Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-15375 August 31, 1960

BALTAZAR RAGPALA, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF TUBOD, LANAO, ET AL., respondents-appellants. Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and Solicitor J. R. Coquia for appellants. Lumuntad, Quebranza & Rodriguez for appellees. REYES, J. B. L., J.: Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Lanao in Special Proceedings No. 743, granting the petition for habeas corpus of petitioners, appellees herein. The facts are undisputed. On June 11, 1955, the provincial fiscal of Lanao filed four informations with the Court of First Instance of said province, against Baltazar Ragpala, Arsenio Lucot, Julio Lucot, Osias Baldoza, Sinforoso Villar, Julius Baldado and Estrella Carausos. Two informations charged the crime of murder in connection with the death of Engracio Angcos and Apolinario Pepito, respectively: a third information was for frustrated murder, wherein one Sulpicio Mahipos was the victim; and a fourth also for frustrated murder, in which Diego Palomares was the offended party. Pursuant to section 2 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the Court issued, on June 22, 1954, orders directing the Justice of the Peace of Dansalan City of conduct a preliminary investigation on the four informations. Complying with these orders, the justice of the peace conducted the first and second stages of the preliminary investigation, after which he issued on July 5, 1955, an order dismissing the criminal cases against the accused and at the same time ordering their immediate release, with the exception of Estrella Carausos who was then still at large. However, the case against the latter was, upon motion of the provincial fiscal, ordered dismissed in an order of the justice of the peace on October 25, 1955. On October 13, 1955, Atty. Antonio Capilitan, special investigator of the Department of Justice, filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Tubod, Lanao, six (6) informations, the first for murder for the death of Engracio Angcos; the second for murder for the death of Apolinario Pepito; the third for frustrated murder, wherein in the victim was Sulpicio Mahipos; the fourth for frustrated murder, where one Diego Palomares was the victim; the fifth for frustrated murder, wherein the victim was one Constancio Marcos; and the sixth for frustrated murder, in which the victim was Lorenzo Parilla. On their preliminary investigation conducted in the municipality of Baroy by the said justice of the peace of Tubod, Lanao, the accused objected on two grounds: first, that the justice of the peace of Tubod lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of and conduct preliminary investigation on the charges, which had been already investigated upon the directive of the Court of First Instance of Lanao and dismissed by the justice of the peace of Dansalan City; and second, that since the crimes complained of were supposedly committed in the municipality of Tubod, the preliminary investigation could not be conducted in the municipality of Baroy which is a different municipality. Supplementing said objections, petitioners, on October 15, 1955, filed a motion to quash the informations, which motion was denied by the justice of the peace of Tubod on the 17th day of the same month. On the same day, finding that there were crimes committed and that there was probable cause that

defendants were guilty, the justice of the peace of Tubod issued warrants of arrest on each of said petitioners, who were thereby detained in the municipal jail of Tubod. As a consequence, petitioners filed the present petition for habeas corpus. The provincial fiscal of Lanao filed his answer to the petition, arguing, among other things, that although the informations filed by Atty. Antonio Capilitan of the Department of Justice were based on the same charges alleged in the informations previously filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao and which informations were dismissed by the justice of the peace of Dansalan City, the new ones were based on additional evidence; and that the municipality of Baroy, Lanao, where the preliminary investigation was conducted, was within the circuit court of the justice of the peace of Tubod, hence, said preliminary investigation was well also within the latter's jurisdiction. The same answer alleged that there was no double jeopardy in the informations filed by the special prosecutor, since the investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of the City of Dansalan was only a preliminary investigation to determine the existence of a probable cause of the crime and no trial on the merits was had. After hearing the arguments of respective counsel, the court a quo rendered a decision granting the petition forhabeas corpus of the petitioners and ordering their immediate release, with the exception of Estrella Carausos, who, as found by the court, had primarily been investigated on the cases filed against her by the provincial fiscal. From the judgment, this appeal was taken.. Appellants urge that the justice of the peace of Tubod has authority to conduct a second preliminary investigation on the same charges that were the subject-matter of a first preliminary investigation conducted previously by the justice of the peace of Dansalan City upon directive of the Court of First Instance of Lanao, which dismissed the informations for lack of probable cause; that the preliminary investigation may be conducted in the municipality of Baroy, which was within the circuit court of the justice of the peace of Tubod; and, lastly, that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy in the case at bar. As to the first point, appellants correctly point out that under section 2 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the Justice of the Peace Court of Tubod (the municipality where the alleged crimes took place) is not precluded from proceeding with the preliminary investigation on the charges filed by the special prosecutor of the Department of Justice. The aforesaid section states: SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. Every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance. The Justice of the peace of the provincial capital of the municipality in which the provincial jail is located, when directed by an order of the Court of First Instance, shall have jurisdiction to conduct such preliminary investigation of any offense committed anywhere within his province at the expense of the municipality wherein the same was committed. (Emphasis supplied) . As it may be noted, nowhere in the above provision does it appear that once a court takes cognizance of a case for purposes of preliminary investigation, it necessarily acquires thereby the exclusive authority to conduct all subsequent investigations. A subsequent preliminary investigation is not a continuation of the preceding one, but is and must proceed as an entirely distinct and separate proceeding by itself. The objection of appellees that such a rule would, in effect, make the justice of the peace court, in certain instances, some kind of an appellate court "over and above the

