Public Officers Digest

PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAWS Notes & Digest
RAMON L. LABO, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA PONENTE: BIDIN, J.: DOCTRINE: One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega, on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office. Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec, on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Comelec decided in favor of Ortega. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to run for Mayor; 2) Whether Ortega having the next highest number of votes is entitled to be proclaimed Mayor upon Labos disqualification. HELD: Petition DISMISSED. 1) No. Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Labo merely applied for repatriation and such application unless officially approved does not amount to repatriation. One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. 2) No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor. While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676) Separate Opinions PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not deprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status. In deciding cases involving citizenship, the presumptions should be in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth. In view of the foregoing, the PETITION is GRANTED. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.: DOCTRINE: Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semipermanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. Mrs. Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood", however, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed her that the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. COMELEC sustained Montejo. ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections
HELD: Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile in election laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile. Separate Opinion PONENTE: PUNO, J., concurring: First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied) Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. FRANCISCO, J., concurring: Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present
intention of making it his permanent home. It is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. The records clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the PCGG which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila. In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution. ROMERO, J., separate opinion: I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte. MENDOZA, J., separate opinion: Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting: To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent. REGALADO, J., dissenting: Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party. When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment, she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City. It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied). Mrs. Marcos having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law
sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage. Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows: The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death. Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.: DOCTRINE: There are two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship :By birth natural born citizens; Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Teodoro Cruz was born a Filipino in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his citizenship by rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congress, this time declaring himself as natural-born. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was Bengson. Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Article IV, Sec 2 of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House. Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase from birth in Art IV, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner argues that from birth means starting from a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. Respondent contends that from birth refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via Repatriation, so that he is qualified to be a member of the House of Representatives; 2) Whether the HRET committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favor of Cruz as natural-born citizen HELD: 1) YES. Cruz is a natural-born citizen and is therefore qualified to be a member of the House of Representatives. There are two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship :By birth natural born citizens; Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress. a. Naturalization mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. b. Repatriation available for those who have lost their citizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity.
Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local Civil Registry The 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for reacquisition. Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. 2) NO. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Courts jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. Separate Opinion: PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reacquire natural-born citizenship. The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution, a matter which can only be accomplished through constitutional amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.: DOCTRINE: Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Both Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano got the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not an alien. COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. COMELEC en banc reversed the 2nd Division. ISSUE/S: Whether under our laws, Manzano is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. HELD: No. In including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Manzano by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR. PONENTE: FRANCISCO, J.: DOCTRINE: The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Rodriguez and Marquez both ran for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-
elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory Marquez alleged that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). COMELEC dismissed Marquezs petition. In the 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This time the COMELEC sustained Marquez. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the which prompted Marquez to file urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC granted. Nonetheless the Provincial Board of Canvassers still proceeded with the proclamation. The Court ordered COMELEC to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to receive and evaluate such legally admissible evidence as Rodriguez may be minded to present to establish petitioner's contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from justice. In its report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" it declared that Rodriguez NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985). ISSUE/S: Whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice", the determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. HELD: No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice"
under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.: DOCTRINE: The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. NATURE: Special civil action for certiorari and preliminary injunction FACTS: Lee sought the disqualification of Frivaldo to run for governor of Sorsogon for being an alien. When Frivaldo got the highest number of votes, Lee asked the COMELEC to proclaim him instead of Frivaldo since he got the next highest number of votes. Accordingly, Lee was proclaimed Frivaldo alleged that he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when COMELEC order was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor. ISSUE/S: 1) Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? 2) Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? HELD: 1) Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and
on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. It provides a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. Any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date. 2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. NATURE: Review of Sandiganbayan Decision FACTS: Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Lecaroz father and son arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. Lecaroz father and son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 13 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. They now seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence. ISSUES: 1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes; 2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired; If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the office despite the vacancy therein, in a holdover capacity; 3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars, accused Lenlie was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover capacity; if not WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent; 4) WON the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which they had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements HELD: Petition is meritorious. 1) NO. Red had not validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27 September 1985. Under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. 2) The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had expired. However, Lenlie could occupy the office as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB in a holdover capacity. The concept of
holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. 3) The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. 4) Prudence and good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian. AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG v. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.: DOCTRINE: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. It does not recognize dual allegiance. NATURE: Original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. It seeks to enjoin respondent from implementing RA NO. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." It contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." The said law provides for the loss of Philippine citizenship upon acquisition of foreign citizenship; the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance; derivative citizenship; and the corresponding civil and political rights and liabilities of those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under the Act. Pertinently, the Act provides under Section 5 on Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities: xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; xxx (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or xxx ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional because Section 2 and 3 of the act taken together allows dual allegiance and not dual citizen HELD: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. Excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is: To do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries; To allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. The Court also held what the RA No. 9225 does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado v. Manzano had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J: DOCTRINE: While petitioners are not among those officers mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board, they are alternates of the said officers, whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC FACTS: On Feb. 22, 1991 in SC declared EO 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants, to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices and to receive compensation. COA issued Memorandum 97-038 directing all unit heads/ auditors/ team leaders of the national government agencies and GOCCs which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, and their representatives in violation of the rule on multiple positions to: a)Immediately cause disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials; b)Effect the refund of the same from February 22, 1991 until the present. Accordingly, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of Cabinet members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA BOD and//or their respective alternates who actually received the payments. NHA Board of Directors from 1991-1996, appealed the notice of disallowance, grounds: 1.) The prohibition against multiple positions does not apply to appointive officials 2.) NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Asst. Secretaries COA denied their appeal, because petitioners were holding the position as representatives of cabinet members who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office during their tenure. ISSUE/S: HELD: COA AFFIRMED. P.D. 757 Creating the National Housing Authority Section 7. BOD The authority shall be governed by a BOD, which shall be composed of: 1.) The Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication,
2.) 3.) 4.) 5.) 6.) 7.)
