Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-83882 January 24, 1989 IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent. Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner. Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner. Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5 Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988. Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988. In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO. The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of

Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12 Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988,13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15 Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989. Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced,

upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof

PADILLA, J.: The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution,

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of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed. While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered. The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the wellrecognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.

Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters. Considering the serious implications of deFilipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if thrown out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary proceedings. I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines. I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express

renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary nature. There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases. The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process. CRUZ, J., concurring I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not

Separate Opinions FERNAN, C.J., dissenting I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being

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shown that he comes under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship. Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer. CORTES, J., dissenting I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review. However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation. I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation. Separate Opinions FERNAN, C.J., dissenting I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they were offered. The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the wellrecognized principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.

As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship. Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government power find their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters. Considering the serious implications of deFilipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if throw out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary proceedings.

I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the Philippines. I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most summary nature. There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.

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The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process. CRUZ, J., concurring I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship. Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer. CORTES, J., dissenting I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial review. However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy

of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation. I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation. Footnotes 1 Petitioner, Rollo at 2. 2 Rollo at 24 & 29. 3 Resolution of 20 July 1988, Rollo at 47. 4 Rollo at 111. 5 Rollo at 127. 6 Rollo at 136. 7 Rollo at 141. 8 Rollo at 153. 9 Rollo at 136. 10 Rollo at 153. 11 Rollo at 175. 12 Rollo at 166.

13 Rollo at 144. 14 Rollo at 173. 15 Resolution of 15 December 1988. Rollo at 171. 16 Rollo at 187. 17 Compliance, par. 2. p. 5. 18 Rollo at 151. 19 Petitioner's oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. Exh. A, Compliance. Rollo at 200. 20 Rollo at 33. 21 25 SCRA 890. 22 In Oh Hek How vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 94, L-27429. August 27, 1969, Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion speaking for the Court, said: "Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certiorari is issued, the petitioner shall 'solemnly swear; inter alia, that he renounces 'absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate' and particularly to the state of which he is a 'subject or citizen. The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino

citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired." 23 A passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries (Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, 1986 Ed., p. 699). Conformably with the universal concept of a passport the Philippine Foreign Service Code, Section 136, provides that a Philippine passport is a document certifying to the Philippine citizenship of the holder in use for travel purposes.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on

December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not

violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.

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his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including governmentowned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee

received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4 On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy

or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives. This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6 On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows: WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001 SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

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III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8 Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11 It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the

two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14 In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But

petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the

Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18 Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.

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Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that: ... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal

partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. 21 It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies

even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained: [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

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Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. Puno J., on official leave. Footnotes 1. Rollo, pp. 43-47 2. Rollo, pp. 49-55 3. Exhibit F, Records, p. 38 4. Ibid 5. Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36 6. Exhibit E, Records, p. 37 7. Rollo, p. 55 8. Rollo, p. 18 9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993] 10. Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000 11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra 12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2)Their consent, freely given; (3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and xxx

(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides 14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx

children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. 14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: 14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law 17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233234 (1995) 18 Id., p. 234.18 19. Id., p. 230 20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971] 21. Id., p. 326 22. Supra 23. Supra

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character; xxx xxx

15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29 16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common

(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1 Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4 The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents. 1. Illegal solemnization of marriage Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994 JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents. Esteban R. Abonal for complainants. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages. Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so. Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the

couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present. 2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial

PER CURIAM, J.: Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

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fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference. Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report. Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for

notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same. 3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac. Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would

not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige. 4. Cash bond issued without a receipt It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac. Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor. Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court. 5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is

accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992. Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large. 6. Unlawful collection of docket fees Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account. Respondents Baroy contends that it was JudgeDesignate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

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On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof. xxx xxx xxx The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G). In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled

up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code. The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and

bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with. Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate. With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place

of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac. The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached. The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4a, K-4-b, K-4-c, K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.

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One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures. Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage. With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA). In their marriage contract which did not bear any date

either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo

did not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate. This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time? The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a

copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract. With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On crossexamination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their

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affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4). Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe. Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value. Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task

of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12; 2-1-94). This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code). The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been

to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53; 10-28-93). Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7). In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not

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charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal. The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned. The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register. Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his corespondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy. The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he

certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel." On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-2393). Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he

only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct. The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-2393). The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to

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the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits. For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fiftysix (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer. Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of

P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license. Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The

notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S). It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably. Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of

One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case. On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94). The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993

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respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7). Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the

Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts. The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet. The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of

Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness. The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27). With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon

received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier. Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex

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Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac. Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon. The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991

showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 03). Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano. The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving

this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same. The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy). Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.

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In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with. The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting

parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court

personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158). In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court

order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service. It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of

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Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter. Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a

clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service. xxx xxx xxx We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the

dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standardbearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8 The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government. The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on

respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., took no part. Bidin, J., is on leave.

