Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government Traci R. Huesing The Ohio State University

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

1. Introduction To what extent, if any, is congressional productivity impeded during times of divided government, due to legislative gridlock in the United States Senate and House of Representatives? According to popular belief, the president is more likely to experience difficulty passing legislation during times of divided government than during times of united government. This literature will analyze the time period of 1947 through 2008, focusing particularly on the successes of each presidential term by examining the amount of legislative productivity accomplished during each Congress, through comparing the amount of significant enactments from times of divided and united government. The paper will also focus specifically on the early 1980s onward, as this is when Congress became more partisan polarized, in order to better understand if party relations directly affect legislative productivity and the voting behavior of Congress. There is a discernable problem of partisan polarization in Congress, because if the majority does not share the same ideology as the President, he will most likely not be able to make changes he considers necessary for the United States, according to popular perception. This is viewed as the most logical conclusion, because partisanship affects voting habits. Nevertheless, is it truly more difficult to progress when dealing with a politically divided Congress than it is when Congress is composed of a majority of the presidents party? Most likely, there are more factors involved than strictly the party identification of each member of Congress, such as the median voters position and individual policy preference considerations. If the president is eager to follow through with his agenda during a time of divided government, he will need to appeal to both parties as well as gather support from a wide range of constituents. It is important to understand why members of the House and Senate vote the way they typically do, in order to establish a connection between which propositions of the president get passed, which ones fail, and how the outcomes affect citizens of the United States. II. Existing Literature Intuitively, one may conclude that during times of divided government, passing legislation, especially major legislation, would be more difficult than when Congress and the president embrace the same party preferences. However, according to research from David Mayhew (1991), it appears that through extensive problemsolving, even during times of divided government, Congress and the president are able to cooperate in the same ways as when there is unified party control. This is not to suggest that passing legislation is simple. Instead, Mayhews Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking, and investigations,

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

1946-1990, concludes that there is a similar amount of conflict within ones own party, so regardless of if the government is united or divided, differing opinions exist and a problem-solving mindset needs to be held by representatives in order to facilitate cooperation and promote legislative productivity. When put into conversation with Mayhews findings, research by Richard Conley strengthens the argument that legislative productivity is not increased solely because of united government. Congress and the presidency are remarkably able to adapt to changing policy-making contexts and shifts in the balance of influence and power between the branches (Conley, 2003, p. 221). Conley continues on, describing how a cooperative mindset enables progress and agreement between parties and individuals, not merely analogous party identification. Research by John Coleman also argues the same contention. Congress enacts substantially the same volume of legislation (public acts and private acts) when party control of Congress is divided as it does when one party is in control of both houses (Coleman, 1999, p. 823). It appears that legislative productivity is not affected substantially by whether or not government is united or divided, but rather if individual congressmen can problem solve across party lines as well as within their own party. If divided government does not drastically impede legislative productivity, what then are the incentives for elected officials to problem solve within and across party lines? The Median Voter Theorem suggests that policy outcomes will typically reflect preferences of the median voter. Party motivationsare also important in characterizing equilibrium party positions and policy outcomes. Indeed, when parties care about policy as well as electoral success, the model implies that equilibrium party positions need not be so far apart (Ingberman & Villani, 1993, p. 459). Ingberman and Villani suggest that due to a prisoners dilemma, it is more beneficial for officials to come to a similar consensus of policy preference, that is more favored among voters in the center of a onedimensional political spectrum, if they desire to increase their chances of reelection. This would create an incentive for partisans to compromise and reach a more moderate policy preference. However, this process could still be demanding, because not only would the two major parties have to come to a common agreement, members of the same party would first have to agree where the center of their preferences lies. However, empirical analyses by other researchers suggest that partisanship does matter. We can again conclude that party matters because of its ability to discipline members, for example by deciding who gets to sit on key committees or receives other perquisites controlled by the leadership (Chiou & Rothenberg, 2006, p. 726). This work sheds light on inner-party conflict, and how establishing party cohesion can often be challenging. Individual

