Robustness of Russian Design NPPs Against Extreme Earthquakes And Tsunami

Sergey EGOROV Concern Rosenergoatom JSC Victor KOSTAREV CKTI-Vibroseism Ltd

International Experts Meeting IEM3 4-7 September 2012, IAEA, Vienna
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Content of the presentation

I. Some lessons learned from strong Niigataken - Chuetsu - Oki Earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site, July 16, 2007. Russian participation in the IAEA EBP Karisma Benchmark and results of analyses. II. Fukushima Daichi NPP event March 11, 2011 and response of Russian Nuclear Power Industry. III. Some future perspectives for NPPs seismic safety upgrading. Seismic Isolation System for NPP Reactor Building; Real Time Safety System (RTSS) for Extreme External Events Managing at NPP site. IV. Conclusions

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I. Some lessons learned

I.

Some lessons learned from the strong Niigataken - Chuetsu - Oki Earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site, July 16, 2007 at the most powerful NPP in the world 8 212 MW (e) power.

Russian participation in the IAEA EBP Karisma Benchmark and results of analyses.

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Strong earthquakes at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa and Fukushima 1 NPPs sites influenced on safety re-evaluation process in nuclear power Characteristics of Niigataken - Chuetsu - Oki Earthquake at KashiwazakiKariwa NPP, July 16, 2007, 10:13 AM (980gals= 1.0g)
Foundation of reactor building Design basis seismic motion S2, gals Observed values, gals (Factor to Design) Unit 1 Outage 273 680 (2.5) Unit 2 Start 167 606 (3.63) Unit 3 100% 193 384 (2.0) Unit 4 100% 194 492 (2.54) Unit 5 Unit 6 Outage Outage 254 442 (1.74) 263 322 (1.22) Unit 7 100% 263 356 (1.35)

1. In spite of huge acceleration level exceeds significantly design values (up to 3.6 times) the Seismic Category 1 SSC and SSEL items were not damaged and operated under nonfailure mode during and after earthquake providing safety functions. 2. Several failures occurred of auxiliary and secondary systems including cases of a small radiation release (tanks, turbine equipment, transformers, pumps, cranes, fire piping, penetrations, SFP , stacks, etc.) as result of the seismic impact. 3. Kashiwazaki events confirmed that an interaction of different safety classes equipment, anchorage, foundation structure performance and soil subsidence are subjects of the most importance for NPP seismic capacity and safety. 4. Planning of personnel activities prior, during and after earthquake and their corresponding training have a paramount importance (see IAEA Safety Report No. 66).

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Results of the IAEA ISSC EBP KARISMA Benchmark

Russian participation in the Karisma Benchmark Program

IAEA within the frame of EBP and being supported by ISSC in response to strong earthquake has occurred in the vicinity of Kasiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site (the most powerful nuclear power plant in the world) developed a special Program to access an accuracy of the modern analysis methods targeted at definition of actual seismic safety margins of SSEL items and components vulnerable to radiation release. Russian companies nominated as donors and/or participants of the mentioned IAEA Benchmark Program carried out the following subtasks: 1. Subtask 2.1 RHR safety related piping system; 2. Subtask 2.2 - Sloshing seismic wave of the spent fuel pool; 3. Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric tank buckling.
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Subtask 2.1 RHR Residual Heat Removal Piping System

Dynamic Analysis (Linear-Spectral Method)

Layout of the piping elements critical for a systems seismic capacity (T-joints and Snubbers) rosenergoatom.ru
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Subtask 2.1 RHR Residual Heat Removal Piping System

Principal differences between Russian Nuclear Code PNAE and International ASME BPVC Section III for a piping seismic analysis

Parameter

Code

Document

Article N

Value

PNAE Allowable stresses ASME

PNAE G-7-002-86

5.11.2.11

1.8[]

ASME BPVC, NB-Class 1, NPP Components PNAE G-7-002-86

NB-3656(b)

3.S m, but not greater 2.S y

PNAE Damping ASME

5.11.2.4

0.02

ASME BPVC Appendix N

N-1230, Case N411-1

0.02, 0.03* 0.05-0.02*

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Subtask 2.1 RHR Residual Heat Removal Piping System

Dynamic Analysis (Linear-Spectral Method)

Parameters V1 Code Hanger Stiffness Swing High Frequency Bend Flexibility Modal Combination PNAE YES YES YES PNAE SRSS V2 PNAE YES YES YES PNAE CQC

Variants of Analysis
V3 PNAE YES YES NO PNAE SRSS V4 PNAE NO NO YES PNAE SRSS V5 ASME YES YES YES ASME NB SRSS V6 ASME YES YES YES Code Case SRSS V7 ASME NO NO YES ASME NB SRSS

Matrix for Parametric Study

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Subtask 2.1 RHR Residual Heat Removal Piping System

Dynamic Analysis (Linear-Spectral Method)

