G.R. No. 96724 March 22, 1991 HONESTO GENERAL, petitioner, vs. HON.

GRADUACION REYES CLARAVALL, Judge, Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Br. 71, BENNETH THELMO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner. Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondent. RESOLUTION

NARVASA, J.:p Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rizal a sworn complaint accusing Honesto General and another person of libel, and alleged that by reason of the offense he (Thelmo) had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the total sum of P100 million. The information for libel subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting the damages due the offended party. At the trial, the defense raised the issue of nonpayment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection, by Order dated March 28, 1990. It also denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration and motion for suspension of proceedings, by another Order dated May 17, 1990. General and his co-accused are now before this Court applying for a writ of certiorari to annul the aforesaid Orders of the Trial Court on the theory that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The issue he poses is whether or not, in view of this Court's decision in three (3) cases 1) Manchester vs. C.A., 149 SCRA 562 (1987), 1 2) Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), 2 and 3) Tacay vs. RTC, 180 SCRA 433 (1989), 3 the rule should now be that the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course. Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims of damages must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court." Sun Insurance and Tacayaffirmed the validity of the basic principle but reduced its stringency somewhat by providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were not specified would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect was not necessarily fatal of irremediable as the plaintiff could on motion be granted a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the requisite filing fees, unless in the meantime the period of limitation of the right of action was completed. Now, at the time of the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, 4 read as follows: 5 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal

case is filed. In all other cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court. (1a) The rules set forth in the first paragraph are substantial reproductions of the corresponding sections of Rule 111 of the Rules of 1964. The second paragraph is new. It was incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in light of this Court's Resolution of September 13, 1984 in Adm. Matter No. 83-6-3890, 6 requiring increased court filing fees effective October 1, 1984, which resolution pertinently provides that: . . . When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in the Rules of Court and approved by the Court shall first be paid to the Clerk of the court where the criminal action is filed. . . . The purpose of the Resolution, according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, 7 was to discourage the "gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's office to include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees." This was the same consideration that underlay the Manchester ruling: the fraudulent practice, manifested by counsel in said ". . . of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint, . . . (an omission which was) clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee." 8 This Court however adopted further amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, with effect on October 1, 1988. 9 Among the provisions revised was Section 1, Rule 111. As thus amended, it now reads as follows: 10 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil action extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. (1a) The amendments were deliberated on and adopted by this Court after the Manchester doctrine had been enunciated. Yet observe that the last two (2) paragraphs prescribe a rule different from that in Manchester, and in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the 1985 Rules, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal had to be paid first to the Clerk of the court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard to whether the claim for such damages was set out in the information or not. Under the 1988 Rules, however, it is only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial." In any other casei.e., when the amount of damages other than actual is NOT alleged in the complaint or informationthe filing fees for the civil action "to enforce civil liability against 2

the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages . . . shall (merely) constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages." This Court's plain intentto make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or informationhas thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions. In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtbecause the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal actionthe rule is as follows: 1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;" 2) in any other case, howeveri.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages. WHEREFORE, there being no error in the challenged Orders of the respondent Court dated March 28, 1990 and May 17, 1990, these appearing on the contrary to be in accord with the law and the facts, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 102705 July 30, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOROTEO MEJORADA y SILLAN, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Leonardo D. Suario for accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., J.: On appeal is the 14 June 1991 decision 1 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 138 (88). The accused therein, now the appellant, was found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the "penalty of reclusion perpetua or imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law." Fortunately for the accused, however, the court a quo decided not to award damages to the offended party since there was "no showing that filing and other fees have been paid." It was on 11 October 1988 that the offended party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, filed a complaint against the accused with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. 2 The latter was subsequently arrested after the court conducted a preliminary examination. Finding that a prima facie case existed against him, the MTC transmitted the case records to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Sur 3 which, in turn, filed on 8 November 1988 with the RTC in Digos an Information charging the accused with the crime of rape committed as follows: That on or about October 7, 1988, in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused aforenamed, being then armed with a knife, and after having forcibly dragged or pushed said Elizabeth B. Regino from her house into a (sic) grassy ground, and by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge of said Elizabeth B. Regino, against her will; to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Law and with the aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed in disregard of the respect due the offended party, she being a school teacher. 4

No bail was recommended for the accused's temporary liberty. Trial on the merits ensued after the accused entered a not guilty plea during his arraignment on 12 December 1988. 5 Presented by the prosecution as its witnesses were Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, Lydia Duterte, Carlito Duterte, Vice Mayor Proceso Guido and Dr. Lydia Ozoa of the Davao Medical Center. Mrs. Regino and her husband, Eduardo, then testified as rebuttal witnesses. On the other hand, the defense called on the accused himself, his wife Nilda and his daughter Nancy. On 20 June 1991, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the inevitable conclusion of this Court that the accused Doroteo Mejorada is guilty of rape as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua or imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law. Since there is no showing that filing and other fees have been paid, there is no award for civil damages. The kitchen knife used in the rape is confiscated in favor of the State. The accused, however, is entitled to deduction in the number of days in the service of his prison terms (sic).
SO ORDERED. 6

