Property Case Digests On Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance

Property Case Digests on Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990, 134 SCRA 614 Cruz, J. FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. (EDCA), payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a check. Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who paid him after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her. Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further, Cruz had no account with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the check. EDCA went to the police, which arrested Cruz whose real name was Tomas de la Pea. EDCA sought the assistance of the police, and forced their way into the store of the Santos and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books. Santos sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored. 2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books that were sold to Santos. HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. A contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. 2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the Santos spouses. Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books and Santos had rights over the books. Dizon v. Suntay G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 160 Fernando, J. FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. She entered into a transaction with Clarita Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring was not yet returned and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as she had already pledged it with Dizons pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay. Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon asking for the
Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW
delivery of the ring pledged but, the latter refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500 as attorneys fees and costs. She asked for the remedy of replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination of the action. The CFI of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to regain possession during the pendency of the action. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay. On appeal, Dizon sought the reversal of the lower courts decision and invoking estoppel. CA affirmed the lower courts decision. SC affirmed CA decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the pawnshop owner. HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and the defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the without notice of any defect in the title of the pledgor is unavailing. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his rescue. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized. Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. The usufruct of Wanda. The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.) The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Fabie v. Gutierrez David G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945, 75 Phil. 536 Ozaeta, J. FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the respondent Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein. Previous to September 1944 litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned. ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action and as such within the jurisdiction of said court, or an action founded on property right and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court. HELD: Yes. It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of the property in question and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil Case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon, and in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things, in which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question. The naked title to the property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime. Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary during her lifetime of the income of the property in question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of administration to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary
Moralidad vs. Sps. Pernes The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioners kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CAs holding that the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity. Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise: ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy anothers property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. 11
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioners "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CAs ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between the parties. However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the question is resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents right to possession, proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case, petitioners action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer case could proceed and should prosper. The CA disposed of this issue in this wise: xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides xxx xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants [respondents] right to possess already expired and terminated. Now, has respondents right to possess the subject portion of petitioners property expired or terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents basis for occupying the same. It is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o occupy portion of her property on which their house may be built. Thus "it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like." From this statement, it seems that petitioner had given the respondents the usufructuary rights over the portion that may be occupied by the house that the latter would build, the duration of which being dependent on how long respondents would like to occupy the property. While petitioner had already demanded from the respondents the surrender of the premises, this Court is of the opinion that the usufructuary rights of respondents had not been terminated by the said demand considering the clear statement of petitioner that she is allowing respondents to occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want to. Considering that respondents still want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly cannot eject respondents. 12 We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment: ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished: (1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears; (2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct; (3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person; (4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct; (6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct; (7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.) The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents own evidence before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an irretrievable level." 13 There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice versa. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated. To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents claim for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter: If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil. 449). 14 (Emphasis ours.) By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code: Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same. Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. 15 The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioners property. Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent spouses to use and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time. They opted, however, to repay a noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called for by the law and facts of the case. It is also right Jabonete vs. Monteverde Court of First Instance of Davao, in view of its finding in Case No. 824, entitled Jabonete vs. Monteverde, et al., that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that a gravamen or easement of right of way existed thereon The easement awarded or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and their family, friends, drivers, servants and jeep. The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs successors-in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate. In resisting the extension of the aforementioned easement to the latter, the plaintiffs successors-ininterest, the respondent-appellant, therefore, was not defying the decision of March 11, 1954 which was then no longer subsisting, nor the order of May 24, 1954 since the said successors-in-interest had no right thereunder. Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the latter without any compensation to the respondent-appellant. North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo
FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as mill site) and also its adjoining plantation Hacienda Begona. He constructed a road adjoining the mill site and the provincial highway. Plaintiff allows vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for each one; pedestrians are allowed free passage. Defendant owns the adjoining Hacienda Sangay wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon (as in drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay.
At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda Begona in a passageway used by the carabaos. Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant from entering/passing through his properties (road & Hacienda). ISSUE: WON injunction should be granted. HELD: NO. RATIO: For injunction to be granted, it must be established that the right sought to be protected exists, but also that the acts against which the injunction to be directed are violative of said right. In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right and that the defendant has committed/attempts to commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint does not state how and why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiffs estate conveying tuba to his Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiffs property rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact that tuba is disposed of at defendants hacienda in which the plaintiffs laborers have access (apparently, the plaintiff hates that his laborers are getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant). This however, is a nothing more than an exercise of legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What the law does not authorize to be done directly, cannot be done indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant from selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba). (TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road was constructed by the plaintiff on his own land and it made this road accessible to the public, regardless of class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement constituted in favor of the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure as no period has been fixed when the easement was constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the road devoted to the public in general, the road is charged with public interest and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private person. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing its use, but so long as he maintains it, he must submit to the control. Furthermore there exists a forcible right of way in favor of the defendant (CC 564) because those living in Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial road except through the road in question.