Variant of Analysis V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 TEE at Nodes 42 1.17 1.15 1.17 1.17 0.45 0.46 0.45 611 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 95 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.13 0.49 0.46 0.52 63 1.14 1.06 1.14 1.18 1.20 0.85 0.83 Snubbers at Nodes: 63 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.10 1.00 0.91 67 1.15 1.06 1.14 1.19 1.05 0.84 0.95 77 1.12 1.06 1.00 1.11 0.99 0.90 1.01

Results of Parametric Study (ratio of calculated values to allowables ): A) Tees up to 6 times deviation in results; B) Snubbers up to 40% Note: All analyses were performed by one experienced piping expert and one software! rosenergoatom.ru
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Subtask 2.1 RHR Residual Heat Removal Piping System

Dynamic Analysis (Linear-Spectral Method)

1.6

1.4

V1

V2

V3

V4

V5

V6

V7

1.2

1 FS Ratio

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0 42 611 95 63 63 67 77

Results of Parametric Study (ratio of calculated values to permissible ones) rosenergoatom.ru

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Linear and Non-Linear Case Study : Piping Rod Hangers N

60000 A15 50000 A15 LIN 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 Limit Load

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7 0.8 PGA, g

0.9

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

Reaction Force (Node A15) under seismic TH excitation. Two times deviation in evaluation of hangers (piping) seismic capacity

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Subtask 2.2 Liquid sloshing in the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Analysis method Software used for Analyses: SOLVIA Method used: potential flow fluid FE formulation, time history analysis. FLUID3 elements are linear and based on a definition of velocity potential making assumption that absolute fluid displacements, as well as the corresponding variations in its density is negligible

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Subtask 2.2 - Liquid sloshing in fuel pool

Analysis results Maximal determined wave height above the curb is 1.84 m Maximal wave height above pool curb in the corner is 1.6 m Estimated spilled water volume is 42 m3

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Subtask 2.3 Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Analysis method Software used for Analyses: SOLVIA Method used: potential flow fluid FE formulation, time history analysis. The potential FLUID3 elements at the boundaries are automatically fastened to the tank walls as per criterion of joint displacement forming general system and fluidstructure interfaces.

Method benefits: - easy model preparation; - fast numerical solution. rosenergoatom.ru

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Model details: Tank model structure: shell and beam elements; Soil conditions: by springs and dampers (dashpots); Gap simulation between the tank and foundation to make assessment of possibility of the tank rocking and jumping; Linear elastic model for main tank structure. Failure criteria: Codes: ASME Part III, Appendix F, AWWA D100-96, API 650; Tank shell buckling: critical axial compressible stress; Tank shell strength: equivalent allowable stress; Bolts strength: tensile allowable stress.

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Results of Analyses Availability of the diamond buckling was confirmed by the Code formulas; Elephant foot buckling not happened analysis since the anchor bolts rupture was not occurred. However the bolts were undergone significant residual plastic deformations under considerable exceeding of allowable stresses.

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Analysis results: side walls buckling Average axial stress zz, (MPa) 7.1 18.4 28.1 18.6 24.2 22.4 30.0 rosenergoatom.ru Allowable stress Fa, (MPa) 9.9 9.9 9.9 18.6 26.5 34.4 39.4 FS 1.45 0.52 0.33 1.00 1.10 1.55 1.32

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Analysis results: side walls buckling

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Analysis results: walls strength Maximum equivalent stress (RLE+NOC) e , (MPa) 200.5 Allowable stress a, (MPa) 259 FS

1.29

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Subtask 2.3 - Atmospheric thin-walled tank buckling

Analysis results: bolt strength

bolt # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 force N 7.25E+05 6.37E+05 5.73E+05 5.52E+05 5.35E+05 4.10E+05 6.60E+05 9.55E+05 1.06E+06 9.17E+05 6.42E+05 5.94E+05 stress MPa 3.38E+03 2.97E+03 2.67E+03 2.57E+03 2.49E+03 1.91E+03 3.08E+03 4.45E+03 4.96E+03 4.27E+03 2.99E+03 2.77E+03 FS 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09

All the bolts are damaged!

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Comments and Proposals

Piping Analysis: The most important for seismic strength of piping is accumulation of permanent deformations rather than dynamic (primary) stresses. Multi-support seismic impact and non-linear behavior of piping hangers also play a significant role. Essential deviation in the results while using different initial data for making linear calculations was obtained even for natural frequencies. Existing considerable differences in nuclear standards and allowable stresses of different nuclear countries can lead to absolutely different results in assessment of seismic stability of the same piping system. Sloshing in Fuel Pool Seems possible to predict water behavior in the fuel pool using modern calculation methods. Definition of the volume of the spilled water requires additional analysis by a special approach. Atmosphere Tank Eventual loss of diamond stability of the tank walls, as well as elephant foot loss can be well predicted using modern techniques. The tank anchoring, flexible connections to the outside systems and possible soil subsidence play an exclusively important role in seismic capacity evaluation.

GENERAL NOTE
Each SSC has its own seismic failure mode(s) represented by corresponding damage indicating parameter DIP. Modern strength standards are not provided adequately DIP for different NPP equipment and systems.