Court of First Instance" does not hold true where, as in this case, the new informations were based upon new or additional evidence. The case of United States vs. Marfori, 35 Phil., 666, is not authority to the contrary,. The Court suggested in that case that if the prosecuting officer was not satisfied with the quashing of the case by the justice of the peace, he could secure the arrest of the accused upon a second preliminary investigation conducted "before either the justice of the peace who held the first investigation or before the judge of the Court of First Instance in the exercise of his functions as a committing magistrate." This language assumes that the crime charged was committed within the municipality of the justice of the peace who conducted the first investigation; otherwise, the justice of the peace would not have had jurisdiction over the case in the first place. In the case now before us, the Dansalan Justice of the Peace conducted the first investigation not because the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction but by delegation and direction of the Court of First Instance. Hence, the Marfori doctrine does not apply. The court a quo nonetheless validly granted the petition for habeas corpus on the second ground, i.e., that the justice of the peace of Tubod (the municipality where the crimes charged were allegedly committed) erred in conducting, over the objections of accused, the preliminary investigation in the adjacent municipality of Baroy, where he was then also concurrent justice of the peace. The fact that the same officer discharge the duties of the justice of the peace in both municipalities did not merge the two offices into one single court with expanded territorial jurisdiction. Our attention has not been called to any executive order or circular or other executive disposition under which the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of Tubod has been extended over both the municipalities of Tubod and Baroy (cf. Judiciary Act, section 68, paragraph 2). So that when the justice of the peace of Tubod proceeded with the investigation in Baroy, he did so without authority of law, since the alleged crimes were not committed therein. Venue in criminal cases being jurisdiction, and considering that the preliminary investigation, which is the basis of the petitioners' detention, was invalidly conducted, the remedy by writ of habeas corpus was not improper; and on the basis of the above findings, the lower court did not err in granting the petition. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs de oficio. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent. PANGANIBAN, J.: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation. The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two Orders1 of the Sandiganbayan,2 both dated February 15, 1999. The first Order rejected the attempt of petitioner to stop his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 24524-25, on the ground that he had been denied the right to a preliminary investigation. In the assailed second Order, the Sandiganbayan directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for all the accused, including herein petitioner. The Facts Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint3 filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao issued an Order4 dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also reqquired respondents, within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998,5 recommending the prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation.
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Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrect under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolos City on May 20 of the same year. On the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation."

In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment. Hence, this recourse.6 Ruling of the Sandiganbayan The Sandibayan rejected petitioner's plea for preliminary investigation in this wise: "This morning, the accused herein appeared for arraignment duly represented by their counsel. Before proceeding, Atty. Omar A. Rivera appearing in behalf of accused Yusop informed this court of his reservations about proceeding with the arraignment this morning, primarily on the ground that accused Yusop did not undergo preliminary furnished any notice nor was he informed of the proceedings before the Ombudsman with respect to these cases. It would appear that one of the reasons [therefor] is that the accused despite notice of the existence of the accusation against him in Criminal Case No. 24525, had not given any timely notice nor any statement of any alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information herein; thus, the Court is not persuaded that the claim of the accused Yusop with regard to the inadequacy of the proceedings as against him could still be validly entertained at this time. This is more particularly significant under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and xxx Criminal Cases 24524 and 24525 refer to the same incident although the prosecution, for its part, has filed Infomations under different statutes covering the same incident. Thus, the claim of accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of the cases on an identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular significance since this would the be indulging in a superfluity. xxx xxx xxx

"Thus, in view of all the following, the Court will now proceed to the arraignment of the accused herein." The Issue Although the parties did not specify the issue in this case, it is clear from their submissions that they are asking this Court to resolve this question: Whether the Sanduganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment. The Court's Ruling The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, the case against him should not be dismissed.