Valisno v. Adriano G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398 FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the
Pampanga River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adrianos land. Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57 hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau PWC). Bureau PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of Bureau PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisnos complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of BureauPWC and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisnos evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisnos motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case. HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal on Adrianos land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code). This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property
right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adrianos act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River. Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al. G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84 Montemayor, J. FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road which traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of a right of way of said plaintiffs. On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiffs right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then later, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it. The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way. However, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the CFI. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription. HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: I would like to elaborate my reasons for concurring with the majority in declaring the easement of right of way not acquirable by prescription. The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is a limitation on the servient owner's rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from his property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosser, or passes over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner can not be continually and uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous nature. Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (old Civil Code, Art. 430; Art. 423, new Civil Code) and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession (enjoyment or exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and discontinuous. From this premise, it is inevitable to conclude, with Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement can not be acquired by acquisitive prescription (adverse possession) because the latter requires that the possession be continuous or uninterrupted (old Civil Code, Art. 1941; new Civil Code, Art. 1118). The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) did not change the situation. Observe that its section 41, in conferring prescriptive title upon "ten years adverse possession" qualifies it by the succeeding words "uninterruptedly continued for ten years which is the same condition of continuity that is exacted by the Civil Code.
SEC. 41. Title to Land by Prescription. Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants. But failure to occupy or cultivate land solely by reason of war shall not be deemed to constitute an interruption of possession of the claimant, and his title by prescription shall he complete, if in other regrets perfect, notwithstanding such failure to occupy or cultivate the land during the continuance of war. The case of Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 541, does not, if properly analyzed, constitute authority to hold that the easement of right of way is acquirable by prescription or adverse possession. The Court there said: The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was constructed in or about the year 1987; that wall on the southeast side adjoins the building lot in question; and that since the construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall through which the worshippers attending divine service enter and leave, they having to pass over and cross the land in question. It is therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also carries with it the use by faithful Catholics of the municipal land over which they have had to pass in order to gain access to said place of worship, and, as this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed since the church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period the municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by the persons who attend services customarily held in said church. The record does not disclose the date when the Government ceded to the Church the land on which the church building was afterwards erected, nor the date of the laying out of the adjacent square that is claimed by the municipality and on which the side door of the church, which is used as an entrance by the people who frequent this building, gives. There are good grounds for presuming that in apportioning lands at the time of the establishment of the pueblo of Dumangas and in designating the land adjacent to the church as a public square, this latter was impliedly encumbered with the easement of a right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the church a case provided for by article 567 of the Civil Code for the municipality has never erected any building or executed any work which would have obstructed the passage and access to the side door of the church, and the public has been enjoying the right of way over the land in question for an almost immemorable length of time. Therefore an easement of right of way over said land has been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the public which, without objection or protest, has continually availed itself of the easement in question. (34 Phil., pp. 545-546). It will be seen that the ratio decidendi of that case lies in the application of Article 567 of the old Civil Code that provides as follows: ART. 567. When an estate acquired by purchase, exchange, or partition is enclosed by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, the latter shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Bearing in mind the provisions of the article quoted in relation to the wording of the decision in the Dumangas case, it can be seen that what the court had in mind is that when the Spanish Crown apportioned the land occupied by the Church of Dumangas, it impliedly burdened the neighboring public square (which was also Crown property at the time) with an easement of right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the church, because without such easement the grant in favor of ecclesiastical authorities would be irrisory: what would be the use of constructing a church if no one could enter it?
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Now, if there was an implied grant of the right of way by the Spanish Crown, it was clearly unnecessary to justify the existence of the easement through prescriptive acquisition. Why then does the decision repeatedly speak of prescription? Plainly, the word "prescription" was used in the decision not in the sense of adverse possession for ten or thirty years, but in the sense of "immemorial usage" that under the law anterior to the Civil Code of 1889, was one of the ways in which the servitude of right of way could be acquired.1 This view is confirmed by the fact that throughout the passages hereinabove quoted, the court's decision stresses that the people of Dumangas have been passing over the public square to go to church since the town was founded and the church was built, an "almost immemorable length of time." It would seem that the term "priscription" used in said case was merely a loose expression that is apt to mislead unless the court's reasoning is carefully analyzed. Since 1889, however, the Civil Code repealed the prior legislation; and thereafter the right of way could only be acquired by title and not by adverse possession (usucapio), saving those servitudes already acquired before the Code came into effect (Decisions, Supreme Court of Spain 27 Oct. 1900, 1st February 1912; 11 May 1927, and 7 January 1920).
