or In

ountain W a r f ~ r e
red School,
1
60

l
' _,.04. o.
A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox Kentucky
1949 - 1950
R
6
ARMOR IN MOUNTA IN WARFARE
A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
BY
COMMITTEE 28 OFFICERS ADV1,NCED COURSE
THE SCHOOL
1949 - 1950
LIEUTENANT COLUNEL HENRY FRANKEL
NlA,JOR KENliJETH A. NOSECK
MAJOR VICTOR B. FOX
IVIAJOR iiALTEH H. WILLIAMS
WJ..JOR WELDON W. WILSON
CAPTAIN JERRY G. WALLACE
CAPTj,HJ JOHN W. HUGHES, JR
.JOHN H. IRVING
CAPTAHT NJilURICE L. YOUNG
FORT KNOX I KENTUCKY
MJ.Y 1950
..
?REFACE
This report been by of students of the
ch",pter l3.bout l3.rmored WI:lrf"lre for 8. pro.iected book. The ori,dn8.1 8.ss:ignment
spedfied thl3.t the Committe'3 would not limit its consider"!.tion to C1ne or two
"l.1"11'oreO units wh j.ch bl'l.r:l eng" s::ed in mountl'l in warffire, because such reports
8lre"dv been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11'ittees of former cl"!.sses of The
ArIrored School. this ComlT'ittes w'"'s t('l into the brol3.d fjeld
of aJl l3.rmored comhat in mount" ins, illustrl3.tinS!' the re-port with eXl>,.mples
lected from foreign l3.S "s American sources.
/---
t () obtl3. in. It could be .rlep.ned from the qft"lr-action repC1rts of the
units jmrolvec, sub.i"let to the hherent of unit "lchie'-ement
common to suer, publ:ic,:;tir"lns. However, the dehdls were l"!.cldnl?:.
Frequent incident"!.l 1'efarences tr> lIdifficult terr<"1 jn
ll
were common but the
moen possible, the h"ls filJed in the olcture; based upon
ml!lp study, person8.l :inter.,rjew, or "I remember 11 8.rticles in SI31''I1iC9
.iournl3.ls. even the l"ltter source TI:11st rem"lin suspect. The articles
freg1)ently extol the scintillp.t:in
T
f5 re, mlllneuver" "nd shock' action (If the
excellent source of S1)I""'F.lstjons. Hovrevflr, the',! seldoll1 O'''l.ve comb"lt
,j..Llustr'lticms which the COImTlittee b'3liev"Jd were sorely needed in order to
. nrel':.
3ent '3 ,'V"ell-r(lunoed picture.
if
-
It is hoped thJ;l,t some futu't"e oommittee will this wo't"k.
To do so will 't"eqUi't"6 qccess to of the Army files.
possibly to be l'luP.'rrenteo by specifjc tnterrot!qtion of GerWlin Oi'f'iC6't"S who
in Itlily Sicily.
Future W't"iters on this roilY find these procedures
the C("Imrrittee crnscienti('luslv h'3s striven to follow in ttlis report: thoroue:h
d("lcllwentqti("ln of tl:1e text; ('If edjtorltll o--i. Y1 1('ln to ttl6 conclusion;
text is desired; !ind the jnclusion of I3ddition'31 useful infortnl'\tion in the
J;l, ppe nO. i xe s
iii
----_._"

--
-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPI'ER
1
INTRODUCTION ... '. '. 10 .. .. .. .. " .. "
Statement of Problem

... .. . , .. .
1
1
SdUrees \ .. " 10
1
. .. .. . .... . . . 10 '.
2
Definition of Terms



... .. ..
"
3
GENERAL '. .. " .. .. " " It ..
Terrain and Weather
. ...
.. II
3
1st ioa1 Support

" .

8
Special Considerilltions ................ 20
ATTACK

t. .. ...
.. .
. .. ..
... .
28
Specifll ....... " ......... .. 28
I Techniques
.... .. ...
, ... ,. . 32
Problems '. .. " .. " 'it ..
45
4.
DEFENSE '...


" " ... .
. . . ..
"
61
"
"
.
"
"
Techniques
'.

'.
..

"
to ..

..
:.
..


,
Problems

' .

..

..
,

..

;
84
" "
,
CONCLUSION

..
:
.. ..
" " "
,; 94

"


"

APPENDICES
" .. " .. # " J " J 4
I. Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions 4 .... , ...
103
II. Factors To Be Considered
107
" " " " . .. " .. " , ." . .
iv

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
PAGE
on Icy , .. .. ,. .. .. .. .. .. 5
Tank in Snow
16
ot SP Howitter, View II I>
12
EV'1cuation of SP Howitzer .. Front View .. .. 14
.. . , . . .. ... . ....
5. SP Howitzer in Mounts ins .. . .. .

.. .. ,. .. . .. 35
6. Verde Trail. Luzon. p. I.

37
.... 41 III
III , _ Pl!norl;lmio View. Verde Trail 41
8. Tanke on MountJl in ROlld, Okina'W'l ,!" ........... . 43
Gun Fire by OkinJlwa
....... " . II
46
Sketoh MAp, Monte ItJlly .. ill ..... .... ,. .r
50
MA.P.
."
SJlV6rne
>. i
e
, ,.
54
......
12.. Tllsk Force Howze

.. ., .
....
........ :,' ....
67
13.. Sketoh Eqst Tunisill ..
... ... .....
., - ..
.
14. Aotion Ilt .Mqlkino
...... - . ........,. ............., .. 80
15.. Tl'lnks, Mount Be lvedere, Itl'lly
:....... '. -. -..........
82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of '3. comtl'ittee on of the use of I'1rmor
in in World II. It oonsiders of
l'Hmored units of 13.11 shes from section to d ivis:i.on. It \lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re'3.dy reference '111 describing
comb"t experienoe in mount'3.in operptions.
Comb"lt in IIlountl3. ins is not unusu'i 1 in the 'IIistory of W'l3.rf'l re but it
represents I3.ctivity in which virtu13.l1y until World Wl'1r
II. A thoughtful cons ider'ltion of mountq inaus I'1ral'1t of the world -- the
Rockies, Alps, Pyrenees, Url3.1s. Himl3.ll3.Yl3.s, I'1nd the

C :us -- will reve"ll their importl3.nce 13.11 n'ltur'll "lnd
bound13.ries yit13.1 in g:lobl3.1 wl3.r. Any future conflict well see l'lrg:e
sC'lle oper"tions for the control of mount<;ins involvlng- the use of I3.rmored
units.
This study WI3.S b13.sed on m"teri13.1 obt13.ined offioi13.1 documents,
pedodicl3.1s, "l.nd books "!t Fort Knox, supple.ented by interview qnd
p>9rsonl3.1 9-,rperience. Limi tl3.tions of tj mEl J:lnd qV"l j lqbte re ference mqterl"ll
pre'-ented "lny truly complete stud" but it is believed tbqt 13. representp.tive
cover'le:e bl3.s been suff5cient t('1 justify conclusions.
In order to provide 13. frl3.mework for the present'ltion of the
committee findings, this study been org:l3.nized into three (1)
q discussion of those conditions comrron to 13.11 mountqinous
specific discussion of those I3.ddition13.1 f",ctors peculi"lr to tl1B
,v) " discussion of those c('1
l1
siderl'itions pro,red by experience to be of
1
p ... .,.;try c0ncern to the defense.
In g:ener.;tl, the tern "mountl'linl1 tnel'lns Ii hi!!;b elevB.tion of liS
opposed to 13. IIhill" which is B.ccepted to be B. lower elevl3.tion. HOwe'lTer, the
eXl'lct use of these terms in different loc"llities; for eXl3.mple,
in 10wlB.nds, where tbe e levl3.ti('lns not numerous B.nd do
not reach B. greB.t 13. rise of eround of I3.bout 100 to 2.0 feet
is cl'liled B. mountl3.in, while in 13. mountl3.inous country elevl3.tion
of 1000 feet to less thl3.n 2000 is often cl'liled Ii hill 1
For the purpose of this study, "mountl3.inous terrl3.in" hl'ls been defined
to include violent irregull3.ritv of the e"l.rth' s surf-ace rJ3.ther thl'ln mere.
"l.ltitude.
Nount'3in oper"l.tions were considered chiefly from the tl'lctlc13.1 point
of view, logistic-al '3ctivities only to the extent of their in
upon the tl'lctical situJ3.tion.
Throughout this study the term ""lrmor" been interpreted to me'3n
all I'lrmored units within the "1rmored division: B.rmored inf"ntry, I'lrmored
"1rtillery, J3.rmored engineers, -as well B.S unjts. However, combl'lt
illustrB.tions h8.ve been limited t(l those oper8.tions specificB.llv involving
the use of or t8.nk destroyers.
Resel'lrch included the recorded experiences of '3rmored units from I'lll
8.rmies, both Ilfriendlyl! 8.nd "enemylf. The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8.sons of relev<,111ce to the P'3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne: to show the over"lll
supedority of one force or technique comptl.red with I'lnother.
-.-... ------------.-.------ ----_._._------------
NOTES FOR 1
.
l;;---rc Americanm vol 26 (New York-Chicae.:o: Americannl!l.
194f 5:31.
2

CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ""ere conducted in World )'{qr II lnd tCl1tas cert" jn definite con
comlT'on to l'l,ll mountqin oper<>tions. of mission or enemy
effect on qrmored operqtjons in terrqin, include
visibility, routes of qpprop.,ch. observ<l,tion, fields of fire, "lnd communic13.
tions. Additionql f"l,ctors !'.ire those prob'lems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous w"l,rf'lre: supply, mqin
ten",nce, .-md the prob lems pe rt'l in inf!: to mad ic<l. 1 se rvica s. But thlOlt is not
,..-..
t hole picture. Arising: fr('lm mC'lunblinous cond itions "l,re spec i'3.1 problems
obser"lr'ltion, <:lnd requiretOOnts for sp'3ci'l.l equipment for weqlJons, ,rehicles,
<lnd personnel <is well '!s for sl)pportinR: '1rms rmd services. All these
f<1ctors will be ind:hridutllly cOJ:'si(ll'lred in this jn"l,sm1.1ch '>s they
repr'3sent m'1,;or problems whjch <Jffect "1 rmorec1, oner<ltions of I3.ny chl3.racter in
terr'l,jn.
Terrain p,nd N'el'lther
Americ'ln doctrine concerning p,rmored oper"ltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes
t"l,nks be employed to the best qdvllnt"lge in
mount"l,inous terr"l,in, "l,lthough they m'l.Y be used in l"l,rge units in
broad ,rBlleys on extreme iHth the exception of their
use in such reg:ions they csm be employed only in sm!3.ll units for
r-"tmited objective opertlt ions. 1
limit'3.tions '3.re imposed by the extreme weqther conditions
3
.lly with
Thqt these limitqtions '1re imposed by the ,rery n"l,ture of mountlOinolls
terrq,tn regl3.rdless of its geoll::r'iphic locl'l,tion is I3.mply I'lttested by the
simihrity of reports from 'ill theqters of WlOr where mount""inol1s t'3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units. For eXl3.mple. ""n observer in Itqly reported,
the terrqin is mountqjnous, interspersed with
nq,rrow'11'1l1eys. The rOl-lds through the mountl'lins "lre nl'.lrrow, steep,
"Ind present innumerl'lble defiles, ledge sections, ,:;nd I'l,re bridged
over steep r"J.vines. The vqlleys Imd pll'lins I'l,re cut saries of
connecting drqinqge ditches comprise obstl'loles.
Terrl3.in in North h"J.s been descrjbed lOS follows:
The II Corps W8S to enemy
positinns in terr"lin 'is difficult "IS ol-ln be found in the wbole
bf.'lttle A belt of rug'C'ed hill country, 15 to 20 miles in
depth, hy between the Americ'1.n lines MATElJR The high
g:round "I
v
erl'l,ges 500 to 1000 fget "l,bove the nqrrow vf.3.11eys. Where
trees I-lnd brush "Ire RCl'l,rce .. th'3 ro('lry slopes steepen "It time jnto
)liffs. vqlleys little or no cover Only two
ht.l.rd surfll.ced rO"lds cr08S th'3 h5 lIs to l\IIATEUR. The se rOqds 'vere
of more "iIl'Portqnce to the II Corns 'is lines of supply
tr"n "lS routes of qccess to
From the Pqcific Theqter, qn After Action Report gives "l very simill'l,r
picture of the terr"l,in encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk" B"l,ttlllion in Luzon.
The mountqjns on either side some slopes of
gre'"1t qS 65 degrees, up t"lnk-s were bulldoted. It Wl:S even
on wet d'iYS to tnk-e trucks jeeps up these slares in
the sqTre Il1qnner. Suit"lble routes or trqils weI'';'! seldom Ilv... Ul1ble
to the qrmor l1nd steep resulted in slow pro
gress for the tqnks.
4
The t8ctic8.1 effect of terr'llin cIOn b'3st be summ<).rized by
the rp,port of I'In Army Ground Forc'JS BOl3.rd Obser,rer, I'Ifter detJ) iled crnsultJ)
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit in Itqly:
Doctrines set forth h'ive p.lw"lYs f>1vored the empl('lyment of
in numbers. However, from lessons le'irned in Bctul3.l
here during inolement W6"1ther in country.. em
)loyment of in strength thl3.n a its
The most limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
;0 in. on they qre
to move. , , in the mountl'1 i ns,
were used in numbers. The of the terrqjn dictf:1ted
suoh employment, P.S it hl3s hel3n impossible to move
oountry. vVhe re t!1nks COll ld S11P'port hlfqntrv s;ttflCK-S from fixed
positions, it WqS possible to use few but even then the
field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so nt;.rrow the pogitions
so thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon be used.
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incle
ment wes:;ther. It is ob,rious th8.t sellsons:; 1 ChS1nf!.es involvine: cond itions of
icy snow or deep mud movement qdded to the
of steep slopes f.1nd sh
0
rp curves. Where hie:h flltitudl!3s were in
volved the effect of sudden in wep.thp,r becqme even more
Snow CO"lrer in the fr 11 llnd lone:l3r into the spring, thus
prolonging the h'lrdships of w'int'3r operP.ctions.
too, is I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions.
in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds.)y but left the vqlleys cO"lrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning.
6
This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the e:ood obs"3rv
p
tion 1f{hich
could b"3 on cOIDmflndln!! ground. In this connection.. the possession
of hir.:h does not t11w8.Ys insur
A
excellent obsl".lr"lrl='tion in the
E,ren the possession of t1 lone: serj"3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverr;.e:
o
of the ground below bect::t1J.se much dec,d spp..ce will be disco,rered, even
where successive obs'-lrvpt:lon posts with o"lrarlqpping: fields of observl3tion
Russi'ln experience in Wnrld VV"1r II "One condition es
senti'll to success lies in fq"lror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Posts.tt7 This
substp.nti8ted by Americc\n experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily"
6

r., )'19 t'ugr:red mount&:dns of It'31y forced modific8tion in our
No lonr0r WqS it possible to
for In some instqnces the best pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be appro'lohed or occupioC', so "lIlS 1imited to sup
porting infqntry 'lotion on the
...
Under these conditions it would seem lOf!:icA.l to suppose th,:;t J'lir
'\f{ould furnish the me",ns of However, in World Vifl;lr II
it discovered thqt the exoellent oo,rer of the Tunisiqn hills m13.de locqtion
of smf.11l tqre:ets such J\S jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine positions almost impossible
to the ground observer w:i.th e:lqsses, let ",lone the 'lir observer. Air obser
v!)tion sorties, therefore, were for the purpose of con
firm'in!?; the pre sl'3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def:3d e:round. But here
the CO"1'6r 13. fforded '1nd lithe trfdnine: of the enemy in ttIkine: p.dvan
tqp:e of s1)ch cover frequently the reslJlts of Jl.lr observt1tjon ,8
A SUf! ere ste d s olut ion to tl'\ ; s nrob lew wou ld be q n '3. ir observS3.t ion post
of b!3jne: suspended immobiJ'1 wb:i le the observer. scrutinizes the
in e:r")!:'tt datqll. The So,riet hio:h comms:.tnd htJ.s studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters, not only to qn ide!:!.l meJl.ns of 'lerin.l
but lilso for the leqdjne: units in the However, the
.
helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3.tten
ti.on of the pilot to 1=;\ degrer:J whic
1
1 mBlres debliled virt1lqlly im
possible. The two-plf:lce helicopter, howoiTer, hqs mA.ny possibilitjls for this
type of ope r8t jon.
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem:
From the of in tl-te mountf;.dns the heli
optf3r is superjor to cmD'I
r
entjon'11 One importqnt fqctor
thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding tqke-off
7
reJ!s usuf:ll1y in terrqin. The two-place
helicopter (Typt:! I!3B) J!n who IDliY dl3"1rote his en
tire 13.t.tention to th
/
3 terrp..in" enjoying q wide R.r9j:} of vision
due to tbe construction of the plqne. Since no technicql skill
in flying is regujre of him. this observer be qn officer
fqmiliqr d9tQils of the situR.tion on the
ground. A c13.nnot be used qS qn imwobile
post in high q ltitudes of the rqre fied qtmosphere.. How
e\rer" it is cl1pl1blo of belne: qt Ii much slOt/ver speed thR.n
con"lrentionql qircrB-ft. Tbjs wo"ld pertrit det!1iled stu.dv of the
without presentine: th8 w'l{'tremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for
enemy g:round weqpons which c0TI'plete iwmobilj.tv in"lTobTI'}s. Sjnce
the ml3.int'3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ten
times thqt required for the lil3.json type q greqter num
ber of helicopt9rs would be for constqnt of the
sector.9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3r"l;r!1tion, mountl1inous torrl1in
more difficult tho of ir.forTI'tltion rog:'1rdloss of tlls of
corrl.unic'1tiol1 uS(1d. Rr,dio, f00t or mounted messtJngors, or liqison plt:tnes usod
for this purpose; soriously by t'3rr
r
dn.. Th:is WflS espechtl

:ue of The thpt
tho Iso influenced rl=\dio communicq
t j ons. Thf) inti:! rf') renee I=\S f.l ro suIt of b i e:h ridge s" pe s:). k-s"
hjll often necessitr.;t'3o Cl4.re in the solection of
on sit e s, the 1T'(\'l:n:-lrnf3 Y't of stpt i ('Ins, J1 nd rt:l d j 0 r91qy. Als 0
th') need of tld0jtionfil te('hrdciQl1s !.:Ind repnirmen WqS
f'3lt.IO
Support
Experjence shown obstqcle is insuperp,ble if troops
properly equipped, clothed, supplied, trqined. Tbe bqsic principlos of
lop.:istics th"l whether be in. mC'untqinous terro..in or flClt
country; howe1rer, the technlquos ,--f will cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent.
(
In mount,:;inous "IJV'1=\.rfqre th'j r1.H!:Red terrl1:in qncl extreme cliT'18,tic con
ditions pqke support I'0re difficult tind lirrited. A study of ex
in II shows T,1ountf:1.inous terrqin h8.d q t"lOfold effect
.ofdsticql requircn;:flnts. This effect Wf:1.S felt in increp.sed for
ies in restrictions of the for the of
those supplies.
A of for an demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3. j n re,Tea Is:
1. More food is required because of the rue:ged work. The nor
m'3.1 under qV8rqe:e conditi()ns is 3600 c13.1ories daily; in
mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum.
2. Increqsed of will be required because of
groqter cold.
3. Vehicles require trore fuel than because of steeper
e:rqd ient s
4. Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent re
placelT'ent
5. Marc fuel will be requir''Jd for cooking: because of higher
altitud,cJs. At 10,000 feet it r0quires three times Innl!:er to
. cook food than at sea le,m 1.
Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due
to the dispersion factor caused by
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare in tho of the increased alT'ount of supplies.
It found that mountainous nfforded a sing:le supply
route,. and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd the en
tiro supply net be construct-cd. Even whore a road net existed it Wf3,S
often so narrow tlHl.t only 0r.e-
1
J1TQY traffic could be perT'litted. In North
Africe, the British First Army finally forced to all rOl3.ds
in its qrea one-way only, ofton ':i'q
1
d.pg extrBlT'sly circuitous trips necessp"ry.
Air tr!:lnsportption of supnlios a partia 1 solution to tho prob..
lorn.. This means of transportf"ttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce
The history of World II shows no experience in the
9

noue required by division operqting in mountainous
terrain, Wlartime flying of the "Hump" end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be proof mav indeed be
moved bv air. in the use of air for this purpose
found in the of weqther. as well the restrictions
on a,nailable drop tones. Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satis
for this purpose, with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ir supply s verv succe s stul the late
and offered a vivid to the slower. more difficult supply.
At 36 A-20's dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes. All were recover
ed. Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12
300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql e:round lOOans.
",.,.--...
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13.cb. then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort. Ree:ardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of armored unit. its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy. For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare. Mountqin multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to provides pitfqlls peculi'1r only
to mountains. Even 11Y'ith limi.ted experience, qn 'lrmored unit soon
learns those critiC'll points of '1nd those essential items of sup
ply must h'1.V8 additj<'nql qttentj.on. constqnt check-ine, 'lnd st'lff super
vision.
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mount'lln opera
"-"".s 'is in conventionJ3.1 wtirfJire. Time 'lnd f'lctors become more impor
t'lnt -- the terrJiin rO'ld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
of supply depots.
Thoro is q expenditure of time effort in
it may be it requires three times the
personnel throe the number of vehicles to the end re
sult in supply of Here premium is on
unit's prior experience thp.t experience. however limited.
will those pllrts thji:)t require r:tttention. Thus ..
the unit SOP of supply be to
the vehiclos n,nd men required to resupply r:trmored units
in the mountqins.
14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division up
fqctor
we entered the Ardennos with
overlolld of pr:trts experience indiclltec would
ti high mortqlity. I most of my resupply from
:METZ .. Ii of qbout 100 mile;s. This trip Wlt:s mf:lde with
difficulty of the stGOp grqdes, congested
icy conditions. If tho Ardennes 10nger ..
we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of
.. tqnk trqcks. whoeled vehicle tires. 0f
types.15
Closely with thG problem of supply of units
in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or
The nountPojns. with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hue:,;;ing hills /:\nd with rO'ld toe lie:htly built for qrmored
vehicles" presont problems tbeir own.,
The ...rory f:lot of positinni'r-e: t\ tqnk retrie"!"er to pllll out -uehicle
slid orf mountqir S0metjros is tho work of hours.
oongested rO'lds, qnd of turnouts in
i1
\ ~
o
o
tho will frequehtly it imnossible to tow to the reqr. If
o is considerql:l ly below freezj np' thes ") dj "fic
1
)ltios must be
weil':hed qg"linst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrie"ine: "I disqbled
16
'Qhic]e before it freezes to the ground.
C"Iptqin p. J. Linn, forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of t.he 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly, rel"ltes tl,"lt when his unit WIlS st<l.tioned in the vi cinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA, Il Cqn<l.di8.n unit whom they were relievinl1' turned over to
his unit "I pl"ltoon of fi"e M<t t'mks thqt were in firins< positions in "Ireq
8nd hqd frozen in. Cqotqin Linn's unit trie d intermittent-
I v for q"l-)out fi "e weeks ti"' !Cet t he t"ll'1k-s out of t >- is pas ition but without
success. Finqlly. 'vhe n they V[or'l p.bout to the qrell. they were oblil':ed
to turn the sqme t '1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit. The t<l.nks were still
. t 17
i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS.
n t"lnk-s stuck or knocke d out; some of them with minor to the suspen
sion system. All h'ld frozen f<.lst to th8 ground. To r e trie'Te the se tllnks,
it fin"llly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32's (b:lDk- retrie,Ters) on e8.ch
with two lifting on eitter e nd. Thus. sheer physiclll force
tho t8.nk W"lS loose from th"l Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process. T'lnk-s <.md di rt were loqded onto "I tqnk trllnsporter .
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot, <l.nd unlo"lded in such mllnnet" thllt they could be

winched inside "I where the dirt finqlly t hllwed to en
"In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd rep<.l ir of the tl'\l'1ks .18
The pre<;8nt t;e n-ton while "I po"rerful <lTId l.lseful vehicle.
h"ls l imit"l d usefulness in the Tf1 0unt"l1nS for the nurpose of e ither
whee l ed or tqnks, Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
(' 13
Fivure o. 3 Armor in Mountainous rff! re
Evaouetion self nronelled 0 itzer hich had 150
ye rds do,"n the side
of a steen the rno of Manile, Philinnine I l&n
used
k
o
o
1 ..
T '""

d of of power or Further were its
5 he I).nO limited xooneuverl'!bility JiS we 11 JiS its cC'mplete hck Clf protection
'l/!:"linst fire.
19
The M32 series t"lnk retriever such obvious limitFltions
P.S recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thl'!n two of
rr,ore serious limitqtions: (1) the nFlrrow tr'lck prohibits its use in soft
(2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire.
An JldditiClMl tc", vehicle recovery is the thqt qrmcred
units 'irG often in plp.toon or section site units which frequently
widely corridors. This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for compJiny retrievor to serve of the plp.toons or sections. At
best it only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theI:l all.
The mFlintenp.nce org:JlnizFltion of Jiny unit fror.J Army tCl must
r
I exible enough to its'Jlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
org<aniz'ltion <:lnd use of tre unit it is suppC"rtjne:.
In mountFlin the dispersjon of division. bqttp.lion.
cOr:JpJiny size units in depth over Fl bro'ld frC'nt in SITFlll grC"l lps (often re
inforcod phtoons) requires thqt the mp.intenFlnce f'lcilitios should likewise
be dispersod. However. this dispersion of fqcilities should not be con
fused with 'l effort. The comp'lny qnd bFlttqlion motor
should koep '1 c0ntrol supervision of '111
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure mJiximum qnd direc
tion of F\ll unit fl3.cilit50s.
Division 'lnd higher repFlir 'lnd supply units oust pursue '1
Cl"l nstFlnt r fl "lr-to-frClnt effort. not onlye.1s li"lison tc the front
but must furnish teqms C'f on
15
-
0 1
0 '
the-spot third echelon work th"t wOl)ld be dC"ne in