Main Issue: Preliminary Investigation Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."7 The Court explained that the rationable of preliminary investigation is to "protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer."8 The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court.9 The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial court.10 Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24254 with violation of Section 3-a of RA of 3019. Such offense is punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen years.11 Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation. It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no preliminary invertigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman admitted that "petitioner was denied of his right to preliminary investigation."12 We find no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner "had not given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information." First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier noted, he had not been named a s arepondent in the September 19, 1995 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao. His name did not even appear in the caption of its January 15, 1998 Resolution,13 which recommended the filing of charges against the accused. Indeed, in his Compliance with the August 26, 1998 Sandiganbayan Resolution,14 Special Prosecution Officer Diosdado V. Calonge manifested that petitioner "was not notified of the proceedings of the preliminary investigation and was accordingly not given the opportunity to be heard thereon."15 After learning of the filing of the Information against him when he was served a Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard to him. Several months later, moments before his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given the court timely notice of this deficiency. Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information petitioner had known that the proceedings and the investigation against his co-accused were pending, he cannot be expected to know of the investigator's subsequent act of charging him. Precisely, he had not been previously included therein and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof. In Go v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived.

Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a]n application for or admission to bai; shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx." We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.17 Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted. We desagree with the Sandiganbayan's reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770.18 This provision cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf. In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that the baisc rudiments of due process are complied with."19 For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition. Dismissal of the Charges Not Justified Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary investigation.20 We disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.21 Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the "absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings."22 We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez: "If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so the the preliminary investigation may be conducted."23 In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended with respect to petitioner even if the case is already undergoing trial, because "[t]o reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated to benefit from its own wrong or culpable ommission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point."24 WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED, and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ: concur.

Footnotes:
1

Rollo, pp. 23-26.

First Division. The Orders were signed by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Justices Catalino R. Castaneda Jr. and Gregory S. Ong.
3

Rollo, pp. 35-36 Rollo, p. 40.

Rollo, pp. 27-31; signed by Graft Investigation Officer II Pepito A. Manriquez and reviewed by Director Rodolfo M. Elman. It was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, upon the recommendation of Margarito P. Gervacio Jr., deputy ombudsman for Mindanao.
6

In Resolution dated August 7, 2000, the Court directed that "[t]he Sandiganbayan may file its own comment on the Petition, as the Comment of the Ombudsman is favorable to petitioner, within thirty (30) days from notice, otherwise, the case shall be considered submitted for deliberation." In its November 27, 2000 Order, the Court deemed the Sandiganbayan to have waived its right to file its own comment. The Petition for Certiorari was digned by Atty. Manileno N. Apiag. The Ombudsman's Comment was signed by Leonardo P. Tamayo, Robert E. Kallos, Rodrigo V. Coquia and Ireneo M. Paldeng.
7

Section 1, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000.
8

Tandoc v. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37, 42, July 5, 1989, per Padilla, J.; citing Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228.
9

Second paragraph, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: "Except as provided in section 7 or this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine."
10

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court before the 2000 Rules, states that "except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense congnizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted xxx." Under BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment of more than six years.
11

Section 9, RA No. 3019. It may be noted that in Criminal Case No. 24525, a preliminary investigation was not required because unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code was punishable byarresto mayor - imprisonment of one month and one day to six months.

12

Comment, p. 7; rollo, p. 101. Rollo, pp. 27-31. Rollo, p. 51 Rollo, p. 52 206 SCRA 138, 153, February 12, 1992, per Feliciano, J.

13

14

15

16

17

Duterte v. Sandigandayan, 289 SCRA 721, April 27, 1998; citing Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354, September 7, 1989 and Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, February 11, 1992.
18

"Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. "A motion for recosideration of any order, directive ior decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: "(1) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; "(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the mvant. The motion for recosideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing; Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. "Finding of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. "In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receiot of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
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"The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require."

