Congress

Congress July 18, 2011

19/07/2011 01:03:00

Recap: American political system has not been a linear progression over time, but rather a serpentine ebb and flow. Roger Smith: American political development has had a serpentine development over time, and that multiple traditions better explain this ebb and flow over time than would a single tradition. o Eg. Emancipation Practice questions Federalism is: o Sep (horizontal) of powers across different institutions within the same level of governt o Division (vertical) of powers across multiple levels of government in which each level enjoys at least some power independent of others. o Division powers across multiple levels of govt must be independent o None of the above Smith (1993) argues that: o American political culture consists of multiple interacting traditions including liberal democratic thought but also in egalitarian ideologies Congress 1. Basic Facts Leg branch of US fed govt Bicameral leg two chambers o The House

Members 435 Members 2-year terms More formalized, and under control of majority party, than senate Campaigns less $$ and higher incumbency rate o The Senates Senators 100 Members 6-year staggered terms Confirms presidential appointments Indirect elections pre-1913 Confirms presidential appointments and ratifies treaties Campaigns more $ and lower incumbency rate Congress can also refer to a period of time Relationship between 2 chambers o Both must pass all laws o Nominally requires a majority in both chambers BUT in the Senate often requires 60 out of 100 to head off a filibuster (i.e. 60 votes needed to use cloture on a filibuster, down from 67 votes pre-1975) Check and balances: between branches o Presidency Veto bills passed by Congress

Congress can override by 2/3 votes in BOTH houses Can remove precedence through an impeachment process Confirms presidential appointments o Judiciary Strike down acts of congress Senate must confirm judicial appointments Congress has some control over the structure Parties o Majority party controls the leadership positions in the house House: the Speaker Senate: Majority Leader Both Houses: leadership of the committees o Party caucuses in each chamber choose their own leaders o Strength of party leaders has ebbed and flowed over time, centralized now, committee used to be more powerful o B&W: Leaders can only exercise the powers that their party members give them o Canadian comparison: CDN leaders have greater leverage over their legislators much higher party discipline in Canada than the USA. (eg. Party leaders can refuse to sign nominations, but party caucuses cannot typically depose their leaders) Committees o Main functions Scrutinize legislation Engage in congressional oversight Arguably also provide credit claiming opportunities for MCs (Mayhews 1974)

o Power of committees has an inverse relationship to the power of party leaders How a Bill becomes Law o Bill is introduced o Committee and sub-committee consider bill o House and Senate consider bill and vote (presented to floor) o Conference committee resolves any differences between House and Senate o Bill passes both houses o President sign or vetoes the legislation Agenda control in HOUSE o Standing committee votes in favour of bill, its sent to House

Rules Committee for a rules that sets out how bill will be considered on floor of House Open rule: any germane amendments from the floor) Closed rule: restriction on types of amendments o These restrictions can have a big effect. Closed: take it or leave it offer Open: opportunity for compromise These restrictive rules are typically not present in the Senate o Median voter theorem with closed and open rules, and the take-it or leave-it approach Smith Congress, the Troubled Institution: Main argument: their are 4 interrelated trends in congressional politics. These trends are undesirable, and can only be reversed by electing more moderates 1. Party Polarization o Caused by sorting of both MCs and voters (liberals more likely to be democrats, conservatives more likely to be republicans)

o Parties are becoming more internally homogenous and pulling apart over time o Cause of sorting is as of yet unclear 2. Procedural abuses o In House: cohesive majority party able to freeze our minority party o In Senate: cohesive minority party able to filibuster (or threaten to filibuster) more effectively o Consequence: gridlock things can shoot through the house, but get stuck in the senate 3. Ceding of congressional power to the president o Leads to a weakened congress Crises (e.g. terrorism, Iraq, economy) lead Congress to delegate powers to president Weak oversight of George W. Bush presidency when GOP majority party in Congress 4. The unpopularity of congress o Approval rating of Congress in the tank. Caused in part by highly visible scandals, partisanship, and apparent gridlock.

What Drives Congress? What drives congressional decision making? Why do MCs do what they do? o 1. General motivation and incentives (Fenno 1973, Mayhew 1974, Hall 1996) o 2. Constituency (Clinton 2006, Bartels 2008) o 3. Party (Krehbiel 1993, Ansolabehere et all 2001, Cox and McCubbins 2005) o 4. Organized Fenno, Richard Congressmen in Committees Main arguments:

o 3 basic goals: re-election, influence in House, and make good public policy o mix of 3 goals varies across MCs and time o opportunities to achieve these goals vary across committees Evidence o Uses surveys of and interviews with MCs on 6 standing committees in the 50s and 60s to ID goals of these MCs o Finds that eg. personal influence is dominant goal of members to Appropriations Committee while constituency service is dominant goal of Interior Committee Mayhew, David Main argument: assumes that MCs are primarily interested in reelections o From this we should see them take part in 3 activities: o 1. Advertising 2. Credit claiming 3. Position taking o Congress in well-suited to allowing members of congress to get reelected Typology o Advertising Promote name and positive image, but with little political content Non political speech, congratulations etc. o Credit claiming Generate BELIEF that one is personally responsible for government doing something good Often accomplished through delivery of particularized benefits (pork) o Position Taking Public enunciation of a judgmental statement eg. Roll call vote, policy interview Consequences of single-minded reelection seeking

o Delay, particularism, servicing of organized interest, symbolic but unsubstantial legislative action Evidence o Largely destructive Key point BOTH FENNO AND MAYHEW o Internal practices