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

agendas exist within party agendas, which helps to explain why legislative productivity can be just as arduous during times of united government, as during times of divided government. Members of the same party will not necessarily vote in the same manner, because their preferences and agendas will most likely not be identical. What does this mean for voters during secondary elections? Electoral accountability is imperfect, so voters have to infer each partys true preferences. They use the following rule: associate the observed policy with the incumbent party and use the platform proposed by the opposition party to infer its policy preference (Fernndez-Albertos & Lapuente, 2010, p. 804). It is much more difficult for the unsophisticated voter to differentiate between inner-party agendas during secondary elections. Research by Fernndez-Albertos and Lapuente conclude that voters are far more likely to discern between inter-party agendas, than those within parties. Due to this, it is easier for congressmen within the same party to continue debating over certain policies without it being noticed by the electorate. When put into conversation with one another, all of this research provides reasonable explanation as to why legislative productivity can be impeded during times of united government, to the same extent that it is when Congress and the executive are not affiliated with the same party. III. Data Sources/Research Plan This literature will incorporate data from the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives and The United States Senate websites, in order to accurately assess the majority and minority parties of the House of Representatives and the Senate during the time period of 1947-2008. After determining the partisan breakdown of each presidential term, this data will be used to conclude whether or not the government was united or divided during each term. David Mayhews online datasets for his 1991 book, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990, will then be used to assess the legislative productivity of each Congress within the given time period. The number of legislation will totaled according to the year of passage, and special emphasis will be placed on major legislation, which Mayhew indicates by listing in bold. According to Mayhew, this legislation is historically important. The data will be shown in tabular and graphical formation, according to its corresponding date. By incorporating the exact number of legislation passed by times of both united and divided government, and creating bar graphs, it will be easy to compare the legislative productivity during the different times. This will successfully aid in the analysis of whether or not congressional productivity is impeded during times of divided government, due to legislative gridlock in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, because one will be able to physically see trends, if any are to exist, in the amount of legislation passed during

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

periods of united and divided government. To be clear, for the purposes of this research paper, the definition of united government is when members of a single party control the presidency and both houses of Congress. Divided government is when members of different parties control the presidency and Congress. IV. Analysis <Table 1 here> This table represents each distinct year from 1947-2008 according to who the president was, his party identification, and the exact number of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The purpose of this table is to configure if government was divided or united during each specific year as well as the presidential term as a whole. <Table 2 here> Table 2 uses the data from Table 1 to simplify the partisan rundown of government in 2-year intervals. Data from David Mayhews online datasets are incorporated into Table 2, mapping out the total amount of legislation that was passed during the time period of 1947-2008. <Table 3.1 here> Table 3.1 continues with this analysis by including major legislation, which Mayhews notes in his datasets as historically important legislation. The major legislation column is not additional legislation; it is included in the number of legislation column to the left. <Table 3.2 here> Table 3.2 is a simpler version of Table 3.1, showing the total number of legislation passed in each two-year interval, and specifically makes note of whether government was united or divided. As one can conclude by looking at the numbers, there is not a significant difference in the amount of legislation passed during united government, in comparison to the amount passed during times when government was divided. <Figure 1 here> Instead, what seems apparent is that the amount of legislative productivity increases and decreases in wave-like trends. Generally, from 1961-1975, more legislation was passed. Then, there appears to be a time of decline, followed by a rise in 1987-88. This is followed by a decline, but then productivity picks back up again in 2001 onward. These time periods of increased legislative productivity are from both united and divided governments,

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

suggesting that there is at least one other mechanism, besides the partisan composition of Congress and the executive, attributing to this wave-like trend in legislative productivity. <Table 4.1 here> <Figure 2 here> However, as Table 4.1 portrays, major legislation does tend to be passed significantly more during times of united government. Figure 2 illustrates the amount of major legislation passed by united and divided governments in graphical formation. While there is not a huge difference in productivity, the larger numbers do come from united government. <Table 4.2 here> Table 4.2 separates the major legislation passages by if government was united or divided, making it easier to compare productivity levels. The time period of 2001-2002 was one of united government, but also when the most major legislation was passed. It may be unfair to contribute those successes solely to the fact that government was united. Certain factors, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, more than likely created a rally-around-theflag benefit, giving President Bush a high approval rating, therein incentivizing Congress to vote in favor of his policy preferences. Since Congress became more polarized in the early 1980s, it is important to critically analyze Figures 1 and 2, in order to see if the partisanship similarities or differences seemed to affect legislative productivity. A difference of means test statistic was calculated for the legislation passage data of divided government from both the time period of 1947-2008 and the smaller focus of 1981-2008. The p-value of the 1947-2008 time period was about 0.12 and 0.07 for the 1981-2008 time period. Both of these values are greater than .05, which means they show a small amount of significance. This suggests that maybe something out of the ordinary happened during some of the time periods, causing the amount of legislation to be abnormally high or low. It would be expected that the p-value for the 1981-2008 time period would be a little more significant because of strengthened polarization. That is not the case. Instead, what it depicts, is there may be some other variable influencing the results, which could be a product of something happening within the American economy or foreign policy relations, which would explain the wavelike trends of legislative productivity better than simply attributing successes and failures to partisan composition in Congress and the executive.

