REFLEXIVE EMBODIMENT IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
SOCIOLOGY 111111 SOCIAL CHANCI
Series Editors: Alcm Warde, Nul.. Cro
In y, 1 htlvtr .. uy of Manchester
Published titles
Amando Coffey - Education ami Social Ch311!Jfl
Gail Hawkes - A Sociology o(Sex and Soxu,lllty
Coli11 Hay - Re-stating Social ami Politlcal Chango
Amly Furlong al/(( Frecf Cartmel - Young Peoplc antl Social Change
Mrt11 Mac an Ghaill - Contemporary Racisms nnd Ethnlclties
Mike Savage - Class Analysis and Social Transformatlon
REFLEXIVE EMBODIMENT IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
Nick Crossley
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ADQUIRIDO POR cft;g/_
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Olc n Univcrsity Prcss
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COLEF BIBLIOTECA
u11l '"" l't 1111 Ntw York, NY 10121 2281J, USA
N11 k< to\\ley 2006
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1 yptwt hy llookl m 1 1 d, Roy\hln, llln lor.l\lurl'
PruHtd 111 l'ol,uuf h) t lZ 1,
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This is for Michele and little fakey ( 18 months).
The two brightest stars in a happy sky .
Contents
'' tit's editor's preface
Ir J.nnwledgements
lntroduction
, , One Reviewing the field
1 ldentity, individualism and risk
2 Civilization, informalization cmd distinction
~ Power, resistance and discipline
4 Consumption. gender and the fashion- beauty complex
/', ut Two Rethinking reflexive embodiment
lnlroduction to Part Two
5 Obesity crisis
6 Blind spots, the absent body and being-for-others
7 1, me and the other
8 Reflexive body techniques and social networks
9 Mapping reflexive embodimenl
Concluson
l<<'{erences
flulex
X
xi
11
24
39
52
68
71
79
88
102
114
140
144
153
Series editor's preface
In response to perceived major transformations, social theorists have offered
forceful, appealing, but contrasting accounts of the predicament of
contemporary western societies and the implications for social life and
personal well-being. The speculative and general theses proposed by social
theorists must be subjected to evaluation in the light of the best available
evidence if they are to serve as guides to understanding and modifying social
arrangements. The focus of the series is the critica! appraisal of general,
substantive theories through examination of their applicability to different
institutional areas of contemporary societies. Each book introduces key
current debates and surveys of existing sociological argument and research
about institutional complexes in advanced societies.
Nick Crossley's book ranges across core areas of contemporary social
sciences- social theory, the body and health, popular and consumer culture,
and social and personal identity. Part One outlines severa! major contribu-
tions to the social theory of the body and embodiment. It develops a lucid
critique. Part Two reviews diverse emprica! studies relevant to evaluating
theoretical claims. The organizing themes are highly topical - obesity,
objectification, body maintenance and body presentation activities. This
vari ed material is supplemented by the author's own original research, which
sustains a distinctive and coherent account of how zones of bodily practice
come to be inhabited unequally by different social groups. A contribution in
its own right to the theory of the body, this book is original and challenging
and will be of interest not only to students but also, because of its vibrant
argument, as a stimulus to reflection and debate among specialist scholars.
AJan Warde
1
1
11
Acknowledgements
This book was written during rcwarch tune granted to me jointly by the
Sociology discipline arca and the CcrHrc tor Research in Socio-Cultural
Change (CRESC) at the Univcrsity ot Manchester. Thank you to both for
making this extended period ot lcavc possible.
lntellectually, the book has bccn influenced by the many third-year
undcrgraduatcs who llave takcn my '13ody and Society' course at Manchestcr
ovcr the six or seven years that it has bcen running. The course is a vehiclc
which has allowed me to shift my thoughts on cmbodiment from questions
of dualism to questions of reflexivity and to begin to gct my head around
sorne of the embodicd practiccs that shapc our bodies in contemporary
society. The dcmands, commcnts, critkisms, rccommcndations and encour-
agement that students havc offcrcd in that proccss of transition have been
invaluablc.
1 wou1d also like to thank AJan Wardc, who suggcstcd that 1 write this book
and offered support along thc way, and Simon Williams, whose ideas and
projccts have pla}'Cd their usual role ot kick-starting me into action.
At 18 months my son jakc has bccn too busy to offcr much intellectual
input and has no doubt had to bite his tonguc whcn he has spotted flaws in
thc argument. He has done more than his fair sharc of the emotional work,
howcvcr, and has a wondertul knack tor taking my mind off writing when
this is neccssary. Finally, thanks as evcr to Mkhcle. Her contributions are too
numerous to mcntion but juggling hcr own busy schedule to let me get this
written has ccrtainly bccn a big onc.
lntroduction
llus book is about reflexive embodiment in contemporary Westero societies.
In 1 he present chapter 1 will map out the way in which J will tackle this issue.
1\l'lore 1 do, however, 1 need to unpack my subject area. 1 begin with a
'IJ\cussion of what 1 mean by reflexive embodiment.
What is reflexive embodiment?
'Pl'llcxive embodiment' refers to the capacity and tendency to perceive,
111ote about, reflect and act upon one's own body; to practices of body
111ndification and maintenance; and to 'body image'. Reflexivity entails th<lt
1111' object and subject of a perception, thought, feeling, desire or iJction ciH'
IIH same. When 1 look in the mirror, for example, 1 am both thc sulljl'< t wl1n
,,.,., somebody in the mirror and the object who is seen. LikL'W\<', wllt'll 1
w.t\ll 1 am both the object who is washed and the subject or < ~ g < ' l l l wiJn ""' \
tlu washing. There is no necessity to this coincidencc ol sub!'< t .11ul "''1''' t
Wlten 1 was a baby my mum washed me, muchas 1 now w;sll "'' \CIII \ rHI
wlunllook in my driving mirror 1 see other peoplc hel1i1ultnt . 1\111 wlrc11 tire
IJt'< t and subject are the same we have reflexivity.
In defining our relations and actions towards ou1 l>odtvs .t\ ll'll\'\lvv 1 .1111
111,11- 111g an assumption; namely, that we are our bodics. 11 1 Wl'I'L' solliL'tillltg
rrtlll'l than my body then my relation to my body would not be rcllexive
111 '.lll\1.' the subject and object in the relationship would be distinct beings. In
111 'ontext of the history of philosophy this notion that we are our bodies is a
< "llil'stable assumption. The founder of modero philosophy, Ren Descartes,
Wllt tng at the dawn of the modero era, famously argued both that mind and
1" d \ .11'1.' two distinct substances and that his real essence la y in his mind
111, ., .tries 1969; Crossley 2001). Furthermore, in making this claim he was
clloiiVIIlg, in part, on religious ideas which are still adhered to by sorne today-
Id _,., ol an immortal soul which separates from the body upon death. From
1111-. point of view my body and 1 are two different things, even though 1 am
1 111h"divd in the sense that 1 reside, as a soul, within a body. In common with
111o' 1 < ontcmporary philosophers and social scientists, 1 do not accept this
2 lntroduction
dualist position. 1 have explaifltd ''lllll' ol mv rl'a">ons for this elsewhere
(Crossley 2001) and will not rlitl'r,lll' lhl'm. \uHicc it to say that 1 am
persuaded that we are bodics, nothing lllOil' and nothing less, and thus that
our relations to and actions upon 'our hodit'' arl' rcflexive.
Having said that 1 rcjcct duali\m, it , impoll,lllt to concede that reflexivity
generatcs a livcd scnsc of separation (or plrhap' ot \cparation and conncction)
ben.vccn self ami body. As 1 cxplain in Chaptl'r 7. it cntails that wc turn back
upon ourselvcs, gcnerating a temporal '>plit hltwl'cn subjcct and objcct ancl, as
thc terms suggcst, objectifying Our l'mbodiment is cxpcricnccd, to
an extent, in a manner akin toan externa! ohjl'l't, such that wc might be lcd to
dcem it, incorrectly, as externa! to our trul' '>clf. This is reflected in our
refcrences to 'the body'. Talk of 'thc body' objcctifil's our cmbodiment but at
thc same time abstracts and separatcs it trom our bcing as a whole. 1t creates a
sense of dualisrn and risks the catcgory error that sorne philosophers have
identified as the foundation of dualist thought (Rylc 1949; Crosslcy 2001). At
thc same time, however, this objcct that is abstractcd from us in rcflcxive
consciousncss is also experienced as a possession ami thcreby reintegrated into
our sclf ami idcntity. We talk about 'my body', what '1' am going todo to 'it',
what 'it' looks like. '1' and 'it' are clearly distinguished but 'it' is identificd as
'my' possession: for example, 'Ooes my bum look big in this?', 'I wish 1 didn't
have curly hair', 'l'm going to get my nose done.' Building upon Gabriel
Marcel's (1965) formulation, therefore, we must conceive of our cmbodiment
in terms of the twin aspects of 'being' and 'having'. Human bodics exist in two
dimensions. We are our bodies (bcing) but sometimes perceivc them as an
objcct that we possess (having) and which we might expericnce, in sorne
contcxts, as taken frorn us (alicnated) by way of the actions of othcrs: for
examplc, when they exercise authority over our body or whcn we become
uncomfortably aware that they are staring at us and using our image for their
own purposes, without our consent (see also Tumer 1984; Bartky 1990).
Thc body can be objectified and 'constructed' in many ways, acquiring
various rcprcscntational meanings which both shape and are shaped by
differcnt practiccs of modification and maintenance. Compare, for cxample,
those rcligious groups who regard the body as sinful and seek to mortify it by
way of sclf-flagcllation, with contemporary 'health cults' who valorizc the
body as the sourcc of life and attribute to it needs which thcir membcrs scek
to service. We must be attcntive to this variability of meaning and must be
sure to undcrstand reflexive bodily practices in accordance with thc mcanings
of thcir practitioncrs. 1 do not mean to suggest that mcaning, as a propcrty of
perccption or discourse, comes bcfore or independently of practice. The body
can takc on a mcaning for usas a consequence of the way in which wc lcarn
to use it. Engaging in cxcrcise, for example, may change m y perccption of my
body and thc meaning it has for me. Meaning and practice each shapc the
othcr in a continuous interaction. My point is simply that we must be
attcntive to nwaning as wdl "' prartin. One of my criticisms of much
contemporary 'g1<111d tlll'ory' \Urrounding rdll'\ive embodimcnt will ht that
it laih lo >l'lll'llal! the IIH'<lllin:' .ulu.llly hld to practice hy sm ial ;gnl\
<11 1 lw Ullllll ' lt' .IIHI lind h 1 1l
1\odi,s .11\' nol \ 1111)11\' p.1\\i\t <ltl'll \ 111.11 1\'l ' lll.lllipul.lli' ,uul l'"'lt'l 1
lntroduct1on
1 1eanings on to, however. Our bodies can rcsist thc meanings we attcmpt to
impose upon them, as when illncss reveah a vulnerability 1 was not
previously aware of and falsifies my claim to be 'fine', or grey hairs and
.Khes and pains call my youthful sclf-image into question. Bodies change in
, . ays that we ha ve not anticipated, somctimes as unintended consequences of
e 1.1r actions, sometimes because they (we) are biological and physical beings,
by forces, elements and relations bcyond the social domain, at least in
the pure definition of that domain usually employed by sociologists. Bodies
J'Ct fatter, lose fitness and, if left unattended, become smelly and unkempt.
hey do not stay the same if wc choose not to maintain them and our
111aintenance work must accommodate their dispositions and tendencies.
\>1oreover, to reiterate, bodies are subjccts and agents in the reflexive process.
11 is central to the concept ot reflcxive embodiment that body modification
.111d maintenance are embodicd practiccs. '13ody work' is physicallabour that
wc, qua bodies, perform upon oursclvcs. In sorne cases this may involve more
than one person, an interaction and pcrhaps a division of labour. Although
mdividuals can tattoo or picrce themselves, for example, it is more common
to be tattooed or pierced ata parlour by an cxpert. Thc agent docs not litcrally
modify his or her own bocly in thcsc cases but thc practice is sli ll lt'lll'\1\1'
inasmuch as, by the fact of contemplating a changl' to 'm}' hod>' hl' o1
has occupied the twin roles of subjctt ami objtt t . 111<1 lll'l,lll\l' nodll , .1111111
uwolves embodied skills and work, allwit on bl'll.lll ol .lg<' lll "vtr
body modifies your body through llw llll'di.llion ot plly'i' .11 lo<l s ,Hui
tl'chniques. In many cases, morcovl'l, lllt' individu.11 hi111 "' lu'll J'tlil""l'
whatever body work is requrcd. \\'l 1 ll-.111 ou1 o1111 t th, "'''" <1111 1 IH .,
s 1ave ourselves, brush our own han, jo: olll\1'11'1'\ lit, l'l .
Collective bodies
So far 1 have framed rcflcxil'ity in indi,iduiil ll'rnl\. IIH'II' .111
collective aspects that wc mu\t hl' attl'nti\'l' to, hmn'\'l'l. Fl'l, .... ,, H'l) ' , \)( ""
or 'populations', as embodicd plwnomcna, l,ll1 he iiiHI olll'll .IH' 1111
object of reflexive discourse ami intcrvcntion. 1 he discourscs ami ntuvlll
lons associated with public health are an obvious example. Thcir tocus i't not
the body of the individual but the collcctive body. Likewise, the subject ot
,uch reflections is not the individual but, at the very least, an individual
rcprcsentative of the social body and more oftcn a network of representativcs,
tcams, committees, etc. Evcn at the individual leve!, however, reflextve
mbodiment is achieved by way of the mcdiation of practices which are, in
.ome degree, diffused within and dcrivecl from a collcctive- practices which
lile individual has not invented for hcrsclf, which may both pre-date and
outlive her, and whose 'rules', 'logic' or 'feel' she has had to learn. Practices
can become so deeply engrained within the pre-reflcctive, habitual life of our
hlldics that we eithcr cease to notice that we pcrform them or experience
tllem as 'natural instincts' or 'common semt'. As '>UCh they seem individual.
\V
1
thout denying the cxistence of cithlr Individual habits or biologically
IOOil'll dispositions, sociology liblrall'\ 11\, whl'll' appropriate, from thcse
6 lntroduction
M y focus is u pon contemporal) WL'\lt'lll \ot itties rather than the contrast
between them and other societll t ypt'' hm\'l'\'CL
llaving said this, there are two of 'contemporary' in the book,
deriving from the different focm ol liH: 1\ riters 1 ha ve consulted. And in the
proccss of writing thc book 1 have heen by thc comparisons and
contrasts that seem to keep emcrging lwtween thcm. Sorne of the litcrature on
reflexive embodimcnt is focused upon the pattern of social lifc that bcgan to
takc shapc in thc eighteenth century, a pattern of social life that is often
classified as 'modcrn' and 'industrial'. Other writcrs focus on the period from
the 1970s onwards, a period that has variously been termed 'post-industrial',
'postmodern' and 'late modcrn', to name but a few. 1 do not have the spacc to
rejoin the debates that have surrounded these terms ancl their various
referents. 1 will deal with thc issues raised when and wherc they arise, as and if
they are rclevant. lt is important to be minclful of thcsc two senses of
'contemporary' in what follows, however, particularly in Part Onc of this
book. At least sorne of the disagrecments 1 identify bctwecn sociological
perspcctivcs ancl sorne of my own criticisms hinge upon claims rcgarding
social change in the 1960s and 1970s. This does not complctely undcrminc
the claims of those who operate with a broader (ancl older) scnsc of
'contemporary' as there clearly are many respccts in which society in thc
post-1970s era manifcsts the key features of the modern societies that began to
take shape in the eightecnth century. There are both continuitics ami shifts.
The aims of the book
The literature on reflexivc embodiment is large and growing. Therc is a
healthy body of empirical material addressing a range of reflexive bodily
practices, from tattooing and piercing, through clothing, to working out,
jogging, bodybuilding, beauty treatments and cosmetic surge!)' (Featherstone
1982, 2000; Sanders 1988; Rosenblatt 1997; Pitts 1998, 2003; Monaghan
1999, 2001 a; Sasatelli 1999a, 1999b; Sweetman 1999; rurner 1999; De Mello
2000; Entwistle 2000; Gurncy 2000; Crossley 2004a, 2004b 2006). In addition,
and one step removed from this, there are a number of 'grand theories' which
were perhaps never intended as theories of 'reflexive embodiment' but which
have become standard reference points in debates regarding it. The theorics 1
have in mincl are those of Giddens (1991), Elias (1994), Bourdieu (1984),
Foucault (1979, 1980) anda numbcr of feminist writers who are influenced
in many cases, by Foucault, among thcm Bartky (1990) ancl Bordo (1993). '
This literaturc is cxciting and interesting but problematic. Specifically, we
lack the 'big picture' as far as rcflexive embodiment is concerned. One would
not expect. thc big picture from the empirical studies, focuscd as they are
upon specific practices. Thcy focus on dctails, as thcy should. Ilowever, this
begs the qucstion of how thl'ir divtrse linding\ lit togcther. To my rnind thcy
descrilw 'rtgions' oiHil( lltT whidt IH'l'd pulling togcther in a broadcr map of
tht ttnun. Om of my kl'Y 111 tlii\ llnol; is to lwgin lh(' wnrk of
nlll\lna ting \11( h .1 111.1p.
' IIH t',\\1111!: ':r.uHI lht'llllt'\' ,uc 11 \ l'lllllll IIth fl' \J't ' l t hut 111111 1\
lntroduction 7
In part this is because many of tlwm wt'll ' not intended as theories of
'reflexive embodiment' and come at lht lopll t.ulgtntiall}. In part it is
bccause they and their reprcsentativt''> ha\'l' nol hl'l'll particularly responsivc
to recent empirical work or were formulatnl hdore much work had bccn
done. However, it is also because thcw tiH'IHit'' .m partial in both senses of
the word. They seek to depict sockty l\ <1 whok in a very particular way: for
cxample, as detraditionalized, Ci\ilittd, da" dividcd, disciplinar} or
patriarchal. And their contribution to tlll' lil'ld .. to offcr a framework, such
as 'the civilizing proccss' or 'tht carnral network', which empirical
rcscarchers are invited to slot thcir work into. Wc are invited to look at 'this'
)factice as an examplc of 'that' thcorcti<:al contcntion or social process. fhis
can be a valuable exercisc, and ttrtunl} <.'ach of thesc frameworks has
something to offer us, but that 1s thc probkm: <.'ach has something to offer
but, as with the empirical contril>ulions, wc lack a means of pulling these
mntributions together. We necd a ml'ta-pcrspectivc. Or rather, we need to
consider whether a mcta-perspcctivt is possible. This too, is an aim of the
book: to move beyond thc partial and tangential theories of reflexive
embodiment towards a more cornprehensivc position.
1 am not advocating eclecticism. 1 do not belicve that wc should mix a bit
of Foucault with a bit of Giddens and add Bourdieu to taste. Rather, 1 am
suggesting that we take a good look at what each perspective has to say about
rcflexive embodiment, at a basic leve!, bracketing out differences that wc do
not need to attend to, in an cffort to S(.'C whether and how their claims might
be compatible. To return to my carlier metaphor, and not for the last time, 1
want to construct a map which arrangcs thc various 'regions' of practice they
1dentify relative to one anothcr to form a reprcscntation of the broader
tcrritory.
However, 1 only want to include ideas that stand up. 1 do not want to
incorporate every idea, theory or observation that has ever been made about
rcflexive embodimcnt. Sorne will be wrong and all will havc limitations.
.\nother of m y key aims, thereforc, is to rcview the grand thcories in terms of
both their interna! coherencc and their empirical credibility.
My final aim is to offer my own reflcctions upon the relations, processes
and practices involvcd in bod} maintcnance ami modification. In spitc of al!
the research and all thc theory, it sccms tome that 'ret1exive embodimcnt' is
,till something of a 'black box' that wc thcorize and research around without
cver fully penetrating. Wc ncvcr pin down cxactly what is involved. This is
something 1 hope to address through a discussion of bodily absence (Chaptcr
6), reflexive body techniques (Chapter 8) and George Herbert Mead's (1967)
tascinating account of the naturc of selfhood and reflexivity (Chapter 7).
Related to this, moreover, 1 want to highlight the blind spots in our
rl'flexivity, to consider how boclily (biological) processcs interact with social
processes in non-reflexivc ways, and to consider how reflexive bodily projects
1111ght be triggercd or affectcd by unintcnded bodily changes which shock us
or takc U'> h} \tuprisl' (Cilapter )). 1 hat is, 1 want to elucidate reflexivc
l'mbodinwnt h), .IIIHIIlg\1 otlwr thing,, i<kntilving certain of its limits and
ohstaclts.
8 lntroduction
Plan of Part One
The book comes in two parts. In Part Onc 1 critically review the grand theories
of reflexive embodiment referred to above. In Part Two I offer my own more
positive contribution. The chapter plan for Part Two is given in a separate
introduction to that part. The chaptcr plan for Part One is as follows. Chapter
1 reviews the respective theories of Durkheim and Giddens. Chapter 2 deals
with Elias and Bourdieu. Chapter 3 deals with Foucault. Chapter 4 deals with
theories of consumer society and with a number of feminist critics who have
both contributed to the consumer society debate and, in sorne cases, added a
feminist slant to Foucault's ideas. My outlines are schematic and in each case I
consider sorne of the most pertinent criticisms of the perspective in question.
A more general review of the theories as a whole is given in the Introduction
to Part Two, in preparation for the work which follows in that half of the
book.
Part One
Reviewing the Field
1 ldentity, individualism and risk
As 1 explained in the lntroduction, this first part of the book offers a
\ystematic and critica! review of the main perspectives on reflexive
cmbodiment in contemporary sociology. In this first chapter I examine two
positions: those of Durkheim and Giddens respectively.
Body modification in 'elementary' societies
Durkheim discusses body modification in Elementary Fonns of the Religious
Iif:, in the context of an analysis of aboriginal totemic clans. Members of
these clans, he notes, often bear a symbol of their totem on their body. In
\ome cases this is temporary and serves very specific ritual purposes. Often,
however, clan members undergo permanent modifications. They tattoo or
\car their body; they pierce; they stretch their neck, earlobes or lips;
\ometimes they knock out a tooth:
rhey do not put their coat-of-arms merely upon things which they possess,
but they put it upon their person; they imprint it upon their flesh; it
becomes part of them, ... it is more frequently u pon the body itself that
the totemic mark is stamped; for this is a way of representation within the
capacity of even the least advanced societies. It has sometimes been asked
whether the common rite of knocking out a young man's two front teeth
at the age of puberty does not have the object of reproducing the form of
totem ...
(Durkheim 1965a: 137)
Totems and totemic symbols, Durkheim believes, represent the clan itself as a
1ollective. By physically bearing the mark of the totem or a related sign, he
lll<tintains, the individual identifies herself with her collective, thereby
nvivitying its identity and cohesion. By bearing the mark of the group the
111dividual H' lllfon ts .lwMt'IH'\S of its existence amongst both insiders and
<HII\t1krs dtHI dt Liit s t l ~ t t .illcgiance to it. She reproduces the mechanistic
I<Hill ot soltd.iitl}' lloll ol< t< ti\lil ot sutil l'lcmcntary collcctivcs and analysed at
hngt 11 lly 1 '"'''"'1111 ti"'' 11 111 1/lt' 1 lll 'l\11111 of 1 uho111 Tllc n.tt tices emerge, he
12 Reviewing tl1e field
claims, because collectively thc group gencrates both an esprit de corps that
induces a desire within the individual to cxprcss their belonging and an
externa! (to the individual) prcssure to demonstrate loyalty. The body is the
focus of these pressures and practices b<.causc it is the way in which we exist
for others. The body sets the individual apart both physically and as a site of
sensual experience. 1 am identifiable asan individual by virtue of my discrete
bodily boundaries and existence, ami my cxpcrience of the world is uniquely
my own because it is localized within this discrete organic entity and reflects
the unique position in the world that l inhabit at any moment in time. My
body connects me to others at a primordial leve!, however, because it both
makes me perceptible to thcm, positioning me within their field of experience,
and affords me a sensual apprchension of their embodied being. At thc basis of
the social world is an intercorporeal intertwining of sensuous-sensible, beca use
embodied, bcings (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 1968a). Altering the body thercforc
has profound social significance. It affects our relations with others:
tattooing should be the most direct and expressive means by which the
communion of minds can be affirmed. The best way of proving to onesclf
and to othcrs that one is a mcmber of a certain group is to place a
distinctive mark on the body.
(Durkheim 1965a: 265)
This is just onc way in which the group celebratcs and consolidatcs its
existence. The esprit de corps of the group is maintained by way of regular
festivals and rituals, as well as collective stories and symbols, such as the
totem. And these overlap with body modifications in so far as the latter
signify, in various ways, the stories and symbols of the tribe, and are
themselves performed as rituals at festivals. The modification of the body of
an individual is usually an event for the whole community or at Ieast a select
group, as is proper toa ritual which marks the belonging of the individual to
the group. Others bear witness to the marking of the individual and confer
meaning upon it.
In addition to symbolizing basic group membership, Durkheim continues,
body markings indicate social positions and distinctions within the group. In
addition to the distinction between insiders and outsidcrs, there is often a
distinction between men and women, and between children and adults. In
rclation to sex, natural markers, invested with meaning in culture, are
rejoined by a variety of further alterations of the body which signify many
different things, including bcliefs regarding sexual difference, beauty and
fertility. In the case of children and adults, transition from one status to thc
other is often marked, in sexually diffcrentiated ways, by a rite of passage.
Moreover, this very oftcn involves some form of physical test, which can be
painful. Often the body is cut or scarred. Durkheim suggests that such pain is
integral to solidarity building. To fully make sense of his understanding of
this, we need to be mindful of his contcntion that religions, and through
them societics, are founded on a di\tlnction lwtween the sacrcd ancl the
profane whkh, to pul it nuddy, lll.lp\ onto a dhtinction bctwt'l'll a group
and l\ 'othtl\
1
(t.g. Olll\idtJ\ ,11111 1111' n:lllll,) woild). l'ilil I(ll,tl\, (luildlt'ill
\ll).:).:\'\1\, \)"lllholitt" .1 ol llu p1nl.111t' and .111 ,lltt"\'.nn In the
ldentity, individualsm allll risk 13
'a e red. Individuals achieve sacred status (i.e. t ull group llll'mbcrship) by
ovcrcoming the limitations of the flesh:
we cannot detach ourselvcs from fthe protarw] witlwut doing violence to
our nature and without painfully wounding om lll'itincts. In other words,
the negative cult cannot develop without C<lu'>ing '>uffering. Pain is one of
its necessary conditions.
(Durkheim 196Sa: 351)
Enduring pain, he goes on to argue, is a way in which the individual is trained
to put the interests of society above her own. Avoiding pain is onc of the most
natural of our reactions and consenting to endure it is therefore a clear
indication of our willingness to defy our nature in tavour of social duties and
demands. In ordcr for societies to survivc, individuals must be prepared to
'>ubordinate certain of their own egoistic wishes and wants for the good of the
group, and the group therefore demands of them that they both learn and
prove that they are prepared to do this. Pain rituals play a crucial role in this
respect.
l'his relates to a more general point about asceticism. All societies,
Durkheim argues, place restrictions upon bodily activity and this is necessary:
society itself is possible only at this price .... it is constantly doing violence
to our natural appetites, just because it raises us above ourselves. lf we are
going to fulfill our duties towards it, then we must be prepared to do
violence to our instincts sometimes and to ascend the decline of nature
when it is necessary.
(Ourkheim 1965a: 356)
In some cases these restrictions may serve the practica! function of prevcnting
hehaviours which are disruptive to social order. Groups have to restrict
outbursts of aggression, for example, otherwise they might collapsc into
llobbes's (1971) war of each against all. In other cases, however, the function
of asceticism is symbolic. As with pain rituals, individuals are expected to rise
above their appetites in order to prove their loyalty to the group. Thc Muslim
practice of Ramadan and the Christian practicc of Lcnt may both be
interpreted in this light. They are both tests of a devotion which, in
Durkheim's view, is devotion to one's group.
1 his account suggests that collective life, which is a 'state of nature' for
human beings, nevertheless generates demands which conflict with certain of
our basic individual impulses. Belonging to a society dcmands that we
compromise and that we learn to overcome and control these impulses. In
the first instance this is a conflict between the particularism of the individual
and thc universalism of the group, and it is played out in overt social
interactions, as when a parent reprimands a child for contravening a norm. As
1ndivduals internalize the demands of the group, however, it becomes an
'interna!' conflict hctween conscicnce ancl impulse. Durkheim argues that it is
the expcricnn ot thi'> interna! conflict which leads us to belicve, incorrectly
in his vicw, in tiH t'XI\It'IH't of an immatcrial '>otil '>Cparatc from the hocly.
"1 al k ot a ''><Hil', lit' ,ugnl's, 1s .1 JlH' s<.itntilic w.ty ol mal-.tng stnse of thc moral
nt'\\llll' Wt' '"1111'111111''> txp'It'lln' within oul\t'hl'\, .t pn'isurc whit h is
14 Reviewing the field
interna! and yet experienccd '" dl\\()1 i.tll'd tmm our basic desires and
derivativc of a higher source. We <lit' light lo think that this pressure comes
from a highcr sourcc than our ndivdn.d hody, l>urkheim argues, but not
becausc it dcsccnds from a spirilual r('aln1. lls source is the inter-world of
social interaction and the imprinl il ka\l''> upon our individual conscience.
The cult of the individual
The collectivism that Durkheim identitil'> in 't'ltmentary' societies has been
displaced in modern societies, he by a 'cult ot the individual'. We no
longer celebrate the collective but rathcr thc individual, or at least the
individual is now the totem of the group ami individualism a key value. The
primacy of collective identity has given way to that of individual identity. In
particular, many of the key philosophics as wcll as the law of modern,
enlightened societies afford the individual a moral and existential privilege
that was not apparent in earlier times. This theme of individualism in
modern societies is central throughout Durkheim's work and there are
points, even in his early studies, where it is explorcd via the body. In The
Division of Labour, for example, he notes that the legal systems of Ancient
Greek city-:>tatcs often included prescriptions regarding dress, hair and
beards. By Roman times, he continues, this aspect of law, though still
evident, was less so. And in modero societies it has all but disappeared
(Durkheim 1964: 159). Decisions about appearance are now made by the
individual herself, albeit within accepted bounds. Likewise, he notes that
customs linking forms of dress to particular occupations and classes, which
in the Middle Ages were reinforced by laws prohibiting the lower classes
from wearing certain typcs of clothing, have gradually disappeared. In
modero societies, he notes, we are free to wear what we want. In addition, he
notes how modern societies are characterized by increased geographical
mobility and the formation of cities, wherein members of different national
and regional cultures mix and meet. This generates an interplay of cultures,
he argues, which tends to undermine the authority of specific cultures and
unsettle traditions. The latter lose their taken-for-granted feel and grip as
agents learo about different perspectives and lifestyles, giving way to
individual choice.
lt is necessary at this juncture to note a distinction in Durkheim's work
between egoism and individualism, and to reflect briefly upon the 'body
project' with which he is most famously associated: suicide. Individualism,
for Durkheim, is a social phenomenon in a strong sense. It entails that the
individual, as a moral category, is clearly articulated in law, morality and
other cultural forms, such that the rights and duties of individuals are clearly
proscribed and cach individual recognizcs and respects both self and other as
individuals. Durkheim has a 'sociologized' version of Kant's (1948, 1997)
moral theory. lndividuals live as llldlvldual\ hut within a strong (individua-
listic) moralll<llllt'worJ..: whirh dl'I\'l'' l1onl lhl'ir social world. 1 he mlividual
is not \t'l p.ul trom sotl'l)' hui \'\'1\' 111111 h ,IHodutl ot il. 'J'IH'Illnl.ll id and
id,ll ollhl indi\'idlr,IIIH'Inng'> lo liJe e lr\1' rq>rl'\l'lll.tlioll\ t>l ''" ll'l)". 11 \
ldentity, indrvidualism wul risk 15
,, social ideal. And sentiments of the individual qua andh dual are products of
lollective experience. Furthermore, the modero individu,ll, with all the noble
l.ttulties granted them by Kant, no less than tlle mcml>er of the aboriginal
LI.JO, rises above their animal nature to the extent that thcir society demands
.ami trains them to. A 'man is a man only bccause he is civilised', Durkheim
1 1965a) argues, and civilization is an effect ot collective intcraction between
111dividuals. The interaction of individuals and groups has, over historical
time, given rise to a society and culture which, when internalized, make
e 1ntemporary individuals what they are, allowing thcm to reproduce (and
over time modify) that self-same socicty:
the individual gets from society the best part of himself, al! that gives him
a distinct character anda special place among other beings, his intellcctual
and moral culture. lf we should withdraw from mcn their language,
sciences, arts and moral beliefs, they would drop to the rank of animals ....
But on the other hand, society exists and lives only in and through
individuals.
(Durkheim 1965a: 388-9)
by contrast, suggests a situation in which the binding power of
c;ociety and culture has weakcned, throwing individuals back upon their
primary, animal nature. Selfishness and a lack of respect for others, the less
{ivilized and thus lcss social aspect of the human condition, thrive in this
wntext but so, too, does existential crisis because human meaning and
idcntity, which derive from the collective, are amongst the casualties.
lt is for this reason that Durkheim (1952) writes in Suicide of an 'egoistic'
lorm of thc act. The individual thrown back u pon himself, less integrated in
socicty, is more likely to become personally, psychologically disintegrated
.and is therefore more likely to harm himself, even to the point of self-
dtstruction. Egoistic suicide is rejoined, moreover, by an anomic forro,
generated, as the name suggests, by the erosion of norms in socicties
undergoing change. As norms are eroded, Durkheim argues, the mind
IJecomes less regulated and, in particular, expectations fall out of alignmcnt
with actualities, leading to disillusionment, depression and possibly self-
la;lrm. This is relevant to us since 'sclf-harming' behaviours, particularly those
forms which fall short of suicide, belong within the remit of reflexive
C'mbodiment and have been identified as a growing problem in modero
societies (NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 1998). It has been
.trgued, pcrsuasivcly to my mind, that such behaviours are not, as
psychiatrists sometimes assume, failed suicide attcmpts (Strong 2000;
1 :rtsswell 2005a, 2005b). On the contrary, they are means that individuals
h.t\'(.' for coping with deeply distressing cxperiences which, where successful,
1 .tlm suicida! impulses, thereby allowing the individual to go on living
('\ tmng 2000; Crcsswell 200Sa, 2005b). 1 lowever, the connection with suicide
,uHI thus with l)ut klwim rcmains. Thc causes are the same even if self-
lt.nming shotl l 111 111h tlw :-.uiudal trajectory. And l)urkhcim's analysis of
cgoi\111 ,and <IIWtlll' rnr;ltt IIHrdmt t'lutidall' ll'tlaan mort worrying aspects
ol llll' lrttHI tmv.uch rc"ll, xiw l'tnhodiml'lll 111 < onllupot.IIY societics.
In \Oilll' ll''>JH'< ts tiro ,trfllrrH 111 .tholll gcH\rll .rrtcl ,11111111i< r\ tiH otiH'r \ldl' ol
JI, Httvruwinu 1/, ficld
1111 ,11 1:111111'111 111 1 ii'JJJcnlwJ' Foum ( I<J65a), whic:;h might be read suggesting
111,11 111d1\ .lll' oltl'n preparl'd to harm themselves when they are strongly
lllll').:lollnl 111 .1 .:roup which demamh thi\ ot them. lndeed, Durkheim (1952)
111o1k1'' ltl\1 lh<ll ttrgument in his study of suicide, with respect to its 'altruistic'
1111111. lligh leveh of group integration can override basic human impulses
towartb selfprescrvation in much the same way as Jow Ievels can, he claims.
Modern-day suicide bombers perhaps exemplify this. Durkheim's main interest
in this respect is in suicide but the argument potentially applies to other forms
of body modification, particularly those which can be perceived to cause the
individual pain or to threaten health and well-being.
said all thb, to return to the thread of my earlier argument,
Ourkhe1m also otfers usa framework for understanding retlexive cmbodimcnt
in its modern, individualistic but non-egoistic, non-anomic forms. ro
reiteratc, he points us towards a 'cult of the individual' which membcrs of
moclcrn societies oricnt to and are expected to demonstrate loyalty to by way
of their body work. The body is as important to demonstrations and
celcbrations of individuality as it is to demonstrations and celebrations of the
In addition to cxpressing group loyalty and belonging by way of
our bodi<.'S, we can also express individuality.
Durkheim assessed
Atkinson's (2004) work illustrates this latter point. He interviewcd 92 tattoo
enthusiasts 111 an effort to explore their motivations for becoming tattooed
and thc meanings that their tattoos had for them. A majority said they did it
because they wanted to 'be individual'. Atkinson draws u pon the work of Elias
(see Chapter 2) to make sense of this, but his argument resonates equally well
with Durkheim's argument about the cult of the individual. E ven if having a
tattoo is not particularly unique, sorne people do it because thcy want to be
an individual and, as Atkinson puts it, want to demonstrate their adhercncc
to this kcy modcrn social value. Like the aboriginal maJe who allows his front
teeth to be knockcd out in order to demonstrate his loyalty to thc clan, thc
tattooed individual sccks to prove their individuality toa group which
cxpects this of thcm.
Vcry similar rcsults are rcported in Gill et al.'s (2005) work, in which 140
young British males from a variety of social backgrounds were interviewed
and asked about their body maintenance/modification practices. J'hc ovcr-
whelming fnding was that young men of all social backgrounds place grcat
emphasis upon bcing individual and 'different'. What countcd as individual
diff_cred betwcen intcrviewccs, though not in accordance with sociological
vanables such as class. Sorne wore designer clothes to cxpress thcir
indivi_duality, tor cxamplc, whilst others refused to wear dcsigncr clothcs
tor th1s same rcason. J>ractices and choices wcre uniformly framed in tcrms of
indiv_iduality, howtvtr. Mortmtr, marn othcr studies of reflniw bodily
prat'lrns fl'Jlllll a slron.: t'I11Jlhil\i\ in ;Hlounl\ upon tithtr 111dl\ ulutlily o
1
\l'llhood (l' .:. J),l\i, 1
1
1
1
15, 'i111'l'llllolll 1'1'1'1; llltl k 20C).J), ' 1111'11
l'Vidt' lltl' ln1 .1 '1 11lt nllh1 ind11'1d11,il ' 111 1<1,111<111 lo 11'fh\ht l'llll>t>tllllll'lll.
ldentity, uutlvdu:tll 1111 ,,,,/IIHI\ 1 1
rhere are problems with Ourkhcim's <llT0\1111, hn\\'&'\(' 1 1 il\1 , 1 111 (
11
11
1
11
disputes the linear assumption of Durkhtnl'' tlu'' " 1.1111 t 1 111 .11
, ocieties tluctuate between collectin and 111d11 rd11.llr stH '""' '''' 1 ht
cxperience of the world wars in tlw rnid l\\'1' 1111111 <l' llllll } 1s .1 Htll
cxample of a collective phase. lt i\ olltn ll,lllllt'd 1 h,l 1\'.11\ Hl' llt'r,lll' t """' 111 e
sentiment. lf this is SO, but Ourklll'i lll i' \l 1ll 11gh 1 tlu 1\ ,,. ni IJ11tl r
modification in the gencration ol \olid.ull)', \\'(' would l' XJ>C< 1 w,11 lo rtgisll' l
in reflexive bodily practices. 1 htrc "\OIIIl' , . , llh'IHt' lnl thi'>. In,, hllt'l hi,tmy
of tattooing, for examplc, lk\kllo C:.!OOOl IH>II' s t h.tl lht world war'
stimulated a growth in patnotrt .u1d l,llllll)' lm tl\l'd 1.1ttoos among thc
working class. Individuals expn.'sstd lhl'i1 loyalty lo thcir primary groups by
11ay of a mark on the body. Ami tht n.11un ol thcir marks turther symbolized
this Joyalty. Tattoos involvcd natJontl lla.:s .uHI '}'mbols. rhey involved a
lover's name or the now mtKh tkr idtd 'M u m ami Dad'. rhis finding supports
Durkheim's contention rcgarding llw link hctwccn body marking and social
solidarity but transposes it into tht prescnt and also supports Elias's
rcservations regarding individualization as a linear trend.
Second, following on, howtvcr individualizcd society may be at
particular times, collective forms, such as subcultures and social move-
ments, are always evidcnt and thesc modero 'cults' generally dema_nd
cxpressions of loyalty to thcir collectivc ideal which impinge on reflex1ve
cmbodiment. Fan cultures, such as we find in relation to both football and
pop groups, constitute onc cxample of this; fans wear scarves and hats
declaring allegiance and in sorne cases have club or group emblems tattooed
on their bodies. Another examplc is thc politics of drcss and appearance that
we find in sorne contemporary social movcments and religions, not to
mention the various forms of asceticism these collectives demand. There
were many debates in the 1970s, for example, about how a feminist ought to
(iress and what 'pleasures' shc ought to be prcpared to forgo (Walter 199?;
'lcott 2005). In sorne part thesc wcrc aspccts of poltica! strategy, but 1t
would be nai've to deny that an aspctt of collective identity building was
in volved (Melucci 1986). J'hesc collec:;tivcs are intercsting counter-examples
to the cult of the individual. Howcver, as 1 noted in respect of war tattoos,
they suggest that the mcchanisms of solidarity building that T?urkh_eim
pointed to, including thosc ccntrcd upon the body, have mto
modernity. J)urkheim is right about thc purposc of body mod1f1catwn but
wrong about the demise of its collectivc-focuscd form.
Third, it is reasonable to spcculatc that anomie and widespread egoism
gcncrate a demand for contcxts of bclonging ami intcgration in contempor-
ary societies which subculturcs and movemcnts _ meet. This ?ur
picture as it suggests that an individual who is atfected by anom1e ?r eg01sm
may cngage in extreme body modifications either because of lack of
11
Hcgration or bccause it motivates thcm to join a tightly mtegratecl
,ul>culturc whith dl'mand'i modificatiom as a sign of loyalty. The same
11
ational sotil'l\ l ,111 pllldttct both anomic/cgoistic and altruistic body
lllodititatiom. \vil 11 1 ltts ,,lid, \\'{'tan lurn lo< 11ddtn\.
CQl[F RlPI/()Tr:f'A
18 Reviewing tlie field
Detraditionalization, sclf-11:.r r :rtivcs and risk
Giddens understands rdhx'' .. llu>tlrntl'lll asan aspect of a broader process
of t.he reflexiw fl'Ulii\IIIH lllln tll lhl \l'll. Practices of body modification and
mau1tt'llii1Hl' .IH'Inu11d 111 .111 ' udl'lits, traditional and modern, he claims, but
their ' '"1"'' .a1ul Ir,,., bcen transformed in modernit). Lchoing
Durkhun, l11 " llrat practices of modification and maintenance in
tradiliorr.rl \tlt il'llt'\ lt'lld to be embedded in collective rituals and serve a
dl'li11i1t:. 1ol 01 tunl'tion - for example, as rites of passage. Again like
1 >mkhlrrn: lwwcwr, he believes that modernization has dissolvcd many of
lhl''>l' lradtons. 1 he practices of modification have acquircd a new role in
lhis wntext. Oetraditionalization has removed traditional sources of status
identity and biographical trajcctory, he argues. The questions of who we
as individuals and what we should do with our lives are no longcr answered
for us by cultural scripts and structural restraints. Wc are increasingly forced
to answer these qucstions for ourselves; to reflexively construct a sense of our
identity, biography and future trajectory. Our embodiment is central here
both because it is the very substance of who wc are and must necessarily be
moulded to fit our identity choices, and because, as Durkheim noted it is our
principie mcans of announcing our identity to both ourselves olher
Our external appearance is 'a means of symbolic display, a way of
gtvmg externa! form to narratives of self-identity' (Giclclens 1991: 62).
Reflexivc e.mbodiment is therefore part of a wider reflexive rcconfiguration
of the self m late modern societies:
The body has always been adorned, cosseted and, sometimes, in the
?f higher ideals, mutilated or starved. What explains, howevcr, our
dtshnchve concerns with bodily appearance and control toda)', which
in certain obvious ways from those more traditional preoccupa-
t!Ons? ... fhe body bccomes a focus of administrative power, to be su re.
m?re this, it becomes a visible carrier of self-identity and is
mcreasmgly mtegrated into life-style decisions which an individual makes.
(Giddens 1992: 31)
The cann?t be merely accepted, fed and adorned according
to tradtttonal ntual; 1t becomes a core part of the reflexive projcct of self-
identity. A continuing concern with bodily devclopment in rclation to a
risk culture is thus an intrinsic part of modern social bchaviour.
(Giddcns 1991: 178)
As the first of the two quotations above makes clear, self-identily is not thc
only modern social force shaping the body, according to Giddens. lle rnakes
rcferencc to administrative power, too. 1 wi ll return to that point in later
chapters. For the moment it rnust suffice to note that this is little more than
an for Giddens and that his key argument concerning reflexive
embodunent ctntrcs u pon ib place within thc broadcr narrative conslruclion
of thc modl'lll wll 1 his Mgunwnl , ath anccd, morcovcr, l>y rl'll'rt'llU! to
lhe way 111 wllll h llw l>ody Ira' l> tlllll ', l>olh in opinion and f.ltl, more
m.tlk,tl>lt- ll l.tlt lllodt'lll \Ol il'lit<; IJnnJ lll'lla\'iour modilll'ol!itJII lluough
Ul\llll'!ll \lllgt'l)' In \t 'X 11',1lig11111t 111 , lht Jlllltl'\\ of lllt1tltIII I\, JII OII h,l\
ldentity, individualism and risk 19
involved a proliferation of mcans ot transforming thc body, removing what
were previously fixcd and stablc attributcs. rhe body has become 'a
phenomenon of choiccs and options' (Giddcm 1991: 8). E ven if individuals
have no desire to changc their bod) in thc more radical ways facilitated by
modern technologies, the influx of new possibilities forces them to make a
decision to stay as the) are lhc sensc of necessity that once attached to
particular practices and ways of lite ha\ been liftcd and individuals have no
choice, therefore, but to choose.
There are both similarities and diffcrenccs with Ourkheim in this account.
Both writers emphasize individualism and the collapse of tradition. Where
Durkheim identifies detraditionalization as a sourcc of anomie, egoism and
self-destructiveness, howcver, Giddcm tends to scc it as a liberation and
opportunity. rhe positivc sidc, for Durkhcim, b)' contrast, resides in the
emergence of a new, shared culture centred upon the individual: a
collectively shared indiviclualism. Morcovcr, in consequence, for him, the
cclebration of individuality is, in sorne rcspccts, a celebration of society
because the individual is thc totem of modcrn society.
Detraditionalization and the new possibilities for bodily transformation
are not the only factors shaping reflexive embodiment in late modcrn
societies for Giddens, howcver. In addition, he notes the importance of risk
(see also Beck 1992). Modern medicine, in particular, identifies numerous
sources of risk to our health stcmming from what we eat, how we behave and
from pollutants in our externa! cnvironrnent. Evcn hospitals are identified as
sources of danger in the era of 'supcrbugs'. These risks shape our self-
narratives and body projects. Wc become risk managers in relation to our
embodied selves:
All individuals establish a portfolio of risk asse\smcnt, which may be mort
or less clearl) articulated, well informcd and 'open'; or altcrnati\'cly m.ty
be largely inertial. Thinking in tcrms of risk bccomes morl' or lt'"
inevitable and most pcoplc will be consciom abo of thc ri\k'> of rclu\lng to
think in this way, even if thcy may choose to avoid thosc ri'>ks.
(Giddcm 1991 : 12111
lhis is complicated, however, bccausc, first, thc discoursc ot risk dcal\ 111
probabilities which are often difficult to put in pcrspective, especially tora lay
public who lack statistical compctcncc; second, '>ome risks pull in contra-
dictory directions, such that protccting oncsclf against one danger may
increase one's vulnerability to anothcr; third, the scientific advice is not
always consistent, especiall y where diftcrcnt ami competing camps of experts
are involved, and even where it is, it somctimcs changes over a relatively
\hort time-span. Thc individual is torced to makc difficult decisions in
unclear circumstances. Thc way forward is not clcarly prescribed and she must
lherefore take her own, cxistential stcp. Shc must choose for herself and, in
doing so, choosc hcrself.
< oiddens concedes that at lcast sorne of us are inclined to ignore aclvice
.tl>out risk'> in 0111 mironmnl, l'lldtavouring to conduct our lives as we
.rlways h,l\l' In lt'l,tlrtlll lo llus lalll'l llOint, IH>Wl'H'I, llt reitcratcs thc abo\'t'
poinl lh.tl \\'l' , HP, \tl lo 'illl "" Ullldl'IIIIH'd In hnoSt', \Vt do not han lo
:.'11 HllVIuwt"q tlrr 11olcl
diiiiJ:t ""' ,ttiti H lt ''"' " 111 ''''P"II ' '' '" \UL'IIIIIH. advicc about the dangers of
o ll ltt lnntl \11111 \, lo L'\,IIIIJ'lt , orto g1n up \lllokmg, but it is very difficult to
ol\t old oll\,lll' lll "' lll tlt.tl ollh' iLL' tllld we must actively ChOOSe tO
11 \\'t 1 .11111ol ll\'l' 111 of such risks as our ancestors did. We
lolll ll!ll hchan: 111 .t 'tradttional' manner because tradi ti onal action entails
ig11orancc of the altcrnativcs and absence of choice, but in our society we are
bombarded with inforrnation and alternatives, and we are forccd to choose.
To give an example, Giddcns argucs that we are all 'on a diet'. What he means
by this is not that we are all atternpting to lose weight or all adhering to a
particular regime, such as thc Atkins diet or macrobiotics. So me of us rnay live
on deep-fried Mars bars ami dlips. However, we still makc a choice to reject
the advice of health ancl bcaut} c.xperts and we liYe with an awareness of
altcrnatives. In that our cating patterns are much less shaped by
dccply engrained habits of traclition than they werc in thc past, and much
more by reflection and dccision.
Moral issues impingc here. Thc growth of vegetarianism, for example,
whilst partly fuelled by health concerns, is oftcn more directly related to
conccrns for animal wclfarc ami the environment. And again these ethical
conccrns are sufficicntly diffuse in the population for most adults to be aware
of them. Meat eaters know that thcy eat meat when others choose not to. As
such they cannot but regard their own meat eating as a matter of choice.
Giddcns theorizes this in terms of what he calls thc 'life politics' of late
modernity. Linking into arguments on so-called 'new social movements' (e.g.
\-tclucci 1986), he suggests that the poltica! configuration of late modern
societies has changcd. Thc traditional politics of emancipation, contested by
left- and right-wing partics and movements, has been rejoined, if not
eclipsed, by the emcrgcncc of a range of social movements which have raised
a wide range of new moral issues- movements who have politicized and, toa
degree, reshaped the practices of everyday life. All practiccs are cmbodied and,
in this respect, thc impact of the new social movcmcnts is of great
significance in relation to rcflexive embodiment. In sorne cases, however,
this is even more so as thc body is thematized in the discourse of new social
movements. In addition to vegetarianism, for example, life politics embraces
such issues as abortion, health, sexuality, the use of drugs, legitimate uses of
the body and the alleged repression of possibilities for sensuality in the
modern context. Body projects intcrsect with body politics.
Sorne critics have interpretcd the trends Giddens describes, independently
of him, in terms of a growing 'culture of narcissism' (Lasch 1984, 1991). This
interpretation implies that agents are withdrawing from the world because
they cxperience itas increasingly hostile and beyond thcir own control (Lasch
1984, 1991). They work upon thc body beca use it is theirs and because it is in
thcir control in a way which evcn other aspects of thcmselvcs (e.g. their job
and marital status) are not. Giddcns rcjects these interpretations, adopting a
more Durkheimian view ol thc body as a sign-bcarer in social interaction.
'Body planning', h<. , 'mor<.' oltcn an tngagcrncnt with thc outsidc
world than a dcftmiw wilhdrotw.tllrom it ' ((;iddtns 1991 : 178). As such it is
nol rtarCi\\\Il' 111 lltl' fl')'llto.tn.tl\'tH '<'11\1' lllll'lldld hy tlll'\l' niit\ \gL'Ill\
11101ltf} .111d 111.tili.II1 lllt'll (u u lit '\ \\'1111 , \ <' l\' lo (IICIJl'llillg llH'III\I' h'l'\
Jde nti ty, tndiVI<hr;lism 11111/ risk 21
outwards towards othcr people. However, he a1 u ph 111.11, in psychiatric
tcrms, the so-callcd 'narcissistic disorders' ami \11L 11 ' p. ti of reflcxive
clf-control' as anorexia nervosa have replaced otht" in lhl' li\t of most likely
disturbances in modern societies. Moreover, hl' r10it'' ,, gt'lltll'r in this
domain. Femalcs, he observes, are much more' ulnl'r.mw lo tating disorders,
1ncluding both anorexia nervosa and compuhiw l'.ltlng. 1 his, he argues, is
txplained by thc lack of opportunit ies and powl'l affordcd to women in
contemporary socicty. Women turn to food ami wd-, lo tontrol their eating in
.111 effort to carve out a domain where they art in tontrol. Whcre this becomes
l'XCessive it can spiral out of the woman's control <llltll>ct:orne a disorder. This
h still related to the wider context of rctlc.\il'l' trnhodiment for Giddens,
however. Taking back control could be accompli<.lwd in many ways. The
rcason why eating disorders in particular prcdorninatc is that they are
cxtensions of the body regimcs and refle.xi\'C scll-control that characterize the
li vcs of all agents within late modern societies.
Giddens assessed
1\i otwithstanding the diffcrences between them, the same studies that support
Durkheim's 'cult of thc individual' tend to support Giddcns too, even wherc
t 'le authors claim theoretical differences with him (c.g. Davis 1995). At thc
leve! of individual mcaning, as noted abovc, qualitative rcsearch suggests that
individuals understand their reflexive bodily practiccs as matters of choice
which express individuality, selfhood and individual idcntity (e.g. Sweetman
1999; Atkinson 2004; Black 2004; Gill et al. 2005). Moreover, at Ieast sorne of
lhis work points to the significance of risk, inasmuch as agents either
understand specific modifications (e.g. piercing) as risky ancl elcct to managc
that risk (sce Swectman 1999), or clse cngagc in specific practiccs as a means
of managing widcr environmental and lifestyle-relatccl risks. By the same
oken, howevcr, thc various objections and countcr-examples to the
ndividualization trend that we noted in relation to Durkheim stand in
rclation to Giddens. And thcre are further problcms.
McNay (1999) has argued that certain dispositions, specifically relating to
gcnder, are so dcep-rooted and cngrained that we are both unlikely to spot
them reflexively ami unlikely to be able to change thcm if we do. She uses
llourclieu's conccption of the habitus to capture this sense of deep-seatecl and
>rc-reflexive disposi tions (see Chapter 2). Similarly, Calnan and Williams
( 1991) have argued that individuals do not routincly reflcct u pon themsclves
111 the way Giddens suggcsts, at least with respcct to matters of health, a fact
which they argue is distorted by intervicw-basecl rcscarch which effcctively
l'l' nerates the reflexive discourse it analyses by asking probing questions.
l singa non-directive approach to interviewing, they note that agents do not
spontancously offcr thc kinds of reflexivc accounts of hcalth and thc body
that perspccti\'l'' \\Kh "' that of Gicldens lcad us to c.xpect. Moreovcr,
Jollowing thl\ tlll .11ul dtawing from the the">is of tlll' 'abscnt body' (scc
( llaptcr 6), \\'dlt,IIII S ( 1 'l'lhJ h.l\ argued that r<.lkt:tion ol lhl' kind dc'>cribcd
1>) ( ;tddt'IIS IS 1 (11\ol(lto ' l,llht r lhan chrollit', oiiHI IL'Illh lo IH promplld by
111 1 111 h .1 lhl C t l l ~ l 1 111 lal olltll J>lllhklll\, \\'l thllll-. about our bodies when
1111\ }'11 1\'lltrt}: lul 11111 lllu t\\'1\1', 1 hl\ .tho \Uggc\ts that some groups in
'"t l c l ~ 111.1\ ht 1111111' IIH hncd lo r<:lll'<.tion, smcc thcir bodies are more
''"''l'llllllll\ "' lhtu l.tthng'>. "' wc agc, for cxamplc, our bodies are more
' '''' " 'l'd to lal m and wt art more likcly to be aware of thcm and of the risks
t he y i ncu r.
In other work, which d raws from Bourdicu's conccpts of thc habitus and
cultural capital (sce Chaptcr 2), Williams (1995) has also suggested that
different social c:lasscs have differcnt relations to their bodies which bear
directly upon reflexive embodiment. Generally thc cducated middle classes
are more compliant with the advice of health expcrts and thus, assumedly,
rctlect more upon thl'ir hcalth in the manner Giddcns suggcsts. htrthermore,
as May and Coopcr (2001) a !so claim, resources, tnc:luding thc crucialluxury
of time, are significant in relation to body projccts. 1 his, too, would lead us to
cxpect group diffcrentiation in relation to rcflcxive embodiment. These
claims are borne out by the evidence of large-scale health survcys (see also
Chaptcr 9) which tend to identify differences in both health behaviours and
related patterns of illness prcvalcncc across social classcs (Blaxter 1990;
Tomlinson 2003).
To this list 1 would add that Giddens prcsents a pcculiarly disembedded
model of the agcnt. Norms and traditions may be under threat in
contcmporary society, as he suggests, but agcnts are still attachcd to onc
anothcr in a variety of differcnt types of relationship and thcse relations are
important. To somc extent Giddens (1992) recognizcs this in his concept of
thc 'pure relationship', a conccpt which flags up the importance of
relationships. The traditional material functions of intimate relations have
becn stripped away, he argues, such that thcir crnotional aspect has becorne
all important. This has opened up relationships to choice. Wc expect more,
cmotionally, frorn our relationships and we no longer 'make do' with
emotionally unsatisfying rclationships on account of material dependency.
We go in search of emotionally more satisfying rC'Iationships. This is an
interesting idea and is plausible if understood as an ideal type. However,
Giddens fails to sec that we are always already embeddcd in rnultiple sets of
relations and networks whi<.:h we cannot meaningfully be said to have chosen
for example, birth-family and work relations or relations with neighbours
and mernbers of our local community. Moreover, both thesc and the relations
wc have 'chosen', in so far as wc choose any relations, are not 'out there' and
scparate from us. Wc are 'in' thern and they, to a dcgrce, are 'in' us (Mead
1967). We makc dccisiom within relations, by talking with others, and find
ourselves constraincd by the power balances (sec Chapter 2) they entail. And
relations form us. Wc internalize them and they therefore shape our 'inner
conversations' ami constrain us from within (see Chapter 7). Reflexive
embodiment is more dialogical than Giddens suggcsts, more socially shaped
and subject to greattr rcstnlliom. We need a more networked conception of
reflcxive embodiml'nt th;m ht ollt'r\.
Finally, thcrl' h .111 .unl>i;tnty in < ;iddl'm'\ atcount. llh dclraditionaliza-
lion liH'\\ \l'l'lll\ lo \ll))1-:l'\llhal lt.tdiltnrt'> .lll'l'toding amlllt.11 lht\ \ making
flllllll lot lldl\'ldlloll ( i\ICIII ,JIIcl 1 fl.,lll', \\'t 11,1\(' 111 liiiHl\1' 111'< .111\l' liii'H' ,Jil'
ldentity, indivi dual is m and ris k 23
no rules or prescripllml\ tor us to follo"'' Other ckments of his account,
howcver, including hi\ locus on risk and life politics, tcnd to suggest that
choice is necess<tr} htt.tll'>l' we are faced with a rangc of competing and
conflicting prcscriptiom; onc public voice tells us to do this, another the
opposite, a third somtthing different again and so on. In sorne respects thcsc
theses arnount to thl' s.ltllt' thing. lf there are many conflicting rules then, in
cffect, there is no ruk. l lowever, in terrns of the concept of choice thc
differencc is irnportant. 11 we have to choose because thcre are no longer any
guides for us to follow then we must choosc without having anything to
choose between. l'his is arguably impossible and likcly to result in anornie, as
Durkheim suggests. lf (,iddens believes that we choose in such a social
vacuum then 1 believe his position is flawed bccausc it presupposes choice
without explaining how it is possible. If, by contrast, we have to choose
because many aspects of our lives are subjcct to competing clairns then our
individual decisions are, in fact, social processes; we decide by engaging in
dialogue with thc compcting voices in question (albeit perhaps sornetimes
quite brief dialogues which amount to disrnissing as 'cranks' or 'boffins' thosc
we are not inclined to follow). This may be confusing but it is not necessarily
anomic because thc social world offers the individual a basis upon which to
thoose. Moreover, choosing how to livc our lives amounts to social
participation bccause we are engaging in thc debates and dialogues that
o;hape our times, albcit pcrhaps in the relatively privatized space of our own
'interna! comersations' (see Chapter 7). lt will become apparent in future
chapters that 1 find thc latter, social model of choice in late modern societies
persuasive and workable. Indecd, 1 believe that it is very irnportant.
Conclusion
Whatever the limits of thcir respective positiom, Durkheim and Giddcns
both raise important ami similar points for our rcflection upon reflcxivc
cmbodiment. In thc first instance they raise questions of the individual ami
the collective, strongly suggesting that the individual takes precedence in
contemporary society but each suggesting ways in which we might think
.tbout the role of collectives. Related to this are thcmes of choice, identity ami
\clfhood. Modcrn body work is distinct, thcy claim, because it is chosen by
the individual, in thc name of individual choice. At the same time, however,
l>oth point to what wc rnight cal! 'psychopathological' possibilities. Reflexive
l'lnbodiment and the society which engenders it can become problernatic for
individuals and damaging to their mental hcalth, resulting in certain more
txtrerne and damaging variants of 'body work'.
2 Civilization, informalization and
distinction
In this 1 co;n.tinue the revi:w bcgun in the previous chapter, focusing
upon the work of LIJas and Bourdtcu. More specifically 1 review the concepts
ot thc 'civilizing process', 'informalization' and 'distinction'. All three
are utilized in Elias's work. Bourdieu, by contrast, is discussed only
111 rclatiOn to 'distinction'.
The civilizing process
Elias discusses the civilizing process in an early work (Eiias 1994) 1-1
h 1 'JI b . . . ere,
wt egm wtth a reformulation that he offers later in his career
1996). behaviour, he argues, is constrained by four factors. The
fust two are not d.tscuss.ed .at length. They are interna! organic needs and
urges, amongst whiCh Eltas tncludes sexual urges and the need for food, and
non-human threats, such as scarcity of food and the weather. The
thtrd and fourth which are more important to his thesis, are the
:xternal. controls applted to human action in social relationships, and
of control derived from them. Human beings are not
tsolated atoms, Eltas notes. We are bound up within networks of relational
mterdependency, which he calls 'figurations'. And this interdependency
generates a of power which constrains behaviour. Jf depend upon
for somethmg, for example, that gives you a lever with which to
mfluence my actton. You can threaten to withhold whatever it is 1 want
unless I do what you want. That relationship is reversible, however, since 1
can refuse. to .do what you want unless you give me what 1 want. All power
relatwnshtps mvolve interdependcnce and reversibility for Elias, and power is
always both a property of rclatwns, rather than individuals, and a matter of
balance. sad.that, balan.ces of powcr are often to the advantage of one
a n::attomhtp. lnfants tntlmnn tlw hchaviour of their parents quite
for e\amplt, ht't.Jll\1' tlwir paren!\ love them (cmotional
want the111 to l>t' .111<! thll\ rt'\pond to tlwr d!'lll.liHis
.llld tmh.tp(liiH'\\, llut p.llt'lll\ 11.1\t' 111.111\' nt<trt' Jvnr\ ;1t thl'ir di'l'"'>.tl th.tn
Civilization, informalization tille/ distinction 25
babies do because babies are more dependent, \O llll' balance of power is
generally stackcd against babies. These relatiom ol powcr often enforce
widely diffused norms ancl, as such, serve to pcrpctuatt particular figurations
and types of social order. Parents, for example, atttmpt to control their
children's behaviour in accordance with legal ami moral norrns. Externa!
control is not the only way in which human condult "comtrained, however.
We internalize norms and assume responsibilit) tor controlling our own
actions. J'he civilizing process, according to Elias\ later work, consists in a
gradual shift n thc balance between external ancl internal loci of control, in
tavour of thc latter. The hallmark of thc civilizing process is the gradual
tcplacement of externa! by interna! controls.
Wc find this same claim in Elias's earlier (1994) formulations but the
tarlier work is centred, empirically, upon a shift in standards of manners and
politeness as revealed through a comparison of etiquette books from different
points in the Middle Ages and early modern period. What Elias hopes to show
hy way of thcsc comparisom is both the enormous discrepancy between
manners in the Middle Ages and the 1950s, when he conducted his work, and
also the cumulative process whereby advances pioneered at one point in time
are taken for grantecl and built upon at a later point in time. rhe civilizing
process, from this point of view, is conceived as a gradual shift in standarcls
and norms.
Many of thc rules of etiquette that Elias analyses are quite shocking to the
modern reader, inasmuch as it seems surprising that adult social elites, who
wnstituted the public for etiquctte books, would neccl them pointing out.
lhey are very basic and obvious to thc modern reader. This serves Elias's
purposes because he wants to argue that we now learn in our early childhood
what our society has only gradually learncd over centuries. Our individual
thildhood socialization compresses hundreds of ycars of collective history.
We need a historical analysis to reveal this because our socializcd dispositions
are deeply engrained and the earlier impulses thcy reshaped forgotten. Our
tivilized disposition seems natural to us and we have learned the lessons of
civilization so well that departures from civilized norms often trigger deep
and unpleasant emotional responses from us, ranging from embarrassment,
through shame to disgust and anxiety.
Elias gives many examples of thcse transitions in manners. 1 will
reproduce a few. In 1589 the author of the Brtmswick Court Regulations felt
it nccessary to state: 'Lct no one, whoevcr he may be, before, at or after
mcals, early or late, foul the staircases, corridors, or closets with urine or
othcr filth, but go to suitable, prescribed places for such relief' (cited in Elias
1994: 107). An earlier recommendation, from another source in the
lifteenth century, states: 'Before you sit clown, make sure your seat has not
bcen fouled' (cited in Elias 1994: 105). larting was subject to similar
rtstraint. Early advice warned against holding back, on health grounds, a
qualification whth was la ter droppcd, but by 1530 the guardia m of good
manners wert nt <lllllllt'IHiing that it be done as silcntly as possible, and
tOVt'rtd wrtlt .1 t111glt 11 noi\l' was unavodahk '1 ht \Ound ot tarting,
t'\(>!'l'ially ot 1 ""''' st.tnd on elt'\'ated ground, 1\ flor tibie. Ont \ltould
III.IK!' \.lt 1 !111 t'\ Wll 11 ll l>ullot k\ IJIIII)' Jlll'\\t'tl ... \rllulatt i1
26 ReviPWfll\1 t/1, llnhl
""'ti 111 111.1 1'"
1
1 11111) Likcwi\t' for men urinating in the
1"""'" JI\ ul 1\'11111111, 1111 IVolllscroclc Court Regulations of 1570 state:
'''"' IJnllltl 11111, 111,, ""'il' wlw llave not bcen to court or lived among
1 '"'' 'd, llllll<tlll.lhl! pl'ople, relieve oneself without shame or reserve in
'"'111 <ti 01 bclorc the doors or windows of court chambcrs or other
'""In, (l'lll'd in Elias 1994: 107). 'iimilarly 'obvious' prescriptions are listed
lor tablc manners, nosc blowing, spitting, nudity, bchaviour in the
l>edroom, relations betwccn the sexes ancl, in particular, aggression. A
decline in aggression and violcncc is a key aspcct of thc civilizing process,
tor Elias. We are incrcasingly expected to control our aggressive and other
cxcited or cmotional impulses (llias and Dunning 1986). llowever, he adds
that many contemporary leisure activities allow for a 'controlled dccontrol-
ling' of cmotion ami excitemcnt which can serve a cathartic function in
rclation to the stress this generates. Many lcisure activities gcnerate
'tensions' akin to thosc we are cxpected to control in our everyday lives
and allow for a controlled releasc of them, thus allowing us to 'Jet off' the
'steam' that our modern self-controlled clisposition generates (Elias and
Dunning 1986).
Many of the rules of civilization relate to organic nccds or urges, such as
cating, scx, sleep, defccation and urination. Llias (1994) notes this himself
and it is an interesting aspcct of his theory sincc it identifics a point at which
organic ami social processes overlap ancl interpenetrate. Thc rules of the social
world increasingly control organic urges and their satisfaction, such that
these urges become socially shapcd, but these urges cannot be wishcd away.
They have to be dealt with and, as such, exert their own shaping influence
upon both society and individual conduct. This is an interesting contention
from our point of vicw as it sets clcar limits to our understanding of the
plasticity of the body and brings the relatively autonomous organic nature of
the body into focus in relation to our understanding of rcflexive embodi-
ment. Whilst the demands of civilization are social in origin, reflexivc agents
find themselves 'in charge' of an organic naturc with impulses and needs that
must be fulfilled and managed. Reflexive agents must 'referee' the contest
between organic and social demands. And thcir organic nature may 'resist'
their socially derived aspirations. lhe desire to lose weight by dieting must
contend with hunger pangs, for example, whilst the desire to 'chiscl' a body
through exercise runs up against bodily fatigue, inertia and the need for rest
and sleep.
As notcd above, internalization of the demands of civilization has a deep
impact upon personality formation in Elias's view. We do not refrain from
urinating in the corridors of public buildings simply because we know that
there is a rule against it. lt cloes not occur to us todo this and it strikes usas
disgusting that somebod} \vould. J\ncl if we die! accidentally wet ourselves in a
public place we would fecl deepl} embarrasstd and ashamed. rhis is because
the civilizing proccss has involnd a considerable reshaping of our
scnsibilities, a lowcring ol our tlutshold of tml>arrassment and shame, and
it has attldH'd ft'l'llngs to .1 lllllth wid11 I.H!gc ot <Kiivities. tni .Hll\ and
\lllall thlldu11 pro\'idt <nl i ll lt'rt'\1 lll}; d ln\1 1 ,rt ion ot th is i ll<l\lllllt h ,1., t ll!'rt' is
\'\'1)' lttll' tll,ll lhl'\" h'l'l.l\h.tllll'tl c11 Jlll,lllol \\c'tl,lhout, n 'll,olll)' 1\'1111 1!'\(ll'CI
Civilization, informalization all!l distinction 27
to such things as their n;1tural functions and naked bodies! but they
l.ikewise with aggrcsswn: although we may still expenence aggrcss1ve
impulses we appear to han: lost our taste for what now strike usas the
sadist ic pleasures of life in thc Middle J\ges. Wc appear to have lost our taste
tor burning Jive cats, for c:o;ample:
In Pars during the si,tccnth century it was one of the festive pleasures of
Midsummer Day to burn alive one or two dozen cats. Thb ceremony.was
very famous .... a sack or basket containing thc cats was hung .. [over a llre[.
The sack or basket began to smoulder. The cats fell into the hre and were
burned to dcath, while the crowd revelled in their caterwauling. Usually
the king and queen wcre present. Sometimes the king or dauphin was
given thc honour of lighting the fire.
(Eiias 1994: 167)
1 las uses the ter m 'habitus', which he defines as a second nature imposed
t
1
pon our primary biological nature, to describe these historica!IY variable
scntiments, tastes, internalized norms and thc increased capaCJty for self-
control they presupposc. . .
Elias is dealing with changes that are sclf-consClous m the short term but
unintended ami not available to consciousness in the long term. 1 he
civilizing process has taken place over a stretch of time that defies any
individual's memory, ami Elias is keen to point out that standards ami
behaviour patterns, once cstablished, are taken for granted ancl deemed both
ntural and invariant. !'his 'forgctting' of the past is part of the proccss
whereby wc leilfn to feel ashamed, disgusted or about beha\'iours
which our ancestors (and childhood self) performed w1th dellght an<l an
absence of inhibition. Nevertheless, individuals are aware of changes in the
\horter historical span that they live through, as adults, ami this extent
flexivity is central to the civilizing process. The \'\'riters ?' book'
;eek to announce changes in fashionable society to the1r readersh1p, and
rcaders seek to sclf-consciously change their conduct. Thc original rcadt'r\ ol
thc books Elias analyscs were contributing to a long-term protL'\\
they were ignorant of but they were, nevertheless, involved in a self-consuom
at tempt to bring their own behaviour into line with the 'more ci.vilited'
nonns of fashionable society. They werc reflexively embod1ctl. In readmg an<.l
applying the advice in the etiquctte books thcy own
hodily functions and behaviours as objects of self-mspect1on and mterve.n-
tion. Moreover Elias notes that the concept of civilization itsclf plays a cruCial
role in the civil,izing process. This is not his concept, he protests. 'Civilization'
ami 'culture' (in the sense of 'being cultured') are social values which
antl are important to the peoplc in the various socicties he stud1ed.
tndividuals aim to be ci' ilized or cultured.
What explains the ch ilizing proccss? The first important point to
111
this resptct is that it is a process and that Elias has a very speClflC
wnception ol
1
non'\\l'S and their relation to 'socicty' (see Elias .1994;
lllas and lluJIIIIIIJ.: 1 llHhl Sot iet\ is nota 'thing' over and above
,
1111
tlll'il .u ti\ rtns, ltol lll ,t\, llutt.Jtlll'r cxish in and through human act1on
01 1
,
1
t1H' I
111
,
11
,, tlttoull lillnl,tll inlt'laC.:tion and the v;uious network' of
30 Reviewi ng tlle fiel d
powcr, including that betwecn ami wives, parents ami children,
ancl teachers and children. In each case the stronger party can clcrnand rcspcct
from the weaker, in the form of manncrs and other clisplays of defcrcrKe, but
in each case that stronger party will respond civilly, in rcturn, as a rneans of
teaching their subordinate by exarnple, rewarding compliancc and maintain-
ing a pacified social relationship wherein force rernains unneccssar}. lf
everybody is polite and does what is expected of them then torce is
unnecessary. The rise of manners is, in this respect, closely tied to the histor>
of pacification.
Second, as noted above, Llias cliscusses the role of manners and etiquette in
struggles for distinction, particularly amongst rising from outside the
aristocracy who do not have the distinction of 'bloocl' to fall back upon.
Manners havc been a crucial mechanism by which social and economic elites
have sought to embody and make concrete their elevation above others in
social space to give themselves a distinct identity ami an air of superiority.
Morcover, such struggles can be inflationary, thereby fuelling a civilizing
proccss. Elite manners filter into the lower ranks ancl are appropriated: 'what
used to be distinguishing features of the upper classcs are likewise spreading
to socicty at large' (Eiias 1994: 461). This underrnines their distinguishing
function, such that newer and more 'civilized' manners have to be devised,
which again filter through and so on. This is accelerated to the degree that
civilized elites both come to believe in their ncw civilizcd ethos, and thus
wish to educate the 'barbarians' in the classes bclow, and need or want the
lower orders to rccognize their markers of distinction. rhe lower orders, who