Carson and Jenkins: Examining the Electoral Connection Question: Does Mayhewian electoral incentive apply to previous congressional eras? Main argument: yes, four necessary condition for Mayhewian electoral incentive are present at least as early 1980s o Ambition Have to want to get re-elected Congressional careerism beginning in 1890s Political leap-frog careerism from even earlier o Autonomy Development of direct primary election in early 1900s. Earlier still: could print own ballots avoided need for nominations o Responsiveness Eg. Rivers and harbours legislation in 1880s Earlier still use of private bills for pensioners o Accountability Evidence: state-generated ballot beginning in 1880s makes ticket splitting easier Hall: Participation in Congress

Puzzle: Why do MCs engage in committee work to produce public goods for floor when have incentives to free ride on efforts of others.? Main argument: o MCs still decide to act out of some sense of self-interest (electoral or personal), not because of congressional norms or socialization. o 3 types of interest 1. Enhance likelihood of reelection (Mayhew) 2. Pursue their own personal policy preference (Fenno) 3. Prosecute the presidents agenda Evidence: interviews with MCs staff

Constituency Lots of research on the role of the constituency on the behavior of MCs o Similar trends between parties, but difference in actual placement. Eg. Bartells constituency opinion vs. voting score Clinton Representation in Congress (based on party affiliation) o Question: To what extent are constituency and partisan subconsti. Preferences reflected in MCs roll call voting in 106th House o Findings Reps are not completely responsive to the district of the whole (geographic) Majority party R. are especially responsive to the prefs of R constituents and Minority party D. are most responsive to the preferences of non-Democratic constituents Bartels Unequal Democracy (based on income) o Question: How has rising economic inequality and increased role of money in the political process affected who actually governs the USA

o Finding: late 80s and early 90s, senators were WAY more responsive to rich constituents than they were to poorer constituents Krehbiel Wheres the Party o Main Argument: Signigicant party effects are rare o Correlation-causation problem: Observes that just because party affiliation is correlated with voting behaviou does not necessarily mean that party CAUSED the voting behaviour o Evidence: Party behaviour in assignment of members to standing committees and conference committees. Finds Majority party status is a weak predictor of committee assignments Ansolabehere o Main arguemnet: BOTH MCs party affiliation andpreferences do matter o Evidence: statistical analysis in which MCs preelection preferences are measured using candidate surveys o Finding Party exerted an independent effect on members voting behaviour in roughly 40% of roll calls taken during 103, 4, 5th congress Jump seen on graph is called the Party effect Cox and McCubbins o Main Argument: Maj. Party contrls houses agenda and uses agenda control to Block bills that majority of majority party opposes Promotes bills taht they favour o Key Assumption MCs delegate power to their party leaders who take action to build and maintain a desirable party brand for re-election purposes o Evidence Eg. Committee roll calls

4/5628 bills that the majoirty of the majority party opposed were reported from the committee to the floor. (Democratic majority)

Summary General motivations and incentives o Fenno, Mayhew, Hall Constituency o Clinton, Bartels Party o Krehbiel, Ansolabehere, Cox and McCubbins Organized interest later class

Presidency and Bureaucracy

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Recap: Filibuster West Wing Stackhouse filibuster o Essentially just means that you need 60 votes, not a simple majority to pass anything in the Senate Clinton 1 unit change is more highly related to change in Republicans in 106 (majority) congress. o Could this be because Reps are appealing to their base, while Dems are trying to bring more people into the fold? Cox and McCubbins Congressional Committees o Joint and Conference (from both houses) Main questions Selection President and VP are only nationally elected offices in fed govt Details of selection process are complex Not exactly popular vote, but a weighted popular vote (Electoral College) Succession President o Vice-president Speaker of the House President pro tempore of Senate Cabinet Secretaries

Removal Impeachment o Treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors o 2 steps House votes to impeach Charged with a crime Majority vote Trial in Senate Can convict and remove by 2/3rds vote Powers in three categories Executive o Chief administrator o Appoints heads of civil service depts and ambassadors, subject to Senate approval o Commander-in-chief of armed forces Cannot declare war themselves, but once war has been declared, the president is in charge o Empowered to negotiate treaties, subject to Senate approval Legislative o State of Union address (weak proposal power) o VP as tie-breaker vote in Senate o Executive orders: nominally clarifications of laws already passed by Congress To direct civil service to a particular type of action

o Signing statements Attaches a statement when it signs a bill into the law. A way where the president can pick and chose which parts of the law they want to follow o Presidential veto, subject to congressional override Judicial o Appoints federal judges, subject to Senate approval (includes senatorial courtesy and holds) The president is expected to consult with the Senators that the appointment is being made in, and to appoint someone they like o Direction of activities of the Justice Dept.

