (b) wells, (c) streams, and (d) organized water points.
Chlorlnation at all water before use, for drinking and cooking, was thoroughly and
satisfactorily carried out. However, the location of organized water points
in respect to bathing areas was careless and unsatisfactory. They were lo cated usually at or near a bridge. No control exited of men bathing above
or at the bridge. The control of these areas was confused, and men of many
organisations would afford themselves of the opportunity for bathing or laun dering at the closest point to the bridge, or in faot within ten feet in
many instanct* of the intake hose. Some measure of control was made by hav ing the reservoir tajik filled in the early morning hours and then the water
from it passed as needed through the filter and ohlorinator to distributing
tanks. Aa a rule tha stream* were swift (8-10 knots per hour), shallow (>5
foet} clear of vegetation (gravel bottom) so that a rapid change of water ex isted. But on the whole the promiscuous bathing and washing of clothes above
and at water points was ever present and uncontrolled. (2) Bathing: Km. availed themselves of every opportunity to bathe. In
front line positions this opportunity was necessarily limited, so that in soms
instances as much as a week elapsed between baths. Unit commanders should keep
in mind the desirability of cleanliness of skin surfaces of the troops and
afford whenever possible relief for bathing purposes. (3) Laundering! Ho organised effort waft made to afford the troops
opportunity to adequately launder (boll) their soiled clothing during this 6b day
period. A clothing issue
was made once. In many instances a man wore the sane pair of trousers during the whole 60 day period. It is recommended that
if All practicable,
a plan be developed whereby a change to clean boiled cloth-
Ing be afforded at least once a week. This will reduce considerably the in cidence of skin infection, fungus and other types.

at^

. TOQDt t1)1) ftn**of Hatlomsl The quality and quantity of rations were t satisfactory with a few minor exceptions. The following oomments on the rations used are submitted: B ration more fruit and fruit Juice and sweets (hard candy) are desirable There is an intense craving for sweet drinks after a period of exertion under conditions of action in jungle In the tropics. Boast beef or chicken and less corned beef and spaa are desirable. C ration The bread component of this ration is in excess and favors wastage to a large measure. The palatability of the biscuit is low and can be improved upon. More salt In it would improve the flavor. The hard candy could be increased to good advantage. D ration A tendency to eat this rapidly as a chocolate bar favors in digestion, pain in abdomen, and diarrhea. This bar molds easily. This type of ration should be improved or altored. I ration A very good ration but the aromatic flavor of peppormint from the chewing gum penetrates the bread component and makes this distastoful. Thero is too much bread and consequently much wastage of this itom. Tho con sistency and make up of this component is more acceptable than in tho C ration. Itis re comended that aromatic flavors be olimlnated and tho broad component be roduood, and more hard candy addod. ANNS! 9 O.J

This 1b excellent. However ap;nin the bread component 1b in A variety of sweet or sandwiched crackers with . su/j.ir fillir-c would \e very acceptable. Tho tendency i eat nore of the sucrose and dextrose 3 to The biscuit is dry, increasing the consumption carbohydrates than starches. The salted roasted peanuts (nutritious and having a of w^ter with the meals. vitamin content) are rery acceptable. These were always con3u.*ned in :-.i#i entirety. Peanuts co\ild be added to any type ration to advantage. 5-1 ration Excellent. (2) VitaminsJ There is a deficiency of B complex and C vitamins In the diet. Even when the individual ration is so calculated to meet the daily requirements, this deficiency will develop Whenever the availability (fruit and fruit Juice) becomes limited or whenever the food is not consumed because of monotony (corn beef span). It is urged that vitamin pills be made more accessi ble in this area and that rations be corrected to overcome these objections. (3) Storage: Storage in regimental areas presented no problem because f the quick turnover or available stores. These areas were generally satis factory. (U) Equipment: Initially there was a lack of adequate galley equipment. Fire units for providing hot chow and for sterilisation of mess gear were not in use until after November 13th. Galleys when organized were well conducted with the exceptions noted below under disposal of waste.

J ration

pxcenr..

d. STERILIZaTIOB OF KESS OgARt In front line areas this was a problem due to the fact that fires were prohibited for purposes of concealment. As a result, discipline regarding proper cleansing and sterilization of gear became individualised and most neglected. Oestro- intestinal disorders were all too frequent. The need for boiling la soapy and clear water (3 pot system) Is ex acting where a system of community ness-gear washing Is used. But where each individual cleans his mess gear in his own water, there is no opportunity of spreading of disease from one person to another. The problem then becomes ono of merely cleaning the grease and food from the gear. This can be satis factorily done by a conscientious effort at cleaning with soap and water im mediate ly after the sal it finished. Mass sterilisation of mess gear mm ac complished fer a week or two by rinsing the gear In a solution containing 12 parts chlorine per millionafter cleansing with soap and water. A new disin fectant fer this purpose has lately been Introduced which it is understood will be Issued by the Quartermaster, rlit ("HIDO fUDB", Xoonomic Laboratory Inc., St. Paul, Mian.). Ota* es. package in 25 gallons of water willdislnfeot
mess utensils for 200 men for 1 meal. further study and planning for some practical way of cleaning and steri lisation of mess gear In forward areas is recommended. lulividual responsi bility must bo stressed.

3.36

DISPOSAL OT WASTIt

(a) In general this was unsatisfactory. Slit trenches were used by all personnel, but the core ring of foces and used toilet paper with sand was haphasard and grossly careless. Ibis was the case with the officers* heads as well as the heads for the enlisted men. Bead pits were used until they were almost lerel with the ground surface before being closed. In the rogimental train bivouac, heads were not more than 35 yards from tho galleys. Some heads were open, others had crude covered seats that were warped and were In no way flyproofed. Lator steel drum heads were used and wero quite satisfactory whon careful attention was paid to a snug, well fitting, hinged cover. Turthor discipline of the individual ie acutely aoeded in his responsibility to soe that all fecal matter or used toilot psper in tronch is thoroughly covered with sand. The proper use of a troaoh to 4a not to toll the sides of tho trench, particularly with liquid etools, should be stressed. (b) Pit or trenoh urinals were used properly, and later when the forward line was stabilised, closed pit urinals wero used in bivouac areas. (2) Kitchen Haste Garbage t The disposal of .used cans from individual rations was bad. In galley areas In the roglmental train bivouac, (KB) the disposal of garbage was bad. Large pite containing garbage were found uncorored. It le better to dig a pit just large onough to bury the garbago from oach moal than ono so large that it is difficult to keep the garbage covered.
11) Bumant


"" .

INSECTS: (1) TliesJ Hies wero not present in largo or annoying numbers until This invariably aftor troops had been in anaroa long enough to favor "brooding. was tho case. Closer enforcement of accepted principles and corroction of tho a"bovo mentioned errors would havo roducod tho fly menace, which, on
tho whole was novor bad in extreme degree.
(2) Mosquito**: Mosquitoes woro presont but woro oxtromoly scarce Tho consonsua and were not a nuisance at all. Anophelos mosquitoes wore presont. was that tho malaria that ranifosted itsolf had boon contracted prior to the lan<> ing at tho Empress Augusta Bay area and was a broakthrough of tho supprossod infoction in the individual. This area was apparently inhabitod by only a fow nativos, and mosquitoes wore not at all plentiful. (3) Contipedos and Soorpions: Con tipdo s and scorpions woro pro sent. Their bite was particularly painful and disabling for 1 or 2 days.

Rspellant was littloused, head nets not a* all, and whore Junglo hammocks wero slung in foxholos. The froon pyro thrum bomb was used whon available. Adoquato sup plies of froon bombs wore not available at first duo to loss In movoment or duo to not bringing thorn because of error. Atabrine discipline ms good. Oiling and draining was done by malarial control sections as was practicable.
cot nets rarely except in tho so instances

* MALABX* COMTROLt

(1) Cloithing! Clothing takes a terrible beating under conditions of rapid advance. It is ro commended that some plan bo formulatod to soo that tho mon have adequate change of clothing and socks, Tho knapsack system is only partially sucoossful. In many instancos thobo wore lost by individuals or as company gear, or, at any rate, did not roach tho ownor. As a result, tho indivi dual willgo through tho operation without ovon a change of clothing. Many aon willdiscard oztra clothing in times of physical stross, only to wish for it lator. Somo systom whereby organisations could ro-issue clean clothing at intorvals is dosirod. (2) Bathing and Lsundrys Mentioned abovo (3) Toilot Paperi This was liaitod and was always sought for. In
tho absonco of othor things, toilot papor was used for wiping out boss gear,
wrapping spoons to pro toot thorn from flios in forward areas whore corpses lay
unburiod, and for handkorohiofs. Whilo this uso is not os tho tic, itis practical
and dosirablo undor tho circumstancos. It is urgod that a moro liboral supply
of toilot papor bo issued for uso in tho forward aroa. (h) Tooth Brushos and Tooth Pasto: Thoso aro much desired by troops
in tho front linos. Many uso their tooth brushos for cloaning of their weapons,
thon fool nogloctod bocauso thoir tocth lator suffor. Howovor it should bo
plannod to havo an issue of tooth brushos durii any oporation. Tooth pasto
whilo dosirablo is not a nocoseity, ordinary face soap willdo as well.

.. POLICE OT CAMP ABBAS : On loaving tho camp sitos, policing of areas

should bo oaphasisod moro. Tho proper filling, mounding, and labollng of heads
and garbago pits should bo moro scrupulously dono

SUPPLIES l
(l) Tho procurement and availability of modical supplies was satis factory. Battalion and Hogimental medical dumps woro amalgamated at the BTB and this dump was roadily and satisfactorily suppliod froa the neorost aodloal company. Torraal chit or requisition was not used, and this privilogo was not abused. (2) Battalion and rogimontal gear sufforod somo loss by way of spoilago from tho rains. Labols camo off bottles, cotton and gauze wore ruinod. Propor tontago or canvas oovor was not available for one month. It is dosirablo that adoquato oovor bo issued, marked, boxoa and carried with each modical section for uso of the aid station and modical dump. b. 3BVACUATIOH. (l) Evacuation of woundod from battalion aid stations to field hospitals was done mainly by amphibious tractors, Tho modical company col locting sections did not function as usually oontomplatod because of the swampy torraln. Ambulances woro not usod except In roar aroas whore roads

3. MEDICAL (OPEBATIOam,) PATA.

->

were passable. It was not until after December 23rd when the East-West trail was available and eneny activity had practically ceaoed, that ambulances could evacuate all the way from aid station to field hospital. Ambulances, drivers, and corpsmen were bivouacked at the Regimental GP. (2) The radical company collecting section was divided into 3 groups under the control of a Chief Pharmacist Mate and the Regimental Surgeon. Each group bivouacked and advanced with their respective battalion. The control of the sections was located at the Regimental CP so as to have ready access to tactical data, medical estimate of the situation, condition of road*, and loca tion of available jeep trails, etc. All ambulances (7 Jeep ambulances) were under regimental control with ambulances parked at the Regimental CP. (3) Many line personnel received commendation for evacuation of
wounded under fire. Such evacuation while humane and laudatory is not strictly
SOP in that such evacuation was from the very advance point to the company
corpsmen while under active fire.
(U) Medical companies remained under division control and not under regimental control. Similarly, their collecting section was never under of ficial regimental control. Occasionally the use of these sections in areas forward of the battalion aid station on orders originating In the battalion CP led to confusion and misunderstanding. Moreover, the use of these corpsmen as litter bearers forward of the battalion aid station is not authorized in the Medical SOP and, if continued, willlead to unwarranted casualties in this group. When it is considered that the ratio of linepsrooansl to corpsmen is 30 to 1, the loss ef a corpsman is equivalent to. tho loss of a platoon. (5) Personnel available for evacuation in the battalion area from the front line to the battalion aid station consists of 3 groups, (a) 12 corpsmen of battalion medical section and band section (7-9) making a total of 21, or 5 litter teams, (b) 2% of line personnel, and/or (0) the litter bearer platoon (!+2 sen, 1 line officer) (Medical SOP). These resources should be utilised to the fullest extent, and a reasonable expectancy of exhausting these facilities in the battalion should exist before a call for additional assistance from the medical section of another battalion is made. The reason for this it that the medical section of each battalion must be prepared in strength of number and strength of physique to be able to go forward with its battalion if and when the battalion is called on to advance There are times when a medical section is inactive, but how long this will oontinue is always problematic In other
words all eggs must not be put in one basket initially.

(l) Medical Sectiont Ho organio transportation except 5 J* 8? ambulance p is assigned to Uxe medical section according to the tablet of organisation. Division orders restrict the use of those ambulanoos entirely to the use of sitting or litter patients. They are not to be used for the purpose of trans porting gear from GP to CP or to transport the dead to eemetoriee. Occasions however do arise when it ie nocossary to carry medical gear in ambulances. A difference of opinion arises and creates an awkward situation. Medical gear consists of many crates; transportation is necessary. The efficiency of the medical section would be considerably onhancod by the addition of several 1-ton vehicles and 1 jeep. d. LOAPIHO AMP UMLOAPPW CT MBDIOjg. CBABj It is a common and predictable cases willbo rifled aboard ship and on docks Allprotection for medical gear to prevent such pilfering should be taken. It is suggested that all alcohol and brandy be cases and stored aboard ship in a looked compartment under guard and undor care of some rosponsiblo officer. Any system other than the present laissesfairo attitudo willbe conducive to good re suits.
experience that nodical goor and in search for alcohol and brandy.
QQMPAjngS:

o QAJS QT WAR HIUBOSIS AHP AKBULATOBX CASK ATTSB UAYIFOHOSPITAL

(l) Thoro is urgont need for a casual company or convalescent ward attached to the Medical Company or Division Hospital whore in patients recovering from hospital treatment can rest two to four days before boing sent back to thoir units for active duty. In tho need for be.ds and the hurrlod ovacuatlon subsequent thoro to, mo have had casual tie's- evacuated from tho combat sone having remained in tho nodical company one-half day; Thrqe of the so oasos wore of tho Combat Fatigue Uourosis group. After Sbvomber 22, in order to rolievo the medical companios, a ward was orectod at' tho Regimental Aid Station whero all combat fatigue and war nourosis patients wexs sent for rost and observa tion. After a rost of^kroo to seven days theso pationjA-wero ablo to return

;\u25a0:\u25a0;,*.

232

kf

to active duty. Moroovor caeae of diarrhea and malaria, aftor being discharged from tho hospital duo to tho need of a quick turn-over were insufficiently well to roturn to duty at tho front line. Sxperionce showed a recurrence of this illnoss, or corabp.t fatiguo would mako thorn non-effectives a^in. Accordingly those patients were retained in the Regimental Aid Station Ward until they had rocuperatod sufficiently to resume their full duty. This arrangement ful filled tho purpose of a casual company. However, under conditions of rapid advance, a Rogimontal Aid Station could not be encumbered in this manner. men (2) According to the CO of the Rear Sfchelon, approximately were raturnod to his connand after having been evacuated from forward area. Not more than 7 of those non could be returned to the combat tone because of lack of available transportation. It is reasonable to conclude that all of tho I+7 men would have boen available for duty in the combat cone had such casual company oxistod in the forward area.

f. BartggT Or PATISETS raoi. HOSPITAL TO B^TTALIOH: Sometimes patients on being~discharged from the hospital would not report to their respective bat

talions in a reasonable time. There was a feeling in the Battalion Headquarters that some of these patients went sight-seeing or visiting. In order to counter act this, the medical companies were requested to send all patients on discharge to the Regimental Aid Station, and from there they would be directed to the exact, location of their Battalion OP. This did not function lOOjfc, It is understood that in the Army, \u25a0 patient upon discharge is delivered to the MilitaryPolice who then take the patient directly to the Battalion OP and receive a chit for him. This enables tho patient to find hie battalion area promptly and eliminated patients wandering around trying to find their organisations which hare moved during tho time of their illness. (1) Tho medical SOP was issued late. Just prior to embarkation, andhhad not been thoroughly digested by all pertinent officers. (2) Tho SOP concorning tho transportation and responsibility for the doad, after the medical officer has coraplotod his modical records as to cause of death, and identification of tho body, was not oithor understood or followed. This regiment's association as a rogiaent with the graves l registration section was not a happy ono. Ambulances aro not to bo usod to transport the dead ex cept whon death occurs onroute.

& MEDICAL SOP:

h OOHCLUSIOSTSt The above criticisms are to be construed entirely as constructive. Consideration of tho splendid work accompli shod by all hands, rod due crodit for sincority of effort did not influonco for or against mini mising the unfavorable factors as mentioned. It is only in tho hope of the attainment of the highest dogreo of efficienoy and accompli shaont of medical aims that this critical report is offered. It is the consensus of opinion that an exceedingly high achievement of the ultimate medical objective was reached in this operation.

-*

g&3

BATTLS AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES. a. PLUTO IN ACTION: KILLED ACTION: WOUNDS, OS, Chest and Trunk

WOUNDS, G5, Extremities WOUNDS, OS. Httad WOUNDS. GS, Multiple SHBLL IRAOMSNTS, Artillery A Bombs WOUNDS, Details Not Known

HAS It/W Ist 2nd 3rd 2 00 7 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL

13
21 1 111

MISSING IN ACTION TOTAL

1)

5 2 00239 0 0 8 6 7 0 1 k 10 38
0 10 0
0

002

53

KILLSD IN ACTION (DBTAILBD): GUNSHOT WOUND HAS R/tf lat 2nd Head 0 0 8 2 *t 2 Chest 8 00530 0 0 2 Abdomen 12 5 Neck 1 0 0 0 10 0 Leg 0 0 0 0 0 Buttock 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ik Multiple 0 0 2 3 9 Details not Known 0 1 U 10 38 53 (a) (b) (b) (c) Note: (a) Killed on reconnaissance (b) Wounds not described, (c) Lost on TTB9 MC KSAN.
patrol

SHELL HUOMH9TS BAB R/W lat 2nd 3rd 0 0 10 1 00U 0 1 0 0 10 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 001 k k

M, 2

1
1

body npt found,

Remarks: Died VIA 7 Malaria 1 Total 8 (1) In Field Hospitals (2) After evacuation from Coribat Zone Total 5 (3) Altar harinc been prerioualy wounded, returned to duty and waa PA 23 days later 1. 2 (U) Killedby own men whan leafing foxhole after darkness (5) Killed by accidental diacharfe of own weapon 1

--

Ist 2nd 3rd TOTAL IUO SOT7 Ik 11 WOUND, 06, Chest and Trunk 0 0 k 5 5 3 10 o t 17 18 13 WOUBD, 06, Ixtremities 39 0 0 2 6 2 2 10 8 WOUND. 08, Haad Q WODHD. OS, Multiple 00063 9 9 k} 20 SBBLL TIUGKHTTS, Artillery A Boab 00 28 U lj 63 0 WOUNDS, Detail*not known known 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Details 0 (T7BS BVSBM, BURNS, Multiple (USS MC EBAH) XZJCS) 00009 9 9 CONTUSIONS! CONTUSIONS: 1 1 Xlbow 0 0 0 10 0 Rt. JBlbow (Tank) 1 Head (Tank) 0 0 0 10 1 0 MZSCBLLANaOUS: MISGBLUNaOUS: 0000 6 6 1 Chemioal Chemical Born lyes 0000 5 Concussion: Blast Concussion: Head-Persistent Headache Head-Peritent Headache 0100011 0 10 0 0 1 0 2 Rapture drums Sars lax* Bnpture drums 0200 0 0 2 1 Cheat Chest and iMoaen Abdomen 0 0 0 0.7 6 7 Multiple 00003 3 00003 3 1 1 1 Spine DU IX7 Fracture Spine 0000 1 0 1 W Shock 0 0 0 0 1 _1 00001 1 WOtTTOZD
iy

ACTION:

HAS

B/W

177
234

T52

\u25a0*

\u2666

93f

15
b

d. GUNSHOT WOUNDS, Comparison of Right and Left side distribution: RIGHT SIDE LEFT SIDE

Upper Extremities,
(Including shoulder)
Chest Lower Extremities

Face

15 3

13

When firing from "behind cover, the face, right upper extremities, nnd right side of the chest are the exposed portions of the body. WOUNDED IN ACTION (DETAILED) Listed according (fImSBOT WUHD : HAS S/W Ist 2nd 3rd TOTAL DUTY IVAC 0 Bond Bond 2 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 Heck Heck 0 0 Shouldet Shouldet 0 0 5 3 11 8 3 0 2 2 g 6 2 2 Upper Atm 0 Lower AJrm 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 Iftrlt 0 0 0 1 0 1 Rind 0 0 1 0 2 1 3 2 Chett 0 0 3 v 0 7 3 U Abdosea 0 0 0 0 1 1 o 1 k Back 0 0 1 0 3 0 k Bnttoek 0 0 0 Il 2 0 z Hip 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 Thigh 0 0 2 2 l 5 0 5 few 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Lovav lff 0 1 v 7 2 Ik k 10 AnlU 0 0 1 2 1 k v 0 Toot 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 Tnco 0 0 0 If 2 6 U 2 0 0 1 1 0 Ur 2 0 2 Multiple _2. J) 0 -1 -1 10 1 TOTALS TOTALS 0 1 3? 21 82 17
to anatomical

distribution.

*
-

SHELL HUOMSNTS ~ B&S A/if Ist 2nd 3rd TOT DUTY IT. b&s r o 0 2 10 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 110 1 0 0 2 3 .1 6 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 k 1 > 0 0 10 0 11 0 0 110 2 1 1 0 0 212 1 5 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 f 0 0 3137 1 0 0 2 10 3 2 1 0 0 001 1 0 5 0 0 5 213 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 3 12 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 10 0 10 1 0 0 0 10 10 i 0 0 10 0 10 _0 JO Jl Jl Jt .' 0 0 27 1 18 ?2 i 53

\u25a0

Remarks: () Votmded on two difference occasions 5 (1 Qa)

(b) Voonded with fraetur* of bone 3 (Mandable, forearm, tauaeras) (c) Wounded, OTfteanted from eoabat area and returned to duty by rear
echelon casual company 7.
(d) Wounded, eraoujtted from combat area, but eeuld not be returned to duty because of lack of transportation Uo.

f.

Missing

Chemical Burns of Eyes -6 1 evacuated.

Blast Concussion 6 evacuated. Chest and abdomen 7 Multiple _ evacuated. 9 evacuated.

I - details UBB MC - mow carried ac HA - 38

not known

Burns, Multiple OSW, (Strafing)

2
1 1

9 evacuated.
2

1
1

DU Shock

09 fracture

Spine

TOTAL VIA (MeKean) TOTAL HA (Mdean) TOTAL

235

ff
33S

29

2U evacuated

fr DXXD:

Injuries

H*S R/V Ist 2nd 3rd TOTAL REMARKS

00000 0 0 0 10 0 1

Illness
h XVJBUISt

Malatla

Lacerated Wounds (Machette) fan Shot Wound (Accidental) Tire Burn gasoline DC Fracture Ankle DO fracture fibia, Right fracture. Patella TO fracture Spine Dislocation Claricle Dislocation Right Hip Stab Uft Hip Contusion Heck Contusion Left Thigh Contusion Bight Kidney Contusion Left Abdoaen Sprain Ankle Sprain B*ok
Total

H&S
0 1

R/w
0
0 0 0 0

Ist 2nd 3rd DOTY JBVAC TOTAL k 0 2 3 7

1
1

I2 6
o
0

0
0 0 1

0 0 0

o
0 0
0

9 7

9 9 9

0
0 0 0

0
0 0 0 0 0

0
0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0
0

1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 I 0 0

l l 0 0 0 0 0

1
1 1 1 1 0

l l
l l
l l
l l l
l l
l l
l l

I l

0
I

0
0 0 1 2

0 1
0

1
0 1

l l

l l

1
20

0
1

1
2

l 3

3
by units

7 10 6 9

31

UO

SrnettAted

0 Ik

Wote: Many accidental 08V, gasoline fire burns, and machette wounds are being carried o other records as wounded in action or battle easuftlti

i. iunn

(lVttf KALARU:
(2)

BkS

9
'

H/W Ist 2nd 3rd 8 U9 >1 Ik

TOTAL ZVAC Ul 16

fIASTBO-imSTHAL PI [UrrW ana Dysentery lote: 6^ eases reaained, OolltU

Intttlaal ParaiU

in hospital

EaaorrhoiA* Jaondlo*
fotals

AppandlcitU, unf

- Parlflnal Absoeas

0 73 17 12 HI t days or less. 00100 1 0 0 2 12 5 0 0 7 0 2 9 10 0 0 0 1 10 10 1 3

0 0 0 0 1 1

6
I 0 0
1

11

0 Bk IS 18

131

11

(3) ItTOTO JUO KHUL iMPMUIgIISt

Coabet f*tifue 0 0 U 11 0 Vr Vaorosls 0 8 3 0 0 0 2 Bh*ll Shock VrvousaMt 0 0 10 Ariblyopia (Hysteria) 0 0 0 0 Deaentia Precox 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 personality Psyohopathie Mental Obserration 0 0 10

2 1

13

29

10

0
1 1

1
1 2 1

0 1 2
1 1

0
0

Totals

0 22 IS 12

51

25

236

>

13<*


0 0 1 0 0

Oil 0 0 2

SOT-BATTLE CASUAIffI3S(CaTTIHHED)- ILLE3SS: (*0 FILARIASIS: H&S R/W Ist 2nd 3rd TOTAL EVaC
(5) SKIIT DISORDERS: s\ingus Infection Cellulitis Dermatitis Veronata Furunculosis Ingrowing Too Hail
Erythema

o
0 0 0 0 0

Setnceous Cyst, face Cyst, recurrent, buttock

0 2 l 0 0 0 0 0

ih 23

1U

6 3

1 1 1 1 0

0 0 0 0 0

5 3

0 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 11l

38 13

5
6

Totals (6) RESPIRATORY: Catarrhal Fever

Bronchitis

2
0 0 0 0 0

>*7
9
h

9 6
0 0 1

70

16

5
0 0 0

1 21 1+ o^o

Asthma
Broncho Pneumonia Totals

1 0 l I

Oil
0 l 1 1

5
0 0 0 0 0 0

7
1 0 1 0 0 2

27 3

6
l

(7) 8.8.H.& T.; Tonsillitis

Vincents Angina Conjunctivitis

Otitis Media, Chronic

Iritis

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 0 1

1 i 0

Oil

111
10

3 9

Totals (8) CARDIOVASCUIAR:

Paroxysmal Tachycardia

k
0

3
0

10

(9) OMITO-URIKAEY; Sneurosis ttreteral Colic

Hydrocele

0 0
0 0

0
0 0 0

1
0 1

0 0 0 0

111 0 12
111

Totals

(10) MISCBLLAITBOUS: Heat 2xhaustion Neuritis-sciatic Medical Observation

Bursitis, Knee
Arthritis Adenitis-Inguinal

Throribo-phlebitis

1 1 0 Oil 0 0 10 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1

0 0 0

0 0 0

2 0 1

030
0 0 0 2 2

Oil

Oil

12

2 2 0

10

Post Malaria-enemia nnd

Malnutrition

Dental Post-Sxtraction, jaw. Abacels Peridental Xbscess Cyst Recurrent L. Knee

Totals

Oil 0 10 0 10 Oil 1

0
0 2

0
0 2

16

237

CASUALTIES: I HOSPITAL CCRPSICLJ: KIA WIA no:: b.-t^:.*3 irjupy

IL^rj.ro
i "j

F.&S

R/w
0

0 0 0
rr

Ist 2nd 3rd 2 0 0 o 6 l 3 0 0 0 1 0222 IS 12

TOTAL 3VAC DUTY 2 10 l 9 1 1 0 0 6 6

'

'

'

Vnth

evacuation

OFFICT KIA VIA k. icciPTrT;;,'::^!!:

0 0

0151 1320
1

6 17

5 5

12

KILLEE

H&S
HT ACT T .OII 0 0

R/W
2

vouirD:...: i?; y.c^ioN TOTAL 3ATTL3 CASUALTIES

Ist 2nd 3rd 23 28 58 51 55 67

0 0 0

TOTAL 111

111

288 or 9.6{
0 1

DIED ETJTJRY DIED ILLITESS NON-BATTLE INJURY

NON-BATTLE ILLNESS TOTAL SJ3N-BATTL2 CASUALTIES

0010 3 0 20 7 10 25 18 288 89 6l

0 0

Uo U2l
or

15.U^

TOTAL CASUALTIES ALL SOTTRCSS TOTAL EVACUATED 3TIOM COMBAT ZONE: WOUNDED IN ACTION 133 NON-BATTLE INJURY 31 NOr-BATTLE ILLNESS J9_l TOTAL 255 or

750 or 25.05

8.5*

Note: These records brought up to date as of 1-2 5-I+l+

238

izi

1.

gOTSS

ON WCW-BATTLB CASTIAI/TI3S

(1) DTT MALARIA: A total of 110 cases suspected of being malaria wero admitted \u2666a.the field hospitals. In 28 of theso the diagnosis was not confirmed by posi tive blood smear. 22 cases admitted with diagnosis of diarrhea were found to have positive blood smear pnd. were admitted diagnosis chf\nged to nalarin. established. Total number of established cases of malaria in the regiment during the period 9 ITovernber 19U3. to 9 Oanuary I9UU, was 126. 13 of these cases have had a previous attack of malaria and 2 of these 13 have had it 3 or k times respectivol: It is the consensus that all of these cases carried the malaria :.to the combat zone with them in a suppressed state and that under the conditions of physical stress rod strain in combat, the infection broke through the atabrine suppros sion. During November the average number of admissions per week was 9< nnd during December the average number per week was 15*1* The peak load coming during the week of December 5- 11 *hen 29 cases wore admitted. Average loss in days per man admitted was 5 days, making a total loss of 550 man days. Of these 110 enses admitted, 10 cases were evacuated from the combat sone on or prior to December 27th. kof these cases wore evacuated after being in the hospital 1, 2, and 3 days. One death occurred from malrxia on the second day after admis sion to the field hospital. The death wr.s sudden, unexpected, and unaccompanied by severe symptoms. Post mortem examination confirmed the diagnosis of malaria.

