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Logical positivists have popularized a distinction between the context of theory or ideas discovery and the context of its justification. The distinction was put forward to clearly distinguish between so called social and psychological facts that lead to a theory and the evidences and arguments that justify it in order to better evaluate the truth or probability of a theory. This distinction is also prevalently believed to distinguish between the study of the history of science and the philosophy of science. The context of discovery is usually linked to historians of science because historians of science study how an idea developed and where it came from; they focus on the facts of the growth and proliferation of a theory of science. While the context of justification is said to be the concerns of the philosophers of science; they study the evidences for a theory and the reasons and arguments that defend it. Strict believers of the D-J distinction limit philosophy of science to only the concern itself with the context of justification and leave the context of discovery to the historians because the discovery of a theory might, and usually is, of an irrational origin. It is only when a theory is presented to the community that it can be judged as justified or not in terms of logical arguments and factual evidences. It is the logical relevance of an argument for a theory that the philosophers of science peddles. I, for one, do not endorse this distinction because I believe that the discovery and justification of a theory are always intimately married and cannot be separated, but I dont mean also that the distinction should be scrapped, I only mean that there should be no active divide between the thinkers that concern themselves with the context of discovery and the context of justification. One will not be able to see the whole process of the theory creation by focusing on only one aspect of it. I believe with Salmon when he says the processes of discovery and justification are intimately intertwined, with steps of one type alternating with steps of the other. There is no reason to conclude, from a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, that the entire process of discovery must be completed before the process of justification can begin, and that the rational reconstruction can be undertaken only after the creative work has ended. For me, Salmon captured succinctly how the reality of the origin of scientific theories in the passage above and his example , even if they seem like science fiction, to support said claim. The philosophy of science can only see the arguments for a theory and the logic behind it while the historians of science concern themselves only in facts about the origin of a theory, and a sharp distinction between the two will only encumber a more complete picture of a theory.

2. Karl Popper for a time focuses on an issue that he later distills into what he calls the problem of demarcation, more specifically the problem of demarcation between genuine science and pseudoscience. It is the problem of when a theory can be ranked, and hallowed, as scientific and the criteria that we will use to decide. Before Popper, philosophers of science believed that the hallmark of a

genuine science is its empirical methods of induction, observation and testing. Popper criticizes this by claiming that verifications are easy to look for, that they are cheap, furthermore, such verification/ confirmations should only count for risky predictions. He then gives as an example the theories of Marx, Freud and Adler and how they seem to have an explanation for every case and how everything seems to confirm their theories, this Popper saw as malicious, he saw confirmation as a vice rather than a virtue. Popper noticed later on that the more a theory forbids, the better it is. Popper saw that the irrefutability of a theory is more of a vice than a virtue and puts forward that it is not verification but falsifiability that is to be the hallmark of genuine science. A good theory is a theory that has withstood sever falsification and survived, this is the only time that it can be called corroborated which in itself, Putnam says is a form of confirmation in itself, but disregarding that, it is only when a theory is genuinely and severely tested that a corroboration is credited to the theory. In a sense, Popper is pushing for us to see as genuinely scientific those (highly improbable) theories that have survived severe and genuine attempts at falsification. Poppers criteria for demarcation seem inadequate because he keeps to very strict criteria which are in themselves inadequate (it does explain the cases of proto science). Poppers demarcation theory seems to see theory as an end in-itself and does not even ponder about the consequences of such a demarcation if applied in reality. That all our theories only to be tentatively believed until a proper test is formulated that will falsify it once and for all. His demarcation gives no security or guarantee for those who actually uses theories and applies hem in reality, his sense of highly improbable theories that have stood testing (with no guarantee at all that it will survive the next) is a completely unreliable theory. Paul Thaggard tries to give an account, which, for me, is better and more conclusive than Poppers. Thaggard puts forward the criteria of theory, community and historical context as the test for a theories being genuine or not. The criterion of theory looks at how a certain theory is constructed, its prediction and explanation powers and puzzle solving powers; community looks at how the community that advocates a theory and how, if they do, have an agreed set of principles for the theory they advocate, if they care to even explain new and apparently anomalous data that seem to falsify their theories; and lastly the criterion of the historical context of a theory which is examines if the community of practitioners examine the success of their theory to other, alternative, theories. If a theory and its community of advocates fail in these three criteria, they are labeled as unprogressive, or that it can no longer add nor explain new data to a theorys set of fact and set explanation. This is when a theory becomes pseudo scientific. I give more credence to Thaggards theory because his criteria are more believable and more prudential in real life; I could not force myself to believe in Poppers notion of demarcation however much I tried. What's more is that Thaggards theory seems to me to show us a better, clearer and more complete view of the machinations of scientific theory while Poppers seem to me a bit isolated and contained in the theory. Thaggards for me seems to be the more down to earth, the more real and plausible theory.