Some leverage over what they choose to litigate, defend o Pardoning power Historical Evolution Tradition (Founding to 1930s) o Relatively weak executive o Position dwarfed by legislative power of Congress Modern (1930s to Present) o Same constitutional powers as during traditional period o Now greater public expectations, greater role of government Ebb and Flow of Presidential Power o Serpent returns o Considerable delegation of Congressional power to FDR during Great Depression o Vietnam War alleged abuses by president caused Congress to enact new laws to decrease power of president o Bush/Cheney seek to revive muscular presidency (theory of unitary executive, where all executive power is concentrated in the president)

Strategy Persuasion of MCs, state official, etc. Going public o Seeks to get what they want from other politicians by leveraging public support o Contingent on presidential approval ratings Kernell bumpersticker Act of going public by presidents increased a lot since 50s and 60s Tension between going public and Neustadts opinion of behind the scenes bargaining Group discussion Persuaded: Can going public/threat be effective Good or bad thing? o Bypassing? Is the public incompetent? Does it matter Presidential Success Divided government: president is different party than one/both houses o Much more successful at having bills that the president supports passed when government is united (legistlative program)

Bureaucracy Key point: both president and congress compete for control of the bureaucracy MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM In the US: certain presidential appts (eg. Heads of departments) are subject to congressional confirmation, congress holds the purse strings, congress engages in oversight In Canada: PM had free hand in appointment of heads of depts. o This same type of multiple principal problem doesnt exist in Canada, where the bureaucracy only has one master US Cabinet 15 cabinet level departments Executive Office of the President (EOP) Fed bureaucracy that is under the direct control of the president Office of Management and Budget o National Security Council White House Office From Lewis, in Kernell and Smith Because the president cannot be assured of the loyalty of the burreaucracy, the president politicizes the burreaucracy o Career bureaucrats and political appointments Moe 1985 Key point: President is driven by expectations gap to pursue responsive competence (in response to presidents political needs) How is responsive competence achieved o central policy making in White House (bring the decision making power closer to himself) o appoint officials all over the federal bureaucracy, based on loyalty, ideology and programmatic support Rudalevige (2002)

o Centralization is contingent on political environment and policy Lewis (2008) o Politicization hasnt changed over time, nor with republicans Moe 1989 Key point: Federal bureaucracy is not designed to be effective (267) Underlying logic of Moes argument? Contrast with Canada should we expect Canadian bureaucracy be better designed? o Yes because we dont have the issue of multiple principals, so the PM SHOULD be able to just fix the problem. Who is the most powerful chief executive? PM or President

Richard Neustadt (1960) govt of separated institutions SHARING powers

Judiciary

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Outstanding questions: What constitutes a majority in congress? o IT depends simple majority of both houses is a quorum o Sometimes you need a super majority of not just those present, but of all member What is a treaty for the purposes of senate approval (while the same technically, but go through different routes) o Treaty approval of the senate o Executive agreement just the approval of the president, does not need the senate Conference committees mechanism by which two houses reconcile each house only has one vote in the process (decided upon by the majority of each house) Iraq war powers to declare war (congress) vs. exercise way (president) o Was a congressional approval of war in 2002 Recap Presidency o Contemporary presidents have high levels of public expectation, but also have constitutionally limited powers Incentives to pursue non-traditional strategies o Competition between presidency and bureaucracy (responsive competence) Prompts president to politicize the bureaucracy Appoint bureaucratic heads who agree with the presidents agenda Facilitates inefficient agency processes Big questions What drives judiciary decision making? Why do judges rule as they do? Given what we know about what drives decision making Congress and the courts who should be making laws? Does it matter?

Judiciary Lots of kinds of laws Laws can come from several different institutions o Statutory laws o Administrative laws o Executive orders o Judicial decisions 2 separate court systems o federal courts powers to fed government in constitution o state courts powers reserved for state governments in constitution State Courts o Most legal action is at the state level (Barbour and Wright) o Some variation in structure and selection processes across the 50 states o Usually 3 tiers Court of original jurisdiction Intermediate courts of appeal States supreme court (decision final, unless entails a federal question, then can be appealed to federal court system) o Selection Not appointed for life, but elected or appointed for a certain time period