The inculpatory facts, as established by the prosecution's evidence, are summarized by the trial court as follows: The prosecution's version may be narrated thus: Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, a public school teacher, then 25 years of age and married, worked as school (sic) teacher at Sta. Cruz

National High School, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, since 1986. She has been married for four years and has three children. In the evening of October 7, 1988, she was sleeping at their house together with Nancy Mejorada, the accused's daughter. Her husband at that time was attending the nightly prayer for his dead grandmother. Their three children were brought by her husband to the house of her mother-in-law, because she was making test questions in preparation for the third grading period. That was also the reason why she requested Nancy to accompany her because she was alone in their house. At about 11:40 in the evening, she noticed that somebody forcibly opened the door. The person came in and was moving around. Their house is only half finished. So, the door was only tied with a rope. Believing that the person who went inside was her husband, she stood up in order to switch on the light. Before she reached the light, she was hugged by the person and a knife was pressed on her face. The accused pressed her downward and forced her in going out of their house. She was brought at the back of their house, particularly at the grassy area. She was able to recognize the accused when he was hit by the light in the chapel. She recognized the knife for the reason that she used to borrow the same with (sic) her sister. When they were in the grassy area, she struggled more to completely recognize the person. She made a sudden glance by swerving her face towards the left and she recognized him to be the accused, Doroteo Mejorada. She pleaded not (sic) to harm her. The accused did not heed her pleas. He forcibly pushed her down and she was at the kneeling position with her two hands as a support to her body. The accused bent his body towards her. She struggled. The knife was touching her side. The accused kept on telling her not to shout or else he will kill her. She was at the kneeling position when the accused removed her underwear downward up to her knee. He (the accused) pushed her down. He succeeded. At that time the accused started to have sexual intercourse with her by trying to insert his penis in her organ. She felt that it has penetrated. After the accused satisfied his lust, he withdrew, stood up and left her, leaving words "ayaw tug-ani ang imong bana ha! Kon motug-an ka, patyon ta ka o kon dili ang imong bana akong patyon". (Don't tell your husband, otherwise, I'll kill you or I'll kill your husband). On October 9, 1988, she narrated the whole incident to Vice Mayor Guido in the presence of her husband. She did not reveal the whole incident to her husband in their house because she was afraid that her husband might lose his control and probably kill the accused. Vice Mayor Guido then summoned the accused. When the accused was already with them, and was informed about her complaint, the accused asked forgiveness and appealed for settlement. Vice-Mayor Guido prepared a written settlement. When the accused was about to sign, she shouted, because her conscience could not tolerate being abused by the accused. Vice-Mayor Guido then decided to bring his matter to the police station for the filing of the proper complaint, for the case cannot be settled. The accused was brought to the 46th IB's Station Commander. On October 10, 1988, she went to Dr. Lydia Ozoa for a medical examination. This was also corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Ozoa. A medical certificate was then issued portion (sic) of which are quoted herein below: (A) Physical Examinations: 1. Superficial, Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Right Ring Finger. Distal 3rd. 2. Superficial. Wound 0.25 cm. Proximal to Wound 1. 3. Superficial Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Left Thumb. 4. Superficial Wound 0.2 cm. at the Tip of left Middle Finger. 5. Superficial Wound 3 cm. Right Elbow. (B) Vulva: 1. Old Median Periveal Laceration. 2. Caruncles Noted on the Hymen. In toitus is Parons Cervic is close, Non-tender Uterus is small, anteverted. No Adnexal masser: Whitish discharges.

Sperm cell Determination: Presence of Sperm cells. The same was properly explained and illustrated by Dr. Ozoa and (sic) further identified her signature in the said medical certificate; She (Dr. Ozoa) asked the victim how she incurred these injuries and she informed her that she was raped and that she resisted. The testimony of the victim was also substantiated by Vice-Mayor Guido. The victim and her husband were in his house on October 9, 1988 at about 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning. The victim narrated to him the incident. Thinking that he could settle their conflict, being his neighbors, he requested the appearance of the accused Doroteo Mejorada. That was that time when the accused asked for forgiveness to (sic) the complainant, claiming that he was drunk during that incident.
Doroteo Duterte testified that on October 6, 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the accused borrowed his knife because according to him (accused), he will use the knife in butchering the pig. He identified the knife (Exh. "A") used by the accused in threatening the victim to be the same knife borrowed by the accused from him. 7