3.

Popper calls the scientific method a method of conjectures and refutations. This works like a veritable trial and error by using the deductive method instead of an inductive one, based on his (Humean) belief that induction does not work or for the sheer reason that an observation of an object even if I was repetitive cannot guarantee the knowledge of the same object unless it be observed again. Resemblance, cause and effect and continuity cannot be presupposed to give a sure and certain prediction of the same object unless it was observed again. Induction cannot be rationally defended and used as the fertilizer that brings growth and certainty to the products of science. Science has no use of induction and as I have said above does not seek confirmations, but rather, falsifications which easily conform to deductive logic. Popper believes that it is in our nature to seek patterns in the world, to try to understand the things we see in the world and it is with this nature that we make conjectures of the things we see. It is with conjectural beliefs of the world that we live our day to day life, but we cannot live on mere guessing, so we start to test our conjectures, try to refute them. If they survive our testing then we live and use them for another day until we formulate a better test to better ensure that our conjecture is not wrong (which is as best as we can hope for.) while, if our conjectures are proved to be false, we just start to formulate a new one and proceed into trying to falsify them again. In this way we get to discard erroneous conjectures while getting closer and closer to the most reliable conjectures we can formulate. It is with this method that science has been able to grow, with a very refined version of trial and error. This ensure the rationality of science by only claiming (and actually knowing) only what is false, what has been falsified, while testing and testing the ones that survive thereby not making and brash generalization that when a theory is confirmed by an experiment it is inadvertently true (which is the inductive.) According to Hilary Putnam, Poppers sense of a corroboration of theories is problematic because in renders knowledge to be merely provisional, that it has merely withstood testing and that there is never any form of guarantee or assurance that it would withstand the next one and that application of theories in themselves are merely, again, attempts at falsifying a theory. Provisional knowledge is not reliable enough for the practical need is of men and scientists and that applications and predictions of a theory are reduced to mere attempts at falsification. Popper seems to have forgotten the practical day to day importance of scientific predictions and applications of theories, reducing them into merely provisional, tentative truths that at any moment can be falsified. The practical reliability of scientific theories and concept are rendered moot, scientists and science are turned unimportant because they can no longer recommend anything for people to rely one because they are all provisional. The practical use of science has been diminished. Popper forgets that theories and ideas are also a means of guiding day to day action. Scientific laws and theories are no longer safe to rely upon as guides for our actions, this makes the whole endeavor of science unimportant, understanding is lost when all we ever get to know is that a theory has survived tests but we are still not sure if it will survive the next. This insight of Putnam is significant because he puts Poppers notion of theory and sets it up against reality, shows us that in reality this cannot work and science as conjectures and refutations make it an useless venture because the usual application of scientific theories are the prediction of future events and pattern making. Putnam gives science back its reason to use induction, that without it, science would not be able to predict anything, it would be useless.

4. Popper believes that the view of the sociologists of knowledge- which is the belief that believes that objectivity, or knowledge, is always relative; that there is no objective truth, only truth for a certain time and a certain age- is mistaken because he believes that the objectivity of science is not based on the objectivity of the scientist. The objectivity of science is based on a self-correcting, critical tradition of mutual (free) criticism. It is the social institution of science as an enterprise that can be tested over and over, that speaks in one tongue, as much as possible and its tradition of competition, and therefore mutual criticism, will purge science of partisan ideals. It is always the fittest theories that survive the critical enterprise of science. Crusonian science cannot lead to genuinely objective science (at best only a form of reveled science) because a part of the scientific method is missing- it lacked the publicness of the scientific method, he had no one to check his results, no one to criticize his work and show him his prejudices which are inevitable. There was no one to help him clear his biases and prejudices for the result and therefore the result is not objective, it did not pass through anyones criticism and it is full of prejudice. For Popper, the social/public character of the scientific method is important for its objectivity, that is, the objectivity of science is social/ Institutional and this institution is what shows scientists his partiality. It is the element of publicness and the technology of mutual criticism that is important in attaining objectivity. It is important because it uses the inherent partialities against each other and therefore succumbs to mutual criticism, experimentation, falsification that enables science to be objective. I find Poppers that To this we can reply that knowledge and will are, in a certain sense, always inseparable; and that this fact need not lead to any dangerous entanglement. No scientist can know without making an effort, without taking an interest; and in his effort there is usually even a certain amount of self-interest involved a cogent answer to the issue of the partialities inherent in man that leads up to relative knowledge specially if combine with his theory of mutual criticism as an institution that purges prejudices from science.

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