Abcen Marriage Void Marriages

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 1
TITLE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO
FACTS
ISSUE WHETHER THE ORAL CONTRACT MAY BE PROVED IN COURT.
RULING The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as a mutual promise to marry. For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However, Felipe Cabagues action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of mutual promise to marry. Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro on a mutual promise to marry.
Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from the latters refusal to carry out a previously agreed-upon marriage between Socorro and Geronimo. The complaint alleged that the Auxilios promised such marriage to Geronimo, provided the latter would improve their house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and that without cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word. Auxilio moved to dismiss the case, on the ground that the contract was oral and hence unenforceable. The court granted the MTD.
DOMALAGAN VS. BOLIFER
Domalagan filed a complaint against Bolifer in the CFI of Misamis for recovery of a sum of money. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a contract by virtue of which Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of Bolifer, Bonifacia Bolifer. That subsequently, said sum was paid together with P 16 as token of future marriage but Bonifacia got married instead to Laureano Sisi. The CFI ruled in favor of Domalagan. Bolifer filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, arguing that the CFI erred in upholding the validity of the verbal contract subject matter of the case. Bolifer invoked Sec. 335 of the then Code of Civil Procedure which requires that a contract be in writing in order that recovery under such contract may be validly commenced: In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
WHETHER VERBAL CONTRACT VALID?
THE IS
We have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. Section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Soledad Cagigas was a high school teacher in Cebu. Cagigas was dating Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost 10 years younger than her. Subsequently, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter. Eventually, intimacy developed between her and Hermosisima. When Cagigas advised Hermosisima that she was pregnant, he promised to marry her. However, when the child was born, Hermosisima married Romanita Perez. Thereafter, Cagigas filed a complaint for damages against Hermosisima on ground of breach of promise to marry. The lower court ruled in favor of Cagigas.
WHETHER MORAL DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY. NO
Under Art. 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is liable for seduction. However, apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, strongly indicates that the seduction therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant surrendered herself to petitioner because, overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
WASSMER VS. VELEZ
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Subsequently, judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay Wassmer P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorneys fees; and the costs.
WHETHER THE AWARD OF DAMAGES PREDICATED ON THE BREACH OF MUTUAL PROMISE TO MARRY IS VALID? YES
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21. Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
ESTREMOS VS. EPHAN TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being of adult age. They had frequent dates and subsequently became close and intimate to one another. Thereafter, Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings. In consideration of Tanjancos promise of marriage Santos consented and acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge. Eventually, Santos conceived a child. Due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, she had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; Santos filed a complaint for damages against Tanjanco on the ground that due to the latters refusal to marry her, as promised, she suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos also wanted Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child. Tanjanco filed a Motion to Dismiss which the CFI granted. Santos appealed to the CA which held that Santos complaint did state a cause of action for damages premised on Art. 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco in turn appealed to the Supreme Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction. WHETHER ACTION BREACH PROMISE MARRY PROSPER? NO THE FOR OF TO CAN In actions for breach of promise to marry, for a recovery of damages to be warranted, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case that - to constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. In this case, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. WHETHER ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES AS TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF DAMAGES PREDICATED ON BREACH OF In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because
BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gashem Baksh for alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Gonzales was a waitress who met Baksh, an Iranian citizen then taking a medical course at the Lyceum in Dagupan City. Gonzales alleged that Baksh courted her and that she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. Subsequently, they lived together. However, Bakshs attitude towards Gonzales
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; Gonzales thereafter found out that Baksh was already married to someone living in Bacolod City. The RTC, applying Art. 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of Gonzales; CA affirmed.
PROMISE MARRY? YES
TO
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioners fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellants part that made plaintiffs parents agree to their daughters living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. However, the petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