On the other hand, the accused's version of denial and alibi is condensed by the trial court in this wise: Against this evidence of the prosecution, the accused relied mainly on denial and alibi. He flatly rejected the complainant's allegations, claiming that on October 7, 1988 he was in the house of Carding Ayop, his companion, working in the Franklin Baker, to help in the preparation for the barrio fiesta in Astorga. At 10:45 in the evening of the same day, he went back to his house. He brought a little food for his family. After eating, he had a conversation with his wife. He slept together with his wife. The wife of the accused also corroborated his testimony. Same is true with Nancy Mejorada, the daughter of the accused. She declared that his (sic) father at that evening was in the house of Carding Ayop. She was told by her mother to accompany Elizabeth in their house. When she was in the house of Elizabeth, they had a conversation particularly on the fact that Elizabeth's husband left their conjugal home. At about midnight, when she was about to sleep, she noticed that Elizabeth rose from their bed and went out. Thinking that Elizabeth will just urinate outside, she continued sleeping. After few (sic) minutes or an hour, Elizabeth woke her up and told her that she will accompany her to the place where the vigil was being conducted. She was then requested to get a glass of water. After drinking, they proceeded to the place of the vigil. On cross, she further testified that she did not notice of any wound on Elizabeth's hand's nor any dirt of (sic) her duster.
The defense (sic) version was belied by the complainant and her husband Eduardo on rebuttal. 8

We find both summaries to be accurate and fully supported by the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the witnesses' testimonies. The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly to the declarations of the offended party; it concluded that Mrs. Regino harbored no ill-motives to falsely charge the accused with the commission of rape. Moreover, the court found it difficult to believe that Mrs. Regino, a married woman, would tell her husband that she had been raped by another married man, a neighbor at that, if there was no truth to it. It rejected the accused's claim of denial and alibi in view of his having been positively identified. Immediately after the promulgation of sentence, the accused filed a Notice of Appeal 9 which was given due course by the RTC on the same date. 10 In the Appellant's Brief 11 filed on 21 September 1992, the accused assigns this single error: THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE. and, in support thereof, alleges that he is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt because the prosecution's evidence is not clear and convincing while Mrs. Regino's testimony is "too incredible," "unnatural" and contrary to "common experience," and contains "deliberate and studied perjury" signifying falsehood. The accused then cites the incredible and improbable declarations of the offended party together with the reasons for such a characterization: (a) Mrs. Regino failed to attend the final night's prayer for her husband's deceased grandmother which would have ended, as it usually does, at 9:00 o'clock because she

had to finish preparing 400 test questions for the third grading period in school; in fact, she even requested her husband to bring their children, including their two-month old baby, to her mother-in-law; and yet, Mrs. Regino went to sleep at 10:00 o'clock that same evening; (b) the accused entered her house to rape her knowing fully well that his twelve-year old daughter, Nancy Mejorada, was also there; the accused was supposed to have even struggled with the offended party in the very room where Nancy was sleeping; (c) she said that she thought it was her husband who entered the house that night; however, she also knew that the latter would be staying in the wake of his late grandmother; it also seems that forcing the door open was not her husband's way of entering their house; she likewise revealed that after discovering that the person who entered was not her husband, she did not shout for help; (d) the accused was wearing only a pair of briefs despite the fact that the place of the incident was surrounded by houses and had adequate lighting; moreover, employees of the Franklin Baker Company were reporting for duty at midnight; (e) she did not even tell Nancy Mejorada about the rape upon returning to the house; nor did she inform her husband later on that evening when she went to his grandmother's house and played "solitaire"; and (f) she said that she was bending over, with her hands supporting her body and her face looking downward, as she was being supposedly raped by the accused; despite such a position, she was unable to break free from him. Insisting that his account is more credible, the accused conjures up a tale of infidelity on the part of Mrs. Regino. He claims that the latter was having an illicit affair with another man at the time of the incident. In fact, he avers that the stepped out of her house on the night in question to meet with the said man. Accused further states that he was framed by this man who is very powerful; that in the evening of 7 October 1988, Mrs. Regino deliberately avoided going to the wake of her husband's grandmother and even asked her husband to bring the children with him because she was going to have a tryst with her paramour; and that in order to avoid suspicion, she requested Nancy's mother to allow Nancy to accompany her. The Appellee refutes the accused's contentions, explains the alleged improbable portions of the offended party's testimony and urges us to affirm the accused's conviction for rape, with the modification that moral damages be awarded in favor of the offended party despite the non-payment of filing and other fees. The appeal is devoid of merit. At the core of the controversy is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. On such point, the trial court had this to say: In the case at bar, the complainant's version is not bare. It is supported with (sic) witnesses, especially that of Dr. Lydia Ozoa, who found several wounds and the presence of sperm cells. Besides, the weapon used in the intimidation was produced . . . .
These evidences and the natural and straightforward testimony of the victim alone would be too difficult to ignore. It was clear and free from any serious contradiction. It was ringing throughout with the bell of truth and it bears with (sic) the stamp of absolute candor. Underiably, it was impeccable. Her mistakes are signs of a story that is free from rehearsals. 12