the Director-General of NEDA, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Labor, The Secretary of Industry, The Executive Secretary, The General Manager of the Authority.
From among these members, the President will appoint a chairman. The members of the Board may have their respective alternates who shall be the officials next in rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided, that in the absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding officer, xxx.
ABETO V. GARCESA PONENTE: Davide, Jr, J.: DOCTRINE: Justification of helping the poor and the downtrodden does not absolve a public officer from administrative liability for the violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules NATURE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the SC. Malfeasance in Office. FACTS: Manuel Garcesa, stenographic reporter, RTC, Bacolod, is charged with misrepresenting himself as full fledged lawyer, and giving assistance in the filing and prosecution of some labor cases. Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) dismissed the charges, informing Garcesa of the Revised Civil Service Rule and SC Memorandum Circular No. 5 prohibiting government employees from engaging in any private business, vocation or profession without permit from the Court. Upon re-evaluation, DCA recommended reprimand for engaging in a limited law practice. ISSU/S: Whether Garcesa is liable for unauthorized practice of law. HELD: He could not be liable for unauthorized practice of law for there is no convincing evidence that he misrepresented himself as a lawyer.
However, he is guilty for moonlighting, as representative in those cases, which amounts to malfeasance in office. Manuel Garcesa is REPRIMANDED with warning that commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
RABE V. FLORES PER CURIAM DOCTRINE: The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests, and in the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. NATURE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the SC. FACTS: On August 18, 1995, Narita Rabe, filed an Administrative Complaint against Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III, RTC, Panabo, Davao, for: 1) Conduct Unbecoming of a Government Employee; 2) Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service; 3)Abuse of Authority
Rabe claimed that Mrs. Flores took advantage of her position by claiming a stall at the extension of the public market when she is not a member of the clients association awarded with the stalls pursuant to the decision of the court of Oct. 30, 1991.1 Flores also destroyed the stall of 1 client & brought the materials to the police station. The RTC absolved Flores but required her to explain:
(a.) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor
R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing her duties as [an] interpreter on May 16, 1991 when according to a certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (b.) she took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991, why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; (c.) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty [60] days from her assumption into office; and (d.) why she has indicated in her DTR's for August 1995 that she worked on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and for September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one [21] working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section
1
In Complainant Rabe's separate affidavit, she made the following allegations:
xxx xxx xxx That on August 14, 1995 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mrs. Delsa Flores, a Court Interpreter at the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, went to the stall I occupied and while there, she made several defamatory utterances against me in a very menacing, arrogant and threatening manner and in the visayan dialect, as follows: Putang ina mo ka, akoa nin pwesto, wala kay ulaw, wala kay batasan, mangingilog ug pwesto That Mrs. Flores attempted to inflict injury upon me by scratching my face but I was able to evade and with the timely intervention of Mr. Espiridion Vivas; That Mrs. Flores made the foregoing remarks and other remarks of the same import for several times in a very loud voice while walking to and fro; That Mrs. Flores challenged me to a fist fight and destroyed the stall I occupied by removing the wooden fence and the GI sheets with the help of her husband; loaded the materials on a motor vehicle and brought them to the police station of Panabo; That Mrs. Flores committed the aforementioned acts during office hours and in such conduct unbecoming a government employee; xxx xxx xxx
7 clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as per its Section 13. Her explanation: (a.) That she has really been reporting to the court even earlier in order to familiarize herself with her duties, and assumed office on May 16, 1991 in compliance with Court Directive. She admits that she had received from the municipality (LGU) a salary despite her transfer to the judiciary. She claims that she intended to refund the amount, but the salary from the SC was 3-4 months delayed. (1.) alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer is inaccurate because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment Clerk I. (2.) She allegedly took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form. (b.) She claims that she "was never engaged in business during said period although I had a stall in the market." (c.)She alleges that her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never implemented as it became the subject of a law suit. (d.) She avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on those dates because she did. The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). OCA found Flores guilty of: 1. dishonesty and 2. failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. ISSUE: Whether Flores should be dismissed? HELD: Yes. The Court finds that the report and recommendation of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of respondent misconduct is evident from the records. (a.) unsatisfactory. Respondent's
Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.
