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PF/5651/Dissertation "Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defile, marshes, and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army1." Sun Tzu RECONNAISSANCE OPERATION IN BANGLADESH ARMY PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION Problem Statemant 1. Reconnaissance is the activity of getting information for military purposes using

various means which enables the commander to execute his plan successfully. The outcome of reconnaissance operation will largely influence the decision making process of selection of the course of action. So reconnaissance operation need to be carried out effectively which depends upon mode/method of reconnaissance operation and capability of reconnaissance force. Bangladesh Army being defensive and less mechanized has got inadequate reconnaissance capability. Reconnaissance force are neither organizationally supported nor equipped with modern reconnaissance facilities. We still have the weapons and equipment which came into the organization long time back. As a result the range of surveillance and gaining information is very limited due to very characteristics of weapon and equipment we are having. Even the concept of reconnaissance operation is not clear to many of us. However, the limited surveillance and reconnaissance activities practiced in our Army are age old and lack of dynamism. In present days context, the method of detecting enemy and gaining information which is followed by us is not very effective in reality. Over the years there had been a revolutionary change in the method of operation, equipment, design and capabilities of reconnaissance elements of modern armies.Our potential adversaries are also equipped with modern reconnaissance capability and follow a better technique of
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reconnaissance operation. In an Infantry Division, in fact, there is no dedicated reconnaissance force that can be employed to perform long range surveillance and acquire combat intelligence. With present organizational set up and capability, it is difficult to perform reconnaissance operation effectively. So it is clearly understood that reconnaissance operation is a grey area for Bangladesh Army and demand modification in planning and conduct of reconnaissance operation. Besides, the improvement of reconnaissance capability in terms of modern equipment, training and organizational set up are also required. Now, Reconnaissance operation is a term applicable for Armour, Infantry, Artillery and Engineer also. For research works, it is a vast area to be addressed. So, for effective research work, the scope is limited within Armour and Infantry. This research will make an endeavour to highlight the concept of reconnaissance operation itself, the need for reconnaissance operation in Bangladesh, the existing state of reconnaissance operation by Armour and Division Support Battalion of Bangladesh Army, reconnaissance capability of other countries and finally suggest the possible means of carrying out effective reconnaissance operation by Armour and Division Support Battalion. Research Questions 2. The Primary research questions are as follows: a. What should be the reconnaissance capability of Bangladesh Army in light of its mission and perceived threats? b. What are the improvements necessary in the existing doctrine of reconnaissance operation of Bangladesh Army and in its capabilities? 3. Secondary Research Questions are as followings: a. What is the existing doctrine and capability of reconnaissance operations of Bangladesh Army? b. What are the weaknesses of Bangladesh Army in its organisational and operational doctrine and capabilities related to reconnaissance operations?
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Limitations 4. Reconnaissance operation involves Armour, Artillery, Infantry and Engineer

elements. To address the issue, all the mentioned elements need to be considered that entails a vast area for research and also difficult to come up with plausible solution. In order to narrow down the topic for analysing more in details and end with an effective, implementable solution, the study is confined within Armour Regiment and Division Support Battalion only. Review of the Literatures 5. 1st Part - List of Literatures Consulted. Following literatures were

consulted for this review: a. Covering force operation of Bangladesh Army- A quest for improvement.

Major Md Abdur Razzaq. 2008. b. Evaluation of Reconnaissance Troop of Bangladesh Armour Regiment. Khairul Kabir. 2008.

Major A M M c.

Employment and utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in joint military

operations. Wing Commander Kal Ranathunga. 2008. 6. 2nd Part - Disc on Findings of Review of the Literature. In the literature of

Covering force operation of Bangladesh Army- A quest for improvement, the writer analyzed the present concept of covering force operation in Bangladesh Army and finally suggested viable options to make covering force operation more effective and purposeful. In doing so, the writer developed his paper gradually by highlighting threat analysis in our different sectors terrain. The writer rightly explained the present concept of covering force operation in our army. In that he mentioned about the tasks, compositions and employments of reconnaissance elements, covering troops, advance position and screen. The writer did not forget to say about other countries like India and USA. Then, after explaining the strength and weaknesses of our covering force operation, finally he gave some modifications for effective covering force operation. The
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paper talked about four elements (reconnaissance elements, covering troops, advance position and screen) as a whole basically about their employment. Readjustment in the employment of covering troops and advance position, dedicated force for covering troops and collective training are mentioned as part of modification. But the method of reconnaissance by the reconnaissance elements, their capabilities were not included. How reconnaissance operation can be performed by covering force elements was not mentioned. 7. In the literature, Evaluation of Reconnaissance Troop of Bangladesh Armour

Regiment, the writer evaluated the Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured Regiment of Bangladesh and suggested few viable measures to enhance its operational efficiency. The writer mentioned about task, organization, equipment, communication, logistic and training of Reconnaissance troop of Armoured Regiment. At the end, the paper recommended on additional manpower for reconnaissance troops, inclusion of new reconnaissance vehicle, communication sets and also training directives. The paper is almost a complete and composed product. But all it talked about Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured Regiment. Reconnaissance operation by Divisional Support Battalion, Artillery Regiment or Engineer Battalion is not within its content. Thereby, the reconnaissance operation of Bangladesh Army is not discussed. 8. Employment and utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in joint military

operations- In this paper the writer examined the effectiveness of employing and utilizing of UAVs in joint military operations for tactical aerial reconnaissance role over the manned aircraft and suggested a philosophy for the employment of UAVs for reconnaissance. In the paper, the characteristics, development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, its comparison with manned aircraft, principles of employment and its reconnaissance role are rightly mentioned. Though no ingredients about

reconnaissance operation for an army as a whole, we can derive the utility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in reconnaissance task. 9. In above mentioned literatures, the way of effective employment of covering
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force, enhancing the reconnaissance capability of Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured

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Regiment and also the details of one of the latest reconnaissance equipment Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are well discussed. So one important aspect is overlooked here which need to be evaluated the reconnaissance operation of Bangladesh Army. 10. 3rd Part. a. b. Clearly, there is scope here for a great deal for more research that:

Modifying the method of reconnaissance operation by Bangladesh Army. Enhancing the reconnaissance capability in terms of organizational set up,

modern equipment, training and other facilities for reconnaissance operation of Bangladesh Army. Objective / Purpose 11. To recommend various measures for modifying the reconnaissance method and

enhancing the reconnaissance capabilities of Armour Regiment and Division Support Battalion of Bangladesh Army for successful conduct of reconnaissance operation. Research Hypothesis 12. With the advancement of science and technology, being blessed with modern

equipment and facilities, the mode/method of reconnaissance operation has improved to a great extent. So, to modify/develop the method of reconnaissance operation, we need to enhance its capability by new organizational setup, modern

reconnaissance/surveillance equipment, training facilities with new concept of effective employment of reconnaissance force. Methods of Data Collection 13. For this research work, both quantitative and qualitative data collection technique

are being followed. Personal interview and self-administered questionnaire method are followed as quantitative data collection technique and secondary document study is also done as qualitative data collection technique.

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CHAPTER - II: OVERVIEW OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATION IN GENERAL What is Reconnaissance Operation 14. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information by visual

observation, or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy, or about the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance produces combat information. Combat information is a by-product of all operations, acquired as they are in progress. Reconnaissance, however, is a focused collection effort. It is performed before and during other combat operations to provide information used by the commander to confirm or modify his concept. Cavalry is the corps or division commander's principal reconnaissance organization2. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance Operation 15. Reconnaissance allows the follow-on forces to manoeuvre more freely and

rapidly to the objective. Reconnaissance allows the higher commander to keep other forces free from contact as long as possible and concentrated for the decisive engagement. Successful reconnaissance operations are planned and performed with following fundamentals in mind: a. Maximum reconnaissance force forward. b. Orient on the location or movement of the reconnaissance objective. c. Report all information rapidly and accurately. d. Retain freedom to manoeuvre. e. Gain and maintain enemy contact. f. Develop the situation rapidly3. Types of Reconnaissance Operation 16. The commander organizes the reconnaissance platoon based on mission,

enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.
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This analysis determines whether the platoon uses single or multiple elements to conduct the reconnaissance, whether it pertains to area, zone, or route

reconnaissance. 17. Area Reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance refers to the observation, and

information obtained, about a specified location and the area around it; it may be terrain-oriented and/or force-oriented. Ideally, a reconnaissance platoon, or team, would use surveillance or vantage (static) points around the objective to observe, and

the surrounding area4. Diagram 1 : Area Reconnaissance 18. Zone Reconnaissance. Zone reconnaissance focuses on obtaining detailed

information before maneuvering their forces through particular, designated locations, generally utilizing preliminary reconnaissance in this practice. It can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented, or both, as it acquire this information by reconnoitering within and by maintaining surveillance over routes, obstacles and resources within an assigned location.