It is settled that appellate courts will generally respect the findings of the trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since the latter are in a better position to weigh the conflicting testimonies, having heard such witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 13We find no reason to depart from this salutary rule as a careful examination of the records in this case reveals that the findings of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence. Be that as it may, we shall meet the points raised by the accused head-on. We find to be neither incredible nor improbable the portions of the offended party's testimony which are assailed by the accused. Mrs. Regino's decision to stay home on the night of 7 October 1988 was satisfactorily explained by her. She had just reported back to her teaching post at the Sta. Cruz National High School after taking a maternity leave. As she was under pressure to catch up with her work in school, particularly in her preparation of the test questions for the grading period, she returned even before her 60-day leave period expired. Her staying home and failing to attend the wake of her husband's grandmother was prompted by nothing more than her desire to finish the 400 test questions which she had to submit to her school principal the following day. 14 Such behavior should therefore be seen as a measure of her dedication and devotion to duty as a public school teacher. It is to be noted that the accused failed to present the principal, Mrs. Lourdes Bendigo, to rebut Mrs. Regino's claim regarding the test questions to be submitted for checking, despite his counsel's manifestation that she would be so summoned to testify. 15 Furthermore, the accused's own daughter, Nancy, declared that she saw the test questions in the house of Mrs. Regino 16 that night, thereby confirming the latter's testimony.

The accused's contention that he would not have been so minded to enter the offended party's house with rape in his heart because he knew that his daughter Nancy was there, had in fact been rendered academic by his own admission, during the confrontation at Vice Mayor Guido's house, that he committed the acts attributed to him; in fact, he even asked for forgiveness from Mrs. Regino. 17 Besides, no evidence was presented to show that the accused knew or was informed that his daughter was to sleep with Mrs. Regino that night. It is to be remembered that permission on Nancy's behalf was sought from her mother, and not from the accused who was then in barangay Astorga. And even if the accused was aware of such an arrangement, it would not have really mattered as the presence of close relatives has not deterred men who have descended to the level of beasts and forsaken the highest and noblest in their humanity. Indeed, we have affirmed many a conviction involving men charged with raping their own flesh and blood. Nor would it have been improbable for the accused to have been wearing only a pair of briefs at the time of the rape because, as he claims, the place of the incident was well-lit and surrounded by houses, and there were employees of the Franklin Baker Company reporting for duty at midnight. In the first place, the accused admitted that he was drunk. As the Appellee correctly noted, a person who is drunk would be capable of doing things he would not normally do if he were sober. Secondly, the accused's house is only 5-7 meters away from the house of the Reginos. Moreover, it was not proven that he had walked to the latter's house with only his briefs on. Hence, it could very well be that the accused removed his trousers just before entering Mrs. Regino's room. Lastly, the accused failed to present any witness to testify that at the time of the incident, employees of the Franklin Baker Company were indeed reporting for work. Mrs. Regino's initial presumption that the person who entered their house that night was her husband should not be doubted. As was convincingly explained in the Appellee's Brief, her husband could have simply forgotten something that he needed for the wake. Besides, the wake was held in a house just 100 to 110 meters away. 18 It was because of this initial belief that she did not immediately shout when the accused hugged her from behind. By the time she realized that it was the accused who was behind her, however, she was already being tightly held by him and threatened with the knife he was poking at her face. Being thus effectively intimidated and overwhelmed, she could not be expected to shout. If Mrs. Regino failed to scream, it was precisely because she feared for her life. Under such circumstances, her failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make her submission to the criminal acts of the accused voluntary, since there existed a continuing intimidation which cowed her and made her realize that crying out for help or offering a spirited resistance would prove futile. It would likewise be "demanding too much from an ordinary mortal placed under such a stressful psychological and emotional situation to require that she shout or ward off the impending evil." 19 Mrs. Regino also satisfactorily explained her failure to immediately inform both her husband and Nancy Mejorada about the rape. The former had, at that time, already positively identified the malefactor Nancy's own father and was thus understandably reluctant to disclose such a serious and delicate matter to the young girl. Mrs. Regino likewise declared that her immediate concern then was to leave the house as soon as possible because of the accused's threats of death and the fear that he might come back. 20 Furthermore, when she and Nancy arrived at the house of her husband's grandmother, her husband had just gone to sleep, and so she decided to wait until he woke up. In the meantime, however, she played solitaire by herself to give an appearance of normalcy because, in her own words, "there were many people" and she was ashamed to reveal the rape at that time. She added that as a teacher, she would be "put into shame." 21 When her husband finally woke up, she merely told him that somebody had entered their house. She revealed neither the rape nor the malefactor's identity for fear that her husband "might lose his control and might kill" the accused. She said that she did not want to be involved in two cases. 22 On re-direct examination, Mrs. Regino further explained her decision not to divulge everything to her husband immediately and reveal instead the rape during the meeting at Vice Mayor Guido's residence, thus: Atty. Almazan (continuing): Q [w]hy did you not at first tell the whole incident to your husband? A [i] did not tell/reveal to him completely because of some reasons. [f]irst, [i] am afraid he might not believe me. [s]econd, [i] am afraid he might entertain doubts on his mind that the incident was voluntary on my part. [t]hird, [i] was afraid of his (accused) threat that he will kill my husband, me, and my family, and [i] am afraid to tell the whole story because of Sta. Cruz will know and it is shameful on my part as teacher (sic). Q [w]hy did you decide to reveal the entire incident in the house of Vice Mayor Guido?