She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon
receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five [5] years later. She failed to explain why she was certified to be connected with the Municipal Government, notwithstanding her assumption of office in the RTC To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the same time. Her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to misappropriate the said amount." Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E. O. No. 292: Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal. (b.) Flores is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. She admitted that she "had a stall in the market." OCA found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay (no business permit) for the use of the market stall. Republic Act No. 6713, Section 8 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the
employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interest. Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five [5] years, or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand [P5,000.00] Pesos, or both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven. (c.)She has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty [60] days from her assumption into office. The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the same. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests.2 In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC. V. ELMA PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.: DOCTRINE: Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary , or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the constitutional prohibition , nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus. FACTS: On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC.
2
Section 9 of R. A. 6713 provides: "A public official or employees shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty [30] days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty [60] days from such assumption."
He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners, citing the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary alleged that respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices. Relying on the Resolution of the same case, respondents allege that: a) the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary; b) it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary appointment; functions of either position allows such concurrent
c) since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elmas concurrent appointments to both positions; and d) the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice. In 2001, the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the appointees of the incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. ISSUE/S: 1) WON Respondent Magdangal B. Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC is unconstitutional for being the violative of the proscription against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution; 2) Who are deemed covered by the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution? HELD: 1) YES. In harmonizing Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary that
(a) all elective and appointive public officials and employees are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions (Section 7, Article IX-B); but (b) the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself (Section 13, Article VII). Test in determining WON incompatibility exists between two offices: WON one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other (People v. Green) Definition/Requisites of Incompatibility: Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. What is not incompatibile: Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. Here, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices. 2) The persons cited in the constitutional provision are the Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions. However, despite the nonapplicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution. As held in Civil Liberties, there are only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials office. Further qualification to the exceptions: Additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. It will not suffice that no additional compensation. DEBULGADO V. CSC PONENTE: Feliciano, J.: DOCTRINE: A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure. NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review an order of the CSC. FACTS: Victoria, a career service officer of 32 years was promoted by her husband, the Mayor Debulgado as General Service Officer on Oct. 1, 1982. CSC revoked the appointment on the ground of nepotism. ISSUE/S: Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism? HELD: Yes. CSC had authority & duty to revoke the approved appointment. All appointments include promotional not just original. EO 292 Revised Administrative Code of 1987 Book V.
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; xxx. Section 59. Nepotism. (2) The ff are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: a.) b.) c.) d.) persons employed in a confidential capacity; teachers; physicians; and members of the AFP:
Provided, however, that in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable in the case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed. (3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointments which are in contravention t=hereof shall be corrected by transfer and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative/s who were appointed in violation of these provisions. Omnibus Implementing Rules Rule XVIII Section 6. (essentially the same) Section 9. xxx xxx xxx an appointment may be void from the beginning due to xxx or because it was issued in violation of law. The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. The exceptions appears to be a closed one. SC also cited Laurel V. CSC, wherein the confidentially posted brother was designated into the position of Provincial Administrator, which the Court struck down on ground of nepotism, what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY PONENTE: Pardo, J.: DOCTRINE: The prohibition against nepotism is a comprehensive one.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Dacoycoy, Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, Northern Samar was charged with nepotism for the appointments of his 2 sons: Rito as driver and Ped as utility worker. CSC held him guilty. CA reversed, it was Mr. Daclag who recommended and appointed Rito and Ped. ISSUE/S: Whether there was nepotism. HELD: There was nepotism. To constitute violation of the law, there are 4 situations covered, if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the 3rd degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the ff.: 1.) Appointing authority; 2.) Recommending authority; 3.) Chief of the bureau of office; 4.) Person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. The prohibition against nepotism is a comprehensive one.
PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA V. IAC PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr, J.: DOCTRINE: The power to appoint is in essence discretionary, but it should be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or valid agreements, and provided further that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite. NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the IAC FACTS: Dr. Hernani Esteban was the Vice President for Academic Affairs of the Philippine College of Commerce, due to streamlining, his position was abolished. PLM President Dr. Consuelo Blanco invited him to be ad interim temporary appointed as Vice-President for Administration on June 28, 1973. This appointment was renewed to last until June 30, 1975, with the approval of the Board of Regents. Dr. Esteban was not recommended for permanent appointment despite his 2 & years of service at PLM. On August 1, 1975, PLM President appointed him Ad Interim as Professor III and designated him as Director of the Institute of Continuing Education and Community Service. On August 7, 1975, PLM President terminated Dr. Estebans appointment as Vice President for Administration effective July 31, 1975. Civil Service Commission ruled that, the temporary appointment extended to Dr. Esteban may be terminated at any time with or without cause. However, upon MFR, CSC reversed and certified Dr. Esteban for appointment under permanent status. Upon PLMs MFR, CSC ruled that the certification does not mean it is ordering PLM to reinstate (more confusing than clarifying) As a de facto officer, Dr. Esteban was entitled to be paid the salary of that position.. On June 6, 1978, PD 1409 was issued creating the Merits System Board CSC ruled that the appointment is permanent, because PLM refused and denied the existence of Board Resolution 485 of the BOR approving the appointment of Dr. Esteban, and ordered his immediate reinstatement. When the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose.
RTC reversed, saying that the appointment was invalid, and Dr. Esteban was merely a de facto officer. IAC reversed the RTC, and also ordered payment of full back salaries. ISSUE/S: Whether the appointment of Dr. Esteban is temporary or permanent? HELD: Permanent. The confusion is from the term ad interim The term refers to the manner in which the appointments were made, it is done by the President of PLM in the meantime while the BOR is unable to act. The list of permanent personnel submitted to CSC by the president of PLM included Dr. Estebans name and was recognized by CSC in its 1 st indorsement dated April 18, 1975. The power to appoint is in essence discretionary, but it should be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or valid agreements, and provided further that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.
LUEGO V. CSC PONENTE: Cruz, J.: DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment is protected by the Constitution. NATURE: Petition to review the resolution of the COMELEC FACTS: Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II in the Office of the City Mayor in Cebu City. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another employee. The Civil Service Commission later found Tuozo bettter qualified than Luego and directed that Tuozo replace Luego as Administrative Officer II. The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before the court to question that order and the private respondent's title. ISSUE/S: Whether the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee
HELD: No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus, unlike the Commission on Appointments, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. This political detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.
REGIS V. OSMENA PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J: DOCTRINE: Temporary and provisional appointments are not synonymous with each other. NATURE: APPEAL from the decision of the CFI Cebu
FACTS: On Jan. 18, 1958 Regis was appointed by Mayor Duterte as driver, Motorized Division of the Cebu Police Department and the CSC approved his appointment provisionally. The requirement that he passed the Civil Service Exams was met by him. Subsequent Mayor Osmena, Jr. replaced him with a non-civil service eligible. RTC held that the appointment to Regis was temporary and can be revoked anytime. ISSUE/S: WON the Regis can be removed without cause? HELD: Dismissal was illegal and he should be reinstated, backwages limited to 5 yrs. Difference of provisional appointment v. temporary appointment RA 2260 Civil Service Law Section 24. (a.) Provisional Appointments. A provisional appointment may be issued upon prior authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position in the competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.
(b.) Temporary
Appointment. a person may receive a temporary appointment to a position needed only for a limited period not exceeding 6 months, provided that a preference in filling such position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists.
Festejo V. Barreras (1969) Provisional certain work be done or functions be performed by a regular employee, only there is no one with appropriate eligibility, who can be appointed to do it, hence any other eligible may be appointed to perform such work or functions in the meanwhile that a suitable eligible does not qualify for the position. V. Temporary occasional work or job to be done which is expected to be finished in not more than 6 months Ata, et. al. V. Namocatcat, et. al. (1972) Temporary without definite tenure, dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power A provisional appointment can only be terminated 30 days after the receipt by the appointing power of a list of eligibles from the CSC. RA 6040 (1969) Section 18 All provisional appointments made or appointments approved by the CSC under Section 24 (c) of RA 2260 prior to the approval o f this act shall automatically be permanent under the provisions of Section 24 (b) thereof as
amended by this act, subject to the provisions of Section 16 (h) of said Act as herein amended.
ALCHACOSO V. MACARAIG (WILL SUPRA) PONENTE: Cruz, J.: DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed. NATURE: Petition for prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the Executive Secretary. FACTS: Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA. In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to "all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation which was accepted. Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. However, he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary and made under duress. Jose N. Sarmiento was then appointed Administrator of the POEA. Achacoso is requesting for the Court to annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the respondents from preventing the petitioner from discharging his duties as Administrator of the POEA. He mainly argues that being a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service, he ought to enjoy security of tenure. The Solicitor General concedes that while the office of POEA Administrator is a career executive service position, Achacoso himself is not a career executive service official. He offered a certification from the Civil Service Commission to show that the Achacoso did not possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the POEA in 1987. ISSUE/S: Whether Achacoso was validly terminated as POEA Administrator HELD: Yes. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. In these
circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure. A permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Since the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the time of his appointment, his permanent employment was under the condition that he "shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination." Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his position. Achacoso was not able to meet all the qualifications. At best, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.