MARRIAGE NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATION PANGANIBAN VS. BORROMEO Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala, husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Borromeo. The latter admitted that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document but by way of defense disclaimed any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document. WHETHER THE CONSENT OR PARDON GIVEN BY THE OFFENDED PARTY CONSTITUTES A BAR TO A PROSECUTION FOR ADULTERY OR CONCUBINAGE. NO IN RE SANTIAGO Doctrine: Marriage not subject to stipulation This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Roque Santiago Ernesto Baniquit was already estranged and living separately from wife Soledad Colares for 9 yrs. IS THE CONTRACT VALID AND BINDING IN THE 1ST PLACE? NO. Such contract is contrary to law, morals, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. Further, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitutes malpractice which justifies disbarment. In the case, he was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. However in view of the fact that he immediately tried to correct his mistake, he is found guilty of malpractice and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. We think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not a matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Ernesto wanted to contract a 2nd marriage. He thus consulted Atty. Santiago (a practicing atty and notary public in Negros Occidental). Atty. Santiago assured him that he could secure a separation for him and his wife. Thus he prepared a document which stipulated the ff: o Parties authorized each other to marry again o Both renounce or waive whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying Document was signed May 29, 1939.
Upon inquiry, Atty. Santiago did not deny preparing the document but put up the defense that he had the idea that 7 years of separation would entitle them to contract a 2nd marriage. When he realized his mistake, he immediately asked the contracting parties to come to sign a deed of cancellation on June 30, 1939.
SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA
Doctrine: Marriage / Separation not subject to legal stipulation
IS SUCH PARTITION VALID?
Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document (dated Nov 24, 1972), extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal pship of him and his wife. Respondent judge alleged that he relied on the provision that the H & W may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal pship during the marriage, subject to judicial approval (Art 191 Par 4, then Civil Code). He thus divided the 2 pcs of conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating 13 ha Riceland to the husband and a residential house and lot to the wife. Judge also claims that complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, together with their parents, came to his office and solicited his help in the amicable settlement of their marital imbroglio (entanglement). But in truth, Petitioner claims that by 1972, his father was already dead and could not possibly have come to the judges office. IS THE LETTERAGREEMENT VALID?
NO. Art 221 of the then Civil Code states: Art 221: The ff shall be void and no effect (1) Any contract for personal separation bet H & W and (2) Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal pship of gains or of the absolute community of property bet H &W. Even before the enactment of the then Civil Code, extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal pship without judicial approval was void. Such covenants are contrary to law, morals and good customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family. (Biton vs Momongon 62 Phil 7) However, in this case, due to his being unaware of such legal prohibition (since he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and did not study the new Civil Code, and thus not aware of Art 221), and since of his circumstance and apparent good faith, he is only meted SEVERE CENSURE and not disbarment. NO. Although Art 1306 states the ff; 'Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may be deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.' 'If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent from the beginning. Art 1409 also states "Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: '(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; xxx xxx xxx
LICHAUCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents are mother and son. Petitioner is the wife. Oct 18, 1969: Jose and Sylvia were married Oct 1972: De Facto separation, Sylvia left conjugal home March 1973: Sylvia went to the US and eventually obtains US citizenship Nov 23, 1973: Sylvia files with Superior Court of California (County of San Francisco), dissolution of marriage against Jose. She also filed claims for support and distribution of properties.
March 16, 1977: Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter Agreement with her mother-in-law, respondent Macaria, stating the ff (among other): o That it is a contractual undertaking o That Macaria binds herself solidarily with Jose o That several properties were to be delivered to her free from all liens and encumbrances sums of Php 100,000 and other sums in US $. o Monthly support payable 6 months in advance Mother-In-Law Macaria made such cash payments in compliance with the agreement
'(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. 'These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.' "But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides: 'Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations . . .' "From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's
March 17, 1980: Sylvia moved for the execution of the agreement but Jose moved for reconsideration due to Sylvias demand for Php 4,500 which was NOT mentioned in the original agreement April 20, 1980: Macaria filed for reconsideration
undertaking under Exhibit 'E" premised on the termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to Filipino morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void." Even if the parties argue that the Letter Agreement was a TERMINATION OF PROPERTY RELATIONS and is not an agreement on dissolution of marriage, Art 221 provides Further 'Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: '(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; '(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;" Petition Denied REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE Doctrine / Topic: Requisites / Proof of Marriage PUGEDA VS. TRIAS There are two marriages in this case. 2 (ISSUES) 1 IS THERE A VALID MARRIAGE BETWEEN FABIAN PUGEDA AND MARIA FERRER 2 IS ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES FROM THE FRIAR LANDS ESTATE VALID? 3 IS THE CLAIM TO THE FURNITURE SETS VALID? FOR PURPOSES OF THIS TOPIC UNDER THE OUTLINE, ONLY THE 1ST ISSUE IS RELEVANT YES. Plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that afternoon of Jan 5, 1916 (eve of Epiphany of the 3 Kings), plaintiff and deceased went to Office of Justice of the Peace to ask latter to marry them. Even if plaintiff and witness claimed that NO celebration took place, the ff happened; Marriage was celebrated in the presence of 2 witnesses. After the usual ceremony, witness Ricafrente asked the parties to sign 2 copies of a marriage contract After the witnesses had signed, Ricafrente delivered 1 copy to the contracting parties and one to the President of Sanitary Division (which was the keeper of the records of the civil registrar) As per then Art 53: "ART. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind." In the end, however, the plaintiffs claim was denied, because such was already barred by the Statute of Limitations since 13 years have elapsed before Pugeda instituted this action.
