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SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 190610, April 25, 2012] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES Y LOPEZ, ACCUSED. JOSE BRILLANTES Y LOPEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. RESOLUTION Criminal Case No. 11558 PEREZ, J.: Before the Court is an Appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez (Brillantes) assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897. The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558 convicting accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 entitled An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of 2002.[3] In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged as follows: Criminal Case No. 11556 That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu weighing more or less 0.1 gram including plastic container without prescription or authority to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.[4] On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The two separate Informations follow: Criminal Case No. 11557 That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and custody two (2) big plastic sachet containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams including plastic container without being authorized and permitted by law to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.[6] When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged. The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, in this case methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu. The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officials who conducted the buy-bust operation. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the] accused Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu with a weight of 0.0619 gram and is therefore sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for illegal sale of shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to a Public Officer, who acted as poseur buyer 0.1 gram including plastic container of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, without any license or authority to do so, in violation of the aforecited law.[5]

doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11558 for illegal possession of shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.2351 gram and is therefore further sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the same to be disposed of as the law prescribes. [7] The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court. It upheld that all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs were present and the finding against Brillantes well established by the prosecution. Further, it also found that all the elements constituting illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs were established beyond reasonable doubt to convict De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the three charges, great weight was given to the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3 Rovimanuel Balolong and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer. On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal[8] was filed by Brillantes through counsel before the Supreme Court. His co-accused De la Cruz, did not appeal his conviction. While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division Officer-inCharge Romeo F. Fajardo[9] informed the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report[10] signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical Officer Benevito A. Fontanilla, III. Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities. The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that: Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts. We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,[11] to wit: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) b) c) d) e) xxx There is no civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.[12] No private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the decision of the trial court. The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal liability does not have any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not . . Law Contracts Quasi-contracts . Quasi-delicts

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

file a notice of appeal. The Rules on Criminal Procedure on the matter states: RULE Section 11. Effect 122 of appeal by any of several Appeal accused.

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter; (emphasis ours) xxx The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary liabilities is predicated on his death and not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz. WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal of accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having been extinguished. No cost. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows: a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages; b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;] c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages; d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. The Case Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows: "WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."4 The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5 The Facts The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise: "On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages; g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00; h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages; i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages; j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages; k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages; "The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. "Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial

court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. "Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted) Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability. Hence, this Petition.7 The Issues Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. "B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8 There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A. The Court's Ruling The Petition has no merit. Main Issue: Propriety of Appeal by the Employer Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee. We are not persuaded. Appeals in Criminal Cases Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe

penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11 Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."12 This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.13 Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise: "x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14 The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they

cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16 Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote: "A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation." In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.17 Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows: "In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. "Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such

innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees." Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads: "The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner. Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. "x x x xxx x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised

Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.19 It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.24 What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.25 This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26 Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31 An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34 If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted

out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent. We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy. Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled: "There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x."37 By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39 Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40 Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has

waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final. Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases. Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47 To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.49 Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50 The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment. Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches. According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee. The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability. No Deprivation of Due Process As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52 It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.55 It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.58 After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59 In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by

jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions of the prosecution. ThusUpon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect thereof and there being no comment from the defense, let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases. SO ORDER[ED].6 On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.7 On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing of said civil case amounted to forum-shopping. On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, the instant petition. The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forumshopping rule. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;9 and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 3110 of the Civil Code,11 intentional torts under Articles 3212

JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure questions of law involving the March 20, 19981 and June 1, 19982 Orders3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272. The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.4 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of "failure to prosecute."5 Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising

and 34,13 and culpa aquiliana under Article 217614 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,15 Civil Code].16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party "cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission" or under both causes.17 The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.18 Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxxxxxxxx

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.19 Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.20 In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent portion of the complaint reads: xxxxxxxxx 2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE with office address at Guagua, Pampanga; 3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive, defendant drew, issued and made in favor of the plaintiff the following checks: CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT 1. Interbank Check No. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