are sometimes the intended targets for clisplays of sophisticated demonstra-
tions of grace, manners and so on, will not be suitably impressed unless they
have learned to recognize refinement, but to the extent that they have they
are already 'catching up', thus ratcheting up thc baseline of civilized
decorum.
Finally, Elias rcfers to the increasing complexity ancl differentiation of
society. On one leve! what concerns him here is the generic dcrnand for
control in modern societies. He notes, for example, how precarious the act of
walking clown a busy modern street is for an individual, such as an infant,
who lacks fui! self-control. Compared to medieval villagcs, modern towns are
death traps which cal! for split-second regulation of conduct. Likcwise, in a
fascinating discussion of time, he observes how medieval individuals could
orient their lives around the broad temporal markers of dawn and dusk,
winter and summer, whilst their modern equivalent will miss their bus it they
are even 30 seconds late (Elias 1992). Ata further leve!, Elias is aware of thc
many different contexts in which individuals meet in modern socicty and, in
particular, mect as strangers. Social worlds were relatively smal l in the past
and one <.lid not often meet strangers. In the modern world, by contrast, we
meet ncw people all the time. Moreover, we meet people in different
capacities: as workers, teachers, tloctors and so on. Such interactiom are
potentially "' wt shart no hi\lOI\' with strangtrs and havt not
ft>anwd what will ofknd or pll.t\l' t h1m. 1 hcrt , thu\ a med lo1 rll'.ll ruft>s
al>oul intci.H tion .1 fr,tflHWnlk "' rtt.rlrtll'l'i tlt.1t l'\'\'1\"0IIl' cut 1\'<>rl, within
rtiqut'lll lr<>nk<> 11.1\l' lwnt 1\'1111 11, 111 p.rrl, tn 111:.1 t tlti\ lll'tl .111d te;
Civilization, informali zaton r111ti disti nction 31
standardize expectatiom Manners substitutc tm tlw fl.untwork which sharecl
history affords interaction, where such a framcwm k '' mi\\ing.
A note on informalizat i on
Recently Elias's thesis has come up agau1st .r numhtr of objections focused
upon 'decivilization processes' (\11ennell 1990) that s, the possibility, fully
allowed for by Elias, that the civilizing proces'> may go into reverse. A number
of aspects of modern societ} havc been tocuwd upon in this respect,
including apparent upswings in levcls ot viokrKe in inner cities and the
grand violence of the Nazi Holocau'>t, whtd1 was unfolcling as Elias was
writing his original study. Herc 1 will tocus upon what has been called the
'informalization process'. l'his notion centre'> upon the observation that,
since the 1960s, there has been a general rclaxation of rules regarding
etiquette and, for examplc, sexuality and nudity. ls this relaxation an
inclication that the civilizing process has slipped into reverse? Elias and h s
apologists claim not (see Wouters 1977, 1986, 1987, 2004 Mennell 1990
Elias 1996). He concedes that intormalization has taken place and cites a shift
in balances of power within kcy figurations, effected in partas a consequence
of the campaigns of late twentieth-century social movements, as one of the
key elements in this process. As the balance of power between husbands and
wives, adults and children, teachers and pupils has shifted in the favour of the
(once) subordinate, he thc etiquette and ritual surrounding those
relations has broken clown too. 1 i'> not a breakdown in the civilizing
process according to Elias, however. On thc contrary, he claims that the
above-mentioned shift in power balances means that individuals once
controlled toa greater e.xtent from the outsidc are now required and expected
to exercise a greater degree of self-control. In effect, informalization involves
and rests upon even greater self control, ami this marks a step forward in thl
civilizing process. rherc an examph.: ot th1s type of argument in !he
Cil,ilizing Process itself. Elias ( 1994) notes that bathing ha bits and costumes are
changing at his time of writing, allowing greater displays of naked flesh. h
this a sign of decivilization? He condu<les that it is not, because such displays
of naked tlesh demand an even greater levcl of self-control than practiccs of
covering up. Men are now so self.controlled that we can contain oursetvcs at
the sight of a woman in a bathing costume!
lnterestingly, in his rcflcctions on informalization Elias develops an
argument quite similar to those of Giddcns (see Chapter 1 ). Externa! norms
are eroding, he argues, ancl individuals must therefore exercise more choice
for themselves. They must manage themselves and their bodies in increas-
ingly uncertain contcxts.
Elias assessed
IIHrt i\ lllll< Ir 111 1-11,"'' 1\'tll k th.rt " unprt'\\H' and persuasive. His tocus
upc11r inlt'r,ll , ... ,.,, llgcrJ,rtlllll\ .111d (lt!H ('\\('\ , rn my \iew, an<l
32 Reviewing lile field
his conccpt of power balances i\ pcmla'>in. llis opcnncss to biology is
rctrcshing ami his focus on interna! and externalloci of control is intcrcsting.
vt:oreover, he encouragcs us to think al>out l>oth the reflcctivc ami the prc-
reflective ways in which wc scek to work upon our 'bodies', casting thesc
behaviours in thc contcxt of the overlaps of our individual (biographical) and
long-term collective histories. lli\ attempt to deflect thc claim that
informalization rcvcrses thc civilizing process is flawed, howcvcr. First, it
involvcs slippagc in the definition of thc civilizing proccss. Much of the
original argumcnt for thc civilizing proccss, as 1 noted above, is bascd upon
observation of cumulativc changes in standards of behaviour prescribed in
etiquettc books. lhe focus u pon sclf-control is always evident but the changcs
in thc etiquettc books bcar a largc part of the burdcn of proof and, for much
of thc text, define the civilizing proccss. At thc vcry least, therefore, one
would have to conclude that the civilizing process involves changes in both
standards and loci of control. And informalization, even if it does involvc
grcatcr social control, which is questionable (see below), involves a relaxation
of standards. Thus by one of Elias's criteria, at least, it constitutcs
'dccivi lization'.
Second, the slipperiness of the argument gcncrates contradictions in Elias's
position and begs questions about meaning that he does not address. To use
the bathing costume cxample, Elias seems to suggest that medieval women
coulcl not llave walkecl arouncl in modero bikinis for fear of ovcrcxciting
males. Only modcrn rncn can withstand that tcmptation. However, elsewhcre
in Tile Process he is clear that nudity was treated in a relatively
mattcr-of fact way in thc Middle Ages. M en would have seen women naked as
a mattcr ot course but for that reason would not, in every context, have
attached sexual significance to this and would not, therefore, have needed to
restrain themsclves. Perhaps informalization of nudity is a return to this
earlier, casual attitude, a historical reversa! that rests less upon self-control
than upon a contextually sensitive interpretation of nakcd flcsh. Naked flesh
does not necessarily signify sexual availability and therefore does not
automatically trigger a state of arousal which needs to be controlled.
Conversely, concealed flesh is arousing in some contexts, especially when
norms and prohibitions give it sexual significancc, and may necessitate self-
control if civilizcd order is to be maintained- see Gagnon and Simon (1973)
on arousal ami mcaning, and Foucault (1984) on 'thc rcpressive hypothesis'.
Third, Elias assurncs that a rcduction of externa! controls must equatc with
an incrcasc in interna! controls, but it is not clear that this assumption is
right. J\t onc point, for cxample, he notes that an increase in tecnagc
pregnancies is an indication that young womcn are now cxpectcd lo makc
their own decisions and excrcise more control over thcir sexual and
reproductive bchaviour than prcviously, when their parcnts would have
exercised this rontrol 1996). 1 can sec Elias's point, but rising levels ot
teenage prtgn.Hlty, not to menlion r,ltts ol sexually trammittcd dheascs (set
Figure 2.1 ), might tqually indil.&ll' lh.ll young women ami llll'll are not
c.wrtising lllll'lll;ll rtstr.llllt, ll'll.1inly nol to thl' l'.\ll'llt that tht'}' usl'd to l>l'
l'.\ll'lll.lll)' I!'SII.IIIl'd, .&lid lh.&l lhl''' st xu.d lll'havionr is lll<'ll'.&singly
llllll"gtli.lll'd, H> .&11)' ol Fi&.l\'s lhl\ "do1 1\'lii/II;.
800,000
700,000
600.000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
o
Civilization, informa lization aiiCI di s tinction 33
L
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Figure 2.1 Diagnoses for all major categorics of sexually transrnitted disease
in the UK (http://www.avert.org)
Finally, relatecl to this, in h is ea rl y formu lations Elias (1994: 441-3) links
interna! and externa! controls by way of what he calls 'the social constraint
towards self-constraint'. This argument suggests that self-constraint is
reinforced by externa! controls (e.g. thc thrcat of punishment). We control
ourselves internally because we fear externa! sanctions. lf power balances
have shiftecl, as Elias concedes, thercfore, and externa! controls have been
removed from sorne groups, there is cvery reason to suppose that the interna!
controls of these groups will collapse too, resulting in decivilization. Agents
no longer have a reason to control themselvcs to the same extent because the
threat of externa! sanctions is removed. lnformalization involves at least an
element of decivilizing in 111} vicw therefore.
Returning briefl} to my point about the overlap between Elias and
Giddens, 1 believe that these points about informalization are important
l>ecause they suggest that the process has frcecl certain of
Lfe from normative regulation and opened them up to choice. Certam basK
standards remain in place, in rnost contcxts at most times, and levels of
rcgulation vary across contexts, but bchaviour is less normatively prcscribed
now than in the 1950s. lt is also worth reiterating Elias's view that the 'new
social movements' of thc 1960s antl 1970s played a central role in effecting
these changes because they tipped the powcr balances that sustained these
norms, as well as attacking thc norms themselvcs, ancl encouraged
txpcrimentation with lifcstyle al1(1 thc body. This poi nt connects with and
dcepcns Giddens's (1991) rcflection on ' lifc poli tics'.
Distinction
llw tiH.'llH' ol '1hsli1H tion' that l'llltrgts in Elias's account is also found
111 "" j.,l.,gu.d "' Clllllls rl'll'\illll toan understanding of rcflcxive
emhodinnnl 111 rtl<llh'lll s1u 11 1\' \Vithilll'arly sociolog\ ,l>oth Simmel's (1971:
323) .11, ""ni, 1 l,t .11111 Vohhn\ ( 1 '113) .111 <111111 ol 'tllt ltisurc class'
34 Reviewing the field
focus on attempts by aspiring groups to generate visible, embodied markcrs to
distinguish them from thosc they comider lleneath them. And more recently,
Foucault (1984: 124) discusscs the role ol sexual morals in 'maintaining caste
distinction' amongst the ncwly emerging bourgeoisie of thc eighteenth
century. Finally, Baudrillard (1998), in bis discussion of The Consumer Society,
a study which deems the body thc ultimate consumer object, puts distinction
at the heart of his analysis. Thc concept of distinction is most famously
associated with the work of Bourdicu (1984), however. He shows how
consumption and lifestyle patterns mi rror patterns of class differentiation,
seemingly both drawing from and rcinforcing underlying class relations.
Moreover, the body is central to Bourdieu's analysis.
Of sorne relevance here is thc themc of bodily hexis- that is, the manner
in which social agents embody their position in the social world in the very
way in which they 'use' their bodies. We are all familiar with the differences
in ways of speaking which divide social classes, particularly differences in
accent. Bourdieu (1979, 1984, 1992) pushcs this further, arguing that such
stylistic clifferences extend toa range of 'uses of the bocly', and he cxtends the
samc analysis to gender. Sexual clistinctions are embodied in acquired
dispositions. There is an interesting overlap with Elias here, inasmuch as
Bourdieu attributes at least sorne of these differences to a greater degree of
self-restraint amongst the bourgcoisic and petite bourgeoisie and theorizes
this in terms of habitus. Bourgeois ways of speaking and eating, he argues,
involve tighter, smallcr, more controlled movements of the mouth. The
bourgeoisie are 'tight-lippcd' and 'uptight'. This is their disposition, their
attitude towards the world, ancl it manifests in other aspects of movement
too. Furthermore, he effectively picks up Elias's (1994) historical account,
arguing that the distinction by way of manners which Elias's elites were
striving to establish has become deeply engrained in the enduring culture of
those groups, as habitus. Manners still play an important role in differentiat-
ing the micldle class and, paradoxically, naturalizing their advantage by
lending thcm a 'natural air' of leadership ancl superiority. Establishecl elites no
longer need to try to mark out thcir distinction because their cultural
'superiority' is deep-rootcd in a habitus that both functions and is reproduced
without conscious intention.
Hexis is habitual, according to Bourdieu's account, to the point where it
seems natural to everyone and passes between generations without effort or
thought. Howcver, he also reflects upon more dcliberate 'body projects',
again emphasizing class and gendcr differences (Bourdicu 1977). The key
emphasis in his analysis is upon thc way in which occupation affects an
agent's relation to their body, at the level of thc habitus, which in turn then
affects both their propensity to engagc in body projccts and the types of body
project in which they cngage. His use of the conccpt of habitus, herc as
elsewhere, is not preclusive of an undcrstanding of action as strategic,
however. Thc habitus, for Bourdieu, is a prc-retlective 'feel for the gamc'
derivccl from involvemcnt in v<HiOII\ \O( 1.11 'ganres', particularly, for cxample,
thc 'dating game' in 'marri.tg(' 111.11 h.11\' .rnd tllt' 'prornotion ganlt'' in the
employnwnt m,rr h.et\. 11 d l\flOW\ 1111' .tgtnt lo iH 1 ' 1nstrrH t r\('ly' in
advant.lg1ous w:1y\, 111 111l i !'IJ tlu \.1111 w.r}' 111.11 .1 \porl\ pl.1)'1'1 1\'ill
Civi lization, informalization 11111/ distinction 35
Bourdieu (1977) conceives of body modificatron and maintcnance as
' investment' in the body 'in a double sense'. Agenl\ invt'\t in their bodies in
the economic sense that they expect sorne rcward to1 thcir trouble. They
gcnerate a form of what sorne, following Bourdicu, have called 'physical' or
'bodily' capital, in the expectation of 'profits' (Shilling 1991, 1992; Wacquant
1995). This generates and is later supported by invcstment in the
psychological sense, however; that is, an agent's body or sorne aspect of it
becomes more important to them as a consequcncc of thcir various attempts
to modify and maintain it, and this further fucls thcir motivation to modify
and maintain it, in a self-reinforcing pattcrn. Body work generates a
preoccupation with the body, which gcneratcs body work, and so on.
Writing in the 1970s, Bourdieu argucd that labour upon the body is far
more common amongst women than mcn. Women, he argues, work upon
their bodies in order to make themselves attractive and thus secure a man in
the marriage market. The assumptions behind this argument are, first, that
women are disadvantaged in the labour markct, such that they need to marry
in ordcr to achieve material comfort and security, and second, that their
rnaterially disadvantaged position within the marriage market means that
thcir chief bargaining power resides in their bodies and appearance. Men
bring money to the marriage relation so their looks are less important.
Women are less likely to bring the same financia! powcr, so they must have
something elsc: thcy must be a 'desirable catch' in physical terms, both
because this is sexually alluring for a man and because an attractive wife has
'iymbolic value. Men and women alike 'know' this 'game' at the deep-rooted
levcl of the habitus, according to Bourdieu, and they therefore tend to act
upon it without having to fully think it through. Class makes a difference
here too, howcver. Working-class women lose much of their investment in
the body when they marry, according to Bourdieu, since they have effectively
'cashed in' their physical capitaL Middle-class women, by contrast, must
sustain their 'body work' beyond marriage because their occupational
advancement is dependent u pon it. Many middle-class women's occupations,
particularly in the new service sector, centre upon appearance and presenta-
tion, and women in these occupations are judged in accordance with these
valucs. Promotion and job security may depend upon it (see also Hochschild
2003). One would expect middle-class women to be more engaged in body
work, therefore.
The situation of mcn is less clear in Bourdieu's work. He belicves that men
are generally less involved in 'body work' and the cultivation of forms of
physical capitaL Men may be more involved in sport than women but,
outside of professional sport, this is generally a matter of 'letting off steam'
and forming bonds (social capital) which, in the case of middle-class men in
particular, may be economically advantageous (Bourdieu 1978). However, in
so far as men are 'intcrested' (in the doublc economic/psychological sense) in
body work, thcrt is a class divide. Working-class men, and women, tend to
ha ve a m<m i m11 umtntal attitude towards their bodies, for Bourdieu, not
ltast bt'lilll\c tlwy do 11Jallll,11 labour and thcir body is an 'instrument' of
1<1l>our tmtl11nr 1-llt 'll ui1urpll' 1<>ncern is that their body rcmains functional
,111d tiH'II luul\ r11.ri111 ll.tiHI p1.H II"l'\ tlll', lih.twrsl', dorninatcd by a
,\1, HPVII'Winq fllt liilll
111111 tio11,il 1 ti 1m 1111\ 1\ ll'lllloncd by what Bourdieu (1984) calls their
pw.\lrnll y to 'llt'll'\\ll y'. 1 he wor ki ng class struggle to satisfy basic biological
nct.tb, he argm'\, andas '>uch thcir intcrcsts tend to be limited to this domain.
They cannot afford to bother with body projects or related refinements.
Furthermore, where working-class men do develop a bodily aesthetic it tends
to be focused upon signs associated with physical Iabour, such as muscle and
physical toughness. Bourdieu (1984) reads the apparent working-class basis of
bodybuilding in this light. Middle-class men and women, again particularly
service-sector professionals, follow a different pattern. Partly on account of
their occupations, which afford them access to a variety of medical,
therapeutic and aesthetic discourses, partly on account of their higher Ievels
of education and cultural capital, and partly on account of their greater
material comfort and security, they are more likely to take the body and its
cultivation as an end in itself. In addition, they are more likely when they do
so to adopt projects which are experimental in nature and which involve
'high' cultural aesthetics and/or less visible bodily goods, such as health,
fitness and the various forms of 'balance' or 'inner peace' associated with such
'exotic' arts as yoga. The body is a project for the new middle class, according
to Bourdieu, in a way that it is not for the working class. Furthermore,
echoing a common thesis, he maintains that new social movements have
emerged and tend to recruit from amongst the new middle class (Bourdieu
1984; Bagguley 1992, 1995; Eder 1993). This is important from our point of
view because we have seen, in the context of both Giddens's (1991) life
politics and Elias's (1996) informalization process, that new social move-
ments have had a significant impact in reshaping the social context of
reflexive embodiment in the post-1960s era. What Bourdieu Ieads us to
predict is that this reshaping will be more evident in relation to the new
middle class because they are more closely associated with the new social
movements.
Having said this, Bourdieu is aware that the class attachment of practices
can change over time, in both directions. Once a middle-class pursuit, for
example, boxing is now predominantly working-class (Bourdieu 1978).
Conversely, according to DeMello (2000), tattooing once had aristocratic
connotations, before becoming associated with the working class, convicts
and bikers, only to be reappropriated by the middle class in the 1980s and
1990s, when tattooists trained in fine arts and ethnic (e.g. Celtic and
Japanese) designs began to emerge. Exactly which modification/maintenance
practices attach to which social groups is variable across time, therefore, but
what is constant is the struggle for distinction. The middle classes use
whatever bodily modification practices are available to them to mark out
their claim to distinction and superiority - that is, to embody their social
difference and 'naturalize' their advantage. Moreover, they bring their own
specific class ethos, aesthetic and cultural capital to bear upon whatever it is
that they do; thus tattooing has a diffcrcnt mcaning for them, compared to
the working class. They invcst it wilh llwir ,ll'\lhclic and cultural capital such
that it can function as a marker ot dl\lrrHlion.
Civilization, informalization and distinction 37
Bourdieu assessed
Sorne critics have argued that the salience of class has diminished today
relative to Bourdieu's time of writing and have called for a move away from
the class-based style of analysis that he offers (J>akulski and Waters 1995). I
will address this criticism, empirically, later in the book. In this chapter it
must suffice to make two critica! points of my own. First, gender relations
have changed considerably since Bourdieu's time of writing, in a manner
which affects his argument. In the first instance, the notion of 'marrying age'
is problematic today, not least because increasing rates of divorce and
remarriage imply that a sizeable proportion of the population may marry on
more than one occasion, at different (but not clearly prescribed) times in their
lives, and indeed that individual marriages themselves may be less stable and
known to be so for those in them. For these reasons a woman cannot 'cash in'
hcr physical capital, once and for all, in her early twenties, even if her looks
will serve no purpose for her in employment markets. In so far as looks
remain important in relationships, that pressure is more constant because
women are more likely to pass through a series of relationships across their
lifetime. In addition, although the glass ceiling may remain for women,
gender inequalities in labour markets have shifted in their favour and they are
far more likely, therefore, to be financially independent. This alters the power
balance and bargaining chips of men and women within relationship
markets. If women do not depend upon men for moncy thcn they may
demand something else in their choice of partncr, including good looks. The
stereotypical rich woman who takes a 'toy boy', whilst more predominant in
fantasy than in actual fact, nicely captures this; she does not need a man with
money, whom she must try to please, so she goes for a 'sexy bod' who picases
her in other ways. By the same token, men are in less of a position to be
choosy if the demand for their goods (money) is diminished and women will
feelless pressure to 'look nice for him' if they contribute the same or more to
their joint finances; unless, of course, there is some reciprocation. Nonc ot
this takes account of lesbian and gay relationships, moreover, which arl'
much more prominent today than previously, and which both have thcir
own, different dynamics, and exert an influence upon heterosexual culture.
rhe so-called 'metrosexual', who draws aspects of body work from gay men's
culture into a male heterosexual lifestyle niche and identity, is one example
of the latter phenomenon.
Second, Bourdieu's theories of distinction and the pursuit of profit pose
questions of meaning and motivation which his studies do not satisfactorily
answer. The concept of a 'struggle for distinction' suggests intention.
Bourdieu's analysis does nothing to prove intention, however. In addition,
though sorne studies do point to 'occupational appropriateness' as a factor
\haping women's body projects (Gimlin 2002; Hochschild 2003; Black 2004),
Bourdieu's very economistic understanding of reflexive embodiment is not
borne out al the levd of mcaning in any of the studies 1 have reviewed.
/\gcnts do 1101 11 olllll' llil'll hodv work in tcrms of profit and investment,
l'Xl'l'Pl ptrii.Jl' 111.1\111111 11 ,1\ tiH'} vicw hcalthy behaviour asan investmcnt in
the lultlll' (!1111 tlll\ 1\olllloll!l' r olilllllll\il go()(l\ ratlwr than exchangc valul''>).
...
38 Reviewing the field
We should therefore be wary of doing \o our\t'lves. Perhaps agents act in a
utilitarian manner without consciousl\ thinking so, as sorne rational action
theorists claim (Becker 1978), but thcn ncithcr Uourdieu nor rational action
theorists have established that claim satislactorily. If agents do not account
for their practicc as the pursuit of profit what rcason do we have for arguing
that this is what they are doing? Moreover, agents do not theorize their
practice in terms of class. There is some evidence to suggcst that hexis,
manners and the 'respectability' that surrounds them form a basis for class
identities, at lcast within fractions of thc working class (Skeggs 1997;
Charlesworth 2000), and certainly we have reason to believe that, for
example, objective class-based differences in linguistic accents persist, but the
evidence for more explicit body projccts, as noted in Chapter 1, suggests that
they are understood by those who practise them as manifestations of
individuality rathcr than group bclonging, with no suggestion that the
former is a coded reference to the lattcr. Whethcr objective class diffcrences
manifest in this domain is cliscussed in Chapter 9.
Conclusion
Between them, Bourdieu ami Elias identify thrcc different social dynamics
that shape reflexive cmbodiment and effect the diffusion of practices relating
to it. First, the civilizing process is conceived as a universal process affecting
all members of Western societies. Moreover, it is conceived of in terms of
norms and sanctions which secure its de facto universality. We would thus
cxpect sorne reflexive body practices to be universal. One of the dynamics
underlying the civilizing process is the pursuit of class distinction, however.
We might thus expect some reflexive bodily practices to be class-specific.
Moreover, these practices are not imposed upon agents as norms but rather
strategically adopted by actors pursuing status. Pinally, however, the
civilizing proccss is being undone, in part, by a countercurrcnt of
informalization. This is creating social spaccs wherein choices rather than
norms steer behaviour. Choice will be shaped by many factors, of course, but
in the absence of norms and sanctions actors may opt in or out of them and
we would thus cxpect to find a cluster of reflexive body practices with a range
of rates of appropriation. In bricf, we can derive a differentiated picture of
reflexive embodiment from the work of Elias and Bourdieu, in which diffcrent
clusters of practices are charactcrized in different ways. In addition, Elias and
Bourdieu also alert us both to the tension that is generated by attempts to
mould the body, as biological and social demands clash, and to thc mobile
and blurred boundary between reflective and pre-reflective forms of body
work. These are important developments.
3 Power, resistance and discipline
Elias's account introduced us to themes of self-control and power. Here 1
consider anothcr writer whose work revolves around these themes: Michel
Foucault. Many different aspects of Foucault's work are potentially important
to us. Amongst his early studies, for example, is an account of the formation
of modero medica! ways of perceiving ancl conccptualizing thc body
(Foucault 1973). And in his later work we find an account of 'technologies
of the sclf' - that is, of the various ways in which individuals, at different
points in history, have electecl to work upon their own bodies, behaviours,
thoughts and appetites in an effort to fashion their selves in particular ways
(Foucault 1987a, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). 1 touch u pon these works here but m y
main concern is with thc account of 'body-power' that he posited in the
middle period of his work, particularly in Discipline a/ICI Punish.
Technologies of power
In Discipline and Ptmisll Foucault describes a fundamental tramformation in
'technologies of power' within European societies which occurred around thc
time of the French Revolution of 1789. This transformation is graphically
capturecl at the outset of the book by way of a comparison of two punishmcnt
regimcs, separated by 80 years. Thc first account centres upon the public
cxecution and torture of a regicide, Oamiens, in 1757. Foucault describes how
Damiens' punishment was prescribed: 'the flesh will be torn from his breasts,
arms, thighs and calves with red hot pincers ... on those places poured
mol ten lead, boiling oil' (cited in Foucault 1979: 3). ln addition, his body was
to be drawn, quarterecl and burned. ln the event, however, the horses wcre
not accmtomed to quartering and his body clid not break, even after two extra
horses were added. As a last resort 'thcy wcrc forced, in order to cut off the
wrctch's thighs, to scvcr the sinews and hack at thc joints' (cited in Foucault
1979: {). Sornl' 1\'il 111'\W\ tl<limed that Damicm survived the quartering and
W<t\ <tlive wlwrr 1\'lr.rl ll'rrr.rilll'd o! him was thrown onto the pyre.
Fom;nrlt'\ "'' ond ... 1\ o! .rHI\Oil timl'tal>ll' which prescribes in great
dtt,ril tiH '''1"'' l!d lulr,1\ 111111 ., lllll.tlt'\. ,\t tiH lit\l drttlll roll, it
40 Reviewing tl1e field
prisoners must rise and silently dress. By the second they must be dressed and
have made their bed. At the third they must stand at the end of their beds and
proceed to the chape!. Every aspect of their day is mapped out in this way.
Thc contrast with the drama of Damiens' execution could not be greater. It is
not merely penal practicc that has changed in the 80 years separating these
examples, according to Foucault, however. The timetable is just one amongst
a number of ncw practices which start to appear in the documentation
surrounding prisons at this time. More importantly, howevcr, sifting through
the manuals and plans associatcd with lunatic asylums, schools, factories,
workhouses, army barracks and hospitals, Foucault finds references to the
very same themes and practices. What has changed in this 80-year period, he
argues, is the way in which people are managed and controlled across a range
of contexts. A new apparatus of control has emerged, with a new modus
operandi and rationale. Certain of the above institutions were new to
European society in the eighteenth century. Even the older institutions were
undergoing a radical reorganization, however, and the changes they were
undergoing were in each case much the same. Discipline and Punish is an
exploration of the common rationale, themes and practices that Foucault
discerns in these manuals and plans.
One central theme is visibility and surveillance. In the old regime power
worked by way of its visibility. The spectacle of torture and execution was a
means by which the absolute monarch could demonstrate his power to the
masses, showing them what would become of them if they transgressed.
Castles, palaces and the grand cathedrals of the Church served the same
purpose. Power works in this context by way of a display of size and force -
that is, by way of its visibility. In thc modero regime, by contrast, power
works by making those subject to it visible -by surveillance. The architecture
of power is no longer focused upon making powcr visible as a threat. New
architectural arrangements function to make the inmates of buildings and
institutions visible. This involves segmentation and, in sorne cases, indivi-
dualization. The exercise of power is often held to deindividualize, Foucault
notes, but in fact power works by separating 'the mass' into individuals,
rendering each of them distinct and accountable. Partitions and cells within
buildings play a crucial role here as they separate out individuals or small
groups. And the manipulation of time by way of timetables plays much the
same role. lt specifies where in space any individual will or should be at any
given time. They can be found instantly. The widespread use of timetables
and of spatial/architectural partitions, which Foucault dates from this time,
constitutes a key development in the societal apparatus of power therefore.
So, too, do various forms of record-keeping. In the ancient regime,
Foucault notes, only the grcat and powerful were written about or painted in
portraits. To be written about and have one's likeness recordcd were signs of
power and importance. Such records were celebrations of grcatncss. In the
modern rcgime, by contrast, everyhody i\ writtcn about, photographed and
Iogged in dossicrs and files. 1\ "''igntd an idcntity which fixes
them, makc'i thl'm lcss dusivl' .I IHI ,lllow' 11mw in ,1uthority to prtdict thcir
action' <111<l ca1tgori/t' 1 he m.
i"IH' 1iH'IlH' oJ \IIIVl'lil,liHl' 1\ f.II1HH1\Iy e .IJIIIIII'd lly h>Ut.lll)1 111 lll\ ,1((011111
Power, resistance alllf discipline 41
of thc Panopticon, an eighteenth-century prison design by the British
philosopher and reformcr, jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon is a circular
design, with a watchtower at its centre and rows of cells around its
circumference, facing inwards towards the tower. Backlighting within the
cell renders its inmate visible to the tower at any time. A blind within the
towcr, however, prevcnts reciprocation. The in mate of the cell knows that he
can be observed at any time but he cannot observe the inmate of the
watchtower and thus does not know if he is actually being observed. Thus a
constant sense of being watched is created. In this way the inmate of the cell
'becomes the principie of his own subjection' (Foucault 1979: 203). lt is his
own sense of being watched which constrains his action, rendering the
various whips, chains and manacles that had prevailed before this time
redundant. Moreover, the watchers too are watched. The Panopticon
facilitates instant access to externa) inspectors and was intended to do so.
Bentham was as much motivated by scandals regarding the mistreatment of
prisoners as by anything else. The Panopticon thus illustrates the relays of
surveillance which Foucault believes run through the social body. Bentham's
prison was never built. In his historical research upon the architectural plans
of prisons and other public buildings, however, Foucault found that it was
repeatedly cited in aspirational terms. lt was an ideal that shaped practice.
Another notable difference between the old and new technologies of
power is that the former tended to work negatively upon the body, breaking
it, torturing it and often killing the individual, where the modero regime
works positively. Nature, including human nature, began to be viewed as
more malleable in the eighteenth century, Foucault notes, and numerous
techniques were devised for moulding it. This included both 'Taylorist' type
regimes, which sought to make human activities more effective and efficient
by breaking them down into components which could be 'fine-tuned', and
'behaviour modification' regimes which sought both to 'cxtinguish' undesir
ablc habits and inculcate desirable ones. Tn addition to micro-cconomics ol
reward and punishment, such as 'token economies', 1 this oftcn involved
procedures for ranking and grading individuals, thus allowing slow learners to
be separated out from more hopeful cases and providing incentives tor
improvement. These ncw technologies of powcr were not designed to punish
individuals. They were designed to inculcatc pattcrns of desired behaviour; to
produce good workers, soldiers and pupils; to restore the mad to sanity and
criminals toa Iawful life. Indeed, Foucault notes that in many manuals even
'micro-penalties' were recommended to have a positive aspect. Individuals
who disobeycd or failed were required to repeat correct behaviour over and
over. Bad handwriting, for example, was 'punished' with handwriting
practice, until a pupil got it right. In this respect, Foucault argues, disciplinary
power is positive power. lt creates what is desired rather than repressing what
is not.
l'hl' promotion ot thc hcalth of the body was important in this context
too, not l<.a\1 "' ill'.lllll h irnportant to the maintenance of efficient and
l'fll'ctiVl' wndtH t llli'> lll.llllitsl\ at thc individual level. Many of the
ptdagogi{ 111.11111.1h 11t,Jt 1 C1lll'.llil1 constdtcd, lor cxampk, cmphasi/l'd 'correct
)l0\lllll'
1
1
1101 e >Id) , 1\ .1 111< ',111\ 11) ll).lilll<lil1111g t'illlll'lll )' lll llll' \hOr( ll'l'lll hut
..
42 Reviewing tlle field
also of preserving health ami thu\ maintanling it in the long term. In
addition, however, Foucault ( 1984) note\ lhal, in lhe nineteenth century, the
health of whole populatiom beta mean hsuc, a development which he dubs
'bio-power'. The welfare state is the culminat10n of this new form of social
regulation but Foucault focuses upon 1b precursors (llewitt 1983).
Knowledge of both individuals lll(l populations is crucial to thcse practices
and Foucault argues for the co-dependency of power ami knowledge. The
tcchniques which make individuals observable for survcillancc purposes, he
argues, simultaneously form the basis for empirical research on human
beings. Thus, for example, empirical psychiatric knowlcdge emerges only
after procedures for sequestering and observing thc mad have been put in
place because it is only thcn that the mad are 'collccted' together and
rcndered visible, in a controllcd cmironment wherc they can be researched
(Foucault 196S, 1987b; Portcr 1987). In addition, he claims that social and
administrative problems often frame research questions in emprica! social
science, whilst the various nodcs of the 'carceral network' (see below) provide
the 'surfaces of emergence' for social scientific knowledge (Foucault 1972).
Nikolas Rose (198S), for examplc, notes that emprica! psychology in the UK
was formed around the 'problem' of 'difficult pupi ls' in schools. The schools
served as the first psychology labs, providing the first experimental subjects,
and at the same time shaped the problems that early empirical psychologists
sought to address. Moreover, much of this practica! cmpirical knowledge is
guided by and serves a direct administrative purpose. The regimes of
behaviour modification that Ioucault writes about, for example, were fine-
tuned, if not developed, within emprica! psychology, and the categorical
distinctions and typologies that psychology has dcvclopcd have a played a
crucial role in separating out the various different subgroups within a
population who are likely to respond to different forms of behavioural
management (see also Rose 198S, 1989). Even where the instrumental value
of the knowledge is questionable, the empirical social sciences provide
legitimation for intervention; if naughty or 'slow' school children are given a
psychologicallabel, for example, then intervention seems both necessary and
more enlightened and humane. Related to this, the emplfical social sciences
are generative of many of thc norms which disciplinary power orients to.
Statistical norms, in the form of averages, are a frequent by-product of
emprica! attempts to measure individuals and populations. These statistical
norms can become moral norms, however, fuelling a process of 'normal-
ization' which eliminates diversity and difference. Attempts to identify the
average IQ within a population, for example, very easily lend themselves toa
problematization of thosc who are 'below average'. Finally, administrative
needs can play a crucial role in deciding between scicnlific paradigms which,
in all other respects, are equally deserving and attracl equal lcvels of support.
l'he paradigm which best lits with administralivc concerns will win thc
backing and support whith allow it to bccome thc dominant paradigm. Again
Nikolas Rose's (1985) work, parlintlarly hh dl\t:U\\ion ot thc conflict between
eugcnk amllwgitnhl di\t'OUIW'> lllf dnnaut.lltn n P'Yt hology, h illustratin
of lht\. 'thh lCIIIIl:\1 \\',1\ dn 11kd t>ll tlil' l><iSI\ ol tlll l l ' ~ f l l ' l li\'l: ,Hillllll\tTilti\'l'
lllilil)' ol 1111 11\'n .IJ'J>le>,Hiit'S
Power, resistance and discipline 43
The 'map' of pown that Foucault offers is quite ditlcrent from that offered
by many theorists, who tend to focus upon tht state and/or powerful
mdividuals. Power is not centred in or on a particular organization or
individual. Rather t is dispersed across a network of institutions (schools,
workplaces, barracks, ho'>pitals etc.) which Ioucault calls the 'carccral
network', a network which is increasingly integrated, such that, for example,
problems encountered in thc school are taken up by cducational psycholo-
gists and social workcrs, and perhaps then by psychiatrists and the police.
l'his may serve the interest) of certain elite groups, Foucault admits, and this
vast network is perhaps now incorporated in the institutional complex that
we call the 'state' We '>hould be wary of 'top down' readings, however. lhe
state, bourgeoisie ami other 'powerful' organizations and groups do not lie
behind these mechanisrm as their explanation. 1 he mechanisms and their
interconnection are the products of long, indepcndent and contingent
histories, and they both pre-date and constitute prcconditions for the
powerful state and bourgeoisie as we know them today. Power has emerged
from the bottom up.
Reflexivity as self-poli cing?
What has this to do with reflexive embodimenf! Hrst, it is relevant because
loucault claims that the self-mastery we enjoy in relation to our bodies and
our awareness of our bO<hes are both products of this 'investment' of the body
by these technologies of control. Disciplinary regimes are, under another
description, training regimes and as such they transmit powers and skills to
the individual who undcrgoes them. In addition, thc attention to bodily
detai ls required by this training raises the individual's awareness of ttwir
body. Agents become attuncd to their bodies. More importantly, Foucault
claims that externa! relations of observation and surveillance are internalilt'd
by the agent such that they become a sclf-policing subject:
fhere is no nced for arms, physical violence, material constraints. jusi a
gaze. An inspecting gaze which each individual under its weight will end
interiorising to thc point that he is his own overscer, each individual thm
exercising sur\'eillance over and against himself.
(Foucault 1980: 1 SS)
lrom this point of view 'reflexive embodiment' is a product of externa!
wntrol. The self-awarcness of social agents is self-policing, induced by the
111ternalization of externa! relations of observation and 'training'. 1t is beca use
ol this internalization of control, in Foucault's vicw, that modern societies
llave been able todo away with the more physical forms of power. Indeed one
ol the central arguments of Discipline and Prmis/1 is that liberal democracies
pn.''>upposc both tht tarceral network and thc internalization of its
mtchanisms ot wnlrol Wt lan only have righh, dcmocracy anda civiliztd
w.t)' ot life, Foucault "1-:llt'\, hccause thc mkro-rwtwork\ ot discipline sccure a
lll'le\\ary JtnJ 111 (0111J>Ii,lltt l',
For llw 111osl >.111 llllll'lill\ analysi\ \\'\'111\ lo l>l' lo\ 11\nltt)H>ll a rl'lali\'<.'1)'
44 Reviewing tite field
well-defined and narrow range ol pra<:ti<.l'\ and norms, leaving open the
possibility that other practices fu m !ton indtpcndently of this wcb of power.
Ata number of points in his work, howcver, he makes more grandiose claims
- for example, that muscle building, gymna\tics and 'keep fit' exercising are
al! part of this disciplinar> network (Foucault 1980: 56). Moreover, a numbcr
of those who have used his wo1 k in 'hody studies' have applied his
disciplinary critique to such leisure pursuits as aerobics (Lloyd 1996) and
bodybuilding (Mansfield and McGinn 1993). This is a problematic over-
extension of the approach, in my \ iew, ami 1 return to it. First, however, we
must dclve clecper into Foucault's approach to consider both his concept of
the body and his concept of resistancc.
Foucault's body
What is the status of 'the body' in loucault's work? This is a question that has
bothcrcd a number of critics and we must bricfly considcr it (sec Dews 1984;
Levin 1989; Burkitt 1999). 1 believc that there are thrce distinct positions on
'the body' that one might infer from ;oucault's work, cach problematic. lhe
first is that he has no position on thc body, as such, only on 'the body'; that
is, that he is intcrcsted in rcpresentations ancl constructions of 'the body' ancl
'human nature' but brackcts out questions rcgarding their 'reality'. This
woulcl be consistent with much of his emprica! work. However, it limits his
usefulness from m y point of view, as 1 am interested in the reality of reflexive
embodiment. Furthermorc, Foucault docs not remain within the strict
confines that this position cntails. His account of self-policing appears to be
a claim about what human beings are really like, for example (he bclieves that
we really are disciplined ancl really do police ourselves), and he frequently
makes claims about 'human nature', if only to attack what he takes to be
dominant views of it.
This brings us to the second position. According to this position Foucault
is critica! of the notion of a fixcd human nature, suggesting instead that
human attributes vary historically, not least as an effect of technologies of
control. Most sociologists would agree with a moderate version of this thesis.
Research suggests that many human attributes are socially acquired and
variable. Foucault's version of this thesis is sometimes so radical, however,
that it becomes self-undermining. llc seems to deny the idea of any invariant
and biologically constitutcd human nature. l'his is problematic because, as
writcrs such as Elias (1978) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) have noted, the
plasticity and variability of human beings is specics specific and depcnds
u pon an invariant 'plastic' nature ami a hard wired capacity to both lcarn and
innovate. These properties will havc an evolutionar} histof} l>ut they arr
static across human history and mnssarily so. In addit1on, thc language that
Foucault uses to descriiK this plastidty te1Hl\ lo suggcst passivity <111(1 a tahula
rasa modd ot human lwings. 1 hi' i\ prol>ltill.lllt tmpmtallv, in,l\much "'
most studics ol lt;nning '"ggtsl llt.tl 11 111\'0hT\ a grcat d1.il of active
involvt'llll'lll n11 bth;ill ni llll' "f.' 111 11 1\ IIII'Oil'llt.illy
lll'l olll\l ti 1111 ttii'\IICI!l ni 1\'IJ,Il lt lllllt!lll \ lll tll\1 i1l1111' '!llllll, in lo' iltlu
Power, resistance wtcl llisclphllc 1!
organism is entirel} historical ancl 'blank'. lt is not dcar, tor cxampk, llow
human beings could htcome involvcd in the various 'gymnastit' regimcs that
l'oucault idcntifies as a key source of bodily self-mastcry ami awareness il they
did not alreacly have a considerable degree of mastery and awareness (Crossley
1996, 2004a). 1 do not mean to den y that the social vwrld is a source of basic
human attributes. Howcvcr, loucault's tcchniques do not and could not
operate on a tabula rasa. Morcover, as such it is clear that the acquisition of
:>articular habits, 'body techniqucs' (Chapter 8) ancl evcn 'sclf-control' must
involve interaction betwcen the 'trainer' and the 'trained'. lt is nota mattcr of
'imprinting', as Foucault's language often suggests. Finally, it is not cviclent
what mechanisrns of 'self-policing' and 'self-control' are supposcd to be
policing and controlling if human beings simply are whatever the regimes of
power in a particular historical period makc thcm. Without a 'something
che', a pre-given organism which might conceivably be deemcd in need of
controlling and policing, the mechanisms for policing and controlling it are
rcdundant, irrelevant and intellectually uninteresting.
This is where thc third position comes in. Sorne readcrs claim to have
lound another position in Foucault, in which the body is a si te of incohcrent,
lOmpeting and irrational drives and impulses (Levin 1989; Burkitt 1999).
Hin, in particular, claims that there are two contradictory positions on the
hody in Foucault: one historicist (as described above), the other 'libidinal'. 1
cannot find the textual cvidencc to support this claim. However, if Foucault
does subscribe to this rnodel then he is wrong. As with thc plasticity thesis,
nost sociologists would probably accept a moderate formulation. We are all
awarc that social control, both externa! and intcrnalized, acts upon pre-
cxisting impulses and dispositions that it controls. However, if all that we
ronsistcd of, biologically, was a 'storm' of conflicting emolions and drives
lhen the disciplining that Foucault describes could not occur. Discipline
woulcl have nothing to 'hook into'. And society itself would not be pmsiblc
,s agents would lack the basic organization necessary for their coordination.
In order to be 'trained' bodies must already rnanifcst a degrcc of
organization, consistency and agency. And everything we know about hoth
hiology and child development suggests that they are. Organic lifc is ordcred.
lhis may not be the order required by the social world and socialization
nwchanisms might be nccessary to prepare the organism for social lifc. But
111e organism is not irregular ancl inconsistent. lf it were it would not survive
l>iologically, let alone prove capable of education into the ways of thc social
orlci.
Resistance?
1 >o agcnts not resist the power that Foucault describes? He acknowledges that
thty do, but much ot what he writes about resistance is extrernely vague and
underdevelowd (set < 'rossley 1994: 117-22 for a more detailcd discussion).
Jlcrl' 1 want lo look ;11 lwo \'lrsions ot thc concepl within his work. Both
illUJlllllilll' oi\IH'tl\ 11l 111\ 11\'l'l.ill pmitiOil <IIHI offcr illll'fl'Sting 111\ights for our
di\ltl\\i<lll ol niluulillll'lll.
46 Reviewing the field
The first version suggests that invcstmcnt of the body by various forms of
power in itself raises claims, at thc lcvcl of the body, which constitute
resistance. Powcr excites an intercst in thc body that it cannot itself control:
Mastery and awareness of onc's own body can be acquired only through
the effect of an investment of powcr in thc body gymnastics, excrcises,
muscle building, glorification of thc body beautiful. All of this belongs to
the pathway leading to thc desirc of one's own body, by way of the
insistent, persistent, meticulous work of power on the bodies of children
or soldiers, the healthy bodies. But once power produces this effect, there
inevitably emerge corresponding claims and affirmations, those of one's
own body against power, of health against the economic system, of
pleasure against the moral norms of sexuality, marriage, decency.
Suddenly, what had made power strong becomes used to attack it.
Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to counter-
attack in the same body.
(Foucault 1980: 56)
One example of this from Foucault's work centres upon 'health'. He claims,
both above and clsewhere (Foucault 1980: 166-82), that the imposition of
health regimes on the population has led to a form of resistance in which
agents now demand that their health-care needs are catered for. They reach a
point where they take their health so seriously that they make difficult
demands u pon the health services that were originally deployed to encourage
them to take thcir health more seriously (Foucault 1980: 166-82). Similarly,
he notes how the invention and imposition of 'sexuality', as an identity,
upon European populations in the nineteenth century generated a basis for
resistance, both in the form of the sexual revolution of the 1960s and in the
form of early gay rights movements (Foucault 1984). In both cases the
subjects of power accepted the identity imposed upon them (i.e. 'sexual
subject' or 'homosexual') and mounted a form of poltica! resistance upon
that basis, calling for open recognition and celebration of what earlier regimes
of power/knowledge had identified as their essence.
This is an interesting, if underdeveloped idea. Foucault's purpose in
positing it is, T believe, threefold. First, he wants to challenge the idea that
power acts upon pre-constituted subjects. Homosexuality, as an identity, for
example, did not pre-exist the forms of power/knowledge which seek to
classify and control it. Consequently, neither did the homosexuals (qua
homosexuals) who resisted that form of power. Second, as in his concept of
power, he wants to reject the notion that resistance is a matter of saying 'no'
to power. Resistance may continue what power has begun: for example, gay
politics has involved, amongst others things, a considerable fleshing out of
the gay identity which bcgan life in a complex of power/knowledge. Third,
explaining resistance in this way scems to answer the question of where
resistance comes from, how it comes about, within the context of a theory
where 'human bcings' ~ i m p l y ilrl' wll,llt'Vl'l 'power' makes them. Human
beings hilvt mastcry and awarl'lll'\\ Jll Hl.ton to their boclies bccausc powcr
' inv<sh' thl'lll. llll'Y Jve dtsns IH < .111 s<' p<lWI' r stJllllllatl'\ tlll'Sl' cltsnl'S. l"hey
.lll' i>otiHJcd ,IIHlllt tlll'll hc.lltll , " ' ' 11.l11t\ .11111 \o on lltT<liiSt' (HIWt'l II.IS lll<l<il'
Power, resistance und discipline 47
them bothered about these things. They resist because power has done such a
good job that they are more body-obsessed than it is able to cope with.
1 disagree with Foucault on this final point. Without denying that human
beings are, in sorne part, the product of disciplinary and training practices, it
is futile, as noted above, to deny that the efficacy of those practices
presupposes active agency and a variety of specifically human attributes.
Moreover, the notion that power creates the basis for resistance in this way
does not work. lf human beings were pure 'plastic' they would do what they
are trained todo and no more. The fact that they do more suggests that there
is more to them, that they can rework the categories that are applied to them,
redeploy the skills and attributes that they have acquired. In short, it
presupposes agency. In his very final work Foucault seems to recogni.ze this.
Indeed, he seems to recogni.ze that power itself presupposes an agent over
whom it is exercised: '[power] is always a way of acting upon an acting subject
or subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' (Foucault 1982:
221). For the largest part of his work, however, this insight is missing.
In addition, there is a danger that resistance is tied too closely to power,
such that Foucault ignores much of what is creative about it. Collective
resistance, in the form of the new social movements already referred to in this
book, involves more than opposition. Activists experiment and innovate with
social practices and lifestyles (Melucci 1986, 1996). The praxis of social
movemcnts is generative of discourses, identities and experiences which are
irreducible to whatever they are mobili.zing against (Eyerman and jamison
1991). lmportantly, this applies to the various experiments with and
discourses on 'the body' that have emerged within social movement contexts.
Movements have contested body power and informali.zed various spheres of
body-related practices, challenging the policing and self-policing mechan-
isms that operate therein, but they have also generated new ways of thinking
about and acting upon the body new modes of reflexivc cmbodimcnt. Of
course they have not done so ex nihilo. They have uscd widcr cultutal
materials, but even so, much of what has been generated in this context is
irreducible to its constituents. Tt is new. In this respect new social movcmcnts
have made a genuine contribution to the cultural basis of contemporary
reflexive embodiment. The modero primitives movement, whicl1 bcmoans
the loss of ritual and heightened bodily experience in modero socicties,
pioneering new forms of 'body play' anda reinvention of traditional rituals, is
one good example of this (Vale and juno 1999; Pitts 2003).
Moreover, one form of resistance can spark another. Many studies of the
mobilizations of the 1960s, when the ncw social movements emerged, for
example, show how one movement gave rise to another and then another in
a gcnerative, escalating process (McAdam 1988, 1995). Modes of critique and
protest were transferred from one domain to another, along with the energy
of already politicized agents. Tt is not only power that generates resistance,
therefore. Resistance itself generates further resistance.
In addition, the 'voices' of social movements have penetrated the
collcctive consciousncss of contemporary societies, and by that means the
111dividual consciousmsscs of cven those who ha ve not been active, such that
nlany agl'lll\ lt-1'1 tlHnwlvls s1Jbjcct to com1wting daims and prcssurcs in
48 Reviewing the field
their actions. Feminism providcs a good cxample of this (scc also Chapter 4).
A woman may feel herself subject to patriarchal norms, feminist counter-
norms and post-fcminist replies to fcminism, in addition to whatever
independent desires she may have. A number of studies of both cosmetic
surgery and beauty salons are interesting in this respect, as they indicate the
genuine debate the women have with themselves about these treatments
(Davis 1995; Gimlin 2002; Black 2004). Most are aware of the feminist
argument against such treatments and yet they want thc treatments and feel
that their desire is not simply the product of clever advertising or patriarchal
pressure. In sorne cases one might even say that it is feminism that is
experienced as the 'policing' aspect within consciousness. Women want the
treatment but feel pressured to resist this desire by intcrnalized feminist
counter-norms and fcar of the likely reaction from feminist peers. Whatever
the precise details, however, what is evident is that consciousness is not
dominated by a single controlling force, the Panopticon watchtower, but
rather subject to competing claims which are effectively brought into
dialogue 'within' the individual agent. There is no single nonn that the
women contemplating these treatments could follow. This brings us back to
Giddens (1991), and not only because the women in each of the above-
mentioned studies tend to account for what they do in terms of their
individuality and sense of self. Sorne women may be disposed to listen to onc
of these 'voices' more than the others, but for many women there is nothing
in their immediate environment, in terms of a thrcat of sanctions, that will
force their hand. They are condemned to think it through and choose.
Contestation creates a space for choice.
The second account of resistan ce from Foucault's work that 1 want to focus
upon occurs in a discussion of methodology. He is replying to the objection
that his description of the Panopticon is a far cry from real life in prisons:
if I had wanted to describe real life in the prisons, 1 wouldn't indeed have
gone to Bentham. But the fact that real life isn't the same thing as
theoreticians' schemas doesn't entail that thesc schemas are therefore
Utopian, imaginary etc. That would be to have a very impoverished notion
of the real ... the elaboration of these schemas corresponds to a whole
series of diverse practices and strategies ... [and] ... induce[s] a whole series
of effects in the real (which isn't of coursc the same as saying they take thc
place of the real): they crystallise into institutions, they inform individual
behaviour, they actas grids for the perception and cvaluation of things. lt
is absolutely true that criminals stubbornly resisted the new disciplinary
mechanism in the prison; it is absolutely correct that the actual
functioning of the prisons, in the inherited building where thcy were
established and with the governors and guards who administered them,
was a witches' brew compared to the beautiful Benthamite machine.
(Foucault 1981: 10)
Prisoners resist thc Panopticon hut \o too do guards ami governors, in
different ways. Rcsistancc, in tllh wnw, lltn,lvts l>oth non compliance and
res<.'IHmcnt on l>elwlt of thO\l' wlto llltlsl IJ\t' out pi.Jnll<.'ts' plall\, as wdl as
uniOil'\lTil and .tn idtnt,tl oh\l.lt l ' wltl 11 .ti ," ':1'1 111 tlll' \\,1\
Power, resistance und discipline 49
The conception of resistance is unobjectionable in itself but it points to
further weaknesses in Foucault's position. Specifically, it reminds us that
Foucault studies plans and blueprints. His analysis is one step removed from
the implementation of those plans and one step further again from
whatever effects that implementation may llave. These plans are part of the
social world. They are real. But they are not the same thing as what they
plan for. And there is good reason to believc that, though they will shape
those aspects of the world that they seek to plan and design, their
realization will often be far from perfect, not Ieast because they are not
imposed upon a tabula rasa social world, nor tabula rasa social agents. We
should therefore be extremely cautious when Foucault and those who use
his work make claims about, for example, the investment of power in the
body. It would require a different type of study to those conducted by
Foucault to determine how the plans he outlines are implemented and with
what effects.
Foucault assessed
Ata more general level the concept of resistance poses problems for Foucault
on two levels. First, as with Elias's conception of the role of new social
movements (see Chapter 2), there is a question whether resistance move-
ments have not undermined the role of discipline in late modern societies.
Most of the institutions in Foucault's 'carceral network' still exist and sorne
are more pervasive than ever. But Jevels of formality and deference within
them are greatly reduced, even relative to the standards of the early 1 960s,
and many of the means of control which used to operate routinely within
them no Ionger do so, as the conservative lament for 'good old-fashioncd
discipline' testifies. In particular, many of the sanctions and micro penaltic\
that were once available in schools, factories, prisons ancl so on havc bccn
removed as a consequence of liberal critiques and protests.
One might respond to this that 'good old-fashioned discipline', wht.'H' t
has been compromised, has been replaced with softer but no less effcctive
mechanisms of power. We do not subject individuals to micro-economics ot
reward and punishment any more, for example, we subject them to
counsellors who listen and subtly persuade them back into line (Rose
1989). This response is problematic, however. As in Foucault's own work,
there is a danger that the concept of power becomes so overextended as to
become meaningless. 1f individuals are not brought into line by the threat,
however implicit, of sanctions, then we have no basis from which to talk of
power. We would be better to concede, as 1 noted with respect to
1nformalization in Chapter 2, that in late modern societies the reach of the
normative regulation of conduct has declined, partly as a consequence of the
dforts of social movements, and more space for individual choice and
dccision has opened up.
l'his connects with my earlier point about overextending Foucault's
approach. llow far into the clomain of rcflcxivc cmbodiment do we want to
push tlw notion ot l>ody powcr? Yoga? l'ilalt' '' jogging? Transccn<lcntal
50 Reviewing tlle field
Mcditation? Wc could apply the framework, potentially, to all of these
pr<Kliccs, but that is the problem. The analysis applies everywhere, so ceases
to rnark out anything in particular. The critica! force of the concept of power
h diminishtd. lf aerobics is body-power then body-power is nothing to worry
about. Thc rcason why Foucault's analysis seems to apply across in these
ways, in my vicw, is that he focuses upon techniques which are widesprcad.
Onc can, indccd, find cchocs of the techniques describcd in Discipline allCI
Prmisf1 in contcmporary discourscs on 'working out'. Moreover, evcn where
techniques are diffcrent they are still techniques and can be analysed in a
Foucauldian fashion. Technique is not power in my view, howcvcr. Following
Elias (1978), 1 suggcst that powcr derives from a balance or rathcr imbalancc
within relations of interdependence which affords parties to those relations
levcrage with which to influence one another's conduct (see Chapter 2).
Power is in play when my ability to bring negative sanctions to bcar u pon you
acts as a force making you more likely to do as 1 say. lf you cannot bring
sanctions to bcar upon me then you can watch me all you like from your
central Panopticon watchtower. This may be irritating for me but it is not
controlling. From this point of view there is a diffcrcnce between schools and
factories on the one hand and aerobics classes on the other. They may both
involvc thc same techniques but there is a threat of sanctions (legal and
cconomic) missing in the case of aerobics, which compels pupils and workers
to attcnd schools and factories and to submit to their techniques. Of course
sorne agcnts may feel compelled to work out as a result of pressures of social
acceptability, such that tal k of power is appropriate herc (sec Chapter 4). But
thcn a political analysis of aerobics must focus on that pressure and not on
thc techniques of aerobics itself.
Foucault seems to concede sorne of this in his discussion of 'technologies
of the self'- that is, techniques which agents voluntarily take up in an cffort
to create themselvcs in a particular way. His studies of thcse technologies
focus upon the Ancient Greeks and early Christians (Foucault 1987a, 1988a,
1988b) but he concedes that his inspiration, in part, was thc contcmporary
'Californian cult of thc self' and, in particular, Christopher Lasch's (1991)
studies of Tlle Culture o( Narcissism (Foucault 1988c). Sorne contemporary
Foucauldians have tended to read this back through Foucault's studics of
govcrnmcntality, exploring links between self-regulation and widcr social
rcgulation (c.g. Rose 1989, 1999). This work is important and insightful but it
tcnds to reconceptualize technologies of the self as technologics of power
when, on my rcading, Foucault introduced 'technologies of thc sclf' as a way
of acknowledging and cxploring forms of reflexivity ancl self work (including
body work) which are more voluntaristic, are not reducible to powcr ami do
not necessarily fit within strategies and networks of political control ami
govcrnancc. Foucault appcars to be seeking out domains of voluntary aclivity
which lic outsidc of the vast wcb of control that his carlicr work dcscribtd.
lndccd, h>utault talks in somc placcs, mak111g dtar rctcrcnccs to rnodtrnity,
of tht possibility of creating one's own hk , ~ , .1 'wc11k of art'. l'hc nlltlrast witll
tht disriplillill} nrouldng of thl' l>ody dt'\1 1dwd in his t;trlttr work <<>uld not
llt mon \l.llk. ,\nd 111 \111\H' ll'SIH'I 1s 1111s woll..: <1111\'l'rg<s with <;iddtn,'s
(l'l'll) 1\Hlll' 1'.\\II'Illi,d <OIHI'Ifl\, 1<111<,11111 ts ng.rgn1.; with l l l < ~ d t \ ol "'11
Power, resistance wuf discipline 51
creation which are, in his view, freely chosen (albcit pcrhaps under the
i ntluence of popular opinion ami fashion).
Conclusion
oucault describes a vast 'carccral nctwork' of disciplinary agents and
'l:Chnologics that mould the body in modcrn societies and suggests that
r flexive awarencss of thc body, on behalf of the individual, is an
mternalization of thc policing function of this network. He suggests that
our worries, anxieties and judgcments about our bodics derive from the
normalizing project of this network, and that cvcn our basic mastery and
1warencss of our bodies is a product of the investmcnt of powcr in our bodies.
Much of what he says is impressive. We must be wary, howcver. Many of
loucault's more extreme claims are sclf-undermining and do not stand up. In
.tddition, his detailecl empirical work focuses upon discourses about practicc,
such as plans and blucprints, rathcr than thc practices those discourscs
discourse about or thcir cffccts. Consequently, therc is a huge evidence gap
when Poucault speculates about scH-policing subjects. Thc real world, as he
concedes, is a 'witchcs brcw' compared to the idealizations he studies ancl we
should be mindful to recognize this in our appreciation of him. Finally, we
hould recognize that thc world he describes was a world taking shape in the
dghteenth century, a world which has bccn subjcct to considerable critique
.111d dismantling sincc the 1960s. There are continuities but there are
differences too, as Elias's (1996) notion of informalization suggests. Having
said this, Foucault gives us a way of thinking about retlexive embodiment
independently of political domination \ ia his conccpt of 'technologics of the
sclf' and, though this may be an underdcvelopcd notion, we should pcrhaps
take itas an indication that his work does not lcad us toa singular account ot
rctlexive embodiment as political domination but pcrhaps rathcr idcntfit'\
different sociallogics corrcsponding to diffcrent practiccs of modification and
rnaintenance.
Note
l. That is, regimcs in which inmatcs are rewarded for good behaviour with
tokens which thcy might spend in a tuck shop, and are perhaps 'fined'
for bad behaviour.
4 Consumption, gendcr tille/ llu
fashion-beauty complcx
This considers two intcrrclated themes that have been touched upon
111 prevrous chapters: consumer culture and gcndcr. 1 take these two thcmes
togcther bccausc much of the feminist critique of reflcxive embodimcnt has
been framcd in terms of a widcr critique of consumer culture. Consumption
gendcr are both very big arcas of research. Thcrc is a great deal 1 could say
wtth rcspcct t? them. 1 have limited myself toa few key points, however, in
accordancc wrth the central airm of the book.
The chaptcr begins with a brief discussion of the relation bctween
consumption and reflexivc embodiment in which 1 consider both how the
new social movcments intcract with consumer culture and its bodily impact,
and how the cthos of consumcr culture might contradict that of thc civilizing
process and of Foucault's 'carccral network'. Ncxt 1 consider the claim that
womcn cspccially are affcctcd by the dynamics of consumer culture bcfore
considering how certain fcminist writers have applicd the ideas of to
female bodies in particular.
Consumer culture
The key argument with respcct to the link bctwccn consumer culture and
reflexivc crnbodimen: is conternporary conccrns about the body are
fuelled by the dynamrcs of thc markct and capitalist cxpansion. To remain
capitalist markcts mu'>t cxpand, conquering new
terntoncs - a process Habermas (1987) tcrm'> '<:olonisation of the lifcworld'.
'The body' is one of these ncw tcrritories. 1 nlrcprcncurs have invented a
whole ncw set of 'needs' and 'dt'\lfl''>' in relat ron lo thc body, so the argument
goes, which thcy duly servicc (t.g. leatherstorw 1982). Like the social world
different. r.cgions of our bodk'> and llodily lik havc been progressivel;
commodrhcd and colonized. 111 addllion, rnany further developmcnts of
c?nsu_mer reinfornd lhl\ hodih tocus. New sites of consump-
tton, bars, 111ghtclub'>, hohd.ty dt'>tinations and shopping centres,
for examplc, rnvolve a culture ot di,play which, in turn, nurtures a new
u-'ur.-tt 1 ,,,., 1111 ''' 111''11 tfiJOUIY t.,ttlfliJI .. A a.l
<11111 ht'l).;hlt'lli'd htttl\ \<lll'ollllll\111'\\, \\' .111' .1\\'.111' lh,l 1\'t .111'1111 displ.l) .11111
111,1"1'\ 11\ 1111111 tOII\dtlll\ 11! 11111\l'h'l'\ .11111 111111111111 ol how \\'\' .1ppl'.ll .
ll11\ h,l\ ht'l'll h11ll1t'1 1111 lled, llllllt'0\'1'1, hy tlll' t'llll'lgl'nt t' .tml populut\ ol
lll'\\' \, 1111 lucll11g 11111101\, ltlllll'ltl\ .IIHI vidt'O\, which prc\l'llt
l11dl\ iduah wilh .111 1111.1g1' o! thtn l>ody, fatilitatrng .tiHitrKmrraging bodily
l"''otnrpatron, .11111 hy a tultural shill, notcd by both Scnnctt (1976) and
l .tthl'rstonl' ( 1
1
JH2), lin"cd to ncw si tes of bodily display, in which
jtulgt:mcnts ot tharatttr are now inncasingly based upon outer appearance.
In addition, thc media, which occupy a central place in consumcr
t ulturc, circulatc imagcs of bodies, cultivating ideals with which audienccs
rdcntif). Advertising, which is designcd to cultiva te changcs in behaviour and
is an obvious example. Most forms of media, in virtuc of their visual
1111<tgcry, contribute to an intensified awareness of ancl interest in bodics,
howcver. And writtcn texts, where not harnessed for the samc cffccts (e.g.
dr,tussing appearanccs) often reach bencath the skin, addressing but also
ullti\ating fears and anxieties about, for example, hcalth and sexual
pcrtormancc. In addition, the culture of celebrity plays a key role. rhc
wcight fluctuations of the stars, what thcy wear, how their look has evolved,
thl'ir beauty and physical glamour, in addition to their health problems and
\l ruggles with, for cxample, anorexia, obesity or addiction, are key themcs.
1 onsumer culture rnay not have created these anxicties and desires ex nihilo
hut it amplifies thcrn on a scale ncvcr befare seen.
'!he othcr side of this is that Westcrn societies have become increasingly
,1ftlucnt, such that large sections of the population, including membcrs of a
working class whith previously sur,ivcd on subsistence wagcs, now have the
mcans to afford a range of goods and services ovcr ami above their basic
n, cds. The working class are no longer tied so closcly to the sphcre of
'ncc:essity', as Bourdicu (1984) suggests (see Chaptcr 2), and their consump
lion patterns ami tastes are therefore libcrated from this constraint amlnHm'
divcrse. Agents modify and maintain thcir bodies becausc thcy can aftord lo.
Colonization, commodification and resistance
lhc notion that thc body is commodificd and colonized connects with a
number of themcs that we have alrcady considered in this book. First,
tommodification of the body constitutes the body, as Giddcns suggests, asan
object of choices. New ways of scrvicing and adorning thc body are pioneered
which we may choose between. Second, and relatedly, thi!> helps to call the
l>ody into qucstion, as Giddens again suggcsts, because new technologies and
practices challcnge both traditional assumptions about thc body and what
wcre previously natural, biological limitations to its cultivation. Third, as
llabermas (1987) notes, colonization is integrally linked to the mobilization
of the new social movcmcnts which, 1 havc suggestcd, play an important role
in further qucstioning thc body and regimes of reflexivc cmbodiment. The
link between coloni1.ation and new social movements is twofold. First, the
process of brcaking down traditions and calling the body into question
generates a contc:-.t ot debate which, in turn, givcs rhe to factions and
54 Reviewing the field
movcments. This is particularly so wlltfl dvbate identifies a potential which is
in sorne way stultified or harnptrtd l'XIsting social arrangements or,
alternatively, which raises complex moral qucstions. The technical possibi-
lities for abortion and birth control il lmt1atc this to some extent. Debates
about what we should do can generatt protcsts about what we are doing and
where we are going. Second, commoditication of thc body has itself generated
a critica! reaction. The modcrn primilivt'\, tor example, challenge what they
regard as the nullification and dcsensitizalion of the body in contemporary
culture (Vale and Juno 1999; Pitts 2003). Likewise, protagonists of the 1960s
counterculture sought to re-establish their relations with their bodics by way
of, for example, meditation, yoga, free love and psychedelic drugs. Bodily
expericnce in capitalist societies is alienatcd, reprcssed and inauthentic, they
claimcd, and they set about trying to resolve that situation (Berke 1969).
It is equally acknowledged both in these writings and thc discourses of
the movements in question, however, that consumer capitalism has a
remarkable durability, and that critiques and alternatives are very oftcn
drawn upon as sources of inspiration which facilitate the developmcnt of
new fashions, products, markcts and niches. Movements can be co-opted
and their innovations incorporated and used. The desirc to 'rcturn to
naturc', for example, living in accordance with our bodies' nceds, has
generated a vcry fruitful marketing nichc. In a typically provocative claim,
which echocs this point, Baudrillard (1998) argues that the body functions
as a sign within consumer culture of an authcntic and naturallife outside of
that culture. It is not outsidc at all in his vicw, however. Rathcr, the natural
and authentic body is but another invention of consumer culture. Thcre is
no outside. This view is too extreme in my view, andas a conscquence it fails
to sce the generative dynamic of intcraction between social movcmcnts and
capitalist agents charactcristic of contcmporary socicty. Ncvcrthclcss,
Baudrillard has a point. Social movcmcnts can stand outsidc consumer
culture, reconstituting the body in ncw and intcresting ways, and some-
times endeavour to do so, but this is only cvcr a tcmporary state of affairs
and must be constantly rencwed, as rcsistance can be incorporated and used
as a resource by marketers and product dcvelopcrs. The tusslc is more or lcss
continuous and yesterday's protest chant can vcry easily become today's
advertising slogan. Moreover, though social movements may tap into prc-
existing bodily potcntial which is ignorcd or repressed, it would be
problematic to suggcst that any movcment has discovercd the real,
authentic body. It is more plausible to suggcst that movements invent
new ways of thinking about and practising thc body.
This observation adds complcxity to our picturc of reflcxivc cmboclimcnt
in social lifc. 1 havc argued in previous chapters that social movcmcnts
challenge certain of the norms that surround boclily Jife in modcrn socictics,
calling them into question. To this Wl' can now add that they challengt
ccrtain of the bodily idcals and pm\iblit iv' glnvrattd within the markct and
consumer culture. We mu\1 ,1ho add, """'' \'t'l, tllat commoditication also
calh as1wrh ol hodily lite into qrw\11<>11 , \\'hihl t nJI\t'n,Jtl\l' 111 \OIIIt' nspl'l'h,
l'Oll\llllll'l 1 Ultllll' \