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 September 20, 2006 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI05-2230-RTJ] ALEGRIA P. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On the basis of two criminal complaints against Manuel Beltran, a retired Assistant Provincial Assessor of South Cotabato, one for Falsification of Public Documents (Criminal Case No. 5876), and the other for Attempted Murder (Criminal Case No. 5877), filed by the local police before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, Executive Judge Oscar E. Dinopol (respondent) issued two (2) similarly worded Orders1 finding probable cause to hale the accused into court and consequently ordering the issuance of warrants for his arrest. Thus each order read: After reading the Criminal Complaint including the Affidavit of the complainant, the Court is satisfied and finds probable cause. There being a need, however, to place the accused in custody of the law in order not to frustrate justice, let a warrant be issued for the arrest of the accused. On motion of the accused, Judge Laureano T. Alzate of Branch 25 of the Koronadal City RTC to which the cases were raffled, quashed the criminal complaints on the ground of, inter alia, absence of preliminary investigation.2 Hence, spawned the filing of a November 10, 2004 letter-complaint of Alegria P. Beltran (complainant),3 wife of the accused, charging respondent with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority, which letter-complaint was received by the Office of the Chief Justice on November 17, 2004. A verified complaint essentially reiterating the charges in the said lettercomplaint was subsequently filed by complainant on June 14, 2005.4 Complainant charges that with respondent's acceptance of the criminal complaints lodged by the police, despite the absence of a preliminary investigation, he "us[ed] his position to sow terror and injustice, . . . violat[ed] men's constitutional rights and distorted [the] interpretation of the law and/[or] the rules."5 To the complaint, complainant attached photocopies of respondent's orders and other documents material to her complaint. In his Comment6 of January 26, 2005, respondent proffers the following explanation:

When he assumed his duties as Executive Judge, the Office of the City Prosecutor had only one prosecutor, Prosecutor Elfredo Sales, who had no assistant. Prosecutor Sales suffered a stroke, however, and had not fully recovered. While Prosecutor Ringcar Pinote was designated as Acting City Prosecutor on May 18, 2004, he too suffers from a heart ailment and often fails to attend court hearings and rarely conducts preliminary investigations. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rene Barrion was designated to assist Prosecutor Pinote, but cases were not assigned or indorsed to him. After several communications with the Department of Justice and the Regional State Prosecutor requesting the designation of an active Acting City Prosecutor, Memo Order No. 2004-18 was issued directing Prosecutor Pinote to attend to all cases, but the latter did not heed the same.7 Respondent further proffers that given the length of time that there was no prosecutor in the Koronadal City RTC, he and Judge Alzate, Presiding Judge of another branch of the court, agreed, on the basis of the Philippine National Police's written request, to accept cases directly filed by the police on condition that after the arrest of the accused but before arraignment, the cases would be remanded to the Prosecutor's Office for "further" preliminary investigation.8 Respondent furthermore explains that the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Koronadal City holds sessions only once a week and has instructions to his Clerk of Court not to accept cases for preliminary investigation, there being a designated City/Acting City Prosecutor to conduct the same;9 and that "he exercised good faith with the principal motive of filling a gap to make the flow and services of the enforcement and prosecution agencies continuous, for the promotion of an orderly administration of justice."10 Acting on the complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) has come up with the following: EVALUATION: Pars. (a), Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information." While the judge of the Regional Trial Court determines the existence of probable cause on the basis of evidence on record, and may consequently issue warrants of arrest, the same cannot be done without the required preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the complaint or information. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine." Viewed from the above-quoted provision of the Rule, direct filing of complaints or information is not allowed. Who are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation? Section 2, Rule 112 provides: "Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial [or] City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) Other officers as may be authorized by law." Judges of the Regional Trial Courts are not among those officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. Hence, in the absence of a designated provincial or city prosecutor in RTC, Koronadal City, preliminary investigation may be conducted by the MTCC, Koronadal City Acting Presiding Judge. It should be stressed herein that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is not a judicial but an executive prerogative. For which reason, considering that there is a city prosecutor assigned in Koronadal City, preliminary investigation shall first be conducted by the city prosecutor before the filing of a proper complaint or information.11 (Underscoring in the original; Emphasis supplied). The OCA thus recommends that respondent be fined the amount of P20,000.00, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, and that he be directed to refrain from allowing the filing of criminal complaints or informations which have not been subjected to preliminary investigations and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest on the basis thereof.12 The evaluation and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken. Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates who are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. RTC judges, who were under the 1964 Rules of Court authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, have been expressly excluded under said section of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 Preliminary investigation of criminal cases is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It also protects the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.14 If, as respondent tries to justify his questioned act, the city prosecutor had been sickly, respondent could have endorsed the criminal complaint to the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Koronadal City. The alleged instruction of the MTCC judge not to accept cases for preliminary investigation did not

justify respondent's violation of the Rules. Neither did the alleged failure of the designated Acting City Prosecutor to attend to all criminal cases in the city. Under those circumstances, respondent was not without any remedy. Parenthetically, why would, by respondent's own claim, allow the filing in the RTC of criminal cases which have not been subjected to preliminary investigations and, after issuing the warrants of arrest, "remand [the cases] to the Prosecutor's Office for further preliminary investigation"? A case of putting the cart before the horse! It bears stressing that a judge must be faithful to and proficient in the law. He must maintain professional competence which is a mark of a good judge.15 Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of his hands.16 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it. Anything less erodes the confidence of the public in the courts and it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.17 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato is, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority, ORDERED to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. He is further ORDERED to refrain from allowing the filing before the Regional Trial Court of criminal complaints which have not been subjected to preliminary investigation. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-16474 January 31, 1962

TOMAS B. TADEO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MANGALDAN, EMILIA ACOSTA and LEONCIO MAICONG, respondents-appellees. Tadeo and Tadeo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant. Provincial Fiscal Julian M. Armas for respondents-appellees. PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Branch, dated 30 July 1957, denying Tomas B. Tadeo Sr.'s petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, from conducting the preliminary investigation in criminal case No. 263 of the said Justice of the Peace Court for estafa, against the appellant, at the instance of the spouses Leoncio Maicong and Emilia Acosta. In the appellant's amended petition filed and admitted in Court on 26 June 1957, in lieu of the original filed on 13 May 1957, the appellant alleged that in Civil Case No. 10759 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the appellees spouses sued him for damages allegedly for preparing a deed of sale of their parcel of land conveying it to Francisco Bongato and fraudulently inducing them to sign the deed of sale which they did sign under the belief that it was a partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked the appellant, a lawyer and notary public, to prepare and ratify; that after instituting the foregoing action the appellees spouses filed against the appellant a complaint for estafa in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, arising from the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10759 (criminal case No. 129); that the Court of First Instance dismissed civil case No. 10759; that after the dismissal of the said civil case by the Court of First Instance, the Justice of the Peace Court dismissed criminal case No. 129 for estafa against the appellant on the ground that the dismissal of the civil case which was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal case which arose from the same transaction alleged in the civil case; that after the dismissal of civil case No. 10759 by the Court of First Instance the appellant filed in the same Court a complaint against the appellees spouses for declaratory judgment basing his cause of action upon the same transaction alleged in civil case No. 10759, which was still pending hearing and determination (civil case No. D-413); that after the appellant had instituted civil case No. D-413 in the Court of First Instance the appellees spouses again filed a complaint for estafa against the appellant in the same Justice of the Peace Court upon the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10759 and criminal case No. 129, which already had been dismissed, and civil case No. D-413, still pending hearing and determination (criminal case No. 263); that civil case No. D-413 is prejudicial to criminal case No. 263; that the dismissal of civil case No. 10759 and criminal case No. 129 constitutes a bar to further criminal prosecution of the appellant for estafa arising from the facts alleged therein; that all these notwithstanding the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the appellee Justice of the Peace Court were conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 against the appellant; that the act of the aforesaid appellees in conducting the

preliminary investigation in the said criminal case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the appellant. The appellant prayed that the appellees be enjoined from conducting the preliminary investigation in criminal case No. 263 for estafaagainst him (civil case No. D-539). In their answer entitled "opposition" filed on 22 June 1957, the appellees alleged that civil case No. 10759 had been dismissed without trial on the merits and criminal case No. 129 had been dismissed without prejudice; and contended that civil case No. D-413 for declaratory relief does not raise any question prejudicial to the determination of criminal case No. 263 because the former refers to facts separate and distinct from those alleged in the latter case; that as the same acts that constitute the crime of estafa alleged in criminal case No. 263 are referred to in civil case No. D-413 the criminal case for estafa should first be decided before trial in the civil case could proceed; and that in civil case No. D-413 the appellant is not the real party-in-interest because he was not privy to any of the parties in the deed of quitclaim sought to be construed. After trial and after the appellant had submitted his memorandum, on 30 July 1957, as stated at the outset of this opinion, the Court entered an order denying the writ prayed for, on the ground that although the appellant's "claim of persecution" by the appellees seems to be "borne out by the previous cases between the parties which were dismissed," yet the former has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, for at the opportune time he could set up all defenses and appeal in case of an adverse judgment; and that the Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the Justice of the Peace Court have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation in criminal case No. 263.
1wph1.t

On 2 August 1957 the appellees Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel filed a motion praying that the statement of the Court in its order, to wit: "There seems, however, to be a justification on the claim of persecution on the part of petitioner. There is borne out by the previous cases between the parties which were dismissed," be deleted. On 10 August 1957 the appellant filed his notice of appeal "to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the said decision is contrary to law and the evidence." . On 14 August 1957 the Court entered an order setting the motion of the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel for hearing on 21 August 1957 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning and directing that a copy of the motion be furnished the appellant immediately. On the same day, 14 August 1957, the appellant filed the appeal bond and prayed that the Court approve it. On 21 August 1957 the Court granted the appellant until 26 August 1957 to answer the motion of the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel. On 24 August 1957 the appellant filed his answer to the said motion. On 11 September 1957 the Court approved the appeal bond filed by the appellant and denied the motion of the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel for the reason that it had lost jurisdiction of the case by the perfection in due time of an appeal taken by the appellant. The Court also ordered the transmittal of the record of the case to the appellate court. On 14 September 1957 the Court of Appeals received the record of the case. On 28 November 1959 the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on the ground that only a question of law is involved.

The undisputed facts of the case are: On 29 January 1949 the appellees spouses brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against the appellant for recovery of P2,000 as damages suffered and P1,500 as attorney's fees spent by the former as a result of a fraudulent drafting by the latter of a deed of sale purporting to convey their parcel of land to Francisco Bongato and execution thereof by the appellee spouses under the belief that it was a deed of partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked the appellant to draft (civil case No. 10579, Exhibit A). To this complaint the appellant and co-defendant Francisco Bongato filed an answer with counterclaim for P5,000 and P500, respectively, as damages for maliciously bringing an unfounded suit calculated to embarass them (Exhibit B). After filing the suit in the Court of First Instance (civil case No. 10579), the appellee spouses filed a criminal complaint for estafa arising from the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10579, against the appellant in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan (criminal case No. 129). At the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 129 on 5 January 1956, the Justice of the Peace Court, at the behest of the appellant, suspended further proceedings until after civil case No. 10579 of the Court of First Instance, which has a direct bearing on criminal case for estafa, shall have been finally decided (Exhibit G).On 21 March 1956, upon motion of counsel for the appellees spouses that they were no longer interested in the prosecution of the case, but over the objection of the appellant who asked to be allowed to prove his counterclaim, the Court of First Instance dismissed the appellees spouses' complaint and the appellant's counterclaim in civil case No. 10579, because the latter could prosecute his claim in another action, his counterclaim being permissive only and not compulsory (Annex C). On 18 June 1956 the appellant filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance against the appellees spouses and co-defendant Vicente Torralba praying that the deed of quitclaim executed by them on 27 March 1948 in favor of Francisco Bongato be declare "the genuine document representing the true intention" of the appellees spouses and that he (the appellant) relieved from civil and criminal liability arising from the part he had taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution thereof; that the appellees spouses be enjoined from impeaching the genuineness and due execution of said deed of quitclaim; that the appellees spouses and their co-defendant Vicente Torralba, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the appellant moral and actual damages in the total sum of P2,900; that during the pendency of the case a writ issue to attach the appellees spouses' and co-defendant's properties to secure the satisfaction of the judgment for damages that the appellant might recover from them; and that the appellant be granted other just and equitable relief (Exhibit D). On 22 June 1956 the appellant filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan a motion to dismiss criminal case No. 129 on the ground that civil case No. 10579, upon the facts of which criminal case No. 129 for estafa was based, already had been dismissed and the determination of the question of whether or not the crime of estafa had been committed by the appellant depends upon the outcome of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment filed by the appellant in the Court of First Instance (Exhibit F). On 9 July 1956 the Justice of the Peace Court dismissed without prejudice criminal case No. 129 (Exhibit H). On 30 April 1957 the appellees spouses again instituted criminal proceedings for estafa against the appellant in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, based on the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10579 (criminal case No. 263). A Provincial Fiscal, a duly appointed Special Counsel or a Justice of the Peace Court has the power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations of crimes committed within their territorial jurisdiction. In the case at bar the crime of estafa imputed to the appellant in criminal case No. 263 was allegedly committed by him in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Undoubtedly, the appellees conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 have the power and authority to do so. But in taking cognizance of the case and conducting the preliminary investigation, did they act with grave abuse of discretion which would entitle the appellant to the extraordinary legal remedy of prohibition and justify the intervention of a court exercising supervisory authority over them? Civil case No. 10579 for damages, brought by the appellees spouses against the appellant was dismissed by the Court of First Instance for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiffs therein and not because the fraud constituting their cause of action and the crime of estafa allegedly committed by the appellant

in fact had not been committed by him (Exhibit C). Criminal case No. 129 for estafa against the appellant was likewise dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court but without prejudice (Exhibit H). The pendency of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the appellant against the appellees spouses in the Court of First Instance, was one of the reasons given by the Justice of the Peace Court to dismiss criminal case No. 129. However, the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be declared.1 Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ prayed for is that the appellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the appropriate case and at the opportune time, he may set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an adverse judgment. As regards the motion to delete from the decision the statement of the Court to the effect that the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel are persecuting the appellant, on 2 August 1957 when the motion was filed, the Court still had jurisdiction of the case for it was only on 10 and 14 August 1957 when the appellant filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond and the appellant had not yet perfected his appeal. Hence, the Court should have acted upon it. In fairness to the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel, their act of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 for estafa against the appellant does not constitute persecution; on the contrary they should be commended for their zeal and devotion to duty. It was incumbent upon them to inquire whether an offense had been committed, and, if they should find it had been committed, to charge and prosecute the guilty party. The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

In the order appealed from the Court states that after trial of civil case No. D-539, on 3 July 1957 it dismissed civil case No. D-413 "on the ground that said action is improper."

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-67540 January 17, 1985 FLORENDA SALCEDO, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTHER NOBLES BANS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch LXXII, Olongapo City and HOWARD ALEXANDER & RICHARD ROYNON, respondents. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents. RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A Petition for certiorari calling for the interpretation of Section 9 of the Rule of Summary Procedure in Special Cases, as amended. Although Municipal Trial Court Judge of Olongapo City, Alex C. Almario, was originally included as one of the petitioners, his name is hereby ordered stricken for having been mis-joined. On November 15, 1983, private petitioner, Florenda Salcedo, filed a Complaint for Grave Coercion against private respondent, Howard Alexander, before the Municipal Trial Court in Olongapo City, Branch I, (Civil Case No. 1176-83). This was followed on November 23, 1983 by another Complaint against private respondent, Richard Roynon, for Unjust Vexation (Civil Case No. 1220-83), before the same Court. The Presiding Judge of said Court considered the two cases as falling within the new Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, and ordered private respondents to appear and submit their counter-affidavits within ten days from receipt of notice. Private respondents filed Identical Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court because what were before it were Complaints filed by private petitioner and not Informations filed by the Fiscal as required by Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. In an Order, dated December 7, 1983, the Municipal Trial Court Judge denied both Motions to Dismiss and gave private respondents up to December 16, 1983 within which to file their counteraffidavits. In another Order, a Motion for Reconsideration was denied and the Municipal Trial Court Judge set the cases for arraignment and preliminary conference. Private respondents then filed a "Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction," before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXII, Olongapo City (Case No. 25-0-84),

