PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN 31 SCRA 825 G.R. No. L-28060, February 27, 1970 Teehankee, J.

FACTS: This case refers to the trial Courts judgment on June 5, 1967, it was shown that the accused collected amounts from customers of the business firms, namely; Montel Discount Center, the Iloilo Enterprises and the Piamonte, Bros. for being an agent on commission basis. The said collections were returned to the firms, but on one instance, he refused to turn over the collections for July and August 1965 to the Montel Discount Center. He also rejected the demand letter of the company for the payment of Fifty Five (Php55.00) pesos. The accused contended that he did not return the money because Mr. Manuel Piamonte, his real original principal, has not paid and refuses to pay him his commission, on account of business losses. He further alleged that he should have been paid by the complainant the amount of P1.50 per day as his earned commissions. Supposedly, the amount he withheld which constitutes his accrued commissions is equivalent to or more than what he should receive from Mr. Piamonte as payment considering that he was able to turn over the full amount of Php65.00 to him. Thus, the City Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) in its judgment find the accused-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for having retained in his possession even after demand, his last collections in the amount of P55.00, due to non-payment of his accrued commissions in the larger amount of P65.00 earned on previous collections actually turned over, as well as non-payment of his expense allowance of P1.50 per day, the trial court based its verdict solely on its rejection of appellants defense that he had such right of retention under Articles 1912 to 1914 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code? HELD: Appellant contended that there was an error when the trial Court made no ruling on his lack of criminal intent and the absence of damage or prejudice to his principal. Likewise, it was not even established that there was a damage or prejudice as an essential element of estafa. Appellants principal could not claim any such damage or prejudice, for appellant had retained and set off merely in part what was justly and long due to him, with a balance still owing to him. All these factors, the absence of criminal intent on appellants part and lack of damage or prejudice caused to the principal, besides the appellants proven good faith, entitle appellant to a verdict of acquittal.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from was set aside; the trial Courts conviction of Tomas Jumawan was reversed and he was acquitted of the crime of estafa, with costs de oficio. U.S. vs. CALIMAG 12 Phil. 687 G.R. No. L-4852, February 1, 1909 Willard, J. FACTS: The accused was municipal treasurer of the town of Solana, Province of Cagayan, and also deputy provincial treasurer, receiving as salary for the former position P25 per month and for the latter P10 per month. On December 2, 1907, the district auditor for that district examined the books and cash for the accused and found that there was a difference of P49.04. The auditor informed the defendant about this and he reasoned out that he had to advance his salary of P10 a month from July to November for a total of P50. The defendant was told by the auditor to get the money and he returned the amount of P50. Then, the auditor received the money and certified that the accounts of the accused were correct. Hence, the defendant was convicted in the court below of a violation of Act No. 1740 and sentence to two months imprisonment. Thus, he appealed the said judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant should be held liable for violation of Act No. 1740? HELD: At the trial, it was proven that the defendant had no authority to pay himself his salary of P10 a month as deputy to the provincial treasurer, and it must be considered that he had made personal use of the funds of the Government. It has been suggested that article 392 of the Penal Code imposing a fine in the case of diversion of public property by a public official is also applicable to the case at bar. However, the said article was already repealed by Act No. 1740. Hence, the alleged offense of misappropriation against the defendant was committed after the enactment of the said act. Likewise, the claim of the appellant as to the time of the examination of the auditor amounted to a confession within the meaning of section 4 of Act No. 619, has no proof and inadmissible. The said section relates only to a person charged with crime and cannot, therefore, be applied to the present case because no charged had at the time of the conversation been made against the defendant. Therefore, the judgment of the court was affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