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II

II. Fukushima Daichi NPP event March 11, 2011 and response of Russian Nuclear Power.

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Influence of large earthquakes at Kashiwazaki-Karima and Fukushima 1 NPPs sites on re-assessment of safety in nuclear power engineering Tohoku Earthquake, March 11, 2011, 14:46 JST Measured maximal acceleration at RP foundations of Fukushima I NPP Units in comparison with design values (TEPCO/JANTI 6th Report, August 16, 2012)
Measured maximum acceleration (gals) Maximum design acceleration (gals)

south-north F-I Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3 Unit-4 Unit-5 Unit-6

Tohoku Earthquake, March 11, 2011, east-west up-down south-north east-west 14:46 JST direction direction direction direction direction Measured maximum acceleration at 460 447 258 487 489 Fukushima I NPS Units against design 550 (1.26) 302 441 438 348 values at base mats (TEPCO/JANTI 6th 322 449 441 Report, 507 (1.15) 16, 231 August 2012)
281 311 298 319 548 (1.2) 444 200 256 244 447 452 445 445 452 448

up-down Direction 412 420 429 422 427 415

Onagawa NPP site also was suffered Tohoku Earthquake with accelerations at the RP foundations up to 607 gals but all the units were successfully shut downed and cooled!

Conclusion: The Fukushima 1 NPP severe accident is connected with Tsunami and flooding of the site
rather than with seismic impact. While seismic wave passing and after that the NPP operated according to the normal shutdown procedure until tsunami approached the station.

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Russian Nuclear Power Plant Industry Response to Fukushima Event

Check conditions of NPPs being operated against design requirements, standards and rules
Adjustment

organizations

Architect Design organizations

Conduct analysis of design of NPPs under operation and construction focused on their stress resistance to various emergency situations

Operating Organization
Scientific Design

organizations

organizations

Develop additional measures to ensure NPP safety in case of emergency

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What was checked at power plants being operated

From 21.03.2011 to 28.03.2011 There were conducted self-inspections at all NPPs

from 28.03.2011 to 01.04.2011 There were conducted inspections of all NPPs by operating organization

There was checked compliance with design requirements, standards and rules:
for

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Results of Concern Rosenergoatom power plants inspections

Federal safety requirements are met taking into account the undertaken compensating measures. NPPs safety is ensured.

Terms of validity of the licenses issued by Rostechnadzor are met.

Updating aimed at bringing NPPs into compliance with new standards and rules has been implemented as required. Activities targeted at providing protection against hydrogen explosion in containments have not been fully completed yet.
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Federal Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision Service

WENRA EUROPEAN COMMISSION IAEA

Methodology for risk and NPP safety assessments

Lessons learned from Fukushima accident

Proposals regarding revision of approaches to Russian NPP safety stress tests

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Organization of Russian NPPs safety analysis based on stress tests approach:

General Architect Designer

JSC Concern Rosenergoatom

General Designer Scientific Supervisor

Analysis of safety provisions has been performed for every possible external impact

Balakovo

Beloyarsk

Bilibino

Kalinin

Kola

Kursk

Leningrad

Novovoronezh

Rostov

Smolensk

Russian NPPs

The Reports on NPPs Safety Analyses under Extreme External Impacts

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Stress tests assessed consequences caused by loss of:

NPP power supply including blackout

ultimate heat sinks providing removal of

residual heat from reactors, SNF pools and storage facilities

integrity (no leakage) of reactor containment

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Stress tests were conducted:

1 2 3

for each power unit under operation in Russia taking into account all possible extreme impacts on NPP typical for the region of its location

taking into account various combinations of the extreme impacts

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Reports on NPPs Safety Analyses as regard to Extreme External Impacts

Earthquake

Combination of several simultaneous external impacts

NPP site flooding

Plans of additional technical means commissioning and organization measures undertaking

Loss of power supply including blackout

Other types of possible external impacts

Loss of ultimate heat sinks for reactors, SNF pools and storage facilities

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Updated Plan of measures targeted at mitigation of BDBA repercussions

Pre-conditions for a safety updating: Stress test assessment results; Initiatives and proposals provided by Rostechnadzor, General Architect Designer and NPPs; Programme of introduction of seismic protection at NPPs; Programmes of study and analysis of seismic micro-zoning materials by NPP sites; Supplement activities on BDBA scenarios analysis; Adjustment of scopes of the planned activities.

Updated BDBA possible consequences mitigation measures

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General arrangement to all NPPs under operation in Russia

Prompt measures
Target inspections and analysis of NPP safety under extreme impacts NPP personnel extraordinary emergency training based on BDBA scenarios Analysis of additional BDBA scenarios considering impact of neighboring units Increase in number of regularly conducted emergency training in personnel activities under BDBA

Short-term measures
Determine emergency reserve (additional) water (borated water) delivery sources to provide heat removal from core, spent fuel pool and SNF storage facility. Include procedure of their use in operation documents Establish additional water (borated water) supply sources, provide water delivery from the sources to remove heat from the core, spent fuel pool and SNF storage facility. Include procedure of their use in operation documents Conduct additional study and analysis of materials on NPP seismic zoning and calculation analysis of seismic impact on reactor plant, spent fuel pools, plant SNF storage facilities Conduct analysis of emergency instructions and guidelines (including typical) with respect to sufficiency of personnel actions aimed at accident management