presided by the public respondent herein. On April 4, 1984, respondent Judge issued the assailed consolidated Order, which decreed: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby ordered declaring the contested Orders issued by the respondent Judge Honorable Alex C. Almario in Criminal Cases No. 1176-83 and No. 1220-83 null and void; enjoining the respondent Honorable Judge to desist from taking further proceedings in said cases, and making the injunction permanent. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Hence, this Petition where the issue presented is whether or not the filing of an Information as required in Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure is jurisdictional. Said provision reads: Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation; Provided however, that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; provided further, that when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the Fiscal by the offended party. ... (Emphasis supplied). There is no question that the subject criminal cases are cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court in Olongapo City under Section 1-B (4) of said Rule. 1 There is no question either regarding the applicability of the aforequoted Section 9. Olongapo being a chartered city, the prosecution of criminal cases covered by the Rule before said Court is to be initiated by Information. However, as opined by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the requirement in Section 9 "... that in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by Information ...", is not a jurisdictional requirement but a procedural rule. It prescribes the manner of commencing a criminal case covered by the Rule, as indicated in its very title. It designates the specific pleading to be filed in Court to commence a criminal case. This is so for jurisdiction is and may be conferred only by law. The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, by its very title, does not determine jurisdiction of the Courts therein covered. Neither can it affect said jurisdiction because the same is governed by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP Blg. 129) which defines the jurisdiction of the lower Court, 2 although it could be unavoidable that the question of jurisdiction of a Court taking cognizance of a particular case could be involved. Considering that the filing of an Information is not a jurisdictional requirement, respondent Judge erred in sustaining the Motions to Dismiss the two cases at bar and in declaring the contested Orders of the Municipal Trial Judge nun and void. The proper procedure should have been, without dismissing the cases, to have referred them to the City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding Informations if the evidence so warranted. Petitioner urges, however, that the direct filing of a criminal Complaint by an offended party with the Municipal Trial Court in Olongapo City is proper under Section 84 of Republic Act No. 4645, the City of Olongapo Charter, which reads: SEC. 84. Jurisdiction of City Court. The City Court shall have the same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and the same incidental powers as are at present or hereafter conferred by law. It may also conduct the preliminary investigations for any offense without regard to the limits of punishment,and may release, or commit and

bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. (Emphasis suuplied) Petitioner submits that by virtue of said provision, "the offended party can file directly a criminal complaint with the lower Court which complaint, as held in Tabil vs. Ong, L-46773, 91 SCRA 451 (1979), can be the basis of trial on the merits if the offense is cognizable by the lower Court." It is then argued that "if this complaint can be the basis of trial on the merits, there is no justification why the same complaint cannot commence proceedings under the Rule on Summary Procedure since its filing has basis under Section 84." That such is the practice being followed in the Municipal Trial Court in Olongapo City is shown by the listing by the Clerk of Court of said Court of criminal cases directly filed with that Court and being taken cognizance of under the Rule on Summary Procedure since August, 1983 when said Rule became effective. There is no question that under the Olongapo City Charter, the Municipal Trial Court can conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses. That is substantive law. However, pursuant to our constitutional supervision over all Courts, 3 as a matter of policy, 4 we direct the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Olongapo, whenever a criminal case covered by the Rule is initiated by complaint, to refer the same to the City Fiscal for the firing of the corresponding Information, and not to dismiss the case. That would be in keeping with the spirit in which the Rule on Summary Procedure was conceived, and would help ensure the attainment of the expected benefits from the reorganization of the judicial system. ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Order of respondent Judge dated April 4, 1984, is hereby SET ASIDE and the Municipal Trial Court in Olongapo City is hereby directed to refer the Complaints in question to the City Fiscal of Olongapo City for the filing of the corresponding Informations, if so warranted. It follows that, in the meantime, said Court shall suspend further hearings on the subject criminal cases. No costs. SOORDERED. Plana, Relovo, Gutierrez, Jr. and de la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: The primary function of courts is to try and decide cases, not to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, in Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases effective August 1, 1983, the Court provided expressly that "in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, (criminal) cases shall be commenced only by information" at the instance of the metropolitan municipal trial court judges themselves who feared that they would be swamped with preliminary investigations which they would have to conduct (instead of the cities' fiscals) if criminal complaints were to be directly filed with them. The Court has likewise adopted the same rule and policy in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985 governing the institution of all other offenses that "in

Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal." (Rule 110, sec. 1[b]).

Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: The primary function of courts is to try and decide cases, not to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, in Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases effective August 1, 1983, the Court provided expressly that "in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, (criminal) cases shall be commenced only by information" at the instance of the metropolitan municipal trial court judges themselves who feared that they would be swamped with preliminary investigations which they would have to conduct (instead of the cities' fiscals) if criminal complaints were to be directly filed with them. The Court has likewise adopted the same rule and policy in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985 governing the institution of all other offenses that "in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal." (Rule 110, sec. 1[b]).