PEOPLE vs. ABAYA 74 Phil. 59 G.R. No. L-47710, December 28, 1942 Paras, J. FACTS: On January 10, 1933, a judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna against defendant Francisco Abaya to which Zosimo Fernandez was able to obtain the sum of P4,000, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. In satisfaction of the said judgment, the provincial sheriff sold at public auction the defendant's undivided half interest in certain parcels of land to Zosimo Fernandez for the sum of P4,382.99. Then, the sheriff executed the certificate of absolute sale. Thereafter, Felicita Abaya, sister of the defendant and owner of the other undivided half of the aforesaid land, filed in the CFI of Laguna an action against Zosimo Fernandez on the ground that the defendant had conveyed the latter's interest to Felicita Abaya. Hence, judgment was rendered in favor of Zosimo Fernandez, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the defendant filed a petition for voluntary insolvency in the CFI of Laguna. In the schedule of debts accompanying the petition, the defendant made under oath that in the inventory of properties he included the item of P4,000 as a debt to Zosimo Fernandez listed his undivided half in the land which is being among the properties referred above as "registered in his name in the Registry of Property of the Province of Laguna." On May 4, 1940, the defendant was indicted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna with a violation of article 183 of the Revised Penal Code for alleged false testimony and perjury in solemn affirmation. In sustaining the defendants motion to quash, the lower court dismissed the information against the defendant on the ground that the acts charged therein do not constitute false testimony as defined in article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an appeal was initiated by the Government. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable for the alleged offense of false testimony as defined in article 183 of the Revised Penal Code? HELD: The appealed judgment is correct. The record fails to show that the defendant maliciously committed the acts imputed to him. The acts charged could not be malicious as against the defendant's creditors because, instead of concealing assets, he listed property which should not be included in the inventory. He included his indebtedness to Zosimo Fernandez in the schedule, probably in his very desire to be consistent with the inclusion of the land in the inventory and to safeguard the rights of Zosimo Fernandez. The appealed order was affirmed, with costs de oficio.

PEOPLE vs. LIDRES G.R. No. L-12495, July 26, 1960 Barrera, J. FACTS: Dionisio Lidres was charged with the crime of usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10 at the Court of First Instance of Cebu considering that he perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the Biasong Elementary School which was assigned to and occupied by Miss Joseta Diutay who had been duly appointed to said position. The accused pleaded not guilty during arraignment and after trial, he was found guilty to the crime charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 3 years to 5 years, and to pay the costs. Hence, he appealed the said judgment alleging the error based on the trial courts finding that he was guilty of the crime of usurpation of the official functions. Records show that a certain Magdalena P. Echavez who is a public school teacher at Biasong Elementary School in Cebu was granted maternity leave. Then, Josita Diotay and defendant Lidres filed their respective applications as substitute teachers. Thus, the supervising teacher Hilario Laspias recommended Diotay to fill up the position of Echavez wherein an agreement of 50-50 basis shall be equally divided between them. Diotay then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade class in said school. On the basis of the above-mentioned agreement, the defendant prepared a resignation letter for Diotay to sign to which the latter refused to do so. Thus, the defendant insisted in taking over the class of Diotay wherein one of them conducted classes with the other 2 rows of pupils. The said incident was reported by Diotay to the principal teacher. On the following day, both Diotay and defendant were summoned by the supervising teacher (Laspias) for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said supervising teacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back to school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant again took over Diotay's class against the latter's will. Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at the beginning of this opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant should be held liable for the crime of usurpation of official functions under Republic Act No. 10?

HELD: Appellant now contends in his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to his case because this law is an emergency measure and intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations. Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of subversive organizations, it is neither alleged in the information aforequoted, nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of said seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under said provision of Republic Act. No. 10. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense "without pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, inasmuch as the information does not charge the same. Wherefore, the decision appealed from was reversed; the accused acquitted, with costs de oficio, and the bond given for his provisional liberty cancelled. U.S. vs. RASTROLLO 1 Phil. 22 G.R. No. 202, September 21, 1901 TORRES, J. FACTS: In civil proceedings instituted to obtain a preventive attachment to secure a debt contracted by Carlos Rastrollo in favor of D. Emeterio Ruiz, 1,121 feet of hose, among other property belonging to said Rastrollo, was attached at the instance of Attorney Florencio Gonzalez on behalf of Don Gerardo Urbina. The attached property remained in the possession of Rastrollo, who, with the consent of the counsel for the plaintiff, sold the same to the Manila Fire Department. Rastrollo failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale, to the counsel for the plaintiff, and only deposited the same in the court on the 4th day of June of this year, the day following the filing of the complaint charging him with the crime of embezzlement (estafa). ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be held liable for estafa? HELD: The misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of attached property which was sold by consent by the depositary, constitutes malversation under sections 395, 390, and 392 of the Penal Code, and not estafa.