Jued shops. Such of gun
be dC"ne in tho units personnel qnd the using units'
equipment; thereby dnwn b0th time of the
required by tho shops well P.s the by
vehicles
ll
Which in itseJf is ('ne tf the ml\.ior fJ'lctors in mount'lin W"'lrfl3.re.
well tn working from the
bulk of the
The estl3.blishment ('f vehicle poj,nts <.It bl\ttl3.lion or lower
level frequently ''J'ill be impossible due tC' thf:J physiCl'l.l inl'\bility to find
sufficii'JI'!t ll:round sp<!ce or tl suit<:ble !'Irel1. Artillery emphc
s
m'3nts, medici'll
.. tlssembly I'1r6"1S, "lnc
1
p.ttflck pC'sitir'ns will 1'\11 be competjng
f(,. g:rnund sPl'\ce in the TI'("Iunt<.lins. The individuJll mechp.nic frequently will
be ci"'nfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repq.irs or !lbllndonlJ'ent Clf 1\
vehicle
ll
with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing:-in ,...f the vehicle,
ing its future r'Slcovery in time I\nd eff0rt.
Pr('lblems of medici'll service f0r I'lrtnored units in moun
t"linous terrf;lin differ only in deg:ree 'With thC"se c0nfrnntinf':' units fiv.:hth'1e:
on level e:round. Difficulty in p,ccompliahing: medicp.l in
in proportion to the riso in of the
The mqjor problems the mejicql of the qrmnred unit
of individuql those inherent to the
tion tho medicp.l fqcility. In to the tho meohqnics 0f
of wounded qre qcute.
17
BefOre in in the mountqjns the
must be with the need for qttention to
hygiene. there fewer germs high low
titudes. the sqme problems the in
respect to the need Thar8 is q tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstip'lted ""t h1i?:her 'l.ltitudes lower
temperqtures. This is br0ug:ht Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persC'nl!ll dislike for
incnnvenienco 'lttendp.nt to in ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold For this re'lSClD the soldier must be dven more
concerninf!: his p'3rs<'1np.l neC9SSqry for the of
Although this specific probleID
6
the "will for continued e::ood hel'l.lth
ll
rests entirely with the soldier.
,..--. Anmhe r c
n
tnr.1on tendency is to neglect W!3.shing clol!lnine: the body
t- "111S'" of sce>,rcity of w<lter. oftentil11es fr"'Ul the soldier's dislike
in .zoinK tn tre trr"Jble of 'C'eltine:: snew for this purpose. This nef!:lect re
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd of vermin. When
iDe: is impossible for OVBr which the soldier hqs no the
soldier must be to.uKht to hjs body to oirculqtion by
rubb ing with '1 r"ug:h t<Wro 1 th8 reby keepi skin inf'?ct i"ns t" '1 minit:lUm.
Tho feet require considerpblo speeil!ll "lttenti0n to frostbite
!lnd t("l pr0vont "tron.ch foot.1I One cr tbe t:'th8r of these SerlOl.lS "lilments is
'llWl'lYs present in hh:h ID0untt;\ ins. Feet must be kept dry i'lnd sClcks 'lnd shoe
inner solos cho.nged Principles of foot hygiene
'It "f lower "lnd fre6ting conditi"ns.
All sources of supply f(lr consumption must be rigidly
'olled from "l s"luit'lt ion Sold iers must be tht't "l11
18
tho for is if
l,:tit;ude is sorir'us illnesses r.JIl.Y result.
of wounded p8rsonnel presents diffioult problem
',vl, lor! is DtlG:"n:i fieC' t("'l q oonsidertlble extent :in mount"! inf"\lls torrla in. Most
it is often Parsnnnel who
litter pl'lt'ients beof!!.use ('\f dHfio
1
11ty I'.nc oqin in W'llkiM (Wer mount"linous
Speed of oVtiCUll.t i('\n is extrerre IV Sh("lck is to 13.
dogree followiru: oven slizht in.1urios beCl1usIJ nf the tem...
of the p.tmC'sphero .
".--.
Tho of ml1np01ll3r in c"lrine: fer ctlsul'lltles 1J.1so present
"l. problem. Litters c"l.nnot be hqnd-c"l.rried oval" mountqins tn the ex
tent they be cl3.rried with('\ut extreme
to the litterbol1rers. In order t('\ these cl'lrryine: madi...
C1;\l instp..llp,tions sho1Jld be kept well fOr'W"lrd.
Wounded parsnnne 1 shf"'uld bA locl'\ted Clnd eVl')cuJlted durin!!
hC'urs becrmse tho decrop.sed tA1!1pGrtl.turos 'It night w()uld tend to in...
croqso Nizht is qlso of
terrq in "lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when "in <,pportunity for P. pre,ri,.,us
rope lines often must be ffiP.Y be the only
resort becl1uss enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during h"'urs. When
e,r-- "tion must be cl1rriod <"'ut p.t the wounded should b l brought to 11
19
'.
,;erad centr'll durina:: the dfiY find mllde liS eomfort'lble 'is possible
in preP'!r'ltion fC'lr the nizht movement. Consider'lticn tmy be d'I'Ten to eV/iCUli
tion by "l.ir ,if the terr"lin mfi'kes jt possible to l'ind l1'lison liircrJlf't.
20
Spoc!'ll Consider'ltion
Experience in World II blis limply the need for
61'Oci"3.1 trqinin;c l3.nd IicclimJlticn for I'!ll troops wh('l phn to operq,te in m('lun
find mentfil vehicullir mfiintenfince
of wc"l.pons, will unusufil problems; "IS will speei'll
oquipment for the ,rehicles. for individulils, liS well 'is those for
the supportins: "irms t:lnd sar,rices.
Russiqn experience the fqct thllt,
oper"itions in tl('lunt'linous terl"'lin lire filWllYs compliOllteo. lind
difficult. They require troops. plirticulfirlv for
nents over precipitous "md snow covgred terrp.)n.
2l
Even before C'ur entry int,.., World Wi'll" II it beclilmEl evident th"l.t spe ..
cil3.l tl"'ininll: w<l.S needed. 1.. Wi'll" memorp.ndum for the Secretl3.ry of
too rf
. I). G.. 2 report 'lttributed tbe success of the Gerl!ll!l.n
Army in the to the prosenoe of firmored 'lnd other units
for The Britisb
fp.ilure in on the oth0r in by
htwinr,: no troops tr'lined to in m(')unt'lin terril in.
22
bdditionA.l evidence of the need for specific tr'lining in mount'lin('lus
been to the from
source. Our in on the
in the of
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized, clothed, equipped, con
ditionod, or for either winter or
,.- The result w<\s dissaster !'I.n sarmy whi.ch m"lY hl'l.ve to fjght
lnywhere in the world must "tn importsant pllrt of its
20

units for
... nll: in the I'md in winter. The I\rmy I'lnd equipment must
be on the troops fully fOE such units
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions. 3
Bl\sed upon these the The
Center on 3 Septgmber 1942. The
mneuvers in Februl'l.ry. 1943. showed serious defects whioh tM.y serve
po5nt nut tbe specific problems of mentl'l.l which
my be fllced bv units in mountllins. A letter which
Generlll wrote to the Gene-rill of The Mountl'l.in Trllinine: Cen
ter theso weqknesses
' Trl'liniIll!: did not to comition personnel
for I'\nd under conditions of extreme cold
'ldverso weether
A high peroent"lj!!:e of the personnel fell cut due to sick
ness" frostbite" Sl.nd fep..r.
indicp..ted 1\ of

exercise
ecessnry to properly condition men
The letter mentioned morl'l.le seemed low due to,
""1 high 'lllnrbidity rde littributed to I'\lt1tude of recrel'ltioml
fqcilities." This seem to be fll1 evidence of mount"1in sickness" Ii pe
culiQrly tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mount"lins.
Field Mllnul'!l 70...10" Oper'ltions, exphins:
The nnvice '\no. exoerienced climber q like f\re sub ,;ect to this
m'lll!!dy (i.e. mountJ'l.in sic1rn0ss) in 1'J1titudes lov, qS 4000 to
5000 feet.. The cl!!use :is l1su,,11y poor ohvsicJll condition" l"lck of
llccliml1tizqti('n" or both. Symptons mIly be hel'\dllche" nI'\U861l,
vomitinll:, ll!!ck of lippetite, insomnill" I!!nd irritp.bility. This con
dition my be relieved by r0st. In rl1ra the pp.tient must bo
to lower eltitudes.
25
Once to high mountdns" units Wl.y suffer if they "1ra sudden
21
Vp.lley occurs when to high
ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes. It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness. While in the there is
increqsa in the number of red blood cells the
of the blooe, this increJlsed power is not
sefl. le,rel, I'Ind tho body literr:\11y hp.s too much blood. The
symptons I!re lflssitude, hel!dl3.che" noises in the
neu
rJllgiJl-like PJl in. One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present
'lt the St",U16 time. Depending on the individu'll. they disJlppe'lr
within Jl few dt\ys to P. few
In 'iny CJlse. even where the mountt'li.ns fire not sufficiently to
CJluse eithl3r mountp.in or "':>,lley sickness, thoy hll'l'\9 "l definite effect on the
physiology .,md pqtholoe:y of th9 ind:ividulll. This is beC'luse " the humA.n
is sensitive to wetlthor ch'1nges Ilnc climte."
It is Jl e:enerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be 'lble
drive his in torr"lin. but the interpret'ition of this
iple must c('lns ider tbe tvee ('If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in.
E ,:;he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must le".lrn the
speciA.l techniques of mount'lin driving. A driver r'lted liS excellent on flJlt
l'1nd driving: mie:ht 61lsily be th8 of frequent mechp.l1iclll fqilure of his
when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country.
In June. 1944, the Germt:m i..rmy rece ived A. r'lther l'lre:'3 consie:nment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich. ('If tho d'3struction of the r!3.il
net Ilround FLORENCE, the hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI, some 80
kilometers nt':lrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins.
These new hl1d been bro'k'an in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny, Tbe drivers' experiences extended,
only to Europeqn cnnditions were in no wqy equql to the
spech,l dom"lnds which thn steep, windine: mountlli.n rn"!..ds of Itqly presented.
I'

uently much m3chl'l.nic'll d"mPJe"J 1"'9 sulted qnd qftcr 'i few dflYS the
22
C
entire rrute. Sineo the equip.
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt of the the
urHs h"H:1 to rQpq ir ths btolren..1own on tho rOl'l.d. Beol'l.use of techni
this procedure demqnded I'l.n excessive I'l.mount of
time .. I'l.t thqt peril"ld when only q few we ll-trt'd ned rO'Pq ir men were
!'lV:; il'1b 10.
One Amaricl'l.n which hqd fnur months winter trqin
ing I'l.t Pine Cl'l.mp, New York prior to entering .. suffered I'l.t leqst 30 per
cent less braqkdovrn of thqn did com'Pl'l.rqble units without
this The vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC' con..
siderl'l.tion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power of
his vehicle -- either tr... cked wheel.
,'-'" "!11 dri"lrers qnd crew membsre need more trl'l.ining in, field
e),." -1.ients. Qu;te often m:;hicle, stuck in the mud .. must for mAin
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hl'ld sufficient trqinine:.
A former of the 753d Bqttqlion in
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of crews their
ho lplossness when confronted with terrqin. Only sin.ce I hl'l.ve
worked in field expedients instr
1
1ctiC'n h"lVG I come tC' rep.lize how
!lUlny times I could kept r..y or nf my phtoon in
"lotion h,ttd I mown even the rudiments ('If field expedient work in
vehicle recovery.27
Night driving experienco 13.SS1)mes more' in mount,:; in oper,,\
tions; not only bec13.use orrer tllr'\y be f",tp.l tn the ind bridUt:l.l vehicle
but p.lso becp.use in roqd net through defile vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SI'Iblec the of "1n entire
In such to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle require the use of
23

h to roll the truok or vehicle off the or
in the cp.se of vehioles properly to blow
the off the the consequent to the
rOl1d.
An officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is fe"l.sible I1.nd WIlS infrequent in oorrol3.t to
clo"l.r of vehicles with the use of explosives. To
blow P. mecium t"l.nk off 11 would require from 100
tt"l 400 pounds of explosbro, dependine: up("ln the f',nglfJ I"f the "Ire
hiola '!nd the width of the rc<!d. The explosive should be phoed
under the side nf the tllnk f:J.n:'l not under the tr"lok. The ex
plosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety "l.nd with proper
pl<!oernent would not tho beyond could be
effectod by men with picks ".nd shovels in few minutes.
28
Oper"l.tions in mClunt"l. ins during the IJ'lst W'1r h","o indico::.tod th!'lt the
limit':l.tions of th0 me dium tp.nk were jts l'lck of flotl'l.ti"n "nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the "l.bsenoe (If tlny tr'1cti(ln devioes. liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wp,.,r II,; including the "duck bill," turning:
end oonnectors upside down, welding bits of met"l.l on the met"l.l "nd
grousors fl'lt rubbeT Althl"ugh ("If the
bJ'ld its ('lwn merit, ntme nf them VfflS c(,111pletely s"ltisfp.ctory. It "I.ppe"lrs
those limih.tirns with the 9xc>9ptil'n of flottltirm !'ire still present in
the T.80 qnd T-84 usod on the the T-72 p.nd T-85El
prf3sontly found on the .P:24 t"lnk. It is believed thSlt the proposed T... 91
trmk tr"!ok to b8 used on the T-37 tl'1nk with its thin, continul"'lus, deep chevron
tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effec
tiveness in tr"lction for "I. t"l.nk.
Bec"I.use of tho high mortqlity of wheels
w: it might well bo to minimum of one
24

eol on 'Sp.ch tllnk. Evon thou/1:h tho t"lnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrml'to bordes or roqd wheols, the SP'lre wheel would
f'lcilit"ltlJ the chl1ndnl't of tho whoel in t;hl1t only '3. moch'mic with the
noceSl',l"itry tools would be reQuired for mq inten"lnce. It hp.s beon sue::e:ost
ad in the crew ,of "it be responsible for
echelons of on the Ilnd thqt the tools
for this ml1inten"itnoe should bo inolude& in the vehicle
t
s The pro
posed "Irmy truck "itpp"lrently includes "Ill or most of the desit"lb1e ohllrqcter
1
Tho importnnce of logistio"itl for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the of foreign
nrmios. Tho FinniSh sucoess Russiq in 1939 m"ity be I1ttributed
the Finn's I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mount"lins I1nd extreme cold, "IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1r"lSs cut the Russil1n supply lines. One fl1ctor in
tho It<J.li8.n f"l ilure in the B"'.lkllnf;! W"I s inl1dequ"Ite c lothine:,. equioment "lnd
conditioning. As 11 result, 25,000 wero killed 8.nd 10,000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n success:s 11p.:l1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rl't()ly tho result of
Germl'm 'lbility to mo,'e 1l:.1r/1:o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their diff.iculty well serve 8. to this study
of problems imposed by mountl:.lin Gonerl11 KLEIST, who
crossed the Ardennes with three oorps, the of
tl1nks I\ssembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II. thus de::;cribes his ex
poriences:
25
. ' The mliin probleIl1 not tl'lcticl'l.l, but qdministr<l.tive -
che movement p.nc supply p.rr"ngeIl1ents. It WIiS essQntip.l
to utilize rOl'lds s.tnd tr"l.cks thl'lt were to qny prs.tcticqble
The torrqin difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd
the rO'1ds, though they hqd ".\ P.:C'0d surfqce, were ofton steep qnd
full of bends., The opposition W"lS not serjous. Thl'J.t Wl'J.S
fortunqte, for my tJ.rtillery only 50 per bp.ttery -- tJ.S
the columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the
rotl.ds throug:h the Ardennes.
28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
Oper<l.tions, FM 70-10 W"l.r Depqrtment, 1947),
ptOlrllgr'l.pn 58.
2Lt Col Joe C lIObaervers Notes .. It"l.ly.. 4 October 1943 to 29
Decemb.,r 1943." .. Ltr Hq li.GF, FHa 319.1/103 GMGB.I .. 7 Februqry 1944 .. p 30.
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 Ml'J.y 1943
ton: HistorictJ.l ivis ion, Wqr Depp.rtment ..
4After-Action Report, 775th T"l.nlrB.n.. Sept 194:3 to July 1945, p 7.
5"Lessons from the It"lip,n Cllmpqie:n
ll
, TM 2, Hq Ml'OUSA, 15 Mqrch 1945,
P 107.
6Interview, Lt Col J G Felbor .. hutomotive DepP.rtment, The Armored
Scbool .. Ft Knox .. Ky.
7Lt Geners.tl Kqsilowitch.1 "Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ.1" , Tho
Militl.ry Review Vol 24 No.6 (June 1944), p 72",,73. (Originl'J.lly printed in
Red Stqr, trqnslqted from Russis.tn to French to
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squs.tdron Ri.F, North Africq, November 1942 to
Jf.lnuP,ry 1943" (Ltr by Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF.. ]f.I::ly 1943) ..
P 2.
9Interviow, Cqpt J D wVells .. Armored Officers Ad'lrqnce Chss.1 1949-50..
Tho Schnol, Ft Knox, Ky.
10llLessons from the ItqliSln TM,2, Hq Nl.TO, 10 MArch 1944.1
P 14.
11
ttJun
r.:1e "tnd Mcmntqin Operf.'.tions
ll
L-30, C('Imm"lnd l'J.nd St"tff Depqrtment ..
The Armored School, Ft KnDx, Ky.. p 6.
,..,--. 12 Ib1d ... 4. D
--'
26
wH former Officer. 740th
Bn.. ETO.
14
Feloor .. op cit.
Lt Col C F Reynolds .. former Ordnl\nce Supply Officer"
4th Armore d. Di "ris ion.. ETO.
16Interviow.. M Troy E The Armored
School .. Ft Knox.. Ky.. former Officer 781st T"1nl<- Bn.. MTO.
17Interview.. Cqpt P J former Bn Motor Officer .. 755th T"1nk En..
l!\Villiqms 0E cit.
19
Tqrp1ey.. op cit.
20Mountl'J.in Operqtions. :F'r.: 70-10 (W"1shine:ton: W"l,r Dep"lrtment .. 1947) ..
Pft ss im.
.. oE cit" p
of Cqmp for A. Di1Tision in Hie:h
yw..G-3 for thA of the Gen'3rql Stqff.. bGO 353(8/9/41) (c) 17
'. 194 1)" l'I1 s s im.
23uTr"l.inine: in Mount<lin <>nd Winter W'irf"1re" .. study 23. HistcricSl1
.. AGF.. P 3-4.
24AGF Ltr .. SUb.iect: Inspection Trip.. 331.1 (c) to CG MTC. Hl'Ile"
Colo.. 11 Mqrch 1943.
Operlltions" FlliI 70.. 10 (W"1shinl!.ton: Wqr DeptJ.rtment" 1947) ..
P 60.
26 Ibid.. P 60.
27Interview.. Mr E B Smith. former Phto(1n Sgt .. Co B.. 753d Tqnk Bn,
lITO.
28
.. Lt Col John C H Lee" J r .. Instructor .. Comm"l,nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt .. The Armored School. Ft KnC'x, Ky.
29
Cqpt
B H Lidcell H'l.rt .. The (New Y(\rk: Williqm
Morrow qnd .. 1948), p 125.
27
CF..API'ER :5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions of mission or
enemy been the subject 0f in the foregoing chqpter.
In this II specific discussion of those to the
will be presented. They (1) by the
in (2) teohniques to the
(3) problems vmich mie:ht arise in the qttack in terrain.
Special
The restricted m8.neuver, limited firepower, and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by units in mountqinous terrain them
severe hqndicaps to progress. Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
q well org8.nized enemy in such must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy ore:"',nizp.tjon of positions.
The e"lCoorience of the United Stp.tes Fjfth Army jn It13.lv ml!!y be tl'\1ron
liS exqmple of meqsures alert enemy will tqke to impede the prol!;ress of
'. 'rhe Germp.ns the work of construct ine: defenses in
the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still ene:'le:ed 200
miles to the south. Th'::l main line of the de fense, nqmed by the
the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line, wqs sited to mqx
imum of the rugP.:ed mounti'l ins <:lnd the Ii<1'i ted number of
roqds qcross them. From his points on the hie:h
ground the enemy possessed excellent observl'ltion "nd hroq,d fields
of fire for guns qnd el13.borate
preparqtions were reliance wqs
placed on mine fields of six rows
of <mtit'l.nk m1.nes h.id in 'an '11most continuous for 13. d1stqnce
of tvro milos . ;vorkers due:: A. deep V-shaped "lntit"lnk
ditch strene:thened witb pine loe: revetments. The ditch Bxtended
and one qup.rter miles. Coverine: the mine fields qnti
A.nk ditch Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions
28
,unkers for !1:uns. i\;".ny of those hun'lr9!'s '.v6!"(J dug deep in
to the sides or crests of the bills strengthened with up to six
foet of reinforced concrete ..... l1'hich rendered th6m imp"lrvious to
but Two of ths bunkers were topped by
turrets only the 75mtl1 p':uns the turrets show
ine: "l.bove e:r0und level Infqntry positions, consisting of con
crete pillbox9s. foxholes connected by trencbes
to l"'rge he"l"lrily re jnforced personne 1 sbf:ll ters, werf':l protected by
<J.ntipersonn'Jl mine fields p.nd one or more 20 to 30 font wide b"lnds
of wire. Autom"l.tic W6<J.pons were sited to cover the entqne:le
tl10nts with low fire.
1
As tbe withdrew tl1''ly m"lde skillful use of nJ'lturql obstAcles
which they r';lndered more forrnidpble throue:h ingenious use of explos i,rf3S. They
de stroyed bdde:o s .. culv'1rts, t'lnd l00gr) s. frequently '!!lininl!: wh<J.te"lTer by-
p"'.SSi3S existed. Nllrrow in C'riticl'l.l vill<J.f!GS werp, b10cked by de-
m'l.de more forrridt'lble by dcll1:ol:itions, <ind mine fields covered by fire.
qnd in m'1ny c>':ses raq1Jlrq di.rect hit from he"'vy !1rtillerv to put th<9!!l out
fire not be to the or
of these positi0ns. Moreover, :i't"lfp,utry could nDt oope with the b:mks
wbicb tr'3 enerry h",bitu"llly lrept cC"nC'9".led in phtoon "lna como<J.ny she grC"1Jps
for counterqtt8.cj
r
intt. The solutio!1 to th''lse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
t<J.nks to 8CCOmpqny '3.11 .. tt'1cks wtHJ't"o jt W'lS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoric>':. n doctrine couo0rning m0untr.; in W8.rf8 re Sb3to s,
the inl'l.dequ"te r01ld found in sO"lrsely settled tl10unbdn
enh"ltlces thf3 mi"litctry v<\lue 0f existlng rO"lds "ldds itl'port"l.nce to
heights which domj't"l'3.tc them terr"lin feAtures of
reights which domiu<cte ,Ttllleys "lnd lines of cotrmunic'1tiC'ns with ob
I'lnd fire.
2
This ",grees in pdnc:iple with Russi".ln doctrine which th<:t
29
, one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the
choioe of posts oommitt0d for the good
of tho qttJlc'k- with in p'3rfect "dew of th'3 ob;ective The
b"?-ttlEJ for highw"IVs. roqds of "lppro"lch, v"tlleys. built up
qrs"l.S develops upon heie.:hts !',nd ridges.
3
This fqct is further to by Americqn experience in the
A mp..ior lesson from mount"" in fight:ini! in Northern Tunis
p.nd SicHy, thqt dorrinl1tinl!' heje:hts must bG s'lhed.
nl'lturll.l must be ll."Iroidf3djl qnd units must work
high ridges qnd force th"l en"lmy from his posit jon. W"lS f\P:Slin
demonstrqted in Some modifioqtions of this principle
bf.lvn boen neoess"ry of unusul'llly rug:eed mountt! ins. In
some inst":lncos the tOFB of could not be qppro"lched or
occupied. <\nd th'3 inf<lntrv "lction by "rmor W'ilS oon
fined to the slopos, The n'1tur"l of the mount<dn rJl.ng:es <lnd the
orgrmizqtion 'ilnd construction of ",nemy positjons hqs h'3en fre
quently ml'lde necess0ry the s'ljture of sell3cted terr<dn fe"ltures
ono t q time. 4
An excellent eXl'\mple of tho lJSe of tJ),nks in the P"lcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bl'ltt'llion, Aft", r th9 b${tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th T':mlr
shifted to the hills of ViIAl'HLA '1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1re"l in North0rn Luzon. Here th"l terrS}in totfilly llnsuit'lble for
"Iction. yet th8Y did pqrt in the fighting, The role of the tllnk
Wf;lS limited t" firhw the enemy CJ'1ves 'md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions.
In ml1nv i.1'istI1DCeS tho t<inlrs did not sufficient motive power to g'3t into
position but hp,d to b'3 to'N'Eld into posit:ion bv 011e or tl'ore trl'lctors. For the
most pJ'lrt thjs type of chp.r0.cterized th'3 8rmorsd role in the moun
of Luzon.
5
The use of t'1nks in th"l mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mr:\uner:
The use of hnlrs in th'J dt<J.ck on SAN PIETRO in ly 1ike
presented spf:lcj"l problems. It wP,.S hoped thp.t the qrmor
, TQuld gnt through th'" formidr b Ie de fens'::! s q nd ole<1 r the W"W for
the infp.ntry; however, eV8n thl3re been no enemy opposition,
30
/
-
the tarr13.:\.n itself would beeJ"1 <!lTJ'1ost irr;possible for cross
country moireTJ'lent by tp.nks. First plpns cp.lled for COTJ'lpl1ny A,
753d B13.ttq lion. t("l mo"'3 with the Infl?ntrv 13. 10m!: the
Sqmmurco slopes, w'911 13.bov'3 the SAN PIETRO-,TE}:!"AFRO rOl!\d. The
r:r('ll;nd on either side ('If th9 n"lrrow rOl:!d WfiS r;. s'3ries of rock
wp.11ed terrl'lces, three to se"e'O feet hizh, cov"Jred with olive
trees "nd scrub "nd broken by streqm beds, find
oth"'<r irreguhrities. One qtteTl'lpt W8S l'1'l!\de to get the V'.nks
hir:h enough up on the slopes so thr;.t they could mo"re forW8rd
to th'3 qlone: the upper PI1SS through our for
w8.rd posit:'ions, "nd then drop down froTJ'l one t'?rrqce to the
next. The lllth broke down terrl'lce Wf'Ills to ml1ke Ii
trp.il up to the cOm'rrl1nd post ("If the 3d Bqtt13.1ion, 143d
try. On 12 December when tried out this route, it e:ot
only I1S fq r t)S th'3 second terrqce; e t'forts to o"'er
corl'e the mud ",no the grqde r'3S'11ted only in the t"lnlr throwine:
11 trt:lck.
6
An extreme eXI1T1"ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1r\TIore d operq ..
tions in mount" jns m$),y be formd :in th'3 following qccount conCBrnine: Compqny
A, 775th Tqnk Bl1ttr;.lion.
___ Compl'lny A minus one phtoon I'\ttqched to the 43d Infqntry
)ivision, 8 Februqry 1945, P.t POZOHUBBIO, Luzon were initil'll
Iy employed to set up rOl'\d for the l03d Di
,rlSlon. on 18 Februll.ry, the 3d pll'ltoon returned to
camp-my control. WhEln the 47)d Division W"lS I'9lie,rea by the
33d Division on 14 Februllrv, the Tqnk C01'npqny supDorted "ltt'lck"s
throurrh the mount,,- jus northsl'lst of POZORUBB 10. T"lnks Wl'lre
'lseo f0r direct fire purnos"3S "R:'linst Bnc'l E"un posjtions.
The BAG-UIC Vfl'\S h"llted I'lt this point 8S f'lr I3.S
the t"mks were concerned dU<:I to efficient demolition of bride::es
o'1eI' hrQ"e rivers "lnd ,Q:orges b'IT the f8n
q
ticp.l Jr;.pl1nese. From
SISON the compqny movr,d into P, bi"oUJic I'lrl3e in thf') 'ricinity of
bGOO. The pl"ltoons d8iIy supporting the Int'qntry
"lnd protecting the Engineers buildine:: r08ds.
Enemy rGS ist'lnce W"lS intSlnse throughout thi s very mount"l in
oUs tArrr;.jn. M"lny hnd mines 1.vere encountered in the rq,rjnes
"lna I'lrtillerv mortnr fire intense,
In the first week of April th<:'l 12M Infqntrv W'1S supnorted
qlong the GALH.IW rO"ld to ASIN.. This 'iI'''lS 6'lCtremeIv hl1!:l1rdous
work. T<1nk"s were c<lTI"llized bv high e::rollnd on the south <:md I'l
dry ri,rer bed or, the north. Vision wc.s limitec1 by hel'lVY
,iunde shrubs !';Ind trees. Tho J$l.p"lnese I'lttempted ml'luy night
infiltr"ltions in I3.n effort to destroy tqnk's. Spotlights were
inst<l.lled on t"lnks I'lnd the se when turned on temporl'lrj ly
blinded the 'lud IDI3.de them good t"lrgets for Tl"qchine
fire. .
Throughout liee.y the Comp"tny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-
ts up thl3 mount'iin tr'lil TRn!IDAD. The rOlid ms
'ibout five miles in length "nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine: .
side rO'lds or trqils were ideP.l for enemy liwbushes. The 1st
Plqtoon on the 24th of June. working with 'In infp.ntry pqtrol
from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth
limbushed by lin 200 J'lPS 2000 Ylirds south of C'imp Thirty.
They used Mtchel chl3.re:es. e:ren'ldes. mee mortp.ra. 'lnd mqchine
guns. The tJ'lnks viera helpless qS they could n("lt elevqte their
e:uns to fire on the enemy on ridges 'lnd mlineuverine: wqs impossible
due to the mountqinous terrqin. With the help of li'lison 'lircrqft,
'il"t:i llery fire used on the enemy they fin'llly withdrew.
T'lnk c'lsulllties J'lnd personnel c'lsu'llties were he'lV;; 'lnd the T'lnk
Comp'lny eV'lcuqted for rest reh'ibilit'ltion.
These combqt qlthough they been selected from
widely theqters of opertl.tions,. h'1ve oert"l.in b"l.sic fqctors in common.
These speoi'll consider"l.tions, refGrence Iltt'lck in mountqinous terr'lin,
mllY be sumID'lrized 'lS follows: 1) onemy ore:'lniz'ltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th'3 n<1tur"'.ll obst"l.cles; 2) in P.:l3ner'll .. "l.ttl-l.ckine: forces will
'lS their ob.;ecti"res control of th"l heights; 3) inf'lntry must h'lve J'lrmored
S. Jrt to the 'ldvqnce, to repel enemy Ilrmor'3d oounterqtt"l.ck, "l.nd to
destroy enemy sited in Ilrtillery-proof loc"ltions which only cp.n be
l''l'lched by direct wo 13. pons ; "!.nd 4) to fqcilitl3.te overcoming terrf'l in ob
st"l.c1os in the movl'.ll11!3nt of t"l.nks, IJne:ineers "l.r!J essenti'll to "l,ny tllsk force .
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful by tp.nk units in mount'iinous
terril in merit det"l iled cons iderf'tion. Th:is discuss:i on will include objectives,
reconnp. iss"lnce, size of forces used, security. coord in<l.tion "lnd control,
SupportiD "lnd s9rvices of supply, <l.nd cOIDmunic"l.tions.
In offensive in mount"l.ins, the for "l breqk
throue:h 'llon/?; ro;:;ds p"lss"!ble for "1"9hicl'Js "Ind oquipment. This seqrch is
conducted "llong simult"lneously, with the mjssion of
",-
:1g the heig:hts "lnd ridg':]s dominr.:tine: routes or "l.poro'\ch,
32
,..-....leys. <l.nd built-up Dominp.ting he:i!ghts thus bocome th'3 ob.;ectives