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

The amount of legislation increased significantly from 1965 to 1975, which was a ten-year period of mostly divided government. From 1965 to 1966, 22 pieces of legislation were enacted, which was a time of united government. However, 22 pieces of legislation were also enacted during the time periods of 1969-1970 and 19731974, which were times of divided government. Subsequently, Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of legislation passed declining and stabilizing around the time period of 1977-2000, with miniscule spikes and plummets every couple of years. However, in 2001-2002, the amount of legislation, once again, increases, only this time during a time of united government. However, the increase remains stable throughout the 2007-2008 period, which was a time of divided government. This wave-like motion exemplifies not a correlation between legislation passed in regard to divided and united government, but highlights a trend in which the variables are not identified; events taking place in the United States at the time. V. Discussion/Conclusion Essentially, this research does not prove that congressional productivity is impeded during times of divided government, due to legislative gridlock in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, but rather indicates that there are other existing factors playing into whether greater amounts of legislation get passed during certain time periods or not, even though the research does not specifically identify those factors. It is unclear as to what truly was the reason behind why more legislation was passed during some years than certain others, but it is clear that it was not profoundly related to united or divided government. This study did not focus on the particular type of legislation passed, what was historically occurring during the times of the passages, how quickly the legislation was passed, or by how many votes. However, what this research has the potential to show, with further study, is that certain economic or foreign policy events can affect whether or not Congress will be supportive of any given presidents agenda, regardless of party affiliation. In order to analyze this assertion, one would have to analyze the specific items passed during certain political times. If the majority of the legislation passed during 2001 turned out to be defense related, for example, then that could potentially demonstrate how the amount and type of legislation changes during times of crisis, which would not be directly tied to the partisan composition of government. In conclusion, united government does not necessarily strengthen legislative productivity, which is a positive sign for a president sitting in a time of divided government. The real determining factor when attempting to pass legislation, especially major legislation, seems to be appealing to the median voter. This can be deceptive,

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

because even if the majority of Congress happens to be democrat, meaning the median leans left, that median may lean to the right of the left. This median democrat could be conservative for a democrat. Therefore, even if the president is also a democrat, he will need to appeal to spatial preferences that could fall to the right of the political spectrum. Essentially, if government is divided, he could end up doing the exact same bargaining that he would have had to do even if Congress were united. This is also good news for the American people and democracy as a whole, because presidential approval ratings affect whether or not representatives will change the way they vote. Regardless of party affiliation, if an issue is salient enough for a vast majority of citizens, Congress will not vote to turn down the corresponding legislation, because they cherish their jobs. Knowing that there is at least one more important variable than party affiliation affecting the passage of legislation is quite comforting; it emphases the fact that party politics do not always surpass what the majority believes to be essential to act upon during times of crisis, which is when the United States needs a power to act efficiently the most. VI. Appendix Table 1 Party and Seat Breakdown of the President and Congress (1947-2008) President Year 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 Truman - D Truman - D Truman - D Truman - D Truman - D Truman - D Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Eisenhower - R Kennedy - D Kennedy - D Johnson - D Johnson - D Johnson - D Johnson - D Johnson - D Dem. 45 45 54 54 49 49 47 47 48 48 49 49 65 65 64 64 66 66 68 68 64 Senate Rep. 51 51 42 42 47 47 48 48 47 47 47 47 35 35 36 36 34 34 32 32 36 House Rep. 246 246 171 171 199 199 221 221 203 203 201 201 153 153 174 174 176 176 140 140 187

Ind. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Dem. 188 188 263 263 235 235 213 213 232 232 234 234 283 283 263 263 259 259 295 295 247