o o
1st marriage: Mariano Trias and Maria Ferrer 2nd marriage: Fabian Pugeda (plaintiff) and Maria
Ferrer (married Jan 1916) Maria is now deceased (died Feb 11, 1934)
The rest of the respondents are Marias children from the 1st marriage and surprisingly, Marias children from the 2nd marriage) Plaintiff Pugeda (2nd husband) is claiming participation in certain lands (acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration) in Gen Trias Cavite, a house, a barn (camarin), store and household furniture. He also prays that such properties be partitioned and be given as his share. He claims that he acquired this together with his deceased wife, Maria during the lifetime of their marriage.
Respondents claim that the 2nd marriage is NOT valid and that Pugeda in fact owes them due Php 40,000 in support of his candidacy for Governor of Cavite. Plaintiff and his witness also admit that NO celebration (I think celebration here refers to the wedding reception Bernice) was held because plaintiff was busy campaigning for office of member of Provincial Board and Maria Ferrer was already pregnant.
SISON VS. TE LAY LI FORMAL REQUISITES: AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER Topic: Formal Requisites for a person to be a lawful / valid solemning VILLAR VS. PARAISO officer This case is really about two candidates fighting over a mayoralty position in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Respondent Paraiso won but Vilar contested his eligibility because as per Section 2175 of the then Revised Administrative Code, his being a minister of the United Church of Christ disqualifies him as a candidate. Quo Warranto proceedings were thus instituted against him. In the end, Paraiso was declared INELIGIBLE because in spite of his resignation, the court found that it was a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition. Vilar was neither given the mayoralty position because the law authorized a declaration of election of the person who has obtained plurality of votes ARANES V. OCCIANO Petitioner charged respondent with Gross Ignorance of the Law for: 1 - knowingly solemnizing her marriage to her late groom, Dominador B. Orobio without the requisite marriage license and 2 - for celebrating the marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction Because of this, Petitioner could not inherit his properties and that she was deprived from receiving pensions (Deceased groom Orobia was a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy) Respondent Judge admitted having solemnized the marriage but explained and argued that he had examined the documents submitted to him. Upon discovering that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and requested to reset the date. But due to the earnest please of the parties, the influx of visitors and the request to officiate the marriage in Nabua (25 km away and outside his jurisdiction of Balatan, Camarines Sur) because Orobia had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling. In addition the parties insisted and assured that they would comply with the other requirements on the same day. He solemnized the marriage out of HUMAN COMPASSION on Feb 17, 2000 Sept 12, 2001: having realized her mistake, Araes filed an Affidavit of Desistance with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that
WHAT MAKES FOR A VALID SOLEMNIZING OFFICER?
Vilar presented the following evidence (which also answers the above question) Paraiso was ordained minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 He was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries From 1944-1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption He has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the Bureau of Public Libraries When he transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (April 19, 1950), he applied for, and was issued a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries and that said license has never been cancelled.
IS THE MARRIAGE VALID?
Ruling: NO. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. In this case, the territorial jurisdiction of the judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing outside of such is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law because he acted out of human compassion but nonetheless, should be liable for violating the law on marriage. Further, Judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage WITHOUT LICENSE. Even if the parties gave the marriage license later, a marriage which preceded the issuance of a marriage license is void. SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE CANNOT RENDER IT VALID or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Judge is fined Php 5,000.00. And is issued a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
judge initially refused but that it was due to her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the marriage. FORMAL REQUISITES: MARRIAGE CEREMONY MARTINEZ VS. TAN Petitioner claims that she is NOT married to respondent. Respondent of course claims otherwise. Marriage in this case is what is known as EXPEDIENTE DE MATRIMONINO CIVIL. The only direct evidence in Rosalias favor is her testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace and was thus never married to Angel. She admits signing the document in question but says that she signed it in her own home without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage. Rosalia also claims that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. Respondent presents 2 witnesses. Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. Ballori claims that on Sept 25, 1907, that she and Rosalia met at a store. Upon meeting each other she asked Rosalias mother if Rosalia can accompany her to see some dress patters at Balloris house. Turns out theat they went to the office of the justice of the peace where ceremony had taken place. Evidence of their plans are also seen through the exchange of letters (8) between Rosalia and Angel. The 8 letters show that they have been planning to get married
IS SUCH AN EXPEDIENT MARRIAGE VALID?
YES. In spite Rosalias sudden change of heart, the SC ruled that there is a valid marriage. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required. But the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. Zacarias Esmero, the other witness, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, x x x which certificate gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form x x
MADRIDEJO VS. DE LEON
The lower court found Melecio Madridejo as Domingos next of kin and orders defendants to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property to Melecio. Defendants assigned the following errors: the LOWER COURT erred in: 1. holding that the marriage between Pedro and Flaviana is valid 2. declaring that Melecio was legitimated 3. not rendering judgement in favor of them It appeared that: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had Domingo de Leon. Eulogio died. During the widowhood, Flaviana lived with Pedro Madridejo. Melecio Madridejo was born to Flaviana and Pedro. On Julu 8, 1920, Flaviana married Pedro by the parish priest of Siniloan; the next day, Flaviana died leaving Domingo and Melecio. Domingo died in 1928.
WHETHER THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PEDRO AND FLAVIANA IS VALID? YES
The mere fact that the parish of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
FORMAL REQUISITES: MARRIAGE LICENSE BORJA VS. SANCHEZ Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with ignorance of the law. IS THE CASE OF MANZANO AND For Article 34 of the Family Code to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966. That on March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge claims that he did not know that Manzano was legally married; what he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for 7 years as manifested in their joint affidavit; Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be found guilty.
PAYAO FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTION IN OBTAINING A MARRIAGE LICENSE BEFORE MARRIAGE TO JUSTIFY THE ACTION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE IN MARRYING THEM? NO
2. 3. 4. 5.
husband and wife for at least 5 years before marriage The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other The fact of absence of legal impediment must be present at the time of marriage The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage
Not all of the requirements are present in this case. Manzano and Payao expressly stated in their affidavit of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. Respondent knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is an impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. He cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage as the same was clearly stated in their affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time is immaterial. Article 63 (1) of the FC allows the spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other but the marriage bonds are not severed. Legal separation does not invalidate the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in this case. Marriage license is dispensed with when a man and a woman have lived together for a continuous and unbroken period of at least 5 years before the marriage. The five year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as husband and wife where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. This 5 year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 year and continuity- that is unbroken. At that time Pepito and Normas marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Their cohabitation should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. NOTE: License is required in order to notify the public that 2 persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the 2 shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
NINAL VS. BAYAGOG
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were born the petitioners. Pepito shot Teodulfa resulting to her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months later, Pepito and respondent Norma got married without any marriage license. So, they executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was VOID for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed MTD on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action. Judge Marcos dismissed the petition. Lower Court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death. Hence this petition for review.
WHAT NATURE OF COHABITATION IS CONTEMPLATED? COHABITATION TO MARRY EACH OTHER DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE YEAR CONTINUOUS PERIOD OR COHABITATION WHEREIN BOTH PARTIES HAVE LIVED TOGETHER AND EXCLUSIVELY WITH EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE YEAR PERIOD?
VOID MARRIAGES
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Arturo Mendoza was married first to Jovita de Asis. He contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage with Olga Lema. When Jovita died. He contracted a third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction for bigamy.
IS THE SECOND MARRIAGE VALID TO CONVICT ARTURO OF BIGAMY? NO
Section 29 of the Marriage Law provides: Illegal marriages any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: a) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; b) the first spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void. This plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. There is no pretence that appellants second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years or considered dead as to render the marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court. Thus, a prosecution for bigamy based on said void marriage will not lie.
PEOPLE VS. ARAGON
The accused contracted two marriages with Maria Gorrea in Cebu and Maria Faicol in Iloilo When the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight, he contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang in Cebu. The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang Court: second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding It held: defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage. Appellant relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza: Section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613 plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.
WILL THE ACTION OF THE ALLEGED SECOND WIFE PROSPER? NO
The very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, was still subsisting Serafia Tolentino (petitioner) charged Amado with Bigamy
WHETHER THE PETITION MAY BE GRANTED TO RECTIFY THE ERRONEOUS
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the
TC sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with Maria Clement until his death His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente." Petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. TC dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding. Petitioner filed this case for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. Respondent Court dismissed the case Hence, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO DY Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (ground: Lilia's previous existing marriage to Maxion). Lilia claimed that said marriage was null and void. She and the first husband Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre trial, the issue raised: was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence but was denied Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor. DONATO VS. LUNA An information for bigamy was filed against Donato Later, private respondent (PR) filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. (ground: private respondent consented to entering into the marriage since she had no previous knowledge that he was already married to a certain Rosalinda) Petitioners answer in the civil case: his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent Petitioner and PR had lived together as husband and wife for a period of at
ENTRY AND PETITIONER BE CONSIDERED THE LEGAL WIFE OF DECEASED AMADO? YES
existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. Without need of neither further proof nor remand to the Court below, private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made. In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. While document such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
IS LILIA STILL VALIDLY MARRIED TO HER FIRST HUSBAND? YES
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHETHER OR NOT A CRIMINAL CASE FOR BIGAMY SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN VIEW OF A CIVIL CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise,
least five years, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in criminal case contending that Civil Case raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.but was denied A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner - -but was also denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.
Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case. Petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case
TERRE VS. TERRE
Dorothy Terre was previously married to Merlito Bercenilla. Jordan Terre, then a high school classmate and despite her marriage, courted her. She at first did not entertain him. When Jordan went to law school, he became more persistent. He told Dorothy that her previous marriage was void ab initio as she and Merlito are first cousins and there was no need to go to court to declare it as such. Convinced by his explanations, Jordan and Dorothy contracted marriage in 1977 and despite Dorothys objection, he wrote single in their marriage license. In 1981, Jordan disappeared until Dorothy found out that he married contracted a subsequent marriage with Helina Malicdem. Dorothy filed a case for abandonment and a case for bigamy against Jordan. Jordan argues that his subsequent marriage with Malicdem is validly contracted as he believed in good faith that his first marriage with Dorothy was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration for nullity was necessary.
WHETHER THE MARRIAGE WITH MALICDEM WAS VALIDLY CONTRACTED?
no. Jordan was in bad faith. He should have known that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Assuming arguendo that he held that mistaken belief, same conclusion follows that his marriage with Dorothy must be deemed valid with the result that his second marriage to Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous.
SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE OF ABSENT SPOUSE JONES VS. HORTIGUELA December 1914: Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones. January 10, 1918: Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. October 1919: proceedings were instituted at the instance of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper. Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. April 23, 1921: the court issued another order for the taking effect of the
WHETHER FELIX HORTIGUELA'S ALLEGED MARRIAGE TO MARCIANA ESCAO WAS CELEBRATED?
Yes. The absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage. Marciana Escao died intestate leaving her widower by second marriage Felix Hortiguela who was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate and Angelita Jones, then a minor and her daughter by her first marriage as her only heirs. Angelita Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance. Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void. IN RE SZATROW PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC VS. CA A petition for declaration of nullity was filed by Roridel Molina against Reynaldo on the ground of psychological incapacity. Roridel alleges that during their marriage Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. RTC and CA: declared marriage void because of their opposing and conflicting personalities. WHETHER OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES IS EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate and it does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the present case
No. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. In this case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. No showing of gravity, juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Our Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. It must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. CHOA VS. CHOA Alfonso Ochoa filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Leni Ochoa on the ground of psychological incapacity. Prior to the filing of such complaint, Leni filed cases of perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation against Alfonso. During the trial Alfonso showed as evidence: filing and the prosecution of the cases clearly showed that Leni wanted not only to put him behind bars but also to banish him from the country. He also alleged that while being pregnant, Leni wanted to abort her pregnancy by taking pills. He contends that this constitutes a very abnormal behaviour of a wife. After presenting evidence during the trial of the complaint for declaration of nullity, Leni filed demurrer to evidence. The court denied the demurrer as it held that Alfonso was able to establish a quantum of evidence. WHETHER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER WAS PROPER? No. the evidence presented is grossly insufficient to support psychological incapacity. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. The testimony of his witness likewise failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses. psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. A medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52 Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
BARCELONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana based on Art. 36, FC. He alleges that Diana during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. Diana, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium. She filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