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Diagram 2 : Zone Reconnaissance 19. Route Reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance is oriented on a given

route: a road, a railway, a waterway; a narrow axis (such as an infiltration lane), or a general direction of attack, to provide detailed, new or updated information on route conditions or activities along the route. The reconnaissance platoon must remain far enough ahead of the manoeuvre force to assist in early warning and to prevent the force from becoming surprised.

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Diagram 3 : Route Reconnaissance (troop graphics) Technique / Method of Reconnaissance Operation 20. Reconnaissance by Fire. Reconnaissance by fire is a method of

reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. This technique is appropriate when time is critical, while developing the situation once in contact, or when mounted or dismounted manoeuvre is not possible. During reconnaissance by fire, scouts maintain surveillance of the known or suspected enemy position looking for a reaction. 21. Reconnaissance-In-Force. Reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) is a term that

refers to the usage of military tactics in the advancement toward the targeted area, or enemy, that is of interest; in which, using stealth, or aggression may be applied to provoke a reaction of the enemy to determine their strengths and capabilities. Even such reaction can allow surveying the status of arsenal and weaponry being used by
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the enemy, which helps to determine last minute decision-making for the military commander. Other methods consist of hit-and-run tactics using rapid mobility, in some cases, using light-armored vehicles for added fire superiority, if the need arises 5. 22. Reconnaissance Push. Reconnaissance-push is used once the

commander is committed to a plan, or maneuver option. The commander "pushes" his reconnaissance assets forward, as necessary, to gain greater visibility on specific named areas of interest to confirm or deny the assumptions on which the plan is based. Information gathered during reconnaissance push is used to finalize the commander's plan6. 23. Reconnaissance Pull. Reconnaissance-pull is used when the enemy

situation is not well-known and/or the situation is rapidly changing. The commander uses ISR assets to confirm or deny any reports of enemy activity, or terrain, before the decision on a plan, or manoeuvre option; thus -pulling- the battalion to the decisive point on the battlefield. Success of the reconnaissance-pull requires an integrated reconnaissance plan that can be executed before the commander making a course of action decision. Reconnaissance pull can determine enemy disposition, and find or create exploitable gaps through which friendly forces can pass while avoid obstacles and strong points. Reconnaissance Operations in Different Areas 24. Reconnaissance missions, within the scope of the battle space, are

characterized by the depth of penetration required, in terms of time, risk coordination, and support requirements. Information is gathered by commanders at all echelons and is used to prevent surprise, permit the timely manoeuvre of ground forces, and to facilitate the prompt and effective use of supporting arms.

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FEBAForward Edge of Battle Area FSCLFire Support Coordination Line Figure 1 : Reconnaissance in various Areas 25. Close/Short Reconnaissance. Military commanders use forward platoon

and company-sized elements of their own organic forces, to perform close reconnaissance ("short-range" reconnaissance), such as: the reconnaissance/scout platoons in infantry battalions; reconnaissance troop in armored regiments/battalions; These mission normally are conducted in the area between the forward positions to the rear, extending forward of the "Forward Edge of the Battle Area" (FEBA) to the "Fire Support Coordination Line" (FSCL)7. 26. Distant/Medium Reconnaissance. The units that provide distant

reconnaissance (or known as "medium" reconnaissance) capabilities are usually organic to, or attached to regimental/brigade, division-level, corps-level commands. It is usually directed toward determining location, disposition, composition, movement of supporting arms (i.e. artillery emplacement), and the reserve elements of the enemy

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committed forces. Distant reconnaissance is conducted between the FEBA, beyond the FSCL, to the rear of the commander's area of influence8. 27. Deep /Long Reconnaissance. At the highest command level of a

committed force or component (the division, corps, or field army-level), the force-level reconnaissance is employed to perform deep reconnaissance (or "long-range surveillance"), which is conducted beyond the force (or component) commander's area of influence to the limits of the area of interest (i.e. the geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations, and to plan for future operations)9. Analysis of Reconnaissance Operation Capabilities of Advanced Armies 28. India. At present Indian Army is one of the recognized army of the world. The

reconnaissance operation is basically carried out by mobile elements that include both Armour and mechanized Infantry. The reconnaissance forces are highly mobile and equipped with sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance equipment. The method of carrying out reconnaissance varies in different types of operation. There are three Armoured Division (1, 31 and 33 Armoured Division) and eight Independent Armoured Brigades (2, 3, 4, 6,14,16,23 and 63 Armoured Brigade) and fifty six mechanized brigades in Indian Army. In each Armoured Division, there is Reconnaissance and Support Battalion (comprising one medium tank squadron, one BMP company and one wheel reconnaissance vehicle company), six tank regiments (45 tanks) and four BMP Battalions10. These are the force dedicated for reconnaissance operation (Details of Indian reconnaissance force are given at Annex A). In order to increase the reconnaissance and surveillance capability, Indian Army at present is using many modern devices as follows: a. Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle. The

Indian Army has inducted NBC reconnaissance vehicle developed by Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The NBC reconnaissance vehicle, based on a BMP-IIK chassis for cross-country capability, is fitted with
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nuclear, chemical, meteorological and positional sensors for monitoring contaminated areas. The vehicle will counter threats from armies that use NBC warfare. (Details are given at Annex B) b. Mini Drones. The Indian Army is acquiring man-portable mini drones

for short-range covert missions, which include aerial detection, tracking and surveillance. It would be double-purposed. Following the aerial reconnaissance, the Army's mini drones could strike high-value small targets on the ground by firing the fatal weapons (Details are given at Annex C). There are more than 100 larger drones in the Indian Armed Forces. Those larger drones are mainly deployed in the Army and Air Force for aerial intelligence-gathering. C. Robotic Vehicle. The Indian Army has received the first ever

homemade unmanned ground vehicle which will be used for; surveillance, to detect nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and mines. The prototype of the Unmanned Ground Vehicle, which has been developed and handed to the Indian Army for trials, is based on an infantry fighting vehicle BMP-2 platform. (Details are given at Annex D). Some other surveillance devices used by Indian Army are given at Annex E. d. Reconnaissance Satellite. India has built a satellite-based Military

Surveillance and Reconnaissance System that became operational in 2007. Indian experts have said the set up of extensive ground-based surveillance and coordination systems, hooked up to Indias remote sensing satellites, would enable the country to keep a watch on all explosive spots, missile silos, any movements in the neighborhood, as well as sudden military build-ups. 29. Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army is another advanced and modern army in

todays battlefield. The army is developing with combat effectiveness. Reconnaissance task is the responsibility of mobile troops. Armour, Light Anti Tank(LAT) and Heavy Anti Tank(HAT) Regiments are the key elements for reconnaissance operation. Each Infantry Division has got one Armour Regiment(having Reconnaissance Troop) and
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one LAT Regiment(having jeep mounted ATGM). On the other hand, for nine corps, there are nine HAT Regiments (APC borne). Besides, there are two Armoured Divisions and eight Independent Armoured Brigades. Above all, there are three/four Reconnaissance Regiments that all are involved in reconnaissance operation 11. (Details of Pakistan Army reconnaissance force are given at Annex F). The method of carrying out reconnaissance operation varies in different types of operation. In order to increase the reconnaissance capability of above mentioned forces, Pakistan Army at present is using various surveillance devices as mentioned in Annex G. 30. German Army. The primary mission of German Reconnaissance Battalion

was to provide reconnaissance for Armoured Division. Thereby the reconnaissance battalion was directly sub ordinate to division commander and would report back directly to him. Following a centuries old tradition on how to wage wars, the Germans emphasized the aggressiveness in reconnaissance mission rather than passively observing the enemy. The reconnaissance battalion was required to fight for information. Moreover, the reconnaissance battalion was required to attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitered. Germans believe in employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information. Often they assign supplementary tasks to their reconnaissance units, such as sabotage behind enemy lines, harassment, or counter-reconnaissance. Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitered. Reserves are kept on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitered are changed 12. Details of German reconnaissance method are explained in Annex H. 31. US Army. In US Army the reconnaissance operation is solely carried out by