Ind. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Legislative Productivity and Gridlock During Times of United and Divided Government

1968 Nixon - R 64 36 0 247 187 1969 Nixon - R 57 43 0 243 192 1970 Nixon - R 57 43 0 243 192 1971 Nixon - R 54 44 2 255 180 1972 Nixon - R 54 44 2 255 180 1973 Nixon - R 56 42 2 242 192 1974 Ford - R 56 42 2 242 192 1975 Ford - R 61 37 2 291 144 1976 Ford - R 61 37 2 291 144 1977 Carter - D 61 38 1 292 143 1978 Carter - D 61 38 1 292 143 1979 Carter - D 58 41 1 277 158 1980 Carter - D 58 41 1 277 158 1981 Reagan - R 46 53 1 242 192 1982 Reagan - R 46 53 1 242 192 1983 Reagan - R 45 55 0 269 166 1984 Reagan - R 45 55 0 269 166 1985 Reagan - R 47 53 0 253 182 1986 Reagan - R 47 53 0 253 182 1987 Reagan - R 55 45 0 258 177 1988 Bush - R 55 45 0 258 177 1989 Bush - R 55 45 0 260 175 1990 Bush - R 55 45 0 260 175 1991 Bush - R 56 44 0 267 167 1992 Clinton - D 56 44 0 267 167 1993 Clinton - D 56 44 0 258 176 1994 Clinton - D 56 44 0 258 176 1995 Clinton - D 47 53 0 204 230 1996 Clinton - D 47 53 0 204 230 1997 Clinton - D 45 55 0 206 228 1998 Clinton - D 45 55 0 206 228 1999 Clinton - D 45 55 0 211 223 2000 Bush - R 45 55 0 211 223 2001 Bush - R 50 50 0 212 221 2002 Bush - R 50 49 1 212 221 2003 Bush - R 48 51 1 205 229 2004 Bush - R 48 51 1 205 229 2005 Bush - R 44 55 1 202 232 2006 Bush - R 44 55 1 202 232 2007 Bush - R 49 49 2 233 202 2008 Obama - D 49 49 2 233 202 a. Breakdown of partisan Senate seat data collected from the United States Senate (N.d.) b. Breakdown of partisan House seat data collected from the Office of the Clerk (N.d.)

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0

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Table 2 Partisan Control Breakdown of the President and Congress With Legislation (1947-2009) Year President House Senate # of Laws 1947-1949 D R R 10 1949-1951 D D D 11 1951-1953 D D D 6 1953-1955 R R R 9 1955-1957 R D D 6 1957-1959 R D D 11 1959-1961 R D D 5 1961-1963 D D D 15 1963-1965 D D D 13 1965-1967 D D D 22 1967-1969 R D D 16 1969-1971 R D D 22 1971-1973 R D D 16 1973-1975 R D D 22 1975-1977 R D D 14 1977-1979 D D D 12 1979-1981 D D D 10 1981-1983 R D R 9 1983-1985 R D R 7 1985-1987 R D R 9 1987-1989 R D D 12 1989-1991 R D D 9 1991-1993 R D D 8 1993-1995 D D D 12 1995-1997 D R R 15 1997-1999 D R R 9 1999-2001 D R R 6 2001-2003 R R D/R 16 2003-2005 R R R 10 2005-2007 R R R 14 2007-2009 D D D 13 a. Party control calculation based of off combined data from both the United States Senate (N.d.) and the Office of the Clerk (N.d) b. Total legislation measured from Mayhew, D.R. datasets (N.d).

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Table 3.1 Total Legislation From United and Divided Government With Major-Leg. Subset (1947-2008) Year # Legislation Major UNI/DIV 1947-48 10 2 DIV 1949-50 12 2 UNI 1951-52 6 0 UNI 1953-54 9 0 UNI 1955-56 6 0 DIV 1957-58 11 1 DIV 1959-60 5 0 DIV 1961-62 15 1 UNI 1963-64 13 4 UNI 1965-66 22 3 UNI 1967-68 16 1 UNI 1969-70 22 0 DIV 1971-72 16 0 DIV 1873-74 22 1 DIV 1975-76 14 0 DIV 1977-78 12 0 UNI 1979-80 10 0 UNI 1981-82 9 2 DIV 1983-84 7 0 DIV 1985-86 9 1 DIV 1987-88 12 0 DIV 1989-90 9 1 DIV 1991-92 8 1 DIV 1993-94 12 2 UNI 1995-96 15 2 DIV 1997-98 9 1 DIV 1999-2000 6 0 DIV 2001-02 16 5 UNI/DIV 2003-04 10 1 UNI 2005-06 14 0 UNI 2007-08 13 2 DIV a. Divided government calculated from combined data by the United States Senate (N.d) and the Office of the Clerk (N.d.) b. Total legislation and major-legislation subset measured from Mayhew, D.R. datasets (N.d.)

