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2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications

Integrity Verification Architecture (IVA) Based Security Framework for Windows Operating System
Mohd Anuar Mat Isa1, Habibah Hashim2, Jamalul-lail Ab Manan3, Ramlan Mahmod4, Hanunah Othman5
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, 40450 UiTM Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia. 1 anuarls@hotmail.com 2 habib350@salam.uitm.edu.my 5 hanun204@salam.uitm.edu.my Advanced Analysis and Modeling Cluster, MIMOS Berhad, Technology Park Malaysia, 57000 Bukit Jalil, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 3 jamalul.lail@mimos.my Faculty of Computer Science & Information Technology, 43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia. 4 ramlan@fsktm.upm.edu.my

AbstractWindows Operating System (WinOS) emerged in the market for the past few decades to provide the solution for various platforms that range from desktop computer, server to sophisticated computing systems such as grid computer. The evolution of the design of operating systems continues to fulfill the needs of diverse applications that run on various platforms or hardware. Recently, a new element was introduced to provide trust enhancement on platforms using Trusted Computing. In this paper, we discuss an implementation of Trusted Computing in providing a mechanism to check whether hardware, software or application running on a platform behaves as expected without need for further validation. We further propose a new Integrity Verification Architecture (IVA) based Security Framework to protect user data privacy. Our proposed security framework focuses on providing platform integrity verification and self-healing in Windows Operating Systems via IVA. Keywords - Integrity Verification Architecture, IVA, Trusted Windows, Trusted Operating System, Integrity Measurement, Trusted Computing, Trusted Application, Secure System, Security, Trust, Privacy, Integrity, Healing, Recovery.

protected in the temper proof TPM hardware. Secondly, the main idea behind the client platform verification scheme was the use of root of trust and chain of trust based on TCG requirement. The measurement process of the root of trust model is to measure any meaningful information/content from BIOS, all the way up to the application layer. Binary measurement schema have been used to verify integrity, i.e. whether the OS and its environment has been modified or not without authority. The main purpose of the IMA security is to achieve Clark-Wilson [6] level of integrity verification (such as verification scope, executable content, structured data, unstructured data) and to ensure that the challenger is able to ensure measurements are fresh, complete and unchanged. Clark and Wilson did some modification to the kernel design by adding a security hook to do measurement as soon as the first code is loaded into a process and another hook to detect any changes that may happen by verifying its current measurement with the original integrity measurement. III.
METHODOLOGY

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper proposes new integrity verification architecture for security, trust and privacy in Windows OSs. At the early stage of the development of the IVA Architecture we implemented several fundamental concepts in Trusted Computing such as Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM), Root of Trust for Storage (RTS), Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) and chain of trust [1]. We also implemented and learnt some valuable experience from a few preceding works [24] Linux OS environment. From the experience learned in implementing these concepts, this paper proposes a new security framework that uses IVA in providing a mechanism to verify the trustworthiness of the OS or applications running in a platform i.e. whether they are free from malicious codes or otherwise. II. RELATED WORKS R. Sailer et. al [5] presented a design and prototype used for verifying client platform using Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) for Linux OS (monolithic). The main idea behind this security design is to measure all its executable content that is loaded onto the kernel and user space, before execution and these measurements are
978-0-7695-4745-9/12 $26.00 2012 IEEE DOI 10.1109/TrustCom.2012.189 1304

There are a few verification techniques available for us to verify the validity of a research hypothesis or proposed solution, such as modeling, simulation, experimental and theoretical proving [7]. Our main objective is to propose IVA based Security framework for Windows OS and to use experimental method to verify its validity on Windows operating system as shown in Figure 1. We begin by identifying suitable case studies that are related to security threats in Windows OS. This is followed by transforming these case studies into a security threat model for Windows Operating System, after which we perform security analysis and improve on the design. Finally, perform experiment to verify IVA based security framework in Windows OS. A. Research Objectives The objective of this research is to offer enhanced integrity verification architecture for enhancing security, privacy and trust of Windows Systems using Trusted Computing. B. Motivations The motivation of research is to overcome an issue of an owner of a machine not having a good control over its own running Windows OS. Currently, any activities performed by Windows OS are hidden from the owner of the machine,