Judicial elections often means election campaigns o Face some kind of regular election 3 common types Partisan elections Run with a partisan label Non partisan elections Run without partisan labels Retention elections Incumbent judge runs for reelection without partisan label or challenger (wins if he gets a certain % of voters continue to support him) o Canes-Wrone et all (2010) Trend over time Partisan>non-partisan>retention Which election system do you think is most likely to favor judicial independence (from public opinion) Main argument: retention elections will not insulate judges from pressure to cater to public pressure. In the context of modern judicial campaigns (with interest groups). An absence of party label makes judges susceptible to being characterized by one or two isolated decisions. If you dont know a lot about a candidate, then a lack of label can be difficult to overcome, in the face of a few well marketed decisions. If you have a party label, then it gives more information about values. Data: Abortion decisions Findings Retention election 10 pt increase in pro-life public opionion = pro life decision increased by 8-10% Non partisan elections Positive relationship

Partisan elections Almost no relationship, almost a negative relationship Conclusion Contrary to conventional wisdom, retention elections do not insulate judges from public opinion on hot button issues, and in fact creates greater pressure than a partisan election system Ks questions does this control for judges who are not seeking reelection, do term limits apply to judges, why the negative relationship for partisan elections

Federal Courts o 3 tiers federal district courts (94 districts, geographically) US courts of appeal (12 circuits, geographically) US Supreme Court (1 court, 9 justices, all based in DC) considers only small fraction of cases o The appellate courts DO NOT make any new judgements regarding facts, but are concerned with how the trial judge made decisions o Selection Appointed by president, confirmed by senate Lifetime appointments on good behaviors Basis of presidents selection Electoral needs Ideological compatibility Libs vs. cons, constructionist vs. interpretivist, activist vs. restrained Merit (ABA reviews) Reward o Confirmation

Senatorial courtesy, not for USSC Informal process Increasingly politicized and partisan Senate confirmation process MALTZMAN (2005) Purpose: examine confirmation process of lower federal courts (district and circuit) Data: length of confirmation, likelyhood of confirmation over 25 years Result: less likely to be confirmed, and more likely to take longer to be confirmed now than 25 years ago Suggested causes: Divided party control of White House and Senate Increased ideological distance between parties Partisan balance in federal courts (new appts would tip in favour of 1 party) Increased policy importance of federal courts Suggested Consequences Vacancies may hurt performance of federal courts Politicized confirmation process may harm legitimacy of courts Partisan tension may harm senate Acrimonious confirmation process may discourage promising judicial nominees KASTELLAC et al. Main question: does public opinion influence Supreme Court confirmation politics Data: Senate vote and state-level opinion on recent USSC nominees. Finding: Greater home-state public support increase significantly the probability that a nominee with be confirmed.

50% public support = 50/50 chance of yes vote from Senator, high quality nominee low quality nominee needs 65% support to have the same chance o Canadian Comparison CDN reflects a federal arrangement. But is more integrated, than the American system Criminal law is a federal jurisdiction Provinces have some control over the structure of the courts, but feds appoint and pay all superior court judges. No confirmation process in Canada (appointed by Cabinet) Decision Making o BAUM, LAWRENCE 3 dominant models strategic model Persue own policy prefs, BUT instead of taking ideal point, they strategically modify their opinion to: o Secura approval of rest of court o Avoid reversal on appeal o Win the compliance of mass public o Avoid provoking legistalture Most widely used Strategic in their choices Pure attitudinal model Pick the decision that most pleases them, regardless of the other factors Pure legal model Interpret the law accurately, without concern for their own preferences or the desirability of the policies that results

No longer commonly accepted by Political Scientists, as the decision making model of judges Critique of 3 models All 3 assume that judges act solely on their own interest in the substance of legal policy, but this doesnt make sense, because achieving these goals is hard work, and subject to free-riding. SO....discard this assumption Main argument Craft rulings to gain and maintain regard of audiences that they care about. Their desire to be liked by certain groups.

o Discussion Do Scalia and Segal and Cover fit somewhere in these three models? Where? Scalia: Does not want judges to rule on own policy prefernces. Prefers the pure legal model Segal and Cover Pure attitudinal model at the USSC level Segal and Cover (1989) Main argument o USSC judges policy preferences have large effect on their votes Evidence o DV: votes on civil liberties cases o Explanatory Va: policy preferences, inferred from content analysis of editorial written about them between nomination and confirmation

Regression questions to consider: Do the variables measure the concept of interest well? Could they be measured better? Would this produce a different results? Are there omissions from the analysis that might change the key inferences? If a causal claim is being tested, is their hypothesis causal mechanism clear? Does the step from A-B-C-D make sense? Are the authors conclusions reasonable given their results? (generalizability) Scalia, A. Where would he be placed? o Very conservative o Textualism just the text, not concerned about intent o Pure legal model of Baum Preview Public opinion and representation Talk about the analytic essay Summarize Stimson et al., Druckman and Lupia. Chapter 10 of B&W

Public Opinion

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Review from last class What to do if there are an even number of justices sitting on the USSC o Majority of those present so if there were 8 sitting, you need 5 to agree. Quorum of 6 to funtion Life-terms at the USSC what to do if a judge is debilitated o No provision for removing a judge due to inability to preform, much more likely now that they will do into retirement Analysis of Kaplan - NYT o How does the news relate to the course material? Challenging constitutionality of a federal law federal court interested parties, but not actual litigents, seek to influence judicial decisions making by filing amicus curiae briefs Presidents judicial powers: ability to direct the department of Justices actions Brain storming exercise re. judiciary o Factors in judicial decisions Attitudinal model Pure legal model Strategic attitudinal model How to write the analytic essay 2 stages o When it comes to politics is the American puplic competent? Why? o If it is not competent, does it matter? Why? o Public Opinion Areas of Consensus

Beyond the fundamental setup of US govt o No longer basic facts like we have been doing o Will now talk about scholarly consensus and controversy.