Taedo v. Bernad G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86 Padilla, J. FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Taedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Taedo as a security for the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Taedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Taedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Taedo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the same interest. HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Central Case regarding the milling contracts and use of the railroad in going to the sugar central HELD: 1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar company for the construction of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the servient estates can be transported on said railroad, because it is a well-settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership
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and not by easement. That an easement being established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of the servient estates cannot limit its use to the transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to that effect. 2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons carrying goods pertaining to persons who arent wners of the servient estates and at all time the person entitled o the easement may please, for in such case the easement ontinues to be the same.
Goldcrest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp.
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a tenstorey building located atHerrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof decks limited common area by Section 4(c)[4]of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.
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Goldcrest contends that since the areas it allegedly encroached upon were not actually measured during the previous ocular inspections, the finding of the Court of Appeals that it built an office structure on the roof decks limited common area is erroneous and that its directive to remove the permanent structures constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck is impossible to implement.
On the other hand, Cypress counters that the Court of Appeals finding is correct. It also argues that the absence of such measurement does not make the assailed directive impossible to implement because the roof decks limited common area is specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed, which reads: Section. 4. The Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use of such limited areas: xxxx (c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex B) by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck. xxxx
We rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings, the failure to measure the supposed encroached areas is no longer relevant because the award for actual damages is no longer in issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure on the roof decks limited common area is supported by substantial evidence and established facts, to wit: (1) the ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB Inspector Edwin D. Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular inspection of the roof deck was intended to measure the actual area encroached upon by Goldcrest;](3) the fact that Goldcrest had been fined for building a structure on the limited common area; and (4) the fact that Goldcrest neither denied the structures existence nor its encroachment on the roof decks limited common area.
Likewise, there is no merit in Goldcrests submission that the failure to conduct an actual measurement on the roof decks encroached areas makes the assailed directive of the Court of Appeals impossible to implement. As aptly pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.
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Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof decks common limited area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do not impair the subject easement.
For its part, Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject easement because the same are already beyond the contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.
The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one of fact, considering that its resolution requires us to determine the acts propriety in relation to the character and purpose of the subject easement. In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.
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Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333 Sarmiento, J. FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it. Therefore, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate." ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of Costabella. HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate. Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the case at bar, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. National Power Corp. vs. Suarez In issue in the present petition is whether petitioner, the National Power Corporation, in its acquisition of an easement of right of way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the land, must be paid. Petitioner's plea for the application of Section 3A(b) of RA 6395 which directs the payment of an amount equivalent to only 10% of the market value of the property as just compensation for an easement of right of way does not lie.
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Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent's property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. x x x True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. [ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner's assertion that respondents can still make use of the property by planting corn, rice, root crops and similar plants fails to consider that the property was originally tilled and suited for, as reflected in the Commissioners' Report, 234 fruit bearing coconut trees, 617 abaca plants, 50 madre de cacao and 23 jackfruit trees. That petitioner prohibited respondents from planting trees higher than three meters clearly shows that the easement had impaired respondents' beneficial enjoyment of their property to warrant the imposition of payment of its full value. The measure is thus not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to thereby convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of taking is thus the principal criterion in determining just compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be considered. Lao vs. Alburo Hence the question to be decided relates solely to the matter of the said wall of the property designated as parcel No. 2 the subject matter of the objection filed by the administrator of the estate of the deceased Lorenza Alburo, owner of the property adjoining that designated as parcel No. 2 inasmuch as the administrator alleges in his objection that the said stone wall forms a part of the property that belonged to the said deceased while the applicants claim that this wall is theirs, being a part of the strong-minded material house constructed on the said parcel of land, Lot No. 2 according to the plan, Exhibit A. Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. As the court held judgment appealed from that the wall which lies between the properties of the applicant and the objectors was a party wall, and as the applicants appealed from this ruling, it devolves upon us to decide whether it is in fact a party wall, as counsel for the administrator of the estate of the deceased Alburo or for her heirs finally admitted that it was in assenting to that decision, although he averred in his written objection that it was the exclusive property of the objectors; or whether, on the contrary, this wall is a part of property marked No. 2 on the plan Exhibit A, as the applicants claims. Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on
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one of the lots and not on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and cement, has stone projecting at intervals from the surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the adjoining building. The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the applicants, is much higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the said wall is covered by the roof of the applicants building; that the supports of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants land and that none of the buttresses are on the side of the objectors lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing wall of the applicants property in such wise that the two walls that inclose the lot form but a single construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but that it forms a part of the applicants building and belongs to them. Besides the signs just referred to, the evidence also shows that on the objectors land and flanking the disputed wall there is another and lower wall which has no connection with the one in question. Cayetano Arguelles, a master builder, who climbed to the top of the wall in question and examined it, testified that the aforesaid drain caught the rain water from the eaves of the applicants roof, and that from the outside the division or space between the applicants wall and the wall on the objectors land could be seen; that the lower part of this latter wall had two arch like hollows; that according to the testimony of the objector, Ireneo Mendoza, the latter wall was that of an old building that