Reconnaissance Battalion. The primary mission for Reconnaissance Battalion is reconnaissance and the additional mission is counter reconnaissance, security and combat. The battalion acts quickly, aggressively and if required fight to gain information. The tactics of reconnaissance battalion involved spreading out two
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reconnaissance companies down to platoon or even section sized patrols and keeping a reconnaissance company plus a good part or all of the tank company as a reserve near the battalion headquarter. The battalion headquarters and the reserve move by bounds, with the reserve tank company marching before the reserve tank company. This is to allow commitment of reserve Tank Company as soon as possible if there is a need for fighting for information. In such contingency battalion headquarter plus reserve needed to be kept in a position which allowed rapid movement of reserve. When enemy resistance grew stronger, the reconnaissance battalion attempted to get into the rear of the enemy line by seeking gaps or flanks. If that is not possible, the reconnaissance battalion commits its reserve (Tank and Reconnaissance Company) in an attack into a weak spot13.

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Reconnaissance Battalion Headquarter

Tank Company

Reconnaissance Company Tank Platoon (5 Tanks)

Reconnaissance Platoon

Reconnaissance Section 4 scout cars 24 Men

Reconnaissance Section 4 Jeep 12 Men

Reconnaissance Section 2 Half Track 1.75 mm gun

Chart 1 : Reconnaissance Battalion of US Army

CHAPTER III: RE-VIEW OF EXISTING OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES OF BANGLADESH ARMY RELATED TO RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.
32. The concept of reconnaissance operation did not much develop in Bangladesh

Army. However, at formation level basically Armour Regiment and Division Support
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Battalion are tasked to provide reconnaissance support as one of their role. The lack of organizational support and other facilities do not allow them to conduct detail/deliberate reconnaissance operation. The tasks, organogram, arms and equipment and employment of Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured Regiment and Division Support Battalion are discussed below. Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured Regiment 33. Tasks. Reconnaissance Troop of Armour Regiment is designed to perform

its classical tasks ie; collect and pass back information. Because of the firepower organic to an armoured Reconnaissance Troop, it is often tasked in addition with a delaying or possibly even an offensive role. This is done once Reconnaissance Troop is mostly employed in conjunction with combat teams of covering troops. The function and role of Reconnaissance Troop include close reconnaissance on the front and flanks, tank going reconnaissance, flank protection, screening, surveillance of regiment area, traffic control, night navigation, escort duties, flank liaison, seize and hold tactical features, establishment of road block and deception14. 34. Organizational Structure of Reconnaissance Troop. As per Table of

Organization and Equipment (TO&E) Reconnaissance Troop of armour regiment is placed under Head Quarter Squadron. Total manpower is 35. The head quarter of Reconnaissance Troop consists of five persons. Each Reconnaissance Troop is consists of three sections each having ten persons. Every section is authorized with one RR and one MG detachment. Each detachment is authorized with two106 mm RRs and two 7.62 mm MGs. Reconnaissance Troop is authorized with six jeeps for carrying of RRs and six for MGs15. The organizational chart of Reconnaissance Troop is given in Annex J. 35. Existing Arms and Equipment. At the moment Reconnaissance Troop of all

the armour regiments lacks in authorized arms and equipments. Table 2 shows the existing poor state of arms and equipment of Reconnaissance Troop.

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Equipment/Vehicle Category 106 mm RR

Bengal

12

Cavalry Horse Horse Cavalry Bengal Lancers Authorization 6 6 6 6 6 Lancers 6 Held 4 6 5 6 6 6 Deficiency 2 Nil 6 6 Nil 6 3 6 6 Nil 6 1 6 6 Nil 6 3 3 6 Nil 6 Nil 6 6 Nil 6 Nil 4 6 Nil 6 Nil 6 6 Nil 6 2 4 6 Nil 6 Nil 6 6 Nil 6 Nil 5 6 Nil 6

7.62 mm MG

Authorization 6 Held Deficiency 6 Nil

Jeeps for RR

Authorization 6 Held Deficiency 2 6

Vehicle for MG

Authorization 6 Held Deficiency Nil 6

Table 1: Arms and Vehicle State - Reconnaissance Troop (Source: Primary Data) 36. Existing Method of Reconnaissance Operations by Reconnaissance Troop. Reconnaissance Troop is a mobile element. Two basic characteristics of Reconnaissance Troop; mobility and firepower should be utilized to their optimum while employing. But at present, in Bangladesh Army, Reconnaissance Troop is hardly employed to perform their classical role. Reconnaissance Troop is basically involved in security zone battle area (covering troops battle), especially as covering troops. They form the nucleus of covering troops and employ along most expected enemys line of approach, 30-35 kilometres ahead of main defensive location. They gain information about enemy, pass back and attrite to gain time. Besides, they are also kept in reserve as final punch of the commander at the decisive moment. However, they are also employed for other offensive and defensive operations. But, not employed for purely
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reconnaissance operation. Reconnaissance Troop does not break down into detachments. Involving Reconnaissance Troop in flank protection, rear area security, anti heliborne operation, escort duties, traffic control, route reconnaissance etc are not in vogue in our army. Division Support Battalion 37. Tasks. The Division Support Battalion is the divisional resource of division battalion has the characteristics of mobility, firepower,

commander.

communications and flexibility. With greater manpower and firepower it is tasked to provide reconnaissance cover, anti-tank support, additional fire support and special support. So reconnaissance is one of the primary role of the battalion. Battalion or company, as per their operational grouping, in reconnaissance role, will be centralized in space, responsibility and operation. Once the reconnaissance mission is given to the battalion, the battalion commander translates the mission into tasks and allocates them to his sub units. Finally the task is performed by the composite platoon of Support Company. With this composite platoon, the Support Battalion is to provide close and medium range reconnaissance to division. 38. Organizational Structure of Division Support Battalion. The

organizational structure does not fully support to perform the role of it. While carrying out reconnaissance operation, at times it needs to be involved in limited offensive operation. So for a good reconnaissance, it demands adequate manpower with good armour protection, mobility and sufficient firepower. But the battalion as a whole lack in armour protection, assaulting capability, patrolling and integral mortar support. The detail organizational structure of a Division Support Battalion is given at Annex K. 39. Existing Arms and Equipment. In comparison with the authorization of

arms and equipment, at present the Division Support battalions of our army are with huge deficiency. Again the battalion has got neither organizational support nor equipped with required surveillance / reconnaissance devices. For example, the existing arms and equipment state of 29 Division Support battalion is given at Annex L.
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40.

Existing Method of Reconnaissance Operations by Division Support Battalion.