Kinder - 1988 Sample survey is dominant measurement tool, but also as weaknesses American lack important political information (see Carpini and Keeter) Evidence of intolerance is ambiguous o Tolerant in abstaract, less in specific situations o Mixed if Americans have becomes more tolerant since 1950s 3 ingredients of opinions o Material self-interest Little evidence to suggest its important, but matters more when teh cost/benefit is well publicized o Attitudes towards groups Opposition to social welfare programs derives from hostility to towards the poor. o Principles and Values Individualism, equality, limited government American are programatically liberal (specific policies) Dont like it in the abstract, big pictures Opinion and Action o Campaign effects mixed

Dueling campaigns with competing messages Durable party attachments Large segments of public pay little attention o Bigger effects when information flow is one-sided (only one candidate is well-known) Framing: a central organizing idea or story line Priming: rendering certain consideration more prominent Considerable evidence that framing, agenda-setting and priming all strongly affect how cititzens form opinions Elites attempt to prime and frame in order to shape public opinion

Druckman and Lupia Preference Formation Purpose: Review literature on how individuals form and change preferences o Dominant model of preference formation and change Information-beliefs evaluation (attitudes about an object) preference Conclusion o 1. Preferences are a result of individuals personal experience AND interaction with his/her environment o 2.Individuals process information using a memory-based model o 3.Middle attentive individuals are more susceptible to preference change (Zaller 1992). Why? Requires receipt and acceptance of message Low-attentiveness dont even receive teh message High-attentiveness receive the message, but know enough to generate internal counter-arguments o 4. People are risk averse when it comes to politics: so negative messages are more persuasive than positive messages

o 5. Individuals evaluate source of information when updating their beliefs and preferences

Controversy #1 Online vs. Memory Models Memory Models - Zaller o Main Idea: people base their evaluation on information that they retrieve from long-term memory o Examples Individual receives information about a candidate When prompted, searches memory for relevant information and generates and evaluation, based on what she remembers o Variant Limited processing capacity, evaluation is based on top of mind information (easily recalled) o Implication Citizens are unlikely to have true attitudes (Drukmen and Lupia) People dont have fixed, stable, coherent attitutdes, but rather about how people search their memories Online Models - Lodge o Main idea Base evaluations on a running taly o How it works Recieves information about a candidate Retrieves her running taly from long term memory, updates with new information, refiles in long term memory, and eventually forgets where/how/that she got the new information Remembers the what, but not the why

o Implications Ppl cant remember or explain the basis of their evaluation, so while initially informed, it might not appear so at a later date Preferences are more stable than accessibility-based memory models Which model is correct? o Both are likely used, depending on context and political sophistication o ONLINE: believe judgment will be required later, MEMORY: when not (Druckman and Lupia, Kinder) o Some evidence that online processing occurs more often among political sophisticates (Druckman and Lupia)

Controversy #2 Competence Many ways competence can be assessed Essay reading highlights ONE major aspect of competence debate: whether or not lack of political knowledge makes them incompetent Essay reading o Uncontroversial lack of political information o Very controversial lack of information undermines competence Some reading aggress (Bartels, Carpini and Keeter, Quirk and Kuklinski) Ppl can get buy relatively well with other methods Lupia 1994, Barbour and Wright Political ignorance is not necessarily ignorant Lupia 2007 o Note: Lupia et al. in a reply to early piece Bartels: Homer gets a tax cut

Why did most American support large Bush era tax cuts that mostly benefited the wealthy? Argument: not because they were indifferent to economic inequality, but because they didnt connect their concern for inequality with the tax cuts Data: 2002 ANES, asked several questions about econ. Inequality and Bush tax cuts Findings: MANY american dont know if they support tax cuts, but of those that do, 2:1 in favour

of Bush tax cuts Hypothesis: Because they like equality opportunity so much, they are willing to accept economic inequality as a result o Found wrong: widespread recognition and disapproval of economic inequality Hypothesis: Support due to simple minded and misguided consideration of self0interst o Found: perception of own tax burden was a good predictor of support for Bush tax cuts, but perceptions of the rich tax burden was not Hypothesis: support due in large part so misguided considerations of self-interest o Found: rich families less supportive of Bush tax cuts o Those who wanted more government, spending more likely to favor Bush tax cuts o Better informed, are less in favor of tax cuts Some readings have a helpful summary of the debate, we must adjudicate which we find most helpful