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#Footnotes

1 Original Record, 1. 2 Ibid., 9 and 23. 3 Ibid., 86. 4 Ibid., 134. 5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 635. 6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994. 7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended. 8 Article 4, id. 9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act No. 3613.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

petition must be granted and the challenge abated. The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows: SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election. The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal

research fee as required by law. and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1 For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was fliedahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a preproclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and redocketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date. The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC. In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the

payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the firstmentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part: Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the tenday period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven

CRUZ, J.: The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this

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days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed. The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause. In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared: This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed. The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus: Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, theCommission may

refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon. This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of thequo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action. The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus: From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the

extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6 xxx While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending, we

apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states: ... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court. (p. 43) Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that: ... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76

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SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lwph1.t Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7 xxx Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8 This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for

stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office. We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says: In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9 This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case. Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11 The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official

verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian. The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980. On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows: I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct. STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976. B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country. C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen. E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.

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F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship: (i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or (ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES. (Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13 Sir: With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following information: 1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows: OATH OF ALLEGIANCE I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14 and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares: AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18 The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts. The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now. There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of

the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen." The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of

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Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: ... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.) That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his

present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows: Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect. The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26 Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case ofGeronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without

any dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court held: ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the

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sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien. Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office. WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED. Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring: As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989) and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important cities in the Philippines. What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty day from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement inFrivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.

Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because I am impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

a decision. Under Section 7, Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty day from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement inFrivaldo that my concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion. Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because I am impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio City, in the peace and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court. Footnotes 1 49 SCRA 562. SYCIP, SALAZAR 2 Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or suspend the proclamation. The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

Separate Opinions GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring: As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989) and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important cities in the Philippines. What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further proceedings and the rendition of

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3 Rule 44, See. 4. COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Effectivity. These Rules shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall take effect on the seventh day following its publication. Actually, the Rules became effective seven days after the official release of the Official Gazette dated June 27, 1988 on November 8, 1988. 4 146 SCRA 446. 5 G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989. 6 Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 616. See also Ortigas v. RUIZ, 148 SCRA 326; First Asian Transport and Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople 142 SCRA 542; Quisumbing v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 031 Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, 112 SCRA 629; Francisco v. City, of Davao, 12 SCRA 628. 7 Tejones v. Gironella 159 SCRA 100. 8 Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. CA, 157 SCRA 357. 9 Rollo, p. 159. 10 Ibid., pp. 182A-1 95. 11 Id., pp. 94-107.

12 Id. Emphasis supplied. 13 Id. Emphasis supplied. 14 Id. Emphasis supplied. 15 Id. Emphasis supplied. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 (i) Statement dated 25 November 1976 that he is an "Australian made before Det. Abaya. (ii) Statement affirming that he is an Australian citizen in the affidavit-complaint executed on 1 July 1988 and in the complaint filed on 13 January 1982 with the City, Court of Baguio: "... being an Australian citizen the subject of this complaint is one of which the Barangay Court cannot take cognizance of." 19 Soria v. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561; Sia Reyes v. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478. 20 Rollo, pp. 159-160. 21 Art. V, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.

22 137 SCRA 740. 23 Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring. 24 Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and MelencioHerrera, 25 Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ. 26 Fernando, C.J. 27 136 SCRA 435. 28 23 Phil. 238. 29 Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring. 30 Makasiar, J. 31 Aquino, J. 32 Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., C.J. 33 Except in times of war, under CA No. 63.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI,respondents. Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners. Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui. Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36). Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid). At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39). On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-

mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid). On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4). The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads: It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application

to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37). However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus: The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68) The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15). On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of

BIDIN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila. The undisputed facts are as follows:

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innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations. The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981. The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents. The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120). With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for

its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]). Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee,

43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]). So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra). The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]). Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of

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Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66). In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches

(Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]). Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]). In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now

resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners. Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. xxx xxx xxx It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title. Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents

discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes * Penned by Associate Justice Elias B. Asuncion, concurred by Sison, P.V. and Censon, JJ. ** Presided by Judge Serafin E. Camilon.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending. In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were

considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2 Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance. The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse presentmust institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.) There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or

ROMERO, J.:p The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has

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unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41." The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by : (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision

states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a

six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 7-8. 2 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v. Collado, A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30. 3 Rollo, p. 12. 4 Rollo, pp. 10-11. 5 Article 4, Family Code. 6 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263 citing Ubongan v. Mayor, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998 FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of

conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.5 On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9 Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties. We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversybefore the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from

BELLOSILLO, J.: FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina

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receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution. We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in

San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial

court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20 As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting onehalf (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur. Footnotes * The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedings before the lower courts. 1 No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355. 2 Id., p. 367. 3 Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same Code provided that the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. 4 Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC- Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15. 5 Art. 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to

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one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. 6 Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4. 7 Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such as widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their descendent, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. 8 Decision penned by Justice Pacita Caazares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39. 9 Id., p. 42. 10 Id., p. 180. 11 Rollo, p. 196. 12 CA Rollo, p. 29. 13 G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139. 14 CA Rollo, p. 30. 15 Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26. 16 Rollo, p. 206. 17 Brief of Oppositors-Appellant, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.