< il,tli<'ll l) lllg .111tl illlltJ\'.tl l\1' 111 othl'l'\
\!H i.ll 1110\'l'llll' lll\, , 1\ lt>tt ' ' tJ t tt ' \1 \ l.trH t' , .ti<' vttlnt llh to
Consumption, gender aiiCJ tlle fashion-beauty complex 55
incorporation al1(1 lO optation within consumer cultut. Cntique is oftcn
easily absorbed and neutralizcd such that it mmt l>t t<Hl\lantly regcncrated
and rcformcd if it b to maintain its vitality al1(1 rt'\\1<1111 quality.
Asceti cism and hedoni sm
Consumer culture further complicatcs our picture, morcovcr, in that it
appears to entail an ethos which is at odds with thc image of the body-society
relation that we have hithcrto considercd. In our discussions of both thc
'civilizing process' ancl Foucault's 'discipline' we considered thc claim that
the body is increasingly subject to controlling pressurcs and forccs. Bodies
and appetitcs are tightly regulated in modero societics, wc !carnee!. rhcy are
madc to work efficiently ancl effectively. fhis litcraturc rcjoins an established
sociological tradition which claims to show that modern, industrial
capitalism was founded upon an ascetic ethos centred upon hard work, self-
control, discipline and thc deferral of gratification (e.g. Thompson 1967;
Weber 1978; Marcusc 1987). Thc ethos of consumcrism is rather diffcrcnt.
Oesires are encouragcd and cultivated. We are invited to act upon impulses
rather than repressing or controll ing them; to 'buy now' on credit, while thc
offer lasts, rather than saving until wc can afford to pay; and to indulge
oursclves. Plcasure, play and hedonism are thc names of the game.
This is interesting because it suggests that the rise of consumer culture, like
thc informalization process (Chapter 2), may be a countervailing tcnclcncy to
that towards increascd control identified by both Elias and Foucault. Thc
agents of discipline and the civilizing process are rclegated toa position whcrc
they are just one amongst a numbcr of agents and forces competing to shape
social lifc, which in turn leads to a more complex social configuration than
cither Foucault or Elias describe: a socicty pulled in different clircctions and
thus pcrhaps more differentiated, with diffcrcnt domains distinguished by
the degree of asceticism or hcdonism expccted or allowcd within them. lt
might equally pose difficulties for agents who must live with thcsc potentially
contradictory ethics, however.
In sorne respccts the contradiction is more apparent than real. Fcath-
erstonc (1982), for cxample, notes that consumer culture celebratcs 'perfect'
bodics - that is, toncd, tanned, slim, fit, 'sexy' bodies. He draws attention to
the narcissistic plcasure of 'looking good' that charactcrizes consumer
societics and the voyeuristic plcasurc of visually consuming the good-looking
bodies of others. Moreover, he notes that thc cultural scripts of consumer
culture cxplicitly link thc rewards of this society with such bodily perfection:
thc fun on offcr in consumer culture is for those who look the part ancl can
perform. 1 n these ways consumer culture genera tes incentives for the samc
\orts of body as are encouragcd by thc discipline of production, and the two
'pheres are manwd h.trmoniously. In other respects there is a contradiction,
however Wh rht ,Jgrt<ntg 1 hat 'sexy' bodics and bodily control are celebrated
in 1 oll\UIIH'I t ult Hit ', lttl t'.\,unpk, Su san Bordo (l<Jln) argues that the pursuit
ot l>odlly l"' lft'< ll<>tl .11HI 'ttlltl{)l, llOtll in t;H 1 .111!1 ,1, a matter of values, is
ttlflll.tdit tnl f> \' lll< <'!litiS nt lttdoll\111, gt'IH'I.IIlll: .t doui>Jv hrlld lo put it
56 Reviewing the field
crudely, if we eat the burgers, drink th<. alcopops, take the holidays and sit in
front of thc TVs that consumer culture oH<.r' us then we will not look like the
models that we visually consume on thmc telcvisions and celebrate as an
ideal. For Bordo, morcover, we risk pathology or at Ieast unhappiness in every
direction. The slim and toned ideals cclebratcd in consumer culture are more
or Icss unattainable. If we try to attain them wc are likely to cnd up either
disappointed or body-obsessed aJ1(1 anorcxic. lf we focus exclusively upon the
hedonistic ethos, by contrast, we risk obcsity and the various health problems
associated with it. There is no happy medium within this double bind,
moreover. Combining asceticism and control with hedonism constitutes a
form of 'bulimia': wc fluctuate between control/denial and abandonment/
gratification, feeling guilty for 'blow-outs' and punishing ourselves but then
ultimately consoling oursclves with another 'blow-out'. Consumer culture
itself is bulimic for Bordo, rocking as it does between these contradictory
ethics of asceticism and hedonism.
Whilst she ovcrstatcs thc case in m y vicw, Bordo's analysis of this double
bind is important. However, we must be careful how we construe hedonism
and asceticism. Bordo assumes that body work is not pleasurable. This is
problematic in my vicw. Moreover, she tends to portray consumers as
'cultural dopes' whose consumption involves no active, interpretative or
reconstructive role. Ethnographic evidence paints a different picture. In my
own work on gyms and working out, for example, 1 found that many people
(myself included) enjoy it and carve out their own social world within it
(Crossley 2006). As in sport, there is a pleasure to be found in physical
exertion and in the reconnection with certain aspects of embodied agency
that it facilitates (see also Elias and Dunning 1986; Grimshaw 1999;
Monaghan 2001b Gimlin 2002). This is a pleasure that demands work and
discipline and, to some cxtent, involves pain, but it is no less pleasurable for
that. Moreover, gyms, like sports teams, generate social connections and
friendships which are intrinsically valued and enjoyed, and which can
become an additional incentive to work out (Crossley 2006). By the same
token, many women who havc beauty treatments claim to enjoy the
pampering (Gimlin 2002; Black 2004). Critics of consumer culture, like
Bordo, complain that it reduces the body to its exchange value; according to
their analysis, body work is oriented to the generation of a product that will
be valued on wider markets. In sorne respects, however, it is they who reduce
the body to its exchange value, failing to recognize the intrinsic pleasures that
attach both to the process of body work and to its end results. Moreover, they
fail to see how social agents such as gym-goers, whilst perhaps not
challenging 'colonization' in the manner of activists in the new social
movements, nevertheless carve out pockets ot meaning, value, identity,
autonomy and fun for themselves in tlw ver} lwart of consumer culture (e.g.
in gyms). In this rcspect, turth<.rm<Hl', nrt,tin IOJim ot plea\urc seeking,
associated with consunll'r tulturt, .nt Jll'lf'rtly 1 ornp.tlihlt with a discipline<!
and regulated hody. Om tan han 11111 g1'11 111g 111 ,111d \lrivng to look good.
lt might lll' OI>Jt'tll'd thattln\ l.ril\ 111 ,ulti'\S .1 iluiiH'I p10hlt111: txdusion.
'1 h<. l>odily id1.tl\ ol IOTI\111111'1 111111111, , .. , to 1 1',11IH'I\Iont ( 19H?), fo1
1',\,llllpfto, \III lly \fH',il,lll); llollll'\\dl !11 l'\l'l)'lliH', ,111' 11'\S ,111 1'\\f>flo
Consumption, gender cmd the fashion-bea uty complex 57
to some than others; as are thc practices associated with this 'body cult'. The
mdy in consumcr culture', for example, is young and able-boclied. Moreover,
.ts with everything in consumer culture, services are paid for and are thus
more accessible to the wcll-off. This is surely true. 1 Iowever, we must again be
tarcful not to identify, as ana lysts, too closely with the idcals nor to be
\l'duced by the advertisements of consumer culture, at least not if those we
.ne studying do not ancl are not. Although gym memberships are financially
costly, for example, ancl may exclude some on this basis, the physical
plcasures of the gym, rcferrcd to above, are potentially availablc to all people
.111d may actually help people who do not fit with dominant bodily ideals to
fl'cl more confident 'in their bodies' (see especially Gri mshaw 1999).
the gym-goers 1 worked with in my above-mentioned cthnography
were not young, they varied in shapes and sizes, and they were not seeking to
pursue abstract bodily ideals (Crossley 2006). Most, in so far as they
,.,ltertained a bodily ideal, worked with a more attainable sense of what was
possible for them. They were not, to reiterate, cultural dopes. More work is
tceded here. Exclusion is more complex ancl subtle in both its mechanisms
nd forms than we have hitherto suggested.
Gender and the fashion- beauty complex
l'he bodily ideals which circulate within consumer culture, Bordo continues,
t,1rget women in particular. Tides are turning, she concedes. The mate body is
increasingly fetishised and targeted (Bordo 2001). But women rcmain thc kc}
target, and this is rcflected in statistics regarding cating disordcrs. Bordo do<.s
not review these statistics, but they are conshtcnt wi th her position. l\kn .lll'
cstimatecl to account for only 10% ot diagnoscs ot anorexia lll'rvm;l, lo1
cxample. And prevalence rates for bulimia ncrvo'>a in dcvcloptd \Ot il't it'\ .111'
1 'YcJ andO. 1% for young women and young m en, rcspcctivcly (1 loe k ami v,1n
llockcn 2003). Proving a link betwe<.'n anorexia ami consumer tulturt , \'l' l y
ditficult. lnciclence rates (i.e. number\ ot ncw cases within a sp<.tiht Jll'liod)
do appear to havc risen in devcloped societics since thc l930s, whidt i\
CL'rtainly consistent with the idea that thcy are cxplained by social changcs
which might include the rise of comumcr culture. But such rises might be
I'Xplained by othcr factors and thc figures are extremely problematic in any
, ase; diagnostic criteria have changcd, public awareness is greater and
,1vailability of treatment has incrcased, to name only a few complications
(lombonne 1995; Hoek and van Hoeken 2003).
l'his gcndcr dimension is devcloped further by Bartky (1990). Women in
contemporary society, she argues, are often reduced, in both description and
judgcment, to certain basic characteristics of their body qua physical object-
lor C\.ample, their shape and their beauty. Thcy are objects of visual scrutiny
.u1d inlorrna l 'beauty contests' in evcn the most mundane contcxts of their
tn ryda} lives. More importantly, women learn to view themselves in t his
w.ry. 'lhcy Icarn to adopt the perspective of the othcr towards themselves and
imll'rt thtmsclvcs from this perspective, beco111111g, in Bartky's terms,
'n,ud\\istit'. In part thh is a stratcgic adaptation \\'onun know that how
58 Reviewing tlle field
they look influences how they are trcated and thcy scck to avoid negative
judgemcnts by being the first and most critica! of their scrutinisers: 'Knowing
that she is subject to the cold appraisal of the male connoisseur and that her
life prospects may depend u pon how she is seen, a woman learns to appraise
herself first' (Bartky 1990: 28). More broadly, however, women internalize the
norms and perspcctives of both specific others in their social network and a
'generalized other' (see Chaptcr 7) that Bartky dubs 'the fashion-beauty
complex', such that they genuinely judge themselves in terms of their
appearance and genuinely despair at their failure to live up to ideals.
The fashion-beauty complex, as Bartky (1990: 39) defines it, is 'a vast
system of corporations - some of which manufacture products, others
services, others still information, images, and ideologies - of emblematic
public personages and of sets of techniques and procedures'. In earlier times,
she argues, the family and Church were the source of dominant ideals of
femininity and assumed responsibility for regulating their implementation,
but as these institutions have declined in influence their role has been
assumcd by the fashion-beauty complex. Moreover, the latter works in a very
similar way to the Church. lt generates a sense of shame and inferiority in
relation to thc body, akin to original sin, but then offers salvation and relief
from those feelings. lndeed, it even suggests that the women who fall short of
modero feminine and beauty norms are, in a sense, fallen and morally
reproachable: '"There are no ugly women" said Helena Rubinstein, "only
lazy ones"' (Bartky 1990: 41). Where the fashion-beauty complex differs from
religion, however, is in the constant shifting of its aesthetic norms: it is a
movement with which women are expected to keep up: 'Breasts are bound in
one decade, padded in another. One scason eyebrows are thick and heavy, the
next pencil thin' (Bartky 1990: 40). There is pleasure for sorne women in this
situation, Bartky concedes. In learning to assume the perspective of the
fashion-bcauty complex they learn to perceive female bodies, including their
own bodies, as sourccs of visual plcasurc. Moreover, to a limited degree thc
fashion-beauty complex helps them to ovcrcomc thcir original state of bodily
'inferiority' and thus offers relicf from the pain that it causes them. This is
'repressivc satisfaction', however, derived from the satisfaction of 'repressivc
necds'. It is a form of alienation. Womcn are trapped within thc objectifying
gaze and mindset of the fashion-beauty complex and thereby turned away
from the possibilitics of crcativity and transcendcnce that might otherwise be
available to them. lurthermore, many women will ncvcr reach thc ideal, to
their own satisfaction, and will be perpetually unhappy about their
Working-class women, in particular, suffer inasmuch as they lack the
resources necessary to attain contemporary idcah of femininity and beauty.
This unhappiness and self-hate is a\ nwd1 intlgral to what Bartky mean'>
by 'narcissism' as the sclf-love Wl' mon t<lllllll<llll)' with the term, it
not more \O. Drawing trom P'>Yt ho.Hlaly'>i'>, '>IH' lltHitr'>t<liHh narcissism a\
preoccupation with tlll' '>di, .111d in 11m',,,, 'lll'< JIJ<.IIIy tiH hody, which may
be a \Ollfll' ot t'Jthlr pk'a'>UJ.Jhi<' 111 ll''"'"' to1 thl' agl'nt in qul'Stion.
NaHJ\\1\Jil 1\.1 pmhll'lll, whdiHI r''l\lllolfl 1>1 p.llllllll, lrolll lhi\ point ol
\'l'\\', " l (lll'\<'111'> tlll' .Jgtnt 11<>111" dJ/111)\ IIL't 1"'\SJhilitll'\ tor ltdom 11 .,
oll\ iclll\l}' lll<ll<' ,1 (ll<ll>kJII, fi.,\Vl'\l'l, wlwn .1'> H.ulk\' JI lt-.Hh lo
Consumption, gender and tlle fashion--beauty complex 59
great unhappincss and anxicty for many women, ami psychopathology for
so me.
Bartky does not offer any emprica! evidcncc to support this notion of
general unhappiness regarding the body amongst the women but there is
sorne evidence to support thc idea, particularly in rclation to young women.
In a small-scale qualitative study, for examplc, Frost (2001) found body hatred
to be common amongst adolcscent girls. This is supported by a larger-scale
survey of 900 women aged between 18 and 24 conducted by the Bread for Life
Campaign (1988). Of the respondents to this survey only 2So/o were happy
with their weight and as many as 22o/o claimed that they sometimes stay at
homc, rathcr than going out with friends, because of concerns about thcir
looks; 61% said that they feel inadequate in com parison with media images of
women and 20% claimed to dict most of the time. Moreover, many
psychological studies point to bodily dissatisfaction and distortions of body
1mage among women (Grogan 1999).
Foucault and feminism
the gcndcr theme that emerges within the consumer society debate has also
been framed by way of a dialogue with Foucault (Chapter 3 above; Bartk}
1990; Butler 1990; Sawicki 1991; McNay 1992; Bordo 1993; Lloyd 1996).
Bartky (1990) is important again here. She is critica! of Foucault for ignoring
l>oth gendcr-specific and lcss institutionalized forms of discipline. Ntw-
thcless, she suggests that he offers a powerful perspectivc for tllinklng
t hrough issucs of gendcr. His analysis of surveillancc and self smnoill:nH ,., 111
particular, resonates with her concern about bodily alitnat ion .IIHin. 1\\J\nt ,
1 he woman who checks her make-up half a dOll'll t lllll''> ,, d.ar lo,,., 11 l1 '
foundation has caked or her mascara run, who wo,., 111.11 111 W111.t 111
rain may spoil her hairdo, who looks freqmntly lo.,..,. JI tu '''" tn' H' lr,t\1
bagged at the ankle, or who, feeling fat, monito' <'\'')'llti11g ''H' ,.,,,,, ""'
beco me, as surely as the in mate of the l'anopt , 1111, .1 '' 11 I'"IJ' ng '"''11 t, ,1
sclf committed toa relentless sclt stJr\l'ill.nH 1' ' 1 hi' '"'' ""'"df.1n ,. 1' ,1
form of obedience to patriarchy.
(1\.ulk) 1'1'10, HO)
1 ying insights drawn from Foucault to migflh tro111 thl' wo k ol '>1111<>111' d1
tll'auvoir (1988), she argues that: 'Wc <Hl' l>orn m,1k o1 ltm.lll', but not
masculinc or feminine. Femininity is an artfice, an ad11evement' (Bartky
1 '>90: 65). 1t is an achievement that is demandcd from women, however, with
.athreat of sanctions for non-compliance. Bartky outlines threc arcas in which
IL"mininity is produced, by women themselves, via the mediation of
di,nplinary mechanisms which operate upon them both from the outside
oiiHI, as a conscquence of internalization, by means of their own self-
' otl'>tHlusmss: '>ha pe, size and general configuration of the body; comport-
JJH'Ill, pmture and gesture; and ornamentation of the bodily surface. Thus she
discm'>t'\ tfle monitoring and regulation of appetite, particularly during the
l11kini '>l'<l'><>n' ami atter the 'diet busting' Christmas holidays. She discusscs
60 Reviewing tlle field
the inculcation of correct femininc posturc and the sclf-policing of, for
example, sitting position and walking. \nd she discusses the preparation and
trcatment of the bodily
A woman's skin must be soft, supple, hairless, and smooth; ideally, it
should betray no sign of wear, experience, age, or deep thought. llair must
be removed not only from the face but from large surfaccs of the body as
well, from legs and thighs, an opcration accomplishcd by shaving, buffing
with fine sandpaper, or foul-smelling dcpilatories.
(Bartky 1990: 69)
This is sometimes clescribed as a forro of self-expression, she notes, but there
is, in fact, very little variation from the ideal either permitted or practised: 'at
best it might be described as painting the same picture over and over again
with minor variations' (Bartky 1990: 71). Furthermore, she notes that modern
society has given birth to numerous forros of expertise in relation to each of
her three basic domains of femininity, expertise which prescribes and
provides both goals and the means of attaining them to womcn.
Womcn may fcel uncomfortable 'enacting' their femininity in these ways,
Bartky concedes, both in the sense of the physical discomfort caused by the
various regimes and in the respect that they do not always want to pcrform,
but multiple mechanisms exist which ensure that femininity is reproduced.
On one side, for example, she notes how internalized discipline bccomes a
form of self-mastery and skill (e.g. of making up or cutting calories), ami as
such can bccome something that women value for themselves and are
unwilling to give up. Like any social group they resist 'deskilling'. More
centrally, however, she notes that since one can only be either maJe or female
the doing of femininity becomes central toa woman's scnse of identity (see
also Butler 1990). lf she does not do femininity then who and what is a
woman to be? This is reinforcecl by the fact that doing femininity, and doing
it well, are intimately linked to 'her sense of herself as a sexually desiring and
dcsirable subject' (Bartky 1990: 77).
In contrast to the conception that she identifies with loucault, hmvever,
Bartky (1990) has a much more developecl sense of resistance. rhis is
particularly clear in certain of the early papers in her book, where shc
describes the practices and effects of feminist 'consciousness raising'. Through
consciousness raising, she notes, women learn to perceivc, think and fecl
differently about sclf, other and world. There is a sense in which, in the space
of their reflcctive consciousness at least, they can shake off certuin of the
fetters of patriarchal control. This point finds expression in her <liscussion ot
Foucault in the form of a discussion of the libidinal body subject, a concept
which Foucault lacks but, she argues, very much needs. The fcmalc body is a
source of desires, needs ancl scnsuous experienn, \hl' argues, anda\ it ,
incline<! lo 'cornplain' at what h dorw to rt in tiH' nanw of norrnat ivt
fcmininity. Such 'cornplaint'' are tht h,l\11 1:1"1111 ot l.lttr Jl'\ISt<llllt' projeth.
Whtn WOilH'Il attiullatt thdr li\!d luulilv , on1pl.rinh', irl\ll'ad of Jl'Jlll'Ssing
tlwm, thl')' lll'gin lo light lw k.
ll.rrtk\''\ ()()'lO) .1ppropria!u>J1 "'''(1111 oUIII \ <llll olnl(lll\' llJ\"\1'111 fl 'lliil\1
\\'nlks Cl;l \"JilluulinH'III. l\n1doo lf'l'li) ,Jf ,ll ll \t \ l ll ll l,\1111, .,, t' li,llll)lh' llutkt
Consumption, gender ami tlw fashion-beauty complex 61
(1990) offers a widely lited critique of the normativity and performativity of
gender. And Lloycl (1996) has aerobics from a Foucauldian point of
view, tracing the 'anous forms of that shape that 'clisciplinary'
practice. Similarly, Mansfield and \lf<:Ginn (1993) look at bodybuilding and
gender from a Foucauldian perspective, exploring similarities between
workout schedulcs and the disnplinan '>Chedule'> described by Foucault.
Evaluating the gender and consumer culture theses
lt is difficult to deny that much body work involves consumption and thus
that contemporary forros ot rcflexive ernbodiment are shaped by consumer
culture and the dynamics ot the 1 n addition, it is important to stress
that the hedonistic ethos within consumer culture, like the informalization
process, generates a countcrcurrent to thc tendencies towards control
identified by Elias and Foucault. Pleasme, irnmcdiate enjoyment and letting
go are extolled in certain domains ot comumption. Finally, the gendering of
rcflexive embodiment is very strong. We should also be mindful of a number
of problems in the litcrature wc have reviewed, however.
First, we must be careful to avoid the homogenizing assumptions
sometimes carried by the notion of 'consumer culture'. Marketing experts
operate with sornetimes quite complex typologies of different groups of
consumers and market niches, and we should be at least as sophisticated as
this. Different social groups, as defined by a variety of interacting variables,
consume different things, in different ways, for different purposes. And
advertising campaigns target spccific groups. In addition, different domail1\
of consumption arguably imite U'> to behaw in diffcrent and contradictory
ways, undermining the sense that there is a single 'right way' to liw om\ lift.
l'he alcoholic drinks industry, for example, whiht it rnust <lt'knowlldgt
responsibility' and 'health}' living', has an ctonomi<: interl''>l 111 culti\',lllllt:
iclentities and lifestyles which centre u pon hem-y drnking. lt 1\ nwrt 1111 lirwd
to try to tap into our 'inner hedonist' than lwalth promottr., or tlw d11'1 .rrul
excrcise industries, ""ho must acknm..,.ledge our de\ire to 'enjoy oul\l'lvt, ' hut
need to tap into, for example, our anxictics about health ami 11101 t,tlity.
Consumer culture is nota homogcneous cntlty with a uniform message ami
effects for all people. Furthermorc, ccrtain groups and individuals rnay, tora
variety of reasons, be more vulnerable to particular types of message.
This point potentially has many implications for a concept of reflexive
cmbodiment, but one very central implication is that clifferent groups will be
affected by it in different ways. Thc manner in which age mediates certain of
the gender dynamics discusscd above is an important illustration of this. Frost
(2001) makes this point forccfully wi th rcspect to female 'body hatred'. She
agrees that consumer culture cngendcrs a sense of body hatred amongst
women but notes that it is young women in particular who are affected, a fact
rl'flectcd in diagnostic statistics for both anorexia and deliberate self-harm. lt
" young womtn in partintlar who are overrcpre'>entecl in these figures.
l"here h aho .1 dangt'l 111 idtntitying prodtKt'r'> ami advertisers as an all-
JlOWl'rlul lmu, ,rrrd ol O\t'r'> t.lling tlwir t.J)l<H il\ to manipulatt our dt\irc\.
62 Reviewing t11e field
Following Elias (see Chapter 2), 1 suggtst that we think of power as a balance
of interdependence within relatiomllih. In this case we may depend upon
producers to supply what we want, and what we want may be influenced by
their advertising and marketing but they depend upon us to buy
their products. In sorne ways we are in the stronger position because we do
not need, in any absolute sense, what they are offering, but they, as
industries, do need to sell to us. 1 have observed in my ethnography of health
clubs that this has an impact on the ground. lnstructors who take classes are
very sensitive to the wants and objections of those who take their classes, in
sorne cases, because bad reputations spread and unpopular teachers can lose
prime-time 'slots' and even their contracts. Teachers can only be 'really cruel'
or impose strict discipline if this is what their clientele want and are prepared
to pay for. Similarly, given the level of competition in sorne places and the
tendency of some consumers to shop around, clubs are very keen to monitor
the wants of their members and to respond accordingly. This makes health
clubs very different from the disciplinary institutions discussed by Foucault
(e.g. prisons and schools), whatever the other similarities in practice.
Prisoners do not choose to be disciplined, cannot opt out and thus have
little opportunity to shape the regimes to which they are 'subjected'. Gym-
goers, diet club members and beauty product consumers can and do. The
power balance is very different (see also Chaptcr 3).
lt might be objected that economic demand for body products and services
is an effect of clever marketing. Bartky, for example, suggests that women's
desires are manipulated by the fashion-beauty complex. 1 would not deny
that we are all influenced in this way but there are two weaknesses in the
argument. First, to take beauty treatments as an example, historical analysis
in the USA points to the existence of a thriving culture of 'home recipes' anda
local 'cottage industry' pre-existing the commercialization of beauty and skin
care (Peiss 1998). Before consumer culture there was a folk knowledge which
fuelled desires and anxieties concerning appearance and well-being. More-
over, advances in commercialized beauty culture have often had to wait for
changes in consumer belief. They have not been able simply to 'manipulate' it
(Peiss 1998). Finally, many of the early pioneers of beauty culture, in the USA
at least, were women who sought to build upon the above-mentioned
'cottage industry'. Beauty culture was not simply imposed upon American
women by powerful corporations, even if they are now in charge. It grew up
from a grassroots culture. As such there is a strong case to suggest that pre-
existing demand played a considerable role in its development. Second, there
is a problem in assuming that consumers are easily manipulated 'cultural
dopes'. Women are capable of taking a critica! stance towards the beauty
industry, as feminist critiques themsclves illustrate, and of thinking through
their decisions to buy. Moreover, tiH.se feminist critiques are widely known,
so that most women are aware ot thcm. Indtnl, a numher of recent studies
ha ve found that women who llllll h.l\t' lll'.HII \ gomh and scrvices (including
cosmctit surgtry) art oflen aw.lH' ni lnninist l' lllllJlll''> and considcr thcm
l>dore purdlas1ng (1>.1\'\ 1 'l'IS; 1 lllllin /1111;'; HI.H" .>()().J).
1 i11,1lly, withoul w;u111n: tn tlc,ll .lcl\t'IIISIII); gtlll'l<llt'\ sodalHl'\\llrt',
\\T 11111\1 [l 1\"oll)' not lnln.ul ton 11111 11 )Hl\\'l't onto it. ,\l,nkl'llllg
Consumption, gender ami lile fashion beauty complex 63
is not magic. 1t is just communication, ancl thc same comrnunication
techniques fail as often as they succeed. In part thh may be because they do
not tap into pre-cxisting desires, but 1 believe tllat wc nced to be more
sociological here. What really influences thc behaviour and desire of an
individual is the behaviour and desire of those around them, their 'others',
hoth individual and generalized (see Chapter 7). The collective, as Durkhcim
(196Sb, 1974) argued at the dawn of sociology, gencratcs pressures which are
mdependent of any given individual within it but which act upon those
mdividuals. Marketing agencies are advantagecl as 'individuals' in this
context because of their expcrtise in communication, their resources and
their capacity to broadcast to millions, but they are just individuals. They
must dcal with the collective 'as they find it', with its own relatively
autonomous tendencies and dynamics. Thcy are more likely to succeed if
they 'go with the tlow', much less so if they go against it. Products, services
and practices do not proliferate until they 'catch on'. This sounds like a
tautology, but 1 mean to suggest that wc must be more attentivc to the
complex processes and dynamics of collective life and of social diffusion; that
is, of the way in which thc spreading of an idea can itself generate conditions
which make further spread more likely, as, for example, when 'tipping points'
are reached. Likewise products and practices whose diffusion has 'tipped' and
achieved a 'critica! rnass' might prove resistant to attempts (political or
cornmercial) to remove them, partly because they become habitual but also
bccause critica] rnass gcnerates inertia and a pressure to conform which is
difficult to resist.
Conclusion
In this chapter 1 have examincd work on both consumcr culturL' ami tht
gendered dirnension of reflexive embodiment. lt is clear that gLntkr is a kt'}
structuring factor in relation to practices of rcflexivc embodiment aiHI tl1;1t
many of these practices depend in various ways upon consumption. lllt,t
points are indisputable. l have tried to rcsist the tendency, cvidcnt in )OilH: ol
the literature, to variously interpret consumer culture as a form of control,
akin to Foucault's 'discipline', however, orto treat itas an absolute sourcc ot
many practices and problems regarding 'the body'. In some ways consumer
culture is a countercurrent to the austere institutional complcx identificd by
loucault, encouraging choice, hedonism and acting u pon dcsire and impulse,
.1nd even where it encourages control it operates within a fundarnentally
different balance of power and its effects are mediated by individuals,
collectives, their dynamics and desires, all of which are relatively autonomous
from it. Nevertheless, 1 have also noted that therc is a tendency for forms of
political resistance, including those centred upon the body, to be drawn into
consumer culture, as marketing cxperts draw upon it as a reserve of
innovation. Illis may allow these forms of resistance to have sorne impact
upon tlw 'Y'll'n h11t thty aho tcnd to tamc forms of resistance and bcnd
thtm to lit thc ln};u ni Jli<Hiuction. !'he currcnh of late moclern life are
\larling In'""" \o ' <\' e !HIIJlox.
11
l:l
l ' ~ l f Two
t Pthinking reflexive embodiment
1
1
1
'1
lntroduction to Part Two
When considered collectively, the theories rcviewed in Part One present us
with a series of conflicting irnages of reflexive embodirnent. In the first
instance, for exarnple, we have a conflict between perspectives which
ernphasize control and power, and those which ernphasize choice. Do we
elect to rnodify or rnaintain our bodies on the basis of existential and identity
concerns, as Giddens suggests, or in cornpliance with externa! and
internalized social pressures, as Elias, Foucault, rnany ferninist and consurner
culture theorists suggest? 1 suggest that the answer differs according to the
\pecific practice we are addressing, and there is sorne indication that the
above-rnentioned theorists agree. Giddens accepts that sorne body rnain-
tenance is the preserve of 'adrninistrative power', for exarnple; Foucault
acknowledges that power is resisted and also posits a notion of voluntarily
chosen 'technologies of the self'; and Elias notes that social rnovement
activism since the 1960s has 'inforrnalized' many previously socially
regulated aspects of bodily life, opening thern up to individual choice.
Perhaps sorne practices are irnposed and sorne chosen?
These qualifications further rnuddy the water, however, both becausc
Foucault's 'resistance' is not equivalent to 'existential choice' and thus adds a
third possibility to our original dichotomy (practices may be neither imposed
nor freely chosen but chosen in opposition to atternpts at control) and
because reference to 'social movements' adds a collective dirnension which
conflicts with the strong clairns about individualization that rnost of the
theories we have discussed rnake, generating a further dichotorny. Sorne
reflexive bodily practices are collectivizing or at least connected to collectives
and collective identities; others are individualizing.
Feminist theories add further cornplications. First, they argue that fernales
in particular are subject to controlling influences, whilst simultaneously
exemplifying the resistance that prevents us from reducing all body work to
power. Second, rejoining Giddens and Durkheirn, they point to forrns of body
work which are statistically abnormal, socially defined as syrnptorns of mental
illncss and which entail that the reflexive agent is, toa degree, out of control
witllout twing \lll>fl'l 1 lo lile controlling influence of another- for exarnple,
llll' Htitl i('(''> . ~ . , . , , H 1" 1 e d wi 111 c.111 ng clisorders and deli berate self-harm. Scll i ng
68 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
aside questions rcgarding thc prcchc '>tatus of these forms of rcflcxivc
cmbodiment, it is clcar that thcy havc '>pcofiC properties and dynamics that
mark thcm out from othcr pract<:cs discu'>'>Cd in this book and thus call for
additional or diffcrcnt forms of cxplanation. At the vcry least thc small
numbcr of individuah involvcd in thcsc practiccs rules out the general
thcorics we havc dscusscd as adequatc cxplanations. Thus, wc havc yct
anothcr varict)- of rcflcxivc bodily practices to add to our list.
lf fcminists put gcndcr into the 'pot' thcn Bourdieu and Llias put class into
it. Whcre Giddens and Foucault sccm to be talking about how 'we all' bchavc,
Bourdicu and Uias challcnge this 'we', arguing that socicties divide into class
groups whosc ways of concciving and acting upon thcir bodics vary. Again
this introduces thc prospect of collective identities, with thc middlc class in
particular sccking to mark out their group belonging by way of perceptible
signs of distinction. In addition, it further unsettles the link bctwccn body
modification and control: first, because it deems modification a stratcgic
action rathcr than norm-conformity; and second, becausc it cntai ls that lcss
dominatcd social classcs are more inclined towards body work, invcrting the
ordcr wc would cxpcct if body work were an effcct of domination or control.
Evcn whcn Bourdicu focuscs upon bodily control and rcstraint, as whcn he
describes the 'tight-lippcd' eating techniques of the petite bourgcoisic, he is
dcscribing self imposcd constraints devised within middle-class 'tri bes' to
mark out thcir identity and differcnce from the proletariat. This is a way in
which thc pctitc bourgeoisie govern themselvcs but it lacks the scnse of
externa! imposition implied in Foucault's account of disciplinary power.
Philosophically ami methodologically the respective positions of the
authors 1 havc revicwed are not only different and competing but also
incompatible. Each makes different assumptions about human nature,
society, knowledge and so on, and each approaches analysis and data
differently. There is good reason to believe that the approaches are
irrcconcilablc at this leve!. However, if we abstract, rather crudely, their
crnpirical clairns, as 1 havc above, then there is a plausible way of reconciling
thcir diffcrcnces within a broader, superior framcwork. This entails recogniz-
ing that differcnt clusters of reflexive bodily practices cnjoy a diffcrent
distribution in socicty and are differently socially embcdded, such that, for
cxarnplc, somc are freely chosen, others are enforced, somc of those enforccd
are also rcsisted, some are individual, some collective, some gcnder-specific,
others class.specific and so on.
l"his may sound like a weak eclectic synthesis, but 1 suggcst a different
frarning. The philosopher of scicnce, Gaston Bachclard (2002), notes that thc
proccss of rcfuting thcories in natural science docs not always lcad to thcir
rcjection. 11 often lcads to their respecification and thcreby toa more cornplex
undcrstanding of thc phenomena they purport to explain. The ohscrvation
that X causes Y, for cxample, may later be as it is discovercd that
this happcns only undcr ccrtain cirnnnstancl'S. Thus later scil'ntrsts argut
lhal X t<lll\l'S Y undtr rorHhtrorl\ /, wl111\t undl'r diftcrcnt Ulllditions
somtthng dw happtns 1 am trying to propo\l' sor1wthing similar rn nlation
to tlw IIHoril\ H'\' l' Wl'd in l',nt 1 lnt . t .1111 ,11gning th.1t r.IIIHr th.111 .11 npltng
Cllll' .11111 ll' t' t ting tlll' 11' \l, tlll tlu 111 ,11 tlwy ,11!' 11111111,111 }' t')i t lusht,
lntroctuctlon to Part Two 69
,,.e should think of cachas potcntially instructht i11 t ,., t.li11 dom<Hns but not
1thers. My criticisms of cach, outlined in Patt Ollt', 'till ,t,llld all(l 1 am not
s .ggesting that we can combine whole thtot it'' "' t lm way; thcy are, as
, )ted, incompatible in important rcspech. Hut t;u h anount does offer
intcresting emprica! insights which it makt'\ \l"ll\l' to hold on lo, even if we
dJ reject most of thc philosophical baggagl' thty l11iug .!long with them and
.tpply them only in specific arcas. Retkxw t'llthodumnt in contemporary
'' >cieties is vast and cornplex, as are thow \ot ttits thtmselves. Differcnt
.1,.:cnts and processcs, including thosc wt h,l\t' tt"\'lt'\\Td, pull in diffcrent
d rections and divide the social world into dilltttnt domains. lt would be
si lly, given this, to supposc that wc haw lo dtl'itk whether practices of
tnodification are chosen or imposcd, t"OIItllivlling or m di\ idualizing, and so
. 111. A much better way forward h to app1t't"i<llt thal theories which focus
upon one of thcse options or anothcr .nt pattial thcories and that our bcst
w.1y of resolving thc apparcnt conflitts lwtwttn thcir respective emprica!
t laims is to seek to map tllc doma tn ol rcllcxivc cmbodiment more
t omprehensively, Iocating the 'rtgions' they describe relative to one
.1110thcr.
This presupposcs that wc can idcntify tmpirically, for cach theory, a cluster
of practices that it accounts for. And it this is to be an interesting argumcnt
then wc must seek to rcplacc what wc can now recognize as the one-
dlmensional theories of :oucault, Bourdicu, Giddens and so on, with a
multidimensional conccption of both socicty and the human agent. Morc-
ovcr, we need a clcarer conception ot what is actually involved in reflexivc
cmbodiment- that is, of reflcxivc boclily practiccs. In this second part of the
hcok 1 begin to cstablish this groundwork. In addition to offering a map of
w ntcmporary reflexivc cmbodimcnt, which locatcs its various 'regions', 1
offer a preliminary theorization of thc agcnts, practices, relations ancl
processes it involvcs.
1 begin, in Chapter S, with a discussion of obesity rates in Wcstern
societies. This bricf chapter is somewhat tangential to my argurncnt but i'>
un portant becausc obesity trends pose a prima facie challcnge to all thl'
thtories discussed in Part Onc, with thc exception of the more hedonbtk
11 terpretations of consumer culture, and because it allows us to explore
unportant complications in thc naturc of rcflcxivc cmbodiment. lt offcrs an
tnteresting route into reflexive cmbodimcnt.
Chapter 6 builds on this and sceks t o furt hcr complicate our model of
l'flcxive agency by way of a considcration of Leder's (1990) 'abscnt body'
t hcsis, Merleau-Ponty's (1962) claim t hat our bodics beco me thematic for us
<lllly whcn wc assumc the pcrspective of the other, and ccrtain feminist
critiques of Mcrlca u-J>onty. This discussion, which hinges upon a distinction
hl' twccn our livecl bocli ly ' 1' and objcctificd bodily 'me', is further devclopcd
in Chaptcr 7, which focuses upon the work of G. l l. Mead. Using Mead, 1
pmtulate a multidimensional modcl of thc rcflcxive agent.
Clwpll'J R l>uil<h u pon t his by way of a distussion of what 1 call 'reflexive
l>llll)' ttt"hniquts' a11<l of tht \Ot"ial lll'twmk' whith carry and diffuse them.
ll11s gin' U\ t lw nHHt'pt 11111 ol nart it ts t .llh-d fo1 .tl>ove and begins to
dtvtlop a 111011' 1111111 idinHnsion.ll pit lllll' ot t lw sor ut.ll t ontl'.\t of reflexive
70 Rethinking reflexive crnh()(fuunnt
cmbodinwnt, Pl\ 111.: tlu w.1} ln1 Ch.1ptcr lJ, whcrcin this multidimcnsional
l'\flloHd lliCHI lh<Hollglll]. In Chaptcr 9, 1 devclop my map ot
rctlt \1\l hod1h p1.H llll'\, "'"' kang out thc various regions that can be
'" 11'1111\ ol powl'l .111d norms, choice, resistance and so on. Chapter
9 also dt\UI\\l'\ \urvcy data whilh form the basis of this map.
5 Obesity crisis
In this chaptcr 1 l>cgin my own exploration of rcflcxvc cmbodimcnt. M}
aoutc in is via thc rising rates of obcsity in most dcvclopcd societies. This may
\ound likc an odd point of departllrc. Obcsity is not, prima facic, the rcslllt of
dl'libcratc body work and its incrcasing prevalcnce sits unhappily with an
unagc of a socicty whosc membcrs are increasingly conscious of their bodics
.111d pursuing idcah of slimness, hcalth and control. lt is for thcse reasons that
1 ;un focllsing upon obesity, howcvcr. lt runs contraf} to what our theorics
k.1d liS to preclict, and they cannot cxplain it. That makcs 1t important and
lntcrcsting. It forccs liS to think in more cletail about thc nature of reflexivc
tmbodimcnt. 1 bcgin with a bricf dhcussion of thc obcsity statistics.
Obesity 'crisis'
f{atcs of 'obcsity' and 'overweight', dcfincd in terms of 'body mass indcx'l
(BMI), are escalating in developcd socictics. Figure 5.1 dcmonstrates the trcnd
30