Division Support Battalion is a divisional resource for the formation commander. The battalion is entrusted with number of operational responsibilities both offensive and defensive. Carrying out reconnaissance operation is one of the principal tasks of it. But they seldom employed to perform such task due to many reasons. The Support

Companies are break down into Composite Platoons and can be employed independently. But they do not carry out reconnaissance operation independently. They also form part of Covering Troops along with Armour and carry out reconnaissance tasks. As flank protection party and rear area security, they also carry out limited reconnaissance activities16. In fact, in real sense, the reconnaissance operation is not practiced in our army. Weaknesses of Reconnaissance Operation in Bangladesh Army 41. At present, the soldiers of Reconnaissance Troop of Armoured Regiment or

Division Support Battalion bear a very hazy concept of reconnaissance operation. Many of our officers and men feel the reconnaissance is a highly technical matter and it requires some technical personnel to handle. As a result, we have not been able to evolve an effective reconnaissance system for our army. Due to lack of clear concept, co-ordination and synchronization of available assets, we have not been able to devise any effective procedure. More so, our army does not have any dedicated cell or organization responsible for reconnaissance. Some of the impediments of

reconnaissance operation are mentioned as below: a. Employment Difficulties. In Bangladesh perspective with existing

resources, reconnaissance elements cannot perform its tasks efficiently. Existing reconnaissance vehicles are not suitable for cross country mobility. The movement restricts in roads and tracks. More so, during monsoon even these roads and tracks at times get boggy. In most cases in the Winter Collective Training (WCT) Reconnaissance Troop or division support elements is exercised as part of covering troop battle or as flank guard. Due to shortage of vehicles often foot drill is conducted. Due to non availability of any surveillance devices
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and effective communication means they cannot even perform its basic taskintelligence gathering and pass back the same. Other operational employment like anti heliborne operation, escort duties, route reconnaissance, establishment of road blocks etcetera cannot also be practiced due to shortage of integral resources. b. Age Old Arms and Equipment. To know the difficulties a mail

survey was conducted among the Commanding Officers and Squadron Commanders of the armour regiments (detail questionnaires are given in Annex M). An analysis has been made to find out the operational efficiency level of the Reconnaissance Troop with existing state. The data given in Table 2 has been converted to operational efficiency. Out of total 100 points 30 points each has been assigned to the weapon (RR and MG) and 20 points has been assigned to RR Jeep and MG Jeep respectively. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the comparative state of operational efficiency of Reconnaissance Troop of different armour units. Bengal UNIT Cavalry 4 Horse 7 Horse 9 Bengal 12 Lancers Efficiency 30 30 0.00 0.00 60.00

6 Cavalry Lancers

Equipment/Vehicle Efficiency 106 mm RR 7.62 mm MG RR Jeep MG Jeep TOTAL 20 30 6.67 0.00 56.67

Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 30 30 10 0.00 70.00 25 30 10 0.00 65.00 30 30 0.00 0.00 60.00 30 30 6.67 0.00 66.67

Table 2: A Comparative State of Operational Efficiency of Reconnaissance Troop (Source: Primary Data)
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80 70 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 106 mm RR 7.62 mm MG RR Jeep MG Jeep Total Combat Efficiency 56.67 65 60 66.67 60

Figure 2 :Comparative analysis- Efficiency level of Reconnaissance Troop Vehicles available in the units are age old and at the verse of obsolescence. A mail survey was conducted to have an analytical view on the performance of existing vehicles. Out of many weaknesses three key weaknesses were found to be obvious; lack of cross country mobility, lack of armour protection and poor technical performance. This soft skinned vehicle is not suitable for carrying of ammunition. Being driven by petrol this vehicle consumes lot of fuel. Existing RR jeeps are very light in weight and the load distribution of mounted RR is not equal. As such it cannot adopt required fire position specially if there is any gradient. This vehicle has no night driving capability. Table 3 and Figure 3 present few of the mentionable weaknesses those were obtained from the survey according to their priority. Priority has been multiplied by the value 3, 2 and 1 respectively to get the total value.

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Weakness Priority Category 1 Response Value Lack of Protection Lack of Cross Country Mobility Poor Performance Lack Device Lack of Night Fighting Capability Petrol Driven Very Light and less Load Capacity 1 2 5 5 7 3 1 9 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 13 8 of Surveillance 1 3 2 4 3 3 10 Technical 2 6 2 4 2 2 12 3 9 2 4 1 1 14 3 9 2 Value 4 1 Value 1 14 2 3 Total Value

Table 3: Priority of Weaknesses RR Jeep (Source: Primary Data)

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Lack of Protection 7 8 Poor Technical Performance Lack of Surveillance Device 13 14 Lack of Night Fighting Capability Petrol Driven 10 12 Very Light and less Load Capacity 14 Lack of Cross Country Mobility

Figure 3: Priority of Weakness RR Jeeps c. Lack in Communication. Reconnaissance element cannot perform

its task due to lack of communication equipment. Over the years this has been felt badly but nothing was done. Being mobile and operating at longer distance reconnaissance elements needed its integral communication facilities. The survey clearly revealed that with existing communication arrangements reconnaissance elements cannot perform its operational tasks in any way. While operating in conjunction with covering troops reconnaissance elements cannot maintain the communication with rear elements due to lack of compatible sets. For operational purpose they may have to be self sustained for a certain period of times. Without the integral communication facilities this is also not possible. d. logistic Difficulties. Since there is no specific policy or guidelines for

the logistics of reconnaissance elements, logistics has been always an area of concern. The nature of operation of Reconnaissance Troop varies from the squadron operation. But the logistic is planned in the same way of squadron which at times does not suit the requirements of Reconnaissance Troop. Majority of the respondents in the survey opined that with existing set up
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Reconnaissance Troop cannot be logistically supported effectively. Carriage of ammunition with the integral vehicle will not be possible. Repair and recovery in the forward area remains a problem. If the reconnaissance element is widely dispersed the problem of logistic will be rather aggravated. Over the years reconnaissance element has been facing acute shortage of vehicles and equipment. As such logistic feasibility of the reconnaissance element could hardly be tested on ground. Whatever logistic arrangement is made is based on basically experience and assumptions. e. Difficulties in Trainings. Due to the shortage of vehicles and

equipment on ground the troops could never be trained efficiently. There is no prcis on the subject. The quality of the unit instructors has been poor since no formal training on reconnaissance tactics is imparted to them at any stage of their military career. Though in the training instructions emphasis is given to maintain the crews intact, in reality this is seldom possible due to the shortage of manpower and overwhelming commitments in the units. In many cases this is limited to some foot drills which do not give the actual flavour in anyway. Figure 4 shows the major impediments of the training of Reconnaissance Troop.

Figure 4: Training Impediments Reconnaissance Troop(Source: Primary Data)

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f.

Budget Constrains for Military Procurement.

Approximate army

budget for few financial years are appended below: Serial Financial Year Total Budget (in Crores) 2001-2002 1968.19 360 18.29 Army Procurement Percentage of total Budget Budget Procurement for

2. 3. 4. 5.

2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006

2222.89 2264.05 2452.25 2482.17

392.64 360.07 420 243.912

17.66 15.90 17.13 9.83

Table-4 : Budget Allocations on Procurement Head The military budget for the fiscal year 2008-2009 were Tk. 6400 crores, out of which 85 per cent will be expended for the pay and allowances and paying the pension of retired persons. Army shares 55 per cent of the total defence budget out of which only 10 per cent is available for procurement and unit raising head. Rest amount of budget is spent on pay and allowances, food, ordnance items, minor works, miscellaneous expenditure and MES project works. Thus it will not be possible to buy reconnaissance and surveillance equipment at a time.

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CHAPTER IV:OPTIMUM CAPABILITIES THAT BANGLADESH ARMY REQUIRES ON RECONNAISSANE OPERATIONS IN LIGHT OF ITS MISSION AND PERCEIVED THREATS
42. Mission of Bangladesh Army . The primary mission of the Army is to

provide necessary forces and capabilities in support of Bangladesh's security and defense strategies including defense of the nation's territorial integrity against external attack. 43. Bangladesh Armys Perceived Threats. The India-Bangladesh border is

porous. It runs through rivers, ponds, agricultural fields, villages and even houses where the entrance is in India and the backdoor in Bangladesh. It is perhaps the most complex land border anywhere in the world.

Figure 5 : The Map of Bangladesh A countrys land defence policy should be based on her geographical location. By location, Bangladesh stands in a very vulnerable location. Its three sides (west, north
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and north-east) are surrounded by India and at south-east is Myanmar. The Bay of Bengal at her south. So the land defence concept of Bangladesh should be based on guarding all the prominent approaches from India and Myanmar. Hilli-Bogra-Dhaka and Jessore-faridpur-dhaka from the west, Dinajpur-Bogra-Dhaka and Jamalpur-TangailDhaka from the north are some of the significant approaches from boarder. Again two important rivers-River Jamuna running from north and River Padma running from west got vital role in planning countrys defence strategy. On the other side, Chittagong Hill Tracts, which is one tenth of the total size of the country, with its enormous natural resources and strategic geographic location is vital for the existence of Bangladesh. Taking advantage of geographic proximity to its Tripura state and the desire of the local Chakma tribes for greater autonomy with an ultimate goal of creating Jumma landan independent state for Chakmas--- India used its military and intelligence resources to provide help and support to Shanti Bahini. So Bangladesh Army is forced to pay her key attention in dominating Hill Tracts. Finally, the centre of gravity for Bangladesh is Dhaka. From border all communication links are ended at Dhaka. If Dhaka is collapse, the total national defence plan will collapse. So immediate threat may be developed from India and Myanmar border and all possible approaches up to Dhaka need to be brought under the overall defence plan of the country augmented by effective reconnaissance capabilities. Again Indian Armys supremacy in reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance operation poised additional threat against us. 44. Necessity of Reconnaissance Operation for Bangladesh. The Foreign

policy and the capability dictate Bangladesh Army as a defensive army. Bangladesh Army has very less fighting formations than needed for effective defence against likely threat in order to guard all the approaches as mentioned earlier. The army being a non mechanized army, would need longer NTM (notice to move) to readjust to def strategy/enemy's line of ingress. Besides, the formations have deep pocket of gap that has to be guarded for early warning. Being an inferior army, our army reserve is also small, hence earlier the early warning, better possibility to defend. Now, a very strong reconnaissance force can only meet the requirement of effective method of early warning. But unfortunately neither the concept of reconnaissance
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operation is clear to us nor do we have adequate reconnaissance force. So we need reconnaissance capability much more than what we have. 45. What Reconnaissance Capability Required By Bangladesh Army. The

terrain layout of Bangladesh is thickly vegetated, interspaced with cluster of villages and build up areas. Most of the areas have got very limited observation and field of fire except some areas of north-western part of the country (eg; Bogra, Rangpur, Dinajpur etc). Thus terrain itself provides restriction in carrying out detail reconnaissance operation. But keeping the necessity of reconnaissance operation in mind, all possible scopes need to be addressed. In Bangladesh terrain perspective, close

reconnaissance may be an option with highly equipped reconnaissance force. However, with sophisticated long range reconnaissance/surveillance equipment the extent can be increased up to medium reconnaissance. Since Bangladesh Army may not effort to have large reconnaissance force, therefore, small reconnaissance detachment may be effective in conducting reconnaissance by fire. On the other hand, in order to have detail reconnaissance for a particular area, cross country maneuverability is a must. A light weight track vehicle or Armoured Personal Carrier (APC) with firepower and armour protection can be very effective over ours soft terrain. As it is a close terrain, the Ariel reconnaissance can be very effective for gathering information of enemy and terrain with the help of Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV). Finally, night vision capability will definitely enable our army to conduct reconnaissance operation at night.

CHAPTER V: MEASURES OF IMPROVEMENT IN CAPABILITIES OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS OF BANGLADESH ARMY FROM DOCTRINAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND TRAINING PERSPECTIVES
46. Modification in Organizational Structure. Present organizational structure does not support the task of reconnaissance for broader aspects. In order to get the optimum performance from our troops involved in reconnaissance, we need to modify our existing organizational structure. Either we may strengthen them in terms of
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manpower and equipment keeping under same ORBAT, or a dedicated force may be there entirely for reconnaissance operation which many modern armies are following. This research paper intends to give two options in this regard. Option-1 will suggest about a dedicated Reconnaissance Regiment composed of both Armour and Mechanized Infantry as a division unit. On the other hand, option-2 will suggest strengthening the existing organogram of Armour Reconnaissance Troop and Division Support Battalion. In the Reconnaissance Regiment, there will be three Reconnaissance Companies. Each company comprising two Tank troops and two Mechanized Infantry Platoons. The details of Reconnaissance Regiment are explained by Annex N and P. In option-2, there will be a reconnaissance squadron instead of a troop under Armour Regiment like other Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) Squadrons. The reconnaissance squadron will be composed of four troops and equipped with APC or BMP-2 instead of age old RR Jeep. The details are shown as Annex Q. Option-2 will also suggest the modification of existing Division Support Battalion by having one Reconnaissance Company and three support companies instead of four support companies. The reconnaissance company will have 14 APC / BMP-2 instead of MG and RR Jeep. The details of proposed organizational structure of Division Support Battalion are given at Annex R. 47. Inclusion of Modern Reconnaissance/Surveillance Equipment. Protection,

mobility and firepower are the three basic requirements for effective reconnaissance force. Existing Recoilless Rifle (RR) with its jeep and Machine Gun (MG) are obsolete with no armour protection and less fire power. So, we may include BMP-2 instead of age old RR, MG and RR Jeep (Details of BMP-2 is given at Annex S). As per proposed organogram a reconnaissance Regiment will have total 17 BMP-2s (APC) beside 18 tanks, while in option-2, reconnaissance squadron will get total 9 and reconnaissance company of Division Support Battalion will get 14 BMP-2s. Enhancing the surveillance capability is also required for effective reconnaissance operation especially at night. Therefore we can plan to procure Night Vision Goggles (NVG), Weapon Sights, Night Vision Device (NVD), Binocular and Short Range Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR), Sensors etc phase wise as per priority. As a long term mission we can plan for Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) (Details on UAV are given at Annex T) and Remotely Controlled Piloted Vehicle (RPV) (Details on RPV are given at Annex U). Likely allotment of various reconnaissance / surveillance equipment are given below based on option 1 and 2 :
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a. Reconnaissance Regiment (Option 1). Serial Sub Unit Types of Equipment Scale Minimum (a) 1. (b) Regiment Headquarter (c) Night Vision Binocular Night Vision Goggles 2. Company Headquarter Night Vision Binocular Night Vision Goggles 3. 2 X Tank Night Vision Binocular Night Vision Goggles Portable Sensors Digital 2* 6** 6** ** One in all 2* 2* 2* 6** 8** 8** Tanks. *One each Platoon. 2* 8** 8** ** One in each 2* 8** BMP-2. in the 2* 2* 6** 6** *One each Troop. in 1 1 1 1 (d) 2 2 Maximum (e) 2 2 (f) Remarks

Troop

Route 2*

Reconnaissance Box Mobile Security Kit 4. 2 X Night Vision Binocular Night Vision Goggles Portable Sensors Digital

Mechanized Infantry Platoon

Route 2*

Reconnaissance Box Mobile Security Kit

Table 5 : Proposed Scale of Reconnaissance / Surveillance Devices-Reconnaissance Regiment

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b. Serial

Reconnaissance Squadron of Armoured Regiment (Option 2). Sub Unit Types of Equipment Scale Minimum Maximum (e) 1 1 (f) Remarks

(a) 1.

(b) Headquarter

(c) Night Vision Binocular

(d) 1 1

Reconnaissa Night Vision nce Squadron 3. 4 X Night Vision Binocular Goggles

4* 4*

8** 8**

*One each Troop.

in

Reconnaissa Night Vision -nce Troop Goggles Portable Sensors Digital

4*

8** 8** ** One in each

Route 4*

Reconnaissance Box Mobile Security Kit 4* 8**

section.

Table 6 : Proposed Scale of Reconnaissance / Surveillance Devices-Reconnaissance Squadron

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c. Reconnaissance Company of Division Support Battalion (Option 2).

Serial

Sub Unit

Types Equipment

of Scale Minimum (d) Vision 1 Maximum (e) 1

Remarks

(a) 1.

(b) Company Headquarter

(c) Night Binocular Night Vision Goggles

(f)

3.

X Night Binocular

Vision 3*

12**

*One in each

Reconnaissance Platoon

Night Vision Goggles

3*

12**

Platoon.

Portable Sensors 3* Digital Route 3*

12** 12**

** in

Four each

Reconnaissance Box Mobile Kit Table 7: Security 3* 12**

platoon.

Proposed Scale of Reconnaissance / Surveillance Devices-Reconnaissance Company

48.

Implementation Schedule.

For implementing the above mentioned scale

huge amount of money will be required. But due to the fund limitation, procurement will not be possible within one or two fiscal year. As such, to develop our reconnaissance capability gradually we need to induct the proposed devices. The induction can be done phase wise. The following schedule is not likely to strain the annual budget but allow a gradual and viable implementation of proposed scale:

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a.

Phase 1 1st 5 Year. Unit / Sub Unit (b) Reconnaissance Regiment / Squadron / Company Equipment (c) Night Binocular Night Vision Goggles Portable Sensors Digital Minimum 3 rd Year 4th Year Minimum 2nd Year Scale (d) Vision Minimum Year (e) 1st Year

Serial (a) 1.

Route Minimum

Reconnaissance Box Mobile Security Kit Minimum 5th Year

Table 8 : Proposed Implementation Schedule of Surveillance Devices b. Phase 2 2nd 5 Year. In the second five years of implementation

schedule, the aim should be providing maximum scale (at least more than minimum scale) of each device. Priority of devices will be same like phase 1. 49. Budget Management. Having discussed the requirement of technology

based reconnaissance operation for Bangladesh Army, it is obvious that financial constrain shall not permit us to achieve the required reconnaissance and surveillance devices over a period. Hence, the provisioning of budget should be arranged from various sources so that requirement can be met gradually. More so, the present sociopolitical situation and economy shall not permit Army to obtain additional budget for procuring such instruments. As such, the most viable option is to cut short the maintenance expenditure in order to provision money for the induction of modern reconnaissance / surveillance devices phase wise. For this, a master plan should be
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made to scrutinize the feasibility of induction of those items phase wise and as per priority in the formation. 50. Training Facilities. An effective training curriculum is essential for

reconnaissance operation. The training package should cover use of all available resources to get maximum output. Troops involved in reconnaissance operation must have a clear understanding about the concept of the operation. At the same time they should be efficient in handling of all available reconnaissance and surveillance equipment they have. To do that, the training of both armour (may be Reconnaissance Squadron / Troop) and Division Support Battalion (may be Reconnaissance Company) need a radical change. Effective training will only be possible if they have their organic vehicles and equipment in full strength and operational. Training should start with the planning at all levels keeping in mind the likely employments in different operations. Necessary guidelines about the training should be covered in details in the training instructions. Objectives for the training should be mission oriented and attainable. 51. A detail syllabus is a must for a complete training. The syllabus should include

technical subjects on weapons, vehicles, equipment and reconnaissance / surveillance devices. More emphasize should be placed on practical handling and maintenance of the equipment. Subjects on Reconnaissance Battalion/Squadron/Company Tactics should cover its possible employments in all operations of war. Theoretical classes on tactics should preferably be followed by small demonstration at unit level. All the battle drills should be covered in the syllabus. Important aspects like surveillance, communication, movements, night operations and air defence should get equal importance. A probable list of subjects for the syllabus is given in Annex V. 52. For ensuring effective training, a clear guideline or reference materials is

required. So to conduct the classes effectively, prcis and pamphlets on Reconnaissance Tactics are essentials. These should be composed as soon as possible and issued to the armoured units / Division Support Battalions so that the entire lesson plans can be prepared accordingly. Technical subjects and

Reconnaissance Tactics should be covered in different prcis. Cycle Ending Exercise

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for the Reconnaissance Battalion/Company should be well planned. All the battle drills and employment in different operations should be practiced during the exercise. Every effort should be made to ensure that crews act as they would in war. 53. Qualified instructor is one of the prerequisite for effective training. So, respective

arms school to take the responsibilities of producing instructor for the units. The qualified instructors to take the classes at unit level during group training in every training cycle. There should be combined reconnaissance training for armour and support elements and at the end field training exercise is required for better assimilation. Young officers should be trained on basic reconnaissance tactics in their basic course. The training may be augmented further during the mid career course. Simulator training will add realism to the theoretical lessons. Having simulator in every armoured unit may not be financially viable. 54. Employment Concept of Reconnaissance Force. In option 1, each Infantry

brigade of a formation will be provided with a reconnaissance Company (Manpower120, 3 X Tanks, 5 X BMP-2s) and option 2 offers an Infantry brigade with one reconnaissance troop and one reconnaissance platoon (Manpower-16+37=53, 2+4=6 X BMP-2s). So option 1 enables the commander to employ more troops. Whatever may be the number of reconnaissance force, the employment concept remains same in both the cases. Though we employ reconnaissance elements in offensive operation, it is a grey area in defensive operation. We need to place number of small reconnaissance detachments in between Border guard post and delay battle elements (Covering Troops/Advance Position). The entire front of the brigade defence to be covered by number of reconnaissance elements by placing them in different NAIs. In a close

terrain they may be tasked to carry out silent reconnaissance or reconnaissance by fire and pass back information immediate to delay elements and then to main defensive location. They can occupy positions in between delay lines of Covering Troops and maintain contact with the enemy. Separate reconnaissance elements may be planned at the flank for early warning.

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Figure 6 : Employment concept of Reconnaissance Force in defensive operation 55. may Proposed Method of Carrying out Reconnaissance Operation. be the organogram (Reconnaissance Whatever of

Regiment/Squadron/Company)

reconnaissance force, it has to perform several tasks in defensive or offensive operations. The nature of tasks may vary in different types of operations. The tasks may include surveillance, delay action, target acquisition, fire control, reconnaissance of manoeuvre space and control measures, flank screen, depth operation, rear area security etc. The proposed method of performing different tasks by reconnaissance force in different operations are explained as below : a. Defence. During defence, reconnaissance force may perform the

following tasks :
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(1)

Surveillance Tasks.

Surveillance tasks may include the

observation of enemy positions and predicted enemy positions and routes (eg. NAIs, TAIs and decision points). The aim of these tasks could include the identification of the enemys rate of advance, axes and main forces as part of the battle group Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP). Surveillance tasks may be related to the security of the battle group by observation of flanks, gaps and depth areas. A small detachment may perform the task ahead of main defence location. (2) Guard Force Action. Close reconnaissance troop/platoon may

mount an effective guard force action. As such they may be used to cause early attrition to the enemy; to force the enemy into early deployment; protect the main force by gaining time; and protect the main force from enemy ground force observation, direct fire and surprise attack. Such an action is likely to require the close reconnaissance troop/platoon to be mobile and, especially in a delaying action, provided with a mission related to time. During a guard force action the close reconnaissance troop/platoon should, unless specifically tasked

otherwise, continue with its primary role, that of observation and reporting. The task organization for the guard force role will be dependent upon the specific threat faced by the battle group. The guard force must have a designated commander which could be the close reconnaissance troop/platoon commander. (3) Target Acquisition. Close reconnaissance may be well suited to

acquire targets resulting from the IPB and opportunity targets. Once targets are acquired they can be engaged or, more likely, reported to other assets within the battle group for them to engage. In defence and delay operations, the deployment of the close reconnaissance

troop/platoon must be linked to the battle group STAP.

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(4)

Fire Control.

Close reconnaissance forces may be trained to

control indirect and direct fire battle group assets. To that end they may always work within range of battle group close support indirect fire assets and be allocated an appropriate priority to call for fire. (5) Rear Area Security. With inherent mobility and communications,

the close reconnaissance troop/platoon may be used to provide rear area security. This task could involve the surveillance of likely enemy approach routes into battle group rear areas to counter heliborne, air-landed or special force operations. (6) Liaison. Close reconnaissance troop/platoons may provide

liaison with flanking and rear units. Their mobility, communications and knowledge of the battle group concept of operations makes them particularly suitable for this task. They may be tasked to liaise with other HQs, sub units or to man coordination points. (7) Deception. Battle group commanders may wish to create

deception to conceal real intentions. Reconnaissance forces may be used to enhance the deception plan, possibly operating in an area where the enemy may expect to encounter reconnaissance troop operations but which the battle group commander is not going to use. b. Offence. (1) Surveillance Tasks. Surveillance tasks may include the

observation of enemy positions including withdrawal and reinforcement routes. They may also include surveillance of proposed battle group manoeuvre space or control points such as proposed FUPs, fire base and assembly areas. (2) Close Target Reconnaissance (CTR). This is the provision of

detailed information on a specific enemy target. Information gained must

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include size, including depth, breadth and flank security composition. It also includes information such as defences, strong points, gaps and observation. A CTR relies upon stealth and should avoid being compromised. A CTR may gain information from a reconnaissance close to the target, well sited standoff operations or a combination of both. (3) Locating the Enemy. Locating the enemy can be effected as a

result of specific information/intelligence or as part of a planned operation. Once contact has been made, it must be maintained or handed over to another force or unit. (4) (5) (6) Target Acquisition. Fire Control. Same as defence operation.

Same as defence operation.

Reconnaissance of Manoeuvre Space. This could include

information on size/space (with a resultant effect upon formation), going, observation, security and cover. In certain circumstances such

reconnaissance may result in routes, breach sites, defiles etc being physically marked. It may be appropriate to group specialist personnel (e.g assault troops/pioneers/engineer reconnaissance) with the

reconnaissance troop/platoon for this task. (7) Establish Depth Operations. Close reconnaissance forces

may play a valuable part in battle group offensive operations by the provision of deep operations. These can report on and/or engage enemy reinforcements or the enemy in the withdrawal. They may be sited to observe likely reinforcement/withdrawal routes. (8) Flank Screen. Close reconnaissance may provide the

security element to observe, identify and report information on the flanks of the battle group. With a change of grouping the screen force can be

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turned into a guard force with the ability to provide aggressive protective fire while at the same time observing and reporting information. c. Advance to Contact. A well protected highly mobile reconnaissance

force equipped with NVD/NVG, portable sensors, security/surveillance kit etc is very effective during advance operation. The use of UAV/RPV will provide good intelligence to formulate/alter the plan. (1) Screen Force. Though the concept of screen force is not there

in our doctrine, the role may be best performed by reconnaissance small detachment. Reconnaissance troop/platoon (may be reconnaissance section) can be deployed ahead of mobile troops to provide information on the enemy, especially information regarding the suitability of routes for the advance as well as the identification of observations/gaps.

(2)

Covering Troops. Reconnaissance force can mount an effective

covering troops action. They can be used as both mobile troops and flank guard. They need to be equipped with surveillance devices to locate enemy, maintain contact and counter enemy reconnaissance capability. The protection and firepower will allow them to cause attrition to the enemy and provide security to the main body.

(3)

Route Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance troops can be used to

reconnaissance routes for the advance. This could include obtaining information on size/space, going, observation, security and cover. Once identified,routes, breach sites, defiles, etc, may require marking which can be completed by the close reconnaissance troop/platoon although it may be appropriate to group specialist personnel (eg assault

troops/pioneers/engineer reconnaissance) with the reconnaissance for this task.

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(4)

NBC Reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance force is not limited

to identifying and marking NBC contaminated areas but can also be tasked to find clear routes for battle group sub units to move along. d. Withdrawal. The complex withdrawal operation demands maximum

information regarding enemy and terrain throughout the breadth of the operation. Reconnaissance force can be employed to perform various tasks at different stages of the operation:

(1)

Prior to Commencement of Withdrawal. Gaining maximum

information regarding enemy and assessing the situation is very important before carrying out withdrawal operation. At the same time anti reconnaissance activity is important to deny own intention to the enemy. Aerial reconnaissance with the help of UAV/RPV can be of great help. Reconnaissance troop/platoons can be used for reconnaissance and to assess the suitability of routes, check points, RVs, embussing points, replenishment locations etc and can be used to mark a route physically and, using their good communications, be part of a traffic Control organization.

(2)

During Withdrawal Operations.

Reconnaissance

force

can

mount an effective delay operation during withdrawal in the form of covering troops. During withdrawal, the tasks may include flank protection also. Reconnaissance platoon with surveillance devices can provide early warning regarding enemy approach. The close reconnaissance

troop/platoon can provide a number of patrols to conduct guidance for battle group sub unit rear reconnaissance parties or sub units themselves. Guide tasks may include rearward movement, especially in the area of Check Points, RVs and/or observations and defiles, or relocation at the new battle group positions.

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56.

Comparison Between Suggested Options. a. Serial (a) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Tank BMP-2 (APC) Night Vision Binoculars Night Vision Goggles Portable Sensors Digital Route Reconnaissance Box Mobile Security Kit Requirement of Arms and Equipment. Item (b) Option 1 (c) 18 17 7 7 4 4 4 Option 2 (d) Nil 23 9 9 7 7 7

b. Additional Manpower Requirement. Option 1 Option 1 requires one Option 2 additional Option 2 requires additional only 34 of 460 manpower in Armour regiment (35 to for converting reconnaissance

reconnaissance

regiment

manpower in each division. It demands 69) huge monetary support.

troop into a reconnaissance squadron and additional 10 manpower in Division Support Battalion (829 to 839) for converting one support company in to a reconnaissance company.

c. Command and Control. Option 1 Option 1 is a combination of both Option 2 Option 2 does not offer any

Armour and Infantry elements, thus combination of fighting elements. Thus formulating a command structure and integral chain of command can be maintaining a chain of command might easily maintained. be a challenge.
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d. Budget Allocation. Option 1 Option 2

Option 1 requires 14 additional tanks Option 2 requires no additional tank along with 17XBMP-2s. But the but 23XBMP-2s. But the requirement

requirement of reconnaissance devices of reconnaissance devices is more. As is comparatively less than option 2. a whole, more budgets need to be allocated for implementing option 1.

e. Training Facilities. Option 1 Joint training can be conducted as Training reconnaissance force will represent a separately Option 2 need for to both be conducted and

Armour

single unit. Better affiliation among the division support elements, thus lack in troops can be generated. affiliation.

f. Cooperation and Coordination. Option 1 Option 2

As operationally and administratively it Blending two separate unit elements is a single unit, better cooperation and into one in war time is really a coordination are expected both in challenge. It requires lot of cooperation peace and war. and coordination during peace time.

57.

Findings of Comparisons. a. Option 1 requires more budgetary support to implement as increased

number of additional manpower and arms and equipment specially 18 tanks. Thus option 2 can be implemented with comparatively less economical effort. b. c. Command and control will be easier in option 2. Training impediments of option 2 need to be addressed during peace time

by conducting number of joint training.

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d.

The lack of cooperation and coordination of option 2 need to be overcome

by maintaining good affiliation during peace time. e. Monetary consideration is the principle factor for any implementation plan;

other short comings may be negotiated by sincere effort. At the end, option 2 may be considered as implementable better option. CHAPTER VI : CONCLUSIONS 58. Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of

reconnaissance operation. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential to win the battle. Our own military history contains many examples where knowledge of the enemy, or lack of knowledge, directly led to victory or defeat. The role of reconnaissance has not changed on the modern battlefield; if anything, it has become even more important. A good reconnaissance effort is critical to successful defensive or offensive operation. On the other hand, a poor reconnaissance effort almost guarantees defeat for the commander. So, in order to domain the battlefield and get the victory, we should have comprehensive knowledge on reconnaissance operation, enough and effective modern reconnaissance equipment, a supporting organizational structure, training facilities and finally practicable employment concept of

reconnaissance force. 59. While carrying out reconnaissance operation, the basic fundamentals, ie;

maximum reconnaissance force forward, maintaining contact with the enemy, developing the situation and rapid flow of information etc are to be followed. For

effective execution, we need to have comprehensible idea on different type and method/technique of reconnaissance operation. 60. Reconnaissance operation in Bangladesh context is quite different than other

countries. The geographical characteristics have significant impact on countrys land defence. The peculiar land border, presence of rivers and hills made it a defence paradise. But being an inferior defensive force, Bangladesh Army needs to have strong reconnaissance force for early warning and have sufficient time for counter measure.
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The terrain layout does not allow conducting long range reconnaissance operation. A small close reconnaissance group equipped with modern equipment can be very effective against overwhelming threat. Taking the advantage of cover and concealment the reconnaissance force can be well forward and maintain contact with the enemy. 61. Analyzing the present concept of reconnaissance operation it is found that, the

existing capability of our reconnaissance force is quite meagre to meet the requirements. The Reconnaissance Troop of armoured regiment is usually employed in its classical role of intelligence collection and passes back the same as part of any offensive or defensive operation. Reconnaissance Troop of armoured regiment is comprised of six 106 mm RRs and six 7.62 mm MGs on vehicle mounted. These are soft skinned vehicles. All the Reconnaissance Troops of armoured regiments in Bangladesh have major deficiencies in terms of its manpower, vehicles and equipment. None of them has full strength. Available RR mounted jeeps are at the verge of obsolescence. They lack in cross country mobility and cannot carry the load of RR in undulating ground. None of these vehicles has crew protection. These also lack in modern surveillance devices and night operation capability. Shortage of manpower is another major weakness. With these deficiencies Reconnaissance Troop will not be able to perform its tasks efficiently. On the other hand, the organizational structure of Division Support Battalion does not fully support to perform the role of it. While carrying out reconnaissance operation, at times it needs to be involved in limited offensive operation. So for a good reconnaissance, it demands adequate manpower with good armour protection, mobility and sufficient firepower. But the battalion as a whole lack in armour protection, assaulting capability, patrolling and integral mortar support. Each support company is comprised with Machine gun(6 MG), Recoilless rifle(6 RR) and Light machine gun (12 LMG) platoon having no special reconnaissance vehicle or equipment. Similarly, there are other grey areas or impediments for conducting successful reconnaissance operation, ie; due to age old arms and equipment, the combat efficiency of Reconnaissance Troop of six armoured regiments range from only 56.67 to 70.00 out of 100. Amongst eight weaknesses of our existing RR Jeep, lack of protection and lack of cross country mobility are identified as priority ones. Though
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communication is the most important aspect for reconnaissance force to be operationally efficient, Reconnaissance Troop does not have any integral

communication means. At the moment with existing resources unit tries to manage the communication. Logistically Reconnaissance force should be self sustained for a limited period of time as it would operate well ahead of the area of operation. Ironically, in the present system this would be difficult with the bare minimum logistic resource of the unit for both Armoured Regiment and Division support Battalion. As

Reconnaissance Troop has always been facing acute shortage of vehicles and equipment, logistic feasibility of the Reconnaissance Troop could never be tested on ground. Training of the reconnaissance force is another major weak area. Since the concept of reconnaissance operation is not crystal clear and not familiar to us, therefore there is no specific training of reconnaissance operation. In Armoured Regiment, though a complete training cycle is allotted for the reconnaissance troop, in most cases this cannot bring desired output due to lack of operationally fit equipment, qualified instructors and prcis on the relevant subjects. All these impediments confirm the need for modification of reconnaissance operation of Bangladesh Army. 62. To draw the comparison, the capability and method of reconnaissance operation

of Indian, Pakistan, German and US Armies are considered. In Indian Army, each Armoured Division has got Reconnaissance and Support Battalion (comprising one medium tank squadron, one BMP company and one wheel reconnaissance vehicle company), six tank regiments (45 tanks) and four BMP Battalions. The Army at present is using many modern devices; ie, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle, Mini Drones, Robotic Vehicle, Reconnaissance Satellite etc. Armour, Light Anti Tank(LAT) and Heavy Anti Tank(HAT) Regiments are the key elements for reconnaissance operation of Pakistan Army. Each Infantry Division has got one Armour Regiment and one LAT Regiment. On the other hand, for nine corps, there are nine HAT Regiments (APC borne). Besides, there are two Armoured Divisions and eight Independent Armoured Brigades. Above all, there are three/four Reconnaissance

regiments that all are involved in reconnaissance operation. In US Army, there is a dedicated Reconnaissance Battalion having three reconnaissance companies and a
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tank company. The companies are well equipped with modern surveillance devices and both wheel and track vehicles. Thus the reconnaissance capability of Bangladesh Army is insufficient in comparison to other countries as mentioned. 63. For ensuring effective reconnaissance operation, existing organizational

structure needs to be revised and the manpower should be increased may be by introducing a dedicated Reconnaissance Regiment composed of both Armour and Mechanized Infantry as a divisional unit or by strengthening the existing organogram of Armour Reconnaissance Troop and Division Support Battalion. Existing vehicles should be replaced immediately by modern wheeled or tracked or mix vehicles having better cross country mobility, fire power, crew protection and night operation capabilities. Operationally and financially viable surveillance and observation equipment may be authorized in the TO&E. Vehicle mounted communication sets should be authorized. In addition, handheld walkie-talkie sets can be issued to communicate within the troop and in shorter range. To be logistically self sufficient additional vehicles like 3 Tons may be authorized. Small detachment of A echelons can be grouped with the troop. A light repair team may also be grouped for immediate maintenance. Inclusion of modern equipment is a must. BMP-2 can easily replace age old RR and MG jeep. We can procure Night Vision Goggles, Weapon Sights, Night Vision Device, Binocular and Short Range Ground Surveillance Radar, Sensors etc phase wise as per priority. As a long term mission we can plan for Unmanned Ariel Vehicle etc. But the budgetary constraint of us needs to be overcome. The most viable option is to cut short the maintenance expenditure in order to provision money for the induction of modern reconnaissance / surveillance devices phase wise. Most importantly, the employment concept for reconnaissance force needs to be revised. In defence, reconnaissance force must operate well ahead close to the border. They can be employed for surveillance Tasks, Guard Force Action, target acquisition, fire control, rear area security, liaison etc. For attack, they can be employed for Close Target

Reconnaissance (CTR), Locating the Enemy, target acquisition, fire control, reconnaissance of manoeuvre space, establish depth operations , flank screen etc.
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Similarly, reconnaissance force can be effectively involved in advance and withdrawal operation also.

CHAPTER - VII : RECOMMENDATIONS

64.

In order to conduct successful reconnaissance operation by Bangladesh Army

following recommendations may be considered for implementation: a. Existing organogram may be strengthen by having a Reconnaissance

Squadron instead of Reconnaissance Troop in Armoured Regiment and introducing a Reconnaissance Company instead of a Support Company in Division Support Battalion.(Option-2) b. c. Age old MG and RR Jeep may be replaced by BMP-2. To enhance surveillance capability, we may plan to procure Night Vision

Goggles (NVG), Weapon Sights, Night Vision Device (NVD), Binocular and Short Range Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR), Sensors etc phase wise as per priority. As a long term mission we may plan for Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) and Remotely Controlled Piloted Vehicle (RPV). d. To overcome the budgetary constraint we may cut short the maintenance

expenditure in order to provision money for the induction of modern reconnaissance / surveillance devices phase wise. e. A comprehensive joint training package on reconnaissance operation (for

Armour and Division Support elements) may be introduced at the division level. f. New GSTP/pamphlet covering details of reconnaissance operation may

be published that can support to formulate syllabus for reconnaissance training.

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g.

A combined reconnaissance force (Armour and Infantry) may be

employed well ahead in small groups for close reconnaissance operation. h. Reconnaissance force may be tasked to perform its classical role only

and not assigned with other defensive or offensive tasks.

AHMED MUSTAFA SYRUS

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