(2) DIARRHEA: A total of 111 casos were admitted to the sick list with symp teamrof diarrhea, enteritis, or dysentery. 22 of these cases also had a positive malaria smear. Diarrhea was a common experience in about 75$ of the troops. It was usually mild and responded readily to treatment. Some oases corrected thenselves without treatment. The cause of wide-spread diarrhea is manifold and can not be placed ipso facto on unsanitary galley conditions. Atabrine is a gastro intestinal irritant and has laxative effects. It is a "primer" in some cases and in others it produces cramps and liquid stools. With all the troops taking atabrine, this stage was set for diarrhea at the least provocation. The wnter was alkaline, contained pumice, and this change of vater constituents is to be considered a factor tending to produco diarrhea in some individuals, fhe onset of malaria symptoms may be featured by the predomlnence tf gastro-intestinal symptoms. Improperly cleaned mess goar, careless galley conditions, rapid and excessive consumption of D rations, and over-oat ing generally are all factors tfhlch produce diarrhea. Other contributory factors are physical or nervous exhaustion, coryca or colds, illness, and avitaainosis. Six cases were evac uated from the combat sone, only 3 of these remained in the field hospitals more than 3 days. The nsed for beds, and the lack of a casual or convalescent company in the combat sons resulted in an unwarranted number of evacuees on the one hand and too early discharge to duty from the hospital on the other. Oases cf diarrhea require 3 to h days ef convalescence before returning to duty; otherwise in this weakened condition, diarrhea symptoms reoccur or else they become victims of early combat fatigue and have to bs readmitted to the sick list. The average stay in the hospital was 3.U days. Of the 111 total cases admitted, 12 cases remained in the hospital 1 day; 26, 2 days; and 19 remained

days.

(3) mnrvous amp mshtjj. Awrowmgias (otobo-pstchiatric disuses) t (a) Fifty-one cases in this group were admitted to the sick list. The following general terms are defined: COMBAT riTIOOl: Sheer physical and nervous exhaustion which can be completely cbrreoted by rest, sleep and hot food, in one or two days. '?AR NEUROSIS: War anxiety or fear which exists in the absence of physical fatigue, occurring in a.consitutionally inferior individual un able to adjust 'or compensate for the realities of war. Jven after a rest period these syoptoms persist if the individual remains in the combat sone, Msmd if returned to duty in active combat the man inevitably has to be read-* to the sick list. / SHELL SHOCK: Subjective symptoms (anemic, dissiness, stammering,
Iteadaches) concomitant with a history of hrving been near
the bursting of a lrge shell. Allthese cases have to be evacuated.

Jetted

239

931

("b) Her again cases wore unnecessarily evacuated duo to the need of bods. In order to remedy this After VoTomber 22nd, all oases in this group wore order od to romain for a period in a w.~.rd tent at the Regimental Aid Station before admission Inter to the field hospital if this was deemed necessary. This system did not function perfectly. Tour teen out of 25 euch caeos were admitted to tho field hospital direot contrary to instructions, and 7 of these cases were unneoossfirily evacuated. The average stay in the hospital of these cases returned to duty was 2,3 days. Whereas the average stay in the hospital of tho so eracuated from the combat sone was 2 days.

(c) The December 6, 19U3, issue of Tim* Magaslne quotes figures Issued by the Office of *nr Information as follows t (l)"In the last war the rate of admission for neuro-psychlatrlc dis eases la Army hospitals averaged 30 per 1000 por year in the continental U.S. and slightly less than 20 per 1000 per year in the A.J.T. In this war the ad mission rate for a*uro-psychiatrio diseases is about 50 per 1000 men in the continental United States and slightly higher In some theaters." (In contrast, strength of regiment 3000) our regimental rate (22 men for 60-day period was Mk per 1000 per year. (22 x 6 x 1/3 equals UU) In this calculation oases of oombat fatigue were not oounted at thlt is not a trus mental disease but ratter a condition of physical exhaustion.). (2) The ratio of killed to wounded in the Army is one to throe; in tat Wavy one to one; in tho Marine* one to four." (Our rat* oounting all IUwas 1 to 1.618. This high rato is due to 38 son lost on tho MD HAI. The rate, considering only men engaged in aetloa on lmd, is 1 to 2). (3) "About 3.5* of tho Army's wounded have died; tho Irj has loot 3.16*; tho Marinee 3.19*. In orld far X, wounded fatalities worot Army. o>; to **7. 7.99<; Marines, 12jk (Our ratio of battle eaoualtlee(9) die after mo is 6.7>. In uation to field hoopitals (7) and those* to baso hospitals flsld hospitals death ocourrod aftor th* oaoualty was reooived as follows: liniday;3inlday;lin2 day*; 1in days; 1in 6 days; and oth*r ba*o hospital* 1in U days: X in 7 **7: 1 ia 9 jgr*s 2 in 35 >ys).

240

f>

tftifc
Hq, &, 12th Marines
W:.

3 Mar Dlv

Subjeot: Referancew:

Report of

operations Nov-Dec 1943.

Ltr C5, 3 Mar Dlv to CO, 12th Mar, dated Jan 4 , 1944.

procedure.

It 1. The "oelow report la not a narrative of the operation covers only points of particular Interest from the standpoint of
variations from standard

v.

\u25a0'!,

J. B. WILSON

wwj

wl
ii

W~

o nt'd.

A INITIAL LAligiliaT I;, -\u0084.: initial landing of two combat icnzs rbrcp.at, artilxcry wne dccentr-liz e-d with a battory attached to er.cn landing ten-. The combat teams landed on a wide front, and thus ; A I<n#y bn-Uorl e wore widely GOpr.rat.d on initirllanding. The * L Da-Co-J.ion headquarters b^tccri.a were landed in two cchcljnc on dif * rc ' lv ,;-^cnce -'ithln wnch cor.ibat team beachhead. A lar>ic percentage oi rruJllcry personnel was used ao working parties to asciot the ehorc p-rty. Thoco circumstances did not pcrnlt quick or c-oy z+on of artillery control. At no tine did landing tc-.ni contraliza coun^dcro actually order or supervlce the lnotall-tlon of the It is batteries. recoai/.cnacd th^t in future opcrationc direct euppoi-t rr^'p^y be landea unacr artillery battalion control on a bench centrally lusted with in the- conoat team beachhead and vrhcre artillery pocitlcnc are -vail -ble. xhe above circumctancco did not "How the nrtillorv to i-ot into nocltion to be ready to fire imuodlatcly upon landing. In the Ninth Oocbat esn, , "Baker" battery was in Dosltion ready to fire t 1400 on Able in position ready fy% battery b^tery was position ready to to fire at 1700. 1" Charlie" was not in until HDH D plus day. In tho Third Conbat Team "Itera" battery fire position ready to was in fire at 1700 on "D" day. Itwas registered at 1810, and fired inter mittent firee throughout the night. "George battery was in position ready to fire at 1800 on "D plus 1" day. "How" battery was in posltlo: ready to fire at 1000 on "D plus 1" day. The first request for fire from the infantry came from the Third Combat Team at 1305 on "D" day. Sinoc no batteries were in position ready to flro, this roquost could not be answered. It io believed that had artillory batteries landed under battalion control and had not been required to furnish shore working parties, that effective fire could have been dclivorod by at loaet one battery per battalion within two hours after landing. Tho artillery recommends that batteries land under battalion control and be relieved of shore party duties. This howevor, is a command declslo If early artillery support is desired, it is necessary that the above conditions be complied with. The artillery regimental headquarters was landed in two parts on boaches five thousand yards apart. The headquarters battery equipment was not landed with the personnel. Thl condition required two days to rccitify, and the artillery rcgimont was not able to take control until 1200 on "D plus 2" days. Had the artillery headquarters been landed in a single echelon on a central beach, centralized control could have been obtained on "D plus 1" day. Similarly, it Is recommended that artillory headquarters battery por eonnel be relieved of shor o party duties if early massing of fire's is doslrod.

cticil Dh-Bv.B of the operation logi

hSu

To further emphasize the desiroabllity of landing batteries on call under artillery battalion control the following excerpt from the report of CO, 3-12 is quoted:
11 'George l FO's, Linision and roconnaisance parties landed as scheduled with the Ist Bn, 3d Marines on Beach Blue 1 except that the liaison party was not boated in the boat with the infantry battalion compandor as in SOP. The landing was made against very heavy opposi tion the boats being caught in cross fire of automatic weapons firIng from Puruntn Island, Beaches Green 1 and Blue 1, and a 75mm gun from 1. Naval gunfire and dive bombing had proved almost usolobe in knocking, out these weapons which wore all in well-built log and sand bunkcrc. In the confusion caused by boats being trnnk, officers and NCO's in charge of bo at 6 and coxswain being wounded and killed, companies landed on wrong sections of the baach and the landing team as a whole was displaced to the right about 2wo hundred. yards. The FO teams fought x/ith the infantry helping to clear out tho bunkers which started about 5 yards from the water's edge and oxtended inland in depth. The liaison and reconnalsance parties landed on schedule and v'crc asse-.iVi..-;cl in * ion? encry trench Juot off tre beach. The

'

&!>

c '-'cmone cdf ftWfctlc wcyjfFKly^i,'\u25a0:."\u25a0':,- c I'C'inonD,, tr^c snipers, knee RO * -.I*; 'chc two parties under the c '\u25a0 1 -\u25a0\u25a0he mortars, WM^W% " &%J&Jh& r.r^ntrv battalion M^ntry br.t :p.lion commander In nnd proceeded wlflr #Ju Blf^wl --..-.p.

wore

'

"r"

vb slow due to Jp fire but order to learn the Blzurm&zM&rz the Infantry battalion eyccu'ftfc v,r>o r,;>d taken command ;:hcn the bat t nlJcn -cor/.innd.T '-^c i/our.dod was located about 200 yn.rC.ti :Vjitv the bcac Th.: \u0084i; " :Jcn v>rcv/\-d obscure but our infantry n.pponr^d tv be advancing Dl'-'*r;yi> .V '\u25a0 -'-ounter atlpck wrs feared, the BC returned to his partie P.n\ :.l<. '-. o..;:.: ':o the left flank of the beach whore vcrv little fightin pl.-icu. This move was couple-ted at "H plus?, hours. Pcoon vn3 T.ie t_s nc'iJ.r,,-.:ico for a battery position was still out of question, the bo*:': Vfiaignji to the firing battery containing bp"".c :--r. \u25a0-i :.:.-:v of ;he \u25a0-,' .: .-..'. '.".cl landec detail, machine gun ecction and ninccllancous at; this tir.e, having be :.i ordered to do so by th^, iiw). .>:T:.'^j in s .3 charge of the boatfl. Tlilo pcrconnol \"'S PGsenbiv-.C. j. :.r. ;.hc on the left flank and the battery executive was c^i'.oi'C-. 'ey "2"/ i.-z to land under any circumstances and to st^y spread out curing the air attack which wafl taking plncc at the time. The FO trid to contact 11 the CO, 3-1Cby TBY to ask pornlcclon to land "George:I battery on Blue 5 but the attempt was in vain. At about H pluc 3" hours beach the CO, 3d Marines was seen on bench Blue 1 and pcrmlcr-ion vrae ob tained from him tc land the battery on Ee^.ch Blue 3. Ac thi 0 time beach Blue 1 wafl ctll?. covered by Jap snail armti and uurtar fire ex r cept on the cxtrjrc left: f?. nnk. Uou cvcr, /it thin coin'C a lagoon was 10 yard 3inland from the beach and bhero v/ao no ;.'ocu fcr any T.orc equipment much less a battery position* The Bat";cry Executive was ordered to r-jmo ir: to the beach rjid -nick up the a% rJlcl the firing battery was Iniuod on the left edge of beach Blue 2 at about "H plus 5" hours. Wire w;>b laid fror. Blue 1 to 3luc 2 and lator during the : day "Q-eor\"X ! F0 J3J 3 .and Ilal2or officer fired "Itcn' battery ir >uv>port 2.?., 3d Mariner, rfho had r.dvrJiced about 150 yards Inland 'oy of tho Ist r J-'he BC contact c nightfall although C-^e Torokina had not been taJcon. the CO 0-12 who we trying to find battery position in tho vicinity o Blue 2 and 3.
v
1

Ac a battery position had not been selected by nightfall the entire battery J caa FO -^nd Liaison sections wae ei\ouaced 0:1 Bench 1 Blue 2. On Jhe no.rn.lng of :iD plus 1" a battery position was selectee deep lagoon about ono hundred yrirde inland on the inl-'Tui tide cf from th.; ri::ht ed^e of becoh Blue 2. Two pj^hibi^ tractor 6 were finally obtaii.i.d at -bout noon and the r.ove.iont of the gur,r> 2/3 c ' a unit .i1 fire to the bpttory position v;ae completoc 1. at rbout 1500 when the tractor wore taken away by order of D-4. Rubber boats .and dltlonal pmmuniticn were obtained from beach Blue 1 and "by about 1600 slightly over a unit of fire vms across to the battery position. By 1800 on 1: D plus 1" enough gear had been cf.rr.iod across the lagoon to enable the battery to occupy the position pacl clc-.r enough of a fielc". of fire go enable the battery to shoot in support of the let Bn, However, fire of the bnttcry w.s not called for and do 3d Marines.. ing of field of fire and organization of the position continued the next day. All the nmrunitlon wra brought from Blue 1 by tor.t and * ~~ carried ".erosj tV.o lagoon by rubber boa'c "nd by ni^htf-ill of ''D plus r cv.o: ?. -jnlts o^ fire \:aa at rhe battery position. .'he ".vifccry firvd its first round at IOCS on 'Tj plus 2" on a rogiet oration on ?iva Vil lage ty air cpot through battalion FDC. The first; supporting fire was delivered at 1015 en Plva Village when 124 rounds were flrexl pri to an advance by the Haiicre." (2nd of quote)
1

B- WI^ZJK[ LYXQ3: T:ic follox;ing charts and provided prior :^ i-j-Aiin^ the advanced base 1
J

photos

irr

\u25a0' 1. -) l "20000 half-tone

;

mosaic;

controlled by radial-ii;
idcntlepl

i.;t.

EwMQ^

i'ul_-- ;

;cr.j

zicG-iic

with the

i:r-'.:-

244

itf

norw lc identical to the

i

1/20000

rvo reproduced from tho full.:ir::C by stcrooconpar^crnph. (c) A c0r.p1. ",.: ec~ of .\u25a0\u25a0.^.\u25a0roo-pr.iro, 1/15000, that woro usec 1 In tlic orcv-'.^ition of the noofiice, Y (f5 A sot of otliqucu of tho boach, lni:."^-. priunrily for uoc with ur.vnl g;uvfirc.
r

c.-.'^jrirJ.ly intended to uoc the full-tone mosaic p.s a firing clue ".:y lntccuraoice in the crjnora useel for reproduction (which irij\ocui"fio.lo6 */oro inhcront in tho canora) or.eh oiioet of the i' wnb nc'r.'^c \ino to a ecr.lo ylightly different fror. 1/20CGO, '..vl .i-"\ic of therefore impossible to rsscmblo tho shoots in n onolri '. tho ber.ohhor.d aron. Different sheets of tho hnli'- i-o-.o ?*.:! ;-.:/. 'liy i\.s rnlr an;r vo?o iContionl in arwdo ni,a c<.u3d bo asjcnLior i.-.-i..^ ,-. .-ao^.io of who ben'ohhead pj?or>. It wao thoi'Cforc decidod ..<;; t uhc hail -*s \u25a0'no nooaio irouia bo used as a firing ohart. Tho coordinate* SGacurocL on tho full tono ngrood to within five yarO.e of tho coor^-natc? measure! on tho half-tono. Thus, it was possible to transfer coordinates It >me aleo found olmt -cho haaty diroctly from ono chart to another. toprni-1 ciap agrood with both mosaics in areas that had i.ittlo or no tjco north of tho area difforonoo in vortacrl olovmtJ.om Howovor, countajuns. to In tliia aroa, sharp hille fir.A tho boaohhoad has runcroue ooordinatos differed by o.b nuoh ao i.hroo hur.drod yurds, A3Lo?.s tho

Iv. chr.v 1 ,

u.-.j

char"i ooastlino and tc t-h-j woy^; of the boachnaad, "cho av;rago rigiit eorroo thruo tion for ran^o waa a olnue ton ytrda poi* thousand and a nils in deflection. On tho right flank of tho boachhoad along tho coastlino, tho t-.vorp.go oliart dofloctiort for rango was ii"O and tho avorago doflec^.ion oorrootlon was. aoro. In :ho riorthoaatorn uootor of tho boachho.-^fi, tho avorr.'s chpj^t rango ccrrootion *ac plus fifi.ocn yards por thcuannft. Tho nvci-ngo dofloction oorrcoilon wa right *ir toen. To tho nortV* oi chc boaohhoad, tho ftvo^cgo .oh^rt rargo tion vra coro, i,rC tho ar:,r,>j chart du'&oetlw po*^ooti^R-vai\ri^it fifty. Thio latter doflccticn eorrootioa indloaxoa en onot-v^st crrox In tho aeaonibly of t.ho "Bou^.to. C yrATTi ATP ftpffiCT: Tho sv.rvoy plctfi vr\3 proarrangod to lon.vinpr tiio T^lvKncod "Vc\bc; It wab not fcundnoco ocnr;: fo- deviate frort this Xilnn, Ti^j 'plr.ii vrr 3 t \r. falloVi: !w> pcinta r'ooiit a.vro thouoanA yrjede .p!V-- r v^.<.h fi'm n study. of tho c.oenic boliovod
to bo intcj> vleiblo rjnd r?.9iT.y"ldont?tflftblo on tho ground* wore nolootod. MiOBO
t^o poincu vcro ueod \.o establish a bp.elc c'.iroots.on. C^eurvation
into the tarrofc /^rcn va inposslblo bocouso of the; donso Junglo and
flat character of tho terrvrih. It was initially intended to use tho dirocuion of this lino for the wrposo of rodeolinating all inexru monte. Thin vrs found impossible boonueb of tho oagnotic looal
attrnoVioa vxhich vr.rlod froo thirty to sixty uV.LV Thorafor?, coa pnse noodlod wcro not ueod, but the chart Circe tldn of Vhi3 baco.lino
was used ac a tnoi.c direction. A third point inRemediate between
tho hcovc -.two Tsoix\ts, wp.s identified and ueod to ciccurately dotorninc
tho ucfO.c of tf*o Lioanlo* luitfally, directional upborne* only were oari-iod. to b.-ato:.\:'- positions from this .lino. Horitoa*:?". control was 03-fe.t>ilfihod by inapecrod looationu. After tho lbrigtb of tho auxil iary line had"T-03ix aocu^tcly dotonainad by a oh>?s.n traverse a.
horizcival oontrol was cnrrioC to battory positions- Tho surveyed
lo^ftion and tho ineacotod location of battci-y rjoaitlona did not ftif foi" by norc than nin yards. Horizontal control by chain traverse
the front linos for a distauco of five thousrri
wns lator extonded yards an^. w^s foui:. tc Agree vith iripeoted locations to within twe-xj
Tht^ao travcr'd
yards. Initially,. :-.5X viTivuroos vzrc open traverses. road nsto and trails pernitted. Trrgo'J were uvontu&lly oioaod *vhen " aroa eurvey vrr.s .Liavioselblo. I'r.ttnl.iona were tied" together ia the position area by qbour-Ato su^yoy ii in the tai^get area by rogie^^ntion on QOGcen oh^ckj^intD iy r:!.? ;pct. Tho locnticn of those, 2'aoo. tnoae. slart.
Qouccn oh^ck j^lnto '.?y ?.i..- :pct, The location inapc-e^ir* pin-pricked coocntration3 w^s Vmwdfr*M*^<- '^'l^r ***opln-prioked by inapc-c^irsr
*&&*\u25a0*['\u25a0"' A^7

'^

5-;-t'a.

r's chart c r>rlcr to the :". op nrturc Theso concentrations were found ion. Ihcy were, selected co that in cj'.ch -ohoto mci so that there vr.s at least ono check point vrithin tr;r.:for liuits of any target sub Thj corrections, determined by registration on sequently selected, those check points, wore very tool- Knovn velocity errors and vcathor efxects vrcrc takon cut of the adjuatcu data, leaving" a chart corroc tlon only. "\th the application of weather corrections of the noncnt to the ohnrt correct ion's, effective fire could bo dclivored at any point at any time. Air spot had little or no difficulty identify.\ri those check concentrations, but because of the dence character of the Jungle and the fact that the SBD pXar.c flies too fast and has too n:nij blind spots to be n gcod otsorvation plnno, targets of opportunity pio?tod up by airBpot voro rare. There wore very low communication failures in air-ground coLinunicatlon. Most failure wore believed to bo onuecd by failure to adequately check the aircraft's conr.unication equipment prior to lcpvin^* the ground. 3ood evidence io available to substantiate tho boliof that the various battalion n wore accurately tied togothor in tho target aror.. On 6cvoral occasions surprise fire by threo 'or four battalions woro dclivorou on targets pin-pricked on tho firing chart and identified to the air obsorvcr prior to dollvor ing the surprise firo. In nil casos, tho &ir obecrvor reported all battalions togothor and in the targot area. The effect of this firo has not boen determined, since the target aroao firo-'l upon have not yot boon occupied. Considerable disrttption of the onrcy's plans is bolicvod to have -boon cauaod by firo of this typo. No eystcn of adequato vortionl control in ten pin of this oharaotor where obser vation is virtuallyimpossible has yot been devised. The form lininf on iiho hasty torrnln nap was found to to vory inaccurate, A hill shown tc bo ono thousand foot high on tho terrain map was detcrninod to bo six hundrod eight foot hlg^i by ourvoy. Another hill shown as \u25a0ix hundred foot high vns found to bo throo hundred ninety foct high. A hill uhown as flvo hundrod foot high was found to be two hundred
ninct/ foot high. A alll ahown to bo fiftoon hundrod foot high uas
found to be olovon hundrod eovontcon foot high. At tho prosont timo, tho followinc system of dotorclnlne olovation Is boing tried, and toons to glvo satisfactory roeults: The tope of such hllle as onn be By tho aid of a toroooomparagraph or oontoui juPTcyou woro located finder, tho form linoa below tho so spot olovationu woro mado, Thoeo olovations are chocked by baroootcr readings taken from a Cub epottlt plane flyiag at the aauo altitude fit tho top of the hill. On Deo 13. two battalions fired fitoixundrod tvonty fivo rounds into an onoray poolcot bclov tho orost of a hill, >ihoro tho altitude of tho hill wre
y dotor&ied "by a aurvoyoa olcvation and the altitude of tho enemy
pookot was dotcrdlnod by itbroooomparacraph. Tho elope of fall bo twoon thoeo two points wiib thus dotcrrainod and a ohar^o eelcotcd thr v : would give a steeper elopo of fall than the slopo of fall between tha two points dotormlnod in tho abovo mannor. Those oonputations prvod to bo eorroot, but a probablo orror in rrui/^c of thirty nino
yarda and tho varying hoight of trues
on top of the mass oaused sovc troo burfats in- tho fivo hundrod twonty fivo"rounds firod. This mdi cat oe that spot donations plus contour finding work grives adoquatc infomaticn on olovntionr, but cannot prevent tree bursts oauscd by tho inherent ineccu.tT.o lea of the gun.

D. OLObE yJFP.ORTina FIRS6: Most close supporting firos wo adjuetol by sound. In tho ci80 of the 20 cinutc (5000 round) prcpar tion dolivorod for the 3d Marines on Nov 24, tho short licit wr.s ad justed by aound end rcplattcd on the firing chart (hnlf-tone mosaic) the remaindor of tho prjprT^tior. was ccoputod from the chart and fir with excellent rceulte. "Lator inspection ehowod that tho covorcjpjo c tho targot aroa was ur-lfoiin ar.-!! correct. Adjustments by sound ailoc* In tho looationof front linoe. The procedure vac: tho tonrrvCL ob eorvor located h ilf "by J.napoction; a round ourcly over vp.s "Ts.r3d; the forward obsc: -.he fire in to tho target, then toy ojfttt w.na dctcrtiincd, and tho observer roplot the loop.t knVw hie looatld o^'^j^o|i%iA:^.dJustnont, thue the front xinos woro looat; for uoc on su'^icqu' %# oporationo.

w^e''cd

Jlu^Dfttec.

/ft**

ForwprcV
dv 4^"-:-\u25a0 most cases the YO di:. : in v_nfciown nuaber".' V j.-mcL'/cse.-.-c.:.-: failed to $ive fwer. -..is r.uch ; 1 of r. ttovjpt liU-iitifiOFition, Tii 'i:>- v . ic r.o vpy o* jurY n: tlie -j-oper pr.-.ur.Uion to eroend o* /: fivget. The for.mrd o or erver arr.^U!vs "'-\u25a0? lia:\ to 'jc 031'.i-ci ?r,r*i.r* in ni offer- to lotor;ninc the extent cT tlie tpr?--et \i: c>*d<->r to'iiipo^ an adequate ranount of anir.unition en uhc tarB ft". This oauicd oclpy in tho delivery of fire. -Tlic name *v. tr '. ;\u25a0 of rcginient nl aa m .' on i

:' '. c/osorvers v\~rc' :^^fk:"l"-:'-'-/.^:ri\Z.:-'.. I.i :'LC -.Dcr.y.r;.^ In i' o:' vro en;?- f.xc-., \u25a0..rr^s
'

Fonmrd obocrvcrs wore not fauiLlipr with the or-.r-r ;ior .>f :n^T27U monte (B.C. soopes pud a.'.1r.'.;0.:i lra'runCiits) Moro instruction in tfco lading of aoriol p-.'. ."->a i- nccrn:,j-ry r.n*. sdoquato steps must bo taker, to provide fora;ard c:".^c^ v.v;:'i rr. opportunity to otudy etorco-p.iirs prior to golnf co
::-; front;, '.mry must to provided vith v.o:.?ticalo to a soale cf nt wor;: thai. 1/10000 o.
tho ar-oa in whloh thoy willoocrcto.

<\u25a0

used

Bllatoral aound adjuatmont botwoen adjacoriu f jrvr:.l oforcx'vora ,wef "uo good offcot but made adjuetmciit oluvcr.

Forward obaorvora as well as liaieon offlooro wir-". gu.Mt.y of Bonding baok information baeod *on oaaucl rcmarko cf the- in.Vnntry or A iitvie Choughs befox f.\ret :jnprcr>eloab gained by haety obaorvaticn. a report" la' forwardod would matorially roduco tho muslx c of confliot ing reports I'cooivod.
1

PorwMv' obscrvore must bo more familiar with tho characteristics mtocioum ordinato, elopo of fall, protablc orror TUoy icuat be able to draw panoramic ekotohce viicr. Vvi'tiOcuLs firo no* avail Siblo. y A training prcsrnn to root if thaeo dctflolonoios has alroady bee
of.arSilisry firo puoh p.e
4'

laatltnjitod. \u25a0.'..
;V

from front line untio was gei>> Tha nature of the terrain (ewcjnp, fleti danto 4\^ngl<u) was in a iargo aeaauro recponslblo "cr this condition lndtvlm:fa rooponclblo fcr reporting infoTpation ricglootcd to inoluc The timo olo mil oloocnts I.e. vh'au, wioro, whon, by whea obao;*vc<?. Panic incident was reported orit i.B partlculavly important. Oftcri by tvo oiffor oat afc,on<jica b^it was oo Vevscuc- diid conflicting what tlio WO; roporte oould riot bo rocognlioa aa.haviu^ cri-^r-.r^itnd from ;ho raao iacidont, an aoourato roport' as to time wovli have helped rootlr this conditicn.

>*

rjiauomctt.

rally vig.# and

liiforAHtioa r.f Viio

enotny

iriOoasTleto.

rsdelrtfd

</

By far tho ajit valuatlo sburco of lnfonaation available wae Etoroo-paira to a soalo of 1/50G0 or 1/10000 wor aD-*i^l photographs provided at lOst bi--rookly titter nD plus 10 1 days, of areas eurroun \ng tho bcaohhoad. . The -no o^f>>".oe voro etudled to give information on ground forme and erieiay activiiiy. In coat oases t'r.cy revcrloa. now , solorlnga .mp.do by r.hc.or.^ciy, vocp eupportinis fires ror: deliver:! by nil iUfgh ac men on v.rtillcvj br.tfc/J Jono on those vrrlie and e7i.pr.rlr as they were found Thrfiio fires n.^iaJ.ctid matoiir.lly.in tho defor^ o Mr^inoe tho- olJooy forces .Gtt'.TacS'jf. b/ ti*o Third\u25a0jr^n.r^rod lur?rg tLo porj.oi 3c ~ Bu*2*iclontly tc I*-. to' 2?* Vhoa tni ICFVJhht-1 hofl "c^wfcu.:d that th.o tirtillory Oiudc cJioao .#>?\il3 ?vivi o^voririfc-fj., i. firea 'dolivoi'odfcn'.i. bcon cTitiroaol/ acenrnte nnc effective Th^p^ fi.>*os wore aV.t uaobcerv-cd rr.i OLC-li*/wi*cd by n trrr.cfoi' frou p.-.Tii-V;-.