/

15+--------------

.. - ----


1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2003
IISIII<' 5.1 l'l ' " tnt.Ht "" rt' ,l\t'\ in (HMI > JO) 111 l. ngland hctw<.cn
f<lHO .utd :'11111 ( N, IIHHI . d \wlit llll1tt' JOOI, aiiH'IHI!'d wilh ligurcs front
\j>l<l\IOII ,111d l'tllllollo", ll '111111
lc11 l11gl.111cl 11\' t 1 1111 l.1\l o'" ' {1 \< , 11 1 h l\ 1\ \ lu l'l'l 1h.111 111 r11.1111
111111)1<' ,111 \Oc ll'Ics .uul h ,l\ 1.11 11 1 lll(l.c1111 l1 111 , 1 le ti\' 111 .e lu;l1 jlll\1111111 1111
lhl' luropt,lfl oht\11\ 'lc .lgllc l.clolt ' (\lu 11 .'IJ!II ) lt IS 11111 ,J\ ,1\ 111 lho
h<>Wl'Vl'l, ,ualtht gl'lll'l.cl lll'llcl le,,,'"'''"' 11111111otl tluoughoul 1 111111'1
(Shcll 20<>3). Rhlllg obt\11] k\l'h olll ' ,) ll '"!',11111'\l lliOhll'lll tlunugllllul !Ice
developed world.
In England, as cbcwhcre, thc ci\J... ni nbt,it\ ,,,., wlh .tgl' (stc Figurt S.:!)
This is explained by both social nd l>iologiral "'Jll't ts ot agl'ing. 1 IK' currl'llt
trend is affecting childrcn too, howe,er. IIK lnttrnton,ll Obcsty 1 ilsk h111 e
(2005) suggests that the rise in childhood obesity is greatest in
countries but, again, thc trcnd is ubiquitous across devclopcd societics. ,\
recent report by the Royal College of Physicians el al. (2004) observes th.11
obesity in 2-4-year-olds in the UK increased from So/oto 9% bctwcen 1989 and
1998, whilst ratcs for 6-1 S-year-olds more than trebled betwcen 1990 and
2001, increasing trom So/oto 16%.
Thc picturc with respect to gender is not clcar. In tenm of 'obcsity' U"-
womcn are marginally more affcctcd than mcn. 1 lowever, if we pul
ovcnveight into the picture then men are much more affccted. Moreovtr,
as feminist work might lcad us to expect, women are significantly more likeh
to fall in the ideal range (Figure 5.3). As Bourdieu suggests, however, gendl'l
interacts with classz (see Chapter 2). For females there is a direct correlation.
Women are progressively and significan ti y more likely to be obese as we mon
from social class 1 through to social class V (Figure S.4). lndeed, women in
social class V are almost twice as likely to become obese as women in sociill
class l. With males the picture is not as clcar. Men in social class 1 are less
likely to be obese than men in otber social classes, four pcrccntage
ahead of thcir closest rival. However, the maJe rate pcaks in social class 111
(manual), and social classes 11 and !11 (non manual) have more or le\s the
sarne rates as classes IV and V, respectivcly. This is consisten! with Bourdieu's
claims, discussed in Chapter 2, that rnen have less work-related investment in
80
?o
6oJ...-----------f
5oJ.-----I
40.1.-----1
3o.J...--=--f
20
10

16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
Figure 5.2 Perccntage of indiv1du.ch ofl1ually ovtrwcight (BMI > 2S) in
England in 1998, by gender ami age (1\.tllonal Audit Office 2001)
4%
47%
1 Obese O Underwecght O Overweght O Descrable
L
, 11 "-'Ct'' y ' t trtt:l
"'
6%
33k
G d
an(l
weight statu'> in England 2001 (Spro-.ton and
1 5.3 en er
t'cimatesta 2004)
1
11
111 (NM) 111 (M)
) b
n ler and d '"In 199H (NM
/
: o; 4 Obesity rates (percentages Y gc <. '
rswe - . . ()ffi.' 2001)
manual; M...,rnanual) (National Au< tt ce
11011 -
phvsical capital, in gene_ral, bul al-;o that ...
as we find in class 1, bnng men tnto wt
. , h b d comoousness.
well-bemg that ma atfect t ctr
0
) . . . , ndintes the
lt mi ht be argued that the obcsity cnsiS, cnss, e
g f bo power That we know there is a cnsts, for exampl.e, pmnts to
operat10n o 1 - A
1
th ncerns of cxperts shO\\
tht population-level surveillance of . m . e c.o . t fts into the
. 1 . 1 r average bodv wetghl, ti'> el socle y, 1

Experts. qucst_ion :velfare ::::