MAROHOMBSAR V. ALONTO PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause. NATURE: PETITION to review the order of President of the Mindanao State University FACTS: Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar was the Vice-President for External Studies. She has been a career official for over 27 yrs. On March 22, 1988, the MSU President Ahmad E. Alonto, Jr. appointed her as Officer In Charge of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of the MSU Marawi Campus. On January 2, 1989, the Office of the Vice-President for External Affairs was merged with the OVCAA.
The Board of Regents of the MSU, on May 16, 1989 approved her appointment as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, issuing Resolution No. 59, Series of 1989: A. DESIGNATIONS A.1. Major Designations xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
9.) Special Order No. 10-P, S. 1989 designating Prof. Emily M. Marohombsar as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, MSU Marawi Campus, with an honorarium in accordiance with the approved policies of the University, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations, effective January 2, 1989 and shall remain in force until revoked or amended by competent authority. The MSU President wanted to transfer Dr. Marohombsar as Vice-President for Academic Affairs, an administrative position under the his Administrative Staff. Dr. Marohombsar refused. MSU President designated Professor Macacuna Moslem to replace Dr. Marohombsar, but Professor Moslem did not accept. On May 28, 1990, the MSU President issued Special Order No. 158-P designating Professor Corazon Batara as Officer In Charge of the OVCAA. ISSUE/S: Whether Prof. Marahombsar can be removed from office without cause? HELD: No. The intent to make Dr. Marohombsar serve at the pleasure of MSU president is obvious. Marohombsar shall remain as the lawful occupant in a permanent capacity until the end of her 3 year term or her tenure is otherwise lawfully terminated. The maneuvers of the MSU President cannot be characterized as bona fide. The MSU President gave an indefinite period of appointment to Dr. Marohombsar. Code of Governance of the MSU Article 4. Section 40.5 Paragraph 22. Designation of any Dean, Director, or Department Cahirman in acting capacity or any Officer-in-Charge for any of these positions, for a period of less than 1 yar, such designation being made without additional compensation for the position designated except the honorarium attached to said position; PROVIDED, that the President shall report the designation in the next regular meeting after which the designation shall be null and void unless otherwise renewed.
RA 1387, MSU Charter: Section 6. The BOR shall have the ff. powers and duties, in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of the power of the corporation; xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professor, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University. The permanent nature of the administrative position is not detracted by the permanent nature of her appointment as Professor VI. There is no showing that the interest of the service will be served by forcing Dr. Marohombsar to accept the appointment under MSU Presidents Administrative Staff. DECS Secretary Isidro D. Carino opined that MSU president cannot remove Dr. Marohombsar without approval of the BOR (wala in this case), and the special order cannot revoke the designation as Acting Vice Chancellor. The action of the MSU President issuing the assailed SP 158-P to the BOR after the Court issued a TRO is in contempt of court. Court gave him lighter penalty of admonition. A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause. However, there are circumstances which rule against the routine or blind application of the principle. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen. The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims fo the appointee to a lengthy tenure but also fenies the authority of the appointing power. A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot claim that the appointment shall in time ripen into a permanent one. However, neither can the appointing power use the principle of temporary appointments to evadce or avoid the security of tenure primciple in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.
The head of an office cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions to primarily confidential items so that he can more freely fire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion. An ad interim appointment is one made during the time when the appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear and present urgency aused by an impending obstruction or paralyzation of the functions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made.
SINON V. CSC PONENTE: Campos, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the CSC FACTS: Prior to the reorganization: Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) in Region II, Cagayan Juana Banan Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II Eliseo Sinon Department of Agriculture (DA) reorganized the MAF with the issuance of EO 116 on Jan. 30, 1987. The evaluation of employees list prepared by the Placement Committee excluded Banan. She filed an appeal with DA Reorganizations Appeals Board (DARAB) for reevaluation, the next list (Resolution 97) excluded Sinon. CSC affirmed the DARABs findings. ISSUE/S: Whether the Committees findings are subject to DARAB reevaluation.
HELD: Yes. The Placement Committee3s findings is subject to the reevaluation of the DARAB. The RAB was specially created by the Circular of the Office of the President and conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. The decision of RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is controlling in matters of appointment. In fact, the DARAB findings here had the approval of the Secretary of Agricultures approval affixed.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA PONENTE: Kapunan, J.: DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the Governor of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. He was promoted Assistant Provincial Warden by Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr. but he had no civil service eligibility, so he was extended only a temporary appointment.