A [i] revealed it completely to him, ma'am, because [i) could not tolerate that [i] will hide something to (sic) my husband especially that [i] was sexually abused.

23

Mrs. Regino's initial fears are not only consistent with the Filipina's traditional modesty and aversion for airing matters affecting their honor to the point that some would rather suffer in silence than admit the dishonor they are also well-founded in view of the accused's death threats. Having been amply explained, the lapse of one and a half days from the time the rape was consummated until it was finally revealed and reported to the authorities, is no longer significant. Delay in reporting the rape due to death threats is justified, 24 especially in this case where the malefactor is the offended party's neighbor. We have also ruled that a delay of three days before complaining to the authorities due to embarrassment is justified, 25and that a lapse of thirty-five days before the victim finally reported the sexual abuse done to her is not considered unreasonably long as to render the victim's testimony doubtful, if the same is fully explained and is due to a fear of the malefactor or the shame and dishonor that would follow its disclosure. 26 Accused's contention that rape is not possible or could not have been consummated in the manner described by Mrs. Regino, that is, in a "dog-style" position, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Appellee, this Court, in People vs. Saylan, 27 sustained a conviction for rape where the accused used not only the "missionary position,i.e., male superior, female inferior, but also "[T]he same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind." In the case at bar, Mrs. Regino even asked if she could demonstrate in open court, during cross-examination, how the accused accomplished the sexual act, including the positioning of his hands. The defense counsel, however, denied the request. 28 The case of People v. Bania, 29 which was cited by the accused, is not applicable since the position of the offended party therein was different; the latter was lying on her back with her panty rolled down to her knees. We declared in Bania that rape could not have been committed because the accused therein was clutching a knife on one hand and was holding the offended party's hands with the other. The "other man" theory presented by the accused is nothing but a malicious imputation resorted to in a final attempt to create doubt on the prosecution's version. We find it highly improbable that the offended party, a public school teacher whose good reputation remains unsullied and who had just given birth to her third child, would carry on an immoral and illicit relationship with another man whose identity was never even revealed by the accused. The alleged liaison is pure concoction as no evidence in support thereof was offered. Moreover, defense witness Nancy Mejorada never mentioned during her testimony that she saw the offended party meet anyone on the night of 7 October 1988. Further reinforcing our belief in Mrs. Regino's story is the fact that she is a married public high school teacher with three young children. Absent a most compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable that she would allow the examination of her private part, subject herself to the ordeal of a public trial, risk receiving the stigma and social humiliation which accompany an admission of having been raped or openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which could very well send a man her neighbor, no less to jail. 30 The accused miserably failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of Mrs. Regino. The court a quo correctly rejected the accused's claim of alibi. For this defense to have prospered, the latter should have proven that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. 31 The accused admitted that he had gotten back from Astorga and was already in his house at around 10:45 p.m. in the evening of 7 October 1988 when the rape was committed. It bears stressing that his house is just 5 to 7 meters away from the house of the Reginos. Furthermore, he was positively identified by Mrs. Regino, first inside the house when his face was illuminated by the light coming from the chapel near her house, and then at the grassy area behind her house when she suddenly swerved to the left to look at her assailant's face. 32 Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. 33 It cannot likewise be doubted that in the commission of the rape, the accused used a deadly weapon a circumstance which, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, raises the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death. As indisputably shown by the evidence, the rape was consummated at the grassy portion behind the house of the Reginos. It was here that Mrs. Regino was, through threats and intimidation, forcibly dragged against her will by the accused. That the latter was moved by lewd designs is beyond doubt as he was wearing only his briefs at the time and did, in fact, eventually consummate the crime of rape against Mrs. Regino. While it may appear that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, was also committed, we are not about to convict the accused for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. First of all, although the information sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of Mrs. Regino to the grassy ground, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." Secondly, it appears that the accused's real intention