>

i 1i
1

.^aflons,

Co ? .* d

'

Hie information wao vory vac sufficiently thin to allow r.tho along the grovnd, theso trails Iri-tlcn of the ground showed thit tho ' 4 r, -.inc.' of i;hcao nn enemy bivouac fiivo vcrc Accurately deli r??p believed to hnvc been 00c; ?!:\u25a0 b> .-. rrlr.'.r.uin of two companies was cfr'cctlvcly neutralized by ui'.r;:- ..: -".-jce. Tnooc intordlotory flroe wo2 e dollvorcd during a six dry 00./lod pj-ccccdln^ wid following the Third Mrj?lnca rttnok, nnci r.ro believed to hp.ve effectively proventod rcinforccaont or rvr.cuition. Thlu belief lo tubetantlntod by the etnttmont of ono priooncr of war taken following tho Third Marines 1
i

flifcfic photocrr.pho lingo

action.

Ino'^ruotion of nil Jnformr.tion r.goncios to roctlfy the dofiolcn clcb noted above is in progrcot the following request for photos for euccocdlng oporatioho has boon forwnrded:

r.. 1/20000 full-tone moealoe for flrir.3 charts. t. 1/10C0O storoo-palre of ontlrc .rvco., c. 1/10000 vcrtlonls for ueo by fon^ard obcorvcrs. (These photos to bo griddod and bound. into bookg of suitable sio for forward obscrviis.)
Mo cooments. 4. SPECIFIC 2MOASSMSNT3. This operation provod oonolueivoly thnt wncrc no
6. i;OVEH3K? fc a i rj?t lllorynust hr.vo priority on position p.--cn.s and
rood net e:ci requires onginocr holp in novoment and supply.
6. SUT?li^. This oporr.tion indiontod that allowanoos as aot up in T3A aro" "'deduct 0 but tli.t the system of distribution la oocr, outstanding cxazaploe of short igos woro: poet oacehange supoltos, gun cleaning n-itcrial (uattc, orl soda), rr.w linsood oil, lubrioatlng oil grnphit c gr c r. : Wo comaontB. ? Ejr."*CL:A.XjN

. -\u25a0.

8.

It jt .- JC; ramended that tho TBA bo ohengod nm follows:

,
Op Art

'
I I

KcjSo^
1

Ar't'V-lc

A&iitl

lowAI owe

atl

11 Ortcrr, 10 910

1 1por 2inr Off A 1 dcx* Mar Off Sni & fcnl of FO

,*

S9-4C Cnl
41-4$

4^
4

45 ML9I9A^ ML9I9A^
y 87C Fllo *.Cp t# I'^-S 0 Zen* 4i'i!r
$m i'liorj, '.'\u25a0?, \u25a0?, 9iW

Ing 2JLGI9ii4 and

and
'one 'one

..

bO, brown-

1 pc r
fono fono

Ci^nfrcoli

1per

Crj-itoon] 4 per "fCry in"

4 por oti'y in" .n
f+4 art;-

afldarty j In afldarty

J_cul-U^ f 6 4" 04 >; 1-dio rf3ci.v.tr.^ jNo/jo Ic-qpn, Mo3:l P3O | l lr.cvc-tJr.^.l _J'^ _J !.J2WaP.s.5J

rouni-r*oco, 8iio 8iio |: |:

i^ono iiono

1 per H&S 3ty 1 por 73gnc PH/R3 7&SRJ Tpcr !i<4 Biy 1perrH4 TbC ri<t*i sty 1por Hftj
1

75n* PH/EW 75nci PH/EK

790n 7tan

PV^i PV

1po^ per m I bty in" fiiarty ni arty

C^J I-it^ ' ..->i3 r>or r ^3 ETy 9 por Lfy
4

4~
4 J

'->.-.3{ ?$* \u25a0.rpt / x'oc-ri

"

!^^

.-^ .-^

.^L-

oo?.*

tln'A/Rfrr

K&S"KK&S"K
.:T

I^iTto?

X per ULo

VLULflililli ILU'

%*i

IV

i i
822 Jelt LC-23

c mt-MMLcvi \

Adi

'

Total

G ncr H::S 3ty 5 nor firing jbt." in A/RGT in A/RGT 12 12 per H.:;S pty in A/KGT i i 909 Liner.an*s eqpt 1 nor HJS Bty in 1 per He: 3 Dty 2 ncr H-s3 i^t;. He:3 He": A/RGT in A/RGT in A/RGT TS-21 or equal 963 MICE eqpt MMS-9 1 por 10 rndio 1 per H-:: Dty 1 nor H":o _t' in A/RGT f/T3X T&R eqpt, nodol in A/RGT T3X, or nnjor fraction thereof 987 2 oor H:3 Sty in 8 ncr H-::S Bty 10 por H-:b 'Older H-31 lbs A/RGT In A/RGT In A/RGT 4 [1003 LJi-19 La iwbd X Tr.po, TL-83 I nilo of 1 per nilo o 2 per mile c l per (friction)^ lb roll wire HM.IO;V/-130 wire W-1103; wire W-110-L; 6 -ocr Bty in

A/HC-T

014 NTCE Eqpt,

1 por 25 toltc-toltc- phone b EE-8

V-130 W-130 1 per 15 tolft 1 per 15 tele tolft phones ES-8 phonos EE-8 or najor frrc
tion

'orq;

\u25a0P

por

034

Lblo

'yoowritor, Toort
(WU .Ty.uo). Ire, w-, 10-^

ono or uty in ono

on

x-<

4*. miloe Wlro, ooppcr, 00

00

but not lest than one per Dn or higher unit per Hai 12 per H<T:3 Dty in A/RGT i' A/RGT 1nor H<JS Bty 1por H& lit; in A/RGT in A/RGT or Jty in 1 por Jty ii
2000 per Hfit Dty in A/RGT

thereof.

'

21

#8.^3

2OOC 3

por

Gaugo, Gaugo,
woathor*proof woathor*proof
triple braid. -It
-It leroometer for pow None dor teno 750n shell

Dty in

A/UK.

">V

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955 Radio T&R eqpt, 6 per H&S Bty Radio

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HEADQUARTERS, NIiNETIENTH hARIWES,

THIRD kAKINE DIVISION, FtoF,

IN TH*

FitU).

29 January, 1944.
REPORT OF
oPttrfjtTloNB

NOV

- DfcC 1943.

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Enclosure:
(A) (B) (C) (D) ()

|ApAl A

*lARXN DIVISION, FhF IK THE FIELD.

January,

iXIi.LTLLiVI'H hARINS ,

28

1944.

*"VlWm~mm mI operations, Subjt!ft:^^^eport of

0 G 3rd Mar Div (Attention D-3)

Nov

Deo, 1943.

Supply lttter. Motor Transport, HAS Company. Division Engineer and Operations Section. Bomb Disposal Operations. Ist Battalion. (F) 2nd Battalion. (G) 3rd Battalion.

(H) Hap of operation.

1.

Reconnaissance:

(A) Aerial photographs, and FKaC Hasty Terrain Map First Edition were available shortly before combat operations. This advance issue of reconnaissance information proved inadequate, lacking indication of terrain features of great importance, i.e., high ground, low ground, swamps and beach conditions. (B) Stereoscopic pairs and aerial photos were studied by this organisation prior to combat. Such studies failed to reveal any relief except the highest of terrain features, and

afforded no indication of extensive swamp areas. (C) Reoonnalssanoe by ground and plane was not avail able to engineer units previous to combat, and for approximately 11 days after the opening of the operations. This eleven day handi cap considerably retarded the later engineer operations* It le considered neoeesary for engineer units to conduct reoonnalssanoe prior to Invasion and Immediately after D day, and not be detained beoause of shore party activities (D) Part of the Engineering Seotion of the HAS Company landed on D day. On D plus 3 days they were released from shore party activities and began general reoonnalssanoe for orientation, high and low ground areas with view of disseminating necessary terrain information for taotloal, engineer and dispersal purposes* On D plus 6 days a base line was established, and some inland points were surveyed in. Sketches were being established constantly, Information was compiled and on 0 plus 80 days the first aoouarate maps were reproduced, with coordinated information* Transit work ahead of pioneer roads was accomplished on approxi mately D plus 15 days. Considerable time was lost during the shore party functions, when the mapping seotion should have been acoomv plishlng their preliminary work and establishing a suitable base
line. () Engineer reoonnalssanoe was additionally re tarded due to the lack of preolse information on the taotloal situation. Many of the reoonnalssanoe missions, lacked a oonelse Intent of purpose, and were rendered somewhat useless* (F) Reoonnalssanoe in advanoe of friendly lines for proposed supply routes proved difficult. Infantry units usually wanted no one in advanoe of their seotors. A workable solution infantry oommand selects the areas of the now positions and furnishes a guide to oonduot the engineer re connaissance party to this new or proposed position* The engineers then oonduot reoonnalsanoe from this proposed area rearward to the old position and end of the supply line* Possible lateral supply routes were then reconnoltered and work oonslsted of:

_ "The

*4Mffa^BDMMS^FPl*

was oonoerned primarily with maintenance of a situation map,

in the coordinating of available information for use by engi
battalions. (1) It is proposed in future operations that ..
the R-2 seotlon:
(a) Control the photographio seotion and
assign the tasks of recording progress on engineer operations
for enclosure in daily and weekly reports.
(b) T^owKh "s personnel, have daily oon \u2666 . with the *w taot ~.w .v other regiments, gathering and coordinating this in rormatlon and disseminating suoh to all engineer unite and higher
echelons.
(c) The R-2 should be subordinate to R-3, as the functions are closely allied. 4 Furnieh the mapping and reproduction .. -\u0084 ection information in the R-2's hands, and upon request, secure any Information desired by the mapping and reproduction section.

O) Kigineer Intelligence in the 1ast

l

- ..

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* E/SJ*^! ? *f tt^ r ;7ns o "^ icT&ack!; ""^

SSS?

Taotloal phases: I*) Flame throwers. Several attempts were ..,, , mad* utilite flame throwers in knocking out stubborn enemy positions to The short range of the flame denied any effective results, but did cause minor eneny evacuations in several instances. Flame throw ing terrified the enemy and sometimes caused him to flee, never were the flames within effective range. Ignition ofbut let
the
proved difficult. Best method in the field seemed to be the utili sation of an incendiary grenade thrown ahead of the jet and ianiT "^ tion accomplished by oontaot with the jet. (B) Reserves. Engineer units were always required r rr M fti PlPit oae of the latter. Occasionally they were Battalion wii called upon to gP in the front lines. Ammunition, weapons and personnelfill were oaUa ' by often

2.

oonetJntly

wa.

iJSed^
?

*tSS 53tA * * 01 atiTity Mld trcm th* 'oonni.^o.

<A) #ap * > tituation demanded only routine ^,-*.. security. Pereonnel were required to oarry small arms amsiunip. tion at all timee, or have them immediately available. and Mlilun^

'ZZZ^H J XSLiS patrol? !^*!*?1^

\u2666 M praotable. *w

( Forward areae. Inglneering aealpimente being Mtttoluw in the forward areas aooompUshad . did not always require eeeurity Or oftM Mtlf them. It was found; 3r that Or5 enj^neero stroops worked more efficiently, and under lest strain, 01 provided. Por thie reason, in the "*-** t*^ units were aooompanied by adequate security

howJver!

were found to be lm There was no safe manner of conducting routine lnspeo tione. It was 80* of this regiment to be in f duTOU by dark. The engineers slept in double foxholes in planned ireae, each pair of engineers providing their own looal seourityT ww. TbU *me proved entirely adequate in the situation.

(C) Night

ntil *n* poets

oxholelrind

4.

being crossed and in lineman equipped with accompanying each traoto:

S.?? of the tl<IM laxity X? supply

(A) Wire oommunloation

was the predominating ohannel B#o~ *- difficult and irrcguroutes, communication lines were oonstantly

terrlin^uid^SiSS

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V%l|l A|lAHb |sf |d

difficulties of coauunl cat lone of our limited 4ksonnel. This B^F |yftB#tyP-y overwme by having a limited nuawr of pre-traihed erlgJ4fl||prBonnel who were utilised to the utmost. Twenty line men, trained from the ranka for three weeks, would secure us the needed personnel to properly maintain wire communi oat ions*
the

Apab lilt lee

The maintenance

considerably:

(C) The following additional changes

would help

(1) It is recommended that metal watertight packs be made to contain two complete sets of TBX batteries, plus six batteries BA-30, each. Allbatteries to be shipped and kept in these containers until actually ready for use. (Five gallon food containers with modification would suffice).

(2) The SCR-536 (radio) should be replaced with the SCR-511 (radio) for chore party command nets. The SCR- 556 proved practically useless for shore party use and its operation was very unstable. (3) That all switchboards BD-72 in the engineer regiment be replaoed by BD-71 switchboards. BD-9 or BD-U switch boards would be preferred, if available, over the BD-71* (4) Cryptographic side should be held to an absolute minimum. Div. 801, CBP-488, C8f.l&00, and CBP-1528 would suffice for operations.

6.

Equipment;

(A) Motor Transport

six cargo proved in however, that with flexible metal half tracks* 80 equipped* these trucks could operate orcr the moet difficult terrain. (2) One ton, four by four, reconnaissance trucks provided an important complement to the larger six by six truck*. They oould travel over almost as difficult terrain, provided they were fully equipped vlth ohains. (3) One quarter ton, four by four (Jeeps) were found to be inadequate on the seoondary roods used by heavier equipment, and often when stranded, considerably retarded vital traffio on poor roads* It is felt that the use of Jeeps on seoon dary roads should be curtailed as such as possible in future opera tions of a similar nature* (B) Heavy equipment. The traotors furnished Hat), First Battalion and Third Battalion should never be smaller than a TD-14 or HD-lO* Traotors furnished the fteoond Battalion (pioneers) should not be smaller than a TD-14, and equipped with bulldozers of a width which would allow tractors to be loaded and unloaded from an UN. it le also desirable that all tractors be cable operated and equipped with double-drum power take-offs. Each letter ooapany of the Third Battalion (Naval Construction Battalion) should have an additional eight (8) cubic yard carry-all and power unit. HAS Company should also be allowed two eight (8) yard carry-alls with power unite* The riret Battalion should carry a minimus of three bulldozer* in each letter ooapany* It is rocosaended that the bull elan excava tor, three and one half cubic yard, back duaping scrapers, and the mobile loaders be dropped from the TEA. Two bucket conveyor type material loader* should be included in the Hatt Company equipment, "Barber Greene", or equivalent. (Not if three quarter yard crane is furnished letter companies of let Battalion). HAS Coapany and lettered companies of First Battalion and Third Battalion should be equipped with the longeet and wideet tracks available.

(1) Two and one half ton, six by oarrltrs, and two and one half ton six by cix duape, valuable on this operation. It is deemed neoessary, these truoks be equipped with ohains, and preferably

BtClRSSintB

|!kiA:AtAJ|J^^ 1 Iff! flPt.OliSH'lW'l^lfcmrlintenance,

cqulp7R"Jn

engineer regiment should

servicing

Mctff

crane

Company (not the 20-ton Le Tourneau

g| of the same make an^spare parts supply. and the First Battalion be
type).

(C) Maintenance.

(1) The difficulty of proper maintenance proved 0 8* ? one of the greatest obstacles in efficient engineering For 15 days after D day only minor repairs cculd be accomplished. xcxc During the early stages of shore pn.rty Activities, very ff1 operaroutine maintenance w\n rcconpllshf.cU Vehicles and tractors s*]t water should hevc been scrivocd at least ting in the sand and daily. Salt water was 1 cur.d in tractor differentials as late as D plus 20 days.

OP^J^

(2) Suggestions

for better maintenance,

of equipment should be assigwith him Ned a permanent operator, and responsibility shall reat operation and maintenance. for (b) 'j'hat a repair and service unit be set up In each battalion with cne Individual responsible for that battaliona equipment being serviced at all times (c) Tt is deemed necessary that the repair sections land as soon as possible after D day, so they may follow engineer equipment inland after shore party activities, and maintain equipment during the operation. Several reconnaissance trucks should be equipped with the necessary tools and equipment One tractor to go to the Jobs and perform light and medium repairs. with winch should be available to tow heavy equipment to repair shops and remove foundered equipment. (d) Light hand tools and equipment proved An increase of 100% insufficient during the combat operations. should be made in the allowances of hand tools ; such as double bitted axes, round po'.r . ;\u25a0. shovels , ..iachette:^ brush hooks, two man cross cut saws, wedges and mechanics hand toolfi. This in crease is requested due to the her.vy demands of all Marine unite upon engineer supply during combat. Due to the rapid pace of op erations, the tools mentioned above are abandoned, lost or become property of the borrowing organizations. Salvage operations netted few lost tools. Picks were used very little during the Bougain
(a) Each piece

ville

operations.

(D) Water purification* (1) It was found during the operation, in similar terrain, that a minimum of one (1) portable unit should be PWPU should be complete abailable for each infantry battalion. with water supply set, supplementary distillation units should Three foViPU be in Category "A", to augment ground water supplies. should be available for use inestablishing central water points. (2) Report 8 from water points should be made to H&S Company Utilities Section as often as the situation permit*, preferably each day. These water points should be located with consideration of accessibility by wheeled vehicles. (4) lyster bags. (3) Each company should have a minimum of four
operations:

6.

Engineer

(A) Bomb disposal.

See Enclosure "A", classified secret. (B) Shore party, see Enclosure "B". (C) Roads and trails, see Enclosure "H".
(1) Yellow IIRoad. (2) Wachtler (4)

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6D***ir

ff^/tf M#%4% *> a m f/ I

4 9 <( &) M&Jor Flssell Hlghi^. ) East-West Road.

bridges constructed by this regiment were of the pioneer type coneisting of logs and rough timber secured with drift pins. Portable bridging and tubelox were not used except for ajST romps
(iO Obstacle

~.).r.b '/.^cw.:i, activities, to v In many minor obstacles vu.-.-j rc-.0vu.l t;r "c)-c en._;irw ers. Typical was the removal of 200 l&nu :! 1- n;:d bj\; j;en ooohy \:r^ps by H An Com. pany along the then pro?-^:.} East -v^rt '.'rr.il.

R&COi'ikSNDiiTIONS :
*
The following recom:iurf.a:icne are cuggestrd GB a result of observation of operations f.-cm Nov Deo 43, cy this regliaent,

1. Engineer personnel and equipment shou'.d b reverted to com mand of CO not later thr.ix I.TjOO on d x>3.us 2*
A, This is necessary cation lines at the earliest

to start construction possible date.

of vital communi

nA", 2, Additional equipment as liuted by Enclosure RQM# report should be supplied this regiment before next operation.

A. It was found that equipment now contained within this regiment was entirely inadequate in both si^e and amount to perform : efficiently and with the no.-eesa-y cpeed, the v/or1 e::pcoted and required by it.
3. Amphibious tractors should not v>pe~ate over roads and trails constructed for whCsO.ed and tractor drawn equipment.

damage

A. It was found that many traffic congestions resulted from the above condition anrl aDso that the tractor did considerable to roads and bridges. 4. Loads carried by all vehicles traveling over roads recommendations made by this regiment.

be

governed by

should

A. It was found during the operation that a. great peroent of vehicles were loaded well over their rated capacity and, as a result, many of the roads were damaged to the extent that they

became

impassable.

B. Responsibility for controlling loads should rest upon the loading personnel at the supply dumps to avoid unnecessary delay in deliveries.

5. The engineer regiment should prepare and engineer plan for the next operation and that the plan be followed In so far as possible to avoid construction work that ultimately becomes of no value

A. It was found during the last operation that much work and time was expended constructing roads that were later paralleled or abandoned because of the final tactical disposition of troops and future permanent construction projects such as air strips* B. It is believed that a large portion of this lost work can be avoided if complete knowledge of the tactical plans in all stages and the final disposition of all troops are known in suffi cient time to make necessary engineer plans to coordinate their work with the advance of combat troops.
6* It is believed that all trucks of the engineer regiment
m*m

to this regiment are partly dump trucks are necessarily used for haul earth*tJkjflJyacing materials for roads and the cargo trucks are necessary vv transport engineer personnel and construction supplies to the projects on which they are working. B. It was found on the last operation that the dlvlersion of engineer trucks to other usea was the primary cause of having insufficient hauling facilities on construction projects.

Mm* anEpwljgirJD ing

16 if' allocated dump

The

7. Engineer equipment ment to operation.

should be

given high priority for ship

A. It was found that engineer equipment taken ashore on the initial landing was entirely inadequate to construct primary roads and that much valuable time was lot waiting for heavy equipment which was not made available to us for several days. 8. Engineer personnel can be utilized only as labor until their equipment is available.

8. It is believed that repair parts for all engineer equipment of all engineer units on the operation, should be catalogued, consolidated and lists given to each unit to facilitate repair of uneervioable equipment.
A. It was observed on the last operation that many machine hours were lost because location of necessary parts was not known*
CONCLUSION;

It is believed that with the fulfillment of the above recommen dations and suggestions, that this engineer regiment can function efficiently, and rapidly and be used to the greates advantage in supporting combat troops and constructing necessary all weather communication lines*

R. . FOJT.

0/15

VMD/rhh

C-O-P-Y
i, 19th Marines,

ENCLOSURE (Engrs).

"*
1944.

January,

From: To : Via

Subject:

Supply letter* (a) Supply Administrative Order #1-43,

dtd 27 May, 1943.

Reference:

1. The below listed recommendations and information is forwarded in accordance with reference (a), after observations made during the operation of November-December 1943.
(A) All tractors should be furnished with bull dozer attachments*

than a TD-18 or HD-10. Tractors furnished

the 2d Battalion (Pioneers), should not be
smaller than a TD-14 and equipped with bull dozer blades of a width that would allow the tractors to be loaded and unloaded from a LCh. In fact all tractors that were
used in Initial landings should be fitted with blades,
if possible, that will fit into an LCK. It
is also desirable that all tractors be cable
operated and equipped with double drum power
take-offs in addition.
(C) Each letter company of the 3d Battalion (NCB),
should have an additional eight (8) cubic yard
carry-all and power unit* H&S Co., should also
be allowed two eight (8) cubic yard carry-alls
with power units.

(D) The Ist Battalion should carry a minimum of

three bull-dozers in each letter oompany.
(E) It is recommended that the below listed items
be removed from the basio allowances for the
Engineer Regiment*

(B) Tractors furnished H&S Co., Ist Battalion

and the 3d Battalion, should not be smaller

1. Bull-clam excavators. 2. Back dumping scrapers;

3. Mobile loaders.

cv.yd.

(F) Two bucket conveyor type loaders should be

included in H&S Co., equipment; Barbar-Greene or
equal. (Not is 3/4 yd., crane if furnished).

(G) h&S Co*, and each letter company of the let

and 3d Battalion, should be equipped with a 3/4
yard crane and attachments instead of present

equipment

(H) All track laying equipment should be equipped

with the longest and widest tracks available.

&t $t%

f$

(I) All the equipment in Engineer Regiments should

the came make or as close as possible as that
M

*\u25a0

k>CbObUn&

is strongly reoonmended that light meters be furnished for all photographic chests and every camera. At the present tine, hundreds of dollars worth of film is ruined due to the lack of the above nentloned meter.

(X) It Is recommended that H&S Co., and the Ist Battalion be furnished a tractor crane* (Not to be confused with the 80- ton Le Tourneau Crane)
(L) An increase of 100 should be made in the allowances of hand tools such as double-bitted axes, shovels R.P., S.H. machettee, brush hooks, two man cross-cut saws, wdges and mechanics hand tools. This Increase is requested due to the heavy demands of all Marine units which the Engineers supply in combat. Due to the rapid pace of the operations, the tools mentioned above, are abandoned lost or become property of other organisations* Salvage operations have netted little results. General opinion is that 76% of all axes should be double-bitted. Picks and mattocks were used very little during the operation at Cherry Blossom.

/s/

V. h. D*VIS
m

iuNCLObUh \u25a0*\u25a0

am

M B A SHV/rhh hAD^JAKTRHNO SERVICE COiJ>aNY iNINttTmVTH MjuUNES, THIRD uihl.ttt DIVISION, FLEET i-^tnl^.c FOBC&^ a n '"

'
\u25a0

IN THb. FItLD.

fPjF>~

19 January, 1944. From To Subject Motor Transport Officer. CO, H&S Co., 19th Mar.

1.1 t,MIkI'J

>'" V
i

"'

r~*

Suggestions for future operations from experiences of present operations.

1. 6x6 trucks have held up satisfactorily and it has been found they willtake a lot of punlehmnet. Would suggest that every effort be made to equip all 6x6 trucks with half tracks for the dual rear end, as it was noted that trucks so equipped could go most anyplace. 2. It is believed that drivers instruction in the use It was noted that a considerable of the Vlnoh should be stressed. number of drivers failed to use winches and walked or waited for tractors to pull them through bad spots. 4x4 Recons were found to be very useful as they 3. would go through roads where the going was really diffioult. Considerable trouble was found with the front and rear differen tial and it is believed that a large part of this was oaused by improper driving. Using the high gear ration. Instead of the reduction gear.
T^is writer believes that a large part of mechanical
4. failure in this organisations equipment would be eliminated if
it were possible to have the driver responsible at all times for
hie vehicle It is felt that several drivers on the same pieoe of equipment should be eliminated completely*
4x4 Jeeps were found to 5. on secondary roads, where trucks were their use should be curtailed as much usd, stood up well and only troubles tlt water*

used* and it is believed

as possible. The ones found were oaused by uee in

be very inadequate for use

6* D-6 traotors caused most of the trouble in tractore and this writer is of the opinion that praotloally all of the trouble with these traotors would have been eliminated if they oould have been properly serviced as soon ac their use on the beaoh and emit water was eeoured* Salt water was found in tractor differentials and transmissions as late ac D plus 20 days* It was noted by this writer that none of the traotors had been lubri cated when turned over to NT for repair, and all indication was, that was the reason for this meohanieal failure*
Spare parte were almost completely non-existent for tractors, praotloally all repair had to be improvised, or patched up. It was found that our machine shop and its equip ment was of the utmost value in making and converting parte so
they

oould be ueed*

7. for future or use of

operatlone;

Thle writer has the following suggestions '

to make

(a) The same operatore shall stay with the pieoe of equipment and be responsible for it, regardless of the location
equipment.

(b) That some central means for each battalion be act up with responsibility to be eettled on one individual for that battalion equipment to be properly serviced at all times.

ge,

*jr *

\u25a0

, ;vvj|

NCIX>BUR "B"

)%

Enclosure
(o) That up complete with all that one location and only minor rep A companies. All parts-trailer, machine be centralised. This for Ist Bn, 2nd Bn, and any H&S equipment usi This seotion be supplied with personnel from and to be under the direction of H&S Co.
by

"b"

done at

on be set the

;, etc, to all repairs operation*

(d) This seotion should have the following equipment other than present equipment: (1) 1 or 2 4x4 Recons equipped with the necess ary tools and equipment to go to the Job and do medium repairs.

(c) Be equipped with one trailer with a winch, to pull Jobs to central locations for heavy repairs, and to help pull tractor and other heavy equipment out of holes, etc. (f) It is suggested that the repair seotion be de barked as soon as possible after D day, and that they be kept as mobile as possible so they can follow the oompanles inland and keep within a reasonable distance of where equipment is being
used.

(g) Suggested equipment for use in the

Welding Trailer, Arc Welding Equipment Oas

field;

Two if possible

105 ou.ft. air compressor Greasing Trails r fileotrlo Shop for generator and starter*

// S.

VUHGmMNON,

Vrnt. Off. (kTO), UBMGEU KMCLOBUIUt B

3/11

A
DIVISION NGIwLR &

"C"

o/wJK^S

SfiCTlGrt

From: To :
Via :
Bubjoct:

CO H&8 Co, 19th Mar.

Dlv Engr and Oper Sec, use of in future ope rat ion
recommendations for.

flF

1. The below recommendations are based on the experi ence gained in the last operation. It is felt that this section can be of groat value to the Division by following the recommended outline* It is further recommended that this plan be adopted as b.O.P. for the section on all future operations. 2. All recommendations are based on the experience of this eeotion and its contact of front line unite. It was found that these unite were laoking and begging for infornation regarding their correct locations. It was found on several ocoaelons that units had believed themselves to be 4-5000 yds*

from their actual location.

3. Xt is recommended that one transit survey party be attached to the two leading combat teams and one office force be attached to the advance H&8 Co. detachment. Allunite must land on D day*
4. The transit parties will be composed of 7 men, 4 men aa transit party, 2 men as field sketchers and 1 man aa runner* Both parties willbe responsible to and controlled by the eeotion leader. The surveying equipment willbe handled and carried by the men as part of their oombat equipment. On hitting the beach D-Day, the survey parties will Immediately establish a Base line, survey the beach line end prooeed surveying Inland to the front lines. Their duties will be:

(a)

To give to unite correct grid coordinates of their locations. This willbe accomplished by calculating latitudes of departures aa the survey lines are run* (b) To establish permanent stations from which future surveys by other units may be made. (o) To make survey controlled field sketches of all areae not oovered by the transit survey* (d) To gather and report all Information regarding terrain featuree that may affect Engineering
(c)

To make Engineer Reconnaissance

upon*

Operatlone

whenever called

(f) To make a dally report to the section leadsr v/enoloeed copies of all field notee and This report oust be in by 1600 dally* sketches.

5. The offloe foroe shall be composed of 6 men and officers; 2 men to plot survey notee and compile available In formation, 1 draftsman, 2 Aerial Photo Interpretors, 1 photo and reproductionjassm All the work of this section willbe done between 1800^s^picL Their duties will be:

m %T~.^m^sm IL^tjQXfc

|*v

ftTfcV (%p

all field notes and compile all field 'ketches into a 1:5,000 map (on hard copy or acetate). (b) Reduce the 1:5*000 map to a 1:20,000 map by 0800 the following morning and make distribution by 1000*
'
280

\u0084.-.

!%o

Subject:

Dlv Engr & Oper Sec, use of in future operat Re commendation 6 for.
(Cont'd)

r*^

5.