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Table 3.2 Total Legislation From Divided and United Government (1947-2008) Year 1947-48 1949-50 1951-52 1953-54 1955-56 1957-58 1959-60 1961-62 1963-64 1965-66 1967-68 1969-70 1971-72 1873-74 1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 2007-08 Uni Leg 12 6 9 6 11 5 15 13 22 16 22 16 22 14 12 10 9 7 9 12 9 8 12 15 9 6 16 10 14 13 Div Leg 10 UNI/DIV DIV UNI UNI UNI DIV DIV DIV UNI UNI UNI UNI DIV DIV DIV DIV UNI UNI DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV UNI DIV DIV DIV DIV UNI UNI DIV

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Figure 1 Total Legislation From Divided and United Government (1947-2008) 25

20

15 Uni Leg Div Leg

10

Comparison of total legislation measured by calculations of Table 3.2

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Table 4.1 Total Major-Legislation From United and Divided Government (1947-2008) Year Uni Leg Div Leg UNI/DIV 1947-48 2 DIV 1949-50 2 UNI 1951-52 0 UNI 1953-54 0 UNI 1955-56 0 DIV 1957-58 1 DIV 1959-60 0 DIV 1961-62 1 UNI 1963-64 4 UNI 1965-66 3 UNI 1967-68 1 UNI 1969-70 0 DIV 1971-72 0 DIV 1873-74 1 DIV 1975-76 0 DIV 1977-78 0 UNI 1979-80 0 UNI 1981-82 2 DIV 1983-84 0 DIV 1985-86 1 DIV 1987-88 0 DIV 1989-90 1 DIV 1991-92 1 DIV 1993-94 2 UNI 1995-96 2 DIV 1997-98 1 DIV 1999-2000 0 DIV 2001-02 5 UNI 2003-04 1 UNI 2005-06 0 UNI 2007-08 2 DIV Major-legislation measured from bolded legislation, indicating historical importance, listed in the Mayhew, D.R. datasets (N.d.)

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Figure 2 Total Major-Legislation From United and Divided Government (1947-2008) 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Uni Leg Div Leg

Comparison of major-legislation measured by calculations of Table 4.1

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Table 4.2 Major-Legislation Breakdown From Divided and United Government (1947-2008) Year 1947-48 1955-56 1957-58 1959-60 1969-70 1971-72 1873-74 1975-76 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92 1995-96 1997-98 1999-2000 2007-08 1949-50 1951-52 1953-54 1961-62 1963-64 1965-66 1967-68 1977-78 1979-80 1993-94 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 Uni Leg Div Leg 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 4 3 1 0 0 2 5 1 0 UNI/DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV DIV UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI UNI

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References Chiou, F-Y., & Rothenberg, L. S. (2006). Preferences, parties, and legislative productivity [Electronic version]. American Politics Research, 34(6), 705-731. Coleman, J. J. (1999). Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness [Electronic version]. American Political Science Review, 93(4), 821-835. Conley, R.S. (2003). The presidency, congress, and divided government: A postwar assessment. United States of America: Texas A&M University Press. Fernndez-Albertos, J., & Lapuente, V. (2010). Doomed to disagree? Party-voter discipline and policy gridlock under divided government [Electronic version]. Party Politics, 17(6), 801822. Ingberman, D., & Villani, J. (1993). An institutional theory of divided government and party polarization [Electronic version]. American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 429-471. Mayhew, D.R. Datasets For Divided We Govern (1991). N.d. Web. 10 May 2012. <http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html> Mayhew, D.R. (1991). Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking, and investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present). N.d. Web. 10 May 2012. <http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx> United States Senate. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present. N.d. Web. 10 May 2012. <http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm>