China as a SAARC Member: A Debate1 Abiderda Md.

Abdujjaher*

Abstract: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was founded in 1985 to enhance cooperation among the countries of South Asia in apolitical and areas of mutual interest. Since then, a little progress has been attained. Member Countries follow bilateral instead of multilateral solution to issues which also weakens the potentiality of SAARC. Given the condition of SAARC, there emerged a debate on the issue of Chinese inclusion in a SAARC as full-pledged member within academia and security analyst recently. The debate can be categorized into two broader areas-i) the supporter- arguing the Chinese membership will enhance economic benefit and mutual cooperation, therefore make SAARC more effective; ii) the opponent argues that Chinese inclusion will increase conflict and therefore, has the potential of making SAARC ineffective. In this perspective, this paper surveys and analyses both the views critically, and argues in favour of a third choice out of member vs. Not member debate. Introduction: South Asian economy is the least integrated among the regions of the world for politics and rivalries. However, if Indian trade with its neighbors reach levels last attained during the Raj, Indias powerful economy could help lift and transform its neighbors, creating the worlds fourth giant economic zone after the U.S., China, and the E.C. 2 The apprehension of this economic dynamics most probably has encouraged many countries to opt for observer status at SAARC i.e. the EU, Myanmar, China, Iran, Australia, the USA etc. What will be the future of these observer countries status has recently gained academic interest mostly in relation to China. Though there is no proposal to expand the membership of the group3, the debate of Chinese inclusion or not inclusion in SAARC has deep impetus. Scholars agree to disagree with the issue. The debate on giving the China full membership of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is primarily seen in the context of positive and negative thinking. While China has an observer status in SAARC, its case for full membership is primarily advocated by Nepal and Pakistan but not supported by India.4 In this perspective, this paper analyses the contesting arguments regarding Chinas full membership at SAARC and argues not to be so hurry to include or exclude Chinas fulltime membership option at SAARC and favors to follow wait and see approach. SAARC- An Overview: SAARC has set modest goals and tasks since its founding in 1985, recognizing and accepting the reality of conflicts, distrusts, fears, hatreds, the ideological and political divides that grip
* At the time of publishing the paper the author, Abiderda Md. Abdujjaher, was South Asia Foundation Scholar, UMISARC, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India-605014.
1

This paper was published by Annamalai University, India. To cite it, Abdujjaher, Abiderda Md. (2012). China as a SAARC Member: A Debate. In. Dr. D. Devanathan and Dr. S. Prabhakaran (ed.), Good Governance and Sustainable Development (p. 172-176). India: Annamalai University Press. 2 Stephen Cohen: Rethinking South Asia, available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/rethinking-southasia-5253 accessed on 08.01.2012 3 Iftikhar Gilani, India seeks better economic integration, connectivity, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws051111SAARC.asp 4 Moonis Ahmar (2011): China in Saarc? To What Effect?: A Pakistani Perspective, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 508-510

the region. But even the modest aims such as a common front against terrorism, creating the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), greater road, rail and river water connectivity for trade facilitation have been stymied, some by forces that remain anchored to ideologies and policies that are against collective security and regional order, others by the weight of conservatism and fear of the unknown.5 The contemporary relevance of SAARC depends on its success in transforming a distinct geographical and civilisational space, with several political units that are not cohesive and are yet to overcome the legacies of colonial rule, into an integrated, modern, prosperous and secure regional community.6 A regional order is more than a free trade area or an economic community. It is an alternative way of organising the inter-state system. In the South Asian context such an order has to be based on unity at the three levels of politics, economics and security.7 There is hostility between and among the countries of SAARC for economic, political and security related issues8 that imbue them to forge strategic alliances with outside powers such as China to counter and balance India. For this reason, the creation of harmony or conditions for regional cooperation in SAARC is absent. Moreover, member countries of SAARC follow bilateral policy to solve or bargain issues concerning the countries interest instead of multilateral SAARC platform that weakens SAARC effectiveness and opens way for external involvement. In addition, the two faults of SAARC charter handicap the success of the groupsi) decisions to be taken unanimously; and ii) bilateral issues cannot be discussed. Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nepal are very positive and proactive about making a success of the regional process where as India and Pakistan remains reluctant to make the forum success. India is much eager to ASEAN and Pakistan to Middle East. Building strong and stable democracies and effective governance, rule of law, tolerant societies and ethnic coexistence are fundamental to the growth of stable, secure and prosperous states in South Asia. These are the sine qua non for the building of SAARC as a progressive regional order that contributes to global security and prosperity rather than being a drag on it. Debating Chinas Membership at SAARC: The question of Chinese full membership in SAARC is debatable. They can be grouped as supporters and opponents. In the opponents category, Sujit Dutta (2011) believes that countries willing to counter- balance India want to include China at SAARC.9 He deems China as not being eligible to be a full member of a cohesive, secure and integrated democratic political order in South Asia. He adds that Chinas membership at SAARC will jeopardize the South Asian regionalism as China is the worlds largest authoritarian state and aids authoritarian regimes thereby bars democratization; not a market economy thus weak economy cannot be able to compete with China which will in turn make them raw material producing country and the process of industrialization will stop; has active territorial dispute with India and Bhutan, poses increasingly complex security challenges to India and the region. The China, Pakistan and Nepal Triangular special relation is directed against India; and Chinas entry will not change it. Therefore, Chinas entry into SAARC will not help the
5

Sujit Dutta (2011): China in SAARC? To What Effect?, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 493-501 Sujit Dutta, ibid, p. 494 7 Sujit Dutta, ibid, p. 494 8 To know the impeding issues and how they bar regional cooperation see Sujitt Dutta, ibid, p. 495-499 9 Sujit Dutta , ibid, p. 499
6

regional process. It will instead further complicate the efforts and wreck any hopes of building a cooperative neighbourhood.10 However, he admits that India and the other states of South Asia need a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with China as the Asias largest state and a rising power. But that does not entail its induction into SAARC. In the coming years as both India and China continue to rise and become major global players, the states of South Asia will have to make a few choices, not in terms of their bilateral political and economic ties, but in terms of their security ties, political trajectories, and regionalism. For SAARC to remain relevant and grow into a vibrant, progressive and stable regional order it is vital that it promotes all-round gains for the member states, including its core state, India. Attempts to undermine India by power politics and balance of power strategies, not only through bilateral strategic tie-ups but also by recasting the dynamics of the regional organisation that has struggled to survive under the weight of the contradictions among its members, can have only one effect the final wrecking of SAARC.11 Moonis Ahmar (2011), views that China shares its borders with five out of eight SAARC member states and has meaningful ties with all the South Asian countries. However, China is culturally and historically not connected with South Asia, therefore, it cannot claim membership in SAARC. Sharing of borders with some South Asian countries does not mean that China belongs to South Asia. Furthermore, if China is considered to be a full member of SAARC, regardless of its cultural and historical disorientation from South Asia, other countries located in the proximity of South Asia like Myanmar, Iran and the Central Asian States may also stake their claim to membership of SAARC. Yet in view of Chinas growing economic, trade, political, security and strategic interests in South Asia, its admission in SAARC is considered useful for the region by some states given the asymmetrical regional characteristics of South Asia.12

Smruti S. Pattanaik (2011) supports most of the points Prof Sujit Dutta (2011) propagated while disagrees the democratic criteria13 for being member of SAARC. Nonetheless, she added some more evidence against Chinas full time membership into SAARC. She has pointed out that China has actively supported Pakistan to keep India confined to the region. China has substantial trade with most of the countries of South Asia. Its membership of SAARC is not going to substantially change its economic engagement. Its military ties with countries in the region have India in the background. Chinas entry would make SAARC more dysfunctional in terms of power politics. However, her opinion of with or without SAARC (?), India has an interest in cultivating good relations with all its neighbours given the socio-economic structure and security dynamics disregard SAARC. At the end she seems to be very comfortable and tension free as India can impede Chinas entry by veto as SAARC charter urge decisions to be taken unanimously.14 S.D. Muni (2011) drawing the distinctiveness of SAARC from the ASEAN and the EU went on to argue that it is unrealistic to assume that economic performance of any regional grouping can be dissociated from its geo-strategic genealogy, economic fundamentals and

10 11

Sujit Dutta , ibid, p. 499-500 Sujit Dutta , ibid, p. 501 12 Moonis Ahmar (2011): China in Saarc? To What Effect?- A Pakistani Perspective, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 508-510 13 Discuused later 14 Smruti S. Pattanaik (2011): The Time is Not Ripe for China's Entry, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 517-518

political context.15 He argues the uneasy relation between India and Pakistan has affected SAARCs success while Pakistan bars the development of SAARC by terrorism as state policy, and India being reluctant of SAARC established BIMSTEC excluding Pakistan. 16 Indias reluctance is understood when it is seen that SAARC is not even mentioned in Indias grand strategy or foreign policy vision documents, policy statements of ministers, and election manifestos.17 Therefore, the inclusion of China into the SAARC process would further complicate the process. Chinese veto on regional development programmes might hamper the progress of the region because SAARC decisions are based on the unanimity principle. China has used this status to reinforce its strategic and economic presence in member countries without contributing towards regional integration. Before taking up the question of Chinas entry into SAARC as a member, the record of the past three years of its observer status should have been closely examined. It may also be relevant here to examine Chinas role in other regional groupings i.e. EAS. Moreover, Chinas entry into SAARC would hurt Indias interests and may also not be conducive to the growth of the regional organisation.18 However, Prof. S. D. Muni thinks that all SAARC members except India would welcome Chinas entry into SAARC to cash in on the competition between Asias two growing giant economies19. Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra (2011) argues that China should not be offered membership in SAARC on a platter. Serious research needs to be done to undertake a cost-benefit analysis. The membership decision ought to be positive only if the benefits outweigh the costs for South Asia in general, but India in particular. Appropriate criteria should also be evolved for a disciplined expansion of SAARC in the future.20 Dr. Sreeradha Datta (2006), argues that inclusion of observers might energize S.A.A.R.C. toward greater economic cooperation and positive dynamism within the member states and with the outside world, especially vis--vis the observers. It might even minimize political differences that often cloud its economic cooperation and progress. While all of these extraregional powers are economic powerhouses, their political calculations are different and often in competition. While all of them maintain close economic ties with India, some of them maintain political soft corners for states that at times have adversarial relations with New Delhi. The presence of such states, especially China, within its framework makes S.A.A.R.C. a potential playground for power politics.21 Chinas Membership at SAARC Supporting Arguments: Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladeshs Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujibs assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one
15
16

S.D. Muni (2011): China in SAARC? To What Effect? - A Comment, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 505-507 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 505-506 17 Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011), ibid, 515 18 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 506-507 19 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 506 20 Chintamani Mahapatra (2011): China in SAARC? To What Effect?- A Response, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 511-513 21 Dr. Sreeradha Datta (2006): S.A.A.R.C.: A Potential Playground for Power Politics, available athttp://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2006/04/saarc_a_potenti.html, accessed on 23.01.2012

authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries. Therefore whether China is an authoritarian state or a democracy has little relevance as far as membership of SAARC is concerned.22 Prof. S. D. Muni also agrees with Smruti S. Pattanaik to this point.23 Prof. S. D. Muni, disagrees with Prof. Dutta to a number of points i.e. Indias concerns regarding Chinas disruptive role in SAARC, are seldom shared by any one of them instead they held the positive perception of a rising China. Even Bhutan is uneasy with its frozen non-relations with China and, given clearance by India, would be happy to resolve its border issues and establish diplomatic relations with China.24 In discussion of economic dominance of China, Prof. S.D. Muni (2011), provides a very nice evidence saying that the yawning trade deficit with China is a matter of concern for countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; and they have raised this issue with the Chinese side. China has been rather prompt in making attractive proposals to reduce the trade deficit, including relocation of some of its manufacturing units to these countries and buying back their products.25 Prof. Sujit Dutta (2011) provides an absurd proposition that Pakistan and Nepal can be excluded from the SAARC since the two are in tandem to forge an alliance with China to counter and balance India26. Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011) counters the opinion calling it as an attempt to break SAARC. He adds that Nepal hosts the SAARC secretariat and is its founding member. Advocating for its dismissal from SAARC accurately presents the hawkish and intimidating attitude of a certain section of the Indian elite towards smaller countries in the vicinity which does not contribute to Indias rising profile in the comity of nations.27

Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011), advocates strongly for Chinese membership at SAARC. He opined, I dont think it is prudent to call China an outside power; they are also making in-roads in South Asia just like India has begun implementing its Look East policy. China has good relations with each of the SAARC countries, and its trade volume and interactions at all levels with all countries of SAARC have been increasing. In fact, for the bilateral trade to reach $100 billion, Nepal could be developed as a transit state in between the rising economic giants of Asia. Increasing connectivity between North India and Tibet via Nepal will prove a worthwhile venture for Indian goods to make use of the ShigatseLhasaGolmud railway straight into the Chinese mainland. India should show its strength and demonstrate confidence as regards Chinas entry into SAARC instead of fear and anxiety. After all, if Afghanistan could become a member without an amendment of the SAARC charter, so can other countries such as China and Japan, with whom all countries of South Asia, including India, enjoy good relations.28

22
23

Smruti S. Pattanaik (2011), ibid, p. 517 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 506 24 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 506 25 S.D. Muni (2011), ibid, p. 506 26 Sujit Dutta (2011), ibid, p. 493-501 27 Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011), ibid, p. 515 28 Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011), ibid, p. 515-516

Shen Dingli (2011) writing as counter to the points that Professor Dutta posed29 as opposed to Chinas full membership at SAARC opines that a regional institutional setting is largely determined by the common interests of its members, especially in the economic and security spheres. While a shared political vision and common interests always help, these are not necessarily a must to propel a regional institution to success.30 He Cites the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ChinaJapanKorea (CJK) in support of his argument. In response to democracy, he raised questions of the effectiveness of democracy and cites only being a democratic set up, the US killing in Afghanistan and Iraq was not stopped .31 Moreover, he proposes to do a field research on Chinese authoritarianism (?) as he feels China is not such as the term imposes. Economically, the argument that (China) is not a market economy could hardly disqualify China. The US launched a massive bail-out in the wake of financial crisis. This government intervention is hardly the action of a market economy. India has, like China, controlled the free conversion of its currency into dollars. However, this in no way prevents India or China from playing an important role in SAARC and the EAS.32 In terms of security, China joining the EAS and CJK was not because it had had no security issues with some of the EAS members, or with Japan and Korea. Rather, it has on-going territorial disputes with a number of them. But by engaging with them, China made a Declaration on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea, in 2002, with all ASEAN members. Therefore, he says to solve problem engagement is important.33 In countering the opinion of Chinese inclusion will raise leadership competition in SAARC, Shen Dingli argues that without China being a full member, Indias leadership in SAARC has been challenged by some members of the organisation, so what would happen if China were to be a member? But I would like to point out that China has not challenged ASEANs leadership in the EAS, and has not dominated CJK, and has only shared leadership with Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which it co-initiated.34 He concludes in saying that in keeping with political sensitivities, China ought not to be in a hurry to seek the full membership of SAARC. It should do so when it feels it to be necessary, and when it can make a contribution to South Asia without India feeling its legitimate interests undermined. There is still some distance to go in this direction before attaining an all-win outcome.35 Moonis Ahmar (2011) argues that Islamabads prime interest in advocating Beijings membership in SAARC is not to counter India in South Asia as Chinese foreign policy in the last three decades rejects alliances, encirclement and containment but to be benefited from Chinas enormous economic power that can be a source of strength for the countries of South Asia. Second, how can Beijing team up with Islamabad against New Delhi from the platform of SAARC when Indo-Sino cooperation has reached new heights, particularly after the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to India in December last year? Moreover, as emerging economies, China and India can hardly afford to enter into another phase of confrontation.36