Controversy #3 Partisan Bias

Definition o No standard definition o Ppl resist, or selectively ignore information which challenges their partisan predispositions and loyalties Findings o Berelson (1954) Perceive own candidates stand as similar to own, and opponents stand as dissimilar, and this misperception is stronger among partisans. A projection effect. Gerber and Green (1998, 1999) There is no partisan bias Tracking aggregate level evaluation, across 3

groups, move at the same speed and direction over time. Bartels (2002) Large aggregate differences between partisan groups exist for many factual beliefs (objective economic conditions during Reagan Admin.) Gaines et al. (2007) Theory: Complete updating Reality-beliefs-interpretations-opinions Data: Panel studies of university students. Asked factual and opinion questions about Iraq war and its conduct Finding Most respondents, regardless of PID, had similar factual beliefs, their interpretations of these facts differed across groups Controversy #4 - Representation

Interest Groups and Media

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Review of material Consensus o Lack important political information o Self interest, attitudes towards groups, values, impact P.O. o Middle-attentive most susceptible Controversy o Online vs. memory models o Competence without information o Partisan bias Controversy #4 Representation Manza and Cook Public Opinion on Public Policy o Large effects 3 types of evidence quantitative studies intensive, policy domain-specific, qualitative journalistic accounts of politicians consumption of polling data o Small effects o Contingent Effects Relationships between po and pp changes depending on institution, policy area, time etc. Stimson et al. Does po influence pp?

Theory o Indirectly Electoral turnover, kicked out of office o Directly Rational anticipation, change to reflect, so they dont get kicked out office Data o Large surveys of p.o. and policymaking in House, Senate, Presidency, USSC Findings o Changes in public opinion and public policy correspond over time. o

Interest Groups Groups with the same political goal, and unite to influence policy in their favour Many types of interest groups: economic, civil rights, public interest, govts etc Collective action problem (free rider problem) o Why join if I can benefit without joining o Like in Baum, or Halls Overcoming the collective action problem o Selective incentives (member-only benefits)

Material benefits ( newsletter, discount) Solidarity benefits (bonding with other members) Expressive benefits (strongly expressive values)

Strategies o Direct lobbying Long-term contacts with congressional members Expertise to MCs Fundraising for MCs (max $5000.00) Meet with bureaucrats Litigate/intervene in court cases o Indirect lobbying Mobilizing membership or wider public to pressure polticians Akin to going public strategy (Kernell)

Guest Lecture, Interest Groups and Media 19/07/2011 01:03:00

Deliberation in congress TEXTBOOK Committee hearings o Witnesses called and questioned Committee Markups o Amendments offered by both parties Floor debates o Final opportunity for amending by both parties The textbook assumes that both parties have an equal opportunity to amend and present their ideas on a bill. Increasing Partisanship Change in the way that bills become laws. o No a proposal is discussed, and introduced, but no may just be written up behind closed doors, without the opportunity for markups, and goes straight to the rules committee, followed by a very limited debate o Total majority domination of the process and content of a bill Speakers use Partisan Task Forces/Design Teams Ad hoc informal groups to work in place of the committees. Newt Gingrich headed most task forces, and would be surrounded by favored legislators and lobbyists. Nancy Pelosi first 6 bills presented were written behind closed doors by favoured senior Democrats. Legislative deliberation Definition: gather, discuss and evaluate policy information to make policy decisions (Quirk 2005) Runs along a continuum from one extreme to the other. One-party deliberation o Speaker and likeminded colleagues

o Involves only majority party Two-party deliberation o Committee of jurisdiction o Involves both parties.

Which conditions encourage one- and two-party deliberations? H1: As parties become more polarized, the majority party will control bill deliberations H2: More 1-party bill deliberations when the majority partys support decreases. When it looks like its majority may be under threat. H3: Majority party will dominate deliberatsion more during unified control. o President becomes the legislator in chief, and congress majority party wants to look like they support their president. H4: R. control of House will lead to more 1-party deliberations than D. control o Republicans as daddy party, Dems as Mommy party

Findings: Partisan polarization and electoral pressures encourage house majority leaders to omit hearing and markups o As the parties move further apart, the less likely it is for a bill to go through a 2-party process Contrary to Expectations o 1. Bipartisan debate more likely in periods of unified control Unified: Majority wants to avoid obstruction later, and to have the presidents agenda enacted. If we allow open debate, and involved the majority party, and then send the bill to the house. IT is harder to justify a filibuster a bill that the minority party has been thoughtfully involved with.