(c) Check surrey notes w/ 12th Marines surveyors to give a double check on all surveys and to initially have a Fire Control Map.
(d) To obtain aerial photographs taJcen during in tervals of the campaign and make seni control led aerial mosaics. To obtain as much accu rate information from the mosaics, as possible, and plot on the 1:20,000 map. (c) To check origin of grid system and establish True North by Solar Observations".

6.

It is further recommended

that:

(a) All aerial photos, survey notes of other organizations and field sketches be made available to this section. (b) All survey parties of this Regiment come under Dlv Engr Sec control w/authority to coordinate all survey work.

K. *. GORDON, letLt., UShC.

(2)

ENCLOSURE "C*

tf


Co
M

C-O-F-Y

J(Ag|U)SURE

"D"

UNITED STATES hJihl^E COi

A", letn, 19th

In the Field.
12Jan44.

Mar. 3dKarDiv,

Fron: To :

Boob Disposal Unit #1, 3dMarDiv.

Chief of Naval Operations.

(1) CG, 3dMarDiv. (2) CG, FhAC. (3) CfoC, Washington, D.C.

tf

Subject:

Bomb Disposal Activities, report of.

(a)
U. S. Navy Bomb Disposal Intelligence Bulletin

Reference:

#52.

1. In accordance report is submitted.

with reference

(a), the following

Unit #1, 3dMarDiv, composed of First Lieutenant's

2. Robert C. COFFEY and David W. SCHUwidCfiR, is attached to the
Engineer Regiment of this division, and is such oapaolty teryoa the entire command. We were present at the original landing on Bougain elan, 8.5.1., on 1N0v43, serving under the command of
l ville the Ninth Marine Regioent, to which we were tactically assigned.
The second day on the beach we extracted fuses from three (3),
*Nk, IOO# bombs. The fuse were indent leal, M-103, two having
armed, and the other in a safe and relatively harmless condition*
The first few days were spent clearing out areas
for provisions and gun emplacements, of small arms, grenades and
The 75mm howltier ammunition (Jap) which
knee mortar shell* was disposed of was stored in three formidable pill boxes* As the roads ver being pushed forward, we were engaged in removing 5" Naval sh'-tl** probably fired at the time of the initial land ing, land <*ines and unexploded artillery and mortar shells We few occasions to clean out bivouac areas of foreign were use* on as wel- * domestic ordnance. On tow oocasions we were assigned
the r*"ia of destroying by demolition, the unexploded experl s>er' al rocket, in an area approximately 500 yards forward of the
fc-roed wire. We were given adequate security patrol by the
commanding officer in whose area we were employed*

We were oalled upon at different times to remove unexploded bombs from the area of the Bomber Strip, and the area embracing the second Tighter Strip on Bougainville Island* The ammunition dump of the Second Battalion* Twelfth Marines whioh received a direct hit from a 63 Kg. Japanese bomb. was oleared, and straightened away by Unit No. 1, with the aid of the Twelfth Marine Ordnance command. A fire resulted from the explosion, and many of the fuses has shrapnel Imbedded in them* we cleared out the rejected shells and duds from the vari ous ammunition areas of the artillery batteries.
During the month of December much of the work was done la conjunction withCapt. d. J. Kerriman, of HAS Co., 19th

Marines*

SUKHARY:
2 63 Kg. F. P. Japanese bombs, fused with ASA. Low order
detonation, after penetration of 6 and 12 ft. respectively.
20 AMk. 100# bombs. M-103 Nose fuses throughout, (about 2/3 of
these failed to arm). Most all fuses of this type wero set
on delay. Three of these bombs oontained AN-WIOIAI tail

FffttT tItMttHIM sMIf if

ENCI-CSURi: "D8

9-S>

10

fuzes, all were

.7
3

8
20 4

Japanese IS Land Mines 150 Rounds 75 mm Japanese, (15 duds Included)

12 Hand grenades -U. 8. A. -dude /
100-200 Hand grenades Japanese (pins extracted on 30)
300-400 Knee mortar shells.
1500 75mm pack Howitzer, U.S.B. (rejected)

5" Naval ehellWauds. 155 on shells dude.

75 no shells duds.
75 am shells duds. 60 am aortar shells dude. 81 mm mortar shells duds.

nq^d

--

to be in an armed cond;
A
A

ri

Unit #1 of 3dMarDlv in conjuctlon with Capt. D. J. Merrlman, and the B.D. officers of Ist MAC was employed for a period of three weeks, previous to the recent oampaign. During this time we helped in the vast program of cleaning out ammunition dumps, and prospective bivouao areas of Japanese ordnance as well as domestic, and also cleaned out paths which at a later date were developed into roads. A complete report on this undertaking was forwarded via proper channels by Ist MAC B.D. personnel. 3. In would recommend a set of drills with a mall braoe be forwarded to Marine Units, for removing crimps on domes tic artillery fuzes. A two (2) pin spanner for removing mortar base fuses, and also one spanner that could be employed in the removal of the detonating cap of the N-103 fuze, would be useful additions to a Marine B.D. tool set. Field expedients are prac tically out of the question when a B. D. unit is attaohed to an infantry command.
(2)

ENCLOSURE D"

JS3

FIRST

BATTiHoN NINETEENTH MARINES, NETEENTH IN THX FLELU,

9 U( ;{.--."ij
')<:.<"\u25a0

From
To
Subject:

CO, 1^,1; 2n

CO, 19^ !i

Report of Op-^j

c 1 For the fir l j,-k-vt<:.:.C'\ h 'i -;.'./ a personnel o? this bat calx "\t v. 1 tlon teamn were conrai-' -'a : el:^;. & -i \y \u25a0\u25a0'Lvc'-JL 7 :. :.". -. ; the opinion of this heaiiqu&rtci-o thai (\u25a0-:\u25a0. fw.;-;,.' \u0084'i rr :\u25a0 i>z_not be committed to shor-.j i-ar^y func- ici'-< <f -:..- :'.;sj cay. Tt ie ii apparent that the rap:'.:! -.ompletir ii :"!' t .r-x '.iii. y be tli r -j determining factor i:\ th.t jucct:^ 'i o_ '\u25a0 t?:\?. jyy. It is therefore b01.i..'-. i taat e?it -^'" r '\u25a0"\u25a0.iV-.v.r/j , t.;.'...--.r.' rrr. i x and th.i as Bumbling c: tr^ineer u)t:.t; \u25a0\u25a0'. -v.v.'i ~.n-~ii ic-i...!.i >c^:l:i inmodiGtoly.. a.XI net '-(.r clays Itfter ; 1:*\u25a0;\u25a0. It if im.joc^ljlo for the engineer bat;r.: on to do th:.: end perform shore party duties concurrently. T.n this partlcu.:.rr operation there was appar ently little or no engir^ir reconnai3iu>oe conducted untlj. D-plus ten day. This first pux^.^aph aleo applies to the Pioneer Batt alion ac well, though t^ a lesser deg.-eo. It is believed that some form of labor tree;.? should be furnished to do the routine stevedoring after the ir.Uial landing, thus permitting the pioneers to do engineering work.

- . -..
v
..i i-

\u25a0v en*/

-L-J.L'..

''253

._

\u25a0

\u25a0

2* All of the tractors of this battalion worked on the beach for ten days. During this period they often worked in salt water three or four feet deep and it was noted that heavy equip ment was operated continuously with little or no servicing dur ing this ten day period. It is recommended that a six by six (6x6) truck be equipped with a grease unit, an extra supply of special lubricants, and emergency tools. This truck should be patterned after the service truck now carried by the companies of Naval Construction Battalions, and should be landed in Cate gory A along with eleotrio welding equipment. Mechanics assigned to this vehicle should not be given shore party or other duties. 3. For the most part the equipment of the battalion held up very well, considering the operating conditions and the servloing facilities available. The six by six (6*6) dump trucks performed especially well. There were practically no mechanical failures among the twenty-seven dump trucks operated by this traoks. The three trucks that were so equipped proved themselves Invaluable
battalion.

It is recommended that they all be equipped with half

4. In general, the heavy equipment is too light. There was a definite need for heavier tractors and more of them. It is recommended that the TD-14 Bull Clam, Athey Mobile Loader, and TD-9 tractors be dropped from the Table of Organization. An engineer company should be equipped with three Caterpillar S-7 Angle Dozers, three D-6 Angle Dozers, and three D-4 Angle Dozers, all to be equipped with hydraulioally controlled blades. The D-7's and D-6'a should in addition to be equipped with a double drum power take off. The D-4 should have a Hyster winch on the rear end. The Hyster winches now on the D-l'a were literally worth their weight in gold. Should the procuring agencies desire to equip us with International equipment, each company should have three TD-18 Angle Dozers and six TD-14 Angle Dozers, equipped as recommended for the Caterpillar equipment. Teh two 3& yard back dumping scrapers in each company should be dropped from the Table of Organization, and one & yard cable operated front dumping scraper be substituted.
ENCLOSURE "E"

9*+

'->

simple natter craft make the landing of this equipment a Each company should have one puJ.l grader, leaning wheel type.

It J^HrecoomenJ 6. shovel with crane and pile drivin provided each company. The

d Bay City .chments be

6r The small tools provided each company were able to meet the needs of the engineers in general. Additional cant-hooks, peavies, axes, and machetes should be added to the pioneer sets. Each company should be provided v;ith a supply of ?A# and 5/8" steel cable, together with cable clips and large snatch blocks. There were not enough entrenching tools to fully meet the needs of " 1 the infantry regiments. I" is nuggested that the pioneer company carry an additional infantry intrenching set. At the present time one infantry entrenching act is carried by the engineer com pany. The pioneer company carries no tools for '.Bue to other unite. If a second infantry entrenching set were carried in the pioneer company the reinforced regiment would hu^e two entrenching sets available. This woull no : add any torra^? to the engineer company which is already very icnvy a^d iv '..t ihoughc that this additional equipment would r.ot overburden the pioneer company which is relatively light, 7. In this operation there was no demand for portable bridge equipment and it is believed that pioneer bridges are the praotlcal answer to the bridging problem. 8. The demolition equipment and explosives provided were ample* It was possible to fulfill every request. The flame thrower equipment was obtained Just prior to this operation and it is believed that additional training should be conducted. A method of handling requests for this equipment should be developed and the problem of getting the equipment to the proper place in time to meet the situation requires more study. They did not prove themselves praotleal in this operation. 9. In general, the engineer were not informed of the taotioal situation and it was liposslble to anticipate future requirements. It is believed that an engineer liaeson offleer should work with each Infantry regiment supported by the battalion* It is our opinion that the engineers could be of more assistance to the artillery regiment and that some provision should be made for providing engineer support to the artillery.
pected. It is believed that the number of communication personnel and radio equipment in this battalion could be reduced. There was, however, a definite need for all communication personnel in the shore party. It is our opinion that this service could better be provided by some other communication unit, possibly the pioneer company.

10.

Communications

functioned as well as oould be ex

11. There is a and an Operations Section The Table of Organisation to the Bn-2 Section/ and

definite need for an Intelligence Section

in the Battalion Headquarters Company.
should be ohanged to add six enlisted
three enlisted to the Bn-3 Section.

lE. The Athey trailers operating here were noted with much interest. On -several occasions they were borrowed by the engineer companies and they met a real need. If two ere assigned to each company it would do much to solve the problem of moving engineer equipment and supplies. It is believed that this equip ment should be landed in Category A. should not be attached to regiments longer than absolutely necessary. Prolonged divides command and does not make for harmonious oper o-ordinated effort. A definite doctrine of command and when
engineer

companies

are

ENCLOSURE "

tfs

SURE "E"

14. Water supply here was no pfobfA^ Mie equipment functioned perfectly and was ample to ci^et exTlMrg requirements. Water being plentiful, no use was made of distillation equipment. This equipment is considered essential, however, should ground sources prove inadequate in future operations.
15. Three 7.5 KVa generators were landed in Category A by this battalion. These generators were put to no use until D plus 16 days and should be placed in Category B. 16. There is a definite need for a six by six (6*6) cargo truck in battalion headquarters. It has been necessary to constantly tie up a dump trvu^k to haul for the battalion quarter master.

17 The supply of food, ammunition, e';c-, was ample at all times. However, the anourc of clothes provided was inadequate. Engineer troops work under auc'i adverse conditions that keeping these troops in shoes, sockri, and dungarees was a serious problem* The Battalion Surgeon continually reported that the lack of dry clothing, especially shoes and socks, was having a detrimental effect upon the health of the troops in this command.
Surveying and drafting equipment should be provided 18. for the headquarters company of the engineer battalion in the Table of Basic Allowances. Surveying equipment ehould be landed during the first three days of an operation. All surveying in a beach head area should be coordinated by the senior engineer unit. A base traverse should be established along the beach by the senior engineer unit operating in the area and all surveys ehould originate from this base system, whether conducted by infan try, artillery, or engineer units. This would save much duplica tion of effort and maps could be corrected with greater speed.

RALPH V. BOHN,

(3) ENCLOSURE

Major, UBMCR, Commanding.

tfi

HfiAD^UiiRTERS COMPaNY,
THIRD khRINE DIVISION, FLEET
SECOND BaTTaLI&m NINETEENTH h*RINI i.iiliJ* FGhCb, Iw th.: fikl^

7 December,

1943,

From:
To

CO 2nd Bn, 19th Mar. CO, 19th Mar.

Activities, etc., report

Subject;

on

1.

Activities:

D Co
Tom
U8

D Co., attached to 9th Mar. (reinf .) made combat Served Shore Party functions for CT 9 unloading on equipBeachee Red 1, 2, 3 and Yellow 3 and 4, handling supply and equip from ships of CT 9 and from two AK's. ment D day.
landing. 4 Beaches Red 2 and 3 and Yellow 4
were found unsatisto factory due to surf conditions and receipts were switched to
parties. beaches handled by other shore parties.

day plus

1 to D

day plus 5.

The company sent platoons to take over beaches of shore parties In handling altered receipts mentioned above. other on Ist Platoon moved forward with combat troops on
duty D day plus 1 to serve as combat reserve and remained on this duty
plus 3 nhen they rejoined shore party. until D day
patorl with D-3-9 on D day plus

3rd Platoon moved forward on left flank on combatday. 5* rejoining shore party tame

day plus

6.

Company, now consolidated, moved to East Torokina Beach un4r oontrol of Div BP CO and remained as Shore Party unit for this beaoh until coming back under orders of its own battalion

day plus

7 thru D

day plus

36.

Under bn. control and engaged on unloading ocean receipts of all classes at East Torokina Beach and storing and forwarding.

F Co
D
day

to D day

plus

7.

F Co, attached to 3d Mar# (reinf) made combat Served shore party funotions for CT 3 unloading on ships beaches Blue 1, 2 and 3 handling supply and equipment from of CT 3 and from and AX.
day landing.

day plus

2*

Organised dumps and forwarded supplies to CT 3 and swamp in rear of Beach Blue 2 to assist
artillery po drained sitions*
Ist Platoon moved with LT 7 to serve as combat

U.tyUlflfHillLU

(1>

ENCLOSURE "F" bub>f

"

W\

Re Joined bn. at Beach Green 1.

E. Company

D D

day plus 5 thru day plus 5.

day plus 7.

Ist Platoon landed with LT Party for them on East Toroklna Beach.
day plue

6 to D

day plus

10.
Infantry with mlec work

Ist Platoon served D

day

details*

Plus 10* 2nd Platoon landed and company (less

3rd Plat.) Battalion

Joined bn.

D
day plus

6.

Hq Co landed on beach Blue 1 and unloaded boats of ita own embarkation group*

Hq Co moved to beach Green 1and vent into bivouao* 7

A-l

D and F companies Joined and bn* (leas E Co.) pro ceeded with organisation of oorpe aupply and material an all aland, and East Toroklna beaches (the Latter under Puruate l D co) and reoeipt of all inooming corps supply and transhipping of aame* This routine remained fixed from t day plus 7 thru the oonoliieion of this report a D day plus 56 efcoeptas noted below* Bn was

Joined by Ist and find Plato ohfc of E Cot

Corps Service Group*

Bn, Was

Platoon S Co* joined Critidieme or favorable comments on

detached from 3d KarDiv and attached Jjrd

to

Equipment:

Motor Vehicles:

allowed, seems

The number and make of cargo trucks, 2j T, to be proper to the task Just completed. But it should be> assured that all trucks going into combat in the future carry their Flexible Steel Treads* Division trucks assigned to this battalion were lacking in this necessity.

'**\u25a0"SBmHEH

There should be not less than one dump truck per pioneer company and this should be supplemented by one power shovel or crane with drag line bucket per pioneer bn. These items should be held inviolate for pioneer shore party work and Included in the first oat e gory. This thought is based on pioneers handling supply, after the initial assault for second and all

II

ENCLOSURE

"F"

w>

Tractors: It is again repeated that the mininun necessity for gioneer shore party work is one tractor per platoon and that this should not be less than a medium (TD-14 International op eqaiv,) with bulldoier blade.- It la also requisite that they be recognized as necessary to shore operation and not subjected to transfer order. Trailers: It is believed that shuttling of cargo by Heavy flat bed trailers should be abandoned until such time as both, serviceable tongue be developed, and over loading can be pre vented. On this maneuver the trailer loads were a severe handi cap to the operation. The tongues broke too frequently, and this always happened at the most inopportune plaoes, and the heavy loading was too severe on the available road net. Allclasses
of wheeled vehicles:

Because of the incessant use of supply vehicles over many classes of ramps, it is recommended that more thought be given to larger diameter wheels. The easo with which the heavy artillery prime movers negotiate both romps and heavy mud holes suggests that this might be a general panacea* 2. General remarks:
As a result of shore party work on two combat land ings the writer hat concluded that: Each reinforced infantry battalion should have one shore party staff specialist and should handle its own ship load with its own troops under his direction and as a responsibility of his own Bn CO.

Following this, the regular shore party organisation, as a function of the senior service group, would pick-up shore party work. This latter unit to be in no ways connected with oombat or engineer command.

HaLSTEaD SLLZBON,
Major, UBCR,
UBCR, Commanding*

(3)

ENCLOSURE "P"

it^jCT BnMI

IJ^^J S

S*

1 -2SS*'

#1


A
HiiDw,UAhT>nb

V,
V

AbliNCLOSURE "F"

SECOND BjiTTiuJON, Nln*.T*tfTH kafilrUiiS, THIRD iiiilKa. DIVISION, FwF, IN TH* FlriLD. 25 January, 1944.

TO:
Subject:

The Connanding Officer, 19th Marines. Consolidated report activities 2d Battalion.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of activities of the Second Battalion, 19th Marines, from D day plus 36 thru D day plus 80.
2. This report is a continuation of report pre viously submitted and together the two form a complete report for the entire Bougainville Campaign.

HiiLSTEiiD ELLISON
Major, USi-iCR,

Commanding.

NCLOBUB "F"

$40

ACTIVITIES

<y.
"F"
s

D co

From D day plus 36 thru D day plus 77

Under Bn control and engaged in unloading ocean receipts of all classes at East Torokina Beach and storing and forwarding.

day plus

78

Joined Bn on Puruata Island.

Bn (less D Co.)

From D day plus 36 thru D day plus 77.

Engaged In unloading ocean receipts of all classes on Puruata Island and in transhipping these receipts to Bougainville Island,

Bn (In full). From D day plus 78 thru D day plus 80 Policing bivouacs, preparing property for embarkation, unloading the 20th flight of LsT s and embarking. During this period all staff functions remained in service for training the relieveing cadre of the XIV Corps Service Command,
Signed: HaLSTEaD ELLISON
Major, USfcCR,
Commanding,

'

tf\

THIRD BATTALION, NINETEENTH

THIRD i-JiRIN DIVISION, IN THE FIELD.
9 December, From: To : Subject CO.
CO, 19th Mar.

1943.

Comments on recent

landing operations.

1. As per requested, the following suggestions are offered for the improvement of landing operations of this rogl ment
(a)
Use larger and newer tractors for beach operations.

(b) Have definitely decided who is in charge of shore party Combat team commanders normally assume these duties al though SOP specifies shore party oo&unanders

work.

practical.

(o) Plan before landing, operation where roads and other construct ion work willbe installed, with alternate plans if

(d) Have one person in charge of all engineering work with authority to coordinate work of all engineering and CB units. This person to land on "D" day.

(c) Have central authority to specify locations where oon struct ion equipment is to be used. (f) Have duties of various engineering battalions distinctly speoifled. Combat engineers to build trails for supply lines, CB* to follow and build roads or widen and improve trails as
necesaary.

G. J. WHELAN

ENCLOSURE "G"

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TKI-1D K^ir:DIVISIGI', E FORCE, IT THL FIELD.

> 27 J: nunry , 10
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To :
Subject:
rv From.

CO,- Lt;rvic^4^)Q.
CO, xhlrd harine Division.

Report of operations, L'ovcr.ibor

- Decei-bex , 19vo.
1

uaclooures:

(A) Srlvo^e Section report. (3) Report of vet.pono B'lvi. eu and repaired by u Ordnance Coup: ro (C) Report of veapo:^' exci.^n^u. vjfchthe *ii:triorl

Divicion.

1, The follo^ln>; report of operations of Service Troops is arranged by bettpllons comprising a narrrt ive in chronological order at*d general coffiEients pertinent to the operntions of each battalion, followed by recom- relations which are grouped to ,tither:
#

KARRATIVE

THIRD_S',RVICS BATTiiLIOIJ
1 November.

19^5.

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I.e. Major Chandler and eleven uien frou. the Division ermae t er Bection of Keadquarte*'B Co^pcny, leaded on BoUtAlnTille and- supervised the supply fuuotibns in the Empress Augusta B*y area. -:b The Fira^ and Third Platoons, Service and Sunply Compf ny, conaieting of the Hen&guerter, Service and Sup -ly, Chemical, Cpnoieeary, Post Exeli^itge, Rnd Graves Registration Sections, were Attached to the-Hlnth and Third Re^inents respectively, md were present during the initial land inc. Tile First Service and Supoly
Miittiilihe unloading of the ships; next at 1500, it
* tfettt fftsltar*/ Jl*e* tm chore party, and assisted in unloading
eupol ;*rhf*itom Iml\^ boats. The third Service and Supply Fl&tort;*U >XH e<nu-U/ bet vc-en the Hl^ins boats and the r 4tmpe otk-the tttoh for purposes of mo vine re^lnervtal Chore v**tj Opolles fiitj tlie ehlpe % " beach and their, inland off the the ' ;: ' . \u25a0' befceh. .M?f\ \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 : Registration Section acted at gunners in c. The^^fUird Oraife* * he Higglw ttoi* d. The afffeualtion teotion of the -Ordnance Company were assigned to duty v^th the Xollovint;units: First flection, coneistrin^ of eight enlisted > meu $o %m Kinth Regiment. > * consMtinG l of eight enlisted on, to the Third.Raelmcnt, ' ction, <Hw^tln^ o-f Chief Marine Fcrarth : . Gunner Bhzto*zck%nc. eight enlisted men
Q,uart
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Pfcrieion Du# #i% lodated n err Beach Blue #1, was 68taoliohed by the Divleion %uartt3*nster and ConuJlssrTy Sections. They op or tod this duqp throughout the op oration. 9ettttxs of their duties &nd the supply set-up of Duup wl, and the other dumps tht.t were let up later, are covered in
fl9 I X
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\ ..^t I I H Enclosure "IC"

art

b, Thi. ruvt6 ny^fsfra^MbfjSJfctions, ettachud to the First tml Third Service end Su./Ty Platoons, Joined the seotlon under Karlne Gunner Mcee. The6e three sections established Cemetery 1, on Torokina Point, collected, identified, registered, end buried the dead. c The Tiret Service and Supply Fit toon, attached to the Srv-4 of the Third batu lion, Ninth Referent, assisted in clear ln^ the beach of all equipment and supplies. The Third Service nd Supply Platoon worked on Beach Blue #3, and at the battalion ration dui..ps of the Third F.eei^nt

3.a. The First Service and Supply Platoon was assigned to beaoh defense on the left flank of the linos during the night and worked at sunply dumps during the day. This continued through the 7th of November, The Third &ervioe and Supply Platoon continued, to funotioh as working details and also to operate dumps, while still attached to the Third Refluent, until the 14th of November. b Ken from the Graves Registration Section were sent out to search the battle areas and to sketch all isolated Bland. A. burials* Cemetery *2 was established on Puruata I daily cheek was kept in this cemetery by this soot ion. 4. Two men from the Second Ammunition Bect lon, Ordnance
Company, arrived on Bougainville attached to tho First Battelion
Twonty-Flrst Regiment.

6. Tho First Service and Supply Platoon u.oved to Torokina Point to bo used as an ammunition dot ail where it remained until.12-.Koirember \u2666 11 MoViiLibtfr. 1943.
Twnty*Plrt Rogioant.

6. Two men from the beoond ammunition Beet ion, Ordraftee Coupany, arrived on Bougalritlllc, attached to the Second Battalion,

7. Three men from tho Division tucrtarmastcr Section wero sent with Liejutenant Lowo and tvrelvo of his men from the First Service and Supply Platoon, to establish DftisloA Inland Dump #2. The First Service and Supply Platoon, which was detached from the Vlnth Rogiatnt on this date, revurtod to division control. The platoon, except for the detail littud atipve, ftftsisttd in tho Operation of "uop #1, under

Ka^or Cliandler.

a. The Third Service and Supply Platoon was d ctachud from the Third Regiaent and ruverted to division control. The platoon was assigned to Dump #1 to assist In its operations.

Enclosure IRC"

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v Tl:. Ihi J b."vict r :: Suy. jly Plr.tocn c.c vi th. to :i>... .-.lit v)O_:'it Co v.r.loi cl.c. t-huttlo truc.^i; and ivlo. v : i::)h t
tr'.ctorn vhie;- corri.d cv.ppli' :\u25a0 to 2i:...p ;.: 2

17 November. 194 c.
lc. Clu-plain Reevee, Service Troops chcplian, arrived tt i-mprers Aurustc Bay, 5 ni. took choree of the relit.lour- and morale fuuetione of the division Hospital 11. The personnel for operating the Service Troops Counand
Post landed r.nd eet-up the cor.v..and pest or. Pivr. Trail Ronu,
one thousand v^rds north of Bep'ch Ydlou f.rl. 12. The Second Service and Su .ply- Platoon, attached lo the Third BavwLlon, Twenty-First Regiment, derived on Boiler mville.
It assisted in unlop*.in0 the ship, end then it ivas dt-tcched
froiu the Tventy-First Regiment end r -verted tc uivlsional control
This platoon acsisted in the operation of Dunp rfl, and occasion ally sent i..en to help co^iv.te Division Duup rf'6, after It vas
established. The Oraves H^glstratlon Section, attached to the
Second 3erviC3 and Suo ly Platoon, was detached and reported to
karine Gunner Mcee at Ceuetery #1.
10. Four men froia the Second AaiKunition Section, Ordnance
Coi-ipany, arrived on Bougainville, attached to the Third
Battalion, Twenty-First Regiment.

18 Noveober

14. The Graves Registration Section lioved inland and

established Cemetery #3.

27 Koveiaber. 1945.
15. The Third Service and Supply Platoon moved to Duap
#2, Joining Lieutenant Lo<re and his detachment. At this

dump all supolieB from Dump :*l, including coitiiiseariea,

olo thing, berbed wire, etc., were received and issued to

the regiments. Later the personnel loaded pnd dispatched
amphibian tractors to Dump f*3.

28 Noyem^er. 1945.

16. The "B* categories of Huadqucrters Company, Service

and Supply Co.-pany, and Ordnance Corp any, arrived at Empress
Augusta 3ay. After the co:qpletion of the unloading of the
LST's, the ooicp&niee aoved to the Service Battalion bivouac
area. Category \u25a0", of Headquarters Coi^pany, consisted of
the battalion ooounand post and oawtalion aid station person nel. Cktecory UB"# of the Service and Supply Coqpany, consisted
of the Htiacquarters Section, four Bakery Sections, the Fourth
Service and Supply Platoon, and fifty froa the Balvago
Section. Category tt", -of the Ordnaxice Corapny, consisted of
the repair and Maintenance Sections for eaall anas, artillery,
and instruments.
29 Kovernbar. 1945. 17. Lieutenant Colonel Bethel took charge of Service
Battalion installations that were already in operation, and

b6<ian to lay the ground work for future installations, such

shops IVl'^iVi for the infantry regiments and division troops.
* Iftfeyl.* I > *? IFflEnclosure "X".
\u25a0

#4

r-p.-ili', nc^JJpr.ly i' -1... r..p;ili', .\u25a0;.air,:i,n,':riCi<, ;. rS^JJpr.ly c i l'.rl :o thj division. ?hij, th^. of J ':. i\ , ie-i-1.
1

'c.-po.i^

and ar*v\ ordnance through tilt- 4th

20 Kovcnocr. 19-10. 20. The Sc.lvr. (\u25a0 Section -orit into deration on thlc late,
working in all rejii..entr..l and division ;r-^as, up vrJl as any
place v:iiM-e t_oar could bt rocova'td. Thic included n.uch
ordnance equip r:.-.,nt Icily fuid v; t,ei:ly reports v;>,re cnibrcitted
to tl'o D-<: office, sho\;in t, total
collected, sorvlcof'Dle and
unservicot.Jl^ b^ lturu. a Maourv: of G^rviceablu eCiUlp-
Cont v/au l^.-lscut-u on 3ou^t ; inville, tone con* to the Salve^o
Section en Guau.- lcuiic 1 for repair and I'eturn to the- Division
CtUi-rt^ruabter, and other iteve viurt sunt to the Fourth Base
Dooot. Included in the Saivr.j.u Section ?ere tx/o etcrllizarlon

trr.ilwr vith crews. One of theco unlcs s^t up shovrors r.t

Dump ?f2, i>nd the othor r-unk c well ni-ar tht Salvage aroa and
eot up the unit; natives wrshod cc.lv at od co thing and other L.quipiLcnt. This la::t section ounk p.noth^r v/ell md set up o purification unit, md heip..d In the operation of ; water
point \'ith p rronnel fror. the Nineteenth Re^im^nt.
cO Novcmoer. 1943.