was to rape Mrs. Regino in her room but that since his daughter was in the same room as she, he decided to forcibly drag her instead to the rear of the house. Given such circumstances, the incidental forcible abduction was absorbed in the crime of rape. We have held that rape may absorb forcible abduction if the main objective was to rape the victim. 34 The trial court should have, however, appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and ignominy 35 which, though not alleged in the information, were duly proven without objection on the part of the accused. At twenty minutes to midnight, the latter unleashed the fury of his criminal mind on a sleeping victim. He defiled the sanctity of Mrs. Regino's home by forcibly opening its door. Wanting to force upon her his evil desires, he hugged her and then pressed a knife to her face without any provocation on her part. He thereupon had sexual intercourse with her in a "dog-style" position. While such a position has been resorted to by consenting adults, it adds ignominy when employed in rape cases. 36 Such aggravating circumstances would have justified the imposition of the greater penalty of death pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering, however, that the Constitution prohibits its imposition, 37 the appropriate imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua, which the trial court correctly imposed, although it sought to define the same as "imprisonment for life." The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not, of course, similar to or synonymous with "life imprisonment." As this Court has repeatedly ruled in many cases, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous but distinct in nature, duration and accessory penalties. 38 However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in not awarding civil damages to Mrs. Regino for the alleged lack of payment of filing and other fees. There can be no question that rape necessarily entitles the victim to moral damages as a result of the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation 39 that accompany the crime. In fact, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of, inter alia, rape. The non-payment of the filing and other fees should not have barred the trial court from awarding damages. InGeneral vs. Claravall, 40 this Court, in clarifying further the issue of filing fees for the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case, ruled that: In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action the rule is as follows: 1) when "the amount of damages other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;" 2) in any other case, however i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages." Conformably with the current policy of this Court, we hereby award Mrs. Regino moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. 41 Considering further the perversity with which the accused committed the crime particularly by his having violated the sanctity of her home and grievously defiled the institution of marriage by raping a married school teacher the imposition of exemplary damages by way of example, i.e., to deter others from committing similar acts, or correction for the public good, 42 herein fixed at P25,000.00, is in order. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, subject to the modification above indicated, the appealed decision of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 138 (88). As modified, the accused is further ordered to pay the offended party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, the sums of P50,000.00 in concept of moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 85464 October 3, 1991 DAVID P. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Padilla Law Office for petitioner. SAMIENTO, J.:p The petitioner questions the Decision of the Sandiganbayan * holding him civilly liable in spite of an acquittal. The facts are not disputed: Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation (Sec. 1, PD 1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he resigned. He occupied the positions of Assistant Corporate Secretary for a year, then Corporate Legal Counsel until November 2, 1981, and, finally, Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, Finance Services, Legal Affairs Departments. ... As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned effective October 31, 1981. Among them were Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier (TSN, Oct. 22/87, p. 2; Exhs. M-2, N-1, and O-1). They were all required to apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits (Exhs. C, M-2, N-1, and 0-1). Condition (a) of the clearance provided: The clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers concemed only when there is no item appearing under "PENDING ACCOUNTABILITY" or after every item previously entered thereunder is fully settled. Settlement thereof shall be written in RED ink. (Exhs. D or D-1 and 1-B) After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was to be approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file employee, or by Col. Duefias, the acting administrator, in the case of an officer, and then by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor ... Notwithstanding Condition (a) just quoted, the clearances of Mrs Perez and Mr. Azucena both dated October 30, 1981, were favorably acted upon by the CPA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, acting for the accounting division, even if the clearances showed they had pending accountabilities to the GSIS and the UCPB, and subsequently approved by Attys. Llorente and Rodriguez (Exhs. M and N). Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity benefits, also indicating their outstanding obligations were approved, among others, by Atty Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them after deducting those accountabilities. ... The clearanceof Mrs. Javier of the same date of October 30, 1991 was also signed by all PCA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto even though the former had unsettled obligations noted thereon, viz'SIS loan P5,387.00 and UCPB car loan P19,705.00, or a total of P25,092.00, and later on approveed by Col. Dueas, Mrs Javier being an officer, and Atty. Rodriguez "Exh. (O)". Similariv the, voucher of Mrs Javier for her gratuity benefits likewise recited her accountabilities of P25,092.00 plus P92.000.00, which was handwritten. Both accounts were deducted from her gratuity benefits, and the balance released to her on November 16, 1981. The voucher passed post-audit by Atty. Rodriguez on December 1, 1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-3). The said P92,000.00 was the disallowed portion of the cash advances received by Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as "super cargo" in the distribution of seed nuts throughout the country. He received them through and in the name of Mrs. Javier from the UCPB. When the amount was disallowed, the UCPB withheld from the PCA certain receivables; the latter, in turn, deducted the same amount from the gratuity benefits of Mrs. Javier, she being primarily liable therefor (Exhs, L, L-1, L-2, and L-3), At the time of the deduction, the additional liquidation papers had already been submitted and were in process. Just in case she would not be successful in having the entire amount wiped out, she requested Mr. Curio, who admittedly received it, to execute, as he did, an affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which he assumed whatever portion thereof might not be allowed ...