However, the accused Rastrollo in selling the said hose acted with the knowledge and consent of the attorney for his creditor and it is proved that the said attorney agreed with the depositary that the proceeds of the sale should be delivered to him. On the other hand, there was no proof that the depositary, Rastrollo, appropriated or applied the proceeds of the sale of the hose to his own use or that of others, but has deposited the same in court. Hence, it is evident that the defendant has contracted no criminal liability. His act does not include all of the elements which constitute the crime of malversation, or of any other crime, and the irregularity noted in his conduct is chargeable to the attorney for the creditor who might have been prejudiced thereby. In view of the foregoing considerations, which are completely in accord with the penal law and the conclusions and merits of the case, the accused, Don Carlos Rastrollo, should be acquitted and the judgment appealed from reversed with costs in both instances de oficio.

VICENTE vs. KAPUNAN 45 Phil. 483 G.R. No. B045049, December 8, 1923 MALCOLM, J. FACTS: In 1917, Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into extensive business transactions in the Province of Leyte. Unfortunately, the business failed to prosper. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up their affairs, they eventually formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz and laid upon the hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the term of one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. After considerable delay, there followed the usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale which resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at public auction. At the time fixed for the sale, Vicente Diaz appeared together with his lawyer Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, under the authority and based on the statement of Kapunan that he was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding at the said auction for consideration of Mr. Diaz offer of one thousand pesos (P1,000). Following the termination of the sheriff's sale, Diaz gave Kapunan P500 of the P1,000. Diaz further followed the usual procedure to take over the property of Mendezona pursuant to his bid of P12,500, which covered the amount of the mortgage with its accumulated interest and with the judicial expenses. Diaz then, filed charges against Attorney Kapunan for alleged unprofessional conduct.

During much of the time here mentioned, Kapunan was the attorney of Mendezona wherein he was given extensive authority by the letter dated April 12, 1919. When Kapunan took part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his client and for the benefit of the client. From the report of the fiscal, indorsed by the Attorney-General, three charges seem to have been considered. The first two, relating to Kapunan's attempt to represent both the parties in the case, and to molest and disturb Diaz by frivolous motions, the law officer of the Government finds not corroborated. The third charge is more serious and has to do with Kapunan having intervened in the manner in which he did in the sale of the property of his client Mendezona. The Attorney-General is of the opinion on this point that the facts constitute a deliberate violation of the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be held liable for violation article 542 of the Penal Code? HELD: Public policy discountenances combinations or agreements on the part of bidders at execution sales, the objects and effects of which are to stifle competition. The courts will consider an agreement between a judgment creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold under an execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties concerned know of the arrangement and consent thereto. Execution sales should be open to free and full competition, in order to secure the maximum benefit for the debtor. Article 542 of the Penal Code is, therefore, a wise provision even though rarely invoked, and should be used to discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales. (23 C.J., 647; Packard vs. Bird and Chapman [1870], 40 Cal., 378; 3 Viada, Codigo Penal, 594.) The Court concluded that Attorney Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of article 542 of the Penal Code. But they cannot adopt the vigorous recommendation of the Attorney-General, for they consider present certain mitigating circumstances which exert an influence in favor of the respondent. In the first place, as disclosed by the judicial records, no reported prosecution under article 542 has been attempted, which is eloquent proof of the practical disuse of this article; and the Spanish jurisprudence, while indicative of the meaning of the article, relies principally on the decisions of the French Court of Cassation. (See Code of Napoleon, arts. 222, 223; decisions of the French Court of Cassation of October 16, 1844, May 15, 1857, and January 8, 1863.) In the next place, the complainant Diaz is equally guilty with the respondent Kapunan. And lastly, Kapunan appears to have been acting in good faith for his client, although adopting an irregular procedure, and although attempting to make tardy restitution of the money received by him. Therefore, the judgment rendered is that Attorney Ruperto Kapunan shall stand reprimanded and that the complainant, Vicente Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the P500 received by Diaz from the clerk and receipted for by Diaz, and the clerk of court shall transmit the P500 to Secundino de Mendezona or, in case of his absence, to Miss Carmen de Mendezona. Costs shall be taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.