21, liajor Concur vr.s c^nt up to Division KeadquaTtors to

r.ct as liason officer betw< en D-4 and the Coaj^.nding Officer,
Service Troops.

Co&jcny, set

22. a. The Bakery Suctions of the Service nnd Supply

up their bukery shops a 8 follows:

Section rrl r.t tho command Mnth Ko^imcnt. Suction fr2 at tho coznarnd post, T'enty-Flrst Rcgle- nt Section t?3 at thtj comiiu\nd oost, Third Reginent. . Section jr4 rt Dump #2.

b. The first threv: sections supplied the respective

regiment b with trend cinft rolls, while the fourth section

supplied the rdaninuor of Division Troope.

c Dcccpocr. 1943.

Third Kr.rine wae dutt-.iled as ansijtnnt tt> the

division iu-'.rteiv.r.ctur, in addition to his r^Qjlcr duties.
H..jor StokvG too.: charge and administered the Division Inland Dunp ff2.
Div.it.ion, Mr.jor Stokes

23.

By authority of the Comiaanding G-er.eral,

8 December.

1945

24. hajor Coa ,r war. relieved of hie duties r.F Service

Troops .llr.son officer one. v;aa ordered to -stilish and take
chr.rgc of Division Dump #5, to bo loc- ted Evr.neville. Mr.jor Con^..r, with Lieut onrnt Jeppesen, t'av.o non fron Her dqur.rters Co...prn; , and the Fourth Service md Su^oly Pletoon, rttrchod,
moved to EvuncvllU. Thlc durup reCeiveu fron Dul^j p2, njid
a,iter fron. ->a..:p f*l, commiss-.rles, fu^l, rxuaunltion, ind

EncljKurc

"X".

7*l

isGUocl th>jac euppli^e to the ft Brttrlion, Ninth Regiment, 25. Tho personnel of tho FlrTt Sorvicc r.nd Supply Platoon,
which iu'd remain d r.t Dunp tfl, ruovad to Dump #2.
4Deccia 9*5.

26. Major Con r.r uas evacuated by the Medical Battalion to C-uadaicanal, and his assistant Lieutenant Jeppesen took charge of Duiirp ff3.
24 Decenber.
returned to

1945.

27. The ammunition section, attached -to the Third Regiment,

Guadalcanal.

25 December. 1943.

26. The Division Inland Dump f*2 was turned over to the Amerlcal Division, U.S. Army, by Major Stokes. AU Headquarters Company personnel and the First and Third Service and Supply Platoons returned to the Service Battalion bivouac are*. awaiting evacuation to Guadalcanal. 29, Captain Smith was sent to Evansville to take oharge of Duap #3, which now beoaoe the main Division Supply Duip, v' Athey TraUer Platoon, fhlrd Motor Transport The was placea under hifl control so as to cove supplies f orwardtd ?; fron the dmap to the various battalions of the Twnt>.nret Hegiment and to the Second and Third Raider Battalion*,

'

Sattalioii.

wa c2?' * ivi1theDun? #3t3Infantry. 55 Quartermaster of ?J 182nd t

c*e

closed. AllService Battalion personnel operating these two duicps, returned to the Service Bftutalion tolvouao aree
awaiting return to

*<> *h Heglmental Division Dubd #lTas

\u25a0

Qundaloanal*

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\u25a0\u25a0*.

31. All Bervice Battalion personnel, except sg*nt Colonel Bethel, Captain lliller,Doctor Roeiaer, Lieut tettotueftt m malk of ciuai'teruiester and adminietrative personnel, and tw*qfcy-*bur salva b e men, embarked aboard LSTU for return to Guadalcanal. 32. The Ammunition Sect ion, attaohed to the Twenty-First Regiment, returned to Guadalcanal.
16 Jqfl\mry.

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33. he remaining personneiltof the Servloe Battalion

vu.

op,ra:,d

uui auir.pt,

personnel.

by Servicf 3W&~MFpeA sonnel, except for the which uere operaW^R- the kotor Transput Battrlion

c.uti

Graves

During the cr^-pal^n, the Graves Registration Section in adaition :o their regular duties stipulated in Registrccion 3.0.P. Besides maintaining cemeteries *!, *?2, and T.o, they assisted at all funerals and nieuiorial services.

craves
o.

<i.

groups of

r.nd one group to handle the division ammunition. The task of the men with the remittents xvae to establish and operate the regimen tal dumps. In addition to doing this, they often carried ammun ition up to the front lines. The tr.sfc of the section handling the Division Ammunition Dump was to wove the amr.unit.lon off the bet-ches into the Division Dump and from there to eupply the regiments.
During the operation, the Small Arms Repair 4. Section sent men to the front lines to repair ve.apons and issue cleaning materials.

ei^ht men each, one group

The Ammunition Section was split up into four

to each infantry regiment,

5. One water, repairman of the Ordnance Company was taken forward to Bougainville. During the period 28 November, 1943, to 4 January, 1944, this nan repaired approximately 125 watches, a service in combat, not offered by any other Marine Division, as far ac is known. 6.
casualties

during the operation:

KILLS)

She Third Service Battalion had

the following

None. DILD OF
,/QULiDS

Service and Supply Coiapanyi

fcAY32IRY, V.arrea W.,PPC, (412730),
USHCR KISSING None* MDUNDED Service and Supply Company:

26 Kov ember, 1943.

Rob ert R - PFC (428231), USIiCR (1N0v43), Returned to duty. (209808), USIK3 t to duty. ut^fT^S ren C - SE. C0rp. (463705) ,USIiCB(26N0v43), Returned U.S. MANSFIELD, James if , (3Dec43) Evac. to
T

SE

?3

Headquarters

Company t

PORTEUS, Donald F. ,Bgt. (415905),

LOrIRO'J, Gordon J.,Cort>
(441330)

USl*% |ft#|v|3) Mi^fM|nK|ik' |"|

USFCR
Batinm.-^
^>
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l.a. Major S, wT Pur&y and one or.li:tod r.inn fi on; Hoeaquar'tera and Service Company, pt.rtlclp.-'.t.ed in initial : landin,; attached to the Kt.tic?.qurrters 5 -caff as Division hotor Transport Officer and assistant to tho Division Shore Party Colander. b. Five officers and olxty-nlne Lion landed from Company "h", attached to the Ninth Marines. v r ive Officers and sixty-two men from Company "C participated In initial landing attached to tho Third Marinoo,
2, a. Tho cou.pan.lvB functioned with the regiments. Duo to the lack of rof-ds there vag little operation except alony the beach. b. Captain Bumg&rnor-was assigned additional duties as bo^ohmaetor of Blue tfl Beach.
i

145

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}
X.

V<^~ V
'

d.a* Six offloor s and ono hundred cix men fron Headquarters and Bervloa Conipofor arrived t.t Stapreas Augusta Bay. b Oab office* and rlneton nen from Coupany "BN landed. vA* A ihut^lo ooavoy under Lieutenant Brown, composed of Aftliattd vehlolea from tho v&rioua companies landed supplies ***-roturn*A t Ouadaloanal.
V
\u25a0

4a A gas dump for division use was set up and maintained . . throughout tho Bougalnvillo Operation.
It

i*

**5*

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I* .-' \u25a0'\u25a0"

sa During the period Captain Harrod and Lieutenant Henry were assigned as boachmast u at Yellow #1 Beach. rs tv On or about 9 Hovoabcr, Lieutenant Henry took the first convoy of supplies to the front using tractors and Athay trailers. The conroy vent to the front everyday, moving troops and supplies until 1Decombor. Wounded waro evacuated on oaoh return trip.
6a One officer ans seven men from Company "A", throe officers and forty-one jaen from Company a 3", and five men fpoa Cottpany "C", landed at Bougainville. b. 4*lcu tenant Jackson was assigned as beachmaster. Yellow #1 Beach.
ivoj

rO.

Those

7. Captain Biocii took first truci: convoy to the front. Convoys went up daily aft a* this until roads iuprcved to the extent where trucks could be dispatched directly from the various dunps, Wounded voTo cvacu.tod on the return trips.

Enclosure "X".

300

lit M PI
n Transport

Tr

this date.

advised ; J;} Cocpanlec3attcliMw||nd

rov.rted

-fccHsattallon

that all Ro,.iEl.ntal control as of

7 Hovu^ber. 1945.

0. Tv/o officers find twenty aon fron oov nte.n Kun from "c Company arrived. "3" Cocpf-n-', and
convoy
Second ehuttle
arrived.

6 Wove-iuber. 1943
0 BBl <"*ty as Ooc.ch.nastcr *i dfc&cn vise Captain | Bncd Wi. Burr. b arncr, who was evacuated.

r^pW^V'l^?
kotor
repair

on 21uc

20 Nov amber. 19^o.

11,

facilities 2S Novfccber.

v^vc

set up at Plva Village.

12. Shird shuttle convoy arrived. Two officers and mon landed at Mnpross Augu6ta 3ay.
50 Novccbcr.

thirty

rop"; ZiiitlTti icrvmS.*"" 101181 P

5 Decocbcr. 19^$

Qen

iarged

14. A trr.ctor platoon as formed this date under Llouocnant F. H. ThoEason, consicting of eighteen T.D.9 e teo Athey tr **-layin* trailers and twonty ' pla:oon ? oqulpaent and supplies from e aUElpG^? tn, front lir s ft"o this date to 10 January. v

\u25a0?S r^

t'^cTA J^ Vr -

section of the pletoon Survicod

each resident.

21 December.
B^t f C d

1945 don left

y-&l Sht l^ ??J I>cllitieGtvont '^>alr rear J ^M? GuadScan?!!

echelon vehicles on

Bougainville to

24 December.

J194-5.

were order .a
to Ninth Larinc, Tvrenty-Firs?

M^rin
17

Karinos,

-^ AfrVth T? s
6
v
S

aJ

p ana btconu Raicere.

!n

f tAr^

truck 6md drives

OS Dec out* wT. 19-^p

uuauai c anal

Sev^n

offlc^e and one- hundred forty-t-ro

.rotary.

mtn left for

19-.4.

16. TxTcnty-onc men left for Guadalcanal

Encloeui^e "Kv

30l

16 Jai.-gi.r'j.
4
1

, rf:_.
I'oV.a-i.cvA tc

actual.

i'.ive officers ar.c". r.ixty-;.vc

xl Q-Ll. .i.-.L CO . .i.Zlli'2?>

i.
maintenance

In addition
*.o

lo

the divider., this br.tt lie/. .^ so

.'ui-r.lo::^:

i;

i'ujM

:iu .-v . ocor hid

1

DlvlBlSn
-IV*

-. The nechrnics '/orked uncer ur.f.-.vorr'.Ci cl "cv^ Tree and wlth-equlpr-ent thp j wp? of nocerolt" tou ir.^ -on-l \-r-de puk-ilshaent, kept better than ninety p t /cont -:^t:-o dally operation. In addition to other in redr -.-oi-k, the repair reConC:Uloned Ail Vtihlcli3s exchur^ed vlt?i the Aruricnl
j

>

r/o'truas

S^VSii^ 225 ? J7 MM^^ r?I/, fr?2 ???

.\ On 1 Ko v^r f 1943. tvo ...er.oc.^- of C0r.0 .-nv "C, ihiru uotor Transport Bf.t tailor*, -4iil6 F6oi -r: b t d to rhoi-e " " duty, took cover in an encuy ollt crenel, while work suspenaed due to hetvy one:^ fire fi-om cmol*.ceaento w\3 Torokinu. The First Battalion, Third ilr.riner, vac on Cane the enemy position. These two men, Corporal Gaor;e V, Anno-.e nnd 7 .: the n-ource of the fireand the t and I l>cx, the fire of. which vaa onflladin., U ' he v the P : l nrneuver * ft^-.ck, cmdeu to f ' of the pilldox, rushed it, end throat, the rear openln-led the two rcmainin,; eneny, v;ho -ro firir through t(j c slit :

"iK

!^?^

at? Jrtn c^rJoCv,

locked aS

?h

Verch? .

-^tV

cesuoitie,
KILLED
Co::.pa.-.y "A":

0110 ln 6

--

CC^D, Richard J.,

:,CLz.
3i:j

VSI.CR

i O v.:r.:bcr f 19,5. lT

or

'

o'j:ds

Company "C":

oiLi-is. P:-AHP T..adLt.

fc

uskc:-: KISSIMG None. .

j i unuir v f 1&:

. ,.

\u25a0Mk

K^U.

.;,*

3o

WLAssipm

H^-.VEY, none R. .PISyt (C6GGO2) US! -C, ( lilov-io) inru"- to V.nUOHT, Russell W ,PrC (S^ocSQ) ,US:iC, (li:cv4;.) Tims to H-^iC USIICR, (1i:0v43) nr.tui'i.tvj. ~o duty. ,Fvt (412590) iUTTOi:, Harry
j. 4-^-71, UN?. (Illiov4o) Zv-c. to MOB ? TxIISL. HaiW' V..FhH-Vc.ol SUARZZ, Hu'.:.ond R. ,PFC, ( 444230) ,US;.CR, (26H0v40) Ev; 3 de.t urkncn.

., .

Jtoygany

r A"

li*^

KLOCi:',

Llpo, FFC

(394390), USLC, (21M.0V-.3) Returned to duty. Com^r-ny "C !l:

THOI-IPSOiI, Sacuel R. Corp. (556430)

Heac'.quartsrs

,JSi:C, (UlJov4,: ) Returned

T

to duty.

I- Service

Company:

IJ^RTIU, Luther 8. C0rp. (o7 6050) ,USi.CP (6U0v40) -etui-ned to duty.

C. THIRD AIJ!-:I5IaI>? TRACTOR BiiTli*LlOii. MaKRATIVZ

1Kovea tr. 19*13

- 15

January.

1944

1. acphibian t: actors participated in this operation in varying numbers ac anticipated and in accordance with plans md availabllioy of cargo space for their delivery to the theater of operations. Thirty-nine acphibicn tractors arrived at Au&-usta Bay on "D" Day, and a total of one hundred twentyfour arrived by "D" Day, plus fifteen daye. C, The aii?)hibian tractors vrere assigned and carried out the following appropriate tasks during the operations:

a. Delivered Initial equipment and cup lies directly

from tto ship to boj-ches and to inland positions and dumpi
b. Cleared the bench for unloading boats of vegetation
on valor's edge and Just above hijh tide line, vrhen vegeta tion i-^nuered or prevented beaching the bop.ts or laovement of
Qai erial.
c. Transported rations and ammunition to front line troops. d. Evacuated dead and wounded from front line positions on return trip to the beach, hosnltal or to ship* This operation deiwmst rated r. pr ctical use of aiiphlblr.r. tractors when no othei means of transport at ion could be ur,ed without royd building. c. Es,)^cirlly during the first dr.ys of the operation,
aqphiblan tractors v;tjre uispereed at niuht alcr_ oei chfrcr.ts
and cre*->s stoo^-l watches in beech defer.sa sectors.
...ded bci.t6, and
f. Towed out stalled vehlcxos, aided ptirforaed jcnoral utility uork on ;r.o beac'.i.
. Delivered equipment and supplir-t. ov.;r terrain that
could not b traversed by other vthiclea.
li. Broko trails for su.-oly routes, rop.up, and accets to
aid et.^ions to remove 'rounded.
i. Cleared Dw&cUeb tnu Lioved supplies and to
main auups and dispersed du.qps.
J. 31ar-cd trr.ils for cooarunicrtlons to forward echelons. l:.b?e vt.rt trltils thft '\u25a0 re blesed specifically for comnur.lcation utilts. Ho- vcr, after aohlblrn tractors have bl. Zed a trial tc
the fro.vt, they are followed by CP men of nurnerou uni:s, .-ho

<"*

DECLASSIFIED
i...)-:-

oi trill e-.c;::.. :: trill ;;\u0084 l

r,i
1

\u25a01- '>.

f.i-

v--:.l-_-.:-.

\u2666:. -

r.i

V" r
L

;.. \u0084t \u25a0,\u25a0.!.-\u25a0.\u25a0 \u25a0.m.'v

-f'.i.r. -''.u.r.

. no . \u0084orSicr:

\u25a0-.\u25a0.i

:,t".: .

'.uicv.iy iiii/.-^t J ruj; " tap.\u25a0 ..\u25a0' or U;p' s

;'

C? ..-:-.
\u25a0:!
Vi

\u25a0\u25a0rt.v. v.hl::..'.' : -'.-.icu iiu-lua^u Jc^.js t.u rrr.lli^-s. 1. ;v..0,.:,l ; \u084, at r-.ny \u25a0..,. ucfiii^. frc:.. ur.i'-.orto'.' in audition tC .'iOili;'.. V.,, r. ;i . pilot,
i^. .\u25a0...Oiji.iOlv.i'a .I"::. ::i.l i'urniir.^l tr. nr.pcrt-. .ion for

::

t; \u25a0\u25a0.". \u25a0y.. : ;\u25a0.; t :r.,. \u25a0\u25a0;".*. itionfl trculio l'.'.uir-.;.vay :'ror.: ti.'. trac/.i; or ;;t, 1 ..l * only or. :i i.'i --lr o :i-; c::r. .v.ci. ii i- .. \u0084.i.;.l of t.ubf v.-.u-^nt vork. ::' uh .
]
i

\u25a0

,-

.u';'.i.;h'..C tr; nspoi ..%tioi' for fi..lu coru.v.'und^rr, in.-., .0 ;in ,-,<.: ti

.*v, lu--.. o.'.'-rolo.

end

ollo'n: '.& en D-<. n;/, 2& op. D-plue , 10 on D-plui- o, 17 on D-plu?- 10, 1H on D-plus 11, .".ncl 12 on D-pluf. lc, \u25a0hich co:v.pl t^d tho I-1 rnrphi:.i:ns enrritd into tiiR . r
' 1

r :\u25a0.

-..-.iii. :i

ri'-'^-jfu-c

a:-:"i.v d \u25a0; n chu Ch^riy

:i';':is

-..

ion a :Ti

.t...,;i;iui,:i tr< ctcre opr: d oBo trcctor dr.ys, and tod .c, 902 tone of su.^plloc rJid mr.torlaL.
k

5. The Erjor typo of cr^o tmnoportcci by aisphibliin tractors, llit.uin or.'.ov -of prodo:.ilncnce, vas an follovct rt.tlone, aon.ur.lt ion, voaponr, orj; .tisftt lon o^.^r including military irwidiicont, n.^uic.-l t-upplloo, c:\yufdtiofl, wrttr, oarbcid wiru jnl and vehicles on. ir.^wr c^uipuv.at, prcXo, pt;rfio.-.r.cl rcnlGtiri, of jocp ?>nd trrll..re.

11. G~:'SRAL CGUZI'TS. Tho b;t:;lion -.-p-r rblc to cooc sith the In: nene- problem "lth r:r,.rt difficulty. TV.is vme due to tho jr.: r n^cd for trr.ctoro f.ad fi.lluro of previous conducted fcr \u25a0..-'/. Jo- t. :cj-tc. Tl:o nuud for waphlri n trr.ctorc was re.'.illy &rt,C:tvr ti-..- :; tli^ nu... .r oi' tractors r.vr.iicolc. Co.iecquently, many trr.ctors coiiftaiitly op r.-tvjd, whv.i'cnn, under r:.oi*. oultrbl^ conditions, these tr.- otorn '.cal_ have bu.,n ..vrilable &t t !:-.> for minor maintenance. Ihi.r-j wr 3 :r. loco of trfctorc because ox" wearing out of c]i.;:in, 1 ma croc.-.c prior to u.\p~ctr :lcn due to the f ct the t \u0084r ic.ic: ily rliopurc.ticn wrs on 1. r.c i^h v^ry h'.avy v; r,r through cuttin v cuo.i of :..ud ..id s; nd. Frc-iu "pr.viouc t<-^6, repluccaents of t);i t:-- h-._ v e.i :i(;uivd en bneis of r. certr.in poi'Conta^e of w^t^r o . .r-.tio.-. The.- iaovln v of cr....p sit^j. . Ad ti.o Ir.cii of suitable pj?ri in,_. .-.r c for ;:-,_>:. l.i'.r. craters ofl\.r..d rdditlorwl hindrrncoo to ir.t .n.-jico, In "AV.ition, sock, tractors w.; _ood r^ coc^l^tely lost in the e-2'li^r ftr uv.r buCru:-: the br.fL-lion Incited nccossr.ry h-avy -.qu^-r.v.nt for srlv-^inc tii^3-:. tiwrtora from v---ter and surf.
tr ctor

1.

fc;

\u25a0

...

2, A.v. .-.i^l.'-.n tr.-'ctcrs '-*.r^ r^ouuuntly ccmuandecred by

off ie .rz v:. \u0084,r tho, -:ui3e cf ;n unior^oncy nd tl-^t turned
o-ij to <. routine runs of low priority ma t^.^rcby diverted tractors fro:., cljln'l ..iosior. o* cr.rrj'in , out ordurs of IV4. L
w

T/.i.-, jrttr^ion op>.ratovi : b;;t cr.lion aid station o. in ;-iacn ;o . ci. cc.-prny opwrr^int; r nicl: bay and aid stneion. *h^ Third a... ,'..x1,1: n Tr. ctcr Bt/o~r.licn he.C the follo^.'in^ casualties
\u25a0

\u25a0

arin.j tr.c c.:,r:.jion:

>

Enclosure

"X".

XI ED LiL
Coi.".pany

"a":

aSEY, nuor,; C0r,, (o737oo) US..CR, (.1 li-<cy-io) I^ILLY,H-arold '/.,pre ,(:2956C7) , USi.C (illlov4o). J^VIS, LwO;. E. ,Pvt. , U505b5), USI.CR, (UNov-io) I^IC^LFE, Henry 3 \u0084Pl3t. , (277009) USkC, (lli:o\w5) I-RIETO, 1^.b.l V..PFC, (00ik.09) USi.C, (llilovlo)

.,

lED OF

XUi:DS

v Co .pony "A :

GOBEYK, Albert R. ,PFC. (-15.-547) .UfIXR, (lCNov4o) TO'iiUSEKD, Robert L..Corp. (b90342) UStiC, (12i:0v43) Li:GLISK, Sv-.r. F.,Coro. ,t 400294), USI;C, (HWov43.)

LISSIHG HNov43) "A MCo liC DEVITI, Robort X..PFC, (345045), USiiC, (bincc

WOUb'DED
Couprny "A":

to duty. G^RRaTY, Ra-Kond F.,letLt., (USi-iCR) (11H0v43) --AGEII John U..PFC. (430436). l/Slffl, (llNov4o) Evr.c dost unknown. k-.RiN', Tho^s D. ,PrC, (430805? USi-ICR, (HNov4o) Return id to duty.
SANDERS, Elton A.,Corp. (o-fl85) USijC, (11N 0 y43) Evac, dest unknown.
(424969) ,USuCR, (HNov43) i^vr.c.deat unknow
1:C DOHOUOH, C-orrld F..PFC, jAbuo 5.,PFC.,M37109), USMC, (11Nov4o) Returned to duty.
COLLINS, USHCR, (HNoy4o) Returned Jr. GRAY? Cleroncc H.Jr., At..(471987) USMC, (HKov43) Returned to to duty
duty.
(283700) Frank R. GORDON

DOUGLAS

GILKORE; AFFORD SANDERS*

pLoon S. 1 c.. (435293) ,USiiC,(llNov43) Evnc. dost unknown.

\u25a0 Kenneth -^,(455522), US.CR, (11N0v43) D .GySgt. ,(266553) U511C, (llllov43) Returned to duty. Ivon pv (402747) ,USIIC, (Ill!ov43) Evr.c.dest unknown. V;\ncr i "t Hrrxnn LR iCorp. (399613) USIX, (llllov43) .Returned to d. BECHTOLD

, ,

.,

UOUKDSD
"C": Returned to duty. >jDOP-" Floyd E. .istLt.,USIIC, (13U0v43) (264213) , USHC, (20N0v43) Returned to duty. KET^ John T.,5gt., , (524617), USKCR, (29N0v43) , Returned to duty. L"IN, Donald, Pvt
Conpr.ny

First Lieucenrnt Hugh K. Bowncs, CoiJpfyny "A",

Trr.c-or Brttr.lion, on 2 Jr.nur.ry, 194-1, was
r.v;r-rdcd tile Silver Star nedcl for conspicuous grllr.ntry vhilo
Serving as r. neubcr of r scout i:^ prtrol throu 0h enemy territory.
Third

5.

D. THI:C_LDICAL
I.NARRATIVE

gATIiiLIOiI,

1Novv,ubcr. 19-.3

-o

Jp.nur.ry.

194*i,

Connrndcr, the Adjutant, the Qur.rterr.-.ae^er, and clerical staff

normally rttr.chcd to the Division Hospital (of v/hich the Battalion
Conanandur is in command by Division Order) were ombarkod on the

1.

Hwr.dqurj'^oi-s r.nd Service Conprny:

The Bnttr.lion

En^euru

XV

3^

CLYKEH, with the ?<ftorVvfc^.Jjpr Br.tcnlion. Before orcbnrkr-tion tho Battalion Co:amrnuur tri;d to hrvo thin chrn^v.d, but without avail, md Hi.r^qurrt and Service Co;.pr.ny wint r. shore with the Raiders on s<-cch Gruon fp2, a^pcratou fro a thoir dost lru..t ion by 5,000 yiuv.a of firo- swept but oh. 2.a. Cou.pr\ny "A", attached initially to the Ninth Km-ince, landcu on Boreii Rud f^l, r.oout 11:00, November 1, 1943. It vr.e assigned to sho.ro parties until tho first pr.tluits were admitted on Kovuiibor 5, "a" Company l\ospitr.l wns fully established on ftov^iuv^jr S, On November 29, this hospital uno movud across th Pivn Rivor to n site in tho vicinity of tho Ninth Marines 1 command post, whv.ro it romninod until departure from the aroa on December 25, 1940. This coqp- ny took care of tho following:

Wounded in Action 278

Non-bfittle (sick, etc.) 1024
b. It performed a total of 178 operations. o. It should be noted that this company, located as it was near the airfield, was subjeoced to daily bombing or shelling for over three weeks, Tentage was badly damaged; on one occasion a shell landed sufficiently close to bury a patient alive The oalmnesa and courage of the personnel of this company is highly commendable, . 5.a. Coxq>any "Bn , attached initially to the Twenty-
First Karines, landed on the looming of November 11, 1943, near
Cape Toroj&ina* It was assigned to shore parties until the after noon of November 10, 1943, when it "ijoved to the vicinity of the
Twenty-Fi^st Regiment 1s cocu^and post. It halted here for the
ni&ht, took care of a fey patients, and established its hospital
permanently .a few hundred .yards a^ay on November ,14, 1943* It
remained in this location until it left the area on J&nunry 5,
1944. This cocpany took cai^e of the following patients:

Wounded in Action Non-battle (sick, etc.)

35J2

941

b. It performed a total of 325 operations. c. This company also behaved well under bobbing
and iuortar fire.
4,&, Coiipany "C", attached initiallyto the Third Marines, landed on Beach Blue #3, Noveaiuor 1, 1943. Its collecting sections landed on Beaches Blue ffl and if2. Because of the tactical' situation, it wns relieved at once of duties with shore parties, with the result that it was able to handle nineteen v/ounded inside of the first hour, and was enabled to perform major surgicrl operations the save day. Strxting on November 18, the company moved forward to n pol; t further inland near the Plva River, This move ment was skillfully carried ouz by echelons, pr.tients being c red for continuously at both points; and tho hospital was well estab lished* on its -new site on Kovenber 21, 1943: b. This company took care of the following:

.Wounded

Non-br.ttle (sick, etc.)

in Action

422

1102

6. The num.- or of

on uiidur frequent bombing r.nd mortar p.tt^icks.

5.a. Company "D" remained at Bevy and operated the
Division Hospital, rear area.
6, a. Company "E v landed on Beach Red tfl on the aomin of Npvura _^r 1, 19-45, cud performed with shore partiofi for tlirtc dry Enclosure "K M

operations performed totaled 154. d, Hv,re, ajain,' the work of the hospical was carried

3bt

1 lid!AQcinrn
" 1 Ur 1 I!\u25a0 ftr
w0 Ha la 1%gF The ori^inrl situ

selected hr-vlnf; proved too swofopy, they finally s~t up as the Division Hospital ut Ber.ch Yellow jf2, 7, 1943. (Dn thrt daco they woro subjected to nttfCfc on by eneny rifle fire, but the surgeons continued to op until the attrc>:ers wero driven off, after five hours, by r. detnehment from the Twenty-First Marines. During this engr^r/.ont (the hospital wr.s protected by a nixed detachment of corpora en, JfculAe cooks, raessmen, and chauffeurs, under command of Firot Lieutenant Leo F. Hrlotek, USMCR, Thir' Medical Battalion Quart cr;iftft*r# ) Chief Pharmacist's Mate Lovelace was woundt;d in the shoulder* On Uovembtr 17, 1945, tho corcpany woved to Beach Yellow 01, and moved r^ain to tha ar^a vaoatod by Division Command Pot on Novumber 25, 1943, It remained there until leaving tho cr^t,

on December 15, 1943. b. The Div.-sion Hospital (Conqpaiiy "E11) took enro of
the following patlbnts!