29

Discussed at page no. 2 Shen Dingli (2011): China in SAARC? Too Early to Worry: A Response to China in SAARC? To What Effect? by Sujit Dutta, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 502-504 31 Shen Dingli (2011), p.503 32 Shen Dingli (2011), p.503 33 Shen Dingli (2011), p.503 34 Shen Dingli (2011), p.503 35 Shen Dingli (2011), p.504 36 Moonis Ahmar (2011), ibid, p. 509
30

Professor Moonis Ahmar (2011) counters Professor Dutta (2011) argument saying that projecting India and Indian likeminded countries as core which marginalise other countries of the region; and Pakistan and Nepal as impediments of SAARC progress are not based on any empirical evidence. Prof. MoonisAhmar also rejects Professor Duttas view of a group of core countries that are most positive and proactive about making a success of the regional process Bhutan, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Afghanistan can begin to draw a road map for closer economic, political and security relations and formulate a new SAARC charter based on the principles of collective security, democracy, secularism and forms of federalism that protect ethnic, religious and linguistic identities. Paradoxically, on the one hand, India is considered to be the core of South Asia whereas, on the other hand, all those SAARC members who at the moment are in consonance with India on various regional issues are termed as some sort of like-minded group of core countries within SAARC excluding Nepal and Pakistan.37 Professor Moonis Ahmar (2011) strongly argues that regardless of Chinas weak cultural and historical linkages with South Asia, the inclusion of China as a full-fledged member of SAARC will make SAARC a viable organisation and ensure stability in its functioning, China can be a source of great help. The Chinese policy of promoting economic progress, peace, stability and cooperation can certainly be useful for SAARC. Most importantly, the issue of Chinas admission to SAARC should not be held hostage to Indo-Pak rivalry.38

Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra (2011) argues that if China is invited to join SAARC and Beijing agrees to do so, the profile of SAARC will change overnight in the international political economy. This organisation will be respected for having the worlds two fastest growing economies, the two most populous countries and the two most significant players in the politics, economics and security affairs of the largest continent of the globe. Constituting the largest single market in the world and containing three nuclear weapon powers, SAARC can emerge as a powerful entity and play an enhanced role in global decision making. With land borders with India, Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan (50 per cent of SAARC member countries) and a de facto border with Pakistan, China cannot be regarded as an extra-regional power. The large size of the country gives it shared borders with several countries and it is commonly called an East Asian country. But in matters of regionalism and creation of regional groupings, the drawing of geographical lines falls into the realm of geopolitical considerations.39 Prof Sujit Dutta (2011) raises an appropriate question Would Chinas entry into SAARC change the political dynamics that have so far prevented its advancement in a positive direction? In answering the question he raises several other questions: Will Pakistan begin to cooperate with India . . . if China is inducted? Will the Nepalese Maoists suddenly become friendly towards India? Could we expect China to withdraw its large territorial claims against India and Bhutan . . . and would it resolve the issue of Tibetan refugees languishing in exile in India for 50 years by granting them the promised autonomy? China truly will not be in a position to meet all these demands. But a more compelling question in this regard may be: will Chinas exclusion settle all these concerns? One may essentially expect China to behave more responsibly and less antagonistically towards India, if it is co37 38