WHETHER TADEO HAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DIANA?
Yes. The petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. The complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants The Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
for failure to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. WHETHER MERE ABANDONMENT AND INSENSITIVITY CONSTITUTES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY? No. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. Psychological defect cannot be inferred from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. The policy of the 1987 Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO
Lolita fled a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio, a Japanese citizen. It was alleged that Toshio and Lolita contracted a civil wedding in the Philippines. One month after their marriage, Toshio left for Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for 2 months, he never sent any support nor communicated with them despite letters sent. Lolita likewise found out that Toshio visited the Philippines but did not bother to see her or their child.
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
Lucio and Lucia became sweethearts while she was in Singapore. When she came back to the Philippines the decided to get married. A week after their marriage, Lucia had to leave for work in Canada and Lucio was left behind. A year after, Lucia filed a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted by the Ontario Court. Lucio contracted a subsequent marriage with Lumbago. He filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucia charged Lucio with the crime of bigamy. Bigamy Case: Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question- denied and was convicted of the crime of bigamy. The court ruled that want of valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. Nullity Case: Subsequently, a decision was rendered in the civil case declaring that the marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. No appeal- final and executory. CA, bigamy: the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
WHETHER LUCIO COMMITTED BIGAMY?
No. one element of bigamy is absent (the offender has been legally married). The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Thus the marriage is void ab initio. There was no marriage to begin with and that declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. For all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. The first marriage in Mercado was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge and then again later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. TENEBRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 1986 Veronico Tenebro married Hilda Villareyes 1990 Veronico married Leticia Ancajas in the TC of Lapu-Lapu City. They lived together for a year until when Veronico informed Leticia of his previous marriage, showing a photocopy of the marriage contract. Invoking this past marriage, Veronico left Leticia to cohabit with Hilda. 1993 Veronico married Nilda Villegas in the RTC of Cebu City. When Leticia learned of this 3rd marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy. Veronico denied marrying Hilda (1st) and that the subsequent declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Leticia (due to psychological incapacity) retroacts to the date the 2nd marriage was celebrated. TC & CA Tenebro is GUILTY of BIGAMY EFFECT OF NULLITY YAPTINCHAY VS. TORRES Teresita Yaptinchay, upon her petition, was appointed Special Administratrix of Isidro Yaptinchays P500,000 estate. She claimed they had lived continuously and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years. Josefina Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and their children, opposed and prayed that Virginia, Isidros daughter, be special administratrix and Josefina be regular administratrix. Virginia was appointed as special administratrix. So Teresa filed in another branch an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for damages. Meanwhile, Judge Torres temporarily restrained Josefina, et.al. from disposing any of the properties. However, upon realizing that another probate court had taken cognizance thereof, he lifted the order. Teresita lays claim on the Forbes Park house built on Isidros property, arguing its construction was undertaken jointly by them and that she even contributed exclusive funds therefor. She showed loans from the Republic Bank but failed to prove these were for the North Forbes Park home since these contained loans for fish pond and agricultural development. REQUISITE FOR VALID REMARRIAGE WIEGEL VS. SEMPIODY TERRE VS. TERRE NO CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY ABSOLVES TENEBRO OF THE CRIME OF BIGAMY? NO
The 1st marriage was duly proved --- copy of a marriage contract and a handwritten letter from Hilda to Leticia that she and Veronico were legally married. The defenses certification that there was no record of marriage cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself is sufficient to establish the existence of marriage. The declaration of the nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned. As subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of Hilda's valid marriage, his marriage to Leticia would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of Leticia's psychological incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this 2nd marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. As soon as the 2nd marriage to Leticia was celebrated, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. The declaration of the nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that Veronico's marriage to Leticia lacks the essential requisites for validity. Since the cohabitation would be governed by the rules on co-ownership, there must be a clear showing Teresita really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, her interests in the property cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction.
WHETHER TERESITA CAN CLAIM THE PROPERTY? NO
JOCSON VS. ROBLES
1958 - Ricardo Robles allegedly married Josefina Fausto. Without having the 1st marriage annulled, Ricardo married Gloria Jocson. When Gloria found out about Josefina, she filed an action for annulment because of bigamy and for damages arising from maltreatment that resulted to the premature birth of their 1st child, who died 3 days later. Ricardo answered, charging Gloria's parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to marry Gloria, notwithstanding their knowledge that he was married and that such threat persisted until 1963, when he was finally able to get away. Ricardo moved for summary judgment since no genuine issue was raised and that Glorias parents admitted to the threat in a joint affidavit while Gloria prayed for judgment on the pleadings. Court of Domestic Relations DENIED summary judgment for annulment.