had belonged to the said deceased and was destroyed by an earthquake; and that in the rear of the objectors land were the ruins of a wall which had also flanked the wall in dispute, and these ruins, according to the said witness Mendoza were what was left of the wall of a latrine formerly existing there. These exterior signs contrary to the existence of a party-wall easement cannot be offset by the circumstance that the dispute wall projects into Calle Juan Luna 74 centimeters farther than the applicants building, and neither can the fact that the face of this projecting wall is on the same street line as the objectors building, for the reason that, in view of the said signs contrary to the existence of the easement of party wall, the projection of the wall does not prove that it was a party wall belonging in common to the applicants and the objectors and that the latter shared in the ownership thereof. The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation was erected on the land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors property may have surreptitiously inserted some of the timbers or joists of their building in the wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a party wall, when there are so many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive ownership of the wall and to conflict with the existence of the easement that the objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong exclusively to the applicants. All of the applicants properties, including the wall in question, should therefore be registered.
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, but the decree of registration of the property designated as Lot No. 2 shall include the disputed wall as belonging exclusively to the applicants, and that part of said wall is a party wall is hereby reversed. GARGANTOS V. CA
FACTS: Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in thepoblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein. On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application. Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent never acquired any easement either by title or by prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise, neither petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final judgment to that effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the prescriptive period never started. ISSUE/HELD: WON Yanon acquired easement by virtue of the deed of sale. AFFIRMATIVE it should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owner by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW
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to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 541, O.C.C (now Article 624, N.C.C) which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates (Articles 530, O.C.C., now Articles 613, N.C.C). We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.
CORTES vs. YU-TIBO This suit was brought to obtain an injunction, in accordance with the provisions of section 162 to 172 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of restraining the continuation of certain buildings commenced by the defendant. The court below issued a preliminary injunction during the trial, but, upon, rendering final judgment, dissolved the injunction, with the costs against the plaintiff. The latter excepted to this judgment and assigns error: Facts: That house No. 65 Calle Rosario, this city, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; (2) that these windows have been in the existence since the year 1843 and (3) that the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. Held: The court below in its decision held in the easement of light is negative, and this ruling has been assigned by the plaintiff as error to be corrected by this court. A building may receive light in various manners in the enjoyment of an easement of light, because the openings through which the light penetrates may be made in one's own wall, in the wall of one's neighbor, or in a party wall. The legal doctrine applicable in either one of these cases is different, owing to the fact that, although anyone may open windows in his own wall, no one has a right to do so in the wall of another without the consent of the owner, and it is also necessary, in accordance with article 580 of the Civil Code, to obtain the consent of the other coowner when the opening is to be made in a party wall.
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This suit deals with the first case; that is, windows opened in a wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff, and it is this phase of the easement which it is necessary to consider in this opinion. When a person opens windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of ownership inherent in the right of property, which, under article 348 of the Civil Code, empowers him to deal with his property as he may see fit, with no limitations other than those established by law. By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement: "For a man," says law 13, title 31, third partida, "should not use that which belongs to him as if it were a service only, but as his own property." Coexistent with this right is the right of the owner of the adjacent property to cover up such windows by building on his own land or raising a wall contiguously to the wall in which the windows are opened (art. 581 of the same Code), by virtue of the reciprocity of rights which should exist between abutting owners, and which would cease to exist if one could do what he pleased on his property and the other could not do the same on his. Hence it is that the use of the windows opened in a wall of one's own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property (judgments of the supreme court of Spain of the 17th of May, 1876; 10th of May, 1884; 30th of May, 1890), and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the latter (judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 13th of June, 1877). The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of possession according to article 1942 of the Civil Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement of light with respect to the openings made in one's own edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them, inasmuch as they may be covered up at any time by the owner of the abutting property, and, as Manresa says in his commentaries on the Civil Code, "there is no true easement as long as the right to impede its use exists." The easement really consists of in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding the light (ne luminibus officiatur). The latter coincides in its effects, from this point of view, with the obligation of refraining from increasing the height of a building (altius non tollendi), which, although it constitutes a special easement, has for its object, at times, the prevention of any interruption of the light enjoyed by the adjacent owner. It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient estate subject to such easement is under no obligation whatsoever to allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything there himself, but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon which may tend to cut off the light from the dominant estate, which he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence of the easement. If, then, the first condition is that which is peculiar to positive easements, and the second condition that which is peculiar to negative easements, according to the definition of article 533 of the Civil Code, it is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement. As a result of the opinion above expressed, we hold: 1. That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which can not be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement. 2. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment
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assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house No. 65, because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court below and condemn the appellant to the payment of all damages caused to the plaintiff/ Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74 Fernan, C.J. FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The servient estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To provide access to the highway, a one meter road path was paved through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and the other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to and from his nursery and the highway, using the one meter road path. As his business grew, he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil catering to the now bigger demand. The problem however was that the jeepney cannot pass through the road path since its width would not be accommodated by a one meter width. Petitioner made a request upon the respondent to sell to him 1 meters of their property so that the pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way already constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the additional land to increase the existing one meter road path. HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough investigation, it was found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. It was also found that during the rainy season, the same was impassable as it became flooded. This right of way could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it may demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants, the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way.
Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748 Sarmiento, J. FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. The private respondents title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as easement of way. As a consequence, there is an annotation which was entered wherein a construction of private alley has been undertaken. However, the petitioner averred that they and their neighbors have been using the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used. The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued ex parte an order
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directing the private respondent to open the gates. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the restoration of the annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondents title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, merger brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property excluded the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the alley as an easement, notwithstanding the sale. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger. HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement but rather, for the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is therefore no owner of a dominant tenement to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. REMIGIO G.R. O. RAMOS, No. SR. vs. 75905; GATCHALIAN October REALTY, 12, INC., ET 1987 AL.
FACTS: Plaintiff Ramos acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision a house and lot containing an area of 901 square meters situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. In the subdivision survey plan, two road lots abut plaintiff's property namely lot 4133-G-12 with an area of 2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135 of the Paraaque Cadastre now known as Pambansa Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs. On April 30, 1981, Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents, alleging, among others the that he constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue (also known as Pambansa Road), Paranaque, and has since resided therein with his family from 1977 up to the present; that during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right infront of his premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest being only about 100 meters, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, the Sucat Road (now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Paraaque); that with the construction of the 7-8 feet concrete wall has constrained plaintiff and his family to use as temporary ingress/egress and with great inconvenience and hardship other lots belonging to different owners, and this becomes all the more pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud; and, lastly, that the aforesaid concrete wall is dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises posing great danger or hazard. The lower court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way as it affirmed the lower court's order. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present. HELD: The Court finds the petition not to be impressed with merit. An easement or servitude in an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement. Since there is no agreement
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between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the plaintiff and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way. A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the following four requisites are first shown to exist: (1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end); (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and (4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." (Art. 650). On the first requisite, the Court finds no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the plaintiff failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the plaintiff when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. The Court agree with the appellate court's observation that the plaintiff should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in spite of a road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.
Quimen v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163 Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of
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the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. Alcantara v. Reta, Jr. G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364 Pardo, J. FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land owned by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject them. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land, they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed complaint for the exercise of the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. However, such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed. ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first refusal. HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that said land be declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.
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To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. 1517. With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease. In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.
Villanueva v. Velasco G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99 Quisumbing, J. FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner. HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is provided
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for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952 FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning." The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. ISSUE: Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play and considered as an attractive nuisance? HELD: The Supreme Court held in the negative, basing its decision from the great majority of American decisions where such doctrine originated. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. Further, the Court cited the explanation of the Indiana Appellate Court which holds that: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance. As petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual needs no further discussion. ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95279, 25 July 1991, 199 SCRA 595 Melencio-Herrera, J. FACTS: Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of an antiquated and dilapidated quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, outside the zone for warehouses. The legal possessor of the quonset sought the prohibition of the Order but was
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denied by the RTC. The CA originally overturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in this case is the validity of such order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatement of nuisance, without prior judicial authority. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra-judicially order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building. HELD: NO Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]). Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings, which applies only to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra). While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination. [Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]). Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
27
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue. NOTES: Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and per accidens. As to the first, since they affect the immediate safety of persons and property, they may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance be of the second class, even the municipal authorities, under their power to declare and abate nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance. (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 (1982), citing Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo [{1913}, 24 Phil., 471]) Petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. (PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, 14 July 2006 citing Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 (1982) Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408
Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a
28
case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers
HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
29
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005 Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that these constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. Ordinance No. 1631 AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA Ordinance No. 1778 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995 The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.
30
The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 Ruling: . As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective. Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code. City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power.
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Property Case Digests On Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance

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