especially when executing non-documented APIs or System iness and nonCalls. The existing issue creates uneasi confidence of its trustworthiness to the owne As it is now, er. Windows OS architecture does not provide Trusted Computing services, either in kernel or in user spaces to n protect integrity, privacy and trust of the platform. hat Consequently, there is always a possibility th an attacker be able to physically or remotely modify Wi indows Files to insert malicious codes without alerting the end-user. For e now, only disk encryption (Bitlocker) is used to encrypt disk d partition in Windows Vista/7 Ultimate and Enterprise cks editions. It opens up a door for possible attac on Bitlocker such as using "evil maid" [8] to attack again TrueCrypt. In nst this particular case, Bootkit swaps the leg gitimate Master Boot Record (MBR) with the one controlled b an attacker. by

t performance measurement experimental designs.

in

the

framework

and

A. Windows Operating Systems Architecture g Windows OS (e.g. Windows Vista, Windows 7) is d) essentially a mixture (hybrid of microkernel and monolithic kernel in the same arch hitecture. This hybrid kernel architecture is meant to serve numerous applications running e in the same platform [9] as s shown in Figure 2. In this study, we decided to divide mea asurement processes into four sections that can be used f integrity measurement. We for noted that Windows OS architecture is different from IMA in Linux OS architecture [5]. We define these sections as follows: nt i. Boot stage measuremen for integrity verification of Initial Program Loader (IPL) or bootloader at the r beginning of boot seque ence to load the OS kernel into memory for execution. ement for real-time integrity ii. Kernel stage measure verification of Window OS and its application files. ws This process happens af the boot stage has passed a fter chain of trust [4][3] to trusted kernel modules (e.g. o NTOSKRNL.EXE). ent iii. Third party measureme for non-real-time integrity verification and self-healing for disk or partition that OS contains IPL, Windows O and its application files. IVA v1.0 is a third party se ecurity tool that performs these tasks. re iv. Hardware and Firmwar stages for real-time platform monitoring. This inclu udes software and hardware integrity verification us sing Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) and Intel vPro technology. Intel ure AMT provides a secu and manageable platform against attacks from insid and outside network [10]. de

Figure 1: Methodology used in this research.

IV.

PROPOSED SECURITY FRAME EWORK

We assumed that we need a new f framework that considers Windows OS security, privacy an trust as main nd topic in our research study. The prop posed Security Framework considers that vital components s should be able to measure and verify integrity of system f files (e.g. .sys), libraries (e.g. .dll), executable (e.g. .exe, .co and etc. We om) propose Self-Healing component as an extra module to m substitute for proprietary Windowss System Restore tool. The Self-Healing module uses Root of Trust for usted-healing of Measurement (RTM) information to do tru any integrity data violations. We studie closely the ed implementation of IMA [5] in Linux O that can do OS

Figure 2: Hybrid Kernel (Mono and Micro) Architecture of Windows ng Operatin Systems [9].

B. Potential Security T Threats Windows OS is protected by internet security suite which d consists of antivirus, firewall, anti-spyware, anti-rootkit, antiphishing and etc. The de esign and implementation of Windows OS emphasizes on access control and protection, n and is being realized using user-mode and kernel-mode

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privileges. Figure 3 shows existing security solutions cannot cks protect itself from privileged software attac and physical temper attack in the disk storage. As an example let us consider the following scenario cases: i. Non-proficient user of Windows OS wi administrator ith privileges may install and unknowingly always clicks y OK or YES when installing any app plication that has been downloaded from internet. In this way, an insert or modify application with malicious codes may i any file(s) in the disk without any user security alert at trust and privacy all. This is a one of the major security, t breaches in computing environment [11][12]. ii. Existing security tools such as antivirus and antispyware ct use virus or spyware signatures to detec new threats or attacks. It would take only a few hours to release new s virus signatures and client may become victim of such e virus, e.g. zero-day-virus [13]. Zero-d day-virus is an unknown computer virus or malware embedded in e antivirus or malware tools of which its signature is not yet available for detection. most convenient iii. Physical temper in disk storage is the m way for an attacker to do malicious activ vities in OS and its applications. Attacker may use Live e-CD/USB tools such as Evil-Maid, Knoppix, Wind dows Preinstall Environment (WinPE) or Ubuntu Cloud Live to access d and do data modification. User secret such as online (non-volatile) in password is not stored permanently ( computer memory after computer shutdo own. Instead, the attacker may add keylogger codes to int tercept keyboard inputs and then transfer this informatio to attackers on email or server [14]. This is a common t technique which they use to steal information in compu lab, library, uter hotel and public computer using internet services.