Wounded in Action Non-battle casualties

and evacuated
831,

336 995

c. Tho hospitrl surgeons op err tud on 516 pntiants,

d. In addition to the direct attr.de by enemy forces already mentioned, the Division Hospital, situated &*r the bench, was subjected dally for ovur three veeks, to bo&bing .-.ttr.oi:B and twice to ni'tillory fire 7. Reci-pitulxitlpn:

Totals

136b

4062

1. The Commander, Third Hedical Battalion, criticised tho landing teams for utilizingmediorl personnel for short* party labor, that is, as stovadoree, and also for empresslng medical personnel placed on guard over ao&ical property, for saae purpose. The solution of this problem must necessarily be a compromise and rests in better discipline and organization of battalion shore parties. Guarding supplies on the b^fch strip and in dumps, is relatively simple, but gr^at opportunity for theft occurs in transit between thw tuo, paort iculiirlyin tho un&le and because of hecoss^Ty dispersion* A substantial incroaso In military police in shoro party organ^ ization and harsh disciplinary measures for offenders, la necessary. Regarding unloading of bor.ts and transport of eupplios to dumps, this is an rll-honds task, and if vork. is light or nil in shore pc.rty aid and evacuation stations, hospital personnel may expect orders to assist in handling cargo. The* tactical situation largely governs the time medical personnel should be released from chore party duty to organ! r.r.tioncl functions. of duty of Lieutenant Commander D. H. McNanara, in charge of Division li wdic.-.! Sup ijlyDepot at BEVY.
1

oporr.tion due in r large

2.

Medical supplies, however, were adequate during the

measure,

to the outstanding performonoo

In this respect, It le folt that increased uue of ,>t<rachute drops could have been authorised by higher authority not because the situation was critical, but for experience and training.

The Commanding Officer, Tfciiv. KedicuJ. 3a":tr.llon, s'. highly cbi-nended the ..uphlbian Tractor Battalion fox* autiit&Ming performance of duty and cooperation in evacuation of --o^ndod and delivery of hedi-cal supplies to forward Btations; -;itho4t this aid, the situation have been critical.
4, The Third Medical Battalion hed the following casual ties during the operation:

None. 'ISP OF WQUKDB

HEUITT, Uillia R. ,PW3/C

.,

Company "B"

564-OQ-52,

(USKR) (12Pec43.)

HISSING None. WOUKDED

Company "C"

HATH2RS, Ralph W., Jr!,PhII2/c. ,6616-51-69, (U3RR) (22N0v43)

Returned
to duty.

to d.

MC COY, Kenneth M,,PItM2/c, 4 628-54-55,

RALSTON, Duford A.,Phlio/c., 677-02-01,
Cowprny nn DM :

(USIIR) (24N0v43)

Returned

(USNR)<24Nov43)
Retxirned to duty.

LOVELACE, Parrel li.,ChPhli.

,3 56-17-15,

(USN) (8N0v43) Lvac dest uniewn

E. PuXOi-lISKDATIQtJS

In future operations, it is r:connended 1. majority of the Service Battalion be landed in the of operations, preferably on D plus 5 days, and at latest on P plus 10 days, TJie reasons for this are below: .

that

the

Theater
the very
as detailed

Coi^pany Operating personnel of

a* Headquarters Kjjadquarters Company sl.ould be available for Pivision (iuartcr master supply functions, in full strength, as soon as Division
assuues responsibility of supply.
b. (1) Ordnance Company Personnel of ammunition 6ec:ions must be ready momentarily to take over, establish dumps,
jpte^^L^e and distribute rjamunition under division control.

Iffy Io \

iL^F^VIt

'

\u25a0

EncloBure MX

"

3o#

(2) Repair and ir.air.senance puiDonnel rauut o-.; on the ground early to maintain and salvage ordnance equipment, eloe much of it quickly deteriorates beyond a ctatc of economical ropr.lr. Personnel of the c. (l) Service and Supply Company Service and Supply and Conixdasary Platoons should be available, in full strength, to tho Division iiuart ericas t.;r at onco, when Division tnkee over operation of dumpr. Thie personnel Is ecsentlul for placing supplies in dumpc from boachs and distribution of supplies by Division Quarter master under Division diroctlvee. {2) Bakery platoon with equl^m^nt should be set up v^ry and oporatino; by D yilus 10 days. The ration monotonouf, aft.-r tun days with dry biscuit.

(oj Five men of Salvage Platoon should follov each battalion on Its initial landing; this to be familiar v/ith the routes follovred and areas occupied by advancing troops so as to quickly facilitate recovery of supplies and equip ment when Salvage Platoon begins operation. About ninety men are necessary for efficient salvage. They should be lightly equipped with repair facilities and hnve at least two. trucks, 2^-ton, available for salvage fear. Salvage Platoon should land not later than D plus 10 clays, other wise, salvaged supplies and equipment ie deteriorated, usually, beyond the stats of being repaired, cleaned, and re-used. This, especially applies to clothing and equipment containing fabrics or leather, If it is intended that Salvace Platoon salvage more than light ordnance, general supplies, and individual and other equipment, it should be furnished at an early date with adequate mechan ical mer.ns for salvaging heavy equipment* 2. (a) It ie recommended that Service and Supply Company reorganized for more efficient service and flexibility,as be follows: (1) Service and Supply Platoon (2) Bakery Platoon (3) Chemical Platoon (4) Commissary Platoon (5) Gravee Registration Platoon ,6) Post Exchange Platoon (7) Salvage Platoon

The platoons should then be organized into four sections, each, which can readily be detached for duty with line units, as
(b). At present , Servloe and Supply Company is organized into four platoons, each composed of the seven functional sections. (cj. The above rscbamended organization is in accord with actual practice of this Division In the field. As soon as practicable after a situation is stabilized, the various soot ions are grouped into ons unit for efficient function ing. ComuisBary Sections go to Division Cotciiser-ry* Bakery Sections to Division Bakery, Salvt^o Sections to Division Salvage, etc. Officers with special qualifications are then assigned to coomand the units of sections bo combined, according to function. This, of course, is not provided for in preee-nt Table of Organization, wherein a platoon oommander is assuned to b& a "Jack of all trades", commanding the seven c.iversified sections.
wi - "-tf S
occasion demands,

%.

4e Hi^

Enclosure

"X"

V*

JP^" C^U^VW utilrr,4/jhAfu|J^t^y;ont

rocor "randod thi-.t service factions b-j in shoro p rty orp...i'/.atio.i.

efficiently htndlod boll..vul find thj t pilforaijc %# "&s\u25a0 truind personnel v/ill V>, on the iji-ound, P vrith the Gltuution find reudv to function during .Lkdiiiiiiy after the tranc itlon from shore party to Division control.

that^Kj^J&^JHFfcbre WW^-WW^*

4. "*ht amphibian trr.ctor le a highly specialized typrj of equipment and the commander should be consulted
frequently in planning ito employment throughout the
various phases of an operation.

13. a. It is re-c our. ended thn': not ovr twenty-five

of th cargo trucks bo Ir.ndod on D-day, either in
ewarapy terrain or ov^r fringing coral reef, due that tractors
und trailers of mt-ximum nucler that cr.n be curried, be landed
on D-uay, b, *it leat-t two greasing trailers per cot-bat team should bo It nded on D-day. c. The La Tournoau Crunks, one for l*otor Transport E^ttolion^ and one for Amphibian Tractor Brtt:,lion, Should be lraiaod on D-day. These are invaluable for salvaging trucks, tractors and boate. d. Wr.teon Oallnot tracks for at least
fifty percent of the 2^-ton cargo and duup truclte should be provided for use
in lieu of chains.

percent

Transport

BOUGAINVILLE operation, Theoo aro thu only vohioles of this type

ftuthoritod for 3or vice Troops, r.nd the nocossity for thorn was folt in every phase of tho operation. They ehould be equipped with
blados. Thay aro neodod to:

1) Haul vohiolos ashore. 2) Open up routes to dumps. 3) Clear dump sites. (4) Rosouj boggod-down vehicles.

6. a* TBA provides for two medium tractors in Motor

Bnttrlion. Theso were not provided for the

expensive nnd vital equipment. trails from dumps to forwnrd unl^s. Anslst TD 9 tractors and trnilors over rough rout os to forot/ard cr^ns. (9) Ktjce omjrgonoy repairs to roads
(10, 1 Cleu vehicle parking nrcas.
(11) Salva o heavy equipment. u (12) nsoiet in unlo^din^ crrf,o in tuccceding echelons.

(6) Excavate dugouts for wounded, for operating rooms, for uodical supplies. (6) Excavate aplaceaonts for mach^no shop and rqpriir shop trrllcre, ruid other

(7^ Clorr (8)

b. It we 8 found that in the initial pho'c^s of landing

thr.t engineer 8^ uttUlpmunt rvVail^ble for shore pr.rty
work, but i^uettirtwly rftur landing this oqulp.wnt was put
on priority workof ror.d md air ttri,) building and was no
loajur rvcilfiblo to Suryice Troops.
c. Sorvloo Troops sliould h..ve n uinimum of four
mediuo tractors (TD 14) with blades. They arc needed in
cornl surfaced lelr.ndr r,c "ell r.B in swampy creas in order
to excavate trenches to provldo hp.sty protection for troops,
c<i mont rXi wounded.
uiP & VIFV'fIPV BBP^^4ft^

3/0

b. not ''^x^^fm'm.o %cq<>fiJCrt%d, that Division Kobpitr.lcontrol rr.t^d fr|f^^ui|>i]Qeht. ayc^^-^dccl to^-thur In r locr*;lon with to acccsnlblllty . nd cucurlty, thr.t Ib, iCyv^.JPrfIJEJcP 's nrtillory pooltlons
B^p;
f

M *-%

or o^hor frellItI^3 vhlcwMLjftpdrW norlal or su^f co (b) It- Is Tv commended tfir.t ir.odlcal porr,onnel bo armed with the .45 caliber automatic pistol. It is apparent tl*cit thoy C.nnot erf^uord, v/hllo working, arias othur than thooe worn on tholr person.

W. D v Bf.asott.

BttttSUFlEtl

Enclosure "X"

3l\

Enclosure

(A) tc

fMMT^g^^:r

fo*^> in tks field.

f P
ov>.r

llcv

D.-c, VJ'\2,
<.

r.t I-v-ugr.ln\llic: 4 V3hin.

<
%

b;lv^ o^v.'i Ord.nr.ncc

tjUi.f;, c; 1.

co Division Orunanc

Rifl..b, iil, cnl. .00.

151i UO ftirUe, 05, c:l. .30.
17 Riflus, C.-rbinu, onl. .30. 14 Rcialng uunB, crl. .45.
19 Tripods, nnchino jur., col. .50, nil- coolcc..
20 Tripods, iu"chind .^r., cca. .30, air cool .c..
129 Brrrola, mr.chii;c gun, cal. .50, air cool^u. 30, r.ir cooled.
173 Bnrrols, Krchlriw gu::, c\l. 65 Barrels, nr.chliic gun, c\l. .50, wn-ur cooled.
16 Receives, cr.oliir.^ cj;l. .{jO, coc.jl.t^.
2 Bipods, Johnson r.rchino crl. .30.
1 Bipod, 60cm, nort:r.
9 Kounte, Ki^ine bo^t, uuohino i^xn
16 Kounts, truck, c^.chiiic 4 Mountb.-iui, .50 cnl. machinu t^in rr-ok. 1 Hount, observation scop a
8 3,-irra supports, mrvohino gwn, cnl. ,60
7 Barrel oxtcnaione, mr.ohinc gun, col. .60.
6 ELovrting c^chrjiisae, machine gun, orl. .60. 2 Cradles, caching gun, wntor cooled, Crl. .30.
5 Druna, rJttiunition, Erchlne gun, cnl. .50.
11 Druiqpa, ftansunitlion, Lewis machine gun, cal. .30. 2 Clips, Johnson machine gun, onl. .30.
559 Clips, Retains, crl, .45.
220 Clips, 3iR
215 Clips, cr-rbinu
222 CarrirB, dips, Rcielng 11 Carriers, clips, BAR 4 BvJ.tB, mcohlnu gun, crl. .50.
2 Bolts, urchin* gun, cal. .30.
26 Slinks, riflo, XL.
10 Slln^e, ccTblnc
6 Slinks,
ri^..unltionboxcB
1 Wa-or cooling pyptuu, ar.chino feur., Cil. .50.
5 Cov or 8, machin. pun, crl. .50.
8 Hods, clor.nih t , c; chine int cr.l. .50.
10 Driving, cprln^p, r..- chin, gun, c.l. .50. 1 Oil buffer body, ar.chinc t^x:\ t crl. .50. B. ck plr-;e roupe, nuchini. Gdi , cal. .50. 4 Link fillingcr^hlm.&, urchint s-un, cri. .30.
5 sult filling nr.chlnv.3, ti:.chine Tun, cr.l. .30.
7 ?u't6 md iito, sorrc, nnchin^ \x>:, cal, .30.
4 Tools, rlflo, Ml
4 Cns^.6, oil rJiC thons, Ml.
3 Op^rtinb springs, Xl
570 Cl,an~r, tore, cms
101 Br^onutG
~

.50, fir cooled, couplwtc i.ir cooled, co.-vl^tu 1 i-loi t-.r, yir.r., cc::.pl.tc
C hor;.- r, CO cm, ccnolc -o
M.flvt, 3AR, c.-l.' .'>o.

;s-un,;

m^

gS^~

Oi bk JJ vJ

*^

G#

uoyon^t

Enclosure "X"

3^ v

Zml(Lm (/jf t\ cfl jUfcjTxs

1#td
r.t dougainvlllu:

S>-'lvr o cd

WB^^m. Iff Ml a^

report of op civ.Lion. Nov

TV,TV,

1944. (Cont'd.)

- Dec,

1943,

WtmSicMMR\w Mirn^d ovor

to Division Ordnance

9 Launchers, anti-tank grenade

1Launcher, VB, rifle grenade
Mounts, 20kei, AA yjin
2 Bipods, BAR.

at

Eou&alnville:
30 65 267 52 24 67 27,000

Salvaged anmuniticn turned over to a: -.unit ion durap

rounds, 81mm mortar ammunition.

rounds,

rounds, 37mm anti-tank gun ammunition.

rounds, 90mm AA Oun ammunition.
Grenades, anti-tank, rifle.
Orenades,
hand.
rounds, cal. .50 machine gun ammunition,
43,000 rounds, cal, ,30 maching jjun anmunition.

60mm mortal* ammunition.

1,700 round &, c&l. ,45 ammunition.

12 rounds, 105 ammunition.

Salvaged amphibian accounting of:

tractors and parts thereof,

85 Tractor s t amphibian
56 Tracks, f/amphibian tractors

VOltt 22 Tractor a, amphibian, and 84' tracks, f/amphibian

t

traotors yr plaoed in the Diriaion Ordnanoe Ooapnj erea at BougainTille,

X rtraotor, amphibian and 8 trsks f/amphibian trmotor, oomplt^e, mm tvrne* ever to the A*s>hibian Tractor Battalion at QtMtOaltfanal bath X Trailer,(.ad and oteriliaation, complete
salvaged,

is now 4a the Salvage Beotlon area*

1 Jeep, complete, salvaged, and turned over to the Division Motor transport Battalion at Bougainville

Items salvaged at Bougainville by the Salvage Section, Ttoird Service Battalion, Service Troops, Third Marine Division! ITEMat

fWUiS&E.
15
16

lafcuxp

pj^jyyfi

brush, vfhrjndl BATIERXSB, lantern Batteries, Jeep, radio

Axes,

Anohors, steel Axes, w/handles

Bags, Bags, Bags, Bags, Bags,

clothing
Xyster

21 75 61 1

0 2 21
0

15
75

14

aall officer, bedroll

sand,

2 1 3

Basins, collapsible

burlap

1525 439

0 0 1 0 0 1525 0

61 1 1 3 0 43 439

DECLASSIFIED

Enqsure

"X*

afc


EncloGurW{^W%olCO\
Itei;.s sr,lv;,td

jcrt of operation, Nov i*ry, 1944, (Cont'd).

Servr^

Dec, 1943,

Third Service Battalion,

ITEkS

rff 3pinMmlle
Wtfme

by the Salvage Section,

Troops, Third Marine Division

SALVAGED ISSUED
554 75 2 19 2 18 1 568 3 191 3 50fc 0 2 19 2 0 1 0 0

Of HAND 232 75 0 0 0 18 0 568 3 23 0

BELTS, ct.rtridb e Belto, life preserver Belus, pistol Blr.nl'.ets, vool, b'reen
Boats, rubber

Block nr.d tickle

brick, fire, cy.se Buckets, collapalble Canales, cases Cans, expeditionary, 5 gal. Cans, C-I, iarfc c Cans, uifcat Cans, eand soap
Canteens

168
3

83 48
506 416 118 277 9 95

83
0

0
48

Carriers, canteen Carriers, dispatch Carriers, packet, first aid Carriers, pack, f/corpsman Carriers, pick, entrenching Carriers, oliovel, entrenching Carriers, wire cutters Chests, fire, unit, empty Cleaver 8, ueat Clips, steel cat, caeos Coses, ceaaoufluge Cor.ts, utility Compressor, elr, f/truck

407 242
0

126

12 3 2 4 101

275 0 73 84
0 0 4

101 174 118 2 9 22

591 20

Containers,
Covers,

Containers, food Cord, primer, feet Cots, field Covers, individual Covers, meat oan Cups, oan teen
Cutters,

cui'go,

f/parachute

1 5 15

583 1 5

46

14
0 21 0 0 64 221 1 0

42 12 3 2 0 56 8 0 0 1

camouflage,

f/steel

helmet

Cutters, wire, entrenching Dither, post hole, screw type Equipment, aviation signal, cases

bolt

Equipment, vroier purification, case Extinguisher, fire, larfee, enpty ExtinbuiBhar, fire, small, empty Flares, electric Garlands, camouflage, rolls
Grlooea, lan:ern, Oil Gloves, lorther, pairs Guard, radiator, Recon. Handles, picfc, lar^e

Haversack Helmet, s^eel, hi Hoist, block and chain Hook cant Inflators, rubber, boat, Co2

31 66 30 64 221 1 8 1 3 1 12 20 85 66 67 8 1 41 504

20

3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

60 88 30 0 0 0 8 0 0 0

12

655

0 41 590
4

20 85 68 67 8 1 0

Jack 6, hydraulic

4 1 14 2

294.
0 0

114
\u25a0

am
0

10
14 2

Enclosure "11"

31*4

c?

o> *W*& %c*'*"\ &V*2''3 IlnelotslrA^J^ok^ ac*v,?r3

t

*m3\d#.^r^lanuary,

Nov report r^port of operation, Nov 1944, (Cont '<?..)

- Dec,

1945

Items saiy^f&'nzji&fcwmvllle by the Sclvu, e Section, ThlrV Service Bp.1 c.lRnjfj^r 1 Jffi Troops, Third Marine Division:
IISI-iS

SALVAGED ISSUED
588 29 5 78 553 6 0 8 13 95 0 0

Hj ;wfl
235 25 5 202

Knap sack 8 Knife, corpsman Lanterns, Col scan, email Lanterns, oil, w/o globes Lr^ings, prs, Lln-s, 3/*", foot Liners, ru-.lnet Litters, csnvas Litters, metal basket type

245
3,000

70

3,000

105

37 21 8

0 10 37

21 4 7

Machette

Mallets, wooden,
mate, floating,

52

16

Mills, coffee Motor, Evlnrude, outboard Motor, Jeep

f/rubber boat
ur., f/boat

email

16 9 1 10 8 XO 18 256 216 2 202 39 460 18 6 300

6

4 0
o 0

56 16 1 1 1 10
8

Motor, reoon.

1 1

0 0 0 0 0 6i 35 159 0 0 0 0 0
6 1

Mount 8, Co tor, outboard, metal Mount 8, motor, outboard, wood Nets, camouflage, tun emplacement Nots, mosquito, cot

Mounts, machine

N^te, mosquito, head Ointment, protective, tube*, cases Packets, first aid Packs, Army, old type

10 18 :196 196 180 0

43

Pack

radio Packs, MO, old

8,

5 4

5
4

type

Poles, shelter half Poles, upright Ponchos, rubberized cloth Pot a, stock and lids
Pads, protuctor

Paddles, boat Paint, camouflage, gala. Faint, protective, clothing, gals Pans, baking Parts, tractor, amphibian, case Pet,B, shelter-half Pegs, tent, large, caaos Flcke, entrenching, w/handles Picks, pioneer, large

39 480 18
6 0 0

5 1

500 85

120 50

Pulley, chain

Pump, decontaminating Puap, gas, hand Pumps, hand inflation, boat Haaks, pan, baking

Radiator, Reeon.
Ran^s,

field, cabinet Repellent, z-osquito, cases

Respirators, dust Rims, 900 X 16 Rims, 600 X 25 X 20 Rime, 700 X 20

256 107 10 2 2 1 1 12 11 1 32 20

95 43 0 250 05 10 0 2 0 1 0

2
6 44

0
2

0 1

n 0

35 6 6 2

12 20 0 0

0 0 1 0

12 0 1 20 0 36 6 6
2 0 7

EnVrosure

315


Encl#^(jft|t<CCi~syfr*%^
a

Report of operation, Nov

- Doc,
QU HAND
iq^ iq^

1945,

a a Third Service

Itoms

Bnt callon,w

sal^#>dj|j^A#alnvllle

ITEt:s

S^^&

by the Salva, o Section Troops, Third Marine' Division:

SALVAGED ISSUED 123

140 6 149 45 211 97 23 0 0

Shelter halves Shirts, es

Shovels, R.P.S.H. Soda ash, case Soap, salt water, case Tanks, gas, 6XO Tanks, gas, auxiliary, f/planes Tanks, oae, Keoon. Tanks, pressure, fire units Telephone, field
Tents, Tents, Tents, Tires,
fly pyramidal storage

Shovels, entrenching

62 39 39
110 110
2 2

2 4 7 2 2
9 9

2 2
43 43

6 6
2 2 2

4 4

0 1

700X20 Tires, 600X16 Tires, 900

X 16 900 Tires, 826X20
Tonya, log

17 23

2 9 15 15
23 0
6 0

0 0

s s

0 0

Trousers, camouflage Trousers, ss Trousers, utility Tubes, aotylene, empty lubes, tire Tubes, oxygen, empty Units, fire Wheels and tire,- complete, f/Jeep Wire, barbed, rolls Wire, ooonunioation. reels Wire, gslvanlted, #9, lb

5 ? 3 3

0
3

85 227 406 2 60 13 9
8 9 43

2 2
0 0
3 3
0 0
5 7 7
0
0

45 208 406 406

0
0

39 39
19 19
0 2 2

60 60

0 0 39 600

4
9
9

13 13
5 5
8 8
0
4 4

600

0 0

The following salvaged items were turned over to the Salvage Platoon, Fourthaaee Depot, Russell Islands:

UJE&
Shoes, Mask, hask, Nets,
prs. gas. Navy type gas, Army Type oar go

SALVAGED ISSUED TO 4TH..8. DEPOT.

'

1294 2870
403 4

16

0 0

1279 1279
2870 2870

409 409
4 4

'

Ih|' Ay

\(

irvTl rt ifcrvfpyagort of operations, Nov

Dec, 1945

ORDNANCE COi-IP^NY, BaTTALIOH, THIRD SERVICE BaTTALION, SERVICE TROOPS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FHF., IN THE FIELD.
12 January, 1944.

Weapons salvaged and repaired on Bougainville (28N0v43 to 4Jan44.)

WEAPON

Bayonet e, Ml9o* Oune, Raising, oal. .46 B.*,)*., oal. .9Q

M 1903 RUI, o*l, .50, Ml, carbine

3.j^a,,o*i

Rlfl*, Cal. Rifle, Cal.

:JtEOEIVED REPAIRED RB-ISBUEP

.30,

30, Ml

643

ao, laoz?

26 36 66 47 17
3 19

652 26 36 55 47 17 19
3 3

206 16 27 #6 4? 19 2
1* 3

?\u25a0\u25a0
1

<i^/

Urtlllerj)
:

. 3 -Tiem *aoit Hoirttsere

.;\u25a0\u25a0

"On^^aiWi AT, MOAI wheel bent. R*PAlre4 and latotd - -^, , Ji-mt Jtl^'^nd "^ *+* 2 TJMfc*gjfc -m* Cifiitoh throH^out bearing replaoed.
v *
.\u25a0
\u25a0

%\u25a0

2 repaired

Enolotur* CO) to 00, BervTre report of operation* 1ov dtd 17 January, 1944.
ORDNANCE COMPANY, SEKTJCE BATTALION, SERVICK TROOPS, THIRD KARXHS DIVISION, P>iF., IN THE FIELD.
, THIRD

Deo, 1945,

Following items serviced and oheoked America! Division*

- Exchanged

12 January, 1944. with the

14

87 2 24 10

eights. Mortar, 60am, w/bipod, base plate, and M4 sights. Mortar, 61am, w/bipod, base .lato, and M4

w/aco w/acc &un, BMO, oal. .50. HB M2, /trlpod, elev.mech, and pintle Oun, am, cal. .30, M1919-A4, */ tripod, pintle, and elev m
Qun, 3?mm, AT M3AI,
Carriage, motor, 75am Q-un, AT,

DECLASSIFIED

Enclosure *X"

sn


1975

25
January,

Jfr^afafii

H2*DQ,UaRTERS, DIVISION SPECIAL TROOPS, THIRD 2iiilH DIVISION, FLEET l-URII-i* FORCE,
194*i.

Subject:

Report on

ChSotJiPsSOM

Operation.

Reference:

(a) CG Ltr AIB/crv, dated January 4, 19-i4. (a) Overlay of Tokokina Area, Scale 1:20,000.
Headquarters

Enclosure: I.

SECTION I, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

Company, (a) Headquarters

Company land

ed in the second wave. aII personnel other than wont ashore with respective sections. the later of five (5; men that aided in the setting up of the w Division- CP, formed a beach working party from "D" day to "D in establishing Division plus 6. Headquarters Company assisted B CP security. Conuflandlng General's galley operated on D" plus days, Headquarters Company eclley operated on "D" plus 5 days. w Hot coffee was available on "C* plus 3 days. Prior to a galley functioning, X rations were used. On "DM nlue 7 Headquarters Company displaced to a new Division CP as shown in onclosure (A). Pyramidal tents were erected at this new location. Three galley s (namely; CG'e, Staff Officers and enlisted personnel's) set up and functioned from 7 KoVvmber on. Security established and "D" plus A regular routines of Headquarters Company performed. sev^nteen (17) days rear echelon of the Company arrived. One officer and ten men set up temporary CP 84 November as shown in enclosure (a). Headquarters Company moved to its fourth Division CP 26 Novembers as shown in enclosure (a), a more permanent CP was established during this period. Personnel assisted In Two Division CP security and regular routine was established. galleys including Commanding Generals and combined Staff Officers a working party consisting of personnel operated, and one officer and fifteen (15) aen served &s an ammunition carry ing detail for one day. From 6 December to 15 December eleven men were furnished as working party in the vicinity of the front lines. 15 December advanced echelon embarked to return to Division rear base. 28 December at 1600 Company CP closed; remaining personnel of Headquarters Company except nine officers and twelve men embarked aboard ship to return to rear base.

Enlisted oersonnsl of the Staff Sections

Military Police Company, (a) Initial phase ("D" day 2. to "D" plus 10). (1) This comply was attached to the 3d Brttalion, 9th I&rincs, duting the initial landing. For landing purposes detail, this company wrs divided into three groups; reconnaissance rear detail, and shore party working detail. (2) The Third Platoon, comprising one (1) officer and twenty-five (25) men, disembarked at "HM plus one, landing on Beach Yellow Two. See Enclosure (A), This platoon provided security for the reconnaissance party during the selection Of the division CP, then assisted in setting up the CP installations and performed local CP security. The rear detail consisting of the C<->, HPCo, and nine (9) men landed at "H" plus three (3), with the division commander and his party, escorted them to the div ision CP, then joined the Third Platoon in local security duty. The remainder of the company comprising two (2) officers and fourty-four (^)'mon remained with 3d Battalion, 9th Marines until W D" plus 3, as z shore party working detail. Upon rejoin ing the company, this detail was sent as an advance element to rr.ake preparation for the opening of a new division C* and to provided local security for sfjne. On "D" plus six (6) the re mainder of the company closed out the last elements of the old
fl^k

*^

Wt

l nf mI "^

3IS

MwsW b I
r.bli shred as the

of Operations

S5 January

,19-i-l.

traffic control was cst both along the beach find the
PIVa Trail. Later was further expanded, traffic
control points wore est&blisheWn the beach, M'JILi NJIIa Trs.il,
JiriST UST Trail, and lp.ter on the Corps Ror.d.
(2) On "D" plus twenty-one (21) the first platoon
of th\- comoany w-.e sent forvrrd to hol^ establish c.n intermediate
Division CP as shown on enclosure (*O, on W DN plus twenty-seven
(27), the Company Headquarters, 2d platoon and 3d platoon moved
to the fourth site of the division CP.
(3) During this phasa, ten prisoners of wr.r waro
confined in the Division Stockade, prior to transfer to First
Marine -amphibious Corps.
(4) This company furnished c. oormanant fifteen
man working party for handling supplies in the forward area
throughout the period from Do 8, until Dec 27, 1943; ft purely
Service Troops mission. (5) All MilitaryPolice duties were turned over
to the Military Police Comapny, itaorio.'l Division, on the rooming
of 28 December, 1943. (6} The MP Company^embfirked r.board the U.S.S.
President Adams at 1000 on 28 December, 1943 arriving Guadalcanal,

tqvl

mxf oMmIcMW, when

tm^MMet

(c) Comments. (1) The nature of the operation, influenced as

it was by the local terrain, did not permit the military police
to perform fully pf.rt of the mission for which it Is organized,
until therd rocd net developed with its normal traffic problems.
However, it is believed that this unit was not always employed
For
to the best advantage under the conditions as they existed. example there was lack of sufficient correlation between the
HpCo, and such sections as D-3 and D~4, and such activities as
the Div Q}4 and the englnocrs. as a result there was some avoid able confusion that arose through the giving of incorrect 'inform r.tion by HP's oonocrning the direction ?.nd location of CPs, dump
locations, and projects unaer development. (2) Care should bo observed in future operations
that the prlmcxy duties such p.s furnishing guides, maintaining
order in the beach areas* rounding up stragglers md guarding
dumps, arc not ignored.