Moonis Ahmar (2011), ibid, p. 509 Moonis Ahmar (2011), ibid, p. 509-10 39 Chintamani Mahapatra (2011): China in SAARC? To What Effect?- A Response, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 511-513

opted to play a constructive role in moving SAARC in a more productive direction. Significantly, successive governments in India since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru supported the demand of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for China even after China invaded India in 1962. In fact, Chinas membership in SAARC with enthusiastic Indian support can go a long way towards reducing the mutual mistrust between the two nations. Indias neighbours have developed a habit of playing India against China. Myriad examples exist where China has extended its friendship to anti-India factions in Nepal and Bangladesh. If China becomes part of SAARC and is seated around the same table along with existing members to discuss issues of mutual interests, the China card so deftly played by the neighbouring countries may just lose its impact over time. Should SAARC members be terrified of a possible Chinese economic invasion of South Asia? Professor Sujit rightly points out that Chinese exports will impinge upon local manufacturing and the weaker economies are likely to become essentially exporters of raw materials. Free trade with China, therefore, is highly risky and is unlikely to result in bringing any great gains to South Asia. But the point is that the current economic relations of South Asian countries, including India, already testify to the expected outcome. South Asia is no exception. One of the reasons why South Asian economic integration is not taking off is the fear of Indias immediate neighbours about possible Indian economic penetration into their respective economies. We cannot parade the same argument vis--vis China to stall Chinas membership in SAARC and indulge in double talk. ASEAN has signed a free trade agreement with China. SAARC is yet to contemplate a free trade agreement. Why should we cry wolf now? In any case, Chinese goods have flooded the Indian market because of our economic decisions. What we need is an open door policy that opens up the Chinese market to Indian goods. China in SAARC may facilitate that. Dr. Swaran Sing argues that Sino-Pak special relationships should not be seen as countering to India solely but also Chinas interest in controlling the Xinjiang Muslim separatism.40 The Pakistan existential threat from India is removed now as both the countries have nuclear weapon that balance of terror secures both the country. Therefore, Chinas special relation should be looked differently. Moreover, while Pakistan was utmost trouble in East Pakistan frontier China did nothing to save Pakistan. In addition, China remained silent in most IndoPak conflict. In the recent tension between US and Pakistan China has not been eager to counter USA and replace them in Pakistan. In addition, the New Delhi and China economic relation has improved dramatically in the last couple of years. Now, China is the largest trading partner of India. Why is China Inclined to SAARC Membership? Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Sing called the observers as civilizational neighbours and economic partners41. Sanjay Baru (2010) argues that if SAARC implements a genuine regional economic cooperation agreement it will earn a fresh base of life that would change the structure of the region by increased region-wide connectivity and trade where observers economic contribution would enhance the process, and encourage them to invest in the region
40

Dr. Swaran Sing ed. (2007): China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers And Distributors 41 Sanjaya Baru (2010): Role of SAARC Observers: An Indian Perspective in S. D. Muni ed. The Emerging Dymensions of SARRC, Cambridge University Press India Pvt Ltd, p. 232