2. Interbank Check No. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00 3. Interbank Check No. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00 in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored for payment on their maturity dates, copy

of the aforementioned checks are hereto attached and marked. 4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were all dishonored for reason of DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF); 5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the checks but she failed and refused and still fails and refuses without justifiable reason to pay plaintiff; 6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per appearance in court; 7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing the plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due notice and hearing a judgment be rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as follows: a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest; b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance; c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00 PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. x x x x x x x x x.21 Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondents obligation to make good the value of the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioners cause of action is the respondents

breach of the contractual obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict.22 The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.23 Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,24 the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of CreditTrust Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings. One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.25 In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act.26 Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual. In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case

because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.27 Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to bar the same. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136843. September 28, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON Jr., accused; PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN, J.: The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.
The Case and the Facts

With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law. The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs."[6] Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's Brief[7][8] on February 4, 2000. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received the Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief. before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief In a letter dated August 7, 2000,[9] however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.
Issue

Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,[2] in Criminal Case No. V-0447, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. In an Information[3]dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder committed as follows: "That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. "Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."[4]

The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the case and on the appeal.
This Court's Ruling

The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto).

Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal

The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows: "Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; x x x x x x x x x" Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas[10] made the following pronouncements: "1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.'" "2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x x x x x x x e) Quasi-delicts

"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. "4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription." In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.[11] Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual. WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan) against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City. The Facts On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-060197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that: Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8 In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10 Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45. The Issue WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11 The Courts Ruling This petition must be granted. The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states: SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides: SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter. On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent. First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action. Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that: Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior

to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply. In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case. This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides: SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law. It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings. In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said: Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19 Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement. Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy. Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution. We find for petitioner. It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had

not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20 Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled: It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit: Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value. Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser. In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the

proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a preexisting obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad. At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.) Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us. WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 183788 April 5, 2010

in the settlement of the latters estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-inintervention in the action for annulment of judgment.10 Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions pertaining to the settlement of the latters estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided by law. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and as far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bellas estate. They were not aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In petitioners opposition, it was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bellas heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC. Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers11 to the petition for annulment of judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three (3) were literally purchased from third persons who represented to Bella and the latters common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as their own. This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the rights of legitimate children. While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a complaint12 for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the

KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 20072 and July 14, 20083 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007 Orders4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was no prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions against petitioner. The following facts are established: Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioners late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of Pasig City.5 Petitioner initially opposed6 Rosemarys petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for approval.7 In a Decision8 dated November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemarys alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.9 Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate

RTC of Pasig City that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals.13 They argued that the issue of whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents.14 The prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before the RTC of Pasig City. On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations15 against petitioner and Rosemary were thus filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61. Petitioner filed a petition for review16 with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer proceedings17 before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.18 However, petitioners appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,19 while her motions before the MeTC were denied by the said court.20 The MeTC agreed with the prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.21 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition22 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 66. In an Order23 dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration24 was also denied by the RTC in its Order25 dated March 9, 2007.1avvphi1 Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTCs orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution,26 the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioners counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in the July 14, 2008 Resolution27 of the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner alleges that: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WAS SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 3, RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1 RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.28 The petition is meritorious. Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.29 The primary question that has to be resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance.30

Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.31 A certification of the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition.32 A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.33 However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.34 In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,35 while we said that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioners counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.36 In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,37 we categorically stated that while the petition was flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.38 Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that the party need not sign the verification; a partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.39 Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-compliance with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification and certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule.40 We deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.41

On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners prayer for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner. Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit: SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.42 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions. Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.43 If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.44 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.45

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case. A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella. It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 and July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal proceedings against petitioner Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are hereby ordered SUSPENDED until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 87222. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Trial Court

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. The Antecedent Facts The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City). On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pretrial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled: WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED. SO ORDERED.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because

prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision. The Issue The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the

2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as: x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11 The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is

whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1 We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned."19 In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009

however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks. On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4 Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5 In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved. The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the petition.

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, vs. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group. Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn. In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this,

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14 Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The CA ruled: In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003. Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS). 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20 The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks.

These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21 The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC. We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.22 If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.24 The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are

entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases. In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.25 In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued." Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

xxxx x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.28 Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case. The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance. Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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