d baseline of RTM based on user/administrator security policies. At this stage, user/administrator is given the cts/files that he wants to protect. privilege to select objec In our proposed framewo we implement chain of trust ork, (using TCG specified R RTM) to store platform integrity measurements (such as hardware measurement, ations, firmware micro codes). BIOS/CMOS configura Any changes that happe in the hardware layer will be en detected by IC. To sum mmarise, IC performs integrity checks on the hardware a software layer. and ii. Stage II: After IC has co ompleted its task wherein it has a complete knowledge of trusted platform configurations f ) (i.e. completed Stage I) and has performed USB boot after Power On Self-T Test (POST) operation; IVAs Integrity Verification (IV) performs (acting as an external entity running in a trusted OS) verification of all local Windows OS th reside in local hard disk. We hat execute IV from a min nimal customized OS that runs from a thumb drive (U USB disk). IV will do integrity measurements, integrity collector and then verify using ed hardware based truste device (e.g. TPM, TPM Emulator). At this stage IV will alert user or another e, system (assuming clie ent-server architecture) if any changes are found in the platform. The main reason for e implementing IV as an external entity is to prevent n access by attacker or m malicious codes through infected windows kernel in local disk. It is assumed that user or l administrator of platfor will only use plug-in USB rm device to perform integ grity collection and verification (IC and IV). The local W Windows OS is prevented from booting as long as USB device is intact (plugin into B USB port) in client platform. To summarise, IV urements and then verifies these performs integrity measu measurements using trus integrity through RTM. sted iii. Stage III: Based on assu umption that IV had completed its task (completed Stag II) and if it found an invalid ge integrity, IVAs Trust ted Self-Healing (TSH) will perform data restoration to any invalid integrity objects n or files which will be t taken from trusted storage. For IVA version 1.0, it co overs only static data but later version of this proposal will perform dynamic integrity dynamic data, including Window verification to support d Updates (e.g. client-server environment). D. Use Case Senarios Based on some listed sec curity threats [5,10,11,13], we identified some of these secu urity problems can potentially be solved using our proposed IV based Framework. As shown VA in Figure 4, our framewor provides security, trust and rk privacy protection using non n-real-time integrity verification and self-healing for Windo ows OS and its applications. Potential use case scenarios that can benefit from using this IVA based Framework are: i. Online banking or confi idential internet transaction to verify web browser integ grity such Internet Explorer and its related files (e.g. ex dll, registry keys, etc). This xe, would increase user conf fidence to use online transaction while at the same time protecting user privacy, as a e

y Figure 3: Existing Users Control, Trust and Privacy

C. Proposed IVA based Framework r The purpose of IVA is to increase user confidence by ensuring integrity of the Windows OS is al lways in trusted state. This means monitoring the integri of software ity components such as system files, registry i information and application files that run in the client platform The following m. stages illustrate the interoperability of IVA: dows OS and its i. Stage I: Assuming that a new/fresh Wind applications are in trusted stated; I IVAs Integrity Collector (IC) perform integrity m measurement as

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consequence of the trusted integrity me easurements and privacy enhancement that have been put in place. ii. New virus detection to discover new virus signatures that are easily generated based on virus analysis, which could be produced within a few hours Our proposed s. IVA based Framework handles zero-day-virus using trusted integrity measurement and RTM to verify the M platform integrity. iii. Protection of Kernel and User Spac ces Existing Windows OS does not use Trust ted Computing approach to protect OS and its ap pplications. Our proposed IVA based Framework protec NTOSKRNL cts and related files in Kernel and User Spaces using r Trusted Computing security stack and ch hain of trust.