Divided: Majority wants to put our strong bill initially to boost its bargaining power, because they know that most things will die. By pushing out the most extreme bills possible, you will satisfy the debate, and you want to start from the strongest possible position, knowing whatever will make it into the final bill, will be diluted down. o 2. Republicans are more willing to engage in open debate than Democrats. Republicans have more party discipline, and are more unified than democrats. Consequences of 1-party deliberation 1.Gridlock o 21% less likely to be signed into law if they do not undergo hearings. 2. Flawed Policy o to evaluate 1-party bills, examine negative predictions before enactment and then see whether prediction materialize look at editorials on legislation before and after passage o example: Iraq Reconstruction 2003, REPs pushed through 22 billion bill to rebuild papers warned bill lacked sufficient oversight concerns that crony capitalists would pocket money without fulfilling contracts 9 billion disappeared and never recovered 5.6 billion diverted to security needs contractors bribed US officials with cash and prostitutes Conclusions 1. Sharp increase in partisan deliberations over the last 2 decades 2. Ideological divisions, electoral competition and divided government all encourage one-party lawmaking 3. Partisan deliberation produces policy mistakes Review of Material From Last Class Brainstorming:

o Interest groups face the Collective action problem so they offer selective incentives o Interest groups can influence through Direct Lobbying and Indirect Lobbying (like going public) o Difficult to cleanly identify interest groups influence Interest Groups Disagreement about extent to which interest groups influence policymaking, especially the extent to which interest groups buy floor votes in Congress Wright, John o Argument Fundraising structures of certain types of PACs undercuts their ability to influence congressional roll calls. Political Action Committee Fundraising arm of interest groups If person X raises 10K at the local level for candiate Y, who we dont think is deserving, well support person Xs work. If we didnt support person X, next time, he might not raise the same amount of money for us. o Theory PACs confronted by a paradox Local, grassroots most effective way to raise money BUT this allows grassroots to influence allocation of PAC contribution Grassroots are AMATEURS, and they want money to go to sympathetic, threatened MCs and candidates, rather than those who are on the fence, and might be swayed. Structure limits the ability to deploy money effectively o Findings 1. Larger contributions to sympathetic, needy candidates rather than those in leaderships positions, who are potentially influential

2. Contributions had miniscule effect on probability of vote in selected key roll call votes Hall and Wayman o Argument PAC money should be allocated in order to mobilize legislative support and demobilize opposition, particularly at the most important points in the legislative process Critique of Wright looking in the wrong place, lots of stuff happends before the bill gets to the floor, and the extent that different members participate in bill development o Theory Should be looking at participation at the committee stage, not roll calls o Findings 1. PAC contributions to supporters increased participation in all three policy areas 2. In 2/3 policy issues, PAC contibutions to opponents decreased participation, but change was not statistically significant.

News Media 1. Does the American news media do an adequate job of informing Americans about politics Motivation 80% of American reports consuming some kind of news on any given day BUT...in same survey, only 14% of Americans were able to correctly answer 4 knowledge questions about news items o 1. Majority part in the house o post held by Eric Holder o company run by Steve Jobs o country with active volcano that recently disrupted air travel Possible explanations for this apparent disjuncture they consume a lot of media, but dont know a lot. Exposure vs. recall? o 1. Problems of measures of exposure and knowledge

o 2. Online model informed but lacking in recall o 3. Media not doing a very good job Threats to an informative media o Ideological bias in reporting o Commercial biases Building and maintaining and audience Commercial Biases Lance Bennett Arguments o 1. 4 information biases that keep people from learning about political events and see the big picture o 2. Political actors take advantage of these traditional informational biases o 3. Ideological biases more difficult to correct and less dangerous than people think o 4. Thematic, in-depth coverage would be better than episodic coverage 4 information biases o Personalization Focus on actors involved at the expense of the big picture, causes etc. o Dramatization Emphasized crisis, present rather than the future focus. Personal scandal rather than institutional context. Chronic issues go unreported as we lurch from crisis to crisis o Fragmentation Stories isolated from each other, encapsulated, little background provided, within and between reports o Normalization Officials promise return to normalcy, framing through traditional values, demobilizes people rather than becoming more concerned and active Evidence: Secondary studies, anecdotes, and case studies

Race, Gender and Politics

Define AND give example of the presidential strategy of going public. Examples should be from the readings. Try not to through out information in word vomit. Be selective.

Returning to where we started with Smith in Beyond Tocqueville. Ebb and flow. Many different traditions that work together. Two key questions 1)How does race shape political preferences Gilens, Martin. Race coding and White Opposition to Welfare. o Like Kinder. Attitudes towards groups o 1988 Willie Horton Attack ad. o Research questions: Do white Americans racial attitudes shape their posistions on ostensibly race-neutral welfare policy? o Define welfare: govt cheques in the mail. o Argument: Literature has failed to consider racial views. Focused instead on individualism and economic self-interest o 2 types of evidence phone survey DV: support for welfare IV: racial attitudes, poor attitudes, income etc. Finding: Perception of blacks as lazy single largest predictor experiment embedded in a telephone survey b/c measurement problems in traditional survey Main finding: While avr. Belief about welfare mother same in both treatments, neg. beliefs about black welfare mothers associated with much more negative view of welfare. Priming race. o Race does influence the levels of support for welfare programs amongst whites.