30 December. 1943.

Signal Company, (a) Planning and preparation. The signal Coapsny, with its 383 Officers ?.nd men,
was divided into five groups as follows: daaup PFFiCaSs BOUQ*iireiLL IT^TTffiday of Atuiiv^T \u25a0h" 1-day 12 183 D plus 5 days 5 110 "C 1 -20 D plus 15 days (To be left at Guadalcanal) \u25a0D 1 . 20 Ouada
(To be left at Guadalcanal)
a?. . . 1a 1 i .30

3.

Oourp "a" was to Install, ooerate, and, maintain

the Initial communication system. The function of group \u25a0"
was to participate in the extension and expansion of the initial
system. Additional supplies and replacements were to be brought
up by group "C. toeups "D" & "E" composed the rear echelon
which was to remain on Guadalcanal, group "D" sending supplies
forward to Bougainville as needed, and group "E" operating the
communication system, for the "Division Administrative Group.
(b) Operations. (1) Initial phase, 1 November 1943 thru
November 1943.
During the landing phase, contact with other
maintained by using & TBY on the Navy TBS net.
tra^oojgsjrfas

31?

Report

of

Operation

25 Jan 4-i.

v' ho division comm.-nd net md this net con tinued to qpgpmcjkJrJiLAfactorily throughout the entire operation, hen the divfttWMc^nmjWj^post was established ashore, the command net continued Wmfrte tho traffic load, though runners proved very valaaw]j|F^yr^jfefaulty loading aboard ship telephone equipment div not reagp^^q^Puntll the third day. This caused an almost complete communications during this period. During the first t^o dayc^F operation there was no radio con tr.ct with L-laC, but traffic we relayed through Radio Koll Point on Guadalcanal. On the third day, telephone communication was \u0084st.VbliBhed through there was difficulty in finding the regiment al lines were to have been dropped on the beach. From this point on, the wire system carried most of the communicat ion burden. Radio, contact vrith IM^C vias also established at this time and the "net continued to function for the duration of the operation. (2) Second phase, 2d CP 7Nov thru 26Nov. To .execute the forward displacement of the CP, an advance echelon was sent forwr.rd to thu proposed sight of *. temporary the new location, set up wr.s made fey using aBD 72 switchboard and connecting it to the rear installation by means of two trunk lines. The following day the movement was completed. Tv/o TC-<1 switchboards were installed, the regiment al trunks were oonnected, and the various radio stations were set up. The rear switching central was kept In operation for a oerlod of six days and was then taken over by Coras troops. (3) Third phase, 3d CP 27Nov thru 28Dec. a ten pair cable was oushed forward towards the new CP location and there was sufficient time available for est ablishing a complete and neat set ur> prior to the movement of the commend post to accomodate the various units which remained in the beach area. (e)Notes concerning the installation, operation, ofid maintenance of the various agencies. (1) Wire. (a) Trouble on wire lines wes caused by bomb ings, amphibious tractors, road building, and especially by the
carelessness of our
oyn troops.
(i)) Approximately 400 miles of #-110 and 20
of #-130 was laid by the Signal Company.
miles (c) Whan cabling #110,^terminal strips were
This proved to ba
used every 800 jards in lieu of epllces. a tremendous rid In trouble shooting.
(d) All wire was, b: necessity, laid with RL-27'8. Because of this, we needed more linemen. (c) Teletype, when simploxed, caused quite It was necess~ry to use a separate metal interference. a bit of lic cir-^it for satisfactory operation. (f) During active phases of the operation.
shooters were posted at intervals along the more im trouT-J-o portant trunk lines. This reduced to a minimum the time
necessary to repair broken linos.

t%MM*fr

lacWfc^^fre

(g) One switchboard operator was rendered senseless when lightning struck a lino, though the switchboard was well grounded, A bakellte hanset was thereafter used by all operators during electrical storms. (2) Radio. (a) Thcr following n^tr were guarded by the
signal company
(1) IMAC Commr.nd net nn AM-locr.lM -locr.l on Bougainville. le,w (2) IMAC comannd net wB"-3ougniviB"-3ougninville, (3) (4) (5) (6)

Mundr., Vr.llr. Lr.vall-., Division command net.

Gu.dp.lc?innl.

Air Wrrnlng nat. Scone of action frequency. A remotely controlled net R/T) be

bjTct# M

.Jleport of

Ooerr.tion.
'

25 Jrji 44. when under

ffiy^
hcr.vy losses

S #5

nd P'.rf.chutc br.ttallons

(d) Recoooendations. (1) All equipment necessary to establish the Initial CP ashore should be carried by communication person Therefore, this equipment should nel when they first go ashore. not be stored in the holds of the ship, but should be carried either on deck or in the troop compartments. (2) In the landing phase of an operation. a division wire team should go ashore with eaoh regiment*! comm and group for the purposes of laying wire from the regimental CPs to the proposed location of the division CP. These wire
teams should be attached to the various regiments At point
of embarkation. Only by following this procedure can it be hoped that the Commanding General will have control of the regiments Immediately upon the landing of the division command group. (3) In operations such as this, where wire can hot be laid b use of vehicles, but must be laid entirely with RL 27' s, there is a definite need for more linemen in all echelons. (4) Signal QH equipment and Signal Company equipment should be completely separated, with separate tonnage allowances. (5) Signal QM equipment should be landed earlier than was done in this operation. In fact, some signal supplies should be landed with the first echelon, thus making it unnecessary for subordinate units to carry 30 days supplies. v/hich they can't begin to handle. 3ignal QM should carry :.*iore extra wire SS^gg-^.. m lfPal%ap xtff lyff^yffi w&8 carrled in^hls operation. jj^sffl

phr.se of the operation

dry cell batteries r.nd some
equipment wr.s rendered unTMUltlve due to he^vy rains. (c) Some Interference wns encountered because of thy fact thfl.t very fow Marine vehicles were radio shielded. (d) Other than in the 6hip to shore phase of the operation, TBY's were of absolutely no value because df their extremely limited range in thick vegetation. (c) The SCH-193, TC3, T3V-2, TBX-2 radios all gave excellent service. In the last stage of the operation, a TC3 6et worked perfectly in a direct net between Guadalcanal and Bougainville. (3) Message Center. (a) Runners were used exclusively in the initial phase, but as roads improved "Jeeo" messengers took over most of the load. (b) The Kagelln, for both speed and accuracy,
is an extremely valuable coding divice for combat areas.
(c) The Indian tallters Droved to be very valuable and efficient. (d) A Corps order directed all units on Corps radio net "A" to transmit a number of drill messages daily. This placed an extra and needless burden on an already extreme ly busy message center. (4). Air Warning. (a) Air Warning functioned very well accept at such times as the command was spread out and the Air Warning section had to use a TBX, In this case the TBX did not have enough power to reach all units. An SCR 193 was ueed most of the time and had sufficient output to reach all units. (b) Air warnings were also relayed over the div ision command net and over the telephone system. (c) The Air Warning service was connected to the fighter command and 3d Defense Bn by telephone and 'was kept informed as to conditions red and green in addition to the AA status.

w were

susts^Jred*^

-Bi-f'^Mk^

Report
of Operations.

25 Mar
*'\u25a0 4

Battery h b.rr platoone was largely In four cli *tiached to landing teal D Jed into Cherryblossom on other day. ihe entire movement w. hout particular incident than in one convoy one ship was lost by enemy toropedo bombing, but no men or quiproent of this Eattalion were aboard thio ship. ntler the larger nart of tho Division had returned to Bevy, H&S and the three aT Batteries were attached to the Pist Regiment and the 2nd Provisional Raider Regiment. This period covered 21De043 to 14Jan<14. H&S Battery, (a) This Battery oerformed normal 2. functions and while attached to the Raider Regiment, furnished and wanned eight (8) maohine guns in the front lines to augment tika..vte&'ions of the weapons of the Raider Regiment. . " Battery a. (a) Three platoons of this Battery landed 3. on D day, the remaining platoon landed on D plus five. On land ing the Eattery was attached for tactical Durtjoses to the '3d Def Bn, and remained attached until the day of departure, 16Jan<l i. Originally the Battery set up aa defenses on the landing beaches. During the construction of the Tokoklna air strip, the guns were moved and concentrated about the air strip. This Battery during the seventy five day period maintained continou air In the period watches and slcclton firing crews on their weapons. enemy planes were fired on, on fourteen different days, 2029 rounds of 40mm ammuntion were expended, and 843 rounds of 50 cal. ammunition were expended. (b) The Battery was credited officially with one (1) enemy plane shot down, and with assists along with the iOrow gune of the 3d Def Bn of five (5) enemy planes shot down. (c) The secondary mission, although the iOmra
are a* guns, was beach defons.
Battery B. (a) Thle Battery was Initiallyin Div **. ision Reserve, however, during the period from 28W0v43 to 19Dec43, the Heavy Platoon was detached by Corps to the <trmy Div. and wes set up on the left flank on beach defense. (b) From 21De043 to 14Jan44, Battery B was
attached to the 2d Raider Regiment and manned fourteen (14)
machine guns in the front lines.
Battery C. (a) This Battery was initially in Reserve. 5. The Battery was attached to the 9th Regiment during period
and 26N0v43; the 3d Regiment during the period 26Nov-i3
C3; and the 2d Raider Regiment daring the oeriod from
sJ*uvi-. They wore employed on the right flank oeri ea and beach defense. Battery D. (a) This Battery was initially in Reserve.
6. It was attached to the 21st Regiment during the nerlod from
10Dec43 to TJan'K, and occupied defensive ooaitions.
(b) The Heavy Platoon, comprised of two 75mm guns mounted on half tracks, was sent by LC^'s to cover the withdrawal of a Paratroop Battalion which had landed in the Jaba River area. The Platoon left on 29M0v43 and returned on 30N0v43. One gun was sent to the right flank under the command of a Kaval Ensign and failed to accomplish its mission. The other gun, under command of Lieutenant Kavanaugh, proceeded to within 500 yards of the beach on the other flank and opened fire on signal and aided in the successful withdrawal of the Paratroop Battalion. 7. Due to the employment of this Battalion, supoly and
evacuation were normal.
In view of the terrain and conditions In Cherryblos som area, the following-recommendations were made to the .iarlne
Corps Inspector, who visited the Division in Cherryblossom;

1.

Umfik)

om

WEAPONS BhTTaLION Bevy to Chcrrybloosom

3>Tr

of Operations

25 Jan <X

elf propelled Fargo mount be re spllt trail 37mm gun aa soon as recommendation was made to the in the event that this Battalion in areas other than this South area, it is believed by the this Battalion the aelf propelled 37mm gun is the superior weapon. b. (1) The 75mm self propelled half track be replaced by the 75mm gun mounted on the M full track 5 tank mount. c. (1) Comments: As a result of the lessons learned in this operation, this Battalion will stress in its training period, the firing of the 75mm half track Iron landing oraf t, and particularly stress the formation and training of .30 oal. machine gun squads to be used in areas not suited to the use of the present organisational weapons.
\u25a0

Casualties.

(a) Bat tale Casualties. (1) Killed in action: None (2) Wounded in action: Four (4) 3) Missing in action: None (4) Total oases transferred to Field Hospital: Four (4) (5) Total oases evacuated: Four (4) (6) Total oases returned to duty: (none)

(b) Non Bat tale Casualties. (1 Dud injuries: three (3) (2 Died diseases: None <3 Injured: Three (3) (4 Total cases transferred to Field Hospital: Three (3) 5) Total cases evacuated: Two (2) 6) Total oases returned to duty: Ons (1) (7) Illness: Sllty six (66) (8) Total cases transferred to Field Hospital Sixty six (66) (9) Total oases evacuated! Thirty nine (39) (10) Total cases returned to duty: Twenty seven (27)

SECTION 111, TitNX BATTALION Personnel. (a) The initial personnel of this Bn landing on day consisted
of: Bn Coodr Bn Malnt Offioer
Bn 2 Bn Medical Offioer Bn 3 Bn Liaison Offioer Co Comdre of Cos "A" B *"C" Unlisted personnel of Cos Hq Scots Co "D" (Scouts) (b) Additional personnel arrived at later dates making total units present as follows! HAS Co (less part of saint supply scots) Co "A" (less c pits and part of Co Hqs) . Co "B" Co "C* (less 2 pits and part of Co Hqs) Co"D* (Scouts) (c) Remainder of personnel at Bevy after receiving orders that they would not move forward engaged in working parties and preparing oamps for units returning from Cherry 1.

3^3

25 Jan 4<i. this Bn as follows Officers Enlisted 3 12 1 !b established on D day in the vic rerr.aindd there until D plas six vhen xt move to Beach Blus 2 and on D plus 21 moved to a forward poaition. The Bn kept liaison with Division at all timus. Bn Hqo returned to Bevy on 17Dec44. *11 units of the Bn had returned
by llJan<l*;.

(b) Co V (1) The Co Coradr and part of Co Hqs landed on D day and enga^ a a in reconnaieance work. (2) The Ist Plat, (Capt. B. R. Nichols), arrived Cherryblossom 0 plus 10. The plat was not committed to action against the enemy. It remained in Division reserve until Its time of departure. (3) Co Hqa and the Ist plat returned to Bevy

3J&n4-i.
day.

(c) Co "B* (1) Co Comdr and

part

of Co Hqs landed on D

2d 5n on corning of D plus 13 and attacked with 25 yard interval, line formation. They advanced about 250 yards through dense jungle. Tank plr.t leaders hit land mine on Plva. Trail and "blew off ripht track, Lt. Stanley was killed as he attempted to evacuat his. t .nk. Routining :..c-r-bsre of crew evacuated safely after enemy resistence cleaned up. another tank was hit on the bustle and the engine caught fire, it wae extinguished and crew escaped uninjured. Both tanks were repaired and in operation in a couple d&ys. Tank then reclamed in aoblle reserve. U) The 3d Plat, (lstLt. <}. H. Joy), arrived Cherrybloesom D plus 16. (a) On D plus 18 entire company was attached to 3d Mar and uoved to a position in the vicinity of the GP,3dMar. (B) The 3dn, 3dMar, used tanks to breaJt trails, convoy supplies and evacuate wounded. (C) On D plus 19, Lt. Joy had three tanks, transporting supplies to front lines when he discovered enemy along ijast West Trail. Together with some stray infantry who guided him, they attack end routed the enemy. Lt. Joys tank was hit four tic.es by an *T gun, one oentrating and seriously wounding the radio operator and driver. Lt. Joy was also slight ly wounded froi MO splash when he tryed to open his pistol port. destr jfcpa^aX was credited with destroying 2 MGs, 1 AT gun, and sever

(2) The let Plat, (lstLt. D. H. Grahaa), arrived on D plus 5. On D plus 6 the Ist Bn, 3d Mar, requested tank support on the left flank of the Division and the Ist Plat waa attached. (a) Five tanks attacked enemy positions and emplacements for about thirty-five minutes. The platoon was credited with killingabout 50 Japs. One tan 1* man slightly Wounded. (B) On D plus 7 tho plat was detached and attached to the lstn, 21st Mar for an attack alon the beach. The Tanks attacked for about 750 yards against, light opposition. (C) On afternoon of D plus 7 one section was detached and attached to 3d Raidern. This section carried supplies and evacuated wounded. This section returned to Bn on D plus 10, the three tanks with 21stliar, returned to Tkn on D plus 12. (3) The 2d Plat, (lstLt. L. 3. Stanley), arrived Cherrybloseom on D plus 11. (A) On night of D plus 12, 21st24ar requested tank support for an attack on D plus 13. Tanks reoort to CO,

lA

ippct of Operations
>

25 Jan 44.
B" were used to break trails

''./" il&m ?*f ft* !06! lr^ If

i*4_

plat returned on LJan44. (d) Co Comdr and part of Co Hqs landed on D day and peiformed reeonnaleance work. On D plus 16, the Ist plat, (lstLt M. F. Ruud), arrived. This platoon was not employed In aotioa against the enemy. It remained In Division reserve until Uan44. Co Comdr and Co Hqs arrived Bevy 17Dec43, the plat arrive 3Jan44. (c) Co *D (Scouts) (1) Co Comdr and Co Hqs landed on D day and re* turned to Bevy. (2) Ist Plat, lstU. 0. Salgo, landed D day attached to 9thMar. (A) Made four day reoonnalsanoe patrol In
Laruma River sector, wad oontaok with the enemy and native
patrols. On fourth day the patrol sighted eight enemy barges landing at mouth of Laruma River. Patrol layed ambush and whan forced to with draw they discovered three more Jap barges had landed between the patrol and our own linos. Two members of the patrol were wounded and being carried* Two men volunteered to twin to an amphibian tractor whloh was about 1600 yards off
short. They returned with two Hlggins boats whloh evacuated
the patrol under fire from the enemy. (B) The R-2, 9th Mar ordered reoonnalsanoe patrol in Tokokina River sector around hill 600 a. Patrol con tacted enemy killing one Jap guarding a Jap bivouac area, mission of patrol was accomplished. (C) Guarded 9th Mar OP and used for working parties until return to Bevy, 30De043. (3) Ed Plat, Capt 0. Sausscy. U) Landed 1> day attached to 21st Mar, returned to Bevy 11 Jan 44. (B) Made seven reeonnalsanoe patrols for 21etMar patrols varying in slse and from one to four days. Contacted enemy on seven different occasions. (4) 3*Plat, 2dLt. E. Jenkins. U) Landed D day attached to MMar. returned to Bevy 87Dec 43.
(B> The plat was used to guard the wrd GP,
security and reoonnalsaaoe patrols varying in slse. The platoon
was also used to oheck communication lines and to string wire
to forward observers. (Of Dstaohod from 3rd Mar on 0 plus 22. (5) 4th Plat, IstIt. R. C. Franklin. U) Landed on D day attached to 9thMar, returned to Bevy 27D0049. (1) Used inbeach parties until D plus 9 when it returned to Bo* (C) OM ft plus 22 relieved 3d Plat aad attached to 3d Mar, tit of OP and working parties.
(D) P plus 20 beoame part of provision Bn, and
bcoame par* of lift*held by that Bfi *?) *"** ritanvA to Tkn oa il*t*43. *4 i.i pi****** fimiisned Tkn information of thf \u2666 -v f*s*l Wff * mntitt m. The puts *i 06! 4 should have >******, l ** toeefl psrform.4 They orgariii

eupp to Bn on D p Ing parties. (6) The coit In Division Reserve, return

transport

until they were detached also used as MPs and on work-

i the 2d plat which was held Bevy on 17De043. The 2d

. . MfUritf

"

*' *St**Xlr W t^^^^jftj

25Jan44.
ctive in Jungle It appears

loyed until definite resistEd by artillery preparation, time to beat down Jungle with

to stop and check directInfantry support about every fifteen 16, (depending on density of Jungle). Not be permitted to advance onoe contact with the Infantry ie lost. (P) Wait for Infantry to Issue order for advance every fifteen yards. (G) Keep dlstcnct and interval between tanks such 8 to permit visual contact at *

ft*eW>W (D]r

allowed time

tnd

all times. (H) Use as many columns of tanks as avail able. (I) Never turn beck but depend on infantry to hold ground they have- gained and oall on
artillery support to aocooplleh this if

necessary. (J) Nev.r move far enough in to allow them selves to be outflanked, (8) For Jungle, a special infantry battalion should be trained and used soley for directing and supporting the units of the Tank Battalion and holding on the line of farthest advance until relieved by the troops of the sons in whioh employed. In the absence of such an the next best is to use the scout oopcny partially for this pruoose by having then guide the tanks to proper line of departure and there after direct the lr rite of advance and direction of attack. Also help form close 'support between the tanks and the close supporting infantry. After the position is consolidated the personnel of the scout company would then lead the t*nks out of the area end bftok to th^ir reserve position. Even using the scout company in this m^-nner, before committing the tank. unit. It would be necessary for thourough plans to be formulat ed between the artillery, lnfnntry, and the tanks. Those plans in the final fora must be thoroughly understood by each Individual Infantry man and tenk man. (3) In general, in small areas It la believed
that tanks should be returned to a oentral area after eaoh
mission rather than held in reserve in a forward position.
The reason being ttet in the event of a brerk through in the
Juqgl-e, the point of vhloh cray be anywhere, artillery can
better cop* with the situation than the t :nks as It requires
more time to organlte a tank counter attack. Also the fact
that the tanks are In the Immediate area is a good reason for the enemy to concentrate his anti-tank defenses at that point, furtheraors, it Is generally easier to return the tank for resupply than to uove the' supply forward. Italso affords better rest, and replacement of personnel and repair or replacement of equipment. |4) The compass In the light tank is only an approximation, in- the medium it is somewhat better. For Jungle work it is reoommsnded that some type of a small gyro compass
as used in riplanes be installed. If practical, a dead
reooning unit should be Installed; in the absence of the
BfclJ|rji Aard|meaflurer would be better than the present
\u25a0

Report of Operations

25<7an44.

comments are coneidered the tank* in the Jungle it is real-

refore any method of use in .he Division to its objective saves lives.
3,

ideal, but generally fights

of tanks is to be avoided, it to lose tanks if It

The supply and eva cuatlon nrobleme in this Bn were negligible. The main difficulty experienced was from an administrative standpoint. With small units attached to larger units within the division, there was no way that we would reoelve the word on men killed, wounded, or evacuated exoept by call ing all possible eourots and checking on each individual case* The senior man of the attached unit would not al ye have the we information as to the disposition of each case. Some system should be devised to h&ve either the unit or the aid st.tlons advisv the parent unit the disposition of all oases. Maintenance* (a) Malnten&noe difficulties experienced In this unit were of a minor nature ohiefly due to the vehioles being sub urged in salt water when being unloaded. (b) All vehloles either damaged or broken down were plaoed in rep&lr by our units own maintenance sections. (o) Halntenanoe equipment will have to be determined for e&oh operation depending on ticc for supply from r*&r areas and type of operating anticipated.
and our own experience warned us of difficulties that might be anoountered in Jungle operat ions. The greatest problem we wtre confronted with was re duction of range in transmitting. In order to operate effeotlvely from r9&r to forward areas it was neoeserry to establish relay stations within rang* limits. In most oases CV had to be used as voloe range wr-s substantially less. (1) Ihe Of 11/RU tank radio worked remarkably well and very little maintenance was required. Its range was greatly reduoed operating in the Jungle. (2) Tha TBX set although more oombersooe to handle, operated very veil. It had the greatest transmitting range of any set we ua#4, (3) The XQS radio Jeep worked very satisfactory and we increased its antenna and were able to pick up trans missions from the TBX. (*) The 'SCR 53$ would be c most baluableu'eet in connection with tank Infantry operations if it were more de pendable. Due to Its unreliability it was not used too frequently, however, it did on oocaslon prove its worth by stopping tanks that had lost their direction of attack. There is , definite neid for a hahd set of this tyr>e that is more mechanically sound. <6i The -HP ief also used and found less reliable. The SCR 536 U preferred to this set. <6) dome* material with a great affinity for water should be on hand for drying out radios and radio equip ment, silica Jell sight work. (7) We are now experimenting with mounting a
box on the rear of the tank so that anyone 6n the out
oa^boJ.

Supply and Evacuation. (a)

Communications. (a) Previous reports

of On^ rations. 0
x.

r5JarU

'tflfeG
OfcAc

( ir.oved for'<' rd "ith :.ost of ,-nt was held CFt.-gory their "a" category* ft Bevy. Other units of their "" md no "5" equipment forward. (2) The situation in cr.ch ooerr tion should die tate what organic eq.ipnent should move in "/" category and its priority of Kovoscnt. (3) lent flys vere found more- GJ.itoblc tcrr.D orary shelters. (i) The metal LNG boxjs for MG a.^r.vanition used by Co MDH were found to be more satisfactory than the "ooden box-vS. (b) Individual. (1) Most Important to allo 1' individual to cerry only -the bare necessities, any excess is usually discarded to ma\e pack lighter. (2) Co "D" (Sets) individual weanone w^-rc not adequate vhen employed on missions without their vehicles. I/very patrol in the .Jungle is a corab&t patrol regardless of Its nature and it is reco.uT. ended that their To ba changed to authorize tvo Bus and four TSiiGs per platoon if they are to be used on si^Hlar missions. (3). The high top, canvas ton, rubber-so l.d jungly. boot proved very satisfactory where long marches were not re quired. The boot kept mud and sand froir the feet and dried o-t ouch quicker than leather "hen it bec^e wet. {A fivery man should be issued one or tyro of the vater tight rackets to ke?t> Personal articles dry inside of his oack.

Ji*M2S M. SMITH.

311

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'

330

CORPS

8 February, 1944. To: Subject: Cornnandinj The Coramandintj General,

Third Marine Division.

Report of Operations of this orb'aniz*tion while attached to the Third Marine O&rlslon. October 30, 1943 to 28 November 1943.

Reference: Enclosure: 1.

3ecret Dispatch fron CG # 3d Marine Division to CO 2d Raider Regiaent Ho. 080QC6L, dated 8 January, 1944. Rer> ort called for in reference, In aooordanoe with the and one copy.

report la submitted.

reference* the enclosed


,
Enclosure:

RAIDER REGIMENT (PROVISIONAL) marine Division. 1943.

erraln Map, BOUGAINVILLE, and second editions,

Regimental Operations

Order 2-43.

Units aboard the U. .5. CLYMER included the Second 3 Raider Regiment (Provisional), lees the Third Raider Battalion, three-hundred and ninety-nine Naval Construction men of the 53d C.B.'b and 71st C.B.s, which were designated as Landing Team Ten for UD" Day, under the command of Lt. Col. Alan Shapley.
Also, prior to landing, Lt. Col *lan Shapley, Commanding Officer of the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional), was designated to be CO. of Corps Reserve immediately upon his unit's return to IMAC reserve.
The Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) composed of Regimental H & S Company, Second and Third Raider Battalions, was trained during the months of May, June, July and August of 1943, on NEW CALEDONIA for the next operation, which was the BOUGAINVILLE Operation.

On 3 October, 1943, the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional), which is a unit of Corps Troops, was attached to the Third Marine Division for further duty. The Third Marine Division attached the Regiment, less the Third Raider Battalion to the Third Marines; the Third Raider Battalion being attached to the Nineth Marines. Practice landings and maneuvers took place on EFaTE Island, NEW HEBRIDES; 16, 17, and 18 October, 1943. The practice landing in cluded unloading the N ships and holding maneuvers as similar to the Operations of "D Day as possible. The beach and terrain was similar .to that of BOUGAINVILLE except that the BOUGAINVILLE Jungle was thicker and contained more swamp.

"D* Day (1 November, 1943), the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) less the Third Raider Battalion, landed on BEACH GREEN TWO and YELLOW ONE, BOUGAINVILLE, BSI, at 0730. On our right flank was the Ist Battalion, Third Marines and on the left flank was the Second Battalion, Third Marines. The Third Raioer Battalion, less MM" Company, which was the Road Block Company for the Regiment, landed on PURUATA Island. The landings were opposed by enemy machine gun fire, "knee mortars" (grenade dischargers), 37mm and 77mm pack artillery. On BEACHES GREEN ONE and TWO, the Jsp+neae had built several strong pillboxes of logs and sandbags, and had them oovered with several feet of earth; also, on BEACH GREEN TWO was a slit trench approximately 150 yards long and about thirty feet inboard and parallel to the beach. Only a few people were wounded on BEACH GREEN TWO while landing. However, the Second Battalion Commanding Officer, (Lt. Col. J. P. MacCaffery) was wounded by enemy machine gun fire on the beach. After moving in board of the beach strip, lagoons and swamp were encountered. .In land, thirty yards from BEACH GREEN TWO, we found the greater part of our sector Impassable. Due to the impassabillty of our sector, battalion, company, and even platoon control was difficult. Enemy sniper fire made reconnaissance of the sector difficult. However, by 1100, 1 November, 1943, enemy resistance bad been broken and we


3peSWKA,l2iy R&port* *(*Contd)

:eoq|d,Jd arlnc Raider Regiment (Provisional) Page 2.

had advanced JftijoP as the operation order had called for on BDU Day ( sel*i]flenJS#3jW Annex 1. Operational Order #21-43, Hq., Third Marines, Division)

inmn^tw^iiw"

ThfrdflHl^^

Contact was made with^he Ist Battalion, Third Marines on our right flank but none was made on our left flank duo to the
Bwanp.

The Third Battalion, leos UM" Company, attached to the 9th Marines, landed on PURIST* Island and encountered sporadic fire while the boats were nearing the beach. The two casualties were caused by snipers firing from coconut trees over the bow of the boats. Ko resistance other than sporadic sniper fire was met on the beach. Due to strong resistance met on BEACH GREEN ONE, "L" Company, Third Raider Battalion, w;.s attached to Ist Battalion Third Marines. Strong enemy resistance was met near the West end of the island. The enemy consisted of not more than a reinforced platoon, but their prepared defenses made the fire fight intense for three hours. The remaining opposition consisted of scattered sniper fire which was knocked out by 1500 "D" plus 1 (2 November, 1943).

A perimeter defense was set up by the Third Battalion.

The C.B.s and Third Defense Battalion "turned to", making the
permanent defense of the island. Galleys were set up the men
Improved their living conditions during the next few days.

On 2 November, 1943, the Second Raider Battalion was astride

the PIV* TRitIL about 1200 yards inland en the 0-2 line. Local
security patrols killed several stray Jape, but no organized
resistance was met.