Features

I IMA

IVA

values) Baseline Process Integrity Measurement Process Integrity Verification Process Self-Healing Process Target Group (Machine) in Experiment Installed Location (effect codes temper resistant) Independent Variables in Experiment Dependent Variables in Experiment Confounding Variables in Experiment (which affect performance) Yes Yes Yes No One group (same p machine) Local Mac chine (as part of Linux Kernel) K File type, file size and SHA1 algo orithm Latency an nd performan of system nce in real-tim me Linux System hooks for measur rement in Linux Security Module (LSM), an nother write operation locks access for measur rement, directory depths, d system hea at (continuou usage) and us I/0 devices & drivers. s

different RTM. Yes Yes Yes Yes One group (same machine) External Devices (bundled with different secure OSs) File type, file size and SHA1 algorithm Latency and performance of system in non-real-time Directory depths, system heat (continuous usage) and I/0 devices & drivers.

Figure 4: IVA based framework for integrity verification and self-healing.

V.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN N

It is vital to choose a correct experim mental design to verify the research project. We chose to use alternating u treatments design: a strategy for comparing th effects of two he treatments in a single subject [15] experim mental design to verify our hypothesis and proposed framew work. Based on reasonably analyzed IMA [5] paper, we found that the authors are using one-group pretest-posttest [16] experimental design to evaluate performanc measurement ce and security enhancement in Linux Kernel version 2.6.30. s We studied two experimental designs and summarize them as shown in Table 1. The main reason why we compared two w different experimental design is because we implemented w more than one static RTM in the system. Each static RTM E represents one group and these group are measured and e verified in the same Windows OS.
TABLE I.
Features

Figure 5: Experimental Desig and Implementation of the IVA. gn

COMPARISON BETWEEN IMA [5] AND IVA (V1.0) A


IMA
IVA

Security Technology Target OS Measurement Agent Root of Trust

Trusted Computing (TPM) Linux (monolithic kernel) Real-time Single Static (single file for all integrity

Tru usted Computing (TP Virtual TPM or PM, TP Emulator) PM Wi indows (hybrid ker rnel) No on-real-time Mu Static (each ulti app or directory has ps.

In our study, both experi imental designs have been used by social science schools to evaluate the target group before, e during and after treatment or intervention to a group. In this r experiment we did not need to worry about post treatment d affects in the same group be ecause we only need to change data in the storage to restore it to its original states. i Figure 5 shows an exam mple of an experimental session using Internet Explorer 7. Ba ased on the proposed IVA based Framework, experiment was conducted as follows:
i.

Choose a folder (an its contents) and created its IE nd browsers RTM and baseline. The baseline process b

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involves backing up and compressing selected file based d on file extensions such as exe, dll and sys. Figure 6 shows zero values representing integrit of unselected ty files for RTM (not measured). Then, shut down the machine for at least 5 minutes afte finishing the er process.

RTM

BASELINE

VERIFICATI ON

SELFHEALING

Windows System32 Windows SysWOW64

377.944 309.522 103.537 128.264

(IM) ) (BC) (IM) ) (BC)

148.638 52.339

22.152 21.045

IM = Integrity Measurement. BC = Backup & Compress Files. C Table II shows the result of this experiment wherein each sured in seconds. We tested IVA experiment sessions are meas tool for Windows Vista S SP1 x64 to measure its IVA performance for its basel line, verification and healing process. In the baseline process, we selected only two file .e. extensions to be measured, i. *.DLL and *.EXE. The main reason why we chose the file extensions is because ese common malicious attacks in Windows OS (e.g. virus, worm n and malware) infect executab binary files [17][18]. Adding ble more file extensions to the l will increase the processing list time for executing these proc cesses. Definitely, it will help in providing a better RTM lis for the system and increase st system protection. However, it takes a lot of time to measure System32 folder compared to SysWOW64 folder. This is of due to the fact that number o EXE and DLL extension files is almost triple in System32 folder and the result in Table II confirms this. Next, we launched malic cious attacks on a single file in each folder (by tampering its content) of IE x86, IE x64 and s Firefox. For System32, we did attacks on 8 random files, out lders in System32 directory; and of 17,936 files and 1,042 fol perform similar attacks on 8 random files from 4,870 files, 315 folders in SysWOW64 directory. Lastly, we performed and self healing process. The IVA verification process a results of experiment are sh hown in Table II. It is observed that confounding variables such as directory depths, I/0 rivers (e.g. standard Windows devices speeds and I/O dr driver or manufacture driver showed marked differences in r) term of speeds in baseline verification and self-healing e, processes.
ONTRIBUTION VII. CO