Abramowitz. Triumph of Diversity o B&W Obamas victory suggest that racism is on the wane. o Preliminaries 20% White. 18% of Hispanics & Asian Americans said the possibility of a Black president made them uncomfortable. Less that of white americans voted democrats. Lingering racial prejudice. o Findings Racial prejudice in high-school educated whites, had a negative impact on the likelihood of voting for Obama. Nonwhite share of US electorate increased from 13% in

1992 to 26% in 2008 o Conclusion Growth in non-white electorate as a whole, helped Obama out, as did the large margin he won in the nonwhite population, to offset a minimal change in support levels among White voters 2) How well are hisorically disadvantaged groups representd? Griffin and Newman. o 2 questions Are white prefs better represetned than Latinos in congressional voting What affects relative representation of two groups o Method Make assumption sin order to place MCs and voters on the same scale. (Roll call and phone surveys) o Findings 1. White preferences are much closer ideologically to MCs actions than those of Latinos to their MCs Macdonald and OBrien. Research question

o Do female of MCs better represetn womens interest than male MC Problems o Prev. work often omitted measures of constituency preferences, potentially biasing effects of gender Solution o Sample pair where MCs where female preceded or succeeded a male MC Data o # of sponsorships of feminist and social welfare bills Findings o Women, on average, sponsor more feminist bills o Effect of gender on feminist bills contingent on number of female MCs Low number of women, similar number of sponsored bills btwn men and women More women, number of bills by women goes up, and number by men goes down

Bumper sticker work

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My house, my rules. Cox and McCubbins. Setting the agenda. Angry voter driving to the polls Valentino et al. Odds of being a judge 50/50 Retention elections Where you stand doesnt depend on where you sit. Khreible. Wheres the party Attention! Breaking Dems, Republicans & Independents. (rainbow) Account of Tea Party movement. Nationally and in E. Mass. Williamson. Tea party remaking republican conservativism Deliberative democracy was the concious creation of the founders. Besett. Mild voice of reason Benefits available to members, not non-members Material Benefits 1970 Congress polarization leading to party homogenity Jacobson. Party polarization Ppl voted for tax cuts because they were incompetant and ignorant

Bartells. Homer gets a tax cut Open to amendment Open rule Bureaucrats: Whos your daddy? The president! Moe. Polarized Presidency Are you scared of 6.5% of the workforce. The democrats are. Wills. Obama and Big Labour Carston & Jenkins. Rub it in why dont you. Credit claiming. Dont rush judgement Maltman. Advice and consent Big happy family Party in government Pick a team. Closed primary Dont blame us, were just responding to demands Hamilton: Media and market Im a D. What R you? Party identification Washington one level, states another Federalism

You dont get a say. Tough. Closed rule We just arent into each other. Fiorina. Polarization in US public Do what I say, or I go to the ppl. Kernell. Going Public. Why did I convict you? Because I dont like your face. Segal and Cover. Ideological values on supreme court votes Opposites are opposites Party polarization IIIII Online modle Fox news missed a memo Groseclose. Social science perspective on Media Biases Amateurs waste $ Wright. PAC B/C nobody like NJ Great compromise Break a filibuster Cloture Small states are over represented. Leohardt. 1 ppl, 1 vote. Hardly. Politicians still learning to share: Fed vs. state powers Kettle. Federalism battlelines Infotainment Commercial bias Split power is stagnant power Divided govt Passing means president electoral college Spidey sense btwn elections (sorta) Stimson et al. Dynamic representation I want you to want me Baum. Judges and audiences.

Domestic and Foreign Policy

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Argument: US foreign policy-making is influences by US domestic politics and institutions

Tools used to understand domestic politics can be extended to foreign policy making

Jacobs and Page. Who influences US Foreign Policy Data: Survey of US foreign policymakers Finding: Business leaders>experts>labor>public opinion, level of influence on policy makers Bartels. Reagan Defense Build up Data: MC voting behaviour and NES survey Finding: in early 80s MCs vot on defense budget related to constituency preferences. Will Georege: Obama and free trade: Appease big labor. Washington Being in bed with big labour is driving foreign policy regarding free trade. To the detriment of the American economy Rubenzer. Campaign Contributions and FP outcomes Question o Level that ethinic minority interst groups are able to influence US FP. Data/Method o Contribution affects re 2005 cuban embargo. Findings contrary to Wright o Campaign contributions from pro-embargo groups increased likelihood of pro-embargo vote. o Impact of campaign contributions on congressional roll calls was more limited when vote concerned, clear, non-technical and salient issues. Lieberman Purpose o Reexamine claim that pro-Israel foreign policy is caused by the Isreal Policy. Collection of Jewish & Christians individuals and organizations Findings o Small percent of contributions, and group so small that they are statistically insignificant in elections. Eg. 2004 Bush win.

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