Frequently. becquse of of successive
ridges, the objectiv9s of necossity <l.lso succAssive in
Thus, the "lfforded by "tny e:ivan ob,iecti...-e is "1ntirely relP.tive
to the position of the I'J.tt<l.cker.
The 711th employed the principle of successive ob- /
i
.iectivGs on Okin"l.wfi. The Jl'J.p"lnese took full tadvO'\nt<l.ge by the cOI1lm'\nd
in!?: ground. Ridges hill were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the A be for e"lch successive
ridfte, with the enemy defending both tht;! forwqrd p,nd reverse slopes.
8
As soon "tS the penetrqted the defense qt "lny point. he
rust h<l.ve mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieq
tions in the re .. r of enemy forces. If this mfineuver succeeds, the de
r
ar mfiy be forced to FEre p.gqin units using every
route should be used bV the ..tt<l.cker to outfl"lnk posi
tions which tho enemy orgqnize, <l.nd to "lcceler"lte the spoed of tho with
A Russi"ln officer oxpl<l.ined:
As soon <l.S the foo commences "l withdr"lwql mO'T'3IU6nt .. "l
p"lr<l.llel pursuit begins on his fl'1nks. Very mobile troops, even
if n("lt vary numorous, r.Jl'lko US') of tr
p
,ils qnd in order to
strike P.t points p.long the rO"ld by tho
troops. This of
withdr<'lwp.l into q rotro'l.t <;nd into "l. rout ... mostly on
of the loss of vehicles
The s6'lreh for w6l!k p0ints in the enemy defensive position "lnd the
determin"ltion of possible routes ("If with terrflin ob,;eotives which
domin"lte those ph-cos <'\ f':ro"lter emph<'\sis upon reconnlliss<\nce.
As et'lrly the Tunisi"ll1 C'3:rnpp.ign in V{orld':V'lr II, the 1m
,"'--"
nec of for qrrrored units bec<lme evid9nt. Expert
35
reconn'l iss<mce of routes of usu13.11y with enzineer qdvice. bec'lIOO
-
. in pll3.nn i ng ph"lses. times. either side moved up 'llong wh'lt
they zood cle'lr only to find q dry wl'lsh. nine or ten
feet high. blocking the This frequently necessitl'lted withdr'lw"ll.lO
On the second'lry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI? tho reconn'liss"lnce of str3'lm crossings presented I'l consider'lble probl':lm.
especi"llly in winter when the wooden hqd been the
pressur0 of ice. The of '3. took "l. long time.
The enemy would p"l.rtil3.11y S"l.W through bridgo supoorts then
cover the cuts with ico. The r'Osult W'lS 'l furth:;r del'lY of the
'ltt"l.ck. in order to check bricgo "rerv thoroughly. When "l.
t'lnk fe 11 through "l. br ichIJ into "l in strop.m. the orewl'!
usu'llly could not bl? The Germqn policy fin"llly evolved
Wl'lS to use fords through str'1f'\m heds possible. If "l.
hqd tl" crClC;S 03. onIv th'J dri"rer rem"l.ined in t"l.nk.
l1
One solution to the problem of route reconn"l.iss"lnce to use t'lnks
for th'lt purpose. The rOS1)lt"',nt report of which terr'lin could bo used for
the P'lSS8.i,cO of to.nks. w"'s b"l.sed upon qctu13.1 Qxpnrience r"l.th"lr th"l.n ,;UdgTOOnt.
This tochnique W'lS used in tho The"l.tor with success in
loc'lting those routes whoro could or could n0t be used. In terr'l.in
wh)re no In.tor"',l rO'1ds exist. nog'ltiw.l rep0rts 'lre "rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCoss'lry operp.tions of l"l.rgr forces.
An After Action Roport of thp, 44th T'lnk B"l.tt'llion in Leyto notes:
T'lnks wore used 13 NO"Tembor to 18 NO"lTCmber (1944) on 1st
Cqvp.lry Division order for terr'lin roconnqissqnce to loc"lto
torr''lin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in of enemy hrel'lk
through. <lnd w'Jre gi"7on an qddition"l.l miss ion of seeking 13.
PI3.SS through the mount<dns be'b.oreen MOUNT B.I'"DIAN MOUNT
LiJ.O (west of Highwqy #2) could be used for q tqn1c- route
to the ORMOC VJ"LLEY. Mount<dn terrqin orohibited qdv"l.noe 'lnd

34
o
o
o
I
,,-
no pass could be the entire of the
r"lnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO.
A medium t"lnk section from "B" Comp"lny WI;lS a simil"lr
mission in the south of MOUNT LAAO but "llso turned bqck due
to terr"lin. Reconn"liss'lnce proved the terr'lin unsuit"lble
for oper"ltions.
12
Mountr:linous terr$lin not only influences the ob.1ective reconn"lis
of the "ltt!1.cker but "llso exerts ''In "lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized. The size of tp.sk forces will V$lry, of course, with the
mission, but 1'1. rule which "lpplicoble to "lll units
in is th"lt the t"lsk force must be sm$lll. We ID"ly consider "lS qn ex
ample, the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion with the 2d
\
French Morocclln Infqntrv Division.
of the terr"lin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces
with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder, the
individu"ll t<;l.nk ph.toon the fie:htine: unit. The Division'
front -;usu"ll1y WIlS divided into two or three These
norm!1.lly consisted of q medium tllnk compr:lny, Q light
tqnk comp"lny, tqnk destroyer compqny. q reconn"liss'lnce com
compqny. qnd qt of infantry.
Within e:ro1Jprnent W"lre s1'Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf'!;
of q of of the units with the of
inf""ntry whicr' furnished a company. Because of these numrous
forces. we s"lldom had more thp.n one plp.toon in
the SC.m8 .
The 2d Armored Gro
1
;p hlld experience in mountqinous terr'lin.
In mountqinous such qS over which units of this
qrmored h"l"lr9 in It"lly, the employment of t"lnks in
mass hqs been impossible. Seldom hqve t'lctical units
th"ln the tank comp'lnY,been used. To d'lte (July, 1944). entire
tP.nk hqve not boon employed such under direct
a:roup control. For the most pl3.rt; t.mks and de stroyers h.wo
beon to existing rop.ds due to extremely steep qnd
rocky terrl1in, the presence of stono terr<:lcos find wqlls, deep
gullje s. 8.nd soft streqll1 beds .14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their t<1nks were lqrgoly ro
stricted to r013.ds qnd thqt 8.S result,
.... it Wf'lS often necessilry owina: to the np.ture of tho
.errl3.in to dopp.rt from the sound principle thl1t should
36
o

o

o

be employed in mil ss "md not decontr'11 i'!.ed in ponnV Dt\ckets. T'3.nks
wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts.
15
The 1st Armored RO/l:imont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
h'ld P'li"tiou1qr success in f0rmine: t11sk forces composed of one m'3di ..
tim t'lnk one infl1ptry one plqtoon of 1ig:ht tqnks.
qi
ono phtoon of t"1nk destroyers, find one p111toon of ene:ineers. These tp.sk
forces 'Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVl'l.lent of "l. rein
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo .16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torr'lin fqctors these
t"l.sk forces usull1ly will bo simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
support is impossiblo "l.nd whore they m"ly ".Ibsolutely no knowled/l:o
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru: in pllrpllel corddors. This w'ill requiro the
p"lrent heSidqu<lrters to re!':ul"lte closely the movemont of (P'Ich unit. If one
",,-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be fe"l.sible to fl"l.nk the enemy
with !Oln "ld:iqcent u'Q.1t ..
Combllt of this technique mentioned "lS ml'l.ny "IS fivo or more

rO"l.ds be im: usod by tho Sl'lmEJ unit qt thG S"l.me time. In c 1eqrinl! the VOS/l:O s
MOll:I1tq ins, for eX'l.mp1e, tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s ml'l.ny ".IS e i!':ht
t'lsk forces simultllneous1y in "lction, qnd m'l.de excellent /l:qins throu/l:h
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few
Tho sml1ll t"l.sk force tochnique however hqs serious
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility. This W'l.S true even in the of the
Army in Itl1ly, with tho benefit of '3.t le<lst five ye"1rs of be..
hind it.
Ame't"ic'ln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins !;onerqlly
38
th0 conclusion wh0nov'Jr decontrfJ.lhl'l,tion WAS IJxorcJsod. it
domfJ.nded highest degroe of initiqtivo of tho smqll unit
comtr.I'l.ndar. rOllson for this would soom to in I'l.ny <l.rn1Y. Dot"lchod
plfJ.toon fJ.nd comp<l.ny comml'l.ndors fJ.ro c<l.llod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th'1 typo which would usuP..l1v be m"l.rle qt bqttSl.lion or higher
lev') I. In qdditi('\!1. th"1 smJlIl upjt comml'lnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQ<l.dqu<l.rtors hils limited of tho <l.ctivity of
units.
In It"l.ly sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl'} out
requirement in comb<l.t. Tho severity of fight
anomy difficult <l.nd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship. ro
suIting from tho wO'lthl)r <;;nd clim<:t9 fl.ll imposod fl. necossity
for high'Jr of rnsponsibility Jlnd
thlln evor bofore.
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns <l.v<l.il<l.blo to control the oper<l.tion
;ho oloments of his comm<l.nd. Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordin'lting tho movamont of his unit. Thnrofore. when thAr'3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t'1rr<l.in fO'1tures suit,::bly loc>:t'9d qlone: th'3 solocted routos of
'ldvnncc it is t('l d'Jsign'1tn. thlJse torrl1in fe::::turos TIJ."rch ob
.ioct:lvo s.
wbonovor porm;t. In this tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cC'ntrol tb'1t WO'Jld 0rdjn'lrily be lost b'3C'1llse of tho difficult t"lrrl'_lin.
Socurity in comb'1t is I1n present problom. Lone columns
moving <; sinf'"lo route of 'lppr08ch g:brA thp on'1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl'1nks of 'In forco. Cross corridors provido oxcollont
of Ilppro'1ch on the flr.mks <',nd br0k'on tarr;: in plrmits m$lximum CO'TCr
- concof).lment. Ambushos clln b'3 propl1rcd in d'1filos with ell-1SG. To offsl3t
39
the in this respqet tho qttn.cker usuqlly sends
",-- high ground to srjcure tho '1dwlUce of his m'lin body.
T"lnks should be protected in p'lssing dofiles,
On Mfly 20-31. 1944" one pl'1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine: with
tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhep,ding "In
ndv'1nce throu,:rh mount"! ins. M'1neU'T'3r W'1 s impos s ib hl <IUd the roqd
h'1d nun;'3T'OUS blown bridge s. When '1nt i t'1 n'k' fire W'1S 1""3 co i ,rod or
when the column encountered blown bridges, the column W'1S forced
to h'11t until the moved <l.he'1d to dd"'O qwt>,.y <l.ntit"lnk
e:uns or CO'TElr the rep"liring the rOl3.d. As "l result the
column moved no f<l.ster th"ln the infl3.ntrv could "ldv"lnce: in f"lct.,
sloWBr, since time consumed in the column qnd
sending: th'3 Ilhe"ld. Two t"lnks were destroyed by encounter
ine: the enemy in defiles wjthout inf"lntry su"'port. It would
hIll ve seemed perfer"lb le to h"l,rEl sent "l co,rerinl!." force of dismount ...
ed inf"lntry "lho'1d of the qS in overy C"lse, inf"lntry h,.,d to
oome up" n.nyw,.,y. with <l. consequent loss of time. HOWBvsr.,.,t no
time WIllS inf,.,ntry design8ted to cle"ll" the routes, when I
emph"ltic"llly requested infn.ntry support qt CARPINGTO.
Air support is usoful to the '1tt"lc'k'ar "IS "l mcqns of extending his
reconn'1iss'1nce. "lS WBll "IS for 'ltt"lck of Gnemy lin"Js of Its
"""---'101" W'lS first demonstr"lted to Am-o;ric"n troops in tho Tunisiqn C'1mp'1ie:n. A
urief sumrnl3.ry of the highlie:hts of these l'1rly "lir operl'ltions mqy serve to
brinl!." out the strong points "IS well the limit,.,tions of this qrm.
In Fobru"lry of 1943. Amoricqn Ground 'Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th':3 mountq ins which run rou/l:hly north 'lnd south in Tunis ill.
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3.t SIDI BOU ZID. fl3.oing "I high
of defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt "It ground recon
nl'l.iss"lnce. Vh'1t lily behind th'1t w'111 Wfl.S of" prime imnort'1nce, but onlY'1ir
v
reconnp.iss"lnce would Bob
T
6 th0 riddle. However. no such support W'3.S
becqusl our Air Corus wqs still strul!."gling with bqd limited
fie Ids. Most q irfie Ids were b!3.ck on the i ve ly leve 1 ground f$.r to tho
west. This much flight. shl;!rply limitine: time over the '1reqs
of conflict. Air suprlmA.cy hl'ld not yet been "lnd no photo roconnl;! iss'1nce
",-
40

lOS l.vorc '"'T8.il8.blo to pierce the b"lrrier. F"lst fighter phlTIcs c0
1
-11(1 see
nothing in the< brok-en As result, the Germqn p..ttp.ck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise. By 16 Febru8.ry they hqd pushed '''lS f8.r
PASS, qnd penetrqted "ltt"lcking: in the direction of THALA 8.nd
TEBESSA. Thon the 1vel",ther clor,rld, "nd more flir support beCIll11El "l'T<l.il<iblo for
direct successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on
Pl:.SS throup::h which 1111 Germqn suppliA.s tr'1'tT131od. This thre8.t to his supply,
couplod with tho strength of ground countBr!lttl1ck W".S instrument"ll in
19
forcing: Rom1"ol to withdrl"l.w.
Tho probloTPs of providh,!?: flir sup"'lirt by ID"l.ior ",ir force units were
in the difficulties f",cjnc: th'3 opor'ltion of e,ren the sm"lllest Ilir
cr,dt. An Artillery Officer in It 0,ly exphined.
Air strips WElre difficult to loc",to close to the frontline
':;roops due to the restricted There WElre times thqt the
"ir strip h'id to be locl1.ted 40 miles to the reJir, where ever
sufficient level ground could be found. With the in
V01-':1Od between tre front p,nd the '1ir strip.. there were times
when the front c 1et'lr l!'l'.'l8.ther but the strip wqs fogp:ed in.
And 8.g8.in when the W88.tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr,
while the <;IiI' over the front r13.1n or fog. As B. result, con
tinuous 'iiI' cover W!3.S hl3.rd tc ,,'et.
It found through the L-4's were of
limited use in these 8,r':)8.S. hrp':6 distB.TIces froTP the 8.ir
strip to the front wer', irnrol,red much difficulty W'1S experienced
due to the limited g'3.S c8.p"lcity of the phne. For tr.is rG'1son,
L-5's with their CBp8.city were found more suitB.hlo
for this type of oper8.tion.
20
The logistic",l support of J)ny unit l')d"ITpnc j ne:: in mount"" ins will h'1'tr0
to be phnned on the of supply for numerous sm"lll columns 8.dv':.lTIcing
8.long widely sop8.r8.ted I1xes. One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service of the 775th T8.nk B8.tb.l:ion in the PB.cific Theqter.
The comp'1ny W8.S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for sup
plies, '1IDrmmition.. 8.nd g8.so1ine to 8.11 comb'1t elements. The
r8.nsport,:;tion pl8.toon sent dr:i1r':Hs 'md trucks to h8.ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o
L! )T_,,'''''I'IT .... T