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The clearance of Mr. Curio dated November 4,1981, (Exh. D or D-1) likewise favorably passed all officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, the latter signing despite the notation handwritten on December 8, 1981, that Mr. Curio had pending accountabilities, namely: GSIS loan 2,193.74, 201 accounts receivable P3,897.75, and UCPB loan P3,623.49, or a total of P10,714.78. However, when the clearance was submitted to Atty. Llorente for approval, he refused to approve it. For this reason, the clearance was held up in his office and did not reach Atty. Rodriguez, ... The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was presented to him on December 8, 1981, he was already aware of the affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curio assumed to pay any residual liability for the disallowed cash advances, which at the time, December 8, 1981, stood at P92,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). Moreover, Mr. Curio had other pending obligations noted on his clearance totalling Pl0,714.98 (Exh. 1-a). To justify his stand, Atty. Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the clearance (Exhs. D and I-B), which, he said, was "very stringent" and could not be interpreted in any other way ... On December 1, 1982, Mr. Curio brought the matter of his unapproved clearance to Col. Dueas (Exh. G), who referred it to the Legal Department, which was under Atty. Llorente as Deputy Administrator for legal affairs. After follow-up in that department, Mr. Curio received the answer of Col. Dueas dated February 11, 1983, saying that the clearance was being withheld until the former settled his alleged accountability for P92,000.00 reduced already to P56,000.00 (Exh. I). Mr. Curio elevated the matter to the Chairman of the PCA Board, who indorsed it to Col. Dueas, who, in turn, sent it to the Legal Department. This time the latter, through its Manager, Manuel F. Pastor, Jr., first cousin of Atty. Llorente, submitted a formal report under date of August 14, 1986, to the PCA Chairman, justifying the action taken by Atty. Llorente and Col. Dueas (Exh. 12). The PCA Chairman did not respond in writing, but advised Mr. Curio to wait for the resolution of the Tanodbayan with which he (Mr. Curio) had filed this case initially against Atty. Llorente and, later on, against Col. Duerias also. On August 31, 1986, Atty. Llorente resigned from the PCA; the clearance, however, could not be issued because, according to the PCA Corporate Legal Counsel, Arthur J. Liquate, the PCA did not want to preempt the Tanodbayan. On November 12, 1986, the latter decided to institlite this case in court ... Nine days thereafter, or on November 21, 1986, Mr. Curio accomplished another clearance, which no longer imposed Condition (a) of his earlier clearance (Exh. E). The new clearance was approved, even if he still had pending accountabilities, totalling P10,714.78 that had remained unsettled since December 1981. His voucher was also approved, and his gratuity benefits paid to him in the middle of December 1986, after deducting those obligations (Exh. F). Nothing was mentioned anymore about the disallowed cash advances of P92,000.00, which had been reduced to P55,000.00 ...
Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to get gainful employment; as a result, his family literally went hungry, In 1981, he applied for work with the Philippine Cotton Authority, but was refused, because he could not present his PCA clearance. The same thing happened when he sought employment with the Philippine Fish Marketing Administration in January 1982. In both prospective employers, the item applied for was P2,500.00 a month. At that time, he was only about 45 years old and still competitive in the job market. But in 1986, being already past 50 years, he could no longer be hired permanently, there being a regulation to that effect. His present employment with the Philippine Ports Authority, which started on March 16, 1987, was casual for that reason. Had his gratuity benefits been paid in 1981, he would have received a bigger amount, considering that since then interest had accrued and the foreign exchange rate of the peso to the dollar had gone up ... 1

On December 10, 1986, an Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against the petitioner: That on or about December 8, 1981 and/or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused David Pastor Llorente, Deputy Administrator for the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and as such was empowered among others to approve clearances of employees thereat, taking advantage of his position, through evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully refuse to issue a certificate of clearance to Herminigildo M. Curio, an employee thereat, who was forced to resign as a result of the abolition of his item pursuant to the 1981 reorganization of the PCA, resulting in his deprivation to receive his gratuity benefits amounting to P29,854.90, and to secure employment with other offices to his damage and prejudice, and that of the public service.

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CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, December 10, 1986. 2