18 Brief of Appellee: Id., p. 17. 19 Rollo, pp. 225-226. 20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1979 Ed., Vol. III, p. 264. 21 Rollo, pp. 129-132. 22 Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

FIRST. His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition. SECOND. His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas, U.S.1wphi1.nt THIRD. His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival here in the Philippines. FOURTH. He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A." FIFTH. He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at petitioner's residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex "B." SIXTH. He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as Annex "C." SEVENTH. He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63

G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999 GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. EIGHT. He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of men's ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines. NINTH. It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen. 1

On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January 1997 2 which, along with the petition and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") on 10 May 1996. On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other things, that A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under R.A. 8171. 3 Concluding, the court ruled: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning. SO ORDERED. 4

VITUG, J.: The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Marikina City in Case No. N-9603-MK, entitled "in the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 965 and 263[0]." Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-9603-MK). In his petition, "applying for naturalization," he averred that

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After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz: After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order. Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality. SO ORDERED. 5 On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The motion was found to be well taken by

the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged: This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19, 1997. The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the DirectorGeneral of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the application; that if their applications are approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, affect which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship and the Commission of Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on

October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines. On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion. The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the same is therefore null and void. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its refiling before the Special Committee on Naturalization. SO ORDERED. 6 A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order asservating that since his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by

the President under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to take cognizance of the case. In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application. Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization 7 filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03 October 1996. The contention is not meritorious. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions of the law read: Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who

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have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for

repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated: This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied

repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist." The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her lawmaking powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not-repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once created to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. 11 Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; 12 hence, when petitioner filed

his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, 13 promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality 14 nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner. 15 It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630 17 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation. Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the

coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M) On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record

of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6 Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos. Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony. On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents onethird of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the

G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them. The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

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legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9 Hence, this petition. We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence. This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. 12 This presumption may be

rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to

exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18 The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro

matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.) Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides: Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child. Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

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Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available. What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found: Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date

(Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N4") read: Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigative body. Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1? A. Yes I know. Q. Why do you know him? A. I know because he is my nephew. Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant? A. Yes. Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him? A. Yes. We are close. Q. Why do you say you are close? A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to Balamban, Cebu.

xxx xxx xxx Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew? A. Because he is the son of my elder brother. This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr. 2 TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6. 3 TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.

4 TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 328. 5 TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 518. 6 TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13. 7 TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 420. 8 TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5. 9 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc). 10 Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903). 11 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2270. 12 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5(bb). 13 Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975). 14 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984). 15 Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows: Parcel No. 1 Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration. Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved. Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares. Parcel No. 2 A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters. Parcel No. 3 A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] PsdAlabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of

ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less. PARCEL No. 4 A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS. PARCEL No. 5 PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. PARCEL No. 6 PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment. We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages. The Facts The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3 During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by

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TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land. On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them. Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents. The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly. Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land. In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e)

sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman. On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pretrial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents. On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II. Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5 Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties. RTC and CA Dispositions On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion

for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: 1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license; 2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos; 3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid; 4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein; 5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to

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issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein; 6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void; 7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein; 8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein. Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. SO ORDERED.6 Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr. On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.7 The CA opined: We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law. We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the

marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied) Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the

absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit: "That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same." Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the

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same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits. If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such. Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,

insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8 On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions. Issues In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues: 1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise

decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; 2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments; 3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied) Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit: Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

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But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.: SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses. (2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied) Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied) By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15 Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated. To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied) Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and

protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16 II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied) Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or

intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied) The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law. The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-1110-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18 The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

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marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19 It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.: As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 0211-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied) Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.23 The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-ininterest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27 Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held: True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real partyin-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of

marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. xxxx In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29(Underscoring supplied) III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-ininterest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30 Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively. Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31 Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

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ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied) Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33 If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line. The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half

being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate. It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo. If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent. Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner. IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo. This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36 We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit: ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied) It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows: 1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos; 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action; 3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar. No costs. SO ORDERED. RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice

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WE CONCUR: Footnotes CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring.
1 2 11

annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. CA rollo, p. 61.

Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders. Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA 766, 772. (Note in the citation omitted.)
18 19

STRIA-MARTINEZ te Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

Civil Case No. 95-135. Rollo, pp. 49-51.

Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
12

Id. at 429-430.

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson

Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.

4 5

G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
13

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
20

Rollo, p. 55. CA rollo, pp. 48-49. Id. at 63. Id. at 60-63. Rollo, pp. 24-25.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.