supply requiremants of the compqnios.. The motor rna
)l8.toon dividod into which were on 'lnd
frequently sent out eche Ion
work WrtS requirod. The job w,:;.s m 11 done J3.S evidenced by the
fnet th'lt Service Compnny WqS qWl';.rded the Meritorious Service
for their in the Luzon Cqmpaign.
2l
Undo.r cold WG'lther conditions which were of'ton found in moun
such 8.S the GorYl\1lns met 'on the Russian Front. snow fonces h'ld to be
built 'llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3.ds since frequent storms
blew IDJ3.ny d13.Ys work in q fow minutes. In the troops built the
f ences too close to the rOtld. They Sh01lld be set "lbout ten metlJrs from tho
. ro<).d. Even when qn 'lrmy equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of supplies impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8.S over 18 inchos deep. Tqnk units hp,d to roly on the use
of horsos sleighs for their supplies. Two r08.ds were used, one for horses
one for vohicles. supply rout es hqd to be J3.t 8.11 times
uso Russit),n ski p8.trols frequently would mine supply rO'lds.
22
support, too, will bo vory difficult bocquso of the dis

porsion fqetor. In ono 0'1S0, "1 t8.nk b<ltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID'1intonqnce support <).long tho main <).xis of '1dv'1nce. E8.ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt'1ched, with tho mission of milking t),ny imroQdic. te rep'1irs which
woro within his cap,:;.bilities. Whore tho vohiclo rep<:lir boyond his
CF.l.pllbilitios, it WI'lS loft en th9 13.xis until the Ul'lintnw.nco could o"f\eullto it .
Other units. using only three 'lXOS, found it possibll3 to qtt'1ch F.l.dditionql
maintont),nco personnel from 8.n ordn'lnce plqtoon to ollch column.
in support of oommqnd seldom functioned unit. Frequent
ly. instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo.
23
44
The problems of in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been dis
cussed in some detqil. They do not differ for the J'ltt8ock. The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJ'lUsmission, I9spoci"llly Frequency
Modul<1tod, Ilpply. These fA.ctors phce ".I speci80l promium upon wire communicq
tions or rlldio relqy. In one cqse, the 1st Armored Division oper'l.tinl1: in the
Apennines, ws;IS providod with pil1:eons from the Corp's loft, in order to keep in
touch with hil1:hor heqdqu'l.rtl9rs under qny qnd ".Ill conditions.
24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found th"lt the use of wire com
munic<ltions in mountqins offered the most reli"lblo IDe <lnS of communic"ltions.
The technique employed Wo.s to follow mq.ior qdv"lncing units with wire. As soon
"l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3.n qppreciqble period of time, the wire 80rrived
communicqtions ostqblished.
A Field oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oL'ience in keeping conmrunic <t tions functioning in th'3 It"llinn mount'lins:
The 125th Field Artillery B'lttqlion depended prirnl3.rily on
r '\d io for communic <) t ions. The difficult t e rrl'l in pre cluded 113.yilll1:
wirl9 in ml'\ ny C"lses. distrmces would show two miles to "l unit
'l.nd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles.
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlw'l.Ys good but gener<ll
ly r e quired '1 r o l"lY stqtion. Relqy stqtiolls were qlWP.Ys locqted
on high e; round neqr the fire direction cent') r <lnd W"lS frequently
c onne cted to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone. Forwqrd
Ohsenrers could usulllly one W'ly with tho fire direc
tion cente r; th<l t they c0uJd send or recei"e without r 9 1qy.
This cut down on r0113.Y trq ffic.
25
Problems
"Impqsstlble torr<dn" qlw"lVs h"ls been the nightmqre of the .bmker. Any
"ltt"lckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin some time.
movinl1: "l t'l.nk l.nto "irnpqss"l ble terrq inti wi 11 necess A. tromendous qmount
of l qbor. The cotl' mJ.nde r must r oq lize th<lt the presence of his t'l.nks beyond
r terr'l.in b'l.rrier will exort 'l. conside r 'l. blo effect in lowerilll1: the lnemy1s
45
o

o

.J
1" ... ~
ity to resist lind in the of our own troops.
Often. 11 B ine:le t"lnk "lppep..rine: in difficult country in 11 which
the enemy considered "impassllble" c'lused mJiny cJisu"llties. The enemy is
usu'lllycounting: on this terr"lin obsblcle to his flllnk. "lnd probp.bly
will not be in q protective position to Iltt"lck. The result is to
"
.. .
d'3mor<J.l ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i!:0ttine: "1n improved route there."
26
When Comb"lt B of the 1st Armored Division p.mbushed on the (
to MASSA MARITTEMA, It"lly, it sent out 11 smllll in "I wide
flqnking: "tt"lck" ovor fl stTl"lll tr"lil. It succe'3ded becJiuse " "1i!:"in the
GermJlns h"ld relied upon 'imPllss<: ble' terrllin to protect their fhnk." At
y were not Tr.lltll'llly supporting.
The question frequently "rose. "W"IS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY
.- ' .
to t'11ro the t'lnks with ynu in tho "Itt"lck?" The 'lnswor wn.s n.lW'":ys, "Yes,"
-""
- :.;->ao".
boc <:\ us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whic'n w<\s multipliod by their
unexpoctod
The TllEHSUres neCQSS '1 r -'
r
tn brjnr tqr..ks 'lcross t'3rrl1 in W'3ro
numerous Pond loni!:thy. I n ono C'1S0 11 ST':'1l1l t<J.sk force of Comb<!t Comrn'lnd B,
1st Armor ed Dhrision. W'lS movj r-,C!: north t0w'lrd VOLTERRA, It'lly. The 'lxis of
"Idvn.nco throuE:h wry difficult t orr<J. )n . <J.nd voh:ic10s "1l3rn. forcod to
t!10,re S inl1:10 fi Ie <\ 101111: tho one rO'1d le<\d ine: north.
In spots the trn. i1 W'1 S so rn.strictod th<J.t jt bec'lnJO necoss'lry
to use picks '1U d sho'wJls to die: down the br.nks "llone:sido the
trllil bn.fore thA could
T1:e fqllflcy 0f the 11 jn" W'":S exposed in "Inother cqse
41
;f.lnk f).ction by the 1st Armored Divis ion .
The (1st Armored Division) their p.ttqck through
the CASTA MOllNTAINS. The employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk
IV q of 50 VI Tiger r.nd the 162
Infqrtry Di1rision. reinforced with self propelled l1:uns. Tho
most error tho Germl'\l1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir
on qpoqrElntly it:1pt.l.ss"lhle tort'''lin for fhnk protection.
R'lpo'1tadly thoy 113 ft fhnk ungu<lrded only to disc0170r too
hte th'l.t 3 . comp'lny of M-4's W'lS sittjng on tho
in. In tho c"lpturo of ROCCASTRADA. minod hill
town in th'3 Comb-:: t Commllnd A s0ctor" tt.lsk forco W'1S sent up
73" f.l two-l'lno tht.lt confinod tho column
to f.l column fot't'ltion. Tho sm'lll Gormlln g'lrrison in tho
tOVIl1 h'ld no difficulty stopping 'lrmorod forco, which could
o::lploy only '1 0r tW0 0. t timo. tho Comb'lt
COnmJ'1ndcr quickly sent !>. second t'lsk forca ."round to
the loft. A f'lint trdl" which showod on the "ll)rllll photo
grllphs, l a d north P'lst ROCCASTRADA" 'lnd intersocted 73
'lbov'3 the town. Tho trll ll Wf', S so nllrrow" rocky. stoep
'1nd twistod th'lt tho Go rm'l ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it.
Tho rout o \'fOU Id h'lv(} boen difficult oven fnr 'l mule" but tho
t'lnks m'ln'l go d to worry th 0ir W'l.y through.. The Germllns
wero forced to oVB.cunte their position with ho'lVY cllsu'llti'3s.
28
Sinco the k()y terr<liD f'J fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f! ins r:.r'1 primllrily i !l f'lntry
ob.;octive s th'J routo of th'3 p. ttflcking force will t:orm'llly bo 'I lone: ride::e
linos or other whcr(l they DIlY gllin surprise Ilnd
whoro they th'J costly losses involved in '1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllnt"l gc of ons 'H"vp.tion is poss '3 ssod by th'l defender. To tho
on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p. tt"lck requir0s
/). e:rellt dOl>, l of work in prepllrine: c01
T
ored 'md in the so
must be pll rt of 'lny forco j n mount'linous t'Jrrdn. An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk B<:\ tt".lion r e l'ltL'g his oxperienc0S :in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
in Itllly st p. tod thll t Engino'3rs '1 r') fJ must jn mountllins for
numerous obstqcles. The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units 'lS low IlS
----toon . tnginoors 11 1s0 f'lcilit8.ted th'J flow mo"umAnt of supplies.
29
48
The use of in the of SAN PIETRO, from the south
presented special problems. It hoped armor would the
formid<ible defenses 'md cle<ir the for the inflmtry. However. even if
there h<id been no enemy opposition, the terrain itself would been
most imp'lss'lhle for cross country movement of . First pl'lns for
Comp'lny A, 752d T'lnk to move with the 143d Regiment along the
",,--,_... _.-
SMJiMURCO slopes, well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road. The ground on either
side of the narrow rO'ld series of terraces, three to seven
fe0t high, covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub lind broken by stream
beds, gullies, p.nd other
One 'lttsmpt m'lde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to alon/t the upper terr'lces, PIiSS our
positions. Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next. The lllth
J.:Jagineers broke down terrf'lce Wl'1l1s to mllke 'l trl'1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d B'ltta1ion, 143d Inf<intry Regiment. On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A, 753d Tqnk Bl:lttqlion, tried out this route, it cOllld only
'is f'l.r 'lS the second terrf'lce. Rep3s:lt
f
3d l'1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
r e sll1t0d only in the t'lnk" throwing its tr'lck. However, this oper'ltion
ShOW0d th'lt "wen with hllrd work by engineers thf3 t.mk could not
mq ,ke Hs p'lss'l.ge, to go into th':1 "lttf'lck.
The diversity qnd extent of eTlj!:ineer support is refloct'3d in tho
following compilf'ltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
B'lttalion, 1st Armored Division:
In a 21-dqy period, this bqtt'llion constrtlctf'ld 37 trB'ldway
bridg:lJ s, repllir'3d 12 bridgIJs, surf'lced F.lie:ht mt'l .ior fords, 'lnd gr"ld
ed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds.
30

The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins.
49
t

,

.

(

M
o
n
t
e

U
\

\
:
2
5
"
0
0

"
"
"

'
;
)
6
.


-
,

Fler / 0
\( l'\o.P
1
(
CI A1" ,..t"'l

;, or As consoquence, nul' WBro P.t pnint
r'1th'1r th'1n "It I;l.re"ls. Th3 torr<tin further derr"lncs "l. considerSlble in
cr0'1S0 in tho of high firq duo to tho defill'.dec positi
0
ns of
both gun "l.nd
Tho prohloms of forw!>.rd 0bseriT"lrs lik-awls!'! wor"l by tho
difficult tcrr<tin. A hif2:her (1f "lost" rounds W'1S experienced,
oven whor<3 thn q rtillory firine: "l.t t:l. vhen thIJ t'lrJ:!:ot
W"lS moving over r('lugh ('11' "lI'h0re tho 110ry firing in support
'''''''''
in mount<l ins "!.r'3 forced tl"l follow 8. wind i nj;t pqth, wit1-, C0nstqnt chl1ng:os in
dir<:lctions "Ind "Iltitude .. which complic'ltes comput"tion of support firos.
Consider for oX'1mple" tho prob10ms of tho officer who
,.--.., support of troops <ttt">cking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY, in It'11y. By 6 Fobru<try
United Stqtes troops qS f"l.r "l.S tho GARIGLIANO
hr;l.d so izod h'11f 0f tho t ovm of Cl.SS HJO. Furthor pro,:ress WI'.S h10cked by
enemy cl'\ntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1.BBEY, sited on fl hill m<tss some 500 motors
qbc'vo the v'llicy. Our forces, th'Jref0ro" executed !3.n encircling:
precoded by concontr'ltions of qrtillory. Those conC0n
tr<l.tinns wer:') phnned tC' follow '1 spir'll Pith" risin!<: il" elo1T"l.tion from 35 to
517 r:l0tors <l.nct with 11 ch<inge sO'Cewhere 'llong th'9 rO<l.d wherAby tho rie:ht k!un
W<l.S firing tho left portion of th0 concentr<l.tion. (See skotch ID<l.p. Figure 16)
ThE) <:0mput"l.tions, which took five d",ys to complete, m"lY well S'3r1TO 11.8 eloquent
testimony t('l the d i fficultios "f fire oontrol in mount'l inDus torr"'! in.
tl1.sk forco,sep<J.r",ted fr'0t:J th'3 1i1f'l.jn body" fr"3Quentlyw13re forced
rely upon their own reS01lrCes in <ill types of of this
51
sopl3.rl3.tion from th0 ml3.in body" C;"IT(ln th8 sU1l3.llest t'3.sk force 1I'l"J.s coltlpased of

Inf<l.ntry 'IIVl'lS essent::1."J.l to the successful
'lT6rql diff"Jrent typos of'troops.
oporl3.tion of 13.11 tl3.nk unite.
Tho 755th Tl3.nk B",tt"l lion, for eXl1mple. found thf.lt f'l. comp"lrA.ti,re ly
nmount of ihf'3.ntry WI18 required. In the oporl1tion tow'3.rd TERELLE,
It13.1y it WIl8 11 C"lSO of too much !'.Irmor confined to the rO<l.d, "J.nd too few in:
f"J.ntrYltlen O"\Ter '1 wido <),1'01). Consnquontly, th'3 t"J.t'lK-S wore requirod to pro..
"Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes.
An officor from this b<l.ttl1lion m'3.de the stl3.tement:
It h'3.s been demonstr'3.tod in every "J.ction th"J.t inf"J.ntrv support
is indispons"J.ble to tqnk "J.ction in U1ountl3.in The
must I3.dVl'\nce close to tho tllnks so th"J.t the fire of the enemy
m<l.chine guns will disclose their positions I3.nd then p8rmit the t"J.nK-s
to loc"J.tc their fire on these positions. If the inf"J.ntry does not
"J.coomp"J.ny the t"l.nks, the cnomy the t"J.nks to t:ld"T"J.IlCe without
being fired on.. "ind when th0 inft:lt'ltry comes within r"l.ngG. the
U1Rohine e:11nS fire on thom f.lnd pin them to th"l ground. Tho tl3.nk-s
hl1,re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1"J.chinl3 l1.'uns <at'ld in most insbmces
oqnnot turn <around "lnd fire on theUl beC"J.use of the n"J.rrow. winding
they "Ire opor'3.ting on in Ulount"J.inous
In other bl!itt'3.lions thr; doctriW WI1S thl!it. "In mountqinous fighting
tho priml!iry mission of the) WIlS clO'se support of inf"J.ntry by C'lnnon l!ind
mt.\chine /1:un firo.
1I
Tl'l.nl<s would stqy inf'3.ntry. Either t<:lnks or infqntry
might le'3.d, but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID'3.intt.\ined between these elemonts th"lt
l!in I'trtiller,,. concentro:!.tion on tho t'3.nks would not strike th9 inf"J.ntrY. The
inf"l.ntrv el"ment WqS essenti'3.l in reTI'ovint:: the ml3.in to tt:lnlr 8.dVl3.nce
in mount!3.ins. the f'l.ntitt.\nk guns" These guns. situo:!.ted on the fl"l.nks to cO"lrer
Jl sm"lll stretch of rO'3.d, wore afton difficult to discover. "l.fter they
opened firo. To combl!it those /tuns, inf"l.ntry hl!id to l'Jo:!."re the r()l3.d. f'l.nd <\d
V'3.nce "l.lone: tho rid/tos. Tf'l.nks used se"lT6r"J.l rounds of smoke fi red in the

52

rs:l.l direction of the gun, to permit th"l infp.ntry tn g:0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld.
Armored units in prospect of
Il one d"l.mned mountqin lI.fter I3.nother.
1I
The b,ck of' spectll'lculqr .. the
mud r"l.in, .. or wind.. tho slopes ""nd rocks .. t>nd the lqck of <:\ny
_J
to\vns for shelter.. serious effect upon A
d ivis ion comm$?ndor wrote:
Too unit cOIDrn<:\nders expect to under ide"l.l
conditi0ns. When they find th<it conditions otherwise .. they
tond to fDa:}, CnT:'1l7ll3.nders of tS1n1<s
'1;-d c0I:lplllin thllt they liro unl1ble"to employ thoir units
to tho best t"l.cticp.l principles. This be truo .. but
tho commndcrs should undorst,"nd thS1t ided cf"nditjrns
"l""ro seld0m rOtJ.lf?;ed in b",ttle. They must le<:lrn to rogf\rd cortliin
hl'lndic<ips "ts hqint!: entirely n0rtnl3.l. Ag:Slin most officers of
units thoir use under conditions of 13. brel3.k
thr0ugh. This .. of cours
t
) .. is tho ide"ll; hrwmror .. the GOrml3.ns
...-...clevf)r in m":l:intqinine: 1'). continuous front llnd t'lke sooci",l pre
:l3.utions tf" defend p.1:"Elp.s suit.. ble for tqnks. Therefore. the con
copti(,ln th"l.t t"lnks I3.re tn bo used ('Inly to bre<:lk thr0ue:h does not
fit in with th9 conditJ.('ns "13 they exist. ArmorlTD.lst w(lrk with
inf'lntry <is 'l te"l.m, whether or n(\"t br'3"1kthroue:h is possible.
32
To tho monotony. Fifth Army instructed II Corps to:
units so to m<iny tr00ps possible
to reqr for rest, reequipping, I3.bsorpti(ln of ropll3.cements
tr'linine: Prmrido awry f"lcility for comfort
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fot"\'{qrd "1re'ls. If
:cless build im,:s 'lnd he'lv\, tent sloepine: 'lccoIn('ld'lti('lns will b9
utilizod.
33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army who
:WIlS well '"!W"1re ('If thE) full i:r:JPl3.ct of m(\untdnollS upon morl3.la 'lnd
of units.
The followine: historiC'll eX'lmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine: highly SUMm'lry (If the rollin points in this
It is boliEnrcd th"l.t this of cort"lin "lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ,'ad unit in comb"lt throue:h inClus t"lrr'lin botter emphllsizes the
53

O
V

I
e

'
/
-
\

I

r
W
-

l
e
r

1
2
S
J
3
1
5

I
l
9
R
(
F
R
)

,

B
r
e
m
p
n
i
l

i
'

,
.
.

?

.
"
,
.
.

.
,
-
.

.
-
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.

t
t
'

J

1
\
.
_
-
,
.

.
.
.
,
.
.
.
.
.
.-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+

l
o

P
e
f

'
e

F
O
R
C
I
N
G

T
H
E

S
A
V
E
R
N
E

G
A
P

2
n
d

F
R
E
"
I
C
H

D
i
v
i
S

O
N

W
I
T
H

X
v

O
I
i
P
S

L
l
G
E
N
D

_
_

F
o
r
c
e

M
O
l
l
u

a
s
k

F
o
r
c
e

M
.
n
j
O
n
n
e
l

.
_
.
_
T
o
l
k

>
o
r
e
e

R
o
u
v

l
i
o
"

_
_
_
_

T
a
l
k

F
o
r
c
e

E
n
e
m
y

r
e
d

.
.
.
.
.

-
-
F
I
C
r

I
I

C
o
r
r
m
a
n
d

I
L
l
!

.
C
o
m
b
o
t

n
O
"

4

-
e

-

-
.
J


--- - - - -

.-.-.,. .....
, .J
i
H
o

i
;

,
- ,.

.
'oi.
':. ......-..............:--..

__
" /"<..-,.r---''"'''_.....
-I"


..
eo.
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP
d Fr . .. " '/ PE t. q 5
t t""
F I Cr 1/
I
I'C"!>I
.. 911('"'
-
____TC'. r
____ 't.ro" ...t.1' o' a mor:d
r ,tn,
.., .. ..
,,
of in the would mere synopsis of tro, body
of the
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL A.t point east of LUNEVILLE, FrA.nce to the foothills of
the Vosges Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hif!:h Vos'!:es in the s011th
from the Low Vosf!:es in the north. The town of SAVERNE is on the
exit of this pass. The High Vose:es re'1C\'1 of o,rer 4000
feet. The Low Vosl<es. lower in elevl'ltion. mot'13 forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent mf"!'6 difficult obstr:lcle tbm
t\'1e Hif!:h Vosges.
The betw'een LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons. Between LUNEVILLE and th':l SAFRE RIVER in "l redon of forest !'Ind
from SARREBOURG is t:ln open to the western ede:e of
tL ,AVERNE PASS. The Vos/tes i.V:('IuntJ'dns constitute the next redon. The
western ede:e is shaped lik'e tiers '",hi 16 th"l eastern ':ldf'-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN. The Germl'Jns had constructed a defense Ijne done: the
"''estern foothj lIs and t:lnothAr in the Vosges themselves. The line the
W\"lstern footrills, or the pre-Vosl!"1S ljne. been constructed by GermJln
troops conscripted hhor. It w'?s coU'pJete with bl3rb"3d vdre "lntp.ngle
menta. antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches. The Vosges d"3fense
line consisted of strone: pojnts eyt'3nr'Jinf!: ':110m: the miUt8ry crest. Old
W8re lJtilhf'ld; pntjtCln
1r
djtchAs were bl.lilt block'ing the
pr'inciP!'ll j:prenues of <>.nr} Drep"lred mJ3.chine e:un positi("lns" fire '3.nd
communjcqtions trenches were plo:J,C'3d At strqtelZ'ical points. This W'3S the
e:round throue:h which the 2d Fr'3nch ArU'ored Dj,rision of the United Stqtes XV'
,,-
AI )I'PS W'3.S to
55
The 44th 79th Infqntry Divisions were to q of
the ore-Vosges line, supported b:T the 2d French Armored Division. the
brol'\'kthroue:h h"ld been qccomplish"Hl, the 2d French Armored Divjsion WI':IS to
throue:h the two infl':lntry divisions qnd secure the 61':1st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP. By the 19th of November the infl':lntry divisions hqd se
cured '3 brM'kthrou!'.'h in the vicinit-. of CIREY. Though the wel':lther qt this
time WqS bqd, with the in the flooded, the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY
The 79th Inf'3ntry WqS to follow the "Irmor mop up.
G'3nerl'll Philippe Fr"lncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne.: roonner:
a.) In generl3.l, the l'!dv'3nce w('luld followt'be less frequented routes
tho Vose:es, north I'lnd sOl:th of the SAVERNE GAP, I3.void jne.: urbl!ln cen
t"
b.) Smf:lll J;lrmored te",ms WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsl'lkthroul!:h 13.nd
probe for we'3k points. vV'hen one WB-S found, the of wnnor would be em
ploved.
scribed.
Durj ne: th9 eqrly ;l of the 19th of November, CeL moved out to
UfJ northe'3st froU' the '\dcinitv of CIREY in two force columns. By 1830
hours on t'be 20th, ono t'1sk force h'3.d reqched Dl',BO. In th"3 l'lte ",fternoon
CCV w<'\s committed to follow thE! 81"1ments of ceL. CCV rolled into thp. VOS!1''3S
in !l. downpour of r"lin "Ind w'ith bhzinl!:. CCR wtJ.s selected to protect
tho? Corps rie:ht fhnk., CCD mov'3d jn the left portion of th'3 tJ.nd lld