RA 6656 SECTION 6. xxx Placement Committee xxx to assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection ad placement of personnel xxx
When he passed the civil service exams, Governor Alfelor approved the change in the employment status of Dato, but the CSC did not favorably act not yet knowing that he passed the civil service exams, subsequently they affirmed (after the criminal charges were filed), to retroact to 1974. In 1976, Governor Alfelor suspended Dato after criminal charges were filed against Dato for conniving and/ or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Dato was acquitted of the charges and requested reinstatement and back wages. RTC held for Dato. CA Affirmed. ISSUE/S: Whether Dato was permanent on time of suspension. HELD: No. The fact that he passed the supervising security guard examination subsequent to his temporary appointment did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment, since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment. These are 2 distinct acts of the appointing authority.
GLORIA V. DE GUZMAN
PONENTE: Herossima, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: Civil Service eligibility is not the only factor, others: performance, degree of education, work experience, seniority, whether the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power. Appointment is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari. FACTS: Respondent employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronotics (PAFCA) were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their appointments they lacked the appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards of their respective positions. Cerillo was issued 1 yr temporary assignment as Board Secretary II of PAFCA, now PSCA. She was relieved as Board Secretary, ground: loss of confidence. She was subsequently designated as Coordinator for Extension Services RA 7605 converted PAFCA into Philippine State College of Aeronotics (PSCA). The Officer-In-Charge of PSCA Col. Loleng informed respondents that they shall be deemed separated upon the the expiration of their temporary appointments. Employees filed a case for reinstatement with backwages in the RTC. Judge De Guzman, Jr. decided in their favor. ISSUE/S: Whether Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement. HELD: No. Cerillo is not entitled to reinstatement. Aside from the appointment is temporary, the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. Cerillos subsequent passing the civil service exams after the termination of her employment does not give her the right to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Civil Service eligibility is not the only factor, others: performance, degree of education, work experience, seniority, whether the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power. Appointment is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO PONENTE: Carpio, J.: DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition. FACTS: On Feb. 2, 1999 COMELEC appointed Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag as Acting Director IV of the Education and Information Department (EID). The Chairperson renewed the appointment in a temporary capacity. Commissioner Javier renewed again in a temporary capacity. In 2001, PGMA appointed, ad interim, 7 yrs term: a.) Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman b.) Borra c.) Tuason, as COMELEC Commissioners COA did not act on the appointments. Benipayo issued a Memorandum reassigning Matibag to the Law Department and designating Cinco as OIC of the EID. Commissioner Sadain objected to the reassignment of Matibag. Grounds: 1. Did not consult her; 2. Prohibition on transfer and detail of employees during election period January 2 June 13, 2001; Note: elections May 14, 2001 Omnibus Election Code Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The ff. shall be guilty of an election offense xxx xxx xxx (h.) transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.
ISSUE/S: Matibag questions: 1.) the appointments of PGMA, 2.) their reappointments 3.) her reassignment, and 4.) Legality of Disbursements to respondents HELD: 1.) Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. The ad interim appointments to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by 1987 Constitution ARTICLE IX-C Section 1. Paragraph 2 (my comment: di ba revoked na ang appointment nila cuz Congress adjourned without COA acting on the appointment, several times? Apparently not kasi long recess due to elections ) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution4 itself makes ad interim appointment permanent, making it effective until: 1.) disapproved by COA or 2.) the next adjournment of Congress, without the COA acting on his appointment. Ad interim appointments take effect at once. Purpose: avoid interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the 3 constitutional commissions. 2.) The reappointments are valid pursuant to RULES OF THE COA Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or Appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission.
ARTICLE VII SECTION 16.
The ad interim appointments in this case are by-passed because the COA failed to organize and did not decide upon the merits of the appointments. The president may renew. What the Constitution prohibits is the reappointment of disapproved appointments. When there will be no reappointments all with confirmation of the COA: 1. when the appointee serves his full 7 year term; 2. when the appointee serves a part of his term, then resigns before his 7 yr term ends; 3. where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term; 4. where the appointee has previously served a term of less than 7 yrs, under the truncated term of 5 or 3 years - and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. The ad interim appointments are for a fixed term expiring February 2, 2008. There is no approval by the COA yet. The reason for the prohibition is to insure that no member of the Commission will serve for more than 7 years, or for more than his term. (if less than 7 yrs). 3.) The transfer of Matibag is valid. 1st: her appointment was temporary, and can be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moments notice 2nd: she is not a Career Executive Service (CES) Officer, required by the position of Director IV 3rd: COMELEC en banc via Resolution 3300 approved transfers and reassignments of personnel by the COMELEC Chairman, the official authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC Personnel. 4.) Being de jure officers, the salaries are properly paid to them. ERASMO V. HOME INSURANCE & GUARANTY CORP. PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.: DOCTRINE: A person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy security of tenure. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS: Erasmo was promoted but issued a temporary appointment as Vice President of Technical Service / Guaranty and Credit Insurance Group (TS/GCIG) of the Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). The appointment was temporary because she lacked the career executive service eligibility necessary. She was charged with: 1.) Neglect of duty 2.) Incompetence in the performance of her official duties 3.) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service 4.) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of her office. She was terminated, even though the charges were dismissed. CSC resolution: she was not entitled to reinstatement. CA affirmed. ISSUE/S: Whether Erasmo is entitled to reinstatement. HELD: A person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy security of tenure. She cited the Palmera V. CSC case, wherein Palmera accepted a contractual appointment but had no intention to abandon his permanent position and security of tenure, having worked for the government for 34 years, was getting on in years and could not afford to face an uncertain future without a regular and steady income. Palmera is not applicable because even though Erasmo formerly held a permanent appointment, she accepted the temporary appointment with understanding of the implications, and that she does not have the CES eligibility required.