to be benefitted economically. But if SAARC fails to do so, there is little hope in its progress in the near future.42 There are sufficient reasons for china itself to be present in SAARC to understand SAARC member and prevent SAARC from making decision or policies which may not be compatible with Chinese interest in South Asia43. As a matter South Asia has increasingly become more critical to the stability and development of China. South Asia is not only the most volatile region around China but also most relevant region with regard to the rise of China.44 Therefore, Chinas South Asia policy is committed to safe guarding the stability and development of Chinas South Western frontier region, the stable supply of strategic resources, the security of energy trade and SLOCs, and South Asian stability with a view to avoiding involvement into any regional strategic conflicts45. Thus, China seeks more active role in South Asia through SAARC; the passive observer status does not satisfy them46. China has some reasons to seek its special status and unique national interest in formulating its South Asia and SAARC policies. Among all SAARC observers, Chinas case is different. Besies bordering with five SAARC members, China is troubled by the disturbance and attacks made by Xinjiang and Tibetian extremists and terrorists, most of whom take shelter and seek sanctuaries at in South Asia.47 Moreover, China enjoys solid bilateral relations with nearly all SAARC members. This advantage provides the facilities for China to transform its geographic and geostrategic strength into special status into SAARC. Hu Shesheng (2010) argues China be considered as a South Asian countries, and if considered so, China should contribute more to the development of SAARC and South Asian countries more than any other observers.48 How can the engagement take place and in what capacity? China and the Prospects of SAARC: Liberal institutionalism argues that the growing interdependence makes a realisation of the increasing cost of conflicts due to economic inter dependency is the growing dynamics to the emerging Asian security. Therefore, we find political shifts are preceding by economic shifts and trade relations. Mutual economic interdependence reduces war.49 Talking about SinoIndia relations, Wen Jiabo opined that The two parties must respect rather than confront each other, cooperate rather than get into ruinous competition with each other, and strive for mutual benefit rather than allowing one party to grow and the other to go under 50. In this perspective, we should not forget that security and military forces are dependent upon fear and secrecy. Terrorism has been a fairly constant phenomenon over the past century 51. From extreme Islamists, and Marxist ultra-leftists to nationalists, a wide variety of militant
42 43

Sanjaya Baru (2010), ibid, p. 232-234 Hu Shesheng (2010): Role of SAARC Observers: A Chinese Perspective in S. D. Muni ed. The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC, Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd., p. 291 44 Hu Shesheng, ibid, p. 291 45 ibid 46 China wants more pragmatic and effective cooperation with SAARC, The Economic Times, 16 November 2011, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-11-16/news/30405830_1_saarc-summitsaarc-member-states-dialogue-partner, aceessed on 23.01.2012 47 Hu Shesheng, ibid, p. 304 48 Hu Shesheng, ibid, p. 305 49 http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/11/04/mutual-dependence-andwar/?utm_source =The+Diplomat+List&utm_campaign=1b8463a1f6 Diplomat_Brief_2011_vol31&utm_medium=email 50 Cited by Bhawna Pokharna (2010): India-China Relations: Dimensions and Perspectives in Sri Kanth Kondapalli and Emile Mifune, China and its Neighbours, New Delhi: Pentagon Press. 51 Andy Yee (2011): Politics of fear, Open Democracy, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/andyyee/politics-of-fear, accessed on 23.01.2012

groups and individuals will use violence to achieve their goals. But death by terrorist attack each year pales in comparison to death by other causes such as natural disasters and car crashes. Yet, governments go to great lengths to create ramified warning systems, security schemes and intelligence apparatus, magnifying terror and anxiety in the process. This may come from a genuine concern for citizens' safety: but a larger part of it comes from the bureaucratic desire to extend its reach and power52. Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors (2012) argued that Chinese security interests in Pakistan are driven primarily by Chinas desire to contain India. Beijing has built up Pakistans conventional military as well as nuclear and missile capabilities over the years to help keep India off balance and focused on threats emanating from Pakistan. Chinas concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan itself are not that extensive. Chinas economic commitment to Pakistan, for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistans economy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times of need. They have also provided some notable evidence on the limits of Sino-Pak relations. In the wake of the U.S. raid on Osama bin Ladens compound last May (2011) and deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Washington, Pakistani leaders have sought to play up their countrys relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. However, Chinas concerns about the future stability and development of Pakistan will limit the extent to which China will bail Pakistan out of its current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington. Chinas concerns about the future development of Pakistan will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence with Pakistan, the U.S. should seek Beijings cooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan53. The purpose of regional cooperation in South Asia will be best served if the principles of sovereign equality, mutual trust and cooperation are kept in mind. Any other approach that favours domination, overt or subtle, will not help the process of meaningful regional cooperation.54 The political good will can help to SAARC get achievements on areas such as South Asian Free Trade (SAFTA), full implementation of the regional convention on suppression of terrorism, a social charter, complete removal of visa restrictions, etc. 55 The rhetoric, tirade, attack or counter-attack launched from either side- India or Pakistan can be highly detrimental to the cause of regional cooperation in South Asia. Indeed, with a positive approach and a vision for a developed, secure, stable and peaceful South Asia, one can expect the region to overcome the baggage of the past and move confidently towards a better future.