WHETHER THE 2ND MARRIAGE SHOULD BE ANNULLED BASED ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? NO
Art. 88 and 101, CC expressly prohibits the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods --- that is, collusion between the parties.
TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA
Romulo Tolentino filed for annulment, alleging his consent was obtained thru fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered Helen Villanueva was pregnant and they had no premarital sexual relations. Immediately, Helen left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown until 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in Cebu. Despite being served with summons, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, so Romulo moved to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence. LC DECLARED Helen in default, but, pursuant to Art. 88 and 101, CC referred the case to the City Fiscal for investigation to determine the existence of collusion. The fiscal summoned Romulo and ordered him to bring documents regarding the annulment. Romulo declined because it would expose his evidence. LC DISMISSED complaint because Romulo was unwilling to submit to interrogation
WHETHER THE ANNULMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED? NO
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. The prohibition is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by nonappearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: FRAUD BUCCAT VS. BUCCAT At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Buccat was already 6 months pregnant. After giving birth 3 months into the marriage, Mr. Buccat claims that there was concealment on the part of his wife regarding her pregnancy and further alleges she was impregnated by another man. WHETHER THERE WAS CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY? NO Even assuming that the annulment is based on the fact that at the time of the marriage, Mrs. Bucat was pregnant by a man other than her husband, there would still be no ground. There should have been a concealment of such fact. Mrs. Buccat was already about 6 months pregnant at the time of marriage, there can be no possibility of concealment. At such an advanced stage of pregnancy, concealment would be impossible. Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of the marriage. ANNULMENT DENIED. AQUINO VS. DELIZO Fernando Aquino filed a complaint for annulment on the ground of fraud, alleging that his wife, Conchita Delizo, at the date of their marriage, concealed WHETHER THERE WAS Conchita was 4 mos. pregnant at the time of her marriage to Fernando. At this stage, her pregnancy wasnt readily apparent since she was "naturally plump" or
the fact that she was impregnated by another man. 4 mos. into the marriage, she gave birth to a child. He failed to present a birth certificate to show that the child was born within 180 days after their marriage but he explains that it was due to excusable negligence. CFI & CA DISMISSED complaint for annulment of his marriage. The CA found that it wasnt impossible for Conchita and Fernando to have pre-marital sex. ANAYA VS. PALAROAN Fernando Palaroan filed for annulment because his consent was obtained thru force and intimidation. The action was dismissed and when Aurora Anayas counterclaim of support was being negotiated, Fernando divulged his premarital relationship with a close relative prior to his marriage. Because of such concealment, Aurora filed for annulment. In addition, Aurora claimed that from the very beginning Fernando had no intention of performing his marital obligations and he fraudulently led her to believe that he would be a caring husband to her. CFI DISMISSED action
CONCEALMENT? YES
fat. Even on the 5th mo., the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus (lower part of the abdomen), which can be attributed to fat formation. It is only on the 6th mo. that the enlargement of the abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. The appellate courts finding was purely conjectural and unsupported by the record.
WHETHER THE NONDISCLOSURE OF A PRE-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER WOMAN IS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE? NO -----------------------------------------WHETHER A SECRET INTENTION NOT TO PERFORM MARITAL OBLIGATIONS CONSTITUTES AS FRAUD? YES
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances for annulment. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On the 2nd fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within 4 years after the marriage. Since their wedding was celebrated in December 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: FORCE, INTIMIDATION & UNDUE INFLUENCE SISON VS. TE LAY LI RUIZ VS. ATIENZA VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: IMPOTENCE SARAO VS. GUEVARA In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until the evening. When night time came, he again approached his wife, however, she complained of pains in her private parts and as a result, he was not successful. After the first night, every attempt on the plaintiffs part to have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure, because she complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician and with the plaintiffs consent, an operation was performed in which the uterus and ovaries were removed. The surgery rendered her incapable of procreation, but she could copulate. Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost all desire WHETHER THEIR MARRIAGE CAN BE ANNULLED BASED ON THE DEFENDANTS INCAPACITY TO PROCREATE? NO The incapacity for copulation was only temporary. The defect must be lasting to be aground for annulment, because the test of impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to copulate.
to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for annulment. JIMENEZ VS. CANIZARES Joel Jimenez filed for annulment because the orifice of his wifes genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration or copulation. He left the conjugal home 2 days after they had been married. Remedios Caizares did not answer and did not submit to a physical examination. LC GRANTED the annulment WHETHER THE MARRIAGE MAY BE ANNULLED BASED ON THE LONE TESTIMONY OF THE HUSBAND ABOUT HER IMPOTENCY? NO PROCEDURE ON ANNULMENT: NO CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT JOCSON VS. ROBLES TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUECA MARRIAGE WHEN 1 SPOUSE IS ABSENT JONES VS. HORTIGUELA LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC GUE VS. REPUBLIC The refusal to be examined is because women are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Abcen Marriage Void Marriages