1 . tb the increased levels of tllnes'> th.tt nstng obest rates
be abeto codpc \h\lthcr the econornv will cope with the loss of working days
gcnerate an w e ,
74 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
through illncss (c.g. National Audit Ollitt 2001). Furthermorc, thc variom
task forccs, national and intcrnatonal, that ha,c formed to tacklc obcsity an:
an important cxample of bio-pown in action. They are chargcd with
maintaining and improving thc hcalth of national and global populations.
This is important, but I want to come at thc 'crisis' from another dircction:
to ask how it has occurrcd if our bodics are subject to the leve! of scrutiny,
rcgulation and intcrvention that thc thcories discussed in prcvious
suggcst. Wh} didn't thc 'police' in the carceral network and in our own
subjectivities spot and prevcnt this crisis earlier? Aren't we al!, as Giddens
(1991) says, 'on a diet'? Arcn't wc in pursuit of the slim, sexy, tanncd bodic'>
that wc find in consumcr culture? Aren't we 'body-conscious' and 'fat-
obscsscd' to a dcgrce ncvcr before known? The obesity crisis seems to run
contrary to thc claims of the thcories we have examined ancl to challcnge
them.
Advocates of thesc thcorics might reply that obesity rates indicatc
resistance to the prcssures and power identified, and thus remain consonan!
with them. 1 have argued against this claim in dctail clsewhere (Crosslcy
2004b). For prescnt purposes sufficc it to say that the reaction of most pcople
to putting on wcight indicates surprise and disappointmcnt, suggesting that
they <lid not intcnd to become fat and were not consciously resisting the
social dcmand for thinncss. Indecd, the reaction of many peoplc to putting
on wcight is to go on a dict or take up exercise. In addition, what cvidencc
therc is concerning a 'fat pride movement' gives no indication that this
movcmcnt is encouraging people to become fat, as would be required if the
trend is to be explaincd. The 'fat pridc' movement serves purcly to protect tht
rights and dignity of thosc who are already fat (Gimlin 2002). fhis !caves the
possibility that fatness may be pursued unconsciously, as some feminist
psychoanalysts havc argued (Orbach 1985). The arguments for this claim are
extremely problematic, ho"vever, even in terms of the psychoanalytic thcories
thc} draw from (sce Crossley 2004b). And they both fail to explain why
obesity is incrcasing, because they link it to allegedly static social factors, and
fail to explain obcsity in men, because those factors are aspects of opprcssion
which they claim to be unique to women (Crossley 2004b). Given that we art
intcrested in obesit} trends and that women are not disproportionately
represcnted in these trends, psychoanalytic feminism is not much help. lhus,
to reiterate my point, rising obesity levels run contrary to what wc would
expect on the basis of most of the theories we ha ve discussed in this book. Tht
exceptions are thosc thcories of consumer culture which identify its
hedonistic ethos and thc informalization thesis, as 1 explain bclow.
llow should we undcrstand obesity? 1 have argued clsewhcre that thc basit
trend can be adequately explained only by reference to social factors (Crosslt'}'
2004b). Biological and psychological factors might cxplain why somt
inclividuals are more likely to brcome ohvst than others, and obtsity "
ccrtainly a funrtion of biologkalnH't h,llll\111\ .rnd physicallaws. Wt nmst11111
tnergy, in tlw fmm ot lo()(l ,111d d1111l, ,urd wv <'.\)lt'lld it hy wa> ol <Hit
<Kiivitlt'\ 1 hvn <lit' inpuh, outputs ,uul .t 1.1l1n of lllJHII to nutput. Wt'ight
rhangvs <Ht' ,r fllllt tio11 ol shills 111 111.11 1 lllll< h is physic.lll)'
dl"lt'llllill'd hut 11 unplits th.rt 11\111}\ <1111 '11\' 1\ .111 l'lktl ni .1 slult 111 t1 11
ObCSily CIISIS
vcrage individual's encrgy ratio, and social fact<H'>, p.11tirul;nly changc'> in
lrestyle, are the most obvious source ot tlwt sllilt. suggcst both tllat
t' are consuming greater amounts of calorifit tmrgy, particularly in the
lo m of food and drink that we consume outsidv the home, including
and that, because of the decline of paid manuallabour and the use
of numerous labour-saving devices, we are much lc-.s active than we once
wcre (t\ational Audit Office 2001 ). lndccd, an tstimate quoted by the
"1.1tional Audit Office (2001) suggests that <:almilit output has declined over
thc last 50 years in the UK by an amount cquivalent to running one marathon
(26 miles) per weck.
These are not isolated changes. Ihcy are l>ound up with a complex of
lurther changes characteristic of late modcrn society. Wc now use cars instead
, ,f walking, for example, beca use wc are regularly and frequently required to
, ross distances in times that would be impo'>siblc by any other means. We live
111rther away from where we work antl shop than in the past. Similarly,
< hanges in womcn's patterns of working lwve intcrfcred with their traditional
domestic role, which has affected pattcrns of food preparation and eating.
\pccifically, fami lies have less time to cook and more clifficulties coordinating
tl1e timing of a family mea!. There are too many of thcse factors for meto
rvcn list hcre, and the intcraction and intcrdependency between them is vcry
<<>mplex. Note, however, that thcy connect with sorne of the arguments of
t ,trlier chapters. High-calorie food ami drink, and use of labour-saving
c,c\ ices, for example, are aspects of consumer culture. Moreover, though
1 ople may resort to labour-saving tcchnology because late modern life
makes them so busy in othcr rcspects, thcrc is scope for interpreting their use
in terms of 'hedonism'. Ccrtainly thcy are 'sold' as ways of making life easier
.md more pleasurable. In addition, informalization may be significant. Many
.tccounts of obesity, for examplc, point to thc fact that major fast-food outlets
t.uget their advcrtising at children. l'argeting children generates so-callcd
pester power', which generatcs sales (Schlosser 2002; Gritser 2003). This
explanation is important in its own right but it presupposes a shift in the
power balance of the family, such that childrcn now make their own food
choices and sometimes even choose for the family. In earlier times parents
wntrolled dict on the basis of what they dcemcd best for both themselves and
thcir children. Chilclrcn did not have a say. Moreover, it presupposes the
IJrcakdown of the traditional, formal family mea! (see also Falk 1994). Eating
practiccs havc been informalized, not lcast as a consequcnce of a shift in the
p.acnt-chi ld power balance that once hcld thcm in place.
lndividuals are not unthinking 'molcculcs' in thesc processes. The social
cllanges involved comprise massivdy wmplcx shifts in patterns of interac-
tion betwccn actors who an llll tlligtnt, rctlectivc and who know, within
llnunds, wha t t hty art doi ng. llrtl ," 1 h 1 r 1 t lw calori fic encrgy ratio are
tlruntendcd and unlort'\t'<'ll < oll\t'tpwru ,., ni IIH'\t' thanges. Agcnts have not
di'! ihtratcly pu t on wl'igll t o1 ir u "'"'"' 1 11<'11 ,rloru st 11 plus. They ha ve acted,
lllltn lor good na,olls, in w.ry' wlrulr, 'lltlllll.lliv<'ly .rnd unbeknown to
tlwlll, han h;rd tlus tltt< t. Sonwtilll<''' l1.1ng' 111 hl'II.II'I<HII .tn rdkttive and
dl'iiilt'l,lll', ()pllltg lt> ti!\1'1,11111'1 111,111 \\',rl( 1<1 \\<111 )u ll llUt'i!\ilgl)
tltxiltk l,rllntll 111.111 ''" "'" !1.1\ 11 ttiJtl d IPII, 1. 1 ddllttr,tl<' it oltt'n
76 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
unavoidable dccision. Othcr times bchavioural change is ushered in by way ot
piecemeal and practica! adaptation to accidcnts and contingencies, becoming
habitual without the agent noticing. Slipping into the habit of using the cat
for local trips may occur in this way. In cithcr case, however, the agent doe'
not notice the change in her energy ratio and, as a consequence, may very
easily find herself unintentionally putting on weight.
Blind spots and episodic reflexivity
In its early stages weight gain is often not noticecl by either the agent or hc1
immediate circle. Gradual bodily changes often pass beneath the radar ot
reflexive consciousness because perceptual schemas and expectations changc
with them in a way that tracks them. Small changes effect gradual
adjustments in expectations without ever being noticed. lt often takes an
independent, objective benchmark, whether in the form of weighing scales, a
photograph or last year's bikini, to bring changes into reflcctive
Magazine confessions are replete with references to such 'shocks'. We are, in
important respects, our own blind spot (see also Chapter 6), and thh
contributes to rising obesity because it makes it less likely that weight gain
will be noticed. Weight 'creeps up' upon the unaware agent - until, that is,
the above-mentioned shock moments bring it to light.
The notion of blind spots is important because it suggests that reflexive
embodiment is more complex than the theories we considered in earlier
chapters suggest. Self-policing and narrative self-construction are more
difficult than is suggested because self-perception is obscured by blind spots.
This might be overcome by regular use of weighing scales and tape measures.
Rising levels of obesity suggest that most agents do not pursue this option,
however. And this leads to two further critica! observations with respect to
the theories of reflexive embodiment that we have considered. First, the
average social agent is not the self-policing, body-obsessecl narcissist that
some accounts suggest. 1 do not mean to suggest that agents are not
concerned about their bodies, only that they may not be as concerned as
some accounts suggest. Second, contrary to these same accounts, reflexiw
embodiment tends to have an episodic rather than a chronic temporal profik'
for many agents. Although sorne agents pursue body projects over
many tend rather to be jolted into action by events which force undesirable
aspects of their body into consciousness, continuing until the effect of tlw
shock wcars off and other projccts become more important.
Body-society interactions
Part of m y argument in this chaplt't i\ t fl.tt agents shapc their bodics in
unintended as wcll as intcndcd W.t\'\ w.t\'\ that thcy are not rdlcxivcly
awarc of ancl may not lll' hitpp) .1ltn111 wh<JI IIHv lOilll' to light. l'utting 011
wcigl1l il\ a UHt\l'C]llt'nn ol 1 lt.r11:11rg nrt<''\ 1111'\l) k r\ nry <'.\.1111pil'. In
lll,l\'t' \u:gt'\ll'<l tlt.rt "" lt '""' \ slt.'l''"l: 1\ oiii'IIH'I.th'd In t IH wrdl'l
Obesity crisis 77
'' tlial world. We change our behaviour in order to accommodate changes in
t llv behaviour of others within our networks (e.g. employers) and this, in
ttttn, affects our body- for example, we move toa new workplace, which is
turther away, so we shift from walking to driving and the drop in exercise
, .tuscs us to put on weight. The body, in its capacity as a biological system, is
,odally embedded and thus sensitive to systematic social changes. The
ttocesses of energy input and output basic to it, and, indeed, to the very
dllinition of life itself (Smith 1986), are simultaneously social practices (e.g.
, .. 1ting, commuting, working in an office) and are thus shaped by changes in
.ttl h practices.
Effects may pass in the other way too, however. lncreases in body mass
111Ucase the probability of illness, for examplc, which affects both agency and
11 tlcxivity (see Chapter 6). Similarly, weight gain tends to generate
unhappiness for the individual, when it comes to light, which might
ttanslate, at the collective level, into significant social trends in body work
.111d (economic) demand for weight-loss products and services. A recent
(2003) survey, for example, points toa steady rise in both the number
ol prvate health clubs in the UK and the number of members of such clubs.
1 hcre was an 18% rise in the number of such clubs in the UK between 1998
.1nd 2002 alone, with membership rising from 4.6% to 7.8% of the adult
population, a 70% increase. This trend corresponds to the general claims
.dmut increased body consciousness made by the theories discussed in Part
< >nc, but one might equally claim that these figures are best explained by
1l'lcrence to the weight-gaining trcnds of late modero society. lf, as 1 have
,,lid, changes in lifestyle are generating unintended ancl unwelcome weight
gains within the population then one would expect to see indications that
.1gcnts are trying to lose this weight. And this is what we are seeing.
l'his explanation is supported, qualitatively, by my alorl'llll'ntiomd
l'thnographic study of a new prvate gym/health club (Cros\ll'}' 2<HH,t,
1006). The key reason that most agents gave for starting at thc gym w,l\ t ll.tt
thcy had recently found that they had put on weight and Wl\lll'd to low 11,
tl'asons for sticking at it were different and more divcr\c lOOll)
h1rthermore, the dissatisfaction that many expressed with thcir own bodll'\
was usually framed by reference to their own former condition rathcr than
1l>stract social norms or ideals. They claimcd to want to return to how thcy
mcd to be, rather than aspiring to a social or even a personal ideal (Crossley
'006). In some cases medica! norrns were invoked but, for the most part, this
was in cases where a recent medica! scare had prompted it. The body was
perec ved to be 'at risk' beca use it had faltered, not simply because that is how
!>odies are generally framed in late modero culture. Recent trends in health
<lul> membership might better be explained by reference to the social changes
t llat are causing weight gain in the population, and the tension this crea tes
l>ctwccn personal expectations and experiences of the body, therefore, rather
th.tn the more abstract social pressures we have discussed hitherto.
1 do not mean to deny the existence of these pressures, or indeed to deny
llt,lt thc bodily content of self-concepts and ideals, however personalized, is
\hapcd by a wicler culture which puts such a great emphasis upon the body.
1\ut wc must alm rccognizc that 'thc body' itself, as a socially embedded
78 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
biological system, plays an important role in generating the rcflexivc
'episodes' referred to above. Bod} work and body projccts can be triggered
by unintended and unwelcomc changes in thc body that take the agent by
surprise. This is still a sociological matter, however, ami not only becausc
body consciousness is socially shapcd. As we have seen, body changcs can be a
direct and unintendcd effect of social change.
Conclusions
In this chapter 1 have swum against the tide a littlc, seeking to open up
reflexive embodiment to further investigation by way of a discussion of rising
obesity levels in late modern societies. This trend can be explained socially
and even linked to the changes characteristic of late modern society.
However, it goes against the grain of much of the theory discussed in Part
One of this book, the exceptions being those theories which focus upon
hedonism and informalization. rhe image of societies populated by self-
policing or self-creating social agents has to be tonecl down, to say the least.
Moreover, a reflection upon obcsity allows us to consider: how bodies are
unintentionally shaped in social life; how they can constitute a blind spot;
how attention to thcm may be more episodJC than is sometimes suggested;
and how changes in the body may sometimes be a camc of reflcxive body
work. Reflcxively cmbodied agents are 'in charge' of a body which may not
always behave or perform as they would likc, and this 'misbehaviour' needs to
be factored into our accounts. Reflexive embodiment is not only shaped by
the ideals, norms ami practices of wider socicty but also by the variability of
the material body itself. The next chaptcr seeks to bui ld on the idea of blincl
spots in an effort to eluciclate further the nature of reflcxive embodiment.
l.
2.
Notes
Bocly mass index (BMI) is calculatcd b} dividing wcight, in kilograms,
by hcight in mctres, squarcd. A healthy BMI is defined as bctween 20
and 25. Between 25 and 30 is 'overweight' and ovcr 30 is obese. lt is
widely acknowleclgecl that this measure is problcmatic when applied to
individual cases, but it is gencrally deemed the most useful measure for
population-level comparisons.
Class, in the National Audit Office citld hcrc, is mcasured
according to a six-category schema that is common in much social
research. Class 1 consists of uppcr man,tgl'llll'lll and professionals; class
11 of middle/lower managers and lom1 st.u.;l's ol profcssional lite; clas'>
lila of non-manual (NNI), dlrkal ,,.,,.!-:<"; ( 1.1\s 1111> ot skilkd manual
(M) workers; Class IV ol sc111i sktllnl 111.11111.11 ''o' klrs; ami tlass V ol
unskillcd manual workl'"
6
Blind spots, the absent body and
being-for-others
111c notion ot blind spots, introduccd in the Chapter S, ncccssitates a much
more detailed examination of reflexive embodimcnt. We nccd to analysc how
cmbodied agents access and reflect upon their embodiment. 1 will be offcring
lll\' full account in thc ncxt chaptcr Before doing this, howcver, 1 want to
my path by elaborating furthcr upon thc notion. of blind spots .md
discussing thc idea, touchcd upon in rclation to both loucault (Chapter 3)
111
d Bartky (Chaptcr 4), that ret1cxivity is mediated by way ot thc
ot others. 1 begin with a discussion of Leder's ( 1990) body' '. a thcsts
which elaboratcs upon thc notion that the human body 1s 1ts own bhnd spot.
The absent body
1 he living human body is a sensuous, pcrceptual-action sysll'lll, to
llder (1990; al so Merlcau-Ponty 1962, 1965; Crossley 200 ). 11 pt'lll'l\'('s
,
11
HI acts in thc world, defining its own cnvironment by wa)- ot 1h Pl'rt.vpt 1om
,
111
d actiom. And perception and action work togcther, cach intorm111g ami
...haping the othcr. Undcr normal conditions, thhs}:stcm ts l.ngd)
invisible to itsclf. lt is pre-reflexive. Perceptual consoousncss 1s cmbodll'd. lt
wmprises a structure of physical scnsations which is by contac_t
,
1
nd interaction betwccn body aml world. Ami human be111gs, as thow sclt-
samc bodics, llave these sensations. However, wc do not ordinarily 1!.\j}('m'nce
wmations. Rather, b)' way of sensatwm we expenmce a world around us. As 1
starc at rny computer, for cxamplc, 1 arn having sensations but 1 do
wrrcive thcsc sensations. 1 perccive computer. structurc ot
lomliousne'>'> is, in phcnomenologtcal parlancc, mtentronal. lt r'> con-
strousnes'> of something other than itsclf, of a world beyond itself. _lmbo_dtcd
romciousnc\\ givcs nH.' a world, a setting, but in tocusing upon_thrs :cttmg 1
IH'tt''''uil} pul mvsdt out of focm. Ernboclicd t"onsciou'>llC\S smks rnto the
,,
1
l k.:round ol 1'.\IH'IH'IH t', .lile'" thl.' world mc to be for_egroundcd.
1 ht llCInt
1
s tllll\tl,llt'd l>y situ.ttiom whtrt thh arranglrmnt rs
,
1111
1ttn
1
g
11111111
tI>.H \\1111 tm1s rnnrt. WIH'n nry light\ slunc
80 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
in our eyes, for example, it hurl\. Wt l>tcome aware of our perceptual
sensations in the form of pain. But the pr in of thh is that we temporarily lose
our visual grip on the world. We art l>lrmk'd. Bodily sensation is foregrounded
in experience but externa! obje( ts tlwrdore necessarily sink into the
background, where they are no longer wrn:ived. Likewise, certain smells or
tastes might make us feel sick, rcfocusrng wnsciousness away from the object
which makes us sick and on to the silknc\s it:>elf. We no longer have a sense
of bad-tasting food, rather we have a sense of our own sickness. Background
becomes foreground and objects usually foregrounded recede into the
background. We are all familiar with these experiences. They are not unusual.
But they are distinct from our routine perceptual expcrience. Routincly the
scnsations foregrounded in these experiences reside in the background of
cxpcrience such that consciousness is 'of' the world which transcends it.
1 have couched this argument in terms of sensation but 1 might equally
have focused u pon perccptual organs. The cye does not see itsclf without the
mediation of a mirror. lt secs what lies before it. The nose does not smell itself
and the ears do not hear themselvcs. Nor does the mouth taste itsclf; it tastes
what is in it. Each organ forms a sensuous impression of the outside world but
rcmains its own blind spot. Touch is more complex as one part of our body
can touch another. However, as Merleau-Ponty (1968a) notes, even here we
see the role of the foreground-background structurc. When one hand touches
the other we may have a sensc of touching or bcing touched but never both
simultaneously. Onc experience always assumes the foreground position at
the expense of the othcr. Leder expresscs this in terms of bodily absence. The
body is the absent background structure of our experience, he argues, and
must nccessarily be so if objects within the world around usare to occupy the
thematic forcground.
!'he body is equally absent in action. Action involves movement of the
body. My currcnt activity of typing, for example, involves movement of my
fingers, arms, eyes, head and so on. This is purposive, intelligent and cultured
action. To type 1 must know what a keyboard is and how to use it. 1 must
know whcre different lettcrs are, reaching for and tapping them in the right
order. My lcft and right hands must work together to access uppcr-case letters.
lndeed, my whole body must work together. If 1 lean back in my chair, for
example, then my arms must reach further to hit the keys and my fingers
must strike thcm from a different anglc. 1 achieve al! this without bcing awarc
of doing so, however. 1 know that 1 a m typing but J do not, in any conscious
or reflcctive sense, tell my hands to movc or give them spatial instructions. I
may not cven know, in a rcflcctive sense, where they are going and may not
have conscious knowlcdge of thc keyboard layout. M y fingcrs know where to
go without my having to look or scarch, but 1 could not discursively describe
where individual letters are without looking or following my fingers. My
knowledge of the keyboard is pratlk.tl, pH-rl'flectrve and embodied. Ami
from the point of view of my umscro11s t'.\]lt'trtnce, my l>ody 'just moves'
appropriatl'ly, without mv intl'tlt'tl''" 1 (< ' rmsle\' 2001). At nwst 1 become
awarl' of ho\\ 1 h:t\'l' tiH' 1'\'1'111; '"' whtn 1 spot ;r typing
l'IJOI. 1\TII 111 \111 h Cil\l'\, ho\\'1'\1'1, ti 1\11111 111}' lltHJ\' th;( ( IJttollll' .IW,lll' of
1>111 1.1th1'1 th1 I'IIOI 011 tlu \111 ''" 111, "'""' :1 ; ... 1.111)', in 1'\ll'lllal
Blind spots, tite absent body ctllc/ being-for-others 81
l'llVironmcnt. What is true of typing is true of all cKltOll, at lcast in fami li ar
s1tuations. From the point of view of consciousncss, <.ulturally appropriate
l>odily action and coordination 'just happen' ami, as such, fall below the
thrcshold of perception and rcflective knowledge.
Again, then, in action my embodimcnt managcs to be largely absent from
my experience. 1 do boclily things ancl my bcing consists in these bodily
doings but my conscious is dircctcd at the worlcl in which 1 am acting rather
!han upon myself. 1 notice my own effects upon the world but am not
mcessarily conscious of how 1 generate these effects. Moreover, when we do
11y to concentrate upon how wc do things this often dccreases our
1om peten ce and inhibits our action. When we beco me sclf-consciousness
1bout how we walk, for examplc, we are more likely to bccome clumsy and
,,wkwarcl. Likewisc, when we try to tcach othcrs practica! skills wc sometimes
llave to run through the action 'without thinking' in orclcr to try to work out
how it is that we do it. Thinking about it makes action more clifficult.
Dys-appearance and bodily ' noise'
there are exceptions to bodily absencc. 1 noted above, for example, that
pamful bright lights make us aware of our and thus of our
1 mboclimcnt. Lcdcr (1990) deems such cxperiences dysfunctional and labels
t rte shifting of foregrouncl/background structures that thcy in vol ve a 'dys-
.1Jlpcarance' of thc body; that is, an appearance of the body that is brought
.1bout through its dysfunctioning. Other examples inclucle illness and the
.1<.hes ancl pains of agcing. When we are ill and our body does not work
propcrly, Leder notes, wc become more aware of it. Pain in particular has this
dfect. Likewise, as we age and find ccrtain activitics harder our body may
hecomc more noticcable to us, a focus of our expericnce. As our body \lips
1nto focus, however, our sensuous experiences bcgin to lme thcir inttntional
structure ancl the externa! world, orclinari ly foregrounded in pcrception, slips
1 ,ut of focus. This is not to say that ill ami old people permaiH.'lltl} lose
ronsciousncss of the world. lndividuals in extreme pain may. The pain may
onsume their whole consciousness. More usually, however, thc focus of
n>nsciousness will fluctuate between bodily sensation and the externa! world.
lurthcrmore, agents tend to limit the focus of their perceptions ami actions,
oftcn unwitt ingly, as a way of compcnsating for this. They lcarn to habitual! y
avoid potentially painful cxperiences (Golclstcin 2000).
Leder's is a philosophical argument. As J noted in Chapter 1, howcver,
mpirical work by Calnan and Will iams (1991), further theorizcd by Williams
( 1995), suggests a very similar picturc. Thcy found that, if not prompted todo
so, agents do not appear to spontaneously rcflect upon matters of health and
tll<.' body in a discussion of their everyday Ji ves ancl concerns. 1 lealth and thc
llody becomc rcflexivcly thematic, they claim, whcn the bocly dys-appears
1 llmugh illncss.
1 htst argum('llh ;ul' impmt.u1t. They allow us lo question accounts which
JliHlray sdf \111\"l' tii .IIJI 1' ni tlll' l>ody as a dtronil condtl ton in latt modtm
\ot il'lI'\ .t i HI \LI)'I""t 111y 1 111 Chapl<.'l fi, tll.1t .llltntioll lo tll<. hotl\
82 Rethinking reflexive embod1ment
h cp.is?dic. in the l"tl\l' ol ( ' aln.lll ami Williams, they are rooted in
studtes ot thc real lite t'.\]ll'litmts ol soda! agcnts and build upon a
w1der body of emprica! studil's in medica! so<:iology which draw similar
<:onclusions. Much of thc tmpirical support for thc thcories of Giddens and
loucault, by contra'>t, as 1 noltd in < h.tpltrs 1 ami 3 rcspe<.:tively, is centred
upon manuals ot various kin(h and lllus te11<h lo capture social ideals rather
than lived realities.
In addition, thc argument al>out thc abscnt body is important both
bccause .1t ernbcllishes the notion ot thc body as a 'blind spot' and
1t .ratses thc of how reflcxivit' bccomes possiblc. It suggesb
that r:th.'xtve emboduncnt is nota primordial condition for human beings b}
showmg that wc arc, 111 '>0111<.' rcspctts, structurcd in a wav which makes us
unaware of ourselvcs. ' .
l'here are problcms with thc abscnt body thcsis, however. Whilst it is
plausible to suggest that wc arc unaware of our bodies in the way Ledcr
:uggests, the that w<. becomc awarc ot our bodies only through dys-
,lppearance ami tllness does not ring truc. For a start, it docs not addrcss
concerns about appearance - concerns which may, for sorne of us
be more in the <.:oursc of our everyday livcs than the absent bod;
thes:s .suggests .. l.hcrc must be to body comdousncss than dys-
Thrs s partl} a matter of how and wh} wc bccome aware of
bod1es when we do; ot what triggers body consoousncss. lt does not take
an tllness to make me worr) that 1 a m ugly. lt is also a mattcr of what we mean
when we say that 'the body' is abscnt, however. Lcder gi\'Cs usan argument to
'>ug?cst, what phcnomenologists have called 'the lived body' or 'body-
subJect s absent trom experience; he suggests that we are largely unaware of,
tor example, the bodily basis of our actions and pcrceptions. And he makes a
g.ood for this. 1 !owever, when we worry about or reflcct u pon acne, the
srzc our nose, pressurc or the risk of canccr we are not reflccting u pon
lr:ed We are worrying about the propertics of our body as
obJcct- that 1s, as 1t appears to others, from the outside, oras it is and can
be known. through the concept: and procedures ot various sciences, again
an pomt ot \ tew. 1 propcrtics of thc body-as-object are not
gt\en to our tmmethate stream of experience any mort than those of thc
body-as-subject. Yl) beaut) or ugliness is not fclt trom within, nor do the
measu.res ?f blood prcssure taken by the doctor necessarily correspond with
m my cxpcrience. 1 can be ill without fccling ill. liowcver, these
obJectJvc properties can become thematic within rctlcxive consciousness and
.do :o independently of Leder's 'dys-appcaranccs'. 1 will devclop thh
posttton 111 what tollow; by way of discussion ol a key conttntion in thc work
of Mcrlcau-Ponty (1962).
Being-for-others
Lt<kr'\ itka\ .Hl' rooltd ill thow <>1 l'onty f l'lh:l) olllll llll' .ugulllt'lll\
ol llw latttr all<l\\ 11\ lo \llo1q" 11 ,11111 l''h'IJd lll\ pt\IIHlll ( llllsidtr llll'
lollll\\'lllg 1 I.IIIl
B!ind spots, tlle absent body .uul being-for-others 83
For myself 1 am ncither 'inquisitive', nor 'jcaloll\', nora 'hunchback', nora
'chil servant'. lt h olttn a matter of surprise that tht cripple or the invalicl
can put up w1th hinv,clf. lhc reason is that \uch people are not for
themselves cleformtd or at death's door. Until tht final coma the dying
man is inhabited by a consciousness, lle is al/ 1/wt ile wes, and enjoys this
much of an outlct. Consciousness can nevcr objcctify itself into invalicl
consciousness or cripple consciousness, ancl evcn it the olcl man complains
of his age or the cripple of his deformity, they can do so only by comparins
tilemselves wil/1 otilen, or seeing tllemselves tilrougll lile eres o{ otllers, that is,
b} taking a statistical and objective view of themsclvcs ...
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 434; emphasis added)
might appear to contradict Leder hcrc. Wouldn't the bod) of
thc 'cripple', to use 'vferlcau-Ponty's unfortunate term, dys-appear and
become visible in the way that Leder's ill and agemg boclies do? In so far as
,1geing or disability involve aches and pains they must make the body dys-
,rppear. That docs not mean that the individual will neccssarily experience
lheir body as old or disabled, for reasons 1 discuss \hortly. But they will be
awarc of their body as a conscquence of such cxpcriences. 1 do not think that
Ylcrleau-Ponty would disagrcc with this. He is making a different point. He is
drawing a distinction bctwecn interna! and externa! experienccs of the body-
that is, betwecn my 'cxpcrience' of my body and your experience of my body.
We ha\'e airead} saicl that 'my body' is abscnt from my cxperience, a
background structure rathcr than a foreground object. Ihis is what Merleau-
J>onty is getting at when he claims that the dying man 'is all that he sees'. The
body of thc dying man is an invisible background structure which projccts
him into the world ancl what he is conscious of is the world, not his dying
body. Merleau-Ponty is extending the point, however, by observing that
hodies have a rangc of properties when viewcd from the outsicle, as objects, by
other people, that have no correlate at the levcl of the interna! expericnce ol
thc embodied agent, evcn whcn the body dys-appears. Agcing and disabilily
are bad examples bc<.:ausc they can involve aches and pains but Mcrleau
Ponty could have used tht cxample of having two lcgs or two cyes. What h tt
like to have two legs? lwo cyes? We do not know what it is like to have two
legs or two eyes, partly because these properties bclong to the absent
background structure of our embodied cxpericnce of the world but also
hecause we have nothing within our own expcricnce with which to contrast
this state of affairs. liaving two legs and two cyes structures our experience of
lhe worlcl but unless we lose an eye or a leg we will never know,
cxpcrientially, how il doe'> so or indeed that it does so. Thcre is nothing in
thc nature of my cvcryday cxperiencc that revcals its binocularity or
l>tpcdalism. Similarly, if 1 had been born with onc cyc and one leg, assuming
that cvcryonc around llll' was in the same position, 1 would not be aware that
1 'only' had oiH'ol t;n h or that 111'\ vision amlmowment wcrc affected. Thcrc
would h<.: 1111 '1111IV' ,dtonl it, nor indeed any stns<.: that my experience was
'afktted' o1 dlnlnll\htd, '>lllll' mH:-Icggtd monmularitv would be th<.:
,llt\tlll lt.11l HIIIUII<I slrlllturt ol my and there would
ht noth111g In 1 111111''11 11 );ollll\1. 1 ht \olllll' .1pplus lo .1 rngt ot hodily
1'\111'111'1111\ 1\1\ 1 \]1 1111111 1111\' l11 \IIIHlll tnl ly 111\' h1ologit,ll \t'X, 101
84 Rethinking reflexive embodimc nt
example, but if it is 1 cannot know thi\ 'intcmally' because 'internally' 1 do
not experiencc my 1 cxptnuKl thc world around me. And in an}
case 1 the comparatrve rctcrcnn pornt which would allow me to juclge
my expenencc or sorne aspect of it 'mak'. l'o judge my cxpcricnce 'male' 1
would nced to compare it wilh fcmak l'xpcriences and the cxpericnccs of
other. males, neither of which an. m ailablc internally within m y own
conscwusness as thcy are, by definition, others' experienccs.
We may argue, contra Merleau-Ponty, that agc is slightly diftcrcnt. On onc
leve! t herc is nothing in rny expcricncc that directly revcals my agc to me. 1
no feel 37 1 fecl two legged. Howen:r, my Jived expericncc
man.rfests a tcmporahty t hat allows me to expcricnce changes and, in
thc bodily <lcterioration that goes with ageing. Pcrhaps 1
cxpenencc certain physical activities not only as 'hard' but as 'harder than
they used to be'. My body dys-appears in the form of breathlessness or aches
and pains, but at the same time my tacit scnse of my own capacities is
challenged. 1 do not match up to my own expcctations, which are rooted in
prior expcriencc, and 1 thcreforc experience my difficulties as deterioration.
Of course my failings may not be due to age. Thcy may be due to illness.
thcm as a matter of age requires that 1 step outsidc of
my ltved cxpenence and apply socially bascd objective ami externa! criteria to
myself- is, age categorics and measuremcnts. Without the concepts of
age and 1 not expcricnce m y aches and pains in this way. This is
a SOCial rcpresentations. play an important role in the way in
wh1ch wc read our bodres and expcnenccs and thus reflexive embodiment
presupposes the acquisition of these reprcsentations and their structuring
role. However, as noted, rny aches and pains do havc a temporal structure to
them; physical to reiteratc, are not just hard but harder than they used
to be .. And good rcason to bclievc that the social category of ageing
owes .'ts ongm, m sorne part, to the sharing and comparing of such li,ed
expenences. We have a concept of ageing and its effccts because we all
experience physical activity as 'hardcr than it used to be' over time, and we
discuss this common expcrience in a manner which allows us to deduce its
probable cause (for a similar argument with respect to thc concept of disease
and pathology, see Canguilhem 1998). More generally, howevcr, Merleau-
is borne out. .There are any numbcr of properties of the body-
ObJCCt, that tS, the body v1ewcd from an externa! position, whicll do not
in first instance, \\'ithin the perspective of the body-subject, e\ en
tf they contnbute to t he shaping of that pcrspcctive.
The implication of this position is that to experience oneself as for
to expericnn onestlf at all, one must adopt an
externa! pornt of vtew 111 rl'latmn to ont\tlf. 11 1 am \ripplcd' onh from ,
111
externa) of vitw llitn 111)' Sl'll\l' ol mvsl'll as nippltd pn.su
1
;poses my
acccss to tlus pmnt of 'itw. llut limv h thi'> JHl\\il>lt? llow l.tll 1 have an
externa! vitw of mystlf! A\ ill' trulu .11!'\ i11 tht :tiHtn pass1ge, Ml'rltau Pontv
l>t ht'\'l'\ 1 11.11 \H .!dlltn 1111\ Jll 1 .ptt ll\'1' by !(',1111 i ng to \L'l e Htr.1 In\ t 1J roug
1
llit t'}'l'\ ni ntlurs' ( 1 ')(,) 1.1<1) 1 <'Xpi<Ho' lllis in 111on dttai l
111
tlll' lll'.\1
< h.lplor lor pro .1111 J'IIIJ><ht'\, 11111\o'\'o r, 1 1\rll prl.'p.rr 1 tltl' w.
1
r \\llh d lllil'f
11\Shlll ni clrll<'ll'lltl' .rrul ' tiro '""''
Bhnd s pots, tlw absunl hculy ,,,/ hotnp lorollu:r!> 85
Difference
Iris Young (2005) used tht work ol :l.il'rlo,111 l'only lo dl'wlop ' h'lllllll\t
account of female embodiment. l lcr l'llg.gcnutr l Wtlh l'onty, wluht
it acccpts and appropriates mulh, t\ utlu.rl, ltlWl'\l't ..,hl' .rtgm' th.1t his
of what Leder calls thc abwnn ol llu '""'>' 111 \l't)'ll.ry t':>.(lL'rtl'lll'C,
and parti<.:ularly the cas} relatlomhtp tlm -;uggt'\1\ lorl\\l'l.'ll hoth ,rntl wl!
betrays a peculiarly male expcmntt' ll u il'rrl.tll hody, argucs, ts
objectified to a much greater degnT t h.rn llu rn.llc I>CHI)' mthul popular
culture and is constituted asan ollJl't t ol \t\rhl! "rrrtiny 111 many cveryday
sttuations. lndeed, the ftmall llml) t\ \IIIIHr.hlt to lloth unwanted vhual
attention and sometimes unwanted ph)'\ll .ti { ont.11 t .ttHl touthrng. lhis, she
makes women much more Ulll\ltom o! t htu hodtl'> and inhibits their
action. Thc body cannot be ah\cnt lron1 wonHtt'\ l'.\pcncnce .in thc way
it canfor men. Women have to he Ulll\l i1Ht\ ol lww therr !>odres look, what IS
\Sible or exposed and what attl'\\tlllc whtn they movc, and this
their movement. As noted abovt, it tan llc \'l'f\ dittllult to perlorm an actron
whilst trying to think about it. ' 1 ht tlwught process inhibits
hehavioural >rocess. Moreovcr, womcn ha ve to m ove tn ways whrch
minimize thcir vulnerabili ty. l hh lloth further inhibits their movcment in
rts own right and incrcases o,cJf-lonsciousncss, causing further inhibilion
again.
rhis argument draws from a cdebrated account of 'the look' by Sartre
(1969). leeling that we are bemg looked at by othcrs, Sartre clairns, changes
our whole way of bcing. lt makcs us self-conscious. In thc absence of this
fceling we may involve ourselves in a situation toa point whereby we 'forget'
or 'lose' oursehcs. We becomc complctely 'absorbed' in the situation or in our
train of thought and imagination. We are, to use Leder's (1990) expression,
,bscnt from our own cxperience. lndications of the prescnce of others who
rnay be watching us, such as a creaking floorboard or movcment in our
pcripheral vision, quickl) snap us out of this absorption, however, makc
us very awarc of ourselvcs, to the point of inhibiting our action. 1 hts selt-.
con\ciousness is a form of alienation, for Sartre, because what we are awarc of
h not simply ourselvcs but rather our existencc as an objcct of expcriencc tor
mother person. Wc do not 'belong' to ourselves because they are watchrng us
ami we are capturcd up in their experience. Young accepts thb argurnent but
ngucs that such alienation is far more common for womcn bccause .womcn
.trt more likely in our socicty to be positioncd as obJects ,,sual
toll\umption Jhis is not simply a mattcr of being in the company ot others.
:-.Acn are often in the company of others. Men, however, are more often
rlrognvcd as fcllow subjects in such encounters and are not positioncd as
olljt'l ts of vhual contemplation. rhe} are, tor example, le'>s often ogled.
lnll rpt:rsonal encounters, as Merleau Ponty (1962) argues, are
{ ornmunicativc. Wc cannot help communicating with othcr'>. But what 1\
olttn u1mmunicatcd to women is a refusal to engage with thcm as
1 onllmrtticatin suhjects ami a tcntlency rather to con\umc them a'> 'i\ual
ohJl'l h. :-.fl-11 .lfl' teUl).;II/l'd a'> COillllllii\t'at \'l' \Uhjl'l h, W011H'II <lfl'
tllll\titultd ,1\ \'\11,11 oh11 1\,
86 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
In many respects Young is making thc same point as Bartky (1990), whose
ideas we discussed in Chapter 4. In both cases women's relations with their
own bodies are said to be inhibited and alienated by a socially induced
awareness of the body, an awareness that others, particularly men, are
watching and judging them, and perhaps deriving voyeuristic pleasure from
the experience. Women are conscious of the consciousness that others have
of their bodies, and their own consciousness of their bodies derives from their
assumption of the perspective of the other. As Bartky (1990: 38) puts it in her
own analysis: 'The gaze of the Other is internalized so that 1 myself become at
once seer and seen.'
In a more recent paper Young (1998) has argued that the situation for
women has improved since she first postulated her argument. Moreover,
Grimshaw (1999) has argued that, though it is most often women whose
bodies are inhibited and alienated, there is a contextua! aspect to this. In
sorne contexts, she argues, it can be men who are aware of and awkward in
relation to their bodies. She gives the example of aerobics. Challenging the
argument that aerobics is necessarily a form of patriarchal body-power, she
argues that it can be empowering for women, giving them a sense of control
in and possession of their bodies. Men, however, often feel out of place in
aerobics classes, in her view, and their actions are often awkward as a
consequence. They feel self-conscious about acting in one of the few female
spaces in contemporary society.
A similar argument to that of Young has been made by Fanon (1986) in
relation to black men. The bodies of black men are subject to clase visual
scrutiny for a variety of reasons, Fanon argues, and this makes black men
acutely conscious of themselves and their embodied presence in a variety of
situations. As such, it inhibits their movement. Their bodies are not quite so
absent for them nor are they at ease in their bodies in the way Merleau-Ponty
suggests.
The arguments of Young, Bartky and Fanon are interesting, plausible and
important. They add much to our understanding of reflexive embodiment. As
with the quote from Merleau-Ponty discussed above, however, they beg the
question of just how agents are able to experience themselves from the
'perspective of the other'. In the next chapter I will introduce a theory which
answers this question.
A tale of two bodies?
The key conclusion of this brief chapter is that the 'body' we are conscious of
in our reflexive projects is our body as perceived externally and available to
other people. We are not, excepting ci rcumstances of dys-appearance,
thematically conscious of our bodics tmm withitt. The lived body is absent,
experientially, in much of our cxwriv1H v .IIHI tlw l>ody we are aware of as our
own is an 'object' that wc knnw IH'''' llw outsiclc, by aclopting the
perspectivcs oJ othcrs low;ll(is <HII'ot ' ht '> 111 1111' next chaplcr, llorrowing
G.lf. Mead\ terminology,l wiiiHf ,, 1111 "' ' ' IIV<I llodl('s' ;1s tlw hodily ' l' and
llll' l>odil y 'tlll'' tl' \ jH'< 11\l'l} 1111 1 ~ > > < 1 1 1 \ ' 1' 1\ 1111 llody .1s '""'' ' ' 1, IIH' lmdy
Blind spots, the absent body (11/(/ being-for-others 87
which perceives and acts but remains 'absent' in experience; the bodily 'me' is
1 he body as objectified in consciousness, known to others and known to itself
,,s known or potentially knowable to others. Moreover, 1 will use Mead's work
to address the key question that emerges from this discussion: namely, how
.ne we able to experience our bodies as experienced by others? How can we
l'Xperience ourselves from the outside? Por the moment it must suffice to note
1 hat this claim, that m y consciousness of m y body is rooted in the perspective
of others, entails that retlexive consciousness and reflexively embodiment are
necessarily socially rooted. There is no 'bodily Me', no sense of my own body,
111 the absence of the perspectives of others.
11 '
7 1, me and the other
Clwpter 6 concludecl with the clairn that we becorne aware of our bodies a'
objects by lcarning to pcrceive ourselves 'through the eyes of othcrs'. In thi\
chapter, drawing upon the work of Gcorge llerbert Mead (1967), 1 considc1
how wt learn to perform thb feat and acquire the disposition to do so
routindy. Mead has a particularly persuasive vision of selfhood, rcflexivity
ami agcncy which 1 am going to take as a central reference point in In)
rethinking ol rdlexive ernbodiment. Moreover, his work allows us to
overcome a problematic dichotomy in the litcrature discussed earlier (see
the Introduction to Part rwo). On one side of this dichotom} is Giddem
( 1991), whose conception of reflexive embodirnent is infused with a strong
sense of agL'Ilt) and of the existential lifeworld of the agent but who
concei\'es of the agent in a pewliarly atornistic fashion (sec Chapter 1 ). On
the other '>de are Foucault and many feminists, for whom rcfle.xivity amount'>
to selt-policing ami political domination, with ,er} little room for agency or
genuine choice 3 and -!). Durkheirn, Elias and Bourdieu fall
bttwt'l'll the'>l' problematic extremes but none has a de\'Cioped conception ot
the reflc.'\ive agent so they cannot really help us resolve it (Chapters 1 and 2) .
Mead can. 1 begin with a brief assessrnent of Mead's relation to thh
dichotomy bclore oftcring a more general discussion of his position.
Reflexivity, social rel ations and interna! conversations
The isolated individual is a rnyth for Mead. Wc are always already involved in
social relations ancl networks. The evolutionary history of our spccies ha\
been shaped by sl'lcction prcssures arising from collcctivc life (set aho Ilirst
and Wooit'y 19H2) ami our 'incompletenes'>' at birth makLs us dependen!
upon others lor an cxtLndtd wriod Wl' grmv w1thin anothLr\ body ami art
born into <1 \olial group. Morl' unpllll.ntlly, our tapaut) fo1 thoughl,
rl'lll'l t ion and rl'llt'\ 1\ r 1 \' t'llll'l :1 '\ Ir orn .111 rr lll 'lll.d /,11 ion ol t Iw JWI\(ll'liiH'
ofollHI\ (\t't' bl'low) swlt lh,lll'\t' lltllll """lflll\',lll' ,IJid infilll.llt nfll'tlion\
wrllt llu ollll'l f'ltougltl , ltJI l'vl "' 1\ olll/llll'llltll (IJ/11'('/\t///1111, llt.ll 1\, a
\ lh-111 111 \ llh\'t)l,il t OII\l' l\.lllftlllh,ll \\ t Jl ol\ l \\' lllt (1111\l'f\1'\ , i11 1\lllt h Wt pf,l\'
1, ,.,., ,,,,, t/11 flhor 89
1 he roles of different interlocutors, generally moddkd 1111 1 "'''1 ,, \vt 1 1111w
11taking points, responding to thcm, replying to rcspon\t'' ur r11,d l111' '"'tl11r
, ,ponses and so on (see aho Archer 2000, 2003).
In the Jatter respect Mead's position antkipates l'oul"illtlt\ LOI1\I'Irl \\lll1
rhe indiYidual assumes thc observational and udgt'IIH'I11.1
postion of others in relation to hersclf. In contrast to loucault, howt'"' ,
\1ead understands the impact of thc of othcr'>, internallzl'd o1
externa!, in dialogical terrns. \\e m marc ot what otlll'r\ think or will tl_link
,tbout our actions, for Mead, ami Wl' antiupatt thtir re,pon\l'\ to "'" .lt tlnll\
111
imaginative rehearsals ot p<>'>'>il>il' lim\ ol .1rtio11, llut \\'l' c,lll .nglll'
within this imaginary space, ami it Wl' l'illl ron\lllltl .1 Jll'I\U,I\1\C rcply to
what we believe will be their critichm, or can wr'>uadt oursclves that we are
110
t bothered by what they wlll '>.!}' allll do, thtn Wl' may pursue our desired
tourse of action, either as we origul.tll) lllll'!lded it orina way modified so as
lo minimize the sanctions we cxpLtt to ITCLive. Our relations with others are
dialogical and the culture into which we are socialized 'tools' of
ngument, alongside prescribed norms ancl values - tools whtch we can

1
ppropriate and use to challenge those norms and ideals if, and to the extent
1 hat, we disagree with thern. In so me situalions we may obey norm_s, even
11
orms that unfairly disadvantage us, without awareness ot domg so.
lkflexivity and self-knowledge are lar frorn perfect. In other cases the
,lllticipation of sanctions that others rnay bring to bear suffices to us
lo comply in spite of our opposition. Our relations with others, qua relattons,
1nvo!ve interdependency ami thus a balance of power, and when we are
disadvantaged in such balances our lihcrty is restricted. Power balances vary
.1 cross our relations and social context'>, howcver, and we enjoy sorne room to
manoeune in rnost contexb.
In addition, \-fead's positJOn allows for what we might cal! 'poly vocal'
111
ternal dialogues; that is to say, from \1ead's point of view we may bring
nurnerous perspectives to bear within our interna! dialogues, if we
internalized them. Our experience is not dorninated by a single overpowenng
figure, such as loucault's Panopticon. Thus, it may be that a wornan
conternplating a beauty treatmcnt will rcflect not only upon what the
of the product sa> but also upon feminist critiques of 'the
mvth' (Wolf 1991 ), post-feminist critiques of that critique, the views ot hcr
tri.cnds and so on. She may contemplate hcr position from a wide range of
difterent points of view, bringing these points of view into dialogue
hLr own decision-making process; always assuming that she does not stmply
.lt't on impulse, without thought, which is also possible according to Mead's
perspective. . ..
Dialogues of this kind are potcntially creative. New vtews
l'rtll'rgc out of the interplay of older ones. Debate can be generat1ve. And tt
c.tn be unpredictable. As Gadamer ( 1989: 383) notes, 'nobody knows in_
,Hh'<HKe what will "coml' out" of a nmvcrsation'. The pull and push of
dillcrL'Ilt voicc.\ could go 1n diff<.orent dirLtltons and the conversational
lr.tjLctor\' i'> '>l'll\llivc l>oth to i11itial \I.Hiing Lnnditiom and to
qu
1
tt llllllor lll'rttuhattom. 1\ tangl'llll.li \11):!:1'\lion nught '>l'lld a debate 111 a
v
1