Develop Statements of works for additional design solutions rosenergoatom.ru

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General arrangements to all NPPs under operation in Russia

Medium-term measures
Develop design and estimate documentation and start implementing additional design solutions Additional equipment delivery to NPPs Adjustment of emergency operation procedures and accident management guidelines after equipment has been delivered to the NPPs

Long-term measures
Implementation of the design solutions to the full extent Adjustment of emergency operation procedures and accident management guidelines after the scheduled actions have been implemented

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Conclusions based on analysis of NPPs resistance to extreme external impacts

NPPs safety upgradings including BDBA management has been conducted for last 10-15 years Vulnerabilities were revealed, and list of hypothetic initial events was developed for each NPP There should be undertaken additional measures targeted at enhancement of NPP capability to operate under off-line mode (up to 5-10 days) NPPs design consider not all BDBA initial events (i.e. one cause failures)

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Measures to improve Russian NPPs safety under extreme external impacts

Improvement of emergency documents Adjustment of system-oriented emergency instructions (instructions for accident elimination and BDBA management manual) upon implementation of additional design solutions; Standard guidelines on severe accidents management (RUTA) for WWER-1000 and RBMK NPPs have been developed and brought into force; Development and implementation of RUTA at all Russian NPPs.
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Measures to improve Russian NPPs safety under extreme external impacts

Power supply ensuring

Development and implementation of additional sources for power supply from portable diesel generators (N = 2.0 and 0.2 W) to the following consumers:

Pumps and valves (water supply to reactor plant, at-reactor Power supply reliability enhancement Mounting of additional lines from external sources power
systems; Improvement of internal backup (redundancy)
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cooling ponds, SNF pools); Main control room, emergency control panel; other control systems; Emergency I&C; Emergency lighting

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Measures to improve Russian NPPs resistance to extreme external impacts

Heat removal
Development and implementation of additional circuits for water supply to the reactor, steam generators and SNF pools using: portable diesel pumps and motor pumps; fire tank trucks; standard systems of fire extinguishing with water; natural and additionally erected reserve water sources Commissioning the system for cooling metal facing of the walls of SNF pool.

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Measures to improve Russian NPPs resistance to extreme external impacts

Seismic safety improvement

Introduction of seismic protection system ASTS (automatic reactor trip in case of earthquake); Data refinement about seismic micro zoning of NPP sites; Conducting of refined analysis of the seismic impacts on reactor plant, fuel pool, SNF storage facility and other equipment of upper unit system; Making seismic resistance category of NPP components more accurate; Implementation of measures targeted at improvement of seismic resistance of NPP equipment, civil structures (detachment, reinforcement, etc.).

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Map of seismic-risk zoning according to OSR-97* D

MSK-64 scale intensity 1 rosenergoatom.ru 12

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Assessment of seismic capacity of NPPs under operation

Seismic capacity for SL2 level taken as design basis or confirmed by calculations, MSK scale number

NPP

Power units under operation

Initial peak ground acceleration for SL2 level, g

Balakovo

Units 1, 2, 3, 4

0,1

7 PSHA+SMA-CDFM+GIPVVER+Seismic PSA has been implemented 6

6 6-7

Beloyarskaya Kalinin Kursk

Unit 3 Units 1, 2 Units 3,4 Units 1, 2, 3, 4

0,05 0,04 0,1

7 6-7 SMA-CDFM+GIP-VVER has been implemented 7 7

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Leningrad

Units 1, 2, 3, 4

0.07-0.1

Rostov Smolensk rosenergoatom.ru

Units 1, 2 Units 1, 2, 3

0,068 0,021

Assessment of seismic stability of NPPs under operation

NPP

Power units under operation

Initial peak ground acceleration for SL2 level, g

Seismic capacity for SL2 level taken as design basis or confirmed by calculations, MSK scale number

Bilibin

Units 1, 2, 3, 4

0,035

In 2011 there were performed the works on making available assessment of seismic hazard in the area of Bilibino NPP more accurate, and receiving the final value of seismic impacts on NPP site. The final report summarized the results of all the works performed, there were made calculations of seismic mode parameters , and there was elaborated the final seismic assessment. Possibility of ground shaking of no more than 4 MSK scale numbers at maximum peak ground acceleration 0,02 g under SL1, and no more than 5 MSK scale numbers at maximum peak ground acceleration 0,035 under SL2 was confirmed.

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Assessment of seismic stability of NPPs under operation

NPP

Power units under operation

Initial peak ground acceleration for SL2 level, g

Seismic stability for SL2 level, included in design basis or confirmed by calculations, MSK 64 number

Kola

Units 1, 2, 3, 4

0,045

Kola NPP operation regulations require reactor shutdown through actuation of emergency protection keys (buttons) in case of earthquake of 5 MSK scale numbers that is detected by seismic sensors monitoring seismic conditions at Kola NPP site. Special facilities intended for BDBA management should eliminate the repercussions of seismic impacts exceeding design requirements . Personnel activities are defined by BDBA management procedures and the document Personnel actions under full NPP blackout with cooling water loss.