As indicated at the outset, the Sandiganbayan acquitted the petitioner in the absence of any evidence that he acted in bad faith. 3 The Sandiganbayan cited three considerations that precluded bad faith: First, when Atty. Llorente withheld favorable action on the clearance on and after December 8, 1981, there was still the possibility, remote though it was when viewed after the fact, that the accountability, which Mrs. Javier was primarily liable therefor and which was fully settled by deduction from her gratuity benefits on November 16, 1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-3), would be reinstated and charged directly to Mr. Curio, for the latter executed on November 26, 1981, an affidavit assuming responsibility for the obligation to the extent of the amount finally disallowed, and the affidavit was on December 8, 1981, already pending consideration by the PCA management (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). Second, Atty. Llorente was appointed Deputy Administrator for administrative services, finance services, and legal affairs departments only on November 2,1981 (TSN, March 9/87, p. 3). Being new in his job, it was but natural that he was zealous in the performance of his functions in fact, overzealous in the protection of the PCA interests, even if that protection was not necessary, as the P92,000.00 accountability had already been paid (See Exh. 12, 4th paragraph). Finally, Atty. Llorente was officiously, though incidentally, taking care also of the interest of Mrs. Javier who, justice and equity demanded, should not be made to shoulder the P92,000.00 unliquidated cash advances, for the reason that it was Mr. Curio who admittedly spent them or who, at the very least, should be able to get reimbursement of what she paid, totally or partially, from his gratuity benefits (See Exh. 5, pp. 2-3 ). 4 The Sandiganbayan, as we also indicated earlier, took the petitioner to task civilly, and ordered him to pay "compensatory damages" in the sum of P90,000.00. According to the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was guilty nonetheless of abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code and as a public officer, he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved party (under Article 27). The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan's Decision is erroneous even if the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith as indeed found by the Sandiganbayan. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending Rules 110 through 127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court shall include, in case of acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, "a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party." 5 The rule is based on the provisions of substantive law, 6 that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action, lies nonetheless. The challenged judgment found that the petitioner, in refusing to issue a certificate of clearance in favor of the private offended party, Herminigildo Curio, did not act with "evident bad faith," one of the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3819. 7 We agree with tile judgment, insofar as it found lack of evident bad faith by the petitioner, for the reasons cited therein basicallv, because the petitioner was acting within the bounds of law in refusing to clear Curio although "[t]he practice was that the clearance was nevertheless approved, and then the amount of the unsettled obligation was deducted from the gratuity benefits of the employee." 8 We also agree with the Sandiganbaya (although the Sandiganbayan did not say it) that although the petitioner did not act with evident bad faith, he acted with bad faith nevertheless, for which he should respond for damages. The records show that the office practice indeed in the Philippine Coconut Authority was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate about the existence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared three employees on the condition that their obligations should be deducted from their benefits. 9 We quote: Confronted with these evidence (sic), Atty. Llorente conceded, albeit grudgingly, the existence of the practice by the accounting division of not complying with Condition (a). He, however, claimed that he learned of the practice only during the trial of the case and that he must have inadvertently approved the clearances of Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and possibly others who were similarly situated (TSN, March 9/88,pp. 4-5). This the evidence belies. First, 13

he himself testified that when the clearance of Mr. Curio was presented to him in December 1981, it already bore the signature of Mrs. Sotto of the accounting division and the notation set opposite her name about the outstanding accountabilities of Mr. Curio; but he (Atty. Llorente) significantly did not ask her why she signed the clearance (TSN, Nov. 24/87, pp. 24-25). Second, in that month, Atty. Llorente approved Mrs. Perez's and Mr. Azucena's vouchers showing that hey has pending obligations to the GSIS and the UCPB, which were being deducted from their gratuity benefits. Attached to those vouchers were the clearances as supporting documents (Exhs. M-2 and N-1; TSN, Dec. 7/87, pp. 13,23). And third, in the same month, Atty. Llorente was already aware of the cae of Mrs. Javier whose clearance and voucher were, according to him, preciselywithheld because of her unsettled accountability for the cash advances of P92,000.00, but here later on given due course; and her gratuity benefits released on November 16, 1981, minus that amount (TSN, Nov. 24/87, pp. 31-32; Exhs. L, L-1, L-2 and L-3).
The cash advances of P92,000.00 were the primary obligation of Mrs. Javier, since they were secured through her and in her name from the UCPB. That was why they were charged to and deducted from, her gratuity benefits. Consequently, as early as that date and in so far as the PCA and the UCPB were concerned, the accountability was already fully paid. The assumption of residual liability by Mr. Curio for the cash advances on November 26, 1981, was a matter between him and Mrs. Javier (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). 10

The general rule is that this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan. 11 As we said, the acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to procedures), as he insists in this petition, yet it does not follow, as we said, that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending obligations when, their clearances were filed for consideration, warranting similar official action." 12 The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio. It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with legal procedures since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio. It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good faith. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines, 13 we held the defendant liable under Article 19 for disposing of its propertv a perfectly legal act in order to escape the reach of a creditor. In two fairly more recent cases, Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals 14and Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 15 we held that a principal is liable under Article 19 in terminating the agency again, a legal act when terminating the agency would deprive the agent of his legitimate business. We believe that the petitioner is liable under Article 19. The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified bv Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the defendant liable for all "natural and probable" damages. Hennenegildo Cunct presented evidence that as a consequence of the petitioner's refusal to clear him, he failed to land a job at the Philippine Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Authority. He also testified that a job in either office would have earned him salary of P2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in five years. Deducting his probable expenses of reasonably about P1,000.00 a month or P60,000.00 in five years, the petitioner owes him a total actual damages of P90,000.00 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.

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