,T' north. AgtJ. in 6'3.ch comb"lt cOU1U'qnd WJlS subdj,rided into two tBS1r. forces.
56
9re wet'e now eiltht am'lll teqms mo,rlntt. north '\nd northel'lst otrer unimpro'\ted,
n'l.rrow.- windine:,- 'lnd slippery mountt::lib
Alone: every roqd. in I3ddition to their nf'ltur'll difficult tr'l.Verse
the poor mt::ln-m'l.de obst'l.cles were encountered time qnd time
Ab'l.tis, old forts .. rO'l.d blocks m13.de of lo!':s I'llld cement "It irree:uhr inter
v
"l1s,_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met !'ind reduced. Althoue-h such obst'l.cles were
frequently bY-p"Issed. mt\ny could not be 'l,roided 13.nd ene:ineers qnd infl3.ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv t'l.nk fire 1111'ere used to red
1
lce them. Adverse
we'l.ther conditions, rl'lin 'l.nd some snow imposed an I3.ddition'l.l hl3.ndic'l.p !'is the
division front'l.l1y left the VosfCes 'l.no dE'lbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN.
Two t'\sk forces h'ld en,reloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south, while
the southern forces turned north, circled 'l.nd entered the pqSS from the eqst.
Another the town of SAVERNE from the north. By the 23d of November
.--.
3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3.d been reduced.
Twenty-one miles, str'l.ight qcross, hqd been t\dv'l.nced. This W'l.S some-
wh'l.t less th'l.n 'l.rU10r W"lS in the h'l.bit of durintr the summer rf.' 1944;
throue-h tre'l.cherous mount'l.ins. The 'l.ctu'l.l dist'l.nce tr'l.veled W'l.S much p.:re'l.ter
th'l.n twenty-one miles. H'l.d 'l. unit other th"ln "lrmor 'l.tt.empted this 'l.tt'l.ck, with
out the speed qnd fire power of I'l.rmor. it is doubtful thqt the SAV"ERNE PASS
would h'l.ve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divi
sion. On the other h'l.nd, the 2d French Division would h'l.V6 been
dehved considor"lhlv hqd they not been s')pported hy infl3.ntry.
The XV Corps h'l.d been opposed hv units of the 21st P'l.nzer Lehr Divi
25th P"'n'!:er Grenf:ldier Di,7ision, 130th pqnzer Lehr Division., 245th Inf'l.n
i . (
- Divis ion, Infl'1ntrv D1 vIs ion, 361st InfJlntry ion. 553d Inf"intlll'Y
57
"..-
1 ion, t3.nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce I':IOross the VOSlS9S
to the b<mks of the REnTE RIVER. The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston. Even the shfirp slopes, forested
bills, steep cliffs in Vosges rp.nge of proved to be unsur
mount"!.b 1 e obst")c le for armor in th'J exploitfition under the 'fIorst 11,119pther con-
d
't'. '34
J lons ln mlOIny va" rs.
NOTES FOR CRAPI'ER 3
lilT he Gothio Line", Fifth Army History, Vol VII (Wl'lshington: Govern
ment Print Office). p 7.
2Field Service Ref!:uhtions, FM 100.. 5 (7ft3.shin/!ton: GOV'3rnment Print
ing office, 1949), 836.
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh, "Mountl3.inous Terr"lin in Generfi1", The
Milit"lry Review Vol 24 No.6 (June 1944) p 72 "lnd 73. printed in
trll.nshted from to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Campl'iie;n", TM 2, Hq NATO, P 22.
5M"l,; M T Hunt, "USEI of Armor on Luzon
ll
, student mono/!r"lph 75 (Ft Knox,
The Armored Sohool 1948), p 11 llnd 12.
6The VYintor Line, Historic"ll Divis ion, U S :Vl3.r Depl'lrt!l1lmt (14 June
1945), p 56.
7After-Action Report, 775th Bn, Sept 1943 to July 1945, p 7.
8Cl'ipt Neil W Dennjs, "A T"ln'k" COlPPl3.l1Y on O'k"in"lw"l", student
103 (Ft Knox: The Armored School, 1948), p 9 and 10.
9K"lsi1owitch. op cit, p 4.
Gen T J C"lmp, in Tunisil'i (Ft Knox: Hq The Armored
Comm"lnd, 1943), p 6.
11 .
Interrogatlon Report 34, 7707 Mis, MIS CE}ITER (4 M"lrch 1947), p 20.
12
After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn, December 1944, p 14.
Report, 757th Tl3.nk Bn, July 1944, p 1.
14After.Action Report, 2nd Group, July 1944.
58
15
Milit
l'lry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12, WilD, Wl'lr DepA.rtment
(1843). p 10.
16 J J 1
After-Action Report, 1st Armored Division, 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y
1944, El'lssim
17"L0860ns froln the It!3.liSln TAil 3, Rq NATO. 12 lVp>.rch 1944,
p 29.
18After_Action Report, 756th Tl'lnk Bn, 1944, P 5.
19lnterview, Cl'lpt H Simpson, Armored Officers Advp.nced 1949-50,
The School, Ft Knox, Ky.
20Intervlew, Lt Col W J Lind, former Executive Officer l'lnd S-3 of 125th
FA BN (L), 34th Infantry Divis ion.
21775th T'lnk Bn, oJ? cit, pl'J.ssim.
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3.tion Report 34, },J:S Center, Mp.rch 1947,
pl3.ssim.
23Interview, Cl'lpt Rl3.1ph Instructor, Automotive
The Armored School, Ft Knox, Ky.
r
24Interview, Cl'lpt Kenneth L Thompson, Communjcatjons D9pl'lrtment, The
A...Jored School, Ft Knox, Ky.
25
L
" d "t
1n , 01' C1
26M,ilitary Repox:ts on th9 United NA.t ions Vol 22, ,MID, W'l'lr Depl'lrtment
(1944 ) p 16.
27After-Action Report, 13th Armored Regiment, 1943, pl3.ssim.
28Lt Col R K Gottschl'lll, GOl3.t M4", The Cavalry Journ'i1, Vol
LIV No.1 (Jan-Feb 1945), p 29.
29C"lDt Robert F Ivioore, "The Employment of Tl'ln1rs in the Mountains",
student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox, The Armored School 1944), p 2.
30
tlMud
, t . t C ( K II
l'llnS l'lnd Armor, rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox, The
Armored School 1949), p 53 lind 54.
31 '
After-Action Report, 755th Bn, Februl'lry 1944, p 9.
G61n Fred L VfSllker, The fh.dling List Vol XXVIII, The Infantry
School (July 1944), p B.
",-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army, Sub.iect: Current Oper"ltions, To CG II, IV, XIII
J, 6th South African Armored DiviSion, and 92nd Infl3.ntry Division, file
59
2-Y2, No"'{rember 1944.
Report, Seventh United Army, Vol II, 1944-1945,
P 397 I:md 412.
60
i
CHAPI'ER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel
The story of the defense of P'lSS, tbe Bqttle of
conbdns severl'll eleroonts which '3.r0 still worthy of considerlition
in "l.ny study ef modern defensive methods in
The outline of the o0fense THERMOFYLAE is simple: The
WBS loc!"lted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA, in Greece. It held pl:lrttoull3lr
in history it the only by which hostile
Rrmy might penetrp.te from 'northern into southern Greece.
In Aue:ustl' 480 B.C Xerxes. rul'3r of the Persi!3.n Empire.
Greece witb I3.n I3.rmy drl'l.wn from "l.11 the peop'les of his r'3Rlm. The Greek"s
THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes <)nd bis "l.T"my therel' S''3t up 13.
c13.1 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the P"ISS, the 'lpDrotlch to which
W<lS only some 50 feet vfide.
l
To ridioule them, he sent the Medes '1nd Cissil',ms
'1l"ith instructions to tp"ke them prisonors 'lnd bring: them before him. 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aft".lr Il fie:ht:ine:. the kine: sent fOI'll'T'lrd his 10.000
"immortB.ls," an elite unit. But they, too, were unsuccessful. Few Greeks
werEl killod, but the Porsil'm losses wero excess:ively S6"1TElre .. The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when 'l nt.lti,re f<:lmiliqr the country told Xerxes of q
which led "lcross the mount<lin. the llse of 'Nhich w('!uld en<>,ble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position. The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong: this trl'l.il .. Ilrriving:
in the of the Greek" position soon middlOlY of the third dqy.
of the qpprol"lchin!1: Pers}llns qlrp.'ldy hr,d heen broug:ht to the Greeks by scouts ..
pl3rmitt:i:re: q withdr"lw1'll of the m"lin body, but thEl 1100 Greeks who rem!'lined
61
were killed.
2

In the 2400 since much new equipment

Howovsr, the of terrqin, its
h"IS be en r-' v'
effect on despite the of
!'1odern p.tmor" ".nd I'!.ircr"lft. In mount"lins the defender clln stop
with few troops. The Gertlll'l.n dehying: .. ctions in Sicily I'!.nd
during: World Wflr II g:"l"l713 proof th"lt this still holds true todliY.
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the roqd, he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by I';l. rop,d. To judge from its description. this rOlid
would se8m to ri'Q'q I those seC(lndt:lr" routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily, to by-pS'!.ss Germlin def':msjve positions: "This p"lth
"l.scended the jtore:e of the River ASOPUS, qnd the Hill ANOPAE; then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETA"3
The defender must block the pqsses principS'!.1 Ilvenues of "pprol':l.ch.
he cp.nnot secondqry routes. Those which he cl':l.nnot block by
troops or we .. pons must 'bo CO"lrGroo by obs')rvtltion. Leonjdlls, the Greek
commqndor, "lbla to oxtriCl':l.t8 ml':l.jor portion of his force due to the
avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persil':l.ns wqs covered by
his scouts, who him of Xarxos' mqneuver.
The defendor must hqvo protoction for his strone: points.
FurthGrmore, th8 mor"llo of th0 defonse must strong to with
st"lnd isollCltion rcpep.t<ld The of individulCIl brq"lT"Jry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo g:"jned fr(l11i history. When tho Grook
forces were frorr both diractions. Xerxes used -
very effectbro "I!:"Iinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents. Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined "Th", Persil'ln I'lrrows "Ire dlirkening

62

. ky," tho Spt:l.rtq,n Dieneces is to I'J.nswerod, "Good, then wo
in the sh.de."
4
The lessons of 480 B.C. still hold true. Consider these excerpts
from 'In "lrticle in "Red st"lr/' givl!ll! Russi"ln experience in defensive ..
tiona in mountqinous in World II.
In the foothills, which ropresent "l series of low
crosts dissected by vl'l.lleys, tho defense often hl'l.S l'l. dis
continuous cbl'l.rl'l.ctor of the isolP.tion of tho sop.rp.te
h,3ights ",nd the limited number of I3.pprMchos from the
r8l'l.r, qnd is up on tho principles of defense on brol'l.d
front. These peculi13.riti0s in tho mount13.ins
proper. Hero it is gonGrG.lly impossible to cre.to continuous
front line. Units Ilnd somotim0s even sm.n e:roups occupy only
the individul'l.l promontories, mountl3.in pI3.SS'3s. roqds, qnd trqils,
forming points qnd centers of resist13.nco. They l'l.re isolp.ted
from one Ilnot'b'3 r c.ud "lequire "l. c"Jrt<> in independence of "lction.
These condjti(lDS Cr0'lte f"l"Clr"tbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd
fl'1nldng t'he d"fensive units. Turning "Ind flp.nldng "lre fUrther
helped bytht? poor field of vision I1nd th'9 del'l.d spqces.
According tho field ml3.nulll, front13.1 I'J.ttp.ck is by
1 required for height or other po
ltion. Tho considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height, their recowmends q through on nl3.rrow
section of the front.
Dospite those flSP')Cts of mountp.in defense, it
Cll!:'. be thoroughly impregn".ble. Comb"lt exporience shows
thflt if the cororr"\nd'3r orgl'l.nizes the def'3nS0 wisely r,nd t<',kes
effoctbre qg,."inst hostile turning move ...
lL<;nts, "lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk
"Ind end in fl3.ilur9. Moro0
1r
ar, tho flqnking units th"lm
SfJ Ivos often fSet into I3.n s itw'l.tion t:1'lke the ir
W'1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty.
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti('n turnjne: Ilnd
fhnking movements is 13. development of de;fense in depth
strong security on the defense in the moun
tpins must first of 13.11 t",lrtJ C"1ro to secure the junctions j:md
6specict11y the opon fhmk This cO"lrering force is dispos
ed in echo Ion 0n th'1 fl<mlrs fl'1d is in 1riSU<l.1 C01'1lTUnj.c<ltion with
the unit sending it out For qdequ$J.te security of .iunctions
qnd fl"\nll::s it is "llso necessl'lrv to h<"ve c0ntinuous
rnlinble outposts, obst<lcles on tho open fl<lnks <lnd to thFJ reqr,
corroct dj spos itions of re S';rv'3 s, I'l.nd const",nt comrrunicl'J.tions
with Ildjllcont units.
But thjs still is pot 13.11. No expl"ldients will SIWe the de
if it <lcts ir r"l solute lYe P"!SS i,rity 13.nd ,rp,cillqtion in
it""bly le"d t" loss of th'J initip..tiv6" to th"l movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the of the combat
..... 1 ,
fonnation
,
and finally
.
to the encirclement of individul'J.I units by
the I:lnemy. Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished
by an acti"lTity which includes the forcine: of our will on
tbe enemy. Superior ity in is not at all necessary for
this. In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads
can perform tasks possible for comoanies and battalions under
ord ina ry cond it ions.
Techniques
Althoul!.h the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre combl'J.t in mountl':l. ins
are timeless, the development of techniques for the defender has been in
fluenced 1}v the r'3finement of modern wel'J.pons. The firepower, mobility, and
shock action of armor h<;,d a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense. Even wt>ere the defender :is WEll'J.k in armor, he is influenced by the
presence <;,nd probl'\ble emnloyment of enemy armored forces. This will effect
his organization of the terrl'J.in, engineer works, defense of mountain P'lsses,
,-- 'ld posts. It influences his mel'J.sures to limit routes of
approach. I'J.S well I'J.S his employment of I'J.rtillery 'l.nd self-propelled I!.uns. In
further pJi:mnine: the defense, considerl'J.tion must be e:i "en to sl)pportinl!' air
'l.nd camoufla.re or concealment from both e:round and air obser'7'l.tion.
Orgl;lniz'l.tion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendin!r a moun
t'l.in position. The forces must correctly I'J.nalyze the routes of
enemy approach 'l.nd the key terr'l.in features, the control of which
will block the These criticql terr'l.in features are manned by strone:.
balanced, self.sustaining units ore:'l.nized for defense. con
st'l.ntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI/!. points of enmll
><roups of enemy 'l.ttemnt :in.,. to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone: points by
,-J.lnits are often critical points thl'lt require const'l.nt patrollinl!. or
/
64
I
to dotoct anomy units r;ttot"'ptinl!. to pJl"i0tr1';te th? def'3ns)ve
p. don.
COYlsid<1rint' tho probhw frC'lT,' the poil1t of ,,('iow <'f the <ltt'lcker r>r;y
help renuc'3 it to tre rniniT!11J'\'!" '1Vl-t;ln l'lttncldnr.:: " stron!!:l:v held do
sl'illtul of the prjncipl1ls of w"-r. Frontl11 A.ttl'lclrs 9.ro by no
the only T"othoa of sehil'1'r Il r,1ount"1jn position.. The onet:ly will un
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo
n
The Gorl'1Qns oftrin l'lttomptcd to
fhnk '1nd isobt') tho mount<:in p"'sit:l"rl.s PT'd would l'ltt'3li'pt brsq'\r
tl:1rough on " n<J.rrow front.
This is prociso ly how thr::J Gorrr,''ms I;lctulllly did operqte in tho
foothills of tho Northern C"1UC"lsus. They tried to utilize overy
br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr. I)vr)ry con,renient hidden IlpprOl1ch
",nd difficult pf'lthWllY lOl3.dine: to the fhmlr or rOl'!r of th9 d,"fonso,
in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the Sometiros tho
to wed!!o t1:let"solvos iY'tn I'lur dofense on "1 YlJJ.rrO'l( sector, en
:;I;\voring; to 6U1org:e on tho lil'1.GS of c01T'run:ic'ltions "1nd il'1to the
A.1Ioya in ordor to thJ EPP on the
fll3.nks l'lnd rellr gf tho units Ciof'Jnding thn f'lll.in positi('ns C'n the
nountqin slopes.
Tho defendire: force whjc'0 relies on terr'lin for fl8.1'11:
security in'ITjtes disPtster. E'lOl, un:it rrust 13.11'010 fIqnk security, str
tho Approl'l.ch of onOtl1y since he trust tirre to shift his ro-
to moot thJ expected enemy For this r8p.son it hecor"GS extrome
ly importqnt to th0 comrrA.nder he set up q outpost system. Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tl"J outposts with th1') -:-ris,sion of gqinjng con-
with the enemy llt the groqt'Jst possible distqnce. It is jrlJort"1'1t to

65
,,-..
the under in front of the position
to bring him under fire tho eBrliest possible time.
strong: points form the b"lckbonl3 of defensi"'lTe system in
These strong points by units from to
plfltoon in strr:mgth !Ol.rf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlr:> position. my be effecttv'31y enployed witl:' the strong: points
with tho mission of lone: r<lnge fires p.g:qjnst the t:lttJ).ckers. Be
C8USO of its mobility 1.'1nd DOW'3rf'ul ""rrnt:l.ment" the he"l"'lry tt:l.nl<'" will prob"l,bly be
used to pro'tTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone: point. In
mount8.inous wher') enemy fltt"l,cks cS'J.n be well trqined tfl.nk
try from th'3ir tJ.rmor find destroy thr) qrIi'or in det'lil" while fire
the defonsive position tl}.k8S C!'J.ro of' the l3.tt<;.cking inf<mtry. Armor
Iso very '3ffectbre Qg:"1inst infqntry without 'lTr.1orod support,
his inff1ntry to tb'"l fil1"\l ob.iectivG.
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inf"lntry
WA rning or syst'nr. sholl Id b"l El An "l.tt"l.cl<" by
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division q GGrm'ln stroDe: point shows
th'3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P, tqnk qS q strong point" without the
protoction of or system. Force Howze WqS
op<Jr"lt in!'.: in the center of' tb'9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of' RonE in the SUJ:l'l1'OOr of' 1944'.
The column 17!O''1ed saveri'll r.:ilos over mount<;dnous terr'lin whon suddenly
the Armored "'I7'3hicl
r
3s found h"l.lted in q .,r8ry d':np (See IDJlp.)
---- sent q to qround the bend where the
66
, 0
J:t .- -.. l '
__ t....,.r{"J D\.l
o
-----u -- :
faC,e, __ n ow'. _


a
I[f .VWt ..... . , .-" I f
the vicinity of C. From there'he.was
, ,.

f
I ~
-curve. The pl3,rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3,nks cov'3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 beyond the S-curva.
The force pll3.ns to knock out tho
Tl3,nk point. An W"l.S disposed on Point A, extendircg
'3.11'nl1: the hillside to Po:int B, ".s shown on sketch. On sign1'l.l 1'l.n M-10
Tl3.nk DAstroyer Wl3.S to proceod to Pojnt C fire on the first Tirror Tqnk.
The 1e'3.ding t1'l.nk of the Wl3.S instructed to send tl3.nk 1'l.round
the bond following the M-10, como up 13.1one:side it, 1'l.nd t1'l.r
gl3t CO') 1d bo found.
A single gunnp,r fired the II st-=lrtine: sigIll'll.!! Tho shot W"lS
rDID1'l.rkqb1e in thl3.t the first Tiger Tqnk 13. direct hit from 200 Yl3.rds.
Tho round dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
of thl') tSl.nk. The infqntry pht00n opBn':3d up with every
Vv_ ,Jon .. nd hundreds of rounds of c"l.libor bullets richl"ted off the two
Tho M-10 out to position C ",nd closely follo'WOd by the tl3,nk
p11'l.toon, which procoedod to positinn D hit the first Tiger Tl3.nk repel3.ted1y.
But round bouncoG off tho t"l.nk into the woods. The tl3.nk destroyer
Will) 1'11s('l firin;,. In tho midst of this b"ldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
the first Tie:or T"Ink. The crP.wVlls instt:mt1y cut dC'lW'n by nur infqntry.
The Tiger tow<:l.rds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rO"lched Point E I'Ind fired down the r01'l.d in "l.tt0mpt to pre
vent tho sacond Tiger fr0m osc"l.ping over stone bridge.
In few minutes the diad down. Both Tiger Tl3.nks been

k d out "l.nd the rO<:l.d W'I'lS c 1e"lr for T1'l.sk Force Howz'3 to C('lrrt inue on its
ti'lSS ion.
cortrr::!",nC:0r r:",d nn infp"ntrv prnt8ctjnn <'nc in q(l,?iti0n ho f"11"Jd t" plf',ce
nbs-,Tvor rn th; blind S-CUTW t,. wP,t'n of Amot'ic"ln f"!T''''til''rs.
7
The loss nf ." strone: point by th', defend)r Ctn'38 n0t rJ"lce SS"lri 1y do-
fiT'J ''In-:: by cI"Ilmter"ttqc"k-s whrmevf:lr the situl'\ti"n perwits. Ml"1ra(,'Irer,
On the E;;.st, eeB h"ld l'3ft R"ute 1 .lnG tlJrnA(l !1rrth into the
mountqins nn rO"ld tn MASSA, chnsen qS q mqin "lxis. TW0
thnUS'lnd y"lrds north ,.,f tb'1 hj th:; fC'rce hac t('l pqSS thrnugh
r- n;;.rTOW sqddle. On tht: f'?,r side of s"ldf!le, distributed qcross
sW'3.ll plqin, nine Tig'3r As tho column nf eeB
crossed the rise, th'3 TL:f.3rs struck. AlthnUl!h s')'ITf:)rql of
the T12:'3rS were d'3strf\yec', the Germ"lns ret;;. iTled cr"ntrnl of tho
position. A forco W"lS S-'l'1t "'.t"(\und th'3 rie:bt to fh.nk, to turn
the position. Shortly "lft')r thl3 force stqrt8d their
qtt<1Ck, six Tircers qnd fl"l11r }',qrk IV tp.nks qtt!1c'\t"e
ri
from fnur
directi('lns '3.nd knocked OlIt f"ur M-10's .,nd tW'=l1ve light bmks.
8
q '\ritq1 role in m011nblins. Orp':<'Iniz"ltinn of I'lny positi('ln must include
ewer, the r'3 n"lture nf T7'l"unt<? j nons tArr"lin prev"lnts "-nv l<lrf!:"l so'!,le
ft'3nElr"ll counter<!.tt.lcks. FUrth':!r # th'3 1imiti?d I'\VIOI ihlJle r"utes mliy ho '9X"
pacted tn impede <l.ny p.ttempt to the reserves rp.pid1y 1")17I3r <!, '.vide fr('\nt.
This is espechlly true where he8,Vlr t"lnks <!.t'':l imTo1,red. For th"lt rer;son
r"lSElrves mqV he heJd "It low!'!r 16'11'''31s qnc c<'rrtr'itted in sn'lOIll units which C"l.n
,....-.
69
exploit thp, limit"':'! terr''lin 'l.v!3.H",ble. Since the p.ttqcker will 1j'Cl <\018 to
,,--.
, onlv q limited ",mount (If his p.TIl'or in "l.ny (lnEi "l.re"ll he be s'1CP6cted
t("l "l.tt'lck on numer(lus r0utes sinlllltt:neously. The sever",1 SIT'lll reser"'(l'9S of
t"e defender qre tr'1 ic18'31 force to "("'opel multiple "l.tt'l.clrs in restricted
terr'l.in.
The tqsk' nf sno;ineer llrdts :i n tbe defense in mount"l. ins is to
f'O't" de fense
In locqtjng <:lnc construct:i't:w "l. syst'3rr, (If field fortificS'ltions,
"lnd "l.pprF3c:i8.tion of th":) tArr<dT' is prerequisite, since field f0r
tific"l.tj("lns cnnsist prim"l.rilv of strengthening its dClfensive v>11ue.
Obst<l,cles hinder n("l"lT'3ment (If tb0 enemy "l.nd hold rim unc,er the de
fonder's fire.
The positi("lns hy th0 defender "l.re str"lnethened by
fteld f(lrtific"ltio!1s. Or:'in"l.dly the occupying troops C'n:<)nize
the ground "Ind construct thp fortific>1tjons. Duties (If engineers
"Ire to provide tools 'l.nd "lnd to execute w0rks of gen
6rql use All w"'rks of "l technic"ll n"l.ture th""t l3.1'"e beyond
,.--- the c"lpl'lbilities of occupyincc troops "lre prep"l.red bv the
Obst"l.cles ml3.Y be ("Ir "l.rt:ifici"ll. N"l.tur"l.l obsbwles include
such terr"J.j,n f'3"l.tur9S "l.S wQter cnurses, p(lnds, SWl'l.mps, >!lll1ies, steep slopes,
cre"l.ting '3. Thev J'l,re Sl1pole11'lented when neceSS<:lrv hy
obst"!.cles. These F'3.Y be wClrk's I'f d"lstr1)ct i nTI, such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJ:i Idin'!:s. rO'id crqt'1rs. inund",t i M'S" "l.nd fe lIed trees or telephone poles;
fjelds of steel r"l.il" 'l'{noden posts, heJ'l,'TY fences, ('dbs, c"lbles, wire r(llls"
'ind b'irric"lc1es. Works (If constt'l}ctjon must be design"'ld to deBl effectively
with the c'l.p"l.biUties ",no limit<:t:ioDs of '3nemv vehjcles which they "l.t''3 in
tended to stop.lO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 11'1'3.,;01' p"lrt [If th'3 I'hstl3.cles tl' the
70
in mountqinOU8 troops thjs by the use
in the of by blowing
btidli:es or culverts. diverting: the course of stre'lms. other
forms of demolitions. Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the de
struction of '1 structure, roqd. or trq so the will be forced
to repl'lce or rebuild r'lther th'ln m'ly be extensively
by demolitions since the 'lre very limited.
the effoct will be to forco the .. tt.. cker seek new into the moun
tqin position.
An observer in ItJlly roported' :
As th9 withdrew they demoli8hed 111 de
molished 'it points. trees 'lcross
rO"lds. mined possible qnd streets in
villqges by All obst'icles were
protected by AT guns r:;.nd J;l.utom'1tl'c WElP.pC1tlS on slopes of connect.:._
ing These weqpons were by weqpons on other
,ridges Jlnd by rel!:istered I1rtillery. SP 88 /1:uns were clenr':
ly concel1led points in fl'lts slopes
commr:;.nding Tqnks were kept in plqtoon 'lnd
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJ;l.ystncks to oppose infqntry qd
vllnce where dirct weqpons "lrtplery were held up
by obstllcles.
l
Bridges streflm cross in rugged o<)ul'ltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(.molitions. tJlnk trqps.
felled troes. 'lnd covering fire can oft'ectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force crossing.
Ene::ineor erected to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he C'ln be hold under fire. or him to seek new routes
into the position. Obst'1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3' bec.. use left unpro...
tected they '1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci .. l equipment qnd troops of the
qttl;lcker. They .. re '1 "nrust" fClr effective de fAns '.) in mount"! inous terril in.
71
\

\

\
,

~
\

~
.
.
.
\

,

\
'

"

~
'

,
.
(
I

.
.
"
,
t
"

,
,

l

,

,

~

,

-
,

-
,

-
~

.
.