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Assessment of seismic stability of NPPs under operation

Initial peak ground acceleration for SL2 level, g 0,024 0,024 0,026 Seismic stability for SL2 level, included in design basis or confirmed by calculations, MSK-64 number 4,5 4,5 4,9

NPP

Power units under operation

Novovoronezh

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5

Starting form 2011 continuous monitoring of seismic conditions at NV NPP is conducted based on local network of seismic stations. The local network is supported by the seismic stations incorporated into the Federal network of seismic stations in Russia that increases monitoring quality. Long-term seismic monitoring in the area of NV NPP location makes it possible to accumulate the data required for making assessment of seismic conditions in the location area and its stability against the time. Individual design for industrial seismic protection is being developed for units 3,4. Industrial seismic protection with signal output at MCR is implemented at unit 5 All the supporting structures of existing buildings and installations of seismic stability category I of units 3,4 withstand LS2 seismic loads. Design of units 3,4 for existing civil structure considered LS1 coming to 4 MSK scale numbers and LS2 less than 5 MSK scale numbers as seismic impacts. For newly constructed buildings there are accepted the following seismic impact parameters of SL2 level: maximum peak horizontal ground acceleration of the free-field surface - 0,1g; maximum peak vertical ground acceleration of the freefield surface - 0,05g. Designs of the newly constructed safety buildings of unit 5 and standby diesel power plant, as well as safety systems tunnels are developed for seismic impact of 7 numbers (0,1 g). Unit 5 containment keeps integrity at the earthquake of 8 MSK scale numbers (~ 0,20,25g). Standing alone spent fuel storage building is designed to withstand the seismic impact of 7 MSK scale numbers (0,1g).

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Definition of sufficiency criterion by seismic impacts at NPPs under operation

Accept 40% increase in the fixed site value of peak ground acceleration for SL2 level as a criterion of sufficiency for seismic impacts on NPPs under operation. It is recommended to make seismic re-assessment of NPPs under operation in accordance with sufficiency criterion based on deterministic method of Seismic Margin Assessment. Use standard values of loads and strength features of materials to define loading-carrying capacity of civil structures considering 40% increase in peak acceleration of the ground being guided by provisions of Limit state levels I, II III (par. 2.9 EUR) and approaches provided by Seismic Margin Assessment method.

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Extracts from plan of measures aimed at mitigation BDBA repercussions

Results of seismic micro-zoning of Kalinin (units 1, 2, 3, 4), Kola (units 1, 2, 3, 4), Kursk (units 1, 2, 3, 4), Leningrad (units 1, 2, 3, 4), Smolensk (units 1, 2, 3, 4) NPPs sites based on complex of instrumental geophysics and seismological methods Results of seismic microzoning of Balakovo NPP (units 1, 2, 3, 4), Beloyarskaya NPP (unit 3), Bilibino NPP (unit 1, 2, 3, 4), Novovoronezh NPP (units 3, 4, 5), Rostov NPP (units 1,2) sites based on complex of instrumental geophysics and seismological methods

November 2012

September 2013

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Extracts from plan of measures aimed at mitigation of BDBA repercussions

Data base of parameters of maximum seismic impacts in the places of location of buildings and structures of I category according to their responsibility for radiation and nuclear safety (as per PiN AE-5.6) for every NPP

Instrumental records of seismic events using accelerometers available at NPP site

February 2014

Data base on seismic impact parameters of LS1 and LS2 levels to calculate seismic stability of NPPs under operation (peak ground accelerations, accelerograms, response spectrum etc.).

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Extracts from plan of measures aimed at mitigation of BDBA repercussions

Natural frequencies and own oscillation mode of I category buildings and structures depending on their responsibility for radiation and nuclear safety (as per PiN AE-5.6) by micro-oscillation method.

for Rostov NPP (units 1, 2) for Balakovo NPP (umits 1, 2, 3, 4), Kola NPP (units 1, 2, 3, 4) For Kalinin NPP (units 1, 2, 3) For Beloyarskaya NPP (unit 3), Leningrad NPP (unit 1), Smolensk NPP (units 1, 2, 3, 4)

May 2012 October 2012 February 2013 September 2013

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Extracts from plan of measures aimed at mitigation of BDBA repercussions

Results of the refined calculation analysis of impacts on the reactor plants, SNF ponds, stationary spent fuel storage facilities, safety important equipment, buildings and structures. Making the category of elements seismic stability more accurate. Plans of additional measures targeted at increase in resistance of elements and systems against seismic impacts for every NPP.

2015

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Supply of emergency equipment to Russian NPPs as of condition

Mobile Diesel Generator units 0.2 MW It is required 36 pcs. All equipment was manufactured and supplied to NPP Mobile Diesel Generator units 2 MW It is required 36 pcs. There were supplied 29 pcs. to NPP. The rest will be supplied in July, 2012 Mobile pump units It is required 35 pcs. All equipment was manufactured and supplied to NPP. Motor pumps It is required 80 pcs. All equipment was manufactured and supplied to NPP.
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WWER Units stress tests in some other IAEA Member States

Ukraine: Stress tests were successfully conducted at all 15 WWER power units on 4 NPPs sites. The plan for implementation of safety upgrading measures was developed. The RLE was assessed by Nuclear Authority as 0.12g for South-Ukraine NPP that is approximately by 40% higher than SL-2 (Safety Shutdown Earthquake). The discussion on upgrading of RLE for all NPP sites is on the way. The scheduled new PSHA sites investigations, SMA, walkdowns by GIP-VVER and Seismic PSA recommended by IAEA are being carried-out. Armenia, WWER-440 Unit 2 Metsamor NPP, SL-2 design basis 0.35g: Within the frame of the programs on technical cooperation with IAEA, EC and other International organizations PSHA and SMA of the plant have been conducted. Seismic walkdowns have been performed by GIP-VVER approach in accordance with IAEA requirements. A wide range of seismic safety upgradings were implemented at ANPP with its finalization in 2013. Stress tests program is being conducted under EC umbrella. The RLE for the stress tests is installed 0.47g. Iran, Bushehr NPP, Unit 1, SL-2 design basis 0.4g: According to the IAEA missions recommendations PSHA, SMA CDFM and GIP-VVER walkdowns were conducted at the design and start-up stages. Special pre-starting seismic walkdowns were performed for more than 5000 items of SSEL. BNPP has its own regulation on EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS developed in accordance with IAEA Safety Report #66, 2011 NPP stress tests were successfully conducted according to WENRA recommendations in 2011.

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New VVER technology and preparation for the stress tests Akkuyu NPP site, Turkey, VVER-1200 Units

Comprehensive PSHA study and probabilistic assessment of extreme external events including tsunami were conducted for 4 Units WWER-1200 Akkuyu NPP being constructed in Turkey considering all modern requirements particularly European Safety Standards for Light Water Reactors and new IAEA standard- IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-9 Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, Specific Safety Guide, IAEA Vienna, 2010".

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Conclusion on stress tests performed at Russian design NPPs

Federal safety requirements are met taking into account compensating measures; There was conducted an analysis of defense-in-depth for Russian NPPs under operation; Measures targeted at increase in robustness of NPPs under operation against extreme external impacts are developed and undertaken; The WWER technology has some safety advantages in comparison with BWR. The major advantage is possibility of heat removal using steam generators or even one steam generator, and secondary systems.

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III Some future perspectives for NPPs seismic safety upgrading

Seismic Isolation System for NPP Reactor Building

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Seismic Isolation System for Reactor Building Reactor Building Structural model and Isolators layout

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Soil Conditions and Seismic Excitation

Soil parameters:
Modulus: E = 6.09109 N/m2 Shear modulus: G = 2.17109 N/m2 Density: r = 1790 kg/m3 Wave velocities: Vs = 1100, Vp = 2750 m/s

General features with the Model:

Direction Horizontal Vertical Stiffness, N/m 4.48*1011 5.43*1011 Damping, N*s/m 2.81*109 3.09*109 Frequency, Hz 7.03 7.73 Damping ratio, % 13.8 13.8

Seismic:
Three artificial TH sets were generated from a conventional example of Uniform Hazard Response Spectrum (UHS) for a NPP site with the following parameters: ZPGAh = 0.6g, ZPGAv = 0.3g Duration: 40 s, Time Step: 0.005 s rosenergoatom.ru
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Seismic Excitation and 3D Effectiveness of SIS. Reactor supports elevation

Initial site specific UHS and generated by TH Z - Vertical Direction

X-Horizontal

Y - Horizontal

Displacements in SIS devices: Max. horizontal: 52 mm; Max. vertical at the RB corner (vert. + rocking): 193 mm.

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Reactor Building Airplane Crash Accident Analysis without and with SIS. Reactor supports elevation
Load function R(t) for Boeing 747-400 faces stiff barrier with different speeds Acceleration at Reactor Supports due to 400 t Boeing 747-400 Crash (SIS). Y-direction

Small plane Lear Jet (6.1 t), Y-direction

IRS at Reactor Supports elevation due to Boeing 747-400 Crash (SIS). Y-direction

Red: without RB SIS Blue: with RB SIS

Red: without RB SIS Blue: with RB SIS

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Reactor Building without and with SIS. Big commercial airplane crash accident in comparison with a seismic event of 0.6g ZPGA
I. II. Big Commercial Plane Crash Case (400 t): Red without SIS; Blue with SIS Earthquake: Purple without SIS; Green with SIS

Y-direction. IRS at Reactor Supports elevation

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Advantages of SIS in NPPs application

The main advantage of SSI is a possibility for essentially reducing

an acceleration demand and set of requirements for SSEL items and all seismic categories buildings, structures, components, systems and equipment inside and outside nuclear island. In case of SIS implementation it would be possible to apply for all above mentioned NPPs seismic categories either reduced seismic requirements or conventional industrial requirements. SIS implementation not only permits to increase seismic protection of SSEL items, but also simplifies and standardizes design solutions and considerably decreases the cost of the equipment supplied to NPP because of unavailability of excessive requirements to seismic stability. Small and Big commercial plane accidents do not bring any essential additional dynamic impact to the SSEL items in seismically isolated RB.
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III. Some future perspectives for NPPs seismic safety upgrading

Real Time Safety System (RTSS) for Managing of Extreme External Events at NPP site

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Real Time Safety System (RTSS) for Managing of Extreme External Events at NPP site Existing automatic scram trip system (ASTS)
An ASTS is generally installed at plants located in high seismicity areas, such as Japan. However, the VVER type reactors of the former Soviet Union and Russian design located in the Russian Federation and Eastern European countries, many of which are located in low to moderate seismicity areas, were recommended to install the ASTS. The same refers to VVER Units in China, India and Iran. The following parameters are important considerations for the selection and implementation of ASTS: peak acceleration, CAV and JMA. A quite new IAEA Safety Report Series No.66 Earthquake preparedness and response for NPPs, 2011 gives basic and very valuable recommendations on ASTS application. ASTS could be set, in general, for three levels against seismic design parameters: ASTS <SL-1; SL-1<ASTS<SL-2; ASTS>SL-2. Using the only one ASTS triggering parameter as PA, CAV or JMA for a such complex system as NPP is inevitably provides over conservatism in automatic scram for all ranges of seismic excitation especially for the low triggering levels ASTS<SL-1 and SL-1<ASTS<SL-2. For example, some recommendation on threshold CAV<0.16 as well as peak acceleration less than 0.005 seems extremely conservative for ASTS with no consequences for the safety state of NPPs SSC. The proposed Real Time Safety System (RTSS) for Managing of Extreme External Events at NPP site is aimed to improve existing ASTS philosophy and mitigate losses connected with unjustified shutdowns of NPPs.

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Real Time Safety System (RTSS) for Managing of Extreme External Events at NPP site

.
The initiation point for developing of RTSS were lessons learned from Kashiwazaki-Karima NPP seismic event happened on July 17, 2007 when losses due to a shutdown of all 7 Units of the plant has achieved several billions dollars with enormous manpower involved in complete walkdowns and analysis of SSC of all 7 Units. For such cases RTSS making a fast risk analysis of safety path and SSC on the basis of actual parameters of impact could essentially decrease the volume of post earthquake actions emphasis on SSC having high probability of failure and not considering items with miserable failure probability. Another reason for RTSS developing was a number of unjustified shutdowns of the plants due to a malfunction of ASTS and shutdowns after low intensity events where no failures or any damages could exist and was not found. RTSS could provide either ASTS function based on probability of core damage failure and probability of individual SSC failures (or individual safety factors in deterministic approach) or play a role of upgraded information system. In case of information system application RTSS will provide operator valuable data to make a weighted and cost effective decision concerning shut down of the plant or extending plants operation after impact. rosenergoatom.ru
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General Logic for NPP Shutdown and Restart

P < Pcrit EQ P > Pcrit

OK (Ext.) Shutdown

Inspections

Restart

What is the adequacy of Damage Indicating Parameter (P) in evaluation of NPP Safety State? (PA, CAV, IJMA, etc)

Confirmation of NPP safety. Actual state of SSC? A huge scope of walkdowns for reactor restarting.

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Existing Shutdown Systems are based on:

Parameter
Peak Acceleration

Notes
Can represent limited number of SSC failure modes, e.g. relays, etc.

CAV, Standardized CAV

IJMA

Can characterize the energy accumulation and subsequent damages due to fatigue failure modes. The systems based on these parameters (in combination with PA and/or response spectra) have been accepted on most NPPs

What is the best parameter which can consistently describe a potential SSC failure? There are at least two contradictory requirements for definition of this parameter (s): 1. To be a robust and fast processing; 2. To be able to define seismic behavior and potential failure of SSC in result of actual earthquake at the site.

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RTSS Procedure Definition of Dynamic Input

initial dynamic impact on structure and components is measured by accelerometers installed at each elevation and/or in close proximity to safety related equipment; acceleration time histories for three orthogonal directions at each measuring point are used for in-structure spectra calculation for required frequencies and levels of damping (broadening of acquired spectra might be necessary). rosenergoatom.ru
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Definition of Damage Indicating Parameter

DIP =
Case # 1 Parameter D CAV

D C
Notes Median threshold from experience data base and analysis. Basically for structures and SSC with a cumulative damages (fatigue, ductility). Median threshold from experience data base and analysis. For SSC with rigid failure modes: movements, tumble. Median threshold from GIP. For various SSC. Tank, heat exchangers, pipelines. Median threshold from analysis.

Parameter C median allowable CAV value median allowable PA value median allowable spectra allowable stresses, forces, displacements that govern a failure

2 3

PA Spectra stresses, forces, displacements

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Accounting of Multiple Possible Failure Modes of a Component

The consideration of several possible failure modes of component leads to the definition of event FC failure of component. Obviously it is a disjunction of events A1, A2, , Am, each of them corresponds to the failure of a particular mode:

FC = A1 U A2 U A3 U ... U Am
A complicated issue is a degree of correlation between events A1, A2, , Am of common initiating cause, however, it is assumed that failures of different modes are independent events. Then the probability of failure of component can be expressed by:

PFC = 1 1 PA j
j =1

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Sequence Quantification
Further procedure flow partly overlaps with Seismic PSA: developing a list of initiating events, event and fault trees, end states. For each of the systems in an event tree there is a corresponding fault tree which relates the various structure and equipment failures. Having assessed the probabilities of failure of safety systems by means of fault trees, we come out to the probabilities of different types of end states realizations. The obtained values of the probability of failure can be grouped by type of end state (core damage, small release, large release etc.) and then for each type constructed its probability measure scale.

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RTSS Operation Example

Mock-up scheme of a single ECCS channel

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DIP and probability of failure vs time

Stick model of reactor building and N-S accelerogram of ground motion

G round Floor Acceleration and Spectra 10 acceleration, m 2 /s 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 0 5 10 15 20 tim s e, 25 30 35 40 A cc-1X S 1x(1.06,5) S 1x(5.42,5)

Accelerogram of the first floor and spectral response at frequencies 1.08 Hz and 5.42 Hz

D and Probability of Failure IP 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0 5 10 15 20 tim s e, 25 30 35 40 D IP Pf

Time variation of DIP related to the load on the pump nozzle and corresponding probability of failure

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Damage parameters of equipment vs axelerogram types

CASE 1: the records of Zarand ground motion used as is; CASE 2: accelerograms was modified by multiplying the time step by 1.15. Thus, the frequency was reduced by 13%. ZPGA of both cases exactly the same, response spectrum and parameter CAV differ slightly. The results are presented in the tables: CASE 1: Equipment failure modes and corresponding probabilities of failure for original ground motion
DIP # Equipment DIP Pf Equipment Pf Channel Pf System Pf 1 Tank 0.781 0.1610 0.1610 2 Valve #1 0.060 1.4E-29 1.4E-29 3 Valve #2 0.149 1.4E-14 1.4E-14 4 0.640 0.0370 Pump 5 0.535 0.0062 0.6282 6 1.073 0.6115 0.6943 0.3347 7 0.137 1.0E-15 8 0.312 1.6E-06 9 Pipe 0.250 1.5E-08 0.0200 10 0.457 0.0009 11 0.596 0.0191

CASE 2: Equipment failure modes and corresponding probabilities of failure for modified ground motion
DIP # Equipment DIP Pf Equipment Pf Channel Pf System Pf 1 Tank 0.871 0.2897 0.2897 2 Valve #1 0.069 4.7E-27 4.7E-27 3 Valve #2 0.149 1.3E-14 1.3E-14 4 0.644 0.0393 5 Pump 0.493 0.0023 0.3222 6 0.873 0.2928 0.5189 0.1397 7 0.130 1.8E-16 8 0.230 2.0E-09 9 0.301 7.7E-07 0.0008 Pipe 10 0.444 0.0006 11 0.415 0.0002

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Preliminary conclusions on RTSS advantages

The proposed Real Time Safety System (RTSS) performs a fast (real time in the future) safety analysis of NPP under actual seismic or other external extreme dynamic excitation in probabilistic or deterministic domains. The RTSS defines probability of the reactor core damage and SSC and /or directly safety factors for categorized SSC in SMA CDFM approach. RTSS uses all available seismic experienced based data in the form of CAV, PA, Spectra to specify actual damage indicating parameters DIP for individual components. RTSS could essentially decrease conservatism in NPPs ASTS application serving in preventing of unjustified shutdowns of NPP and significantly reduce the cost of post earthquake walkdowns and other recovery actions in confirmation of NPP safety state.

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IV. Conclusions
The events happened in Japan at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP and Fukushima-Daichi NPP initiated complex of works (stress tests) in Russia targeted at inspection and safety upgrading of NPPs, which had been constructed or being constructed according to Russian nuclear technologies. Stress tests were conducted according to the requirements provided by Russian Supervisory Authority Rostechnadzor based on WENRA/ENSREG and IAEA recommendations. The results of the stress tests are as follows: Russian Federal Law requirements to Nuclear Safety are met considering implemented risk mitigating measures; Comprehensive analysis of Defense-in-Depth for NPPs under operation was conducted within the frame of the stress tests Program. The measures targeted at NPPs safety upgrading against extreme external impacts developed and are being implemented. were

A number of new technologies aimed to a further upgrading of seismic and dynamic safety of NPPs against extreme hazards are on agenda, for example: Seismic and Vibration Isolation Systems for NPP Reactor building and other SSC; Real Time Safety System (RTSS) the system for a fast NPP safety assessment and managing of NPP operation subjected to a seismic/dynamic impact/

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Robustness of Russian Design NPPs Against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunami

Thank you for your attention!

Sergey EGOROV Concern Rosenergoatom JSC Victor KOSTAREV CKTI-Vibroseism Ltd

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