1
, lll'\\' and difll'll'lll dint tion. ,\, .1 di,llogu ,lll" IIIH, llil' lt' lllll', thc rdll'.\1\'l'
90 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
agcnt is potentially innovativc ami may, in thc contcxt of cithcr real
dialogues with others or imagincd dialogues with their internalizcd
reprcsentatives, sow the seeds of ncw cultural forms.
Mcad's view upon perspectives ami thcir intcrnalization also poses a
challenge to Bourdicu's position. In an interesting footnote in Outline of"
Tfleory o( Praclice, Bourdieu (1979: 233, n. 16) observes that lifc in modern
cities unsettles the taken-for-granted feel of the world which the habitm
otherwisc furnishes, as agents are constantly coming into contact with
(oftcn immigrants) who have a diffcrent lifestyle and culture from their own.
J'his obscrvation sits unhappily with the rest of his work, whcre agcnts are
said to livc na1vely within thcir habitual perspectivc, taking it for
grantcd. lt captures Mead's sense of modcrn life perfectly, howcver. lor him,
pcrspcctives are constantly coming into contact, affording agents a new
vicwpoint on themselves and generating hybrid cultural forms which can
ncver achicve complete taken-for-grantedness. Wc are creatures ot habit, for
Mead, but we are cqually convcrsational agents and our conversational
tcndencies, wh i 1st rooted in habit, tend to distu rb a t least so me of o u r
sedimcnted rcpcrtoires of action, bringing them into view for us. Wt
appropriatc aspects of the perspectives of others, examining our own
pcrspective from this vantage point and thereby relativizing both. Tradition
ami culture or habitus lose some of their grip by virtue ot our awareness ol
them and of their relativity (see also Crossley 2001 ).
1 do not mean to suggest that we should drop the concept of thc habitus or
that Mead's work is incompatible with it. There is a strong and sophisticated
sense of habit in Mead's work, and a fortiori in the tradition to which he
belongs (Dewey 1988), comparable in meaning to the habitus concept. Ami 1
have argued elsewhere that reflexivity, in the manner of \llead, should be
thought of asan acquircd disposition or habit in itself (Crosslcy 2001, 2003).
We have rcflcxive habits ora reflexive habitus. Howevcr, 1 am suggcsting that
wc cannot load all of our agency into the pre-reflectivc clomain of thc habitm
as Bourdieu often seems to do; that we must creclit agents with greatcr
reflexivc powers than he seems prepared to grant thcm, if only because social
change and geographical mobility have the effect of constantly unscttling
assumptions and habits, and clrawing diverse communities into contact with
one anothcr.
. In an interesting way then, Mead emphasizes agency and rcflexivity, like
G1ddens, but combines this with an equally strong emphasis upon social
cmbedding, akin to that of Foucault and Bourdieu. lt is for this rcason that his
perspcctive affords us an opportunity to pass between thesc extremes,
combining their strengths whilst avoiding their weakncssts. Agcnts are
multiply socially embedded, for Mead, and thcse rclatiom shapc thc agenh'
reflexivity. They do not necessarily suhordinatt tht agtnt, howcwr. l'hey are
'voiccs' in reflexivc ami potentially nitll<tl U>ll\'l'l\illions. 1 twrt are limits to
Mcad's pero;pectivc too. Wt cantwt s1t11pl\ st11lstitt1lt' his wrspctlivt lor that
of Bourdicu or h>utault lll'l,lll\1' IH' nusws 11111111 th.11 tlll')' i>1i11g to Jight
(partly lwcausl' lw was 1\'lillll); 111 llw ,uly ll\'t'ntwtll untlH\'). \;\' nttd lo
lwld on to wllat is posill\t' ,J)HIIll 1111'11 I('SJIllll'l' <llllllli>uti .. ;IS '"" llut it 1s
111)' t 11111<'111 IOII 1 11,11 1\'l' t .111 l 11 ,JI l' lt ,Jl '\ 1 1'1 J, XI \'C ,gen t 1\'1 t 11 j 11 llw ,t< t Ollll t
1, me alllf tlle other 91
Wl' are building, in an cffort to resolvc somc ol tlw problems that the other
lheories raise. In essencc, then, 1 am looking to \llead, in this chapter, to help
me to construct a robmt account ot rcflexive agcncy and thereby reflexive
tmbodiment. l turn now to his account of thc gencsi'> of thc self.
Self and other
lnfants do not seem able to takc an outside view upon themselves. They act
.1nd speak, when able to, in ways which suggcst that they are not aware that
other people have a distinct ami differcnt point ot view, and integral to this is
,111 apparent lack of awareness of the fact that they are experienced by others.
l'iaget (1961) refers to this as 'cgocentrism', whKh is apt in one sense but also
potentially misleading as what the child lacks, from Mead's point ofview, and
l'iaget's, is a developecl scnse of selt. l'hcy tlnd to confuse their view of the
world with the world itself ami, as such, fai l to properly grasp the particularity
nf their own experiencc. It is only by grasping that their view of the world is
ust one view of the world that they will arrive ata sense of the boundaries of
t he ir own experience and thus of thc very existen ce of their experience as a
distinct thing; that is, of themsclves. Recognizing that other people have a
ditferent view of the world and are distinct sites of experience is integral to
this. Othcr people are thc differcnt vantage points on the world that allow the
mfant to recognize that her own view of the world is just one view amongst
many. Furthermore, recognizing that they existas an object in the experience
of other people, for Mead, is what allows thcm to begin to expericnce their
own self, including their own body, asan object. We are able to look u pon our
including our body, asan object, he argm:s, when and to thc extcnt th.1t
wc can adopt the perspectivc of 'the other' . Mead agrecs wth l'onty,
then, that we can percc1ve ourscl\'es only 'through the e)T\ o! othtJs' llcm
do infants achievc this?
The first step, according to Mead, , takln during ply, lnfanh pl.1y .11
hcng other people, taken frorn reallife, i>ook\ or tdcvsion. 11m nught
with very simple imitation ot acts that they \Cl' othtro; ptrtorm, l>ut 11
gradually grows more sophisticatcd sulh that, for e.xamplc, thc\ switch bad;
and forth between roles and assign roles to either fnends or toys. Vvhcn the)
tmbark upon such play, to reiterate, thcy are not aware of thc pcrspectives of
others. fhey are merely acting out the behaviours and relationships that are
\lsible to them in their situation, perhaps as a way of making sense of those
behaviours and relationships. In doing this, however, they begin to
.q>preciate that people play difterent roles ami to acquire, through role play,
a sense of the different vantage points and pcrspectives attached to those
mies. Playing 'dad' or 'tcacher' offers a glimpse of how the world looks from
.1nother point of view and rcality thereby takes on a different, multi-
llt'rspectival complexion. lurthermort, by implication children learn that
t IH:i r own perspective is one amongst others. rheir experience and
Jlt'r\pcctive is decentred and thtrtby becorncs recognizable as their own.
1 hev cease to conflate thdr view ol tlw world with thl' world itself.
l.hi\ is advanced, Mead u>ntinut'\, in so 1,11 .1s t hildrtn plav out thl'ir
92 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
relationship with significant othtr!> and rdive significant events within thi\
context. They may, for example, explain the dangcrs of the world to
thcmselves (or a teddy bcar) as their mum explains it to them or they may
scold themselves for doing something that they have previously been scolded
for. They may cal! out 'No!' or 'ah, ah' as they perform behaviours they have
becn told not todo. In doing this thcy learn to apply thc perspective of the
othcr to themsclvcs and thcrcby intcrnalize that pcrspective, coming to
unc.lerstand themselves from the point of view of thc other. The perspective ot
thc othcr takes up residcncc within their habitus.
It is this same process of role play, morcover, which lays the foundatiom
for thc above-mcntioned inner conversation. just as our ability to read quietly
and to ourselves is based u pon our earlier acquired ability to read out loud, so
too thc discrete, slent and interna) conversations of adult life are founded
upon these earlier, more explicit dramatic performances. Morcover, role play
continues in adult lifc and is often deployed for purposcs of increasing
empathy or developing self. In addition to actors, who somctimes report
sceing the world differcntly when they have 'got into' a character, for
cxample, 'swapping roles' is somctimcs deploycd as a way of allowing social
actors to cometo appreciatc onc another's point of view. And we all rehearse
or rcplay important interactions in our imagination, getting a fcel for
significant others in those situations and thereby subjecting ourselves toan
internalizcd representation of their perspective. The cxpcricnce of infants is
differcnt inasmuch as the} do not know what effect role playing will have, are
not doing it in order to lcarn about other perspecti\es, and start from a
position of 'egocentric' unawarcncss. But the discovery of thc perspective ot
the other, achieved by playing roles, is much the same.
Language and linguistic catcgories are also important in thcse processcs.
Self-awareness emerges within a symbolic, primarily linguistic environment,
ancl significant others, usually parents, play a key role in teaching the infant
language. Morcover, they name thc world for thc infant, identifying objects
for her, including herself. They givc her and teach her to use personal
pronouns (l, me, you, us) and they both individualizc hcr, in their
intcractions with her, conveying a sense of her own uniqueness to her and
'mirror' back a reflection of herelf to herself. The infant acquires a sense of
herself by learning to play the roles of others but she also learns to play the
role of herself, to rise out of her infantile egocentrism and take up the
position of a unique individual in a social world. In this respect she also
begins to acquire an identity or identities; that is, a sen se of who she is in thc
world by virtue of what shc is, who she is rclated to and how.
The infant is not passive in this respcct all(l hcr concept of self is not
dcvoid of affect. Cooley (1902), whose work is dosel y rdattd to that of Mead,
strcsscs the role of sclf-feelings in tlw t;nly dcvl'lopmtnt of thc self - for
examplc, noting how tht kiHning ol Jll'l\on;ll pmno1111s tcnds to coincide
with an infant learning that ,IJ ".1 1.111"' in tiH' wolld (.l'. that she makcs
things happcn), With tlll' 'jo)'' th.tt oh! OIIIJ',IIlll'S lhiS ol>\!'1\'llOil and with
l'itrly appropriatin 111&1"\. < ' lllld11"1l h,ltll tn \,1}' 'tlllll!'', lnr 1',\illllJllt, a'i they
tu\\ll' to kttp lwld ol nh11'1 ls tl11r \\,1111 llu \t' .tppwpri.tlt\"<' urgl'\ .tri' tarlv
lnllll\ ni ,, '>1'11\\ ni \1'11, f111 e nolt \ (1\1'1, 1111 ltis inlt'lj'll'l.tltnll tlt)
1, me ,,,. tite other 93
tllustrate the flexible boundaries of the sclf. The wlt ,,in 'omc rcspects, what
he! Jngs tome and what 1 have 'me', 'my' or 'm111c' ll'dings ahout. As such it
extends beyond the boundaries of my organism. 11\ l>oundaries are neither
1111lmitcd nor determined by the infant alone. lhty are negotiated within
.oda! interaction. The infant will assert but will also have to Jearn what is
'tllme' and thus 'me'.
The generalized other
As children grow older, having becn shaped by play, Mead continues, thcy are
.rhle to engagc in 'games'; that is, forms of play which involve multi_ple
playcrs, perhaps teams and certainly rules. As with role play, _playmg
d ,elops by degrees. Children begin with simple games, acqumng the
ohspositions that allow them to movc on to more complex games. Gamcs
lluther dcvelop the sense of self acquired by way of play. Whcre playing at
l>l'ing 'dad' allows children to sce themselves as their dad sees them and to
tntcrnalize his particular pcrspective, playing games demands that children
\l'l' themselves from multiple perspectives at once and from thc point of view
nf thc abstract rule structure of the gamc. This, Mead argues, is a preparation
t living in a wicler socicty wherc one will be expected to live within the
structure of beliefs, norms ami so on of a community. llowcver, while it
rnduces a sense of fairness, rules, grace in dcfeat and so on, game play also
1
ncourages a strategic disposition. 'Piaying the gamc' is not a matter of
unthinking conformit). Players second-guess their others in order to win.
At this point Mead introduces a distinction between particular others, such
'" teachers or individual family mcmbers, and what he calls 'thc gencrali;ed
other'. The application of the concept of the gcnernlized other has llt'l'll l
smucc of contcntion amongst Mead scholars. 1 share lllumcr's (2001) vinv,
however, that thcre can be many 'generalized others' l otrl'Spottditlg llot h lo
thc different communities to which an individual might lwlong .111d '"
successivc Jcvels of abstraction, gencrality amlurlivt'l\,rlity. gtrut.rlill"d
ot '1ers are collectively incorporatcd in 'even more gt'lll'ra lllt'd ot fll't
Integral to this gencralizcd other, morcovcr, h tht .tbilil)' ol thl' .1gl'nl to
.tpply objective social criteria, mcasures and conctph to_l>oth lhl :nd
hersclf. Learning to play 'games' is learning to step oul\rdt ol partrculamlll"
, riteria of judgement and to apply criteria that are agreed
u pon. This may be a matter of accepting when a goal!\ a goal in football but it
.tpplies cqually to thc numcrous standardized measurcs wc lcarn to apply to
our own bodily life, from agc, through height and wcight to blood pressure
.111d blood sugar leve!. llow things seem to me may not be how they to_
1 he majority of othcrs, that is, to society, and internalizing thc pcrspectivc of
1 he gcncralizcd other involvcs Jearning and accornmodating to this fact.
What Mead is saying with respect to the generalizcd other and our capacity
to a\\umc its role has much in common with a number of pcrspectivcs on the
lnttrnalization of social control that l discussed in carlier chapters:
spl"dlically those of Llias, Foucault and Bartky. The 'fashion-beauty complex',
'<.rtnral network', 'l"l\'tlill'd norms' and 'consumer l"ulturt' are all, in certain
94 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
respects, examples of a gencralizcd othc1 that the agent may learn to assume
and apply to their self. As noted al)(l\T, however, internalization does not
guarantee compliance, in Mead's vtw. Knowmg the view of the generalizecl
other is not sufficient to guarantct mv compliance unless an imbalance of
powcr and threat of sanctions force m y hand.
The bodily me
Play and gamcs decentre an agcnt's experience, giving thcm a scnse of their
particularity and their existence within the experience of other people. They
learn that there are externa! perspectives to be had upon them. Moreover, by
assuming the roles of others they learn to occupy these roles, in imagination,
and thereby to devclop a perspective upon themselves. They become an
object for thcmselves, as they are for others, because they assume the role ot
the other. Thb process splits the agent into two 'phases' which Mead refers to
as '1' and 'me'. In reflecting u pon herself the agent is both a reflecting subject
(1) ancl an object of reflection (me). Mead conceives of this split as temporal.
He is not suggesting that subjectivity consists of two spatial 'parts'. The me
emerges when the 1 turns back upon itself, to reflect upon itself. !'he 1 never
quite coincides with itself in this process, Mead argues, and self-reflection h
always historical, therefore. The agent can reflect about hcrsclf but she cannot
simultaneously reflect upon her reflcction, partly because she cannot do two
things at once (i.e. reflect and rcflect upon her reflection), partly becausc a
second-ordcr rcflcction (i.e. reflection upon reflection) must have somcthing
to reflect upon and thus must come after that which it reflects u pon. In so far
as it assumes a ret1exive posture, thercfore, the 1 always reflects upon a
historical reconstruction of itself; that is, upon 'me':
As given, [the self] is a 'me', but it is a me that was an '1' atan earlier time. 1t
you ask, then, where directly in your own experiencc the '1' comes in, thc
answer is that it comes in as a historical figure [i.e. a 'me'l.
(Mead 1967: 174)
History, in this context, might be a matter of microseconds but there is a gap
nonetheless and it is important bccause it means that the 1, the agent in tht
prescnt tense, is elusive. It only ever knows itself through the mode ot
historical recomtruction; that is, as 'me'. This maps quite closely onto what
Leder (1990) argues about the absent body (see Chapter 6). The embodied 1 h
not thematic in its own experience because it is the necessary background
structure of that experience. It is absent.
Some critics have argued that Mead's pmition h limited in the respcct that
the 'me' exists in the past tense only (Wiln 1994; i\rcher 2000). What, the}
have asked, of the tuture? 1 rcad l'vlt.d In tlaiming that the nw
exists 'in the past tenw' Mtad ., not i;IIOI.IIlt ot thl' tall that we can and
do project po\sibk lutun \t'h'' .1 '11111111' 11u' . llowt'\'t'l, an agtnt can onlv
proj<.ct into tlwir own tuttlll' it \lu .il l<',ufv 11." .1 \l'll\t' ot htJ own \tt
to projt'tl; th.lt 1\, ot 'llll'' ' IIH'I< 11111\l l11 .1 '111<' 1\'l lo 1\ go1ng todo th\ or IH
tll,Jt. \nd tlti' \1'11\(' o! 1111' 111'<' \\,1!11\ ,, 11\l'\ li11111 tl11 p.1st ht'l.lll\1', ,1\ \\'('
1, me allll the other 95
have seen, my present being is elusive and absent, whilst my future being is
hypothetical and does not yct exist. 1 can only exht tor myself as an agent
who has acted, in the past. lt is important to add, morcover, that anticipation,
and thus futurity, is integral to Mead's conception of action and is the raison
d'etre for his interest in role taking and selfhood. 1 le believes that playing the
role of the other allows us to anticpate how will react to possiblc
actions on our behalf, which in turn allows us both to weigh up whether the
.lCtions are worth it and to design those actions to elicit the most favourable
of possible responses. Our grasp of our past is central to our control of our
tuture - that is, to our agency.
Assuming the perspective of others gives usa sense of ourselves, including
.1 scnse of our body and what we should do with it. We experience our bodics
as public objects and learn to tend and attend to our bodies in the way that
others do. This might mean, as Bartky (1990) notes, that we learn to judge our
!>odies before others have the chance, and more harshly, in ordcr to pre-empt
their criticisms. lt might mean, as Elias (1994) notes, that we learn to view
tertai n of our bodily functions, products and parts as prvate or dirty,
devcloping a sense of embarrassment or shamc in relation to them. In both
cases our body exists for us, as a thematic object, via our awareness of its
txistence for others.
Our bodies may be constituted as different types of object for us, in
.tccordance with the different people we interact with, different types of
rclations we enter into and different practices involved. The care and !ove
gcnerally by parents to the bodies of their children, for examplc,
constitutcs the child's body, for the child, as a vulnerable and precious objcct
to be cared for and looked after, and also perhaps cleaned and generally
maintained. Children are encouraged, when leaving their parents' control, to
\at propcrly' and 'wash behind your ears'. In rclations with pecrs, hy contra'>t,
!>odies takc on an aesthetic and sexual meaning. lhey are expecttd lo look
mol ami sexy. I'hey might also be expected to perform wcll on tht 'Porh lithl,
the dance tloor and in bed. Taking the perspcctivc of the other, agents le<nn to
perceive their body in this way and to makc corresponding judgcmtnl\ of
hilue. l'hese meanings are communicated through language and symbols, l>ut
.liso rcinforced through play, games and practices. As children take ovcr tht
practices by which their parents have cared for their bodies - for cxample,
I>L'ginning to wash their own hair, clean their own teeth and so on - they
.Ktively constitute and thus come to experience their body as a vulnerable
ohect of care. Taking on a caring role by assuming responsibility for practices
of care constitutes thc me differently for the l. Likewise when, in later life, they
dance or dress for a night out they put themselves into a role which, in turn,
wnstitutes their bodily me for them as an object of sexual attraction. The
nlt'aning ot thc me is embedded in practice (see also Chapter 8).
lltere .,a certain dynamism hcre, as feedback on self and body are relayed
to tht agent in her interactl<ms with others, as Cooley (1902) suggests in his
, onnpt ot the 'looking gla'' stlt'. Wt comtantly refle<.t back images of self to
<>IH' anotlwr, dirtttly and lndntct ly, inordin;uy \ocialllltl'raction, and these
ll'lit'tlioll\ tnttr into our \l'll\t'\ ol onr hodly \<'11 01 IIH'. lt i\ ditficult to
\11\t;un ,1 \('11\l' ol ollt'\t'lt ;1\ llt'.llltlul, !i)l ('.\.1111)11, 11 otlu1<; ll'llus or lrt'<ll \1\
96 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
as if we are not. 1 do not mean to pn'\l'lll an image of selfhood as a passive
reflection of the judgements of olhl'l\, Agcnts can be resilient to negative
feedback and disparaging of flattcry, il\ < ooley noted (although this in itsclt
may relate to a strong sense of sclt dcvl'loptd through positivc rclationships
in childhood). Feedback regarding the may nced to be rciteratcd from
numcrous sources, including sources thc agent decms aLithoritative, in
differcnt contcxts, bcfore thc agent takes them scriOLISiy (Cooley 1902).
Moreover, as Cooley argues, individuals selcct, to somc cxtent, thc others
whose vicws are important to them and cvcn then interpret and (rc)construct
thc feedback they reccive (Franks and Gecas 1992). Finally, agents are activcly
involved in thc process of managing the impressions others have of thcm by
way of self-presentation, as Goffman (1959) famously argucs. Thc vicws and
feedback of others are important, however, particularly as our body is a blind
spot (see Chaptcrs S and 6), and we desire the rccognition of others (sec
below). It is difficult for an individual to get an objective sensc of their own
body without the rcflections of their self mirrored back by others, and they
know this. rhey are aware of their blind spots and partiality. Furthcrmorc, it is
difficult not to be affected or bothered by the views of significant others.
Relatedly, we achieve our sense(s) of our body by way of comparison with
others. lf others are shorter than us we feel tal!. If they are thinner than LIS wc
fecl fat. lf thcy are fastcr than us we feel slow. This is often revealed in
instances wherc wc change reference group. My imagc of myself as a fast
runner, supported by the fact that 1 can outrun all of my peers, will suffcr a
blow if 1 join a running club whose other mcmbers are much faster than me,
for examplc. Such examples sound trivial but they illustratc that oLir sense of
our cmbodied sclf derives from sociallife and expcricnce and is not thcrefore
interna! or intrinsic. Moreover, note that comparing ourselvcs with others
presupposes an ability to take the pcrspective of the other. 1 do not see my
'shortncss' immediately in the taller peoplc around me. 1 mLISt adopt their
lofty perspective to see myself as short.
Within contcmporary society the sense of the me as a bodily being is, as
the theorists of consumer culture argue (see Chapter 4), greatly enhanced by
the wide availability of mirrors and other technical devices, such a'>
photographs and video technology, which reflect back images of our bodily
exterior to us (Fcatherstone 1982). These technologies constitute the bodil)
me as an object of visual consumption for the embodicd, percciving l. We
must be careful to avoid technological reductionism in our understanding ot
this process, however. Mirrors and cameras are used by social agents and thcir
cffects are mediated by their use. 1 will illustrate this with rcfercnce to
but similar arguments apply to al! technologies. In the frrst instilnce note thal
we have to learn to see ourselves in mirrors, as infants, mually with
mediating hclp of our parents. At one le,el this ha rnatter ot karning whal
we look like ami acquiring habitual larnili;ITll)' wilh our own irna.;c, as \\"l' do
images of others, a proctss whilh h;l\ IHn llll\lt.lll'd 111 r.Hl' i!l\larKl'\ whtrl',
fOr ('Xilnlplc, of W;l! h.t\"1; llltl \1'\'ll , lllI llll lllolgl' fot lll(l!l)' )'l',ll\
ami slrugglc in <l group \ilu.11ion lo li1ul the own 111 IIH rllillor. Al
anollwr lt:vl'l illll\'ol\'l'\ ll':urllrlg '"''l''' 1111' llrilll}t "a lkI\'l' sutl.lU' ;llld
IIH' lllilgt ol\ ol
0
llll:ll' ll'lkt'lion ' "' "'-" ' t,tliHI '""' ,lll',il "'"''' (1\ktll';lll l'olll\'
1, nm 1111.! tlw other 97
1968b). Use of the mirror is a social wliid1 .nmlilutes it as a
particular type of object. lurthcrmore, rn,1111pul.11 ion ol .1ppt.n.n1Cc via thc
mirror is an acquired 'body technique' (SCl' < h.lplt'l H) . ot the image
requires the agent to take up a role in rtlalion lo tlll' 1111.1)-:l', ,md the mirror
can be used in different ways, such as playtul ' ll'IH".II\,d' ol fantasy sccnarios
or serious inspection of a uniform.
Networks and the socially situated sclf
lt is interesting that Mead uses th<.' exprl'\\IOil '1.1!.:1ng tht role of the other' in
his description ot the process whcrd>y wt: ,,., o1m: ,lw<Hc of ourselves. !'he
sociological concept of roles wa"> not ,.,.,y dl'\'l'lopnl at hi'> time of writing and
he perhaps uses thc ter m only to 1 h;rl ol hLrs are available to the
infant, initially, in the form of di'>trntll\t' pat kagt:\ ot behaviour which she
can imitate and appropriatc. llmwwr, IIH' implit<ltion is that the infant is
involved in social systems (comprhing rnll'r<ltpl'ndent roles) from the
moment of her birth and that \ht dl'\"l'lop\ <a sl'nse of self within these
systems. There is, in othcr word'>, a '\trultural' aspect to what Mead is
arguing.
This structural aspect is no lc-.s important in his account of adult life.
Actors are primarily for MLad. We are al! located in multiple
networks, sorne formal, othcrs informal. And rnLich of what we do involves
negotiation within thcse networb, l>oth with concrete others and with
network-specific emergent norms, vaiLICS and so on. We are enmeshed in
family networks, friendship networks, formal workplace networks, informal
work-based networks, leisure networks and so on. We are linked to
government through tax payrnents and wellare services. And we are pluggccl
into various 'broadcast' networks, va the radio, television and internet. Each
of these networks may SL1pport LIS in various ways, but each cquall y makes
demands upon us. And each is a soLirce of information. Action is interaction.
Moreover, networks and rclationships involve power balances in Elias\
sense (see Chapter 2). To be in a rclationship with others is to be
interdependent with them and intcrdepcndence generates 'levers' of control.
In some cases this power balance ma) indeed be balanced. Two friends may
depend upon onc another for the same things, for example, and to the samc
degree, such that neither is particularly advantaged. Likewise, a relationship
and thus the power it involvcs may be weak. 1 do not depend upon my corner
shop owner to any great extent, for example, since thcre is a shop on the
other comer too; and shc does not dl'pcnd greatl} upon me as 1 buy only a
newspaper and am onc of many independent customers. Neither of us has
mLich leverage in relation to the other, therefore. However, levels of
intcrdependence can be high and imbalanced, generating considerable
tonstraints. This may be a matter of externa! constraints, as, for example,
whcn one individual forccs another todo something that they do not wish to
do or prcvents thcm from doing what thc) do wish todo. lt might equally be
rntcrnal, howl'\t'r, il\ whtn an agcnt avoids doing something they would likc
lo do in antiOJioilll>ll ol tlll' 11'\>0il\l' ot illlothcr. Mead builds this into his
98 Rethinki ng reflexive embodimcnt
account of the devclopment ot rclll'\ivily ami a sense of self. He notes that
the infant is particularly likely lo appropriatc the roles of those 'whom in
sorne sense control him [sic] and on wllom he depends' (Mead 1967: 160),
that is, those in relations of powcr rdaliVl' to him.
The interdependence involved hcrc 1\ nol necessarily material. lt may be
emotional. lf 1 !ove another pcrson 1 may do as they wish because 1 do not
wish to hurt or anger them orto lost tlldr lovc. My love for them is a form of
dependence upon them. On the othcr hand, interdependence may be
material. My boss can 'pull my strings' bccause he pays my wages, which 1
need.
Amongst the social demands and stimuli that the agent is subject to within
their networks will be sorne concerning the body. Parents, bosses and
religious leaders may !ay down relativcly formal rules regarding appearance,
for example; rules which they are in a good position to enforce. And friends
might play this same role, informally, by way of peer pressure. We know what
our friends will think if we change our appearance or behaviour, or at least we
feel that we do, and our anticipation of their reaction may be sufficient to halt
or change our plans. But at the same time others are a source of information
about new practices and might offer encouragement and support for new
projects, perhaps agreeing to partake- for example, 'let's both have a tattoo'.
This is the context in which our reflexive embodiment emerges a context
shaped and populated by others whose views are expressed or imagined and,
in sorne cases, reinforced by balances of power.
Body work is interdependent and networked at a further leve! too,
moreover. We do not design and make our own clothes and jewellery or our
own barbells and dumbbells, lct alone perform our own cosmetic surgery.
Body work involves ideas, techniques, materials, technologies, norms, ideals,
fears and desires which are passing along or located within specific networks
that wc are plugged into. Even basic hygiene, in a Western context,
presupposes that running water, gas and electricity are pumped into our
homes, and that soap, shampoo, flannels and so on are available. Body work
is collective action in Becker's {1982) sense. Furthermore, the meaning of
body work is often shared too. Jtems of clothing, jewellery, muscles, tattoos
and so on function as what Mead (1967) calls 'significant symbols', albeit
sometimes only within subcultural contexts. They have the same meaning for
those who bcar them as for those who perceive them because they are
commonly coded within and through acts of communication. 1 know what
colours to wear and what accessories to use to cultivate a 'goth' image, for
example, because this image is pre-categorized within culture. Likewise, 1
know how to look smart or causal (scc a !so Barthes 1 990).
Desire and the other
Mead\ (X'I\[)('( 1 J \'(' \ i IIIOIIIICd by 1 hat ol 1 kgl'l ( 1979; \{'(' a lso loas r 985;
1 Ion nl'l h 1 11'1'>) 1 oll o11'i ng 11 tgtl. 1 w 1 t'\1' llll' pn Kt'\\ wiH'H'il}' i mllviduah
illld gtOIIJl\ ic'.tlll lo oiJlfiiOJIII.Ilt' lliH' ,llfll!IH'I'\ (H'I\Ill'l l\'1'\ ,1\ ,1 1110\{' trolll
p.IIIH 11l.111l\ lo\V,IId\ 111111'1'1\,tlit\'; 1111r t1111Hh .uul nllllllt''i .ti!' I'Xp.uult-d l>y
1, me allll tlle other 99
incorporating different viewpoints as we overcomc thc limitations imposed
l>y our particular situation. At the same time, however, again following Hegel,
'v1eacl believes that this wiclening of horizons genera tes interdependence (and
1 hus social relations), desire and struggle. Awareness of the perspectives of
others awakens a desire for recognition. Knowing that they judge us we want
1 hem to judge us well, and knowing that we cxist within their field of
nmsciousness we want them to experience and recognize us as subjects.
i\wareness of the particularity of our own perspective makes us seek their
validation. We need others to recognize the meaning of what we do in order
lor it to have meaning for us. This can generate social conformity and
cohesion. Agents win approval by toeing the line. 1 lowever, Hegel (1979)
Lunously argues that this desire for recognition generates dynamics of
\truggle and conflict, particular! y as agents often want their particularity to be
rccognized above that of the other. Mead ut ilizes this double edge in his
.1ccount, viewing the desire for recognition asan impulse which can generate
ohesion and conformity but also conflict and change.
Honneth (1995) has argued that desire and struggles for recognition
tmerge at three levels. First, there is a search for !ove within the family and
intimate relations. Second, there are struggles of certain collectives and
groups for the recognition enshrined in law and citizenship status - for
L'xample, the struggles of working-class movements, black civil rights groups
and suffragettes. Finally, Honneth refers to struggles for distinction. Agents
,1nd groups are often not content to be recognized as equal to others, he
notes. They want to stand out from the crowd as an individual or lo tmm an
di te.
Each of Honneth's three levels is potentially relevant to om loru'\ and h
i\ present in Mead's work. Honneth's third ll'vl'l is IIH' 1110\t 11'11'1 .1111,
however, because there is a good prima facie <.asl' 101 arguing tll.1t "'"' 11 '"""
work is motivatcd by the desire for individual ll'( ogn11 ion " 1d dt.ll "' t 11111
lnterestingly, Mead uses a body example 1n hi\ kty di\t 11\\ tlllllll lile '''''1"' 1111
n:cognition. Our self must be rccogni;l'd by ot iH'I\, lw "1:"'' .,., Jt,,,. ti"
\'cry values we want to havc bclong lo il' 1\ut 1\ ""' I'IH>tlglr ltl'l.tll\t
'lhere is a demand, a constant dl'mand, lo u.lliw lliH'\1'11 in ''11"'' 'ioll "'
\tlperiority over those around us' (Ml'ad 19h7 lO)l llt ll tiiiiiiH'\,
We may come back to mattcrs ol \ j K't'dt a11d du" 1" " 1 .tp.tcrty lo1
remembering, to this, that or the ot11cr lhing- hui lo 1hi11gs in
which we stand out above pcople. Wc are <.arl'lul, ol UHIIW, not lo dirLttly
plume ourselves. lt would seem childish to intimatc that we takc
satisfaction in showing that we can do somcthing better than others. We
take a great deal of pains to cover up such a situation; but actuall y we are
vastly gratified.
(Mead 1967: 205)
Our bodily appcarancc is central to our striving for recognition because it is
how we l'\Sl for others.
1 ht impression that Mead gives in the above quote is of a strategic agent
1\'ho att rvt'ly the imprcssions others have of them in order to secure
H'wgntiHlll In manv rtsptt'l\ ht anlilipalc'> Goffman (1959) hcre. This active
100 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
sidc is important. We can and do what othcrs perccive of us, to sorne
dcgrcc. Howcvcr, there is anothcr 'i<k to As the notion of a dcsirc for
rccognition suggcsts, agents expcril'IKl' 1 necd for recognition and are thus
dependent upon onc another. The agent clevcrly rnanagc hcr prcscnta-
tiom of sclf, but this is not gratuitous. Shc is responding to a fclt nced to be
rccognized in particular ways congruent with her sense of her own idcntity
and sclf-cstccrn. l:ach needs thc other and they are thcrefore, to reiterate a
central thcme of this book, bound up in rclations of mutual intcrdcpcndence.
Self-control, dialogue and autonomy
Vicwing our-.elves from the perspcctives of othcrs is part of a proccss whereby
certain impulses and actions are inhibited or controllcd. We stop ourselvcs
acting in order to consider consequences and alternativcs. Such self-control is
a prerequisite of individual autonomy for Mead, even if it is also a mcchanism
of social control. lt affords the agent an opportunity to reflect upon possible
courses of action, to analyse her motivations and rcasons for action and to
choose better mcans for attaining her ends or cven better ends. This does not
always work. Impulses can be too quick, strong or unexpected. Likewise, our
level of sclf-monitoring vares. Whcn 1 play sport, for example, 1 cannot afford
the time to stop and think. An clement of control is present rnost of the time,
however, affording us thc possibility of choice. Integral to this, moreover, is
the process of dialogue. Although certain norms may be regarded as
inviolable and certain relations tyrannical, the agent's relatons with others,
and thus the relation that they form with their self, is dialogical. Views ami
intentions are cxpressed, perhaps criticized, then defended or rnodified, and
so on. Anticipating criticism or even punitive sanctions is only a considera
tion in this dialogue, something to be weighed up. lt is not, as Ioucault\
interna! policing mechanism appcars to be, neccssarily overpowering and
determnate - although it may be on sorne occasions and it is an emprica!
question asto when it is and when it is not. Agents dialogue with their others,
both real and imagined. Morcover, different others can be brought to bear
upon one anotller. An agent may feel the prcssure of 'the fasllion-beauty
complex' intcrnally, for examplc, but may alleviatc that pressure by adopting
a feminist per-.pcctive upon it, which they llave acquired through participa
tion in thc f<.minist movement. Alternatively, they may feel thc pressure of
feminist critiques of beautification but develop their own critique of tht
feminist critiques, arriving at a vicw that beauty treatments are politically
acceptable and fun, such that they are inclined to use thcm.
Whcn action i\ not impulsivc ami whcn not completcly dominated by tht
perspcctivc of thc otllcr, it is rational in a 'communicativr' \eme (s<.'t'
!la hermas 1991 ). Tht agent weighs up dlfkrl'llt vicwpoinh and play\ thcm ofl
against one anothcr, adding in .IIHil\,llu.ll ing t IH'II own initlal vilws. llaving
said tl1h, ,pmHalll'OU'o' .nHIJHl' 1l'fln tht .11 tion , not lll'l'l'\\.11} 'nr.lllonal'.
l'll' rd krt \'1' ;lt't ion' ;111' 'oh.q wd hy 111 t 11r.d '>l hl'lll,l'>, i 11t l'ln.llitl'd rull''
.lllJlitl'd 1-:now how .u al ""ltiH'\ .lll'lk\ihll, 11\IHl\'.ttivl' and
.td.t lll\ l' 1 i kt t IH '>llf 111\ pl.rv '1 , 1 hl' ''u 1.11 ,a: n t 1 .111 " t 1\' 1 t ho111 t lnn h i ng 111 ,1
1, nw '"'" 1111' other 1 O 1
way which is both comhtent with social lllh'' .11ul )'l't 'trategically
advantageous to thcrn.
Reflexive embodiment
Yiead's framework is esscntial toa proper gra'p of ll'lllxin crnbodiment. He
allows us to develop the thought that, as tmhodi1d hcing,, we can be absent
from our own experience in certain n:spnh hut llll'\l'llt in ccrtain others;
subjects and agents on thc one hand but ohjl'l h on thl' other. He gives the
names 1 and meto the fundamental distinctionlwtwtln these modalities: the
1 is the active, experiencing agent who is, hy IH'l 1'\\ity, abscnt within their
own stream of experience; the Me h tlll' hody as objcct, present to
wnsciousness and avai lablc for ma ni pu lat 1011 t h mugh body projects and
body work. In addition, Mead strike'> an nnpmtant balance between two
opposing tendencies in the literatun. wt l'X<IIllllll'd in l'art One. His agents are
embedded in social networks and powrr rdat iom t hal atfect them in a variety
of ways, and their reflexivity b dcpendcnt u pon this; rcflcxivity and selfhood
presuppose thc agent assurning the pcrspcctivc of cither specific or general-
izcd others towards thcrnsclvcs. llowcvcr, thb does not result in total
domination of the self by othcrs. Agenh are <lialogical and ablc to answer
back. What happens, how tllcy act, depcmh upon this dialogue.
rhe position that we llave arrived at is not only a 'happy medium' between
two unsatisfactory extremes, however. In sorne cases the extreme may be
closer to the truth. In sorne instances, for example, our reflexivity may
amount to self-policing. In other mstances it may count for nothing as we
know that the consequences of not doing what is expected of usare too great
for us to contemplate non-compliance. In others still there may be little or no
guidance asto how wc sllould act. The point s that \1ead does not commit u'
to any one view by theoretical diktat. llis theory allows for a range ol
possibilities and encourages us to get out and havc a look at which condition'
hold where. lt allows for the variable ancl differentiatcd territory 1 referrcd to
111 the Introduction to Part 1\vo. In Chapter 9, 1 will attempt to map th.tt
territory. First, however, it is necessary to takc a closer look at the practiccs ol
reflexive embodiment.
8 Reflexive body techniques and social
networks
Having established a conception of embodied and reflexivc agency in Chapter
7, I turn now to practices of bodily maintenance and modification, which 1
theorize, adapting a concept from Maree! Mauss (1979), as 'reflexive body
techniques' (RBTs). Thc chapter builds on the previous one in threc respects.
First, it focuses upon what embodied agents do to 'their bodies' that is
reflexive and how they do it. We move, in other words, from agents'
conceptions of their own bodies to their body work. Second, the concept of
RBTs, as 1 will show, affords further purchase upon the process by which an
agent achieves a reflexive and temporal distinction between I and me an<l
thus an embodied sense of self. Finally, 1 link the concept of RBTs to a
conception of social networks, thereby returning to a key aspect of my
concept of agency and self. Reflexive agency is generated in the context of
social interactions and relations, and these same relations and interactions
are thc means by which RBTs rnove through the social body.
I begin with a brief discussion of Mauss's reflections on body techniques,
followed by sections on RBTs and their relation to selfhood. Finally, 1 consider
the diffusion of RBTs within social networks, returning to a key contention
from the Introduction to Part Two, namely that different RBTs, as 1 now
conceptualize them, have different patterns of diffusion and are embedded in
different social dynamics and logics. This paves the way for the final chapter,
where I will expand upon these claims and explore them empirically.
Mauss on body techniques
Mauss (1979) arrivecl at the conccpt ot hody trhnquts ahcr ohscrving both
that certain embodied practie<.'s (t.g. sptting, l11111tit1g tcrhniqms and tating
with a knife ancl fork) are spccilit to J'dltinll.ll s<H i<'ltl's, nd that othcr'> Vil!\'
consideral>Iy in '>tyk anoss so< tl'lt<''> .tnd "H 1.11 group'>. Womtn walk
differttltly trom llH'Il, tiH l>""'l:''"i'll' 1,111 tllllt'll'ntly iloJn tiH pmlttari.tl,
tia Ftl'IICII mi lll.uy rn.ltlli olllll di g dtllt lltlll\ lllllll llllthh IIIHIJIS :tlld so 011
1\uildin; on llltst ol>st't\',1111111\, '" <l 111 11, ' " lt'<lllll<tll'\ .1s '1\',1)'\ 111 wl!itl!
Reflexive body techniques ,,,,,social networks 103
from society to men [sic] know how to ll\l' thti1 l>odts' (Mauss 1979:
97). This definition is potentially problematt<.' "' t t,ln \l'l'lll to \uggest that
'men' and 'their bodies' are distinct. Given thc w<1}' in wlucll Mauss pursues
his point, however, it is reasonable to assumc t11at tlli\ h not his intention.
lndeed, he makes a sophisticated innovation in non duallstic sociology.
Mauss's description of body techniques a\ '11,11>itu'>', whch precedes both
l.lias's and Bourdieu's (see Chapter 2), i'> an mport.nlt point of entry for
grasping this innovation. 'Habitus', he explam, t\ a l.attn rendering of the
<...reek 'hexis' (or what he calls 'exis'), a concq>t which is central to Aristotle's
(1955) philosophy, wherein it denotes acqll!red ami embodied dispositionsl
which constitute forms of practica! reason or wt\dom. Body techniques have a
double edge in this definition. They are fonm of embodied, pre-reflective
or knowledge. But thC} are al\o social. l'hey emerge and
'>prcad within a collectivc contcxt, as the re\ult of interaction, such that they
l>elong to spccific social groups:
1 havc hacl this notion of thc social nature ot 'tl1e lwbitus' for many years.
Picase note that 1 use the Latn word - it should be understood in France-
lwbitus. The word translates infinitely bctter than 'habitude' (habit or
custom), the 'exis', the 'acquired ability' and 'faculty' of Aristotle (who was
a psychologist) .... These 'ha bits' do not vary just with individuals and
their imitations; they vary between educations, proprieties and
fashions, prestiges. In them we should see the techniques and work of
collcctive and individual practica! reason rather than, in the ordinary way,
rnerely thc soul and its repetitive faculties.
(Mauss 1979: 101)
1 return to the question of how body techniques distinguish and differentiate
'>ocia! groups later. Here 1 am interested in the manner in which the concept
simultaneously holds together social, corporeal and cognitivc clements (see
also Lvi-Strauss 1987). Body are social facts. rhey vary across
societies ancl social groups. They pre-exist ancl will outlive the specific
individuals who practise them at any point in time. Mauss even seeks to show
- albeit somewhat problematically (Crossley 1995, 2004a) - that they
'wnstrain' agents. At the same time, however, they presuppose biological
structurcs and embody knowledge, reason and psychological properties.
Stvlcs of walking vary across social groups, for example, indicating a social
l>asis, but all of these cliffcrent styles presuppose bipedalism, not to mention
thc plasticity and intelligcncc which allow the organism to inventor learn
diffcrcnt ways of walking. Furthermore, styles of walking embody under-
standing and knowledge. Switching to tip-toes when silence is required, for
n.ample, indicates a grasp of thc conditions most conducive to minimizing
notse, wl1ilst walt.:ing a tightropc and indced walking per - requircs a
practH.al grasp of principies of halantt', forn and so on. When we adjust our
pmtu rt to '>tcady o u r\dvts wt l'ngagt' 111 1 >r <tri lt a 1 physics. Finally, certain
\tylts of walking, \uth as a pro1HIIl!.lt<II ,,. strut,tmhody an attitude
.11HI rn.1y l>l' cmployd .. , .1 nll'.JII\ "t 'rn"''"l ' tn.lnagtnwnt' (1 lod1schild
200 1) Adopllng <1 ronlidttll JH>SI111l', '"' t'\,1111p!., 1.111 111' a W.l)' ol IIHiuung <1
tonldl'nl lll<tod (Ctossky 21HHt)
104 Rethinking reflexive embodimcnt
l'he 'mindful' aspect of body tcd111iqms is not vcry well developed in
Mauss's work and its lack of <kvl'lopmtnt is one amongst a number of
problems. Wc nced to engage more \criously with the embodied subjectivity
and agcncy he hints at, drawing upon thc work of other writers who have
developed this thcmc, including Mead ( 1967), whom we discussed in Chaptcr
7 (see a lso Ryle 1949; Merleau-Pont> 1962, 1965; Crossley 2001 ). And we need
both to recognize more flexibility ami room for imagination and improvisa-
tion in bodily action than he docs and to do more to grasp the link between
body techniques and the contexts in which they are practised (Crossley 1995,
2004a). Thc sociality of body techniqucs, for Mauss, consists in their group
specificity, but we must recognize also a form of sociality which consists in
the way in which their performance is shaped to meet thc intcractive
cxigencies of spccific situations (Crossley 1995, 2004a). None of this dctracts
from the importance of Mauss's innovation, howcver.
Body techniques are culturally embedded and, as such, oftcn havc
symbolic and normativc significance. Hunting techniqucs may embody
ritual aspccts which connect them, symbolically, with rcligious beliefs, for
examplc, and thcy may be normativcly regulated in accordancc with thosc
same beliefs. Moreover, thc symbolic meaning and normativity of techniqucs
may be contcstcd. Exercise is valorized by sorne groups in our society, for
examplc, but dcridcd by othcrs. Sorne associate it with happiness, vitality an<l
play, whilst othcrs deem it square and boring, if not oppressive. American
high school 'jocks' and their detractors respectively illustrate this point. Such
symbolic ami normative frameworks and contentions are important. liow
ever, we should not lose sight of the embodied knowledgc involved in body
techniqucs. Effcctivc hunting requires practica! mastery of weapons, movc
mcnts, prey and thc hunting environment, for example, all of which ar<
practica! forms of 'understanding'. Likewise, throwing a baseball dcmands a
certain practica! grasp of the ways in which the body can and does move; ol
the mo\'cmcnt of objects through space; of the amount of force and ncccssary
flight path required to make a ball land in the glovc of a tcammatc at a
distancc which itsclf is cstimated (practically, in the throw itself) on thc basis
of prior expcricncc. fhc knowledge of the baseball player is quite diffcrcnt
from that of the physicist, being tacitly embedded in skill and not availablc to
discursivc rcflcction, but it covers similar ground.
Reflexive body techniques
Much of Mauss's cssay is devoted toan attempt to catalogue body tcchniqm'
according to their purposes and attributes. My concept of 'rl'lkxive bod}
techniqucs' extends this cffort. RHTs, a\ 1 dl'liiH' tlwm, <tn tltost l>ody
techniqucs whosc primary purpme i\ to wo1 k ll<H 11po11 thl' l>ody so as lo
modify, maintain or tll<'mati;t 11 111 \<lllll' w.ay. ' 1 hi'> lllight im olvc two
emhodicd agtnh. llairdr<'\\n.:, dnt,ll "''"" .uul co'>llldal' \111)-:l'l)',
for l'\ampk, 11\u,llly tnt.lll tll.at '"" t .... tr' 1\ woaJ,,d IIJI<lll, phy'il.llly, hy
Ollll'l\. lt IIIghll'\'l"ll J>\' l'XIl'lltit'd hlllfill(lt IIH'IISI' Cllllll'dllllll'\, whllli h,t\1'
to lll' )lll'JI.tl<'d .111<1 \1111\11111< d (tlil\ l\ 1 .1\1<'1 lo ;1.1\1' in ll'l.lllt>ll lo
Reflexive body techniques a11tl social networks 105
traditional remedies, especially thosc involving ritual prcparations, but the
principie is the samc for mass-produced pharmaccuti<als). Equally, however,
t can entail a single 'body' acting u pon itsclf. 1 his might involve one part of
he body being uscd to modify or maintain anothcr part; for example, when 1
rse my hand to brush my hair or clean my tceth. Or it might entail total
mmersion in a stream of activity. When 1 jog, for example, l launch my
whole body into action, in an cffort to incrcase m y fitness, burn off fat, tone
1 p and so on.
Each society has a rcpcrtoire of RBTs and a portion of our daily routine is
taken up performing techniques from this repcrtoirc. We wash, clean our
tceth, brush our hair, shave and/or apply cosmctics. Othcr techniques from
the rcpertoire are built into weekly or monthly routines. We exercise, have
our hair cut, cut our fingernails, ami so on. And bcyond routines, we
periodically venture onc-off rnodifications, such as piercing, tattoos or
wsmetic surgery.
lt might seem peculiar to regard the more mundane of these techniques as
acquired aspects of a culture. As Mauss's work shows, however, they do vary
across societies. And they secm mundanc ami obvious only to those of us who
have forgotten the work of acquisition they rcquire. As Goffman (1972: 293)
notes:
To walk, to cross a road, to uttcr a complete sentence, to wear long pants,
to tie one's shoes, to add a column of figures- all these routines that allow
the individualunthinking, competcnt performance were attained through
an acquisition proccss whose carly stagcs wcrc ncgotiated in cold sweat.
lt is my contcntion that of body modification or mainten.tiHl'
bcst understood in terms of RBTs. 1 have thrcc rcasom for this. Fir,t, tlw
wncept entails that the objectivc propcrtics ot bodi<s ilf<' m,rint.riHd ,nul
modified by way of thc agcncy of thosc same bodic'>. \\'t thm .m>id
.11 d thematize reflexivity. Bod} work is rdlc.\in' wmJ..:: wo1J..; on thl' hod\' h}
11 , body. Second, thc conccpt encourag<''> ll'> to idl'nt ify t lu 'nundlnl' .and
"'ual aspects of embodied activity (c.g. know-how and tiiHil'l'>t,nuhn.:), not
'ullordinating those aspects to thc symbolic lll<'<lnn.: tw ... tol\l'tl h}' d.,, .... "'
.111d not reducing embodied activity to mere 'l>ch.Jviou'. 1 hi11l, tlu 1<IIH t .,
,ufficiently concrete to facilitatc empitical analy'>t' .md \lilluH'IIII)' IHh ,,.
that to include a variety of typcs of an;lly'" /1.' lo11m ol pt.tl ttc.tl
urHicrstanding which have to be learncd RB'I\ lat'ilrtat tthno.:taphil anal}'"'
.ttHI what Wacquant (2004) calls 'obscrvant partilip,ltion'. Wl' watd1
1woplc doing and lcarning them and can use our own lcarning cxpcrienccs as
,, lens (Crosslcy 2004a). Moreover, wc can intcrview participants and use
.111 hival, content-analytic and textual mcthods of analysis to explore their
da,l ursivc trappings. In addition, howcver, Rl3Ts can be categorized,
t r llllllcratcd and tcstcd for statistical association both with one another and
wth other variables. lhcy admit quantitativc analysis. There are one or two
'OIHJllir<tion., involwd in th< concepl, and in the concept of body
lt'lllniqul''> mm1 gelllrallv, which rcquire brief discussion.
1\()(ly ll'llllllljlll''> .ad1nit ol dilll't<'lll llnh of description. We might refer to
'\winullnlg' tnluuqtH', lor l'\,unpk,l>ut we Glll break swimming down
106 Rethinking reflexive embodmlcnt
into different styles (brea'>hllo"l', tmnt crawl, etc.). And we can break
styles down further. Somc pl'oplt '>\\'1111 lront uawl with their head in the
water, for example, whiht otlltn, induding water polo players who need
to follow thcir game, kttp tlwir lltad up. l'hcrc is a potential for
ambiguity hcrc. Diffcrcnt analy'>l'> might pitch thcir definition of the
technique of swimming at difkrenl lcvch ami tal k past one another. 1 a m
not inclined to try to fix th<. wnccpt of l>ody tcchniques at one particular
leve!, however, as th<. concept will be mmt mcful whcn it can be applied
tlexibly. I would suggcst rathcr that wc rcmain mindful of the potential
for misunderstanding and tndcavour to be clcar what leve! we are
pitching in at when this is rclc,ant. tlaving said this, there are examples
of what we might call 'enscmbles' or 'systems' of body techniques which
are usefully distinguished from the indi\idual body techniques that
comprise them. Judo, for example, comprhe'> a number of throws,
strangles, chokc-., holds and locks. Each of the'>e is a separate techniquc
and judo is best considerccl as (amongst othcr things) an ensemble or
system comprising thcse techniques.
2. Some techniques are modifications of other tcchniques anclare difficult to
specify bccause thcy secmingly lack positive contcnt. Dieting is an
example. lt is dcfined, toan cxtent, by what an agent does not do or does
lcss of. They eat less. A<.tion is involved. rhc dieter oftcn struggles against
physical impulses, appetites and habits, for example, but it may be argucd
that this is more a matter of an 'interna! conversation', such as 1 discusscd
in Chapter 7, than the owrt behaviour suggested by the concept of body
techniques. Does this mean that dieting is nota body technique? Setting
aside the fact that conversations are embodied, 1 suggest that there are two
reasons to regard dieting as an RBT. First, it often involves behavioural
strategies andan exercisc of impulse control and self-discipline, which is
an acquired power of using the body (akin to the bladdcr control we learn
as infants). Restraint is a positive action when thcre is a force, such as the
impulse to eat, which must be restrained, and it is thcrefore a body
technique. Sccond, dieting reframes the practice of cating and bestows a
new purpose and u pon it (weight loss), thus reconfiguring thr
practicc of eating as a different kind of technique. Thb brings me to rny
third point.
3. 1 have said that RBTs are body techniques whose primary purpose is to act
back upon the body so asto modify or maintain it. At its most basic thh
entails that RBTs are generic bocly techniques which an agent annexes,
in a specific context, for the explicit purpose of (ptrhaps amongst othe1
things) modifying thei r hody in a particular way lor example, in an
effort to lose weight thty ekct to take a walk onrc a wee" orto alter th<.1r
eating patterm. lhl\ 1111 rmhll'l''> ,1 probkm.ltll lJlll''>lion. h the person
who walks into tm\11 lo '>llop 11\lll).: llw '>.lllll' ll'l' hlliljlll' "' the person
who walk' lo tll \ollllt ' dt'>III.IIIoll, 111 tlll' \,JIIH' 1\',ly, lor purposes ol
e.\trdw! 11 ""' wiJ,t " lht dlllt'I<' IH l' / llw I"'I"'W ol tlw walk ,
oh\ oll\1\ llll' dlllt ' ll' lllt' olllcl ll 'i tllt 't IS <1 dillt'lt ' lll 11\1' PI lht hod)'
(\\'.dk111g lo 111 1111 l,illlll< ' 1,1lllt'1 111 ,111 l lt ', ll h ll11 slutps, hut 1\ tlu
Reflexive body techniques a11d social networks 107
technique diftcrent ! A'> in point 1, aboYe, 1 think that we have to be
sensitive to cont1'.\l in approaching this question. lhere may be a
difference, depcn<ling upon what our analysis is seeking to achieve.
Moreover, wc should be attentive to the various ways in which 'the
same' tcchnique h adapte<.! for different purposes, thus giving rise to
different techniqucs. In many cases reflcxive purposes have generated
either dedicatcd techniques or dedicatcd variations upon gcneric
techniques. 'Jogging', for example, is a form of running adapted to
serve the purpose of exercise. In contrast toa mad dash for the bus, a jog
entails that 1 pace myself (a temporal modification), adjust my breathing
and 'settlc into' a cornfortable and efficient posturc and stride.Jogging is
a style of running adapted to the purpose of kceping fit and perhaps
running long distances. }v1oreover, as a style it is publicly recognizable
and accountable. We routinely identify joggers in the street. They can
repeatedly run around the same spot without arousing our suspicion or
concern because we know, or think we know, what they are doing aml
why. We do not ask what they are running from or to because wc
understand a jog, cullurally, as a run for its own sake.
4. Purposc also enters into the analysis of RBTs inasmuch as the body can be
modified for diffen.nt reasons. One rnight modify onc's body for reasons of
health, beauty, sporting success and so on. Again this might in\'olw
significant permutations of an apparently singular technique. Body-
builders, power lifters and individuals who want to 'tone up' aJHI 'tr i111
down' might each litt dumbbells and barbells, for txampk, and might . , 111
do the same basic excrcises (bcnch press, squat, ttt.). lloWl'\Tr, th1 ''}' 111
which thcy do those cxerciscs will vary. lhe 't<>lll'l' will 11'1111 todo ,1 1.11;
number of repetitions with weights they can quill' <'.J'>ily li11 lw< .JII'' ' 1111 ' "
good for toning; the power lifter will do rdall\\'ly hw 11 '1'' 11'1ll1 ,1 '''' 'flll
which is very heavy for thern bccauw tlm iiHII '.IW'> \ 111 11};111 , 111
bodybuilder, who is concerned to increil\t' 11111\1 h 111111. !tul ,11\11 11111\ td,ll
clefinition and 'rips', will use a combina11o11 ni 1111 1w11 111 I'.J< 11 1.l\l' 111<
technique is adapted toa purposc ami thu' bn n11u'' ,1 d.llll 1 1 ' lllll<pll
We need to be mindful of these ditlert'llll''i wlwn \ ltHI )'In.: IW 1'
Body techniques and selfhood
Rcflcxive body techniques play a central role 111 thl'lomtnrt 11011 of arefle:...IVl'
'en se of self; that is, in thc process whereby tht agl'llt tu 1m l>ack u pon herself,
dfecting a split between the embodicd '1' and 'me' (\ce Chapter 7). Whenever
w<.' dress ourselves, wash ourselves, exercise and so on, we effect this split. We
au towards in such a way that wc become for ourselves. Qua
agent ('!') we act upon ourselves as a passive object ('me'). The rhythm
hv which we vacillatc betwcen 1 and me in thesc activities will vary according
,,. tlw l>ody techniqul' in question. An agent on a long run might lose herself
in hl'r run for long perimh, immersed in the pre-reflectiveness of the '1' and
lll'\'l'l appearing hclorl' herself as 'me' until she finishes or her body dys-
.1Jipt.lr'> through pain and tiredness (see Chapter 6). An agent who is cleaning
108 Rethinking reflexive embodimcnt
his tccth, by contrast, might be rod.ing comtantly bctwccn the positiom ol
the brushing '1' and the brushcd 'nw'.
Learning RBTs is, in this respctt, part ot the process through which our
spccific sensc of sclf is developcd. B)" nwans of thesc tcchniques wc lea m to
constitute ourselves for oursclves, practically. Lcarning to attend to ourselves
is lcarning to posit oursclves for ourschcs. lt constitutcs a specific cxperience
of sclf. Wc lcarn to play the role ot another in rclationship to oursclvcs.
Tndecd, in sorne cases wherc we tcnd to ourselvcs in thcsc ways wc are
precisely taking over the role of anothcr, a parent or guardian, who once
tended and cared for us in these ways. We do to ourselves what they havc
done for us at an earlier time and havc taught us to do, applying thcir
standards and techniques to ourselvcs.
Certain RBTs may be selected in accorclance with agents' projccts ot self
clcvelopmcnt ancl thus presuppose an existing self-definition, of cot.rse.
Specific types of 'self' presuppose particular RBTs for their 'practice' ami
agents select techniques in accordance with the self they desire to be. Even in
these cases, however, practising thc tcchnique may heighten the 1-me
distinction and shape the construction of the me in particular ways.
Techniques of wcight training are deployed by bodybuilders in pursuit of
muscular gain, for example, but at the same time thcsc techniqucs orient
agents towards their bodies in particular ways. Performing the techniquc
allows agents to cxperience their cmbodiment in new ways and, in sorne cases
at lcast, to take on a role which, in turn, leads them to relate differcntly
towards thcir bodies. By acting like a bodybuildcr thcy come to think,