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Abcen Marriage Void Marriages

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Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 1

TITLE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO

ISSUE WHETHER THE ORAL CONTRACT MAY BE PROVED IN COURT.

DOMALAGAN VS. BOLIFER

WHETHER VERBAL CONTRACT VALID?

HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

WHETHER MORAL DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY. NO

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 2

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 3

PROMISE MARRY? YES

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 4

SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA

Doctrine: Marriage / Separation not subject to legal stipulation

IS SUCH PARTITION VALID?

LICHAUCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 5

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 6

WHAT MAKES FOR A VALID SOLEMNIZING OFFICER?

IS THE MARRIAGE VALID?

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 7

IS SUCH AN EXPEDIENT MARRIAGE VALID?

MADRIDEJO VS. DE LEON

WHETHER THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PEDRO AND FLAVIANA IS VALID? YES

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 8

NINAL VS. BAYAGOG

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 9

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA

IS THE SECOND MARRIAGE VALID TO CONVICT ARTURO OF BIGAMY? NO

PEOPLE VS. ARAGON

WILL THE ACTION OF THE ALLEGED SECOND WIFE PROSPER? NO

TOLENTINO VS. PARAS

WHETHER THE PETITION MAY BE GRANTED TO RECTIFY THE ERRONEOUS

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 10

IS LILIA STILL VALIDLY MARRIED TO HER FIRST HUSBAND? YES

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 11

CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.

TERRE VS. TERRE

WHETHER THE MARRIAGE WITH MALICDEM WAS VALIDLY CONTRACTED?

WHETHER FELIX HORTIGUELA'S ALLEGED MARRIAGE TO MARCIANA ESCAO WAS CELEBRATED?

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 12

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 13

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 14

BARCELONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

WHETHER TADEO HAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DIANA?

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 15

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO

MORIGO VS. PEOPLE

WHETHER LUCIO COMMITTED BIGAMY?

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 16

WHETHER TERESITA CAN CLAIM THE PROPERTY? NO

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 17

JOCSON VS. ROBLES

TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA

WHETHER THE ANNULMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED? NO

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 18

Civil Law Review: Family Code to Voidable Marriages 19

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