!

f
t
,
,
\
~

"
,

,

,

r

,

,

r
U
T

1
3

lAST 1
I
SeA I: ',000.000
(#( ,- " / /11
,
I
\
s,d- .' '.1
b
2
, t I
II
'.r
, '
, .
,. t ...
.'

,
.
''''
'" ...
FUr 13
when used wisely I3.dd gre"lt strength to the defensi,re position. The
extent to w'hich these obstl3.cles will be successful in del"lying 'in 'ittl?cking
enemy is pn excellent mo"lsure of the effectiveness of the defender's engi
neers.
Frequently in roue:l:> terr"3.in the comb"lt will be reduced to I3,n !!engi
neer's W"lr
n
in which engineers of the '1ttl3.cldng force must le'1d the
const"l.ntly strbrinrr to neutrl3.lize th'9 obstJicles phced in the pl3.th by the
dofender's eng'l_neers. An eXl3.mple of 1tengineer's wqr" m"ly be found in the
comb"lt experiences of the 56th ,2;np.;ineer B'ltt"llion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM.. Ge rmqny. The terrt=J.in "round PRUM is
chA.rl3.cterized by steep slo-pEls, numerous wqter ccmrses, he"ivy wooded '3.re8.s,
'3.nd qbruptly qrisine; h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight.
On the of 3 M"lrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored
Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8,ny B, 56th Armored Dj1rision
B"l.tt"llion in support m01red through PRUM to storm 'towns of
SCE:iifARZHEIM <?nd BUDESCHEIM. At first the engineers repSl ired
rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsA.r <:\ p."th throue.:h "i mine
fie Id.
On the marnine: of the 5th of M"OIrch the whole comp,my Il.S
sistec by q phtoon from Comp.qny C, SOlssembled "it 008 to repll3.ce
two blown bridges. On 6 M'1rch, CCB struck with
'itt"lck to seize "I crossinI': site on KYLL RIVER. B Compl'l.ny with
3d pl.qtoon of Compflny C "lttqchod to build q Bqiley
Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL. Due to the extreme ly
limited roqd net, the rugged of the tBrr"lin, qnd the
rq in. snow, mud l1nd sleet the Bq'iley f!'\ iled to 8.rrive; so wl)rk'
'N'<l sst" rte d on l1 tr<38.d,JII'llY ford A,C ros s the 1" 1,r9 1".1
2
An officer with the 56th Bqttp.lion p.dds thjs eyewitness 8.ccount of
the 8.ction:
Garml'm troops well dug in held the high ground on the
fqr The old bridge h8.d boon complotely blown qnd tho
sito with qrtillery.t I3.ntit8.nk" mortt:lr, qnd sm13.11 8.rms
fire. On the f'<Jr shore the rO>1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge
to the high ground W"l.S criss-crossed by hrg:e f",llen trees to
form offective "Ib8.tis. At tho point"where the r08.d stqrted up
into the hills. hold by the Germf.\ns" Wf'.S11 hrge p.ntitp.nk' ditch
73
which cut thl') rOlld Ilnd prev'mted Ilny by-p"l.ssing. The ditch vms
Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat Ilnd to be two mile!
long.
B Compllny with "l.ll of C stllrted to work on
q ford just the of the old bridg8 site on the of
6 M'1rch. At Ilbout 2300 h('l1Jrs the ford WIlS rf!.lf completed when
the; Ger1M.ns In the ensuing fight of
B C drove the Germllns from the ford
"l.rtillorv Ilnd Ilrms fire on the site continued un
tjl tho morning hours '1nd provented completion of tho ford.
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with /ilpmored
c<:lbs wore out fl.cross tho river to remove the 'lb"l.tis from the
rOl).d on fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river.)
By h<:\lf of the rOlild h"l.d been when
tho Gorm"l.ns st'3.rted AP shells '1t the dozers. The dozers
then withdrtJw to covElred positions "llone: tho bl'ink of the river.
B '3.nd C Compllnios, continued to work on the ford durine: the
morning of 7 Mf'J.rch, however the Gorm'1ns still held the high
ground on tho fl-lr shore fl.r.d the srmll <\nd '1rtillory fire on
tho crossinjl; sito work oxtremely hllz"lrdous.
At 1600-hours the site CCA broken out of
their bridgeho'1d "I.t GERALSTEIN "l.ndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL
RIVER GERALSTEIN following CCA.
El'1bor">to engineer "I.ssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue .. however, un
d. control of p"l.sses throuh thtJ mount"l.ins is held by the defender. These
p'lsses represent k0Y terrp.in on tho of which
tho must to move his t<:lnks, uns, equipment. Control
hingos upon possossion of the heihts
An 'lotion KASSERINE Pli.SS illustrl'ites tho import"l.nce of hold ini;
tho so he ights.
After period of the enemy, two
of destroyer were givon the mission
of Fl,SS I3.gP..inst enomy tl3.nks qnd to
OPts for indirect l'\rtillery fire. At this time there W7Jr8 but
soven 75mm SP's in om oomp"lny <md ten 75mm SP's rem'linjn in
tho othar. Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther
side of the pASS. The TD guns wore ct:treful1y dUj! in,
od, "I.nd nloll the For three tha TD's with-'
stood tho ontire pressuro of tho Germ'lTI Armored force, consist
inl1: of bmks .. inf'1l1try, s\ir I3.tbwks, pnd mort'lr fire.
Evory t'lnk 'ltt'lok into tho pr:tss beAtem wlth heAVY
10ss08. Only whon tho enemy inffl.ntry the high e::round
)n both sides of tho wore m'lchine-e::unnfng the TOts did
they withdr"lw. 14 '
74
the defender must consider been the subiect of
"0ussion by the Their defensive experience W<lS ellrly in
HIl,ring se ized the obtll ins freedom of mneuver
the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd re'lr of whole
units ene:'l!!:Gd in defl3nse. For this rellson the units engllged in
defense <"'f pllsses detnllnd speci13.1 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd
officers.
After c'lpturine: the the the units
must hold them r:t "111 costs. Even if the enemy through
the PIlSS "lnd its defenders Ill'e enCircled, they Yl'ust stllY nn, Bnd
dr'lw up 1l11-qround security on the heir:hts. Holdine: these heights
m'ly be of decisive import'lnce in the bqttle with the second eche
lons of the enemy. Besides the e:"lrrisons of the
heights will pin down forces of the enemy, which will help
in tho hunching of tho counter"lttp.ck. Upon withdrllw'll of the foe,
thl'l encircled gllrrisons clln C8.use considerlOlble dllmq.ge, they
will keep under inccssr:nt fire the entire course of the hostile
retre"lt through the mount'lin
The Russillns noted th"lt the Gerrn'lns frequently 'lttempted 13. thrust in
sector, endellvorine: to brF.i<J.k into 11 v8.11ey 'lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights. Such enemy mllneuver
wqs the morc 'lS it 'NilS often c'lrried out with 113.rge numbers of
infqntry "nd tllnks. If successful, it might lelld to deep of whole
divisions of the defenders. Consequently, Russi8..n doctrine stressed thqt de
fense of mount'lin v"llleys Ilnd passes into them deml3.nded pllrticulllr C'lre from
officers of rllnks. Th'3ir experience of in the C8.UC8.SUS proved
th"lt for d j rect control of th"l ,r<:l lleys the enemy must secure the comm'lnd ing
heip:hts 'llol1P-" which th':3 v<l.lIey uSlllllly extended. Therefore, cross fire from
the 'ld.ip.cent mountr:ins Ilnd slopes W"lS the best to defend the It
wqs expedient to lell,re only sm<lll forces, reinforced with I3.ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the ,rlllley. Tp..nks "llso proved inv'llu8.ble to the defender.
16
In one our defense stretched the northern slopes
of 11 crest extending from ''lest to e"lst. Three regiments of hos
tile inf'lntry, supported by trmk"s, broke throue:h on the .iunction
75
between our units for the Tbe seized it
moved out into the v'llley between tbe mountJ'!ins. Two d'3.ys
more th'ln 100 t'3.nks two
undertook 'lttp.ck '3. to the 6'3.st, in order to com
pleto q deep fl'lnking of tbe ridgo from the south 'lnd to emerge
in tbe of our positions in the mount'3.ins. At this time our
comtn'3.nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl'3.cO of th"3 prospective
this shut off the completely. Rjfle, 'lrtil
lery, 'lnd units were on tho slopes cf the moun
tllins In the center of thQ 'V<l.lley, whoso width Wl'\S sevan
to nino kilometers, q unit of Thus
the entrqnce to th'J v'l.lley reprosented f.\ pocket of riM sub.iected
to 'l.rtillery 'lnd mortqr 'lcti0n frow three The hostile
bmks moved tOW"'lrd tho centCfr of the 'V<l.lley in three echelons.
When they reqched thg zone of cross fire, the 'l.rtill'.'lry, he'3.vy
m'l.chine guns, t'l.nks disposed in'l.mbush opened up on them with
q c0ncentr'l.tion of fire. Pqrt of the 'lrtillAry unjts fired on
tbe inf'l.ntry, cutting it off from the tqnks. The Garm'lnA took
cover wh Ue the ir h"l1
T
ing: suffered d'3.m"lg:e, were un
'3.ble to wi thst"!nd the pcwerfulb'3.rrqf!:e fire 'l.nd retre'l.ted.
After '3. whj le th8 enemy ren'311.,ed the litt"lck. Now his t<mks
'l.nd inf'lntry sep'lrlited ;nto throe g:roups. Two of them mov:-,d
the slopos, hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open
the to the The third group in the cen
ter. Thus the enemy SC'lttored his forces our units
of crush'3d his groups in det<l il. At the
when the enemy hl'l.d re"lched its m'3.ximum intensity
Ind its tempo stl;\rtiru!: to slow down und'3r the effect of de
structive fire from thrs', directions, our t"lnks rushed out of 'lm
bush "lnd counter1;1ttp.cked on th0 right fhmk !':rolJp of G'3rm'ln tqnks.
Immedi1'ltely hoatHe vehicies were set on fire '!nd tho re
mnchines fell not baing to tbe
pressure of our tqnks.
17
.
Russi."In success in this eng'3.goment demonstr'3.ted tl'le ilr.portqnce of con
trol of thf1 heie:hts oV"lrlookinl!: v'l.lleys plisses. Such control WliS obt"lined
by correct of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin/!: of units in the
vqlley. T'l.nks phced in "lmbush were V'3rv effective in dostroyinl!: the enemy
/ .. thus pro"lTing their e:ro'3.t VIllue to '3. dt1fender in mountqinous terr'lin.
I
)
A t'3chnique re l"lted to thB.t of controlling the p<:lsses is one of re
bdnjng observ"Ition posts of 10\ suit'3.ble chtlr$icter. The defending force in
m0unt",inous terr'3.in must set up numerous OPTS to consb:mt surveilhmce
the loc"ltion 8nd lictivity of the p.tt"lcker. FUrther, such
76
'Vfl.t ion posts mllY bring down highly 'l.ccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which in Such OP's
hI;t;rG excellent rfl.dio cNJnnunicp.tion even with smfl.ll FM sets bec'luse of their
locfl.tion on high ground. Ample for this type
be found in '1rmorod unjts. In where post Cfl.n be
spotted by the ''It-b3.ckor, he m"l.Y be forced to divert portion of his strength
to destroy it. Americnn units in Tunisi"l. soon lO'3.rned the Villus of
tI;tnk"s obs'')rvl'ltion posts for communicl'lt ions ''is we 11 'lS protection.
In the mousetrllp south of MATEUR one of Cornp'lny C's plq
toons (Slst Reconnqiss.mce '1,n OP within 400
of t3.n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR. The enemy know th1'lt the OP
W'lS there fin"illy sent '3. plqtoon out to get it. The C Com.
lielltemmt in the OP S"lW them coming o:md f.J.lerted his two
"itt"icbed t'3.nks, which were in f.J, posttj(ln "l.bt"'ll.lt 200 Y'3.rds
in the rOl'tr. The t'3.nks CQ1.ne out, I!uided b;,{ swunoc l'lrounl
the little knoll where the OF WqS 'lnd opened fire with c"inistor
lS
.,....-..The t'3.nks killed or wounded '111 but seven men.
The number of observ"ltion posts necessp.ry for <J.degu"lte w<'!.rnircg be
decrel'lsed if tho defender C8'{} limi.t the routes of '3.')':>roqch tn his position.
Rcutes thrC'llgh m("lunt" in I'l.re limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin. An r)dded m"l" be derived by the defender if he or(!:'lnizes
the gr0und wisely. The enemy should bE! f(lrced to over r0utes of
tbe defendor desires hirr to use. If th" defense is to be suc
cossful, the of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy. If the enemy is to choose gr0und on which he
desires to f'lgbt, th8 defender immediqtely loses wh<:lte,rer initil'l.tbre he
terr!>in is lost to the defender.
In Sicily the Arnericp..n troops frequently turned the
in intn f!ood "ldv'l.ntl3.[e for offensi,T('l '1ction bv pro.iectini2: "icceler<\ted
77
)itp,ckS qlong the limited routes ,..,f Slpprol'loh.
The mountqinous terrJl.in in Sicily tended to c'lnqlize the move
ment of tqnks in most There were certqin however,
where tqnks could be used to in infqntry in
ground by rookiIle: thrusts, closely follollred by
the In such cJlses. Jlnd such qn JlttJlok
made, the objective tqken. The conditions fJlvoring
attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the
enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck.
19
A bJl.ttle position orgJlnized to the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most I'i"lrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlr:ker to
move over routes p.nd into Ilrel'lS previously selected by th'9 defender. The
enemy seeks to surprise flqnk the defender's position by advancing on
th'9 lel'ist likely t'!.venues of I'lpprol3.ch into Il dofender1s qrel'l. Therefore.
the dofendjng: forces must block even the l1il1"possible" Jlvenues of approl'lch
and force the enemy to fig:ht over the terrain 'selected by the defense com
mander. Because mountains limited road nets. the defender will hJl\Te
/,-.....
'iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c('lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust, unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3.s.
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the 'lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiC'n in mountJlinc'us terrl3.in
would S'lppe'lr to be:
1. Deny secondJlry routes nf 'lpproach to forces, pre
venting the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked.
2. Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to c'lnJlliz8
the enemy into JlreJlS to the defense.
3. Have reservos he'lVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3.ble as a counterJlttJlck
force to destroy enemy penetr'ltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes.
The nature of mounta inous in with its limited routes of approach
I'lnd inadequ<lte vis ibility should 'lssist the defel1der in the successful execu
of ambushes. The defender has e. his screening forces
78

g iva him I'l.mple time to prep".lre the ".lmbush; he need only sit ".lnd W'l it
while the "ltt"lcker, limit8d in his routes of I3.pprol3.oh, W13lks into his trl3.p.
The followinr.: I3.ccount of 13. Russil3.n I3.ttl3.ck on 'i Germl3.n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3.nd de structiveness of suoh I3.n I3.mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the sectors of the Soviet-Germl3.n front,
Germl3.n tl3.nks h'id forced thGir into "l VJ'llley. There were 'ibout
40 moving in column the only rOl3.d. A cowpl3.ny of t".lnks
with l3.utoml3.tic riflemen under the cotnml3.nd of Senior Lieutenl3.nt
EROFEYEV w<'<s givon the tp.sk of stopping the enemy 'it the of
MALKINO.
'I'he tf1.nk unit rel3.ched tho vilhg6 ".lfter .!:\ twenty kilometer
Ti'''lrch I3.nd deployed in line on the western side of the vill'l.e:e from
which direction the tanks were expect0d to come. Trymmy
gunners '1nd inf'3.ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions C'n
the flank of the t'mk compP.ny.. protect in!! it from sudden I3.tb\ck
by GerIllr'ln tommy gurmers. Such distribution of f(1rces hl'ls fre
quently justified itself. In wooded hill country the Gerll'J'lns
ofton send I3.he<ld of the ir t'lnks. 'fhey comb the under
growth striving to extermin'1to the crews of So,riet "lntit'mk guns
to the point out thE) more slopes to their t'lnks,
be inl'; I3.t the S"lme time 13. fighting :p'ltrol qud the fi rst
W'lve. For this r8'lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes suddenly
on the fl'lnks or in the re'3.r of the Soviet troops. Inf"ntry ob
servers postGd on the fl'lnks of the inh"l.h point protected
tho t<mks from such surprises.
In the Germl3.n t13nks IlpP9llred out of 'l stl1Sl.11 p'l.tch
of woods SNl two kilometers west of MALKINO. ViithC'ut stoppiI1/?:
they rco\'"ed tow'l.rds the vill"lP-:8 ''It full speed. Senior Lieuten'l.nt
EROFEYEV!S tl3.nks decidod to permit th!3 Germ'l.ns to get close
'l.S possibb "lnd then shell thorn witz., controlled volleys. This
W'l.S 'l. correct decision for th,ry Germ'l.IlS were qd"lT'lncing without
reconnBiss'l.nce 'l.nd did not expect to meet with resistp.nco of
'3.rnorod vl')hicles jn IvIALKINO.
1J1lhen the 0nemy t"l.nks were within 1000 to 2000 !l1eters our
t"nks opened fire witr. their After the first few volleys
two Ger!l1"ln t'l.nks burst inti:' flJ:l1OOs. The r'3trI3.1P'der bee:'l.n to d8
p'loy hA.stily on both side s of the rOlld. Deployment find the
'l.doption of b"l.ttle order occupied five minutes "lnd th) Ger
m"lns 'ld
1r
"l.nced '3. f'3.rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting un'lined
fire. Firo from our stl'1tion'lry t"lnks W'lS so Sl.ccurqte thr;t during
this time 'l.nother six enemy tf3,nks were knocked out . H'l.l f of thom
were burnt. The Germ'l.n tt3.nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire 'IDd
rotreqted. This W'l.S thEl TI1C'TIlcnt when re inforcem"mts qrrived 'l.t
Mb.LKINO. 90ns iatin! of fln bo.ttor' ".lUG s8v8r'l.1 lorry
lO'l.ds of soldiers, "twongst them sO"lter'3.1 tqnk d8strC'vers with I'tnti
t"lnk rifles.
79
Fi s
(to
SCcw-.o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE: Before the second Germ$'J.n the tf'lnk force
W'lS split I1nd phced in I'lmbush on both fl'lnks of the position.
The Ml'lin drive W'lS the infqntry p.nd qfter dis
persine: tho inf'lntr:,,'thc Russiqns concentr'lted on the German
t8.nks.)
Two hours l'lter the 'ldv'lnced the
If-lg-8 of 11,'IALKINO in the SI'Imo formnticlIJ qS before, one compl':lny on
either side of th8 The wp.s reinforced with
q bo,.ttq,lion of I'lutomqtic riflomon'qd,nmcin.e: 100 meters behind .j,
the I'l throp.t from the flp.nk, the Germqns "Id
'Irqncod ''It full speed. As soon qS the t",nks' p.pproqched within
rqnge of qccurqte fire the I'Ind qntit"lnk (TDts) got into
'lction I'lnd opened withering fire on enemy tqnks. The in
fp.ntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tp.nks sep'lrqted
from the ir inf"lntry continu<)c t(\ qdvl1nce. Six GerT!1"1n tqnks
W0re qlreqdy in Their form"ltion wp.s disrupted. On q
s ignl?l our tqnks opened fire on the infqntry
'lnd cnnnon firs on the tl'lnks '
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing I'Ic(,0unt hqd had I'Irtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hq,rG p.ccomplished e,Ten Toore. For in
use of qrtillery. th'3 def'3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p("Issesses eertqin
,inite A few of these I'Idvqntqges qre: his guns CqIl be dug in
to lC'lctions whicb offer protecticn "Ig'3.inst enemy ct"'unterbp..ttery;
tho presenoe of deep Cp",r6S ",I1V offer ""dd4tic'Il'l1 protecti<'n to fire direction
centers I1nd gun crews; "1nd tho prElpp..rl'ltion of b'lrrp..ges rtnd concentrqtions
op..n b"l oompleto. qS8umjrw; complete initip..l p..ccurp..cv of c(,'Ilcentrqtions.
The p.rtillery G lements of the de fense gp..rris('m cp..n p..lso become
thoroughly fqmili"lr with meteorologicA.l conditions of the A.ncl o".n set up
resultp..nt increqs() in qccurp..oy ("If unobser'Ted fire justifies the time qnd
High p.niSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA.]n defense. F0r this pur
p0se the 4.2 mort"lr would seem m("lre useful thl;ln the l05mm howitzer.21

'.s physicp.lly sT)'''111'9r "nd lighter, permittin!1: it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i!1
lon on the crest
fiD'ht " nD' bv
o
o
\.
o
possible position, continue to be fired to hst possible moment .. and
then be quickly disphced to the next position. Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8.test effective use 8.ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis. In Ittlly the use of such
W!1S of e:ro'1tf:lst vl'Ilue to the defonso. Germ'1.n SP e:uns W('luld fire on IOl3.d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy ",nd I'ldvl'l.nce slowly I'lnd c<?Uti(111Sly. By the
time our troops reached its suspected loc<ltion, the SP gun '!1.f'lS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8.d, re$J,dy to r 9 peat the same performance. In th is
the defense Vll'l.S <l.ble tC' k"<3Gp the "ltt""cker cC'nst8.ntlv off' b8.hnce, k-now
ing when he was gojng tn hit th"l !l1<l.in battle position.
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eee:iment .. defend5.nz 8. mountqin PI'lSS in Tunisil3..
Durirw: the first week" we were near SID! BOU ZID we 1/',ere
u'?-rding the P"lss. We W(:Jr0 eq'.'iDped f(1r indirect firine:.
,,11 of our tanks lI{ere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8.SS set
bl'tck 8.b("l'lt fiyo or six mil0s. jIe C<lme within 2000 y"rds of
tho Pl'l.SS rr:ornine:, firoc int('l th"J p"ss, "nd pulled b"ck.
'No were ,iust b... ck of LSSOU"j, ; (,lrrTl. INS. 22
Mountninous genort:l.lly offers the defender
for c":ITrouflqg:o in the br('lken I1;r('lund I;Ind wooded Conce'llment of the
tho dc;fondor. This is espoci.p.lly truE) of fori.lf"l.rd ('Ibser"l.1"!)ti0n posts which I;ICt
I'IS tho eyes <md e"l.rs 0f the defense comnmder. Their concol'llment is their
chief fnrm of ':lofense.
The enemy, nf l,is strnne::th, c'lnnot hit wh'l.t he
c"mnot see. In mountl'l in0us t"Jrr
tl
in, th<:: do fender m'l.V leqve
s1118.11 d9t8.chmonts on isol<ltcd PEll'lks "'lithin siv.ht of the prin
cipl'l.l 8.""'lnUG8 ("If ""ppro'l.ch. If thGs; d!'Jtl;lchrr.ents <'ire well
the m'ly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the
loc"ltion 'lnd of tho ommy, long 'lfter the orig:inl3.1
,..-4efensi
v
e positif"ln h<:.s been penetr'1ted. Such forces p.re t:l.lso
oful in bringing: d0'JV'tl <l.ccurl;lto nrtill'Jrv fire upon f:ln 'l.d
mc:ing ClDOmy wh'J h'1s rEJ'lchEld prc'l.rr<J.llf':od loc'1tlons, such J).S
83

criticql defiles.
23
Within the strong points qnd the "I)<\ttle position" 8.11
possible rr.e'3.suros should bo t'3.ken to c"lmoufll'lge men" we"pons,
supplies" t'3.nks. This will effecti1
r
ely conce"ll the m"lin
defensive position from the enemy. '3.nd keep him const"lntly con
fused '3.S to its eX'3.ct loc'3.tion. The occ'3.sionql p'3.tches of snow
<md b"lro rock mqy cl)mpliC"ltl3 the c"l.moufl'3.ge of t'3.nks; during
light snowf"lll the l'3.ndscqpe require the frequent
chqnidng of the color of individu'3.1 t'3.nks. Germp.n units in
Russi'3. frequentlycqrriod 13, buckot of ch'3.1k or lime in e'3.ch t"lnk
to permit the crews tC'l blend with the by "lpplying the
whitening '3.gent" or it quickly.
During the summer months the Gormqns m"lde effective use of brp.nches
to 8. ir observ'3.tion of the ir t"lnks.
In wooded qnd hilly pre"lS" cover "Ind cqmoufl'3.ge W'1S bottor.
Summer foli'3.ge trees offer better c"lmoufl'3.ge. There were fewer
losses fr"m qir 8tt"l.ck bec'3.USo of bettor c8moufl'1ge discipline
(everv "rmored vehicle WqS c01rered ....dth tree brp.nches '3.nd m'3.de
to hug the edges of hedges or woods so P.S to "lPpeqr from the
'3. ir to be '3. me re pro.iection of the 0li'3. ge .)
In expect'3.tion of enemy '3.ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt'3.ck" the defender
in mountqinous terr'3.in must t"lre 13,11 c"lmouflqge meqsures necessqry in '1ny
type of terr"lin. The to which q milit"lry unit is forc')d by hck of
qir protection m'3.Y be shown by these ststeroonts of '3. Gorm"ln qrrr:ored division
comm'3.nder:
No vehicle W"lS permitted to mO"lre on the roqds during
the d'3.y unloss $?bsolut.ely nocessp,ry" 8.nd the bulk '\":,s conce'3.1ed
deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det'3.chments in vill'1ges.
25
The Division Comm'3.nder h'3.d seen personqlly to the c"l.moufl'3.ge
discipHne in tho 'wen h'3."Irjne: det'3.chments witr brooms
to sweep '3.W'3.y tr'1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO'3.ds. He
cqlled these men IIbroomstick
Prob lems
Coordinqtion "Ind control of t'bo c1efendintr. g:'3.rrison presents se.,rer'3.1
problems. FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to pro"lTide telephone communi

)n throughout his position" since qmple time prob'3.bly 1s '3.v"lilqble for
84
prior to the As result, the defender be ex
,d to h8.ve his dispoSJl.l excellent
immune to the effects of the tertJl. in. In fixed de fenses he eyen h8.ve
time to bury the wire
6
thus it proof enemy or 8.rtillery.
In wooded hilly country, t8.nk must be in
from eVFJry viewpoint. Engineer for t:outes of
must be thorough 8.nd the demolitions must be with the
of de forces. In e8.ch blnk must be "lble to ident ify its
own course for In close wooded this
proved very difficult. One Russi13.n officer suggested 8. thorough re
bo given ",-nd th8 b8.rk of trees be cut driver's eye or
P'linted with q d'lb of lime.
27
In wooded hill countr'T 'in cC"l'nm",nder, llsing movement
controlled fire 1'fith the of smqll gr0upS,
'oss ible succes sful nn <111:<\ i nst hrge enemy forces. Experience
n defend ini! in lleys hJl.s shown th<lt rendered ir
to inf<J.ntry when been cor
rectly
Grol3.t is dOr1l3.nded in phmninl1: support for the
defense, since it is 10gic8.1 to expect th'lt the will use "Ill
'1ble for counterb'lttery fire. If the defl3nder is 'l.ble to
the of his obser"'Tl'ltion posts, in cO!:1munic<ltion with them,
. he C'ln permit gun crews to r'3m'3.in in protected until the l'lst
possible moment. The effect of this coordin'ltion is 'l impro'''3mont in
'lnd lower 8.mong gun crews. This type of coordjn8.tion
W'3.S pBrfectly by forces in the Tl1njsi'l.n hills.
Tho enemy h8.d spent months prep8.ring those positions, 8.nd
when or 8.ir pounded 13. positi 0 n in for
Jerry st'lyed in his dugout until the 'l.rtillery fire W8.S
Then he his f!:Uns <lnd our with
ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8.rds.
29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd this point. Although
S 1<38s frequently Ji-\T'lil"lble th"ln Jirtillery support .. the defender'must
c"lrefully its use when it is "l"lmil'lble. The need fC"r 'lir support
in ID0untll.1.nous terr'3.in is re"llly no different for the I'lttl3.ck or tho defanse.
The technique of its use is the hit tho enemy beyond the of
qrtillery.
From the q pilot with th0 lJindsc"lpe below will ex
parience grcll.t difficulty in pinpoint Jind in
friend froIT. foe withollt "ldditionll.l identifyint" c'3vices. However, the de-
f'3nder should be in "I position to fqmili"lrize his supporting <1.ir with the
terr"lin by previous det"lilec reconn"liss"Ince "Ind reholl.rsl'J.l.
On the other hJ3.nc. if we "l.ssume th"lt ll.ny I'ltt'lcker possesses "l loc'll
superiority over the defense. we ml'lY qssume. "Ilso, thqt the defendor will
be ll.ble to c0ntr01 the 'lir over his position. For th"lt rell.son, the
"Ind conce"llment for his own protection.
the Buh::e,.-" where the Am'3ric"ln defenders '3.ctuJilly possessed p.ir superiority.
When the weqther cl'3"1red, however, there WI'lS presented the unusul'll circum
st"lnces of Il, defend-3r in rough terr"lin who enjoyed q ir sUp-'3riority O"lTOr tho
The following "lccount furnishes q det"liled "Inn striking eX'lmple of
the use of qir by '1 defender.
At 1000 hours on December 23, 1944 'lt his
heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their Within few
minutes he WqS them where to strike. The enemy
f'--' 'uildtipa at this time were west <md northwest of th'3 town(BASTOGNE),
86
the sectors he Id by the 502d "l.nd
527th Glider Infqntry Rej!:iments (lOlst Airborne Divi.sion). The
infl'lntry front lines b'l.d been he'lring: l'\nd seeine: the "'.rrivS'll of
those concentrqtions the two d"l.Ys. But beC"l.use of
the of qrtillery there hqd been no
chock 8.gq them. The pll'lnes dropped low <md C<ltne in fl'lst
"IgP.. inst the anomy columns. gl'\ ining complete surprise. The Gor
vehicles W"lre on the ror.;d fqcinl! tow"lrd BASTOGNE when the
first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them..... On thl'lt first dl'lY the Ger
m8.ns did not use tl"eir I'lntil'lircrqft gnns "l.gBinst 'iny of the
di1Te bombers.
If this reticonce w'ls due t" 1'\ desire to cover up the po
sitions of the it 'Iffl.S I'l 1riew qllickly chp.nged of
th'3 dl'l.UlI'lge the Ninth Air Force plA.nes h"ld done durin!!: the dl'lY.
For there8.fter the Germ'ln Wl",S intense over the front I'lt 1'\11
times '1nd the "l.ir units hl".d W> furthGr hnurs of unopposed operl'l
tion.
They tnl'l.do the most of their opportunity. The snow
qid. visible pointed to forest positions which
were prompt ly bombed. The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from
the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy W'lS ou.t th9 smoke from those
blqz jng phntl;\tions "l.nd from brewed..up enemy columns Ulf'l.de a
complete circle Slround the besiel1:ed forces untn it hit every
Doqrby to\\'11 p.t once -'lith oxplosive '1nd fire bombs.
,-... The entire "iir Wl1S c"\refully sY'steml1titod
then supervised in As phnes VV'3re I7.ssigned to the 101st
Di1rision by VIII Corps, they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by
rqdio. He put them on q cleqr such q or
highWBY P..S they ClX!'Oe in tOV'l'I'!.rd BASTOGNE. Sevor"l check points
wore then gi1Ten them fr(")m tl1e map. When the P.pprolching phnes
were definitely loc"lted, nn appro"tch cirecti(")n given thqt
wOl11d bring th':3m str'llght in ovor the tqrg".lt. This procedure
eliminqted p.ll need for qnd qnd helped them
surprise the enBmy.. Vfuen tho bombs p.nd gun qmmunition were
expended, the phm) s were (lrdet'ed up to "t SP. fe ltitude ta pa ..
tr(")l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wet'e specific re
connqiss"lnce rrissjons. The3r reconn"lissl>nce rer,orts were used
ps tho bDsis for givjug for flights qnd for
the gr(")und forces informl1ti('ln on the build up
of enemy strength. After the first f] ight thr:lre were r;lwi1Vs
tqrgets listed Cqptnin fprker, the
111so c"lms "lcross fligbts to otber ground forces
ling: in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f('lr the ir bombs.
:tIe would then cqll to them "'rJd h'3 often succeeded in
them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE l'l.refl.. In "l few
minutes these would brJ bp..ck on their missions
(it WI'lS Sq id with enthus i"lsm) tlle effect 'W"!.S w0rth two
or three inf"lntry divisions.
It Wf'.S not unusu"ll during the siege to h<\VEi 8.n
cp.ll in five tqnks vrore coming "lt thBn see
P':'4?'s diving ''It the t<:nks within 20 minutes.30
87
The defender in mountp.inous the of choosing,
:8.11y spel3.kine:, where th8 fighting will ttlke <md of being to
Il'I8.ke <il.d"lTl3.nCe His pl<mnintr cJ:in include prior pro
vision of "Idequ'l.te supplie a eX"lctly where they will be needed. This frequent
ly C'l.n be done in so thJ'l.t th8 minimum mO"l'.Hffint ('If supplies will
bp, rQquired I1fter the b<'l.ttle h"ls bean joined. Thus the defender enjoys III
relp.tivo in tho logistic'l.l support of his units <il.t the b'l.ttle po
s ition. He C"l.n mO"lre his supplie s fOI"W"lrd without the h<md ict;ps presented by
o0molitions or bottlenecks. His routes 'ire open r.tnd his rOl'J,d move
mont rel"ltbrely protocted, except for the <;lir 13.cti':rity of th'9 <'I.tt<'l.cker. Thus,
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll!1';e ID'l.y be provided flt successi,"".) defensbr6 positions.
Germ13.n technique in Itt:ll;r fe-llowed these linea. Their tl'1nks or i!:uns,
8.mply pro,rided with 8.t:1munition lliid down no 'I rby, would 'requcntly fire "Ill
po-- I'l.mmuniti0n llV1'lihble "it the positif'n bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In the ntt8.cker is frequently f"rced to leqrn th8 h<l.rd f13.cts
of mount8.in through bitter experience, "IS AF.oric'l.n units did
in Tunisi13. <'I.nd Itl'lly.
Due to c0mbinqtion of t:19'1.ns .of limited
s" unsettled W813.ther, obs) rved I'lrtil1ery fire, "lnd minas
tr"lils tlnd ml"lunt ... in routes, 'logistics in oper"l
tions 13.re much more complic"lted The
use of map dist13.nces in time fqctors in moun
t"dn operJ'ltlon is of no v<>.1l.\a.
3
Little cnn be 'l.dded to tho effocts of qnd th"lt h13.s
not q)roA.dy been mentjnned in thjs report. The oeculhr 'looustics nf moun
t"lins, with the reverber<?tion usuI=Il in t'<"'oky slooes, ml'iy seri(,llsly or-nruso the
listeninR' nnsts ('f defense. In <:ddttil"'n" th'3 frequent thick fC'gs prevl'i
in the ,'<\lleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC' the point where enemy
,,-- y penotrqte undetected to or,tthin f'. fov/ Y"'It'ds of thr; defensive positions.
In the Ardennos, for oX8.mple. enomy tt'lnks wore "l.ble to' ponetr"l.to fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December. two nosed out
of the fog: stopped within 20 Y"lrds of the ro"lch ine gun po
sitions cO,,(713ring the northern sector.' The 57mm gun to the
right of tho rO"ld within 30 yqrds of the A medium
t"lnk with q 75mm gun WqS str"light "It thoro. Tho m"l
chino gunnors tho picked up their bqzookqs. All
fired "lot the S"l.me time "Ind in "I second th8 two tqnks h"ld
bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1. Lqter, f'lll hl,lnds c1"1 imed
credit for tho kill.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fog "l.t night is oven more for the defenders; be
cl,luse the difficulties multiplied. For the men of CeE who
""ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)'ht 1III'qS
quiet. Their W"IS punctured times by the dropping of
q fe'" "Irtillery shells r....nd out beyond the W"all of they
could he"lr the nr>ise of 'n) 6ne1J1y buildup. There WIlS littlo
quiet. hO'iV"J..-rer. 11 long tr'J perimeter. Enemy tqnks in
twos Ilnd threes. sup'orted by jnfl3.1'1trY, probed tow"l.rds them.
filen "'''lrnod by smqll qrms or b"l.zookq fire, they checked qnd
bll'ued "l.'Mt:J.y qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes.
Tho Germ"l.n infqntry tried to infiltrqte through
the lims. Theso sm$).ll penetr'ltions '1nd the resulting fire
woro such th"l.t it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to m'lint<:\in wire com
municqtions with the outnost. For tb(t p$).r"l.troopers these
hours v,re-ro <: of surprise fire ominous noise 0.nd
confusion. But when morning CBme the light reveqled th"l.t two
of th'J enemy t'lnks h"l.d beon kn0cked ('Ut bv b"l.!:ookq fi-re.
32
The defonder in mountqins will f"requently seek to delqy the IJ.tt"lclrer
until tho bJid wOl'.l.thor of l<:\te fqll <':Ind winter tips the strqtel:!:ic bql<>.nce still
further in f"Yor of the defonse. Their co'rttrol of the heights, their prior
prep'1rqtion, I3.nd their defensi,rG role "Ill 'Cl'per'lted in f"l."'tror of the Germqns
throu:;r.hout mQunt>3inous opet"<l.tions qg"l.inst lJinited st"l.tes forces in World 'ilqr
II.. As El$).rly s Februqry of 1943, Time M'lg"l z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericl'.l.n people, concerning the Germ$).n position in Tunisi$).,
ROIT'roel WqS jmpro"in" 8. position in which he ql-reqdy
held the 'I'la..-rqntl1ge. He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurg;in Von A-rmin.
89
of tbe Axis forces in the North, occupied q rim of
heights from south to the Line. Behind
tb'3TIl W"lS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpid
ly q!!':q inst qny vulner"lble Sll1ied point. Gener"l Dwight Eisenho"ver
W"l.S f("'lrced to oper"lte qcross I'l terrq in I'lt the t0ugh end of
q supolv line some 400 miles long.
3
In l"lte 1944, Fifth Army in It'lly still found out tb<l.t even
the w0",ther seemed to work in fp,vor of the defenders
With the of the f"lll trqils
rO"lds turned into 'muddy quqgmires, supply
!"Ind service functions m'1oe difficult by the distqnce the
Army mcyved from b"lse inst"llhtil"'ns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE
qnd mist the rSlin conceqled enemy troop
m0
v
ements, qnd did much to hmce our superiority in
power '>nd 'lrtillery. Even grC'und observers were frequently un
"ble to direct the fire. Wellther conditinns promised to deteri...
further "lS winter Qppro'lcbed.
34
An I'lppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing p,rmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn'1Y be fmJnd in 'l report of '1 Germqn M'l,;or
The Germl3.n P'1nzer units, in to organizqt:ic'U" equip
ment, qnd trqinine:. were intonded prim"lrily frr 'lction on ter
rqin like th'lt of Western, Centrql, f;lnd Eqstern Europe. Here
tbey were 'lble t("\ mJlk"e tho b@st llse of their strength" which
lies in their firepower, speed, I'l.nd mf"lbility. On the other
b'>nd. Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment
of these chqrqcteristics. except, in the regions '1
r0und ROlE. 'lnd SALERNO, and s6"6r'-l1 other qre'1s .....
T,... be sure, the Pq,nzer org'1niz'lti('ns of the enemy I'\re sub,;ect
to the c0nditions. but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the oppor
tunity of choosing the mnst Slnd by cqreful
rElc"nn,"iss''lDce Can prep'lre in ;"dv"lnce the c("lmroitment of bis
f"rc6s.
An import
9
nt for the commSlnd tho cqlcu
l!1.tion of time needed for "\11 'T'("I1rements. Especi"llly in moun
t!) ins. Il greqt d'iJq 1 more th1',n the tim:! usull11y required in
othor theqters of W"lr hp.d t(' he
The tr'lnsfer of one P",nzer d:ivision in the of
1944 (through snow cnverea m0untp,ins) from the south
of ROME to the Adri",tic no'll' I-ESCAEA required sever<J.l weeks
time. Therofcre tho l'1st units h'ld n0t A.rrived when the di
vision W<J.S pulled b!1.ck tr tro ANZIO...
It was of decisive signific<'lDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3.
"""--"ions w'.'ro fighting on def'enshe durin the whole cf3.mpl'l.ign,
here'1s they were intended for "ffensi"l:-e /lction. Almost <\11
90
the !3.nd Grenqdier divisinns whicn to Itqly in
their oxperionce during the in
Frp,nce There, where the pr0blem mostly of
cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements grs!'\t strqteg:ic
their t;TIG hd stC"od the test.
In Itqly these t
o
their
snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons. Tbe p.cticn here
e:enerl111y took plctce in the IDf'luntl'. ins or f0othills, the oppor
tunity for mobile w!3.rf"tre wps s6"rorely limited. The Cflses wero
few in whicr counterqttllcks wit:'1 limited ob.iectbres were mounted
"lud in which t"l.nks h<ld the t'1sl{s ('If "Icc0!llpQnyjng ''lUd supporting:
the inf,mtry directly. Frequently tbese tllnks hl'!.d tn be employed
in rnl'!.ll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time, beclluse the ter
rqin did n"t permit them tC" le'l."T6 the rOf.l.ds Ilnd hig:hwqys. Gen
erq lly they weref0rced tn in direct cooperptiC"n with the
j:r:.fAntrv units; thqt is tr' sf'ly. they were hold in rO'1diness in
tte depth (If tbe b8.ttle pos itinn fr""'1T where thoy cC"uld drbre to
pre"Tinusly race-nnoitered positions "nd engl1ge the enemy qrn"r
whenev-'lr the enemy p.ttqcked or effected q penetrl'\tinn. The choice
of "Issembly in the brttle positi"n wp,s very dif
ficult bectl,use cf the of the necess"lt'y cnV'3r fnr thqt type
0f l".n;e whicle. There WJJ.S rllrely 1Teget"ltjnn, buildine:s
WfJro sCIon dostrC"yed by "!.rtillery fire ('Ir bC"mbing, qnd it W"lS dif
ficult to cl'l.moufhge h"les in the grrund p,nc. the ir axits.
To.move into outside the b'1ttle position prov
ed inexpedient, becJJ.use l?,t t1;:) hegirming of p,.n !1tt"lck the fire (If
the enemy nrtillery JJ.nd f'lir frrce W<"IS generl;illy directed in such
strengtb on the "re<ts thf.\t eiTen ::::rmored vehicles cf"luld n(lt
g:ot int(l 'lcti"n ".It the proper time bec"'luse nf the destl"llction
they sl).ff'ered.
35
NOTES FOR CHAPl'ER 4
lEncyclopedi<3. Brittllnicl3." Vol 13 (Chicq!1:r> UnbTorsity, 1948)" p 941.
2Encycloped b Americqn"l _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-:I'): Cor...
p0rQtjnn, p 546.
3Ib id, P 546.
4 Ibid, P 546.
5
M
<lj R Milovqnov, "Counter'1cti("'TI AF!!l. inst Turning "nd Fhnktng M01re
in tho Mount11.ins", The litr;I'il Review, Vol XXII No.3 (June 1943),
(Origirmlly published in Red st<l.r, 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid ; P 70.
7Ccl H Howze, IlTiger, Tiger", The Inf"lntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI
No.2 (Februqry 1950), p 19 p,.nd 21.
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl3.11, !I1'L0unt'1in M4!! Tr.o Cf\v<J.lry
LTV No" 1 (Jq,n-Feb 1945) P 29.
9Encyclopedip" Vol 19 (New York-Chicf'lgo: A'O"oric8.llIl Corpora
p 76.
P 76.
llit Col Joe C L'lmbr::rt, "0bs';;rvcrs NC'tes, It"lly. 4 October 1943 to 29
Decembor 1943" Ltr Hq AGF File 319.1/103 7 Februllry 1944 P 30.
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec. Enj!:ineer Bf.lttalion, 11th Arm(lred Divis ion"
July 1945" P 15.
13 .
InterV1"Jw, Cqpt M L Yl"Iune:" J.rm(lred Officers Ad'IT"lnce 1949-50"
Tho i. rm('re d Sch 00 1 Ft Knr-.x, Ky.
14"C(lmb"l.t Reports fr-;"m Thopters of Operations"" G-2 Tl'\nk Destroyer
Scbf'ol" FfJbrul'lry 1944, P 2.
15 "1 "t 70
Ml op C1 "p
70 16
Ibid
-' P
70 d 71
, p
18
Lt
Col C J Hoy, "Mech'3.nics (If B"Ittlef:leld Reconn'3.iss"lnce
l1
, Tho
C"l"lralry Vol LIII No.3 (j\.Ay-June p 24.
19Lt Col P L Godd'1rd, IlT<J.nks in Sicily" Tho JourWll, Vol LII
No.3 (N<>.y-Juno 1944), p 6 "me 7. -
20iVl,"i P SleS'lrev, !tUse of T-:.nk F(lrml'ltions in W('(lded, Hilly Cr'luntry",
The Milit,otry Re'Tiew, Vol L'X.III 1\;0. 3 (June p 67 "Ind 68. (Reprinted
from The
21Lt Col T c;. Jr, lI,sc0nomy in Killine:l!, The Field Artillery
Journq,l, Vol 39, 5 (Septenlb'Jr-Octnber 1949)" p 210 I'\nd 213.
22Brig: Gen T J C"I'!11P, Tp.nkers in Tunish (Ft KnC'x: Hq Tho Armored Coro
M'l nO. .. 1943),p 42.
23Intervitlw" Mf-l,i Frqnk B Cl'l.Y, Arrn0red Officers Chss. 1949-50..
Arrr'(\r0G School. Ft Kn0x " Ky.
24
Interr0f!:'1tion Report 34" 7707 Mis, MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947), p 20.
25," p' f "T t t (
,,11' rlsoner 0 .Lnerrng8. 1en Rop(lrt Lt Gan
T
Fritz B'1ye r1a in),
(Ninth AF Ad,r) " 63/1945-3
7
3.2 (29 1945).. p 6.
26Ibid , Appendix I, p 1, 3 (q) (4).
92
27
op cit. p 67.
28
p 68.
29Lt Col C J He>y" liThe Lllst D"IYs in Tunisil'l.lI The Cqvl'llry Journ13.1"
Vol LII" No. 1 1944). p 10.
30 .. (
Col S L A J.\Ij'1rsh"l.ll" B"1stogne The First Eight D'lYs Wqshington: The
Pross, 1946)" p 144 146.
31 . S lin " IlL
Lt C(ll G W ,.chrr.aIzer, .i:topnrt of Mount", in N'lrf<>.re , vuser"lTOrs
pC'rt" Hq AGF ("iq:r 1945) Jt p 16.
32M<>.rsh'l1l" op cit" p 56.
3311The Rim", Tirrr3 1:n.!:I'l.Z jne (22 Febru13.ry 1943), P 5.
34Fifth Army Histt"lry, Vol VII (W'lsh ington: Print ing Office).
p 109 "nd 131.
35Mp.,4 Gen Schmidt, HEmployment "f P<l.nzor Units in CentrBl It'l1y,
"["I r De pA. rtm:::nt Interr ng"lt i '"'n Re p<:'rt (July 1947).
93
CRAPl'ER 5
cm;ctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on "Armor in Mount"\inous Wqrf'3.re in i"lorld
WI'J.1" II" is d8votod to 'l summ"lrv of the conc Ius ions rel:\ched by the Committee
qnd 1:\ short discussion of those mndificqtions in current
tion, "lnc !T1"ltoriel which S80m It must be emph'3.sized these
p.re editori"ll in representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided, the intent inn h'3.s been meroly shed light
or tr- pro
1T
ide ''In unusu"ll vievrpoint. Tbe Committee fl3els th'lt "Imple .iustifi
C$l.tjon for its conclusions "llr'3'3.dy h'3.s been presented in tbe body of this
report. Th"l presently org:qnized "lnd equipped ArIPored Dj'trision is the unit
tOWJl.rds which the Sugg0stions f:;r ch"lnP:G, .. in th 1S study, "J.re !3, i!T16d;
'1S the Armored Divisi('ln is "Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
.Ilount t:l. i n opo r"\t j ons."
At first g:l"J.nce it might '3.ppep.r tbp.t the employment of '3.rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for '3.chievement or success. The
Corr:mittec feels th8.t the discussion to this point b<ls proved th'3.t this is
not entirely true. Time qi'ter time in Worle Wp..r II. t.mks were used in "in_
"lccossible" pll'J.ces t() the cb'3.e:rin of tbe vre"lk-heqrted or less ingenious

Cert"tin I'lt ,T"lrhmce with open fir.:hting do <l.rise. Our
0f must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusu<:llly rugced Org<l.niz"ltion for combqt for !3, keen
of t8rr<l.in f<l.ctors. support of '3.rmored units in the
mount"lins presents w(lrk loqd f'l.nd dem<:lnds ingenuity on the P"trt

94
of '111 concerned.. An undorst8.nding of the nhysiC'llodc8.1 !'Iud
",-
foct of mount8.inous torrl'lin on personnel is t'Gquired. Some modificl3.tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will impro,re its
mobility.. 8.nd firepOl'ler .. Adequ'lte equipment tind 11 80urtd Pt'ocombtit trt:lining:
tiro prerequisites sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l is flexiblo fot'
in 'TP,rvine: situ8.tions. The key to its 8.pplict:ltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount'1ins thomsel,res. In gen0rJ3.1. tho rugp;od I1nd
close mount" inous terrJ3.in requires the employment of so,rerl1l columns sprotid
out like the of 8. hl1nd. columns in one direction on J3.
bro!'ld front. El1ch column probes for 8. W8l1k point. Etich column is weighted
then pourine: throuJ:!:h the hole. to converge upon decisive points. This tl'lkes
/--'1st tid'Ttint8.lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of "lrmor. The ntitur
.1 CO"lror "nd security pro,ridod by mountti inous tert'ti in reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction. But it must nC'lt be tf\K-on for
side.
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt'3.cK-or must h'3 of (WGr-oxtending
his forces. The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n
with supportine: troops. Tho comITI8.ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position. thus to protection: tho more troops
for reser"TG s. the widor his front C'l.n be. LllCk of 1l;1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8.l support by the forces "nd the problem of coordi
!l1ltion. Limited ob.ioctj,os p.re Ildhored to. The loe:jsticlll sunport is kept tiS
f'lr possible ,>nd protected from t'l'l.iding pl'l.rties mo'rine: on foot.
",--..
95
1 ondoSlvdr to control thllt I!round wh ich '1 ffords good observ8.tion
Ilnd fields of fire., This sometimes becomes more importqnt in
the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemy. the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n but seldom cqn he defend them 8.11. Thus. the enemy
c8.n be encirclod qnd isol8.tod by 8.n qttllckine force operqtinl! on 8. bro8,d
front. The m8.ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fot"W'8.rd qnd committed in <l decisb'3 qss8.ult qg:8.inst his defense.
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c8.1 reserves 8,t
oqch strong point. The def8nse is chqrqcterized by control.
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense. It is emph8.sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8.tions tqsk forces 8.re formed, eqch force self
supporting. This is neceSS8.ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move

ch f8.cility in the mount8.ins. During conduct of the entire operqtion,
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult. This thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocess<lry. Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn un
degree of quthority qnd of qction.
The present org8.nizqtton of the 8.rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without m<l.ior chqnges. It rqpid
orgqni,?;qtion of the smllll bqV'mcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8.nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th'3se forces. However. the qr
tillery now 8.V8.ihble in the l'lrmored does not qpoetlr I3.doqul'lto for
in the mountqine. Tho qrtillerv of the present I3.rmorod
division is designed to G'.:ive the comml3.nder minimum support fire durine: com
t'
: oporl'l, lons on qverl3.ge terrqin. compl3.rl3.tively long rl3.ne:os of the
96
r- 'mtil ".lnd 155rnm howitters will provide <ldequ"l.te fire support on leve 1 terr"l.in,'
HOll'rever. fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close, hi!!:h <lnl1:le fire. The 4.2 inch mortqr is well suit"ld to pro
1r
ide this
type of fire. so it is belioved th"l.t one or more b"l.ttl'llions should be
od to tho division. A of 12 mort"l.rs would provide tbe S"l.me supnort
P.S l05mm howitzer when massed fires qre employed "l.nd hqs the qd
v!'tnt"l.e::o of clefJrine:: bie:h rn"l.sks I'lt short rqne:es. The compl'lny's three pll'ltoon
orl!;"l.niz"l.tion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1"l.ll te"l.ms. Tbo mor
t".lr should be se If-prope lled. The 1N'9<lse I-type vehicle (M29 C"l.r!!:o Cqrrier), "l.
personnel c"lrrier. or the hqlf-tr"lck C"ln be modified to C"l.rry this we"l.pon.
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present cap!'t
r
.lities. The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii rela
tively lar!!:e areli} elich must h".lve AAAW protection. If the committee recom.
mendation is favorably considered. the division will acquire more mort"lrs.
Each mort"lr incre"lses tbe need for !'tnt 18, ircr"lft protecti on. Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads. throul!;h numerous defiles. and into widely scattered in
stallations. It seems obvious that qn increasine:: amount of antiaircraft pro
tection is required and th!'tt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
are not sufficient tor this type of operation.
The ratio of inflintry in the !'trrnored division is "ldequlite for moun
tain operations. Inf"lntry provides support to t"l.nks, points out
suitable tare:ets. "l.nd rn"l.y even lead the tanks through difficult terrain.
Tanks, in turn. give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection.
r-
97
Engineers in overcoming terrain presented bv
slopes" stream, and enem:,r mines ot' deblolitiohs. The deml'!l.nd for their ser,rices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain Ser
viee elements will require their help in road "lnd head
quqtters must be into the rocky soil, and artillery emplacements must be
constructed. The front line units, too, will swell the demand for ene:ineer
services. Above all, en/Z:insers are essential for brin.e:in.e: tanks to "im_
possible" locl'l.tions to astound the enemy "ind assure success. The solution
would appear to be engineer troops, preferably with equip
mente
Adverse weather .. sC"l.rcity of roads jO mine fie Ids. and transportation
difficulties make the matter of an armored division a serious prob
lem. The t"l.ctical employment of sm"lll task forces in tho
/--
:oblem of control. Weather I'Ind bl'ld roads tl'lX the endurance of supply ve
hicles. The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route.
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate traffic. Two rO"l.ds
should be selected when possiblo; one for movement the for
return traffic. In mountains tho time-distance factor is gre'ltor thqn jn war
fare over open
Mountain demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
I'l. minimum loss of overall control. Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine: broken loads. This provents nUIDOrous round trips durin/Z: resupply
procedures. An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1'111 vehicles" especially
Class III and V supplies.
defensi,re operations supplies can be btought fot"'l'lard and dumped
r- '.side the battle position. The supply vehicles then can be placed nGt::Ir the
98
of the position or used for other purposes. If successive positions
are to be defended. thesl'lvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new This procedure pres1)pposes the forW'ird units will exh'iust
tbe pre'lTious ly dumped suppliss before the 11 reli.
All mount'1 in operl'ltions req1Jire phnnine: to the most minute data 11.
Coordin!'l.tion by the with qll commanders is of More
dependence is pl!'l.ce upon individufl.ls than under normfl.l combllt conditions.
Mo,remem: of supplies fot'Wl'lrd is normally slower; therefore, !'l. grellter per...
centqge of fl.ll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety ffl.c
tor.
tvlr:dntennnce support must ':le closely tier} in with supply. Like supply
fl.ctivities, the effort is but central control is
/'''''-'1b:J.ined. Individual soldiers experienced in the I'\nd prfl.ctice of
....dId expedients is !'l. must. ,'fec""JqniC6 ShOllld be c<tp"lhIe of rBpairine: 'iny
type of vehicle. Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude of va ..
hicles to tbe re"l.r. On m!1ny occ'lsions, prompt recovery <:Ind rep<:dr of ve
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to 'ldv!1nce the unit.
The sp<>co f'lctor i.a of conC'3rn to tbe commfl.nder. He must see th"tt best poa
slhle $=J.re'lS pre for 111'lintAn"'.nce "lcti'I'Tities.
The desil?:n of vehicles is 'i.ffected by the terrq.in. A btnk of
climbing e;r'1dients !'l.S steep q.s 45 d'3g:reos', trl'l'rersing n'lrrow mount'1in trl3.ils,
qnd of construction QS to m8ke possible shp.rp turns is The
present t'?nk requ ires more horse pow')r per ton. Engines ShOl11d be cl":lpqble
of functioning qt 12,000 feet The of vehicles such
as tho tl3.nk or personnel should be wider thqn on present models.
,..-
ty to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)l'.\te. The ir cooled engine <mo short turning 1itv of the M46
is q step in the direction, but this is too wide for moun
tl'l.in oper"ltion. Its will not elev"lte or depress sufficiently to meet the
rquirements in mount8in fighting. The ground of our qr
mored vehicles. in genel'",l, is too low for use in A ground
cleQr'1nce without Sl1.crific in/?: low silhouette would be the 1 ch8.rl'l.cteris
tic.
Sn'8.11 full-tr"tck- vehicles 'lpproxim'ltely 60 inches wide, C8.p8.ble of
cOIPulete ly "Iround on 40 d'3l"l'ee slopes. J!Jnd h"l-ul he8.VY pqylo"Olds be
come neceSS"lry for personnel Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tl'''lnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnp.issqnce p.nd p8.trol 8.ctivitv. FUll-trp,cked vehicles simil"lr to the
p3rsonnel cnrrier h.."ve to repll'lce wh'3el vehicles for trl'msporting
t>_tlplifls from l1.re"s to fr("lnt line units. They wCluld require modific'l
tion in the Wfly of wider trl'lcks "md thG c<1pl'lbilHy of negooti"lting lro
turns in one motion.
No r-tt'mored unit should oper'lte in mount", inous country without prior
trllining: which would condition the troops to mountqin comb'lt. An Army Ground
Force report "lttributed Germqn successes in the to the presence of
'lrmored units specific8lly tr'lined for mount '1 in Likewise" the
British f!=!ilure in Norwp,y W":lS by httvine: no troops tr!3.ined to oper'lte
in mount"linous terr<l.in. A progr-:m of tl'''lin:ing is neceSS'1.ry for physicl'll
conditjoning the de"'elopment "r inithtjve for self-cg.ra on the p"',rt of
the tr00Ps ... The extr!'). wor.'k" IOf1d, hll':her Il1titude. 8nd usu'llly severe
w8<lther conditi0ns phce I'!, pr0mium on (tood hG"llth. The sense of isohtion"

of pro"lrided b:,r proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es .. found in
100
ffi'll operAtion, the need for strong nerves mentql
Etleh soldier nrust reco:ive tr".iningo in self-<:Idministrqtion of first qid. He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos ".nd nrp,ctice of tnilit"lrv Dili
q:ence in conduct And t'llertness to d"lnr.er 'ire import"lnt in

Tr"ining in smqll unit must be TechnicAl trqin
in vehicle mqintenqnce, of weApons, p,nd C"lre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed. All commqnders must be <!lert <mo experienced
1.n the employment of qttqched units. They must undo::rst"lnd the qpplicc,tion
of t"ctics peculil'lr to mounbdn fightine:. Et)ch individuj:>.l Sht:)111d k-now how
to obt<dn thr;, m'lximum officiencv froIP hjs we"'oon. Sp.lv'l.ge t'lnd rep"lir ser
vice will not re'ldily ",t 1'''Ino. This "'.pplies equ"llly to yehicles "nd
equ ipment. Tl'!nk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight "'s i'rlf"lntrymen
, ..dn U.e need ""rises; e spec iJ>.lly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQlll'lc, or wr.en
the ir t"'nlrs 'lre immobi1 ized. Cooper8.ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier "md the
mounted soldier is pqr'lmnunt.
Troops should pr'1ctice plp.cinz vehicles :in the Trost difficult firing
nns jn selected rU!l:P'Gd ter-t"n.in; "l.!'!d units should be reqllired te> fire
from p0sitjons. Field expedients should be in 6V"lcuqting
he"l"ITilv "Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpfl.ss"lblel1 torr"in. All cmnrr,"lnders should
be tr"lined to find their throu9.:h the roughest terrl'lin. Const"lnt prl'l.ctice
in tr,,: il find will P'W off i":men.sllrtlbly in comb"lt.
Modern "!rll'ored tl1ctics "'r'3 ,"mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mount"linous terr"tin. Succoss in ths l,1se of qrmor under "ld,rerse conditinns
will Ulp.ke gren.t dem"lnds upon tho skill, equipment, time, "lnd of the

l"l.nd. The use (If c:rmor in unexpected phcGS mp..y me<1n tho difference be ..
101
n victory defeat. It is certain the of armor justi
fie s the effort invobr"ld. This study to but one conclusion: IT CAN
BE DONE.
102
,r--.
APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling for this the committee
of the 'lrmored units thlOl.t foueht in mountl1inous terr<:lin. This
dix show's the list of units, to divisions qnd sepflrqte t"lnk b"lttp.lions.
qnd the c<lmp1'liJ?:ns foue:ht wh'3re mountp inous terr"lin WI'\S encountered.
P',rt two of this "lpnendix shows q further brel?kdown, dividin/?: the
<:',rmoroc both qrmored divisions qnd sepl'l.r<'ltl9 to:m1< bqtt'llions, by th"3
PART I
Divisions C"lmpq ig:ns where Mount'! inous were conducted
1st Tunisi"l, Nl'l.plos-Foggi<'l, Rome-Armo, N. Apennines
2nd Ardennes
3rd Ardennes
4th Ard
i
3nnes
,r- 5th Ardennes
6th Arde I1nf3S
7th Ardennes
8th Ardennes
9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44th I.eyte, Luzon, S'1m'::r Ishmd
70th Tunisi'l, Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1;gi"l
701st Rhinehnd
702nd Ard
f
:3nnes, Rhinehnd
707th Ardennes, Rhine l<'lnd
709th Ardennes, R'bjnohmd
711th
Okirmwa
712th Ardennes, Hhjnehnd
735th Ardennes
736th Ardermes, Rhinehnd
737th Ardl) nne s
740th
Ard';Jnnes
741st
Ardennos, Rhjnelrmd
743rd
Ardennes .. Rhjne l"lnd
. '(44th
Ardennes
,,----745th
Ardennes, Ehinehnd
46th
Ardennes II Rhinelrmd
"48th Ardennes, Rhjnehnd
103
r
,--.
750th
751st
752nd
7531'<1
754th
755th
'756th
757th
759tb
760th
761st
763rd
77lst
772nd
7'74th
775th
777th
77Ptrl
78lst
784th
786th
1st British
6th British
7th British
5th C8.n<ldhn
Rhinel8.nd
Tunisi8., North Apennines
Tunisil3., Rome-Arno, North Apennines
Sicily, Foggi8., Rome-Arno, North Rhine
hnd
North Luzon
Nqp1es Foggiq, Apennines
N'3.ples Rome-Arno,
N"'p1'3s Fogg:il3.. Rome-Arno,
Rhin0hnd
Nqplos FOI':)!:il3., Rome-Arno,
Rhinehnd, Ardennes
Leyte, Okinn,wl;\
Rhinell3.nd, Ardennes
Rhinehnd
Rhinelqnd,
North Luzon
Rhinehnd
Rhinehnd
Rhinel'3.nd
Rhinehnd
Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3., North Apennines
Rhine1'1nd
North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi'3., Ron:e-Arno, North Apennines
Tunis it>. .t l'T!),pl'9s FOI.":p'il'\
Rome-Arno, North Apennines
6t\-1 S(luth Rome-Arno, North Apennines
1st Franch Rh5nehno, Centrl'll Ell rope
2nd Fr'3nch Rhj ne l",nc1 .. Cent 1''1 1 Europe
5th Fr'1nch Rhinehnd, Centr'11 Europe
104
Tank B'3,ttalions
44th
7l1th
754th
763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
11th
T"nk Blltt13. lion
70th
701st
702nd
707th
709th
7l2nd
735th
736th
737th
740th
741st
743rd
744th
745th
746th
748th
750th
753rd
756th
759th
761st
771st
772nd
APPENDIX I
PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
in
Leyte,. Luzon, Is l'lnd
Okinl3.wl3.
North Luzon
Le yte, Oki nl3.wa
North Luzon
EUROPEA:' THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes
lirdennes
Rhinehnd
Ardennes, Rh:inehnd
Ardennes, Rhinehnd
Ardennes, Rhinehnd
,t\rdennes, Rh ine Illnd
Ardennes
Ardennes, Rhine l"nd
Ardennes
Ardennes
Ardennes '" Rhine l"nd
Ardennes, Rhino hnd
Ardenne s
Ardennes I Rhinehmd
Ardennes, RhinAhnd
Ardennes, Rhino It3.nd
Ardeymes,
Rhinclmd
Rhino 1l1nd
Rh:inell'l.nd
Rhjno 113.nd
Rhjnehnd, Ardennes
Rh ine hnd, Ardenms
Rb j ne l"lnd
105
774th
777th
778th
781st
784th
786th
'[""or; d D5, vis ions
1st
70th
191st
751st
752nd
753rd
755th
756th
757th
760th
Rhinel"ind, Ardennes
Rhineh,nd
Rhineb.nd
Rhh16h,nd
Rhinel1md
Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJ'.NEAN TEE1,TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill. Nl'lples Foe::e:i1':l., Rome-Arno" North
Apennines

Np.ples Fog:e:i1':l.
TuniSlll, Nc,rth Apennines
Nqples Foggil'l, North
I.pennines
Sicily, Np.ples Rome-Arno, North
Apennines
}kples Foe:/dn, North Apennines
NI3. ple s Rome -Arno
J:.1"lples Rome-Arno, North Apennines
N1':l.ples FOE!:e:il'l, Rome-Arno, North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTb.INOUS OPEPJ.TIOJ)TS
As "In "l.id for future mOl.mt'dnous operl'l.tions the committee hl'l.s f'"'und
in fqctors 11\0}; icr: phy "l.n import"lnt p"l.rt in mount"l in opor"l.tions. Adequ"lte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help !i"lT0id llnnecessp.rily hiil:h C(lst in lives
'md oqlliprrent in futur') Qr1"1orod (lpor!'J.tions in lil(lunt"l.ins. Listed for the
r8<l.der
l
s c("InsidorG.tion "\"('0 s'31oct;;::d pertinent fl'lcts ''inC. f"lctors in mount"linous
operrtions:
1.. Mount" in wG'1thlJr is ch"l.r".lcterized both in suU'rrer winter by in
c or by l".lrge teIT'per"lture differences hr:l'been night d<l.Y II 1'tnd by
SlH"aer, "nd 10c".ll17. "lC "ltmospheric d j st'lrb"lnc8S, such I'lS violent snow storms.
rl3. in "l.nd fo/!,
."--'
2. Smoke from firee in th-::; v<il1ev will often rise in "l. column th",t
cl3.n be seen fClr miles.
3. Li/!,hts "It night C'1n be GO'3n from distp.nt v;siblt:j p6"lks.
4. It is difficult to support qnd r'3S8rve units to execute
counterp.tt"'.ck plfJ.ns.
5. R"tion needs of the troops I'lre jncro"lsed bv the rigors of terr"l.in
6. Mountl'\jn rO"l.ds or tr<dls usually '1r0 unimpro,rod but plissl3.ble.
7. EVf'\cullticn of wounded in m('lunt<dn w'1rfA.re prQsnts 11 difficult Drob
lem.
efficioI"cy.
,,- 9. Low frequency 'Clmplitude modul"l.ted ro:;dio sets I'l.ro better suited for
-l'1tq in cotnmunj ct j on thq.n 1<'.1;1.
107
10. The use of sets on top of frequency
sets in crossing these
11. Long lines of sight excellent use of syst8ms
Ilnd "lssume import':mce in the mountl3.jns.
12. of comml;lnd is chllrl3.cteristic of mountl3.in oper"ltions .
COmnJ"l.nders of 8ubordin13.t8 units must "lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll.
13. Combl3.t in high mountl;lins demllnds in pll3.nning "lnd
prop'l.rfC,tion.
14. Ad.il'l,cent units frequentlv "lre unl3.ble to provide mutu13.1 support.
15. forces of mount"lin troops C"ln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd h"lr"lssing
16. The focal points of mount"lj ns 'l.rl'l he ights.
17. "Ire m"lde 13.1ong ridges r'l.ther th"ln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ippro"lch.
18. Djstl3.nce is me'lsured in time rl3.ther th"ln spllce.
19. MountA.in terr'iln lends itself p"lrticuhrly well to surprise .
20. In climbing by foot, the use of b8l1s of the feet should be
"lvoided.
21. ClimM.ng tire s the he"lrt "lnd lune:s; C'l.uses !!:r6"lt muscuhr
fl3t il1:u':3.
22. Reconnaiss'l.nce of routos of m"lrch should b'1 r.md r01ltes s"llected
on the b'l.sis of tactiC'l.l security.
23. Cilre must be t'l.ksn to select an ob.iective which C'l.n be reached with ..
in time "lv"lil'l.ble.
24. The de fender.' should <1i"S1 inst surpriso ids by 1'lrmored a laments

'ling of rOlld blocks .. mjnes, AT guns.
108
Thll clipture of v'lnt"l/?;o points for I'lrti 11ary obserVl'l.tion must be
26. Once I?:"lined. should neV"'lr bo lost. beC"luse it time
to r'loonnoit'3r onemy positions. <and I'l.void tIlmbush.
27. Dominnnt terrl'l.in provides the donies the
<and positions.
28.
e
It is oft'Jn impossib1.; to turn whic1f:ls I'l.round on roqds.
29. Extensive engineer work is required for construction,
<and of routes of
30. Roqds should not b0 built crcsts of ridges.
31. Underground giv1s considerqb1'9 troub1o in roqd
32. Medic'll sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops.
tlt'lins.
34. Mountqin 0'" '3ith'Jr q dJingBrous obst",c1e to opert:ltions
or I'l. vp.1ul).b1e ,dd. to how well it is understood whqt
is tqken of its chqrS'\ct',ri stics.
t'lnk oquipment.
36. The doop$r snow, tho more it 'lnd the movement
of columns.
37. Silmrnunition I).nd r'ltions 'lS fl'lr fOrw<lrd Sl.S possjble durine: dqrk
ness in ordl1r to rJduce p"lcking ,,"nd h'lnd cqrry.
36. Trqffic control must b'J rigidly ml'1"intqined to pro'l''9nt con
g0stion
".-..
109
39, to in stoep terrqin devicee
of V8hiclos must be chockod since on the of
hqVB results.
40. In cold 'iYO'lthor "lnd mountp..ins, sp<3l)d of is
41. Litt'3r h'luls must be kept '1.8 sbort tlS tho t9.ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit.
42. Night eV"Icu"lti0n O"l.r'1r t"jrr"lin is g"lner<ll1y iIl1prllctic'lble, "Ind
tho r"lsults qr<; r"lrely corrmensurqte with the, effort.
43. During evqcu'ltion O"I.Tor q cliff or down very stp.ep slope, the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter.
44. convsnient "lnd rneSS6ners in tho moun.
bdns, '3 spociql1y for forw'1rd d'Slt'3-chments.
,--- 45. N'311 tr'lined dogs 'lrEl d0p:mdqble qnd m9.Y be useful in
.!bdn oper"ltions.
110
CO MR1NfD ARM'S rlE SEi\ Ft CH
KS
li:1 11 'li,11
3 1695 00324 2930