perceive and fecl like a bodybuilder, a process which changes their rclation-
ship to their bodics (see Fussell 1991).
In addition, RBTs can have a ritual function, serving to symbolically mark
the transition of the self from one situation to anothcr (Crossley 2004c). As
rituals, body techniqucs have the power to transform imaginative and
affective structurcs of intentionality (in thc phenomenologicll sense),
thereby situating those \'\'ho practise them differently. We capture this notion
colloquially when we refer to the Friday-night rituals through which people
prepare themselves for a night out (washing, making up, applying aftershavcs
and deodorants, dressing and doing their hair). Performing these techniques,
in the manner of a ritual, is an important way in which agcnts put themselvcs
'in the mood' for a night out, effecting an existential (affcctive, irnaginative,
cognitive) transition from their mundane, workday mode to thcir 'soirc' self.
Similarly, in a more dramatic vein, Sweetman's (1999) work on tattooing ami
piercing suggests that these rituals mark a symbolic transition for some who
undergo them, allowing these agents to effect transformations of thcrnsclves.
llaving a tattoo may mark the end of a relationship and launch ot a ntw
independcnt life. lt may mark a dccision to takc hack onc's bod}' alter abust'
or rape (Pitts 1998, 2003). lt may symholizc aJHI 'out' a mw identity.
Change, transformation ami lr,IJt'tl<H\ .trl' lfllJ><Hianl lwrl' 1>111 \O too ilft'
conscrvation and rt'IK'titnn Many ot tiH .1hn\T IIH'IIIIolll'd lt'< llnqut'\ are
orit'rlttd lmvaul\ prtstrving .nul rtl.linl.lllllll); ,, p.rtll<lll.u "'Jl<'l t ol \tlf.
Ftrrtht'llliOH', lhty f<lllll Jllll 11f ol ltHIIIII<'. IIH'}' ,111' ll'Jll',llt'd 011 ,1 d,II\',
Wl'l'ldy, IIIOIIIhl)' ,IIHI/or }'<'111)' lt.l\1\ ( < 11.1111 ltl I1111 ,J llll'l\'t'llll<>ll\, \111 h :1\
Reflexive body tcchruqum; ''"" sm:r:al n .. twul kli 111\!
a tattoo or cosmetic surgcry, might \tnt to 1t1.11k" mw th.tpl<'l 111 ' l1k
narrative, but others, by virtuc ol t hci r rqwt i 1 ion, f unltion to st rm tlnt 1 r nu
m a more familiar and safc-btcamt''illllt' mannc1. 1 hcy irwest thc flow of
lived time with meaning by punctuating it, but tl11s meaning centres upon
rontinuity and sameness rather than transition. lt is integral to grasp this
balance of reproduction ami tramtormation in our understanding and
.malysis of RBTs, and also the diftercnt temporal configuration which specific
techniques can assume. RBI s have a spatio-temporality which is central to
their meaning. This is rcflectcd in thc linguistic duality of 'body maintenancc'
and 'body modification' whith 1 have employed throughout this book. The
tormer denotes techniques used rcpetitively, tor rcproductive purposes, while
the latter denotes techniques used to cttect a specific transformation.
Techniques and networks
In Mauss's account body tcchniqucs can be identified with specific social
groups. Different groups have thtir own 'way' of doing certain sorts of things.
Mauss says very little with rcspect to the hows and whys of this group
specificity, however. Here 1 want to advance a few ideas centring upon
networks and diffusion dynamics. At the hcart of my cornments is the simple
observation that agents acquire RB ls trom others with whom they interact
and that RBTs thus pass along chains of intcraction within nctworks. Likewisc
with the norms, values, meanings ami identitics that attach to them. lhi\ i\
not to say that any RBTs can be traccd back toa single inventor. Many l'rlll'rgt
in the context of social interaction, ha\ing c:ollectin - not lo nw1111nll
unwitting - inventors. And most <Hl' moditiGttion\ o! l',nlttr lt>< llllilJIIl '
which were themselves moditicatiom ol othtr tt'l hniquc' .utd so o11 ltlt 1' do
m ove through and be long to nctwork\, hm,'l'nr, ,utd tlus i\ ""f'OII,tnt t. 11
three reasons. First, it connects with :O..kad\ tiiiH<'JIIIOII ni tltt 11\ 1\\cllf ti
agent, discussed in the prcviom chaplcr, ,ntd turlh1 <IHIol'' tlt.1t
conception. We can posit that .1n agtnt', mtwork t<>ttruttuJn\ .nt IJollt '
-;o urce of their conception ot selt ami .1 \otllll' ol tltl'i IU\ h. "'l'l o11d, t hl
notion of nctworks concrrttzc\ our nutnptulll ot tlll' \t>l i.tl world .111tl
foregrounds social relations withnl th.11 rorH<plion, ,tllmvng us lo l'\plon
processes of diffusion and to av01d unlu:lptul rcilicatiom ol ,m'll'l)'',
'cultme' or 'symbolic order' which docs th1s or that to 1t an RB 1
ora nonn enforcing it is widcspread thcn wc are torced to think about how
that leve! of diffusion has been achievcd, what networks and types of social
relationship have been involved. l'hird, relatedly, wc can admit of different
types of relationship, diffcrent channels ancl thus different networks within
the overall societal nctwork, such that wc can aho recognize, as 1 noted in the
lntroduction to Part Two, that different RBTs will be configured differently
withll1 the social body.
!he notion of networks oftcn invokcs a scnsc of facc-to-face, interpersonal
relations. 1 do not intcnd to limit m'} use ot 'network' in this way, howevcr.
1 he various formo; ol the mass rm.d1 con\tttute important links and also
rltldl'\ within 'lht Jlt'twork' oltorltl'lllPOC<Ir)' \OCiety in rny conception of it,
r
110 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
for examplc. Whcn an idea is tdl'Vhld millions of people know about it
instantancously and may rcact to or appropriatc it. llow effectively RBTs pass
through media channels is uncltlr. Many tllcorists of embodied knowledge
and skills tcncl to assume that thcy are vcry difficult to learn from books or
television. And sorne studies of innO\ation diffusion (not involving RBTs)
urge caution in attributing too much significancc to the mass media (Rogers
2003). 1'\cverthelcss, the norms, idcals, meanings and so on that invest them
may be transmitted through media channels, lcading agents to seek out more
embodicd transmission contcxts.
Even whcrc nctworks rely upon facc-to-face interactions, moreover, these
interactions rnay be organized by way of specific norms/roles, taking on an
official charactcr. And the transmission or use of RBTs may involvc powcr.
Childrcn, for cxample, m ay acquirc ha bits of washing, tccth cleaning and ha ir
combing by way of the persistence and threats of their parcnts, who, in turn,
fear thc sanctions and survcillance of educational and welfare agencies
(Nettleton 1992). Conversely, powcr balances may block access to sorne RBTs.
Plastic surgcons, for example, by virtue of their rnonopoly on certain RBTs,
are in a position to demand high prices for their scrvices, such that the
network pathways leading to surgery are inaccessible to many. Morcover,
such balances of power can shift independently of thc wishes or actions of
specific agents. If the number or cosmetic surgeons riscs relative to the size of
their pool of potential clients, for exarnple, then the former may be forced to
lower the cost of their scrviccs. Properties and intcractions in one part of a
network are affected by properties and interactions in other parts.
Power balances are an important factor affecting the diffusion of RBTs, but
they are not the only factor. Drawing upon our discussion of Mead in the
previous chapter, we might also point to the significance of meaning and
identity. Certain RBTs might be categorized as appropriate for sorne social
groups only, for examplc, such that they will not spread beyond that group.
Though tides are turning, for example, the use of makc-up and shaving one's
legs have traditionally been codcd as 'female', such that heterosexual men
have not been ternpted to appropriate these techniques, no matter how close
their contact with women who do. The 'infection', soto speak, does not jump
the heterosexual gender boundary (with certain sports-related exceptions).2
This is also a matter of identity. Shaving one's legs is identified as a fernale
RBT, ancl men who identify as mcn are unlikely to want to do it.
Likewisc desire, particularly the desire for rccognition (see Chapter 7), is
important in relation to the movcment of RBTs through a network. Certain
RBTs or the cffccts of them, such as weight loss by way of dieting, can beco me
desirable to agents because they are desirablc or imagined to be dcsirable to
others whom those agents clcsirc. Fashions prcsumably work in this way: an
item of clothing or hairstyle beco mes dcsirable to thc many by virtue of being
desirable to a desired few. lt may even be that they become desirablc to
'everybocly' because they are imagined to be dcsirablc to 'everybody che'.
Such dynamics can be more local and particular, howcver. Ccrtain practins
or modifkations may becomc only in splcilk small lll'tworks or
cvcn individual rdationships n whicll c;m tlwy ,n lt'\\ likl'ly lo 'flll',td
l'owe1, dtsirl', nwaning and idtntil y t',H 11 \lt.IIH' tllt rvl.11io11\ 1 olllll'l ting
Reflexive body techniques r111d 5ocill networks 111
individuals to onc anothcr and thcrcforc mc<llatt lltt ntoHmcnt of RBTs
through a network. Propcrties of nctworks thcmwln' .nt aho significant,
howcver. For example, rnany networks involw 'llull nodcs' which are
n>nnected to a vast number of other node'>. Whcn IW 1\ art appropriated
w1thin or by onc of these hubs, assurning othcr conditions are conducive,
they are likely to spread. Parliament is onc cxampk ol t11is. Bodily norms
dcemcd important within Parliament tcnd to .tthit,c a wide diffusion
l tcause this institution is connected toa vast wclf<Hc apparatus (comprising
st hools, social work teams, etc.), which is, in turn, conncctcd toa majority of
thc wider population. The immunization of infants against key diseases (a
sdentifically rootccl RBT, but an RBT all thc samc) is onc cxample of this. Thc
diffusion of cooking and hygienic tcchniques, urged by the hygiene and
philanthropic movcments of the early twcnticth ccntury, is another. To takc a
vcry different example, stars such as David Bcckham are connected, va the
media, to millions who desire thern and dcsire to be like thcrn, such that thcy
can play a central role in the diffusion of RBTs. Whcn Beckharn first had a
t.tttoo, for examplc, a positive image of tattooing was broadcast to millions
worldwide in a matter of hours. Thc dcsires and meanings that attach to
Hlckham are important in this respect. llis influencc is attributable to his
.t ructural position rather than his personal attributes, howcver. He has such
.m impact becausc he is a vast network hub with millions of fans connectecl to
him, and to each other va him. rhe eyes of the world are upon him, as the
<;aying has it, and what he does thereforc has wide-rcaching effects upon thc
world.
1 n addition to hubs, levels of diffusion themselves ha ve an cffcct u pon the
thffusion proccss. Studies of diffusion suggest that differcnt dynamics and
1 ,wtivations, appealing to different types of pcople, kick in at different phases
1' the diffusion process (Rogers 2003). To give a very simple example,
conventionally inclined people are unlikely to adoptan RBT that is practised
l>y only a small minority, unless the Rlrl in question is closely identified with
" minority necd thatthcy have (e.g. a lrcatment for a rarc illncss); likewise thc
sl'lf-consciously fashionable. Only thc more innovative, daring or eccentric
are likely to be attracted to very rarely practised RBTs. /\s an RBT becomcs
more widely practised, however, thosc who orient to fashion orto convention
arl' more likely to appropriate it, whilst thc innovators distance themselvcs
from it and move on. lhis dynamic, morcover, can lead both toa process of
lOntinual changc and to cultural 'inflation'. As once innovative practiccs
'ratch on' within a nctwork those who iclentify as innovators or 'different'
lwvc an incentive to cither raise thc stakcs, bccoming more extreme in what
lllty do (e.g. havc more tattoos or more 'cxotic' piercings), orto move on.
lllus, within fashion, as both Blumer (1969) ancl Simmel (1971) rccognizc in
diftcrcnt ways, wc tcncl to have a constant movernent, as wcll as a constant
dhtinction betwecn the cutting edge and the average punter.
1 he norma ti ve and political na tu re of practices may be related to thesc
dtllusion dynami<:s. Whilst therc is a clear differencc between statistical and
tnoral norms, tlll'H' 1s ,, link. /\s Durkhcim (1964) observed, moral norms
ofll'll derive lmtn 1 ollt< ll\t' haiHI\ (i.c. lwl>its tllat lll' statistically normal) as
lhty l>cu>nw ult'tllllwd, mv1 IIIIt', with llll roll<t livity ilsl'll. Thc fact that
112 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
'everyone doe5 it' becomes the n.'il\on why tvcryone should. The collective, 01
rather its representatives, demand tontorrnity as a sign of respect (see Chaptt'l
1). Moreover, it is difficult for political player:, to enforce or prohibit specitu
RBTs if those RBTs are widely diftmcd and practised. Law-makers risk failun
with the loss of legitimacy that causes. As King Cnut so effectiveh
demonstrated to his court in cleventh century England, even powerful
monarchs have to move with the tides. As noted in Chapter 4, this applies to
marketing and product development, too. Consumer trends enjoy a rclatiw
autonomy from product development ancl the latter must orient to, if not
follow, the former.
lnnovation in RBTs may originate at different points in the social network
Obviously there are dedicated centres of innovation, often enjoying
favourable balances of power, including medica! research facilities and tlw
institutions of the fashion world. rhere is no reason to believe that
innovation is restricted to these domains, however, and there is even reason
to bclieve that agents in these domains, particularly the fashion domain,
draw their ideas trom 'outside'. J'he appropriation of the 'punk' look by tlw
fashion industry in the late 1970s ancl early 1980s is one example of this. In
this case the styles of dressing and self-adornment devised by a rebelliou'>
subculture became mainstream bccause of their appropriation by the fashion
inclustry and their movemcnt through the commercial channels of thh
inclustry. The general point, however, is that the innovation took plan
outside of the mainstream inclustry, partly in opposition to it but also partly
with markcd inclifferencc to it. Othcr examplcs of innovation from outsicle ot
the official centres of innovation include the boclybuilding subculture, tlw
modern primitivist movemcnt and the relatcd cyberpunk movement (sct
Monaghan 2001 a; Pitts 2003). This is an important point. Some of tht
thcories wc considcred earlier in the book tended to suggest that reflexiw
embocliment is shaped by a single process or source (thc civilizing process, tlw
carccral network, consumer culture) and that it is imposed from the top
clown, at least in the respect that it is imposed upon individuals. 1 am
suggesting, by contrast, that RBTs may emerge at different points in a
network. This does not mean that such agencies as the carceral network or
consumer culture do not exist, nor indccd that they may not either crush or
appropriate innovations externa! to them. But it allows us to complement our
appreciation of these agencies with a scnse of the free spaces outside their
purview.
Related to this, RBTs may move through different channels and differently
constituted relations, with different mcanings, identities and desires attachcl
to them, ancl cliffercnt balances of power, with the consequencc that th<.y
achicve clifferent levels and patterns of cliffusion. This point has a bearin.:
upon my argumcnt in the lntroduction to Part Two. Crudely put, Foucault\
'carceral nctwork', with its specific normative emphasis and balances ot
power, is only onc mesh within the ovcrall societal network ami, as such, wt
can cxpect its effects to be localizcd to -.ptdtit RB 1\ or 'rt').:IO!l\ of practicc'.
1 ikcwise for th<. conduil\ ol llw lcl\111<>11 IHotut) complt'\ 01 1 oii\IIIIH't cultun
Moreovt>r, in adtllt1on to thc\t' '"'' \ntut.ll rHtwolk'> Wl' 1 ;111 ll'1ng11111' otht'l
H'giOII\ ol jlloll lH' Ullll'\fllllllllll); In \'.111<111\ \01 ,JI lllll\'<'llll'lll 111 \llhlllltlll,lf
Reflexive body techniques 1111d social networks 113
11dworks, in which other, more marginal RBI s u1ull,tte. 1 he concept of
,ocicty as a network allows us to bcgin to think allout rl'llexivc embodiment
"'a multifacctcd reality, particularly if we concel\ l' ot t he wnnections of this
lll'twork as multidimensional sitcs of meaning, idcntity, dcsirc and powcr,
through which diffcrent RBTs and their supporting symbolic and normativc
rnatcrials will or will not pass, to differing cffctt.
Conclusion
In this chapter 1 have focused upon the practices by which cmbodied agents
work upon their bodies. 1 have conceptualized thesc practices as 'reflexive
l>ody techniques' and 1 have sought both to cluuclate this concept and to link
into the conception of cmboclied selfhood outlincd in Chapter 7. Moreovcr, 1
llave argued that RBTs enjoy diftcrential patterns and lcvels of diffusion, and 1
llave sought to explain this by rcference to the various elements (power,
desire, meaning and identity) of the social fabric qua network. In the next
chaptcr 1 elaborate upon this more concretely ancl empirically, showing how
.111d why it allows me to incorporate insights from the various theories
di\tussed in Part One of the book within a larger map of thc reflcxive
l'mbodimcnt territory.
Notes
1. 'Disposition' is the usual l.:.nglish translation of 'hexis' and 'habitus'.
'Habit' would havc worked but, as Camic (1986) notes, its meaning has
2 considerably changcd and dcgraded in the twentieth century, largcly
under the impact of psychological/physiological behaviourism.
3. Top-lcvel mal e swimmers and cyclists sometimes shave off body ha ir for
various rcasons.
9 Mapping reflexive embodiment
In the previous chapter I outlined and explored the concept of 'reflexive bocly
techniques', suggesting that thesc techniques, which facilitatc reflexiw
embodiment, diffuse through various social networks to differing degrccs
and in different ways. The clifferent identities and meanings that attach to
RBTs, as well as the overall structure of a nctwork and the balances of powcr
and desire that characterize its relational tics, J argued, each affect the pattcrn
and reach of this diffusion process. Sorne RBTs, for example, are deliberately
disseminated to entire societies by central hubs with a wide reach, such as
governmental health agencies, whose favourable balance of power vis-a-vis
ordinary citizens affords them the opportunity to impose thosc techniques.
We would expect these RBTs to achieve a wide diffusion. Other RBTs resonatc
with very specific minority identities and semiotic codes; they are not
connected with any central hubs which might accelcrate their diffusion,
relying instead u pon word of mouth and low-circulation media; and the force
of their transmission from one individual to another is not supported by any
threat of sanction except perhaps lack of recognition within a small
subculture. We would expect these RBTs to achieve a low Ievel of diffusion
and to be concentrated in very spccific social circles. There are, needless to
say, many other possible patterns of diffusion. The implication of this is that
different clusters of RBTs need to be characterized in different ways. Wc
cannot have one theory or model of reflcxive embodiment unless, in contrast
to the theories discussed in Part One, this thcory recognizes that different
clusters of RBTs have different conditions of diffusion, appropriation, use and
so on. This claim complements my contention, in the Introduction to Part
Two, that the theories discussed in Part One are parta! theories that we may
use in our attempt to understand reflexive embodiment but only in so far as
we can pull their apparently divergent claims togethcr into a more
comprehensive and also cohercnt picture. 1 usecl a spatial metaphor to
capture this. There are, 1 argued, difft>rcnt 'regions' within the ovcrall
'territory' of reflexive embodiment that <lll adequate modcl ol tlw latter must
'map'. The purposc ofthis chaptl'l h to lH'g111 tlll\ lll<l[lJllllg proccss. 1 will oltcr
my own, more difft>rcntiatld .ll<CIIIIIl .,, 1diJ'.\ I\'l' tnJmdrmtrll i11 contcm
porary, late modem smktit'\
Mapping reflexive embodiment 115
What does it mean to say that 1 will 'map' rctlu..rve bocly tcchniqucs? 1
.rdopt a threcfold process. First, using survcy data tlwt i\ discussed in Box 9,1,
1 examine the basic rates of uptake for a rangc of RHTs from the overall
\OCietal repertoire. This allows meto distinguish bctween, for example, RHTs
which are very widely practised and those which are practised only by a small
minority. 1 discuss the sociological significance of these differenccs in uptake
1.tte as l outline them. Sufficc it to say for now, however, that I seek to allocate
RBTs to 'regions' of my map, on the basis of their ratcs of uptake, arguing that
rates of uptake provide us with a cluc as to the social dynamics shaping the
appropriation and use of any particular RBT, Second, 1 look for clusters of
practices which are statistically associated with one another and/or associatcd
with gender and class respectively, as the theories of Bartky and Bourdieu,
.nnongst others, would lcad us to expect. Again I treat these clusters as
dbtinct 'regions' of practice which are shaped by their own 'local' conditions.
1-inally, 1 turn to qualitative ancl archiva! analysis to flesh out my account of
t he different regions revealed by this twofold process of differentiation. The
analysis merits the !abe! 'mapping' bccause, as will become apparent, 1 use
\tatistica l methods that allow me to display and distinguish the discrete
dusters 1 unearth on a single scatterplot chart, or 'map',
Box 9.1
THE SURVEY
Respondents (n = 304) were asked to indica te whether they had engagcd
in any of a range of RBTs within a given time-frame, which varied
according to the practice: e.g, Have you washed your hair in the last 7
days? Have you had your hair cut in the last 4 wecks? In somc til\t'\
further elaboration was asked for: What sort of cxcrcisc? llow many
hours? How many tattoos? Where on your body? Thesc questiom wtJe
based upon a consultation and piloting exercise, and also a r11ed1,1
search, which allowed me to build a rough picture ot the current
societal repertoire of RBTs, A number of qucstions conccrning
consultation of body-relatcdl websites, magazines and magazinc/news-
paper articles - all potential sources of information on RBTs - were also
included, Finally, 1 included basic demographic questions.
Sampling for the survey was opportunistic and snowballed. I
approached friends, family, colleagues and students, asking them both
to fill in the questionnaire and to distribute it within their own personal
nctworks. The resulting sample was relatively balanced with respect to
gendcr2 and involved representation from a variety of social c l a s s , . ~
cthnic,.J religiousS and age6 groups, though all respondcnts were over 16
years of agc, 1 make no claim with respect to representativeness,
howcvcr, rJw \amplc was convenient and sufficient for a preliminary
invcstig,llion, IHrl 11 1\ rkarly far from perfect,
116 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
Rates of uptake
lhe frequency ratcs for thc various RB 1 s mcludcd in m y survey ha ve the
widest possible rangc (scc Tablc 9.1 ). Somc RBTs are practiscd by 100% of
rcspondents, othcrs by only 0.3lJ{ (i.c. onc pcrson). This is significant because
it is unlikely that a single thcory, at lcast of thc kind wc have examincd
hithcrto, will account for all thc RBTs across this rangc. Some theories are
good at explaining statistically prevalcnt practices. Othcrs are good at
cxplaining statistically dcviant practiccs. In addition, thc theories wc
considered in Part Onc havc more or lcss plausibility at diffcrcnt points on
thc continuum. lt would be implausiblc, for cxample, to suggest that thosc
r)factices which approximatc a 100% rate of uptakc rcflect existential choices
on bchalf of those who practise them, or establish distinction for any
subgroup within this population. lf most people in thc population practisc
the technique then it does not distinguish or clevatc any of them in the
fashion Bourdicu (1 984) identi fies for so me lifcstylc practiccs, and for the
samc rcason it cannot mark out distinct identitics in the manner discussed by
Giddens (1991). Furthermorc, thc concept of choice, central to Giddcns's
account, cannot be madc to do vcry much work in relation to techniques
which virtually cvcrybody 'chooscs'. lf everybody 'chooscs' an RBT then not
doing so cannot be much of an option, in which case thcrc is no choice.
Thc concept of 'norms' is prima facie more applicablc in rclation to thesc
spccific techniqucs. RBTs which close to 100% of thc population practise are
statistically normal and this might gcnerate moral normativity in the manner
suggcsted by Durkhcim (1964). Thc fact that everybody docs something can
gcncratc thc expcctation that cvcrybody ought to do it (i.c. a norm) becausc
dcviation breaks ranks with thc collcctivc identitics that sharcd practices
gcncrate and causes offence. Deviation from common practices can be
cxpcricnced as a snub ('our ways aren't good cnough for you'), which leads to
rcprisal, and anticipation ot reprisal gencratcs prcssurc to conform. In
addition, if a particular RBT is practised by el ose to 100% of a population
whcn most are not wc are cntitlcd to ask why this one is. And assuming that
thcre is no othcr rcason for it, such as basic biological survival (c.g. most of us
cat, if we can, out of biological ncccssity), it is reasonablc to assumc that therc
is a norm in place, supportcd by sanctions and policing mcchanisms. We can
hypothesize the cxistcncc of a prcssure, permeating most scctions of society,
which leads to the uptakc of this RBT. And we can scck to test that hypothesis
through further rescarch.
1 do not mean to suggcst that RBTs must approximatc a 100% rate of
uptake within a populalion in ordcr to qualify as norms. Norms can be
catcgory- or role- spccific, as is thc case with gendered norms, such that only
SOo/o of a population adhtrc to them, and they can be spccific to subculturcs
within a population. A rtligious cult, for cxamplc, may llave vcry strong
norms regarding ccrtain RBI\, whicll it policts and tnlonts nry strongly, but
which show up ;1s h:t\'ing a \'l'l)' low ratt of upt.rkl ,unongst thc general
population ht'l".lll\l' nry hw lll'oph ht'lon; to tlw lllll. '-iuhCirltur.rlnorrns art
not idtntil.ll lo wid1r norlll\ ht'l,lll\1' groupnrcnrlwrs, rl rrot iusul,rtcd from
tlll' widtr poprrl.rti"n, irh'\I.rhh I'Xptrit r111' 1111 l.rd, ,,, tn1u ol 111(' Jhlllll
Mapping rcllcXIVI' cmbodiment 117
rabie 9.1 Frequency distribution of reflexhc hodv ll11lniqucs
1\o. Tcchnique
%
1 Washed hands in last 7 days
lOO
2 Bath/showcr in last 7 days
99.7
3 Brushed tccth in last 7 days
99.3
4 Washed facc in last 7 days
98.7
S Washcd hair in last 7 days
97.4
6 Used anti-perspirant/dcodorant in 7 days
94.7
Combed hair in last 7 days
81.3
15 Used aftcrshave/pcrfumc in last 7 days
80.3
9 Worn ring in last 7 days
66.1
10 Worn nccklacc in last 7 days
S6.9
1 1 Shavcd armpit hair in last 4 weeks
S6.3
12 Used cosmctics in last 7 days
S4.9
13 Sunbathcd in last 12 months
S2.3
14 Shaved leg hair in last 4 wceks
S2.3
IS Used any food supplemcnt in last 6 months
48.4
16 Uscd a brcath/mouth frcshcncr in last 4 wccks
46.4
17
Worn one or two carrings in last 7 days
46.1
18 Flossed in thc last 4 weeks
41.8
19 Worn a bracelct in thc last 7 days
41.8
20 Eaten 'carcfully' for wcight-loss reasons in last 7 days
41.1
21 Uscd vitamin supplcmcnts in last 6 months
37.S
22 Had or done a manicurc in last 4 weeks
36.2
23 Painted toenails in last 4 wecks
29.9
74 Done betwecn 1 ami 4 hrs exercise in last 7 days
28.3
2S Painted fingcrnails in last 4 wccks
27
26 Used a sunbccl in last 12 rnonths
2S.3
27 Dycd or colourcd hair in last 4 wecks
21.7
28 Used 'quick tan' lotion in last 12 months
21.1
29 Done between S and 9 hrs cxercise in last 7 days
1 S.l
30 Ever had cosmctic dental surgery
8.6
31 Got betwccn 1 and 3 tattoos
6.9
n Had bellybutton picrccd
6.7
33 Done 10 hrs cxercise or more in last 7 days
6.6
Dieted for wcight-loss purposcs in last 7 days
S.9
Had nostril picrccd
2.3
Had cyebrow pierccd
2.3
Had cosmetic surgcry
1.6
Got 3 or more tattoos
1
N Had gcnitl aml/or nipplc picrcings
1
40 1 lad sqHum pitrdng
0.3
41 1 lad ,r JlI'Il ing
0.3
12
Enr 11\l'd \h rnid' lor hnd} building purpow\
0.3
118 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
outside the subculture in a maniH.'I which may relativize it, mudt ,,
Giddens's (1991) account of retlexi\'l' modernization suggests. If the hapll\,
healthy, well-adjusted people 1 work and play with do not adhere to 1111
norms that my group does then it ditficult to resist the feeling that tlu
norm is arbitrary or that the subculture is. 1 do what 1 do because t belong 111
this group but 1 have chosen to belong to this group or at least 1 could chom
to !cave it becausc 1 can see that there is civilized life outside of it. In additio11,
and more to the point, such norms cannot be accounted for or integrated i11111
grand historical accounts of 'carceral networks' or 'civilizing prOCl'\"'.,'
because of their group specificity.7 Nevertheless, as numerous studies ot th1
sociology of minority religions and othcr subcultures suggest, it would ,,
toolish to cleny that such groups generate norms and pressures which sho11"
or constrain concluct.
Thus, norms can run right across the spectrum 1 have unearthed, ho111
RBTs with a 100% rate of uptake to those with less than 1%, but the to1111
changes as we move away from the 100% figure. Norms become category n1
group-specific and less amenable to grand accounts of society-wide proct''"''
of control. More to the point, the possibility that the practice of RBTs mighl
be explained by other factors than norms, such as individual choice or t lu
pursuit of class clistinction, increases. If only So/o of the population practi\1 ,,
particular RBT, assuming there b no reason to believe that thc practice h .t
category- or group-specific norm, it is reasonable to assumc that pressurt tn
practise it is not great and that agents can choose whether or not to do '"
Sud1 choices may be made on the basis of incliviclual identity narratives, .1..
Ciddens ( 1991) suggests, or on the basis of class affinities, as Bourdieu (19HI 1
'>uggests (see bclow for a more discriminating review of these two optiom)
Another feature of those IU3Ts whose rate of uptake approximates SO% "
that they are 'mainstream'. J'hey may not be compulsory but neithcr are thl')'
likely to be perceived as odd or deviant. This contrasts with RBTs which ha\'1'
less than a 1% rate of uptake. Such RBTs are statisticatty deviant and may, te11
this reason, acquire a label of moral deviance. l'heir low leve! of diffusion
within the population makes them appear 'different' and, as a conseqm'IH 1,
more likely to attract suspicion and stigmatization. Moreover, they do nol
resonate with the picture suggested by eithcr Giddens or Bourdieu. llw11
deviance clenies them the micldle-class respectability that is integral tn
Bourdieu's account. And though they are amenable to an interpretation 111
terms of existential choices and narrative identities, there are addition,ll
factors which come into play that Giddens cloes not account for. Assum111g
that an RBT or the effect it generates is stigmatized, tor example, "
Monaghan (2001 a) and Klein (1993) ha ve both noted for bodybuilding .tncl
Pitts (1999) noted for heavy tattooing and piercing, we have to ask whv
an agent woulcl choosc todo it. Unlikc Bourditu, <;iddcm dot''> not assu1nl'
that agents pursue 'profit' in all tlwir .tt 11011\ l>ut Olll' dms not mtd to lw .1
utilitarian to womk'r why agt'lth \nHiid IHIII tltl' Ulllttns\iuy cosl\ ni
stigmatization in constnJtting tltl'i1 lcll'llllt}' er1, irlell'l'cl, to ltypotltc\1/t' th.11
soual <llTl'lHal>ility ll\thtlly ligu11'\ in icltnlil\' cl 1\JCtll\. ,\g<'llh 111.1)' W.tlll In
i>l' 'individu,ll' :111d 'dilil'll'lll' hrrl 11111 ,,, cilfll'll'lll IIJ,1111II1C 1\ JIICil (.: Cll l'\duclt
tlll'JII. :-.lnJ<'el\'l'l, .rt k.l\1 \<1111<' cll 1111 pr,ulll es .11 lh1s ll'\'l'i .Jil' 111
Mapping reflexivc cmbodiment 119
. '" t ravention of legal, mora 1 or aesthetic norms, or '' h,l t Scheff ( 1984) calls
llu rtsidual norms' that play a crucial role in tlw diagnmi\ ot mental illness.
tlli use of steroids for bodybuilding purposes h J!itogal, tor example, whilst
non-lethal forms of self-injury or excessive ditting (not covered in my survey
hrll statistically rare according to official estimatcs) can torm the basis for a
ll.lf,IIOSis of 'deliberate self-harrn' or 'anorexia nervosa', rcspectively. In other
wu1 ds, these are not legitimate choices in our '>Ol icty. rhey are outlawed. Ancl
1 ht')' attract sanctions. As such they do not sit happily with Giddcns's
11 e ount, which claims that identities positivcly 'tit' the individual within
' '" ilty.
< lf course Giddens clocs cleal with cleviant such as anorexia,
1e ;.1rding the latter as an extreme version of the reflexivity he identifies
1\llh 'normal' identity work. He cloes not clevote much spacc to such cases,
hoiYcver, ancl fails to explain why some individuals cross the threshotd
,,, 1 ween mainstrcam ancl marginal practices. 1 suggest that crossing that
lltrl'shold must involve some sort of insulation from the wider social
ilrllucnces that ordinarily kcep agcnts within the mainstrcam. This insulation
tll,l) derive from the social dislocation of a 'deviant' subculturc or from the
\Ot ial/psychotogicat dislocation engendered by the anomic ancl egoistic
tonditions dcscribed by Ourkheim. In either case, howcver, it is my
, ontention that different processes and dynamics come into play here than
tltmc in the mainstream, such that we must be wary of simpty applying
lllllnstream theories, like Giclclens's.
1 scarccly need acld that these statisticalty deviant RBTs cannot be
l'X>lainccl as conformity to the norms invoked in Foucault's account of thc
<.nceral network' or Elias's 'civilizing proccss'. If anything they are likely to
tre subject to attempts at correction within the context of the powcr nctwork\
cltscribed by these writers. lt might be argued, of cotrrse, that they are fonm ol
ll'si,tance to these norms. 1 assess this claim with respcct to two t:-.amples
ldow. Suffice it to say for present purposes, however, that thc tontcpt ol
' ll'\IStance' may help to make scnse of some clusters of deviant RB 1\, llut it ,
lllllth Icss helpful in relation to others.
Zones of practice
I,J!dng alt that 1 have so far into account, 1 want to take a
p1l'liminary step in my mapping exercise. Given that there is some rea.,on to
!relieve that different social dynamics ancllogics may be in play in relation to
IU\ h whose uptake approximatcs lOOo/o, 50;'<> or 0% respectively, 1 propose to
dividt the repertoire of RBTs that 1 analysed in my survey into three
e)\'lrlapping a core zone of RBTs which almost everybody practises; an
lllll'rmediate zonc comprising RBTs which a small majority or large minority
praltm; anda marginal zonc of statistically deviant RBTs (Figure 9. 1). There
., no ob\'ious point at which to draw the line hetween thcse zones. That is
wll\ 1 ha ve defined them as overlapping (see Figure 9.1 ). In adclition, 1
,,.l;lgllltl' that tlw pmition which any RLn occupies, definecl by its rate of
upl.lkt, willl>t lti\llHi<.Jlly variable. All RB'h begin life in the marginal zonc
dllll 11111\t 'Jlll',lll llnneegh '"e i.ll nl'lworks (\t'l' ( hapttr H) in ordtr to become
120 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
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Mapping nflc>x1ve <mbodiment 121
'intermediate' or 'corc'. Likcwise, once p1.1l'l i1 \'' n .'a'>e to be so.
Ncverthcless, however blurred the boundari<:' o t .qlld tia nwvement across
them, the above discussion does give us n.a,on to \til>,ullw to the idea of
zones. At any point in time sorne wit lun tlt1 \Olil'lal repertoire of
RBTs will be normative, supported by san<.tiom lo non performance and
thus very widesprcad (core zonc); others wt ll ll<' k'' widespread, either
because thcy involve category- or group '>ptulit IHHill'> or are subject to
choice (intermediate zone); and others still wi 11 l>t pra<.tised by a vcry small
number of people because, in sorne cases at lea,t, thty are socially outlawed in
one way or another (marginal zonc). My argunlt'nl, to reiterate, is that we
need to draw out these different regions ot pracl ice in our model of reflexive
embodiment.
Clus ters
1 want to flesh out this idea of zones. Before 1 do, however, it is necessary to
complicate the picture. My discussion above justifies the notion of zones but
it also suggests that the territory becomes more diverse and differentiated as
we move away from thc core zone. There may be one social dynamic at work
in the core zone, centred upon norms, policing mechanisms and sanctions,
but there are severa! in the intermediate and marginal zones, respectivcly.
Moreover, we might expect to cncounter distinct clusters of RBTs in these
'outer' zones, relating to Giddens's (1991) narrative trajectories - clusters
which have little in common except their marginal or intermediate status .
We might cxpect to find both bodybuilding RBTs and those of the 'modern
primitives' in the marginal zone, for examplc, but we would not expect,
necessarily, to find these practices in the same place on our map because,
prima facie, they have little in common except their minority status.
Bodybuilders and modero primitives aspire to different values and idcals.
Can we capture this on a map? Can we visualize it? We can, using a statistical
tcchnique callcd 'multidimensional scaling'. This is a complcx technique
which Ido not have space to explain here (see Kruskal and Wish 1978; Canter
1 985). lt must suffice to say that I was able to use this technique8 to arrangc
36 of the RBTs9 from my survey onto a scatterplot, in such a way that thcir
relative distances from one another reflect, within a margin of error, their
leve! of statistical association (Figure 9.2). Practices which are strongly
positively associated with one another are located closely together. Those that
are less or negatively associated havc a greater proportionate distancc
between them. Consequently, clusters of RBTs, those which 'go togethcr' in
the sen se that agents who do one of them are more likely todo the others, are
litcrally clustercd on the map and visible to the eyc.
Furthermore, using one measure of association,IO l found that my plot
could be interpreted as a 'radex'; that is, not only did statistically associated
RH 1\ cluster but also those with the highest rates of uptake formed a
llltorelitall t centre point on the plot, with less highly practised clusters of
lending to \Head out t ro m that centre in accordance with their rates of
uplakt "iptt ilit<llly, tme /Oilt ' IU\ 1 W('l't' at the centre of the plot; marginal
122 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
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Mapping reflexive embodiment 123
RBTs were most dht,ult hom them, at the 'margins' of the map; ancl
intermedia te zonc pralt ins fcll between the two. 1 was able to mar k this on
the plot by way ot wnnntric circles. Thus the inner circle in Figure 9.2
cncircles m y core wnt, 1 he ncxt encircles m y intermcdiate zone, and the
outer circlc encirclts my marginal zone. The specific clusters that can be
identified within thest zoncs are demarcated on the map by way of 'cross
thread' or 'pie slicc' lirll'\, from the inner to thc outcr circlc, which segment
thc map.
All the diamond-shaptd points on Figure 9.2 representan RBT, and all are
labclled exccpt thosc in thc central (core zone) circle. 1 lcft the labels off for
these RBTs because the points are too closc together for any Iabels to be
cadable. The practicc\ rn this central (core zone) circlc are, within the last 7
days: washed hands, had a bath/shower, brushed teeth, washed face, washed
hair, used anti-perspirant/deodorant, combed hair.
Fleshing out
Jigure 9.2 looks like a map. Distinct regions of reflexive cmbodi mcnt are
dcmarcated by concentric circlcs which inclicatc bands of uptake rates and
scgmcnts which demarcate thematic clustcrs. We are approaching our goal.
We are moving towards a more differentiated account of reflexive embodi-
rncnt. To push the analysis further, howevcr, wc nccd to discuss the rcgions
dcmarcated on thc map in more dctail. 1 will begin with the core zone which,
.1s noted above, is located in the central circle of the map.
Hygiene in the core zone
1 noted above that thc vcry high rate of uptakc for RHTs in this zonc, thcir
statistical normalcy, whilst not necessarily indicative of moral normalcy, is
suggestivc of it. We can explore this furthcr by considering thc conuttt
tcchniques in this zonc more carcfully. The top six practiccs in the zom .m
di 'hygienic' practices, v:hilst the other two are aspects of personal grooming
Joscly related to hygienc. Core zone RBTs, according to 111) sur\ey,
re chiefly hygicne practices.
Hygiene has a medica! mcaning. Being hygienic is a wa) of minim11ing
outbreaks and thc sprcading of disease. Any account of thcsc core zonc RBh
would have to takc account of their medica! rationalc and perhaps origin,
therefore, and we might be inclined to follow l'ou<:ault (1973, 1984) in
looking for agencies of medica! power/knowledgc who enforcc them.
Ncttlcton's (1992) work on dentistry, for cxample, shcds light upon the
political efforts which underlie, historically, thc widespread disposition for
l>rushing tceth. A numbcr of sociologists, including Elias (1994) and
1'\cttlcton, howevcr, have detected a moral elemcnt in hygiene too. Thc
conccpt, they arguc, overlays a more basic concern about civilized and moral
\Cifhood (see also \ifort 1987). Cleanliness expresscs moral worth. To be clcan
is a mark of lh ilintion and ciYilization, in turn, is a key \'alue of modern
\()( l'l it'\.
124 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
This moral dimension was emphasized forme in the reactions that sorne of
the respondents to my questionnaire gave upon being asked if they had
washed their hair and cleaned their teeth in the last 7 days. Sorne jokingly
feigned offence, as if my asking was itself a slur upon their character. Others
were puzzled that 1 had even askecl about such things; 'of course' they had
done them, 'who doesn't? Yuk!' 1 had asked to make a point. 1 did not expect
that any respondents, who all en joyed access to the necessary resources, woulcl
not have performed tbese techniques. The response was interesting, however,
because it drew out the moral significance of the techniques for them.
Here, then, we find a more substantive and qualitative basis upon which to
define the RBTs in the core zone as normative. There is both a moral ancl a
medica! 'ought' behind our core zone RBTs. Moreover, it is evident that
sanctions and other interventions can attach to non-performance of these
RBTs. For the most part these are informal. Unhygienic or 'smelly' people
tend to be avoided, talked about and laughed at. Their friends or
might 'llave a quiet word'. Beyond this, however, many of the services in
Foucault's bio-political and carceral network police hygiene, at least in respect
of those who have already cometo their attention. Personal hygiene plays an
important and explicit role in the judgements which mental health
professionals make in regard to those in their carc, for example. An unkempt
appcarance is likely to be read as a sign that an individual is 'not looking afte
himself properly' and may precipitate further intervention. The same is true
in care of the elderly, disabled and childrcn, indeed any member of society
deemed vulnerable and subject to close scrutiny by welfare services.
This is a further reason why thesc core zone practices cannot be
understood as choices. They are policecl and enforced. Choosing not to do
them, for many people, would have considerable negative social conse
quences. And there is another reason. Most core zone RBTs are deep rooted
habits. We do them automatically and expect that others do likewise. The)
are not in question for us, at a personal level, because they are so automatic
that we do not even think about or notice ourselves doing them. We do not
choose to do these things because we have always done them, sincv
childhood, and this habit passes below the leve! of reflective choice
Moreover, these RBTs are not in question in the public sphere either, in a
way which might bring them into our personal deliberations and interna!
conversations. There is no controversy about washing and teeth cleaning a'
there is, for example, about cosmetic surgery, dieting and the use of make-up
Feminists have put cosmetics use in question, and many women are aware ol
this to a point where they might question their own usage. There is no
equivalent in relation to hygiene, however.l2 The above-mentioned puzzle
ment of the respondents with regard to my questionnaire, whilst parth
moral, is also partly explained by this unquestioncd status of hygicnv
Respondents were surpriscd that 1 asked about these RI\T\ lll'causc therc is nP
issue here. lt is widely assurned that hygitnt i' a good t h11lg .tnd therc is no
significant voice suggesting otherwhe.
This point rcjoins a central argunwnt 111 th1' '"'"" 1 11"' l' .llgtH:d tllat sonH
RBTs arl' \Ul>ject lo choiet in l.1t1' rn.,dcrrl ''" 11'1 11'\, ,1, < \llggt'\1\,
btt,llJW tiH'} tocontrmc'r\lc e tlll'lll,
Mapping reflexive embodiment 125
publicly, and individual agcnts replay these arguments, arriving at their own
solutions, within their own interna! conversations. What 1 am now
suggcsting is that the high rates of uptake definitive of what 1 have called
core zonc RBTs are achicved, in large part, because they are not subject to
such public controvcrsy. J'hcy are taken for granted. This is not to say that
practices in thc core zonc will never be called into question. Nor do 1 deny
that they may once have becn so. The composition of the core zone is, as
noted abovc, historically variable. At any point in time, however, the RBTs in
this zone are generally unquestioned and this suffices to keep their levels of
uptakc high.
1 low, at a broader leve!, core zone RBTs have emerged and achieved their
degree of diffusion is a bigger issue than 1 can deal with he re. lt must suffice to
say, in relation to the corc zone RBTs l ha ve identified, that different accounts
variously focus upon: the impact of early modern social movements, in both
their bourgeois-philanthropic and proletarian forms (Mort 1987); processes of
professional formation relating to social work, dentistry and public health
(Mort 1987; Nettleton 1992); and the growth of a commercial sector focused
upon personal hygiene (Gurney 2000). The content and profile of the core
zone is, prima facic, overdetermined therefore.
1 have stresscd the 'ought' factor attaching to core zone RBTs, suggesting
that thcy are backed by norms and enforced through sanctions. They are
cqually experienced as 'rights', however. lt is notable, for example, that a
number of influential critiques of total institutions focus upon the indignity
of being denied the right to wash and clean oneself (Goffman 1961;
Bettelheim 1986). Lacking control over these processcs or access to the basic
resources they require is identified as a transgression of basic human
\tandards, not only by the observers in question but also by inmates. They
often report finding these 'little things' very difficult to cope with. Likewise,
rcporting of care scandals and disasters in the mass media often focuses u pon
basic aspects of hygiene and sanitation. This is no doubt informed by fear of
disease and its spread. There is also often a clear appeal to issues of human
dignity, however, and toa basic right to cleanliness. Selfhood and identity are
rmplicated here but in a more basic sense than that suggested by Giddens.
Critics of total institutions are identifying a fundamental sense of dignity,
autonomy and self-posscssion which is violated when basic hygiene routines
interfered with, a sense which underlies modern forms of selfhood
whatevcr narrative trajectory the agcnt pursues. To maintain my sense of
'me', whatcver kind of me 1 am, 1 must have control over my basic bodily
lunctions and the interface they effect between rnyself and the world. Core
mne norms have a double edge, in this respect. They can be demanded as a
duty or claimed as a right.
J'he corc zone, as a region of practice, corresponds in at least sorne key
ll'\ptcts to the accounts of Elias and Foucault discussed in Chapters 2 and 3,
''''Pt'clively. Jts Rlrl\ are normative and consequcntly both policed and
h;H ktd by \aiKt 1on' J\t t lw \ame time, howcvcr, thcy are so deeply engrained
111 tlw Jwhitu,li lrl1 of \CH ral agcnts that tlwy art seldom recognized as
rrnJHl\ltion' IIHc '"' '"'w" rrst onc ;one, lwwt'Vl'l, and it i\ my contcntion
tll.1t Jlotrclll\ oltl11 ' ivtlltlrlf and 'd1'1 iplrnP' IH'Itlllll'lt\\appropriatc
126 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
as we move away from this zone. That said, discipline arguably retains sorne
relevance in relation to our next rcgion.
Doing gender in the intermediate zone
The core zone is only one zone ancl only one cluster on the territory 1 have
mapped. Beyond this zone we have both intcrmediatc and marginal zones,
and within these zones, clemarcated by segments, we have distinct thematic
clusters. The first of these clusters 1 will discuss is located in the intermediate
zone (the second of the three concentric circles) in the bottom left-hand
segment of Figure 9.2. This cluster has a relatively high number of RBTs
located in it. Thematically they tend to centre upon jewellery, cosmetics,
shaving legs/armpits and manicure. As such they appear to constitute a
cluster of practices associated with femininity.
In an effort to test this apparent association with femininity I returned to
my data to determine both whether these RBTs are predominantly practiscd
by women and whethcr any of the other practices included in my survcy but
not included on my map have a gendered profile. As 1 expected, these
practices were strongly gendered, as were certain others (see Table 9.2).
The bottom left-hand segment within the intermediate zone (Figure 9.2)
can reasonably be regarded as a 'feminine cluster', therefore, but how exactly
are we to interpret the RBTs within it? As in the map as a whole, we must
consider differential frequencies in our interpretation. Sorne practices, such as
shaving armpits/legs and using cosmetics, have female uptake rates in excess
of 80%, with very much lower maJe rates (see Table 9.2). These practices, in
my view, are very closely bound up with the 'doing' of femininity, as
discussed by Bartky (1990); see Chapter 4 above. Moreover, their rates of
uptake are sufficiently high to support her claim about gendered moral
norms. Women may feel pressured to shave their legs and armpits whether or
not they want to.
Not all 'feminine' RBTs manifest the same rates of uptake amongst women
as leg/armpit shaving and cosmetic use. These, I suggest, again making
exceptions for category- or group-specific norms, might be intcrpreted in
terms of choice and identity. Assuming core gender modifications have been
taken care of, women then seemingly enjoy sorne latitude for doing their
femininity in different ways, The gender skew of this cluster of RBTs indicates
that women are generally more conscious of cultivating their appearance
than men, however, and this supports the point that women are under
greater pressure to look good, as do the large gender discrepancies in
'consultation practices'. Women are more inclined to read up on tips for
reflexive embodiment than are men- and not only in relation to appearancc.
They are more preoccupiecl with thcir bodics. J\gain this supports Bartky\
argument.
What about men? Are therc any mal!- 'IH'Iilll HBis'? 1 omittcd facial
shaving, which is thc ohvious lll.lil' 11111 , IH>Ill 111\ smvl'y. This was an
ovcrsight, but apart lrom as\CH l.lliiHI \ lul\,1'1' 11 lw.Hth .a1HI 111iddlc <.lass
radicalism, which echo 110111 1111 1 ' l t , o ~ ( '"'\ l! y :>oo 1), llH' Il' 1\ .1rguably
)i((ll' Ol 11111'11'\l llt,tl\lti\ \ '.lllolhit \\'C11IId 1 llllllllttil<' lCIIIItl ).il'll\'1,) dl\111\\l()fl
Mapping reflexive embodiment 127
Table 9.2 Gendcrcd rctlcxive body techniques
Reflexive body techniques
Big differences (witll female preclomincmce)
Shaved leg hair in last 4 wccks
Used cosmetics in last 7 days
Shaved armpit hair in last 4 wecks
Worn one or two earrings in last 7 days
Worn a necklace in last 7 days
Combecl hair in last 7 days
Worn a ring in last 7 days
Had or done a manicure in last 4 wecks
Painted toenails in last 4 weeks
Painted (hand) nails in last 4 weeks
Worn a bracelet in last 7 days
Female
(%)
83.2
84.8
85.3
71.2
74.9
95.7
81.5
53.6
48.9
44.6
56
M ale
(%)
S
9.2
11.7
7.5
30
59.2
42.5
10
0.8
o
20
Small but statistically significant differences (with female predominance)
Uscd anti-perspirant/deodorant in last 7 days 98.4 89.2
Used aftcrshave/perfume in last 7 days 85.9 71.7
Oietcd for weight loss o ver last 7 days 8.2 l. 7
Body piercings other than cars 14.1 4.2
Flossed in last 4 wecks 48.9 30.8
Sunbathed in last 12 months 58.2 43.3
Oyed or colourcd hair in last 4 weeks 32.1 5.8
Used 'quick tan' lotion in last 12 months 29.3 8.3
Ma/e predominance (srna/1 but statistica/ly significant differences)
Used bodybuilding supplements in last 6 months O 3.3
Has 3 or more tattoos O 2.5
Consultation practices
Read magazine/newspaper article on bcauty tips
Rcad magazine/newspaper article on hcalth tips
Rcad magazine/newspaper article on skin care tips
Rcad magazine/newspaper article on exercise tips
Rcad any of the abovc
Rcad a health-dcdicated magazine
Consultcd a bcauty-cledicated wcbsitc
57.1
so
48.4
36.1
69.6
21.7
3.8
3.4
10.8
2.6
16
24.2
5.8
o
P=
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.013
0.031
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.032
128 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
Mcn choose whcther to shave or not, in accordance with an image or
idcntity ideal, ami women do not llave to makc that choice because their
facial hair tcnds to be much lcss cxtcnsi\'C and more slow growing. rhc only
two RBTs with a statistically significant male prcpondcrance that 1 identificd
werc 'use of bodybuilding supplcments within the last 6 months' and
'having three or more tattoos'. This is intcresting because tattoos ami
cspecially musclcs arguably have a 'masculinc' connotation. However, as thc
very low rates of uptakc for these RBTs amongst men indicatcs, thcy are
hardly normative. Thc vast majority of men gct by without thcm ami
assumeclly expcriencc no prcssure to use them. We coulcl approach our
female RBTs frorn a male angle, of course. The very low uptake of tocnail and
fingernail painting amongst men might indicate a normative prohibition on
this practicc for rncn, for example. My suspicion, however, is that the social
prcssure is u pon womcn todo these things rathcr than upon mento abstain.
This is not lo dcny that masculinity is 'done'. Work by Connell (1987),
amongst othcrs, offcrs good rcason to believe that it is. llowevcr, with t lw
possible exccption of 'rnusclc' and 'looking tough', it is much lcss ccntrcd
upon the cultivation of a particular 'look'. Men must appcar as rnen but, to
echo Young (2005), not by turning their body into an objcct of visua l
consumption. Although thc ground is moving, men are not for looking at
and are discouraged from acting as if they were- this i!> one reason for tllt
stigmatization and suspicion that surrounds bodybuilding (Kicin 1993). As
with femininity, this is changing but it is not yet crased frorn the masculint
habitm.
My survcy reveals a clear 'region' within the overall territory of reflexiVl'
crnbodiment, thercforc, whcre the ferninist critiques of Bartky and Bordo
appear to llave a purchase. 1 can lend sorne emprica! support to thcir
arguments. At thc same time, howcvcr, as with the other argurnents reviewed
in this book, rnr map suggests that these theories apply only in this region.
Somc RlHs are gcndered and sorne of these appear norrnative but others are
not and/or do not.
Whither class?
Is it possible to locate class on our map as we have gender? The work o!
Bourdieu, as well as certain of Giddens's critics, would suggest that class is a
key structuring factor in rclation to reflexive embodiment (Williarns and
Bcndelow 1998; May ancl Coopcr 2001). My own survey did not uncarth any
significant class pattcrns. In an cffort to better test thc idea, howcwr, 1
considered the cvidcncc of the 2003 Health Survey for England (Sproston and
Primatesta 2004). This survey is much biggcr than mine (n 18,553)1.1 and
though it does not <lea l with most of thc RBh intludtd in my \urvt'Y it dot's
includc a numbcr ol practiccs a\sociatl'd \\'rllt wmk111g out .IIHI ht,lt lt y
eating. Both Bourdicu and (;iddcm', t rr lrt \ prtlit 1 lh.r1 \IH'h prartite'> wil l lll'
highcr amorlg\1 tltost' in morl' tomnurn \tu r.ll JHI\IIIl>ll\, nll'.l\lm'd interlll\ ol
cconomil or nrltural capital i\nd Jll io1 .111.1l)'\i\ 111 ',11111'1 11.11 ion,ll "" ny, h.r\
tl'lldld 1 o \11 pp1>1l 1 lt i\ prnl il 1 ior1 ( ltl.a x k 1 1 "''" \,1 v,1 g e'/ l. 1'1'1:.!; l"orniiii\OII
200.1), ,, l.11 1 \llllh'h,l\'l.' llll'ljlll'lUI ,1\1\ ht. 11 1 i11 1,1\t>lll nlllo111drl'lt\ rnndl'l
Ma pping reflexive e mbodiment 129
(Savage et al. 1992; Tomlinson 2003). rht' rnmt rc<.:cnt of the surveys
onsulted in this work is from 1993 (in Tom1inson 2003), however, and given
11at we are dealing with rccent changes it sccms rcasonab1e to consulta more
r.:cent source.
1 do not havc the space to conduct a detailed ana1ysis. 1 cannot tease out
c rffcrences between class fractions, as Savage ct al. (1992) do, nor can 1
distinguish between the effects of economic and cultural capital, as Bourdieu
(198-l) does. 1 can clscuss sorne important trcncls, however. Consider
1 igure 9.3. These graphs suggest that indiYiduals in higher social classes are
likely to 'work out',I.J more likely to use vitamin and mineral
\upplements, less likely to acld salt to thcir food (thc focus of a numbcr of
health campaigns in recent ycars) ami less likely to smokc. In these rcspects
1heir lifcstylc is healthier than that of individuals in lower social classes.
Morcover, women tend to ha ve healthier lifestylcs than men in the same class
.1s them. The differcnces are not enormous but they are quite big in sorne
tases, and they tcnd to be li near- lifestylcs are progressively healthier as we
movc up the class scale. There is evidence herc, thercforc, to support those
who champion Bourdieu al1(1/or crit icizc Giddcns by rcference to class
diffcrcnccs in body modification ami ma intenancc. lt is important to add,
howevcr, that this cannot be interprcted simply in tcrms of financia!
rcsources. Not smoking and reducing salt from one's diet do not cost moncy,
wr need exercise, at least not necessari ly (class patterns for home or outdoor-
hased exercisc, which are either free or relatively cheap, are thc samc as for
thosc, such as gyms, involving regular paymcnt). lhe gcndcr differenccs
rl'inforcc this point. lf women tend to llave a healthicr lifestyle than mcn in
1 he same financia! position as them then thcrc must he somcthing mort' th.111
1 nances involvcd.
In arder to push this further, stillusing llll' 1 il'alth Survcy ,utd cmploying ,1
statistical tcchnique called multiplc correspomllntl' ,lllaly\i\,1 1 de' 1wd ,1
'hcalthy eating' scalc which reflects: leYt'l ot tal in dil'l; .1111011111 ot loJd
caten; amount of cakcs caten; amount ot (hmol.ll(' .111<1 ( 11\jl\ <',lten; ,11111
amount of fruit and vcgctablcs caten. 't lll' 111('.111 lor dilll'll'lll g ll(ltr/tl,l\\
is givcn on the vertical axis of l:igurl'
1
1.'1, wilh 1111,111 IIIIIIIIJtr <1
workout scssions per month being given 011 tlw lwri;onlal .1\1\, Notu1' 111\t
thc fcmalc scorcs. They manifest a clear line<n tlass rl'l,IIH>mlup. \\ Wl' r11m'1'
trorn class VI through to class 1 womcn do more e\crcise on il\'('ragc and l'oll
more healthily. Noticc also, howcvcr, that the femalt' 'li11e' is higher than tlll'
male scores, indicating that women generally eat more hcalthily than men.
Thc malc scores do not have thc same lincarit y in rclation to class. Mcn in
socia l class 11 have marginally more hcalthy li fcstylcs than rnen in social class
1, for cxamplc. Nevcrt hcless thcrc .,a clear class pattcrn here too. Men form
two clustcrs, with thosc in social classes 1, 11 and liT generall y doing more
t'\ercisc ami cating more hcalthily than those in social classes IV, V and VI.
Are wc to condudc, then, that Bourdieu ami thc critics of Giddens are right
uHithat rt'llexiH' eml>odinwnt, al kast in so far as it conccrns the promotion
ol lll',llth, is sha1wd l>y 1la\\.! IIHrl' ha tomplication: alcohol consumption
(\l'l' ,1\o l\u11ows ,11111 Nct1lei<HI l'l'IS). \\ Figurl' 9.S shows, highcr social
.lll 1111111' lik1ly 111 d1 in k 'hl'.l\'11)'' .11111 l'\"l'll 'nry lll'avily'. In this
130 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
Any workout in 4 weeks prior to survey by gender and class
60
(/) 50
"' Ol 40
"' e Jo
20
"' tL 10
.....
o oJl iitQ oJ
Smoking by gender and class
f!koMfrft
2 3 4 5 6
--;