52

Andy Yee, ibid

53

Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors The limits of the Pakistan-China alliance http://blogs.reuters.com/indiaexpertzone/2012/01/20/the-limits-of-the-pakistan-china-alliance/ accesed on 22/01/2012
54

Moonis Ahmar (2011), ibid, p. 509 Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011): Comments on China in SAARC: To What Effect?, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 514-516
55

India is undoubtedly the engine for driving the SAARC vehicle. Initially policy makers in Delhi were suspicious of smaller countries ganging up and using the SAARC platform to embarrass India. With the new status of a risen power, India needs to adopt a proactive role in its leadership of SAARC as it has the weight, economic prowess and a global appeal to draw tremendous support from around the world to SAARC as a viable regional organisation. This will help in driving regional growth and prosperity.56 China is more able to increase bilateral relations and tackle India as is evident from the Chinese engagement in South Asia. Whereas India as well as other SAARC members also follow the same bilateral routes for cooperation, the very multilateral framework of cooperation get weakened. Therefore, multilateral SAARC platform needs to be revived as a viable forum. In both the circumstances whether inclusion or exclusion of Chinese membership, China is capable of getting the desired outcome through its friendly states. Thus the question Chinese membership should be critically analysed with all pros and crons before arriving absolute decision of making or not making.

Conclusion: For the primacy of political and security issues, regional cooperation in South Asia remains thin, and the efforts, so far, to make it dense and meaningful have yet to bear fruit. Whether with China SAARC can be benefited more or without China SAARC can be benefited more that needs to be determined before taking any serious decision on China's full membership at SAARC. In this perspective the Cold War like mentality, in my opinion, needs to be rejected. The example of ASEAN's not expanding its membership to China might not be a proper evidence to follow as A. Acharchya and B. Buzan put in Crafts of Cooperation, both the EU and ASEAN models of regionalism have their distinctiveness therefore can't be replicated in other regional groupings. The security thinkers from Indian quarter seem to be disinterested and suspicious of Chinese attempt at SAARC membership for the 1962 Sino-Indian War when India was defeated. Moreover, Chinese economic relation and engagement with Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal is perceived as Chinese policy of encircling India. Though there might be some truth in the Indian suspicion, actually the fear of being dominated by China at SAARC tempt India not to support China's membership at SAARC. Interstingly, all members of SAARC but India support China's inclusion as full pledged member at SAARC. Indian security analysts view this as small neighbours attempt to counter-balance Indian dominance on the SAARC particularly. However, small countries of SAARC including Pakistan do not accept this Indian view instead they emphasis upon the positive benefits South Asia can get by the inclusion of China. For example, India and China are the two fastest growing economies of the world; has the largest consumer market; China is a secuirty council permanent member. A well integrated regional economy with SAARC and China will be stronger than that of EU and the USA also. Nonetheless, to them, it is equal to be dominated either by India or by China. Therefore, we see where as India is concerning more over security and political aspects of China's membership at SAARC, the other countries of SAARC are emphasizing more on economic terms. There requires a comprehensive approach to include both security, political and economic and research on the probable impact of China's membership at SAARC.
56

Nishchal Nath Pandey (2011), ibid, 514

Without doing this all arguments and counter arguments will be sided by one side or the other. The observer status is a passive term and passive position, which does not allow the observer to be pro-active for which China expressed her inclination of keeping more active role in SAARC during the 17th SAARC summit. Keeping in mind the Chinese stance, I think, Chinas observer status can be upgraded upto Associate membership now; and can be given all the privileges of membership keeping two terms at hand i) power of termination and ii) absence of veto power at SAARC. If then China can prove her to be useful and the counter arguments are false, then I think no country will oppose Chinas membership.