PADILLA V. CSC PONENTE: Corona, J.: DOCTRINE: Voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-related ties between the employer and the employee. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Padilla was promoted as Labor Development Assistant in 1983, but her appointment was disapproved because she failed to meet the eligibility requirement. She resigned in 1985, and took the career service examination (professional level), passed and re-applied. She was given casual positions, and then in 1990 no longer given any. Note: she refused a permanent position of Clerk II (also her post before promotion) because she wanted a higher position (like the 1 she lost). CSC dismissed her claim. CA affirmed. ISSUE/S: Whether DOLE was obliged to give her a permanent position, upon Padillas attainment of the required civil service eligibility. HELD: Voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-related ties between the employer and the employee. PD 807 Civil Service Law of 1975 Section 24 (d) Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. When she returned to work for DOLE, it was not a continuation of her previous service, but the start of a new work slate. Her right to due process was not violated, she was a casual employee aware of her date of termination.
CIVL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DE LA CRUZ PONENTE: Corona, J.: DOCTRINE: Every particular job has: 1. formal age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc. and 2. informal qualifications resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Even if the law stated &,the Court held that he has substantially complied 3 yrs & 8mos NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air Transportation Office, he was a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yr managerial & supervisory qualification for the position. CSC-NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of the appointment of Dela Cruz. Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC reversed itself and approved the appointment. (decision of the CSC kept changing)
CA approved the appointment. He has the required qualifications planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools. HELD: The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position AND/OR supervisory position. or either the 1st clause or 2nd clause may be applied. Dela Cruz had excellent credentials and a proven excellent performance. Every particular job has: 3. formal age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc. and 4. informal qualifications resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Even if the law stated &,the Court held that he has substantially complied 3 yrs & 8mos
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: DOCTRINE: With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term to be served. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotional appointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved the temporary appointment.
New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment, ground: Not Career Executive Service Eligible. CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was also not eligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid backwages until the expiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment. CA reinstated Darangina. ISSUE/S: Whether Darangina should be reinstated. HELD: CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages, only salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term to be served. Administrative Code of 1987 Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5
Section 27. Employment Status. Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary. (1) Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. (2) Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temp appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA V. SEN. JOVITO R. SALONGA PONENTE: Padilla, J.: DOCTRINE: The appointment is made solely by the President without need of the confirmation (or rejection) by the COA. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: On August 27, 1987, President Aquino designated Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights. On Dec. 17, 1988, the President extended to her a permanent appointment, subject to her submission of her Oath of Office to the CSC & Office of the President, which she submitted. The Secretary of COA requested Bautista to submit certain info and documents required in its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of CHR. Bautista replied that COA has no jurisdiction to review her appointment, because the position does not fall under the 1st group, on the 1st sentence of ART. VII SEC 16. COA disapproved the ad interim appointment of Atty. Bautista for refusal to submit to their jurisdiction. Pending the resolution of the case in the SC, President Aquino appointed PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as Acting Chairman of the CHR. COA contends that the President has the prerogative to voluntarily submit such appointment to the COA for confirmation, even if not required, which they claim the President did by extending to Bautista another ad interim appointment on Jan. 14, 1989 and submitting it to COA for confirmation. ISSUE/S: Whether the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent office created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the COA. HELD: Petition GRANTED. Bautista is the duly appointed Chairman of CHR. The appointment is made solely by the President without need of the confirmation (or rejection) by the COA. SC cited Sarmiento III V. Mison, on the 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights fall within the 2nd sentence of ART. VII SEC 16,
or in the 3rd group. EO 163 (May 5, 1987) Section 2. (c) The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of 7yrs without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. Marbury V. Madison, C.J. Marshall Having made the permanent appointment, the Presidents power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it. The Mischief in the Contention of COA is the suggestion that the President may time to time move power boundaries differently from where they are placed in the Constitution. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (COA) can create power where the consti confers none. In addition there was no vacancy to which an appointment can be made on Jan. 14, 1989.