14

SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
21

Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177, citing Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289, and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
15

Supra note 17.

Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.

22

Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.

10

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or

Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 529, andAncheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
16

Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
23

Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
17

See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No. 179474, March 28, 2008;Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446.
24

Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735, 746.
25

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Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
26

Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.

29

Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v. Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 47576; citing in turn University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. LigotTelan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra; Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
27

Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
30

Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different classes of illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them fall in the category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family Code:
31

Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec. 1; Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
28

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993 IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents. Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner. Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as "husband of the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing the latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was a "nullity for want of a marriage license". It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . . However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license. The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was valid. Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that

the marriage contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage license issued (Exh. "J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959. On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the

marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding years. Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased and oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of the National Archives & Records Section, testified that a copy of the marriage contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated on January 7, 1955, is on file with their office. Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spouses Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he attended to spirituality, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them socially. He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the couple were quite close with each other and with the people working in their business. Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified that she was aware of the marriage which took place between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the oppositor who has been successfully

DAVIDE, JR., J.: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana Geronimo. The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of Graciana Geronimo-Esman.

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supervising the lingerie business after the death of Graciana Geronimo. Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in charge of all accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities of the province of Rizal which include marriage licenses; and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9, 1953. Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified that in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no. 23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no column for the marriage license; that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that they have a copy of the questioned marriage contract in which the marriage license number is recorded; and that the records of 1959 were lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the archives section. Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the deceased to the public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3) 2 In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:

It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-markings). The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the petitionerappellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which requires that the marriage license number would (sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself. 3 Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the following question in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites license is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently present a question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that there was no marriage license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the public respondent found and ruled otherwise.

In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases on the rule of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated: Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must stand. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings of the

Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of endings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above exceptions. On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the mind of the petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged absence of a marriage license. Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the copies of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus: It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable

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forms of the Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95A) come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern. This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32) 5 At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the

marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes 1 Entitled "Ireneo Geronimo vs. Antonio Esman." Per Associate Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jaime M. Lantin; Rollo, 24-35. 2 Rollo, 25-27. 3 Id., 30. 4 204 SCRA 601, 608-609 [1991]. Footnotes citing cases are omitted. 5 Rollo, 32-33.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. "Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision. "SO ORDERED."

the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F). "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during

their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. "All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. "The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. "On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153). "Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. "At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,

G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000 BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: "It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at

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Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. "In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). "The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]

marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. "In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4] Hence, this Petition.[5]

declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows: "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. xxxxxxxxx

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues: "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests. In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have

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given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically

capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxxxxxxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10] The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of

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the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

(Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).

[2] [3] [4] [5]

CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39. CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33. CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism respondent; or homosexuality of the

This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6] [7] [8]

Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case. Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.

268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J. "Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[9]

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."

"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration."
[10] [11]

Supra, pp. 209-213.

240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.

[12] "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr.
[1]

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said: What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from

the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected? Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position. WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City. On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner. On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read: As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San

Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows: Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853 Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the

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thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727). WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy. We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vicemayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections. ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent

disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that [T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that: A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he: 1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and, 2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of ViceMayor of the City of Makati; C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati. We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed

by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted. I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention: Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's

rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

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Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the

substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship. This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8 Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office." To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our

Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance

of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10 . . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all. What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of FilipinoChinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the FilipinoChinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the

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People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council. When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources. Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places

in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest. And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW. In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11 . . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in

terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun YatSen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great

numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship? Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12 By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an

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individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13 SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship. On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position? SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world. SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen. SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship. SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic. SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification. This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held: [W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our

courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national. Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in

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any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority. In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath: 6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURALBORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN xxx xxx xxx 10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY. 12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17 It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively

give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long

before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age. Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,

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possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we

sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, GonzagaReyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., are on leave. Pardo, J., took no part.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2 Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4 On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the

respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7 On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A

motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14 On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15 On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

REGALADO, J.: An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

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We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case. Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so. To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the

prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22 In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

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In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ... It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in

the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ... Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ...25 Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards

declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce. Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein. WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring: It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege. In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

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In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege. In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved. In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or

prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue. Footnotes 1 Rollo, 5, 29. 2 Ibid., 6, 29. 3 Ibid., 7. 4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition. 5 Ibid., 7, 178. 6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id. 7 Ibid., 8-9, 178. 8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id. 9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id. 10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E1, id.

11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id. 12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id. 13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id. 14 Ibid, 105. 15 Ibid., 11. 16 Ibid., 311-313. 17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court. 18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988. 19 Valdepeas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980). 20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); DonioTeves, et al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984). 21 Rollo, 289. 22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.

Separate Opinions PARAS, J., concurring: It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute

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23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956). 24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985). 25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under Philippine law. 26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911). 27 Footnote 20, ante.

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