XT) Figure 6: Internet Explorers RTM (e.g. RTM0001.TX and selected compressed files (e.g. RTM0001.ZIP) base on RTM. ed

ii. Apply attack vectors to modify some o IE files. After of that, shutdown the machine for at least 5 minutes to fresh state with ensure next booting process was in f normal system temperature (to avoid hea that affects the at verification performance). omparing current iii. Perform IVA verification process by co and stored IE browsers RTM file. An example of RTM invalid integrity file is showed in Figure 6. If any i measurement was found, IV will invoke TSH to perform self-healing process. iv. Self-healing process will uncompress RT TMxxx.ZIP (e.g. RTM0001.ZIP) file and restore it based on stored RTM list. A detail of IVA based Framework API for version 1.0 ges that we implemented in C and C++ languag using Visual Studio 2010. We used HP EliteBook 8440w Mobile dows Vista SP1 Workstation which was installed with Wind x64 and Mozilla Firefox 9.0.1. We laun nched malicious attacks on the platform Windows Vista and running a applications to evaluate the effectiveness of the IVA verification and self-healing process. VI.
TABLE II.
RTM

ONS RESULTS AND DISCUSSIO

IVA PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FO WINDOWS VISTA OR SP1 X64 OS IN SECOND.


BASELINE VERIFICATI ON SELFHEALING

Our major contribution is to offer a third party integrity time integrity verification and measurement for non-real-t self-healing for disk or partit tion that contains IPL, Windows OS and its application files u using IVA v1.0 security tool. Our intention is to provide coun measures for unauthorized nter modification of Windows F Files, including software attacks such as online keylogger, s system sniffer, malware, "evil maid" etc. We had added Self-Healing component as an extra module to replace the proprietary Windowss System s Restore tool. Our solutions may not perform a real-time detection, but it provides an indicator for end-user to have n more confidence and trust in their computer system and its n application.
CONCLUSION VIII. C

Internet Explorer 7 (x86) Internet Explorer 7 (x64) Mozilla Firefox 9.0.3 (x86)

1.576 1.155 1.404 2.527 8.065 7.644

(IM) (BC) (IM) (BC) (IM) (BC)

1.388 0.733 2.434

4.742 5.99 4.602

In this paper we proposed a new Integrity Verification Security Framework of IVA in Architecture (IVA) based S providing a mechanism to ve erify whether OS or applications running in a platform so tha they are free from malicious at

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codes and to protect user data privacy. Our proposed security framework focuses on providing platform integrity verification and self-healing in Windows Operating Systems via IVA. We also implemented the framework and conducted experiments on it. We hope that we would be able to increase user confidence through ensuring integrity of Windows OS and it applications. For future works, we intend to improve its performance. REFERENCES [1] TCG Group, TCG specification architecture overview, in TCG Specification Revision 1.4, no. August, 2007, pp. 1-24. Mohd Anuar Mat Isa, Jamalul-lail Ab Manan, and Raja Mariam Ruzila Raja Ahmad Sufian, Azhar Abu Talib, An Approach to Establish Trusted Application, in 2010 Second International Conference on Network Applications, Protocols and Services, 2010, pp. 159-164. Sharifah Setapa, Mohd Anuar Mat Isa, Nazri Abdullah, and Jamalul-lail Ab Manan, Trusted computing based microkernel, in Computer Applications and Industrial Electronics (ICCAIE), 2010, no. Iccaie, pp. 309-312.

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