On 3 November, 1943, the Demolition Company of the Third Raider Battalion landed on TOROXIKh Island after fifteen (15) minutes of shelling by artillery and found no live Japs, but eightor ten freshly dug graves were found. One platoon remained in occupation of the island.

"E" Company relieved "M" Company at the Road Block (135.0 214.2) at 1520 3 November, 1943.

On 4 November, 1943, the Second Battalion, 9th Marines

relieved the 3econd Raider Battalion at 1300. At 1400 the Third
Raider Battalion reverted to the Second Raider Regiment.

On 5 November, 1943, "E" Company was detached to the Ist Battalion, 9th Marines at 1530. *L" Company, Third Battalion was attached to the Seoond Raider Battalion to set up a Road Block at (134.3-214.2). Lt. Bangser, Lt. Devore and eighteen men left in two rubber boats on a night patrol along the JABA RIVER by order of First Marine Amphibious Corps. On the morning of November the sth at 1130 "E* Company relieved F" Company on the Rotfril Block. Lt's Bangser, Devore and eighteen men returned from patrol and made their report to Lt. Col. Alan Shapley and the C-3. On 7 November, 1943. "HM Company relieved "F" Conpeny on the Road Block at 1300. "H" Company contacted the enemy at 1430 a^d "G" Company was sent up at 1500 to reinforce "H" Company. The eneuy action ceased at 1550. "GM Company relieved "H" Company at the Road Block and was harassed by eneny during the night. "I"
Company ,gi|gjd Jfellez jf alAon a S Bent t0 B CH BLUE ONE#

i

"If

"

334"

#
"HeadqucrterPjffSft^yfi l^rine nap. l
Special action

.egiiiicnt

Ropbil^' M

(Provisional)
Page

\u25a0,

(CpE***

On 8 Novoubcr, 1943, was sent up to the Road Block behind "H" Company Tkij|D73o and m^de contact with the eneray. "2" ...nd "F" Companies were sent forward In support at 1000. The remainder of the Third Raider Battalion (Hq and S) less UK* Company, landed on BE*CH BLUE ONE at 1330 and bivouacked in the rear of the Second Raider Battalion bivouac area. The attack ing eneray force was estimated to be a Battalion. Enemy action was "L" Company reverted to the Third Battalion at very vigorous, 1500. At 1600 the Second Battalion withdrew to the Road Block. 11 F" Company returned to the Second Raider 3attalion 31vouac area and was attached to the Third Raider Battalion. The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, sent half-tracks and tanks to support the attack. Due to the thick Jungle, they were used only to evacuate wounded.

On 9 November. 1943, the Third Raider Battalion moved up

to the "Jump-off line* at 0620. The artillery barrage begaft at
0730 and continued until 0800. The Third Raider Battalion \u25a0 Jumped**
off" on the attack. The enemy activity and fire power was very
heavy, evidence of many 14-96*8 being ueed. At 1230, the enemy
resistance was broken and the advance was very rapid. The advance
was halted at 1515, having met no enemy for about seventy (70)
minutes. "X" Company was sent from PURUATA Island to support the
attack. On the 10th of November, the Second Raider Battalion moved cixhundred yards back along the PIV* TRnIL to reorganise and rest in the Division Reserve urea* The Second Battalion, 9th Marines passed through the Second Raider battalion 1s lines to attack PIV* VILLAGE at 0930. *t 1330, First Battalion, 9th Marines relieved the Third Raider battalion. The Third Raider 13a ttali on then Joined the Second Raider Battalion in Division Reserve *rea* "X" Company was sent out on a nl^ht patrol beyond PIV* VILLAGE, by order of The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, and returned the next day with a negative report.
On the 13th of November, the Second Raider Battalion left
the Division Reserve Area, to be attached to the 21st Marines,
the mission being to set up a Road Block at (135*216) to prevent
the enemy from flanking the 2let Marines. "M" Company, Third Raider Battalion, left reserve area and was attached to the 21et Marines for C.P. defense. On the 15th of November, the Third Raider Battalion moved reserve area to relieve the Second Battalion which returned to the reserve area. The Third Raider Battalion remained at the Raa Block until the 19th of November, at which time they movd out ~nd went in reserve of the Third Marine Regiment in the %. X
out of vicinity of (135.6-216.3).

\ \

On the 21st of November, the Second Raider Regiment, less the Third Raider Battalion, moved to (134.90-217.85). The Third Raider Battalion moved out of reserve of the Third Marine Regiment and Joined the Regiment. The next day the Second Raider Battalion relieved Third Battalion, Third Marines, upon Third Division Order, the\ received the preceding day. The Second Raider Regiment, minus the Second Battalion, moved 1500 yards east to the position formerly occupied by the Third Marines. At 1505 "X" Company left on a thirty-si* (36)

#
of&Marine
.r\rifrCQntd) rr
>-

(Provisional) Raider Regiment Page 4 -'

*

hour patrol for Fira^T^^n^mplKMloue Corps, reporting to They disembarked LCM1 a near BEACH YELLOW ONE to embaTk. MOPARA and went down %ie bea?l|Afccout the area of MOPARA Village east of the TOROKINA River. Tn^|returned to the Third Battalion area on the 23d of November with negative report*

Iffl

At 1200, November 23d, the Ist Parachute Battalion landed at YELLOW BEACH ONI. and Joined tho Second Raider Regiment at Corps Reserve Area (135.00-218.03). Headquarters und Service Company moved to the Corps Reserve Area on the morning of the 24th, The forward C.P, was established at the Third Marines Regimental Command Post.

'Fox line"

The Seoond Raider Battalion started a push to establish at 1000; they had completed their mission by 1530 with only slight resistance.

At 1200. the 26th of November, the Seoond Raider Regiment, minus the Seoond Raider Battalion, moved to the Corps Reserve Area, and were attached to First Marine Amphibious Corps, and designated
Corps Reserve Troops. On the 27th of November, at 1200, the
Seoond Raider Battalion was detaohed from Third Marines and re joined the Regiment in Corps Reserve Area. However, they were reoalled to the Third Marines at 1600 to go in reserve for that Regiment: at 0800 on the morning of the 28th they returned to the Reserve Area, AMMUNITION EXPENDED i "One unit of fire expended from November 1, through November 9, another unit wee then Issued but only a few rounds
expended,

The Raider Regiment is organised under the Marine Corps Table of Organisation D~3lO, Approved 1 February, 1943."
Unit of fire consisting of: M-l 128 rounds. BAR 260 rounds. 220 rounds. TBMO Carblns 75 rounds. 60 MM Mortar 96 rounds. 2000 rounds. LMO
;

o losses of ammunition by enemy aotion." The Ml9lB-A1 BAR was prefered over the A~2 because of It's lighter weight, ability to firs f.A. as well as F.A.^and the faot that the bypod and butt plats are of little use in jangle N
exoalllsntly.

offensive warfare.

The M-l rifle was vsry satisfactory and performed Ths 1919 A B.L.M.G. 4 s very satisfactory and

performed excellently.

"eflfyrWf fc^ft.'MikrAne. gtaldef

Speolal' potion

mpWitJICjrJLLwJ

Regiment (Provisional) Page 5.

The Model M-l Carbine when only slight amounts of sand or and the report la confusing beaause Japanese 6,5 or 20 caliber.
(2)

in the receiver, nf so much like the itNaounds

trouble fcavewould get

by Jamming

apllt their regular rn.r t \u25a0.:. in w't;; iH;ur.d Deader In -Large of one and assistant squad lcad^.* in c!i ,.? oT '.uc other. The econd teams Raider Battalion, divided *.]\u25a0 *>- or- o-. .nuo kr -^, Lhrcc with an M-l man for the loan.r <l t.n ?./u and 10.-U uen.
T;io division of the squad glveo the uutonnicic woapono better coi.^rol
in the Jungle.

ten man squad into two

OPERATIONAL FEATURES. The Third Re xCcr B^ .r.licr.

fly.

The rifle pltoone attached LMG'o with each squad with much better results than trir\*. r:f; them wo the firing l.'.ne after the fire fight had already befun.
\u25a0

The 60 MM Morttrp wero held in reserve und used only. They */.re n)* attached to squudo and v^ere not brought to the firing lir.i

during assaults

Outposts and t>at:c a cn:;uld be sent to er.ch b^.t front df.:iy.. a^ f-w out na four thou; -.v. yards. They should come bt.^k a e-o- "^-^vmlnrtd route i-nd ro-urn to the lines Just after dark. Tnia k>?opo the enemy from knowing exaotly where the front lines are.

tallon's

respective

When attacking the snipers should be completely forgotten about. Snipers don't ct-uae enough damage to afford starting unnecessary firing that often gets out of hand. Snipers oan be oleanod out later by ur.tl-.snipor patrols. When attacking ud^aoent units Bust tit all times maintain oontaot; the ener^v will always try to cut off a ooapany or uny small unit thut pushed ahead of the rest of lines. In any oase where a defense is set up, two or three man. foxhole s should be used and a watoh maintained at all times. There should be no firing at night. In oase of enemy infiltration firing will only cause oonfuslon. Knives and bayonets should be used exclusively.
[JIQIJE. WEAPON;

ape have a "do or die" spirit that makes It difficult to oapture personnel unless they are badly wounded. They congregate in groups *nd talk loudly when they are attempting to find & weak point in our lines. After we had set up permanent defense lines, the Japs came up close and constructed pill-boxes. Our patrols drove them out and destroyed their emplacements, only to find that they would return at night and rebuild them in th some area. They also sent out a large number of small patrols into tne area to the front ot our lines.

At night they will often send small patrols into our bivouao areas. These will not shoot, but use bayonets, and, if we start firing, they will throw hand grenades.

y^^B^Hftj^L^E^ _^L

\u25a0

T*V


Cupt.

istLt.
lstLt. lstLt. Robert U. Page Robert G. Willurd Karl Tanner John A. Sablnl Charles W. Flannery Anthony G. Yclanich Robert C. Loney John R. Leyden William I.Yount Ing-tiua J. Gorack Ralph Stephens Brian J. Quirk Bernard W. Somers Robers J. Henderson Benjamin D. Ferguson John C. Broderick John V. 3tuder Donald G. Probst Henry Gurke Stanley Dierker William D. Beasley James E. Rl&gel

2ndLt. ChWO
GySgt GySgt Pl3gt 3gt
Corp

Corp
Corp

Pfc

Pfc
Pfc Pfc Pfc Pfc Pfc

Pfc

Pvt

U. S. NAVY Lt(ChC) William H. MoCorkle USNR Lt(Jg)(ChC) Robert J. Cronin U3NR PhM3c Daniel Webster PhM3c William M. Gorman John G. Howard PhM3c Joseph R. Woolridge HA2c Grid coordinates given in this report refer to 2. IMAC Haty Terrain Map, BaJGAII4VILL t B. 3. 1., first end second editions, coole 1:20,000.

s/ Alan 3hapley ALAII3HAPLSY

tm

#
' * jitit %mU
(a)
Landing Team Number Ten. Third Marine Division, At Sea, Pacific.

OPERATIONS. ORDER)
NUMBER

37 Ootober, 1943.

1200

E-i^J
Map a:

References:

Army Air Forces Chart of Solomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:600,000 sheet 51. (b) Aruy j*i.r Forces Chart of 3olomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:250, QQ0 sheets 5, 6, 7, .md 8 (Third Edition) (o) Photo Mr.p of 3cloaon Islands,
(d)

t (o) (f)

Buupalnvill Island, scale 1:20,000 ahr.to 162, 163, 18&, 181, 200 (iMAC Haoty Torruin Mao a 162, 163, 180, 181, 200). Sketch, Appondix 1 to *nnex *\u25a0. Third Marine aegiosnt Operations Order Number iilZ^S,

Bougainville Island,* seals 1:20,000 sheets 152, 163, 180, 181, 200. Hasty Terrain Map, Solooon Islands,

1. (a)

ENEMY (1) flpound Forces i The nunber of troops la the Torofcina kr%a is not txaotly known easspt that tht arsa is llfhtli' AsfsMlsd (perhaps one Company) which is undoubtedly usoA to patrol ths bsaohos and man observe tion posts* (2) Capabilities: Unknown, oxcept that he oan re enforce at sin early date from any dlrsotion, in oludlng the aoa. He oan be expected to strike with as uuoh ulr power as available day and night after our landing. Bit ttxLrA Marias* Rstn/oves* wttJi ths Second Xaiar Astiasnt (lass MaatearWr* and three Companies of ths Third Haifa Battalion) attached. Ses sketch H:v>endix 1 to *mmx "A* ths Ninth

(b) OUR FORCES

Marines Roenforoel will land abrtaat and to the left of the Third Marlno 8. Landing Team Number Ten willland om Isaeh Oreen-2 at B-hour, D-day qn BougalnvUle Islcnd # dsatrsr Japaasss forces encountered and asla a toaah head 260 yards la dspth and secure that area for th* s^a#trtloo uf vital alUtajy intftallationk and protsot tho Divlsloa right (if) flank. \ 3. <a)
MOCaffery)

Marines.

and drive in rapidly and secure 1 it s initial objective. The Battalion will a&intcin contact to ths right with ths First Battalion, Th:M

and Beach

Yellow-1

Will land at H.h.)ur, IV^Ay rm

R*nnV, fl,

en- o

Maks active patrols inland beyond ths initial object itifor a distance of 1000 yards.

DECLASSIFIED


EjTfan .Mob* % JThird Marine NtiobeS? 'Tjiim
'&rfJumbejf 2w%*^. v.v .C ont'd
Third the Plva Trail
ZVj^ql

.v.

Pc pz7ep&^ mej|djreenf reenf

jrcements

to Company

"M",

on which willbe advancing al^n<j distance of about 1500 yards.

Be prepared -m order either to continue the advance to 0-2 within the sector now assigned; or to continue the advanco to 0-2 within the sector now assigned (3ee eketch, to the First Battalion, Third Marines. appendix 1. *nr-cx ".n'1 ).

(b) 3hore

Party (Connander Brockcnbrourh) willorganize,

coordinate and o^rr.tG a combined shore party, con sisting of a Headquarters, 3hore Platoon, 3ervlce Platoon, Ship Fla.;>Ji., Naval Platoon, and Boat Platoon. This shore party .-^ll service both Beach Green~2 and Beach Yell^w-1. ocparate dunps will be set up on ouch beach.

Detach units of shore },rty only upon completion of it's duties und when released by the Landing Team Commander. Have the units when released report to organizations as ilrected in paragraph 3(a) of Third Marine Regiment Operations Order Number 21-43.
Organite the various platoons of the shore party to
render lmmedi; te aosistance In defense at any time called u->on to do so. of the beach

(c)

Company M M" Third Raider Battalion (Captain Cunnlnp: Ham) unon landing on Beach Qreen~2 and Yellow-.l will assemble In the general vicinity of the beginning of the trail leading from Beach Yellow-1 inland. They willronaln clear of elements of the Second Raider Battalion und the 3hore Party.

Immediately upon

assembly they will receive verbal orders to advance alonfj this trail for a distance of about 1500 yards and establish a road bl icis. to dony the use of the Buretoni Mission-Plva Trail to the eneny. 3ce sketch, *o jendix 1, jtnnex "a m

(d)

Company. Second Raider Regiment (Lieutenant Lamb) upon lancllng will locate, establish and operate the CP, 3econd Raider Retfitfent, this CP to be in the vicinity of the New buildlnce in the vicinity of Buretoni Mission if practicable.

H&3

(x) Fox holes or/and shelters for protection from air attacks will be constructed at the earliest opportunity. Unit Coraaanders willparticularly concern theueelves with this matter. There willbe absolute black out during hours of

darkness.

Unit Commander will be responsible that troops n.^e cover quickly on condition Red and Just as guic '-;Cet back on the Job from thlfl cover on oMitlon Cre.n.
I-;1

H-hour will be about 0730. exact time to be later.

340

annjv.nc?-i

OECLASSSr !EO

#
Operations

rJC

Ordfr%rtilt*iJk4A. JUD-day is 1,

v*f-fj-|I

' cl '

UovemLe^j^l943.

Beach area under 3cc jnl Raider BattallJn Bn~4 viuurte re 4. master Clerk Davis on D-day. Major V/ade, occond Haider Re (;i:'e:it rU4 willbe in control after D-day. 3ce rtdr.ilnlstratlve Gr".er (Annex "B") to Third Marine Ro; derations Order 21--i3.

5. (a)
(t)

Party Beach Axle of conrauniea~.i.ri '1.33 CLTAL^-C? Sh Oreen-2 C? Secjn' Murl'.c Aalder Ro'lr.ient.

Refluent

Signal coi.-ununlout . .n: 3ee r.nex "C", Third Marine opera-ion 3 Or-iU Kun'.er 21-43. rtlan Shapley xL*rw. OiltxX'Lilsl Lieutenant Colonel, U, 3. Marine Corps
Co,.ir.ancllnc.

s/

K-3.

aUTHZNTICaTION: 8/ 0. F. Peatroee 0. F. ?EaTHOS3 Captain, U3MCR

CT Connandcr, 3d Marines (3)

DISTRIBUTION:

CO Z\ Raider 2atUllon

(10) CO Shore Party CO Co "h", 3d Raider En (2) CO H&3Co, 2d nailer Raft (4j
COPY

(20)

NOTE: CERTIFIED A TRUE: T3U

c/ 0. F.

PeatrDS

0. F. ?3*TRO--*3
R-3 CO?Y

COPY

3<+

BK S. f

|*Joj MARINE*
Froa:
To; Via;
Subject: -

REGIMENT (PROVISIONAL)

FIELD.

3 January, 1944,

The Commandin^%eneral, First Marine Amphibious G^ri^e. Tho Conuiandinij General, Third Marino Division.
1

Commandin*

Battle

reports.

Reference;
Enclosures;

(a) CG, IMaC, Secret Despatch 3022531. (a) Report of the Battle of Puruata Island
with overlay il.
(Bj Report of the Tattle of Plva Trail with

overlays #2 end #3, (C) Revert of the Settle overlays #4 and #5.

of ?lva Trail with

(a), Enclosures

1. In compliance with reference (a), (B) and (C) are hereby submitted.

"^r~-"~-

s/

Alan Shapley aLaN SHaPLEY.

\
Enclosure M 2.

3^

Regt (Prov)
i

Field.

3 January,

1944,

Report of the Battle of Purufla#eland. 0730. 1-11-43 thru 1530 2-11-43. 0730 f 1 Nov 43 Attached to the 9th Marines the 3d Bn Raiders landed at Beach Green (l) on Puruata Island vith "I" Co and ono Plat of "KM Co In assault. "M" Co landed on Beach Green (2) HL" Weapons Platoon, pnd 2d attached 2d Raider Regt. Marinee. Platoon of "X" Co used as chore parties. One Platoon of "X" Co In reserve.

Enoountcrod sporadic fire while were nerrlnp beachhead- two men were wounded. No rceletnnce rt beaoh, but net heavy resistance at West end of Island (eetlarted one Nip Platoon).
1

220.

Jap snipers (Approx o) r.nd knee mortare sone trouble on right flank.

- Reinforced right flrnk with reserve Platoon of *X" Co. - Attack halted, eetabllshed BHL about 125 Yds In from beach. 100Q - Begen 1330
3^oo Lrst
1150

(Approx 3 or 4) opuslnp

Dispatched "L" Co to Beech Blue

(l), attached

to 3d Mrrlnes.

attack on Jrp Doeitionr near village with two Platoons fi'oa "X" Co nnd two Hrlf Tracks. Advance about 75 Yds ur^er heavy fire. Received quite r few oasualitles md attack belted.

OP at Bouth East end of Islcnd, Patrol to South end of lelrnd reported contaot with eeverrJ. Jape. Eetfbliehed C.P. about 100 Yds in from beech at center of Island.

- Established

I^3J2

BHL. During night of 1 & 2 Nov. 43, killed several Jap snipers and riflemen who were attempting to lnfUitrate. Delayed occupation of Toroklna Island on D-Day due

to non-accountability
0810 2N0v45 Weapons Platoon began sweep of Island from the
South end, proceeded slowly, cleared South East end center of
Island of several snipers.
0830 "X" Co patrols on North Eaot end of lelnnd reported about twenty Jap bodies neor position ntttcked yesterday end alpo
cleared area of several snipers.
1220 Weapons Platoon mrde ccntcct with "X" Co et North East end
of Island, a fey cnipers reualncd In this area.

up perineter defenre of Island with "I" and "X" Co on

benoh and "X" Co In reserve. Tied In with rutomrtic weapone oi
3d Defense 3n on bench. Received eniper fire during the nlgnt.
Island wa definitely under Blue sor.trol with exception of one
or tvo enlpere vhldh were killed the next day.

- Dug in for night around -

of troops.

- Set 1530

Enemy killed Blue casualties

It is quite cortrin thr t chip borbp-rdnent before our lrnaJnp did

little or no dnnage to enemy personnel. They were well dug in

and euplrced.

Tactical conclucloib.

&4 KTA 5, VIA

32.

-1-

Enclosure

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#3.
Regt (Prov)

Field.
3 January, 1944,

Report of th 9 Nov. 1943.

1200, 7 Nov. 1943 to 1159,

1200 f 7 Nov. 1943 to 1159, ft Nov. 1943 At 1200, 7 Nov. 1943 the 2d Haider Bn. with "L" Conpcny end "M" Company, 3d Railur Bn, wae- holding the Road Block cm the Plva Trail, and In reserve (See overlay #1). for 3d Marines.

At thle time "H" Company wge sent from the reserve area X2QS. to relieve "F" Company, which had held the Road Block the previous night. There had been no enemy action during the day up to tnis tine. "H" Company had effected the relief of "F" Company and was H2Q In position when contact was jnt-.lp vlth Red forces estimated at one oompany. Thle contact THtr.ian&:ntitlZs. 2o-214. 26). The company commander "H" Company retiuaeted Clmm mortar support frora the 2d 3n. 9th Marines, who wort holding the front lines c.bout 300 yarde behind the Road Block.

14J&

"H" Company reported reci lvlng 81mm mortar support from the 2d Bn. 9th Marines which apparently e topped the Red attack.

iiftS.

One pletoon, "E" Company, In conrrnd of "E" Company exeoutive officer we to support MH"tfoaprny us p temporary expedient until "G" Company otuld be noved up. "H" Conp^ny connfnd er had requested thpt one oonv ny bceent forward to prevent enemy from enolrollng and cutting off "H" Comrjrny.

lEtQib

Troll to r eor of Road Block,

"0" Comprny noved fon'nrd

wae deployed ftlong the Plvn

XS&

2d Bn, 9th Marines reported thnt 40 rounds of 81nu Eneny forces continued cortar h> d been delivered re requested. to crrry out euell scale attacks on "H" and "0" Conpanies, but were repulsed.

- CO, -

1740 Red forces attempted to cut off Road Block, but were repulsed by "0" Coupnny. During the night Red forces attacked repeatedly with knee aortare, 90mn nortnro, nnd lnfnitrating groups. "HB p.nd "ft" Compnnlee Inflicted hervy cpsuolities on the eneuy by holding their fire until lnfnitrating Jrpe were ot
point

blank ronge/

Q7lO, 8 N,ov.

4q "H" Comprny reported thrt n patrol to thel.* front htd net the encay (135.20-214 25). "M" Conpony we ordered to relieve "0" Coupeny to the rerr of tho RB md "0 Conprny vr.e ordered to relieve "X" Cooprny r t the RB. Enery rction ntcetrsL?*-1 ed thrt "H" Conpeny reaain at the RB. rnd prtrole were o^ae^ea foi^wGrd frou "H" Company. The patrol went out 300 yrrds wi." n^ contact, but after starting to return to RB the eneay pper.iel ir ttM" Company had taken over "G" Conpnny p^ciMo: euall numbers. along the trail to rear of the RB md G" Conprny patrol rn<?

Blue cf*surlties

- - KIA 1,
'

345

one Pie toon moved forwd : ware employing automatic

,1046.

of the

trpll and The tnemy

iIQQ Enemy mortar ehelle fell on the RB in a heavy concentration. "E" Company moved from the reserve area ft 1110, pnd arrived at the RB at 1135. "E" Company wac deployed on the right side of the trail tying in with "G" Company's right md swinging to the rear to proteot the right flank. The combined front of "0" and "E" Companies wee about 400 Yds, astride the Piva Troil.
1200

*L Company was ordered forward from the reserve area, end was deployed on the left of the trail, tying in with "0" Company 1! "H" Company left flank and running parallel to the Pive Troll was deployed to the rear of "0" md " Companies on the right of the trail, giving additional protection on the right flrnk.

ojL-1843

1300 "F" Company was ordered forward and "E* Company begp.n a flanking attaok to flank the eneny on their left. They hit p large force of enemy after moving forward about 60 Yds, And inflicted very heavy casualties. The enemy began an rllout attaok at 1345, but were repulsed by "0" Company and "E" Company.

Blue machine guns and other automatic weapot inflicted heavy oaaualtles, in one case a machine gun mowed down 86 to 30 Jrps who charged down the trail.

I2Q

The battalion begem a withdrawal through the RB "0" Company moving beck first, then "E 9 Co, then "H" Co, then "L" Co. When the withdrawal was nearly completed the enemy attempted another BF" Co
attack, but were repulsed by "H", *L" end. "F" Companies. had previously been sent through the RB to cover the withdrawal.
The Sd Bn returned to the reserve area.

ifiifl

"L" and MM" Companies were detached from the 2d Bn md the Bn was relieved from the Road Block.
Blue casualties 8 killed, 27 wounded.
Red casualties 126 killed. Tr.ctioal conclusions.

--

It wae later learned that the Red foroe consisted of at least

a pp.rt of a battalion, and they were naking m "all out effcrt"
to break thru our lines. Vide flunking movements which would have
been practicable for both eie.es were denied due to the swampy
terrain en both flanks. However, the flnnkfeg attempts made by
at least two enemy platoons, first on me firrk then on the other
(see overlay) aotually resulted in straight frontel Pttpck by
the enemy since our own flanks were co well protected (i.e. full
ocmpntiy on each fl&nk). This recounted for the heavy enemy
casualties compared to our own. These attacks by the enemy were
very determined which forced him to expose troops

-2

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3 January 1944

0620 f 9 Nov 4fl Moved out from frivouec area in rear of 2d Rdr Bn bivourc (133.78-213.70) up Pivr TrPll with "L", "F", MS, end Weapons Company's In that order. "L" Co deployed on the left of trail in rear of "M" Co on road block (134.76-214.0). "F Co (24 Bn) deployed to right of trail behind prrt of "M" Co and "I" Co .on road block.

Jeps began from 0730 to 0800, heavy fire and made several attcck threats on our right flrnk At about 0800 which delayed one platoon of NFM Co pnd cause "F" Co to lose contaot with two platoons, contact was never effectively regained.

QZ2Q

- Artillery preparation

c- *V
-

Co jumped off on attack, pushing thru "M" Co lines, platoons of "Ifll Co went lntcty reserve behind NF N Co. The rlre fight wes very heavy and slnoo the Japs evidenced tarvy aotlvlty along rlmoet both Co fronts, it is estimated thrt there were at least two Jap Co's to our front, "M" and "I" Co'e sent out fl*nk patrols which oontroted nothing but one or two snipers, Weapons company in center in reserve.
Compf nies hrd advenoed only forty of fifty Yds above
QS3Q. Heavy fir fight with many
the road block at (154.76-SI4.00), Model 06 LMO's in evidence and eoae knee mortar hells lobbed
in, Japs screeching and Marines yelling beck.

"I" Co relieved \u25a0?\u25a0 Co who hfd trouble keeping contact

IQ2Q within the Co "I" Co reported start of Jap flanking movement
on our right. Sent Weapons Platoon to protect "I" Co flank.
Stopped Jap flanking movement. Continued heavy fire fight
with slow advance.
1130 Committed one Plate on of "M" Co to fillthe gap betveen
\u25a0I" and "L" Co, I end ?h* Ccmprniee mad oontaot ga.ln at
1215, Continued very slow advance.
Broke enemy resistance and began rapid advance. By 1500 122Q had advanced to trcll Junotion cf Pivr, Muma Huma Trails.

--

ifilfi Halted

advance having no enemy oontcot for rbcut seventy

minutes. Dug in for night at trril junotion in a diamond
At 1636 sent patrol tc Pivr, reported no enemy contaot.
defense. Patrol wr.s sent up the Numa Nvunr Trril rbrut 300 Yds, nn enemy
contact, but found large enemy esjpty bivouac area. Companies
petrolled to their fronts for abcut twohundred yards, without
nuking contact. "L" Co, at about 1720, reported seeing several Jape retreating rlong Numa Nuoa Trail*

-1

Enclouere

(C)

DECLKSS.7O 3^

No

1815

F.O. party fired roi9jHflPbarrage on three sides. enemy oontaot on night of Nov 97 1943. Casualties Red Blue

100 -

KIA 11, WIA 30, MIA 1

killed

Tactical oonolueione. The artillery barrage was very effective on rear area Red troops. The barrage was brought down to 250 yards of our Road Block, However the enemy hrd crept up to about 25 yards, of our front lines during the night. They kept quiet and hidden until the barrage lifted. Then when ye commenced the attack we were met by enemy automatic and rifle fire. They could have opened up prevous and during the attack ac there waa much moving ab^ut on our part getting into position for the Jump off. However, they held fire and suppressed us with so much fire on the Jump off as we did not expect them to be inside our barrage.
Being pinned down at the RB at the tine of the "Jump off" the undersigned had an excellent opportunity to watch our superior fire powee gradurlly take effect on the enemy fire power. They opened up with all they had in the way of small anas. We replied with all we had (each rifle squad has 3 BAR's and 7 Ml), After twenty minutes of this the enemy couldn't stand up under it and were forced to withdraw.

-2-

Enclosure (C)

DECLASCi.IED 3Se

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