ro
u_ j
Salt added on plate by gender and class

OYo - . - 2 -r 3 - 4 --T 5 ... -. 6 --- 2 - .3 - 4 .........,...... 5 - 6 - -
..,
ro "
E "
. "' u_ u
1 O Generally a Often lo laste D Seldom lo laste O Never 1
Use of vitamin/mineral supplements by gender and class
n
5
respect they are lcss hcalthy than mcmbcrs ot other classcs. This might
Figure 9.3 Class, gcndcr and rl'll cxivc hody tcchniqucs (Sproston aiHI
Pri m atesta 200,1)
r
<O
o
E +
Q)
LL
E
Q)
LL
"'"
o

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E+
Q)
LL
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o o

>

co

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C\1
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1
Mapping reflexive embodiment 131
l()
(/)
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e:
o
+ro

(/)
(/)
>
Q)
(/)

Q)
(/)
(.)
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.....
e:
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.;:::
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,_,
ro
o..
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Q.J
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.....
o
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....
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.,
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fiunca

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132 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
O Vcry H1gh El Hogh O Med1um O Low Vcry Low O None
Figure 9.5 Alcohol comumption by gender and class
reflect the fact that drink, certainly amongst thc adult population, has nol
been. subject to the sarne leve! of health carnpaigning as, for examplt,
smokmg and salt consumption. Perhaps the middle class are more attuned lo
the messages of the 'risk society' (Chapter 1) and have not cut clown on drink
because t hey havc not been warned aga inst it? That does not explain whv
t hey drink more than other classcs, howevcr, nor does it attributc them wit t
very agcncy. lf thcy are concerned about thcir hcalth thcn surely thc\
can work out or fine! out that heavy drinking is bad for you? Mayl>l'
they dnnk more becausc they can afford to? But of all groups they can bcsl
to smokc and thcy do not. This anomaly is significant cnough, in 111\
vtcw, to cast doubt u pon the claim that the middle class are characterized b\ ,
1
greater commitmcnt to the active pursuit of hcalth. '
Savage et al. (1992) discerned a similar pattern in their work, which thcy
put to groups within thc middle class, defincd by
speetftc occupattons, are mchned to 'puritanism', they argue. This group look
themselves. Othcrs, again dcfined by occupation, are 'postmodcrm'.
lhcy work out but thcy also d rink, eclectically rnixing asceticism and hea lt h
consciousness with hcdonism. Others are a bit nondescript and do nonc ol
the abovc. 1 do not have lhe space to retcst this claim here, but as a final point
on class consider thc Venn diagram in Figure 9.6. Ihis diagrarn prescnt\
relations between drinking, smoking and working out in mcn (over age 16) in
social class l. We can idcntify an ascetic or 'puritan' group here: 16.7% work
out but do not eithcr smokc or drink heavily. Wc can aho identify a 'none ol
the above' group: 23.7% neither work out, smokc, nor drink heavily. And WL'
have sorne 'postmodcrns': 23.9% work out and drink hcavily, and a further
1.6% add smoking to their cclectic mix. Over 259-'<J drink hcavily without
working out, howevcr, and 3.8% both drink ami smokc without working out.
There is a sizeable 'non-cxercising boozers' camp amongst social class mcn
too, therefore, and the idea t hat class preclicts lttalth 1ll'h<tviotlr or furnishts
an underlying ethos which, in turn, shapL''> 1wh.lvirHII to Jook shakv.
There is a great deal of variation within t 1\'hir h ptr h.q1s points to 'a
grcater scope for individual choict .11 ul idtnl i 1 \' 1 11.111 1111111 die u '>uggcsts. Th i\
obscrvation resonalt'' \\'ith 111)' t'.llilt' oh\t'J\,111!111 th.11 tiH' rtkv,
1
nt
qualitativc evidtrHt' \uggrsl\ 11t,11 !:ni\ deo 11111 lill'<lll/l' ti u i1 ll'llt\iVl' hodv
projL'l 1\ in lt'rlll\ ol tl.lss or d1 i 11 1 1< lll 01 11 "11 d 1 q 111\ .tlt 111 s 111 !'1 1 ht'l ol 1 IH,
1
7
lhcy l!'llll lo IIH'OIIIl' 111l l ]'1,11 lit! 111 lt 1111\ col IIHii\Jdii,JliiV ,lflt] j(
1
nlil)'.
Mappmg m11uxivu embodiment 133
Working out
Smoking Heavy drinking
None of the above = 23.7
9.6 Working out, <lrinking and smoking arnongst men (aged 16 and
ovcr) in social class 1 (percentages)
1 do not propuse to solve the class issue hcre. 1 do not have the space
necessary. lt must sufficc to say that class in relation to sorne
RBTs, such that Giddcns's critics are vindicated, but that it is notas significant
as Bourdieu suggcsts, or at lcast is not significant in thc way he suggcsts, such
that t here is room for critique of his position too.
Tweaking in the intermedia/e zone
Returning to Figure 92, considcr those RB ls on the right-hand sidc ol t1ll'
intermediate zone: tanning techniques, flossing, use of breath frcslll'rll'r
and scent, and the use of general food supplements 1 do not have a grcat dl'al
to say about these practices. They are RBTs which, to all intents and purpme\,
individuals can choosc cither to use or to ignore, perhaps 1n accordancc \\'Jth
a sense of either idcntity or risk. Sorne peoplc likc to appear tanned, tor
example, as it convcys a sense of who and what thcy think they are. Othcrs
avoid excess sun and sunbeds beca use of t hc of skin canccr, or becausc
they think that a tan is 'common'. And the tormcr might choose to use
supplements cithcr to improve their health, instrumentally, or becausc thcy
likc to think of as 'healthy'. The analysis above suggests that both
dass and gcnder ma} shapc such choices, but we cannot link these RB 1\ to
gtn<ler in the Wil} that wt could the femininc practiccs rcferred to above. l'ht
dittLrencc'> are not nearly so milrked.
1 hcsc RB 1\ could tll be linked to 'consurner culture'. Certainly they tcnd
to 111\'l>ln t1w purcha\ing ol goods. HowL'\cr, their rtlatively low ratL'' ot
134 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
uptake suggcst, contrary to some vcr'>i<>n'> of the consumer culture thesis, that
pressurc to takc them up is not grcat. (,iddcns's model of individual choice,
based upon identity narratives, a more plausible scenario, and those
stuclies which support the indh idualization thesis do tend to focus u pon
practices of this type (see Chapter 1 ).
1t is important to add, howcvcr, that this cluster is not necessarily
thematically homogenous. These practices might have ended up clustered
together on the map bccause they are not as rare (or marginal) as sorne and
notas fcmininc as others. Perhaps this description captures the intermediate
zone, to some cxtent, but as 1 hope 1 have indicated, we might find the props
of quite distinct identities and narrative trajectories even within this cluster,
and further analysis would be necessary to establish whether or not this is so.
Pumping and piercing in the marginal zone
Finally, consicler the two clusters in the wider circle that 1 have clubbed the
marginal zone (see Figure 9.2). At the top we have a cluster centred upon
tattooing and more unusual forms of piercing. The cluster seems quite wide,
with '4+ tattoos' far over to the right, a long way from the other practices 1 arn
linking it to. This is accounted for, however, by the fact that the categories of
having between onc and three tattoos and having more than three tattoos are
mutually exclusive and are therefore not associated. The fact that this cluster
still enjoys an idcntifiable location on the map (in the top quarter), in spite of
this methodological artefact, indicates the strength of clustering of its
component IUHs. lo the far right of the map, by contrast, wc have 'S hours or
more cxcrcise pcr week', alongside use of both bodybuilding supplemcnts and
stcroids. 1 do not bclieve that 1 captured any 'modero primitivcs' in my
survcy, ami if 1 got one serious, competing bodybuilder 1 only got one.
Nevertheless, thcse two clusters do seem to point in the direction of
'bodybuilding' and modero primitivism; having made a qualification, 1 will
use them as a reason to briefly discuss these two subcultures.
Yfy qualification is that further analysis of my data revealed that many
more peoplc work out for over S hours a week than use stcroids or
bodybuilding supplernents - though doing the latter is a good predictor of
doing the forrner. Bodybuilders are a small subset of those who exercise
heavily. 1 his is demonstrated by the Venn diagram in Figure 9. 7. Eighty-fivc
peoplc in my sample cxcrcised for more than S hours a week, but 78 of those
did not use bodybuilding supplements or steroids and did not read
bodybuilding magazines (a variable 1 added into my analysis for tllis exercise
only). Strictly speaking, 1 shoulcl treat 'heavy exercisc' and 'bodybuilding' as
two more?) distinct subcultures. 1 am nol going to, howcver, for
reasons of space.
Bodybuilding and primitivism are stati\tically dl'vi.ull in our sm iety. A
tiny proportion ol thc tota 1 popula tu 111 1'> 111\'ol \l'd, 1\ 1nlt'O\'l'l, t lll'rt is good
reason to l>clitvc thal, though hoth sll.ldt irllll ollii'Jlll'd olllllt'\lll l<l'hion.tbk
domains in tht'ir IIHHl' rttodl'l.tlt' lc>lllts llwrr 111111.11 ,uul hgtiruaq
i\qutstiortl'd in widtJ socitty.uultlwu lli.HIIIIIIltr\,ut \tliiH'timcssul>jctl lo
sligrtt.alil.lllllll .11111 dtI\Il>ll , 1111\ )llllrl ft,l\ ill'<ll IHlll'cl 111 ll'l.riHlll lo
5 hrs or more
in the gym
per week
Use of bodybuilding
food supplements
Mapping rcflcxivc cmbodiment 135
Hcads bodybuilding
Use of steroids for
bodybuilding
Figure 9.7 Oistinguishing gym use from bodybuilding (11 = 86)
bodybuilding by both Monaghan (2001a) and Klcin (1993), and for female
bodybuilding by Aoki (1996; scc also St Martn and 1996). lt has
noted in relation to piercing by Pitts (1999). These RB rs and the modiftca-
tions they involve are not simply statistically deviant, then, thcy are morally
deviant- not in m y opinion but, thc studics indicate, in the opinion of many.
rheir participants are, in Beckcr's (1963) tcrms, 'outsiders'.
This moral deviancc prompts the question of how and why people become
involved in these subculturcs. Why do something that the average person in
the street will stigmatize or laugh at and ccrtainly not value? It might be
replied that these marginal zone practiccs are forms of resis.tance. In th.e case
of 'primitivist' practices this is plausible. Although the .radical ot
primitivism have been challenged (Kiesse 1999), ccrtam of the ke}: figures
within the primitivist world, including its founder, Fakir Musafar, cla1m .to ?e
challenging the denial and repression of thc body and its sensual capaCJties 111
modern Western societics (Vale and juno 1999; Pitts 2003). Morcover,
primitivism is associated with otllcr self-idcntificcl rebellious subcultures,
such as punk, ancl overlaps with thc lifcstyle 'wings' of certain more radical
social movements. So-callcd 'lifcstylc anarchists' often sport tattoos and
piercings, for example, ancl thc 'primitivism' of the modero primiti.vcs
resonates with 'primitivist' thcmes in certain esoteric branches of anarch1sm
ami cnvironmentalism. lt would not be too rnuch of a stretch of the
irnagination, thcrefore, to consider modcrn social move-
mcnt, at least in so me part ami lor some who engagc 111 1t. 1 he same IS not
truc of bodybuilding, howtvtr. Ntgativt '><>lial rcactions to muscle are
portraycd in tht l'thrl<lgl.tpllll II!L'fillllrt' " sonwlhing that bodybuilders are
'>urpriscd ami tOIH<'IIll'd .IIHHII (Kitln 1
1
1() 2001a). Morcovcr,
jokt\ migllt ,JI>cllllld ,I)IIHII IHHI lllll\tlll.ll 'pin 111'< in hoclvhuilding cirl'k'>,
gt'llt'l ,11 in g ,1 '' 11" ( 1 'u\ ,1111 1 11 H' 111' ( l11S\l'll 1 "" 1 l, 1>111 11 ll'\1',11 1 1t 1 lt.11 1 1 t ' \'l'
136 Rethinking reflexiva embodiment
cncountcrtd that both huildtr' want to challcngc con temporal\
socict) txccpt in thc rcspcct that tlwy want their 'sport' to be rccognizcd "'
a sport and acccpted. E ven fe m ale hodylluilders, who Bartky ( 1990) portra\,
as resisting, do not rcally fit thc n:'>i'>t<lllCL' mould. fhcy do not daim to lll'
rcsisting gender stcrcotypcs and, likt rn.m) fcmale athlctes, they are incli11t'd
both to <.mphasizc thcir feminin<. trait'> and rcsist irnputations of 'gcndt'l
bending' (St Martn and Gavcy 1996).
lf bodybuilding is not resistance thcn what is? J\.,o an
in thc literaturc. Some, such as Klein (1993), offer psychologic.rl
explanations which tcnd to portray bodybuilding as a form of narcissistil
pcrsonality disordcr, fuelled by underlying insccuritics about masculinit\
Others, '>uch as Monaghan (1999, 2001a), offcr a subcultural vicw. Somt
whcre bctween thcse accounts we havc the widcly cited autobiography of Sa111
Fusscll ( 1991 ), who explains his en trance into bodybuilding in terms ol
insccurities ami anxiety, and offcrs a witty account of the obscssiom he ami
his fcllow bodybuilders dcvclopcd, but ncvcrthelcss convcys a scnsc of tlw
subculturc that supportcd his ncw identity and dispositions, and indeed ol
the social process what Becker (1963) calls a 'carccr' -by which he bccanw
more involved. Evcn if Fussell was drawn to the gym by insccurity and
anxicty, his account suggcsts, wc can understand thc bodybuildcr he becanll'
only by following hh step-by-step movement into thc bodybuilding world
ami consequcnt internalization of its culture. His autobiography trace., a
process whcreby he unwittingly made himself into something differcnt from
what he was at the start.
1 favour this subcultural, interactionist approach, not lcast because it ,
ablc to offer the k1nd of evidcnce required by the claims that it makcs. Klcin\
judgcments of 'personality' are casy to make but difficult to prove, ami even
where personalit) tests are used it is difficult to dissociatc cause and effect.
When Klein describes the paranoia, insecurity and narcissisrn of tlw
bodybuildcrs he studied, for example, he implies that these are qualitics that
thc competitors bring to the competition, but throughout his account it .,
difficult to avoid the thought that the compctition induces them in it\
competitor'> as its stakes and intensity escalatc. Whichcvcr way round it i'>,
howewr, what emerges from thcse accounts is the sense in which bod}
building i'> a separate world, removed and insulated from thc influtnce of the
mainstream. lt h for this reason that bodybuilders are ablc to deviatc as tht'\'
do ami are sometimcs surprised at the reactions they clicit. Moreove;,
following Becker (1963), we might hypothesize that the fact that body
builders are, toa degree, stigmatizecl further contributes to this separation. 11
givcs them an incentive to keep their art, and toa dcgrec thcrnselws, within a
distinct subcultural world where they are understood all(l valued. lf a
thcoretical model is to be used to make sense ol bodyl>uilding RBls it should
perhaps be Becker\ (19R2) moch:l ot 'worlds' and in p;utirular the workh ot
'outsiders' (lkcktr IWd)
Bodyhuilding and lll<ldl'lll Jlliiiiii\'\111 ,fll' t k.rrly qurll' di,tim t lmm <>lll'
anotht'l ,rnd lll'l'd In lw tllllll"t\lnod .rnd .rtrountl'd to1 in dilll'l!'lll \\'l\"\. 1 hn
an dllll'll'lll '1!"}:11111'>' n11 111) 111.1p. \l 1111' s.tllll' tillll', 1111\\'l'\l'l, tlui; ,hall;!
11\.ll.:ln.rlll\ .uul (\111\tdl'l \1,1111\ \1'1\ lhl'lll.lf'.lll lllllll 1111' 11101\' llfllllt.lll\'1' and
Mapping rcflcx1ve embodiment 137
mainstream domains ot the core and intermediatt zom' respcctively. In this
respect, though diffcrcnt rcgions, they also shan \OIIIL'Ihing which differ-
l ntiates them from othcr clustcrs of RB h 1 ha\'<.' identified. A more
tomprehensive survcy may haw picked up otiH:r marginal or distinct
clusters, with their own distinct social dynamrcs. 1\:otwithstanding Klein's
mterpretation of bodybuilding, for examplc, 1 ha\'C not explored any
mdi,idual, 'psychopathological' forms ot rdiL.\i\'C embodiment, such as
.morexia nervosa or sclf-harming be ha\ iours. 1 he key point, however, is that
there is a marginal zonc, out bcyond thc mainstream, which theories of the
mainstream fail to account for.
1 have defined primitiv1sm as a rebelliow. social movement and body-
l>uilding as a deviant subculturc. 1 have aho acknowlcdged, however, that it is
unlikely that 1 was really tappmg into thcse social worlds in my survey. lt is
more likely, with thc possible exccption of one bodybuilder 1 happened to
'capture', that 1 was tapping into more mainstrearn cultural regions which are
rnfluenced by thesc 'extremes': maimtream youth cultures influenced by
primitivist themcs and innovations, for examplc, and health and fitness
lifcstyle nichcs that centre upon gym work but do not extend to serious
bodybuilding. lf this is so thcn it may be truer to say of my rcspondents that
thcy were pursuing lcgitimatc but distinct narrative trajcctories, in the
rnanner suggestcd by Giddens (1991 ). lhcy wcre taking a distinctive path
which marked them out frorn but which was still acceptable to
mainstream socicty. Onc of thc reasons why multidimensional scaling is
useful is that it allows us to capture the\e distinct trajectories, in the form of
clusters of statistically associated RLH\.
Conclusion
In this chapter, following through m> critique of the main existing theorit,
of reflexivc cmbodiment, 1 have constructed a prcliminary 'map' of rcfle:-.in
embodiment which distinguishes its kc} 'regions'. Having argued, in
Chapter 8, that reflexive embodimcnt is achieved by way of reflcxiH' hody
techniques, 1 have now argucd that the societal repertoire ot thc,t
tcchniques is highly differcntiated, such that sorne clusters of them are
normative for cverybody; othcrs normativc for certain catcgorics or grcHq>s;
others frcely chosen on the basis of personal and identity conccrns; ami
others still in infraction of norms such that they entail an 'outsider' status.
Morcover, 1 havc suggest<.d that specific clmters of RBTs can and must be
invcstigated on the basis of quite specific framcworks of meaning and
identity. 1 havc moved bcyond the theorics cliscussed in Part One, without
having to reject thosc theorics outright, because 1 have been able to locate
thcir respective ficlcls of application to clusters of rcgions of practices within
a broader territory.
1 o grasp how thcse various regioll\ be long to a single territory we must
rlturn to nw dhcus\ion of soda! nttworks in Chapter 8. The general
'tl'rritm\' th;;t 1 am rl'lerring to i\ thl immensely complex and also messy
mt wo1 wh id 1 1 o111 p1 iw\ \ont'l y - :r llt'twork whose relational ti es are
138 Rethinking reflexive embodiment
multiplex and may involve, in ditkrent combinations: money, cmotion,
physical force, law, mediated communication, face-to-facc communication,
intimacy, impersonality, role play ancl so on. Reflexivc body tcchniques form
at diffcrcnt places in this nctwork, as a consequencc of both the accidcnts and
thc dcsigns of different groups. lhey acquirc diffcrcnt meanings ami
idcntities and thcy pass via diffcrcnt channels through the social nctwork.
To spcak of a rcgion of reflexivc embodimcnt is to identify a cluster of such
RBTs which havc, within this proccss, acquircd a similar profile of meaning
and idcntity, pcrhaps similar channels of transmission and certainl} similar
situations vis-a-vis key social balances of power. To identify one region,
howcvcr, is to admit of the existcncc of others whose profiles, channels of
transmission and balances of power are quite different.
Notes
l. For cxample, concerning beauty, health, tattooing, boclybuilding.
2. 39.5% of the sample were male, 60.5% were femalc.
3. 29.3% were students, 4.6% retired, 1.3% unemployecl, 4.3% unskilled
manual workers, 5.9% semi-skilled manual workers, 6.9
1
)'1, skilled
manual workers, 14.8% clerical workers, 10.5% managerial-grade
workers, 19.1% professionals, and 3.3% owned small businesscs.
4. 88% of the sample identified as white, 3.7% as lndian, 3.7% as
Pakistani, 1.3% as black, 1% as Chinese, 1.3% as mixed racc and 1%
other.
S. 30.2% identified as Protestant, 10.3% Catholic, 8.3% unspccificd
Christian, 5.3% Muslim, 2.7% Hindu, 0.7% jcwish, 0.7% Sikh, 0.7%
'othcr' religious and -l 1.1 o/o 'not religious'.
6. 14.1% were aged 16-19, 25.7% were in their 20s, 27% in thcir 30s,
14.2% in thcir 40s, 15.1% SOs, 2.6% 60s, 1% 70s, 0.3% 80s.
7. Catcgory-specific norms can because category membcrship and its
norms are enforccd by the whole group; for examplc, women are
rcquircd to be 'feminine' both by other womcn and by men.
8. 1 used the SPSS software package.
9. Sorne wcre omitted from the analysis beca use multidimcnsional scaling
is a sensitive technique which can be thrown off coursc relativcly easily,
gencrating results which are difficult to interpret. As with all statistical
techniqucs and methods, one has to exercise theorelically inlormed
discretion to get good results.
10. Thc phi measure of 'distance' was usecl througl10ut lllis analysis.
11. That is, a point which may not literally be in thc middlt ot thc plol but
can be treated as a centre.
12. Environmentalisls ami a ni mal rights campaigncrs h,IVl' <Jlll''' ioncd 1 hl'
means by whith wt kcep tlcan, potnting, tot l'\.ttnpll', lo pml>ll'm' ot
water tclll\<'r\'alion and uudly in animal hui lh<')' do nol
lJliC'\liOil IJygI'IIl' .1\ olfl l'IHI.
1:{. Nnll'\' 1'1\' 11'\jltrndl' fll .111\\\l'IS l ' \'1' 1\ I)LH' \IIIrll o111d 1 lr.l\'1 11 d 1.1\I'S
111 \!11111 111\(.1111{'\
0
llrrt tfll' ll};liii ' S ll llltllll \ L' l\' J,11go 111 olll \' l 01\1'.
Mapping reflcxive embodiment 139
14. A category which comprises swimming, llllllllllg, gym work, aerobics
and doing exerciscs such as prcss-u" ami '11 IIJl'
15. This is not the place to discuss multipil' torlt''Jlondencc analysis in any
detail. lt must suffice to say that, likc latlor analysis and principal
components analysis, thc tcchnique allows om to reduce a relatively
high number of variables down toa rdatiwly low number (in this case
one). lt differs from factor analysis aiHI printplc wmponents analysis
in that it uses categorical data. Sec Wcllcr and Romncy (1990). Clausen
(1998), and Le Roux and Rouanet (2004) .
Conclusion
liuman beings are embodied. We are not spirits or minds that exist insi<k ,,
body. Our bodies are all thcrc is to us. As the exprcssion 'our bodies' indicat<''
however, wc are capable of objcctifying our embodiment and constituting 11
asan object and posscssion: 'm y body' . 1 a m m y body but 1 also have m y bOl!\
I a m somehow alienated from m y embodiment, in m y conscious experienu.
but at the same time reunitcd with itas 1 experiencc itas mine. The proct'\'.
whereby 'my body', the body that I am, becomcs an object of perception,
thought and feeling forme, and becomes something that 1 act u pon by war ol
exercise, diet, adornment and so on, is the phenomenon of reflexin
embodiment.
In Part Onc of this book I reviewed a number of key theories which han
shaped sociologists' undcrstandings of reflexivc cmbodiment. Each of tht'\<'
theories was found wanting in important respects. Thc key problem that tlwy
posed, however, was that, in spite of their problcms, they were each quit<
convincing in certain respects but also each quite different. For sonH
theorists, including Elias, Foucault, Bordo and Bartky, reflexive embodimcnt
is self-policing ami is rootcd in an internalization of externa! relations ol
power. At Ieast some of thc time it is. Sometimes, they concede, it is based in
resistance, in freely chosen 'tcchnologies of the sclf' or in areas of choin
carved out through a process of informalization. Jor other theorists, such a'
Giddens, reflexivc cmbodiment is a matter of identity construction ami ;1
response to detraditionalization whilst for Fcathcrstone it is fuelled by tlw
rise of consumer culture for Durkheim it is a cclcbration of the cult of thl'
individual and for Bourdicu it is the pursuit of class distinction. Moreovl'l,
Bordo, Bartky, Giddens ancl Durkheim each givc us rcason to believe that in
other cases still it is linkcd with social and/or psydJOiogical disintegralion,
thc key examplcs of this bcing the eating di\mdtrs, .IIIOIL''\iil nervosa ami
bulimia nervosa, and dclibcratc SL'if-harm.
Sorne of thesc diffcrcnct''> arL' l'.\(llainnl hy diii'II'IH 1'\ in<thical, polit1<:<1l,
mcthodological, l'J'Stl'lllOiogcal oiiHiontolngJt ,ti '(l0\1111>11\
0
, \\ Slldl tlll')' go
bcyond the rtmit of this hoo(.;. 1 tonk IIH Vti'W,IHl\\'t'\'1.'1, th.11 W<'l'ould l'.\lra<l
\Oilll' of thc l'lllpirie.ll t onttnt ol 1 h ,,. lillntlts, wll hou1 wouying too m u< h
.1hout thl'I lht'<lll'lit.tl o11gins, i11 ''" tll1111 111 '''"""l'l l1ol\' lllt'll di\p.11.11<
Conclusion 141
,l,ums might be reconciled. My argument "''" th.11 111 "' 1.11 ,1\l'.tt h daimcd to
lit< unt for reflexivc cmbodiment in its tot.llitv lhtr Wt'll' .111 \\lollg. But on
lht ,)ther hand, each was a long the right lillL'' .11>11111 \\'11.11 1 1 ,11m to think of
1\ tlifferent 'regions' within the overall 't<:11it111)'' .. 1 11'1lt \1\t' cmbodiment.
ttr llexive embodiment, 1 began to think, is ;1 dlllt 'll'll t ti '" ial doma in, and
, 11 h of the theories 1 reviewed is describing tllll', 11111 <1111} one, of its many
"lll'Cts. The argumcn t bctwcen the theoril's, 11 1 t ll.tt "''Jl<'t t, was a ki n to that
llltwcen the proverbial blind men descrilm1g .111 l'l ll.1nt l.atll has hold of a
,ldlcrent part and thcrefore offers a VL'rv dlllt'll'lll dtsuiplion. My aim, 1
1 herefore decided, was to m ove beyond tht\<' p.11 t 1.11 o1 'regional' accounts
1owards a more comprchensive map of lt'li<'XI\<' t'lnllodimcnt as a wholc.
1 o make my map 1 first opencd up tht <onnpt ol ICII<xiH embodiment by
w. of the concept of 'reflexivc body lt'< hnltlll's'. Focusing upon the
te< nniques involvcd in rcflexive eml>odimtnt .lllowcd me to begin to break
1h territory down into its componen! l'ltmtnts, 111 ordcr that they might
lllen be located relativc to one another on a 'map'. '1 he map 1 devised
l"'rmitted of two forms of differcnlialion. lir\1, Rl\'1\ were found to vary in
11Wrdance with thcir rate of uptakc amongst the population studied. This
\.niance took the form of a continuum, l>ut 1 madc thc case that we might
txpect different dynamics to be in play at cach end ol this continuum and at
1ts centre, respcctively. Though wc might cxpcct to find moral norms, defincd
rules of conduct reinforced by a thrcat of sanctions, located across our
tO 1tinuum, 1 argued that those RB rs that approximatc a 100% rate of uptake
\1 hin a population fonn a special core zone of reflexive cmbodiment which
1 hest explained by refcrcnce to theories which focus upon norms and upon
power. Empirically thcsc RBTs were found to be associated with hygiene, an
nl>servation which rcsonates with the work of both Elias and Foucault. 1 also
11oted, however, that this empirical contcnt alerts us equally to the 'rights'
.1spect of the core zone. Practices of hygicne are not only imposed upon usas
duties but also demanded by usas rights.
1\t the opposite end of the spectrum we find a marginal zone of practices
hose rates of uptake are so minimal that they are statistically deviant, and
\' ''lich turn out, empirically, to occupy an 'outsider' position. In sorne cases,
m)reover, they invohc an infraction of moral, aesthetic, legal or 'residual'
norms. The RBTs in this zone cannot be explained in the same way as thosc in
the core zone since the dynamics of their appropriation and persistence are
(tute different. Moreover, they are buffered by an intermediate zone of
practices whose propcrties and social dynamics are different again.
The picture is more complicated still, however, as the marginal and
intermediate zones are not necessarily homogcncous. One can find quite
d1stinct clustcrs of RBTs within them - that is, clusters of statistically
1ssociated practices which it is possible to intcrpret as thematically associated.
lmpirically, for cxamplc, 1 found, in the intermcdiatc zone, a cluster of
practices associatcd with the doing of femininity, sorne of which appeared to
i>L' backed by gender-specific moral norms, anda less gcnder-specific domain
ol practices associatcd with both health ami appcarance which at least
.1ppcared to be freely chosen, possibly in relation to what Ciddens refers toas
distinct narrativc trajcctories. In my /Oill' 1 lound cluster'> ni IU\'1\
142 Conclusion
associated with bodybuilding and mmkrn prirnitivism rcspectively. Thesc
subcultural worlds are unitcd, 1 suggcstcd, in that both presuppose a degree of
disconnection from rnainstrcam but 1 argued that they cannot be
cxplained in the sarne way. 1 herc h qualitative cvidcnce to support thc
notion that prirnitivism is a form of rcsistance to maimtrcam culture, but this
is lacking in rclation to bodybuilding, which appcars to be a quite
conservative subculturc in many rcspccts. Thc two worlds are quite differcnt
and cannot be accountcd for in thc same way.
Thc evidence regarding class was arnbiguous. My own survcy did not pick
up class differcnccs, so 1 looked to thc 2003 J lcalth Survcy for England
(Sproston and Primatcsta 2004). Hcrc 1 did find cvidcncc of differences but
thcy were relativcly small and thcy werc clifficult to account for in terms of
cithcr basic material rcsourccs or the undcrlying thcme of 'hcalth'. Middle-
class lifestyles wcre found to be gcnerally 'hcalthicr' and, in the case of
wornen, the relationship of class to healthy lifcstylc was found to be linear
(women are also gcnerally 'hcalthier' than men). This class trcnd was bucked,
howcver, by the tact that thc midcllc class are more inclinecl towards hcavy
drinking. Thc class picturc. is further complicatcd, morcovcr, by the fact that
the rclcvant qualitativc studies tcnd to support the individualization thesis-
that is, agents tend to conccive of what they do to their bodies in terms ot
thcir individual idcntity rathcr than any class or collcctivc identity. There is
sorne concession to 'appropriatencss for work', but apart from that agents
imagine themselves to be cxprcssing their individuality in thcir body work.
'lhis does not complctely undcrmine Bourdicu's thcsis, not least as he would
argue that class idcntification operates pre-reflectivcly, by mediation of the
habitus. This is a very difficult claim to test or prove, however, and in the
abscnce of strong class pattcrns in the statistical data it is therefore very shaky.
f'hesc class matters require a more fine-grained analysis than eithcr Bourdieu
suggests or 1 havc been ablc to give.
In mapping rcflexive cmbodirncnt it has not been rny intention to suggest
that either specific RBTs or spccific clusters of RBTs are static. On the contrary,
1 believe that RBTs rnay rnovc bctween clusters and that both they and their
clusters rnay move betwecn thc zoncs 1 have described. Once fashionable or
normative RBTs may fall out ot favour, for cxarnple, whilst once marginal
RB rs can 'take off'. lndccd, in sorne ways it is the movcrnent of RBTs ami
clusters across the tcrritory that 1 have provisionally mapped out, their
shifting patterns of diffusion, that will help us to bcst undcrstand thern. In
addition, 1 suggest that the size of zones thernselvcs may be variable. Elias's
concepts of the civilizing and informalization proccsscs are both interesting
in this respect. Thc formcr suggcsts that carly modern lik was characterizcd
by the expansion of a corc 1onc of practices whith al! peoplc eventually
subscribed to. Thc latter suggests that the p<.riod \IIK<.' llll' 1960s has scen a
general rclaxation of moral norm\ which ha' llH'.lllt tllal llll' number of RBh
we are al! expected to practl\l' has dimin\hl'll, wilh lllllt 11 mor<. hl'ing ldt to
our own discrction 111d t hoin 1 ht t nrt 7 0IH h.l\, 111 t llttl , \hrunk within
lat<. mod<.rnity. t\g,lin llhinJ.; 1 1!.11 111ort' lll\loll .11 W111l-. , t'Xpln11ng tht'\l' idt'.l\,
1\ llt'll'\\<lf}' il \\"(' .lrl' lo hlllhtl 1111' 1111111 1\l ollltliii J; " ' rl lh\ \1' l'lllhodii!H'Ill
lhal 1 lun sought lo 111i11.111'
Go1u:lusion 143
My own contrihution to the reflexi,c <.'lllhod11111 111 dt'll,oll' h," nol h<.cn
limited to rny rnapping excrcisc, howevcr. 1 h,l\ 1' \t 111 ghl " " ' lo hrrthcr our
understanding of the naturc of reflexivit), t'nll" "lrr111 ni .11od \l'lllwod, which
are each implicatcd in thc notion of reflcxiH' l' """"liroll' llt < >n om thh
has involved an attempt to show, by reft'1<'111 1 '" "'"''11 \' lll'lllh, that our
bodies, in virtuc of both social and biologit .11 p1 1" 1'\\1'' 1 h.1ngt' 111 ways that
we do not intcnd and do not always, in tl11 111'1 111 \ l.llll <', noticc. At lcast
sorne of our reflcxive work, 1 have suggt'\ll'd, -.horold IH' trndcrstood as an
cffort to cope with, manage or rcvcrst IIH'''' 'h,roJgts ,1, thq come to our
attention. Our bodies do not remain tlw s,lll11' 11 wt do nol clcct to attend
reflexively to them. hey are comtanll)' 1 h.1ng11 1g ,1., ,, n,ult ot both social
ami biological ami rcflexi\'ity is, to '><mt dt'J.:II' t', .1 matter of kceping
up with thcse changcs rathcr than proat11H'I\' put \ 11111!) .1 hmhly ideal. On the
other si de, 1 have attemptcd to show 111.11 m11 ll'llt',\1\ t' wlfawareness comes
about by way of an intcrnalization ot ou1 td.ltuul\ with others- others, that
is, in the very samc nclworks from wht( 11 1n RBTs. In sorne respects
this agrees with thc 'powcr' models ol hHll.lllll, and Elias. However,
drawing frorn G.H. Mead (1967), 1 havt ,ugutd lhat thc sphcrc of reflexivity is
inherently clialogical, such thal Wl' mtghl anticpate the responses of
authorities to our body work but also 'talk back' to thosc authorities, in our
nncr conversations', deciding for whcthcr deviance is justified or
worth the risk. Sornctrnes thc thrcat ot o;anctions may dissuade us from
certain types of bod) work, whatc\'er we might dcsire. In a differentiated and
informalized social world such a\ our own, howevcr, this will only ever apply
to sorne forrns of body work, not al! of thcm. Moreover, again using Mead, 1
have argued that our inner conversations draw in and play off rnultiple
voices: we intcrnalizc thc vicws of authoritics but also those of social
rnovernents who contcst their clairns, and sometirncs also the critics of these
critics. And again wc play thcse perspectives off against onc another within
our interna! dialogues. A woman conternplating cosrnetic surgery, for
example, rnay fecl thc pressurc of the fashion-bcauty complcx, viewing
herself from thc point of dcw of this patriarchal othcr, but she may also
contcmplate the perspcctives of feminist critics and indced post-fernimst
<.ritics of ferninism. In somc cases the threat of sanctions will carry the day
l>ut, as just noted, this b not always the case, particularly in an increasingly
inforrnalized socicty.
As a final point of condusion 1 would like to say that this model of thc
agcnt, situated in nctworks which are, toa dcgree, intcrnalized but which are,
evcn when politically imbalanccd, dialogical, is nccessary to thc more
diffcrentiatcd conccption of rcflexive embodirncnt that I have attempted to
map out hcre. Retlcxivc cmbodirnent is, in cvcry case, ncgotiated, both with
real others and with our intcrnalized rcpresentations of thern. In sorne cases
bocly work remains contcntious and subject to discussion. In others the cards
are stacked against us and practices are eithcr rnaintained or repressed
through the force of habit. In cvery case we are dcaling with a cornplex ami
dial ogical bcing, howc\'cr, whosc relation to him- or hcrself is rnediated with
multiple others in thc contl':>.t of network\ ot rclatiom which constitutc th<.
l.ahri c of '>Ocia! li!t' .
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lndex
.tbsent body, 7, 21, 69, 79-81
dys-appearance and bodily 'noise',
81-2
action, 97
absent body, 79, 80-1
pre-reflective, 100-1
administrative power, 18, 42
advertising, 53, 61-3
targeted on children, 75
aerobics, SO, 86
affluence, 53
age, 61
and obesity, 72
ageing, 22, 81, 83, 84
agency, 22, 4 7, 88, 143
Mead, 88-91
aggression, 26, 27
nation-state and control of, 29
alcohol consumption, 129-32, 133, 142
alcoholic drinks industry, 61
alienation, 85
' al truistic' suicide, 16
anomie, 15-16, 17, 23
anorexia nervosa, 21, 57,119
anticipation, 95
Aoki, D., 135
appearance, 14, 53, 98, 99
dys-appearance, 81-2
appetite, regulation of, 59
arousal, 32
asceticism, 13, 55-7, 132
Atkinson, M., 16
attribution errors, 3-4
.tutonomy, 4
rl'iattve, 1 .'i
wlluHtlrol, dt.tl11:11t' .ttl!l, 100 1
llat hl'iartl, C., 68
llartky, S.l.., 6, 57-9, 62, 86, 95, 126, 140
i'oucault and feminism, 59-61
bathing costumes, 31, 32
Baudrillard, J., 34, 54
beauty-fashion complex, 57-9, 62
beauty treatments, 48, 56, 62
Becker, H., 136
Beckham, David, 111
behaviour modification regimes, 41, 42
being, and having, 2
being-for-others, 69, 82-4
Bentham, J., 41
biological structures, S
bio-power, 42
and obesity, 73-4
black men, 86
blind spots, 76
absent body and being-for-others,
79-87
Blumer, H., 93
bodily functions, 24, 25-7
bodily 'noise', 81-2
bodily perfection, 55-6
bodily surface ornamentation, 59-60
body hatred, 59
body maintenance, 3, 98, 109
distinction, 34-6
body mass index (BMl), 71-2, 78
body modification, 3, 18, 98, 109
distinction, 34-6
in 'elementary' societies, 11-14
body-society interactions, 76-8
body lethniques, 102--4
rl'llt'.\tVt' \l't' nllt\ve hody tel1111iques
(1{1\h)
154 lndex
botlybulding, 107, 108, 118
marginal zonc, U.J 7, l.Jl-2
subculture, 112, 136, 1-12
supplements, 127, 128
Bordo, 6, SS 6, S 7, 60, !.JO
Bourdieu, 1', 6, 21, 33-8, 53, 68, 90, 116,
128, I.JO
tlistinction, .B-6, 37-8
bourgeoisie W<' middle class
boxing, l6
Bread tor lite ( ampaign, 59
bulimia nervosa, 57
J., 60 1
Calnan, M., 21, !!1 2
calorifir energy, 7-1-5, 75-6
rapitali\m, 52-J, 54, SS
network, 12, .JJ, -19, 51, 112
care, body as objett of, 95
category spedtk nonns, 116-18
cats, hurning aliw, 27
causal analysis, 2H
cl'lebrity, lulture ol, 53
centrilli;ed state, 2H
childrtn, 95, 110
food d1oiccs and advcrtising, 75
ohcstty, 72
sell and ot hcr, 91 ]
chokc, 53, 67
antl rore zonc Rlll s, 12-1 S
llitldcm, 18 -20, 22 3
internll'diatc zonc RB'h and ronsumer
rulturl', 133-4
Christianit)', 13
cites, 1 .J, 90
civilization, 27
ci\'ili;ing proce\\, 24-31, 32, 38, 55, 142
clit\\
1
38, 68, 78
Bourdieu, 33 6, U . 8, 38
and htalth, 22
mapping RBh, 128 33, 142
midtllt> class src middle class
ohl'sity ami, 72 3
dusters, 121 3
rollectivsm, 3-6, 17, 63
diflusion dynamics, 111-12
'ell'mentary' socittits, 11 14
u>lonizat ion, 52 'i
(OllllllOdtl it'ill 1011, 'i2 3, S 1 S
n>mmuntt .ttton, h 1
(.'01llpt111\0il' q,,
lOlll(H'IIrtg 'l.lllll\/)lll'\\llfl'\, 1/ R
t n1npul\1\ ll
Connell, R., 128
tonsciomness, 79 82
comuousness ratsing, 60
conservation, 108-9
consumer culture, 3-1, 52-63
ascetichm and hedonism, 55 7
colonization, commodifiration ami
resistance, 53-S
Foucault and femni\m, 59 61
gender and fashion-bl'autv romplc:-.,
57-9
intermedia te zone RIHs, 1 H-.J, l.J 1
and obesity, 75
contemporary Westcrn sorietil'S, S-6
control, 67, 68
consumer culture ami, 55, 63
externa! controh, 2-1-5, ]2 3
i nternalization of, 24 .J J, 32 3, 43
self-control see selfcontrol
Cooley, C.H., 923, 95-6
Cooper, A., 22
core zone, 119-21, 121-3, 141, 142
hygene, 123 6, 14 1
cosmetic surgery, 48
counterculture, 54
courts, royal, 29
Crossley, N., 1 2, 56, 57, 77
cult of the indi\'idual, 1 .J 16
cultural dopes, 56, 62
culture, 27, 98
bodr tcchniques, 104
consumer culture st'<' consurner rultun
C}'berpunk, 112
Damiem, R.l ., 39
de Beauvoir, S., 59
decivilization protesses, ll, 32, :n
deference, 29
DeMello, M., 17
Descartes, R., 1
des in', 98 100, 110- 1 1
detraditionali;ation, 18-21, 22-3
deviant Rtn s, 118 19
w<' e11.\o marginal zonc
tit'votion, U
di,dogut
lllll'lllill UJII\'t'J'\,lllOll\, Hll l) 1, 92, IU
\l'lt lOIItml, ,nolOIIOIIIY and, 100 1
dut, .!O
dll'llll)o;, .">'1, )llh
thtlt'H'rH t\ XI:\ t.
ol 1{111 s, 111'1 1 11 1
lll\.olllltll' 111
discipline, 55
power, resistance and, 39-51
dispositions, pre-reflexi\'e, 21
distinction, 12, 38, 99
Bourdieu, 33-6, 37-8
l:lias, 29, 30
double bind, 55-6
dress, l.J
dualism, mnd-body, 1-2
Durkheim, E., 5, 11-17, 19, 23, 111,
!.JO
body modification in 'elemenlary'
societies, 11-H
cult of the individual, 1-1-16
dys-appearance, 81-2
tatng dsorders, 21, 57, 119
eating patterns, 20
healthy eating, 129, 131
egocentrism, 91
egoism, l.J-16, 17
'elernentary' societies, 11-14
llias, N., 5, 6, 16, 17, 24-33, H, SO, SS,
67, 68, ' 95, 125, 140, 142
civililing process, 2-1-31, 32
informalization, 31, 32-3
elites, 30
embarrassment, 26-7
emotion management, 103
energy ratio, 7-1-5, 75-6
episodic reflexi\ity, 76
etquette books, 25-6, 27, 30-1, 32
exchange value, 56
e:-.clusion, 56-7
l'Xecution and torture, 39, 40
exercise, 26, .J.J, 56, 104, 107
aerobics, 50, 86
bodybuilding see bodybuilding
class and, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133
health clubs, 56, 57, 62, 77
t.xternal controls, 24-5, 32-3
txternal non-human threats, 24
Jan cultures, 1 7
htnon, F., 86
1 art i ng, 25-6
fash ion, 33-.J
f.tshton beauty complex, 57-9, 62
f.tl prde movement, 7-1
1\,tthtNone, M., S l, SS, 56-7, I.JO
lt'fllllll\rl1, 17, IX, h 11
dillt'rl'lltl', xs h
lllii\IIJIH'r 'ulluu, '\tt hl,
lndex 155
femininit)
inttrmtdiatt 1011e RBTs, 126, 127
produtlion ol, 59-60
figuratiom, 21-5, 27-9
food supplements, 129, 130, 133
l'otlt'ault, :---1., 6, 32, 34,39-51, SS, 67, 125,
!.JO
bod)', 1-1 S
gender and feminism, 59-61
resistance, .JS-9
sclf-policing subject, 43-4
technologies of power, 39-43
frequenry of RBTs, 116, 117
1 reud, S., S
lrost, 1.., 59, 61
htssell, S., 136
futun, 94-5
Gadamer, 11., 89
Gagnon, J., 32
game playing, 93
gaze, HS-6
gender, 61 3
class and Rtn s, 129-32
distim:tion and, 35-6, 37
ami fashion-beauty complex, 57-9
Foutault and feminism, 59-61
intermedatc zone RBTs, 126-8, 141
ami obesity, 72-3
generalzed other, 93-.J
geographical mobility, 14
Ciddens, A., 6, 18-23, 48, 53, 67, 88, 116,
118, 119, !.JO
detraditonalzaton, self-narratives and
risk, 18-21
Gil!, R., 16
Gof!man, E., !OS
governmental health agencies, 111, 114
grand theories, 6, 7
(reek city states, 14
(,rimshaw, J., 86
group membership, 11-12
grou1npecific norms, 116-18
gyms, 56, S 7, 62, 77
we 111.\o bodybuilding; exercise
llaht'rma\, J., 52, 53
habitu\, 90
llourdieu, 21, 34,90
Jli,l\, 27. 211
Ma'"' 101
lt.t\lllg, ,utd lll'lllg, l.
lto,tllh, /.1 '
156 lndex
health, cont.
Foucault, 41-2, 46
risks, 19
health clubs, 56, 57, 62, 77
see also bodybuilding; exercise
Health Survey for England, 2003 , 128-9,
130, 142
health surveys, large-scale, 22
'healthy eating', 129, 131
hedonism, 55-7, 61, 132
Hegel, G., 98-9
hexis, 34
hierarchy of levels, 5
historicism, 44-5
Hobbes, T., 13
homosexuality, 37, 46
Honneth, A., 99
hubs (hub nodes), 111, 114
human nature, 44-5
hunting, 104
hygiene, 98, 141
core zone RBTs, 123-6, 141
l, and me, 94, 107-8
identity, 110-11
individualism, risk and, 11-23
narrative identities, 18-21, 118, 121
illness, 77, 81, 82
images, 53, 96-7
impulses
body as site of incoherent and
competing, 45
conflict between conscience and, 13-14
individual, cult of the, 14-16
individualism
egoism and, 14-16
identity, risk and, 11-23
individuality, 4, 16-17
individualization, 142
power and, 40
informalization, 31, 32-3, 38, 142
and obesity, 75
innovation, 112
institutions
carceral network, 42, 43, 49, 51, 112
total, 39-40, 125
interaction, 4-5, 13-14
manners and, 30-1
interdependence, 50
Elias, 24-5, 27- 9
socially situatcd sclf, 97 H
scc a/so mtworks; l'l'liitinnslilps
lllll'lllll'dldll' /Cllll', 1 1 l) i l , l.' 1 \, 1 11
consumer culture, 133-4, 141
gender, 126-8, 141
inlernal conflict, 13-14, 47-8
internal conversations, 88-91, 92, 143
internal warfare, 29
internalization of control, 24-31, 32-3, "1 \
investment, 35, 37-8, 46
Islam, 13
jogging, 107
Judo, 106
Kant, l., 14, 15
Klein, A., 118, 135, 136
knowledge
and body techniques, 104
and power, 42
language, 28, 92
Lasch, C., 20, 50
learning RBTs, 108
Leder, D., 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 94
leisure activities, 26
leisure class, 33-4
Lent, 13
levels of description, 105-6
Levin, D., 45
liberation, 19
life politics, 20, 33
lifestyle changes, and weight gain, 75-6,
76-7
Lloyd, M., 61
look, the, 85-6
looking glass self, 95-6
'mainstream' RBTs, 118
manners, 25-6, 34
origin and role of, 29-31
Mansfield, A., 61
mapping reflexive body techniques, 70,
114-39, 141-2
bodybuilding and modern primitivism
in the marginal zone, 134-7, 141- 2
class, 128-33, 142
clusters, 121 .:{
consum(r rulttiiT and the intermediatc
/lllll', 1 ll 1, 1 1 1
111''1"''"' v ni IUITs, 116,
11/
1: 11d1 111 1111 llll<' lllll'di.llt' "'IH', 126- H,
111
11 \')\1 ' 1" 111 '"' ' 11111 11111', 1 , 1 1> , 111
1 1 1 , . '>1 "i'l " ' ' 1 lto
1
1. 1 11
mapping reflexive body techniques, cont.
survey, 115
zones of practice, 119-23
Maree!, G., 2
marginal zone, 119-21, 121-3, 141-2
bodybuilding and primitivism, 134-7,
141-2
marriage market, 35, 37
masculinity, 128
Mauss, M., 102-4
May, C., 22
McGinn, B., 61
McNay, L., 21
me, 94-7, 107-8
Mead, G.H., 7, 22, 69, 88-101, 143
bodily me, 94-7
desire and the other, 98-100
generalized other, 93-4
networks and the socially situated self,
97-8
reflexivity, social relations and interna!
conversations, 88-91
self and other, 91-3
self-control, dialogue and autonomy,
100-1
meaning, 2, 110-11
media, 53, 109-10
men, 16
black men, 86
and body work, 35-6, 37
mapping RBTs, 126-8
see also gender
Mennell, S. , 31
mental illness, 21, 119, 136
Merleau-Ponty, M., 44, 82-4, 85
metrosexual, 37
micro-penalties, 41, 49
Middle Ages, 25-6, 29
middle class, 22, 35, 36, 68
manners, 34
mapping RBTs, 129-32, 142
mind-body dualism, 1-2
mineral supplements, 129, 130
mirrors, 96-7
modern industrial societies, 6
modern primitivism, 47, 54, 112
marginal zone, 134-7, 141-2
Monaghan, L., 118, 135, 136
moral deviance, 134-5
moral norms, 42, 111 - 12, 142
morality
dltradi(IOII,dii.IIOII .11Hill101tl', 20
liy)(ll'lll' .111d 111111 ,1[ diiiii'IISIIIII, ] ) l
lndex 157
multidimensional scaling, 121-3, 137
multiple correspondence analysis, 129,
139
multiple-vo1ced inner conversations, 89,
143
Musafar, Fakir, 135
narcissism, S 7-8, 58-9
culture of, 20-1
narcissistic disorders, 21, 136
narrative identities, 18-21, 118, 121
nation-state, 29
necessity, 36, 53
Nettleton, S., 123
networks, 22, 69-70, 143
carceral network, 42, 43, 49, 51, 112
RBTs and, 109-13, 137-8
and the socially situated self, 97-8
see also interdependence; relationships
new social movements, 17, 20, 33, 36,
47-8, 135-6
colonization and, 53-5
see also resistance
norms, 42
core zone RBTs, 123-6
moral, 42,111-12,142
RBTs, 116-18
statistical, 42, 111-12
nudity, 26-7, 31, 32
obesity, 69, 71-8, 143
blind spots and episodic reflexivity, 76
body-society interactions, 76-8
'crisis', 71-6
object, body as, 2, 82-4, 95
objective social criteria, 93
observant participation, JOS
organic needs and urges, 24, 25-7
other, 86, 88-101, 143
being-for-others, 69, 82-4
comparison with others, 96
desire and, 98-100
difference and 'the loo k', 85-6
generalized, 93-4
self and, 91-3
self-control, dialogue and autonomy,
100-1
pain, 81
pain rituah, 12- 13
1' ;111npt1r<m, 10 1, 18
l'.lilldllll ' lll, 1 1 1
1
1
l ' ISS, 1 , (o)
158 lndex
perception, 79-80, 81
perceptual organs, 80
perfection, bodily, 55-6
personal pronouns, 92
personality, 136
piercing, 3, 108, 118
marginal zone, 134-7, 141-2
physical capital, 35-6
Piaget, j., 91
Pitts, V., 118, 135
plans and blueprints, 49
plastic surgeons, 110
plasticity, 44-5
play, 91-2, 93
poly vocal interna! dialogue, 89, 143
post-industrial/postmodern societies, 6
'postmoderns', 132
posture, 59-60, 103
power, 39-51, 67
administrative, 18, 42
consumer culture, 62
diffusion of RBTs, 110-11
Elias, 24-5, 28, 29-30, 31
gender and changing power balance, 37
networks and socially situated self,
97-8
resistance and, 45-9
technologies of, 39-43
practice, and meaning, 2
practices, 3-4
pregnancies, teenage, 32
primitivism see modern primitivism
prisons, 39-40, 40-1, 48
producers, 61-2
profit, 35, 37-8
psychiatry, 21, 42
psychological structures, S
psychology, 42
public health, 3
punishment regimes, 39-40
'punk' fashion, 112
pure relationship, 22
purpose, and RBTs, 106-7
quartering, 39
radex model of RBT distribution, 121-3
Ramadan, 13
rational action theory, 38
recognition, desire for, 99- 100
record-keeping, 40
reflexive body leclllliLJll('s (IU\Ts) , 7,
l)t) 70, 102 1 .l, 1 11 l
tnapping see mapping reflexive body
techniques
antl networks, 109-13, 137-8
and selfhood, 107-9
reflexive embodiment, 1-3
reflexivity, 1
rclationships
pure relationship, 22
reflexivity and interna! conversations,
88-91
social! y situated self, 97-8
see also interdependence; networks
relative autonomy, 4-5
religion, 12, 58
religious cults, 116, 118
repertoire of RBTs, 105
repetition, 108-9
repressive satisfaction, 58
residual norms, 119
resistance, 60, 119
colonization, commodification and,
53-S
Foucault, 45-9
marginal zone RBTs, 135-6, 142
see also new social movements
resources, 22
restrictions, 13
reversibility, 24-5
rights, core zone RBTs as, 125
risk, 18-21
rites of passage, 12
rituals, 108
role play, 91-2
Rose, N., 42
routines, 105, 108-9
royal courts, 29
sacred and profane, 12-13
salt, 129, 130
sanctions, 41, 49-50, 143
and hygiene, 124
Sartre, j.-P., 85
Savage, M., 132
Scheff, T., 119
self, 7, 69, 88-101, 143
bodily me, 94-7
body techniques and selfhood, 107-9
hygiene and selfhood, 125
looking glass 'LII, ' l ~ 6
and otlwr, '> 1 l
\l'pdt<li10il ll<llll llocly , ~
"H 1.illy \1(11.11< <1 " ' 11, '1 1 H
lt't 1111<>1n:ll ' \ "' ""' ., , 11, 1'1, ~ t ) 1' ~ 1
self-control
dialogue and autonomy, 100-1
Ellas, 24-31, 32-3
self-harming behaviours, 15
self-narratives, 18-21, 118, 121
self-policing subject, 43-4
self-surveillance, 59
Sennett, R., 53
sensation, 79-80, 81
sexual behaviour, 32
sexual morals, 34
sexual significance of nudity, 32
sexuality, 46
sexually transmitted diseases, 32, 33
shame, 26-7
Shell, E., 72
significant symbols, 98
Simmel, G., 33-4
Simon, W., 32
smoking, 129, 130, 132, 133
social change, body changes and, 76-8
social constraint towards self-constraint,
33
social movements see new social
movements; resistance
social participation, 23
social problems, 42
social relations see interdependence;
relationships
social science, 42
social structures, S
socialization, 25
socially situated self, 97-8
society, 3, S-6
body and, 4-5
body-society interactions, 76-8
individual and, 14-15
as a process, 27-8
soul, 13-14
stability, 28
statistical norms, 42, 111-12
subcultures, 17, 98
bodybuilding, 112, 136, 142
norms, 116-18
suicide, 14, 15-16
surveillance, 40-1, 42, 43, 59
Sweetman, P., 108
swimming, 105-6
tabula rasa model, 44- 5
lndex 159
tanning, 133
tattooing and lallos, 3, 12, 16, 36, 108,
118, 127' 128
marginal zone, 134- 7, 141-2
wars and, 17
Taylorist regimes, 41
technique, power and, 49-50
technologies of power, 39-43
technologies of the self, 39, 50-1, 51
teenage pregnancies, 32
time, 30
token economies, 41, 51
torture and execution, 39, 40
total institutions, 39-40, 125
totemic clans, 11-12
touch, 80
urges, organic, 24, 25-7
urination, 25, 26
Veblen, T., 33-4
vegetarianism, 20
violence, monopolization by nation-state,
29
visibility, 40
vitamin supplements, 129, 130
walking, styles of, 103
war, 17
weight training, 107, 108
see also bodybuilding; exercise
welfare state, 42
Western societies, contemporary, S-6
Williams, S., 21, 21-2, 81-2
women
body work, 35, 37
difference and 'the look', 85-6
eating disorders, 21
fashion-beauty complex, 57-9, 62
feminism, resistance and, 48
feminist account of embodiment,
85-6
mapping RBTs, 126, 127
working class, 35-6
see also class
Young, 1., 85-6
zones of practice, 119-23
scc o/10 111/ila individual zones
COLEF BIBLIOTECA
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