NOTES: Tenure in Office v. Term of office Article XIII Section 17 (2) the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the CHR shall be provided by law Ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. EO 163-A, June 30, 1987, providing that the tenure of the Chairman and Members of the CHR shall be at the pleasure of the president is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. CHR is an independent body, constitutionalized to be insulated from political intereference. Of course Bautista may be removed, but only for cause, with her right to due process (i. Notice; ii. Hearing) properly safeguarded. (as in NASECO V. NLRC)
The process to remove Bautista would be to file charges against her with the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman finds a prima facie case against her, the corresponding information/s can be field with the Sandiganbayan, which may in turn order her suspension from office while the case/s are pending.
CORPUZ V. CA PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: Where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Former Chairman of the MTRCB appointed Atty. Corpuz in July 18, 1986, and others and submitted their appointments to the CSC which was approved. Corpuzs position: Attorney V, Legal Counsel-Prosecutor and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer).
Subsequently the MTRCB issued Resolution 8-1-91 declaring the appointments of administrative and subordinate employees by the past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB null and void for being in violation of PD 876-A Section 5 & PD 1986 Section 165, which requires that the appointments should be submitted to the Board for approval prior to its submission to the CSC. On July 14, 1992 Henrietta S. Mendez became the new MTRCB Chairman and resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except of Corpuz and 7 others. The CSC granted the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated due to appointments not submitted to MTRCB for approval. However, the CSC also ruled in favor of Corpuz, saying that he has acquired security of tenure, because the action for revocation or recall should have been brought to the CSC within a reasonable period of time; and that the appointments signed by the Chairman of the MTRCB Manuel Morato (then) are presumed to have been made after complying with all the legal requirements, including the Board approval, whether express or implied. CA reversed the CSC ruling in favor of Corpuz. Note: Corpuz is no longer seeking reinstatement, but for continuity of his government service from the time he was illegally dismissed from the MTRCB on June 30, 1993 until his permanent employment in the Office of the Ombudsman on August 22, 1994, plus back salaries & other benefits. ISSUE/S: Whether Corpuz is entitled to back salaries. HELD: There are 2 stages in the process of appointing MRTCB personnel, other than its secretary (whose appointment is by the Board itself alone): (a.) Recommendation by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper which is among his powers under Section 5 (d)6; (b.) Approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.
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Section 16. Organization Patterns; Personnel. The Board shall determine its organizational structure and staffing pattern. It shall have the power to suspend or dismiss for cause any employee and/ or approve or disapprove the appointment, transfer or detail of employees. It shall appoint the Secretary of the Board who shall be the official custodian of the records of the meetings of the Board and who shall perform such other duties and functions as directed by the Board. 6 Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD.
It is long settled in the law for public offices and officers that where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure. The years of service tendered cannot substitute for the want of consent of another body required by law to complete the appointment. A pub officer or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is only a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise.
SARMIENTO III V. MISON PONENTE: Padilla, J.: DOCTRINE: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition FACTS: Taxpayers, lawyers, members if the IBP and professors of Constitutional law seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs & Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments. ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. There are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1 Group: heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose vested in him in this Constitution7;
appointments
are
This group is clearly appointed with the consent of the COA Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination, And if the nomination is confirmed by the COA, The President appoints
ISSUE/S: Whether the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation. HELD: The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation. 1. Constitutional and Statutory Construction Rules 2. Historical Background In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the COA This power of confirmation transformed the COA, many times into a venue of horse-trading and similar malpractices In the 1973 Constitution, the absolute power of appointment was placed in the President, with hardly any checks
The framers of the 1987 Constitution struck a middle ground by requiring the consent of the COA for the 1st group and Leaving to the President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers
3. Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution & of the people adopting it In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were 2 major changes proposed and approved: 1.) the removal of the heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by COA;
Other officers are: 1. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (ART. VIII, SECTION 8, PAR. 2) 2. Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC (ART IX-B, SECTION 1, PAR. 2) 3. Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC (ART IX-C, SECTION 1, PAR. 2) 4. Chairman and Commissioners of the COA (ART IX-D, SECTION 1, PAR. 2) 5. Members of the Regional Consultative Commission (ART. X, SECTION 18)
PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAWS Notes & Digest 2.) the exclusion of appointments of positions referring to the 2nd-3rd
groups of appointees, from the requirement of confirmation by the COA

4th group, notice: in the president, alone. The clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the 1st sentence of section 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the COA.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications to such power should be strictly construed against them. The President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. PD 34 (Oct. 27, 1972) amended RA 1937 : Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (June 22, 1957) Section 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau. The Bureau of Customs shall have 1 chief and 1 asst. chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. Even if RA 1937 and PD 34 were made under the 1935 Constitution, they should now be read in light of the 1987 Constitution. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ, dissenting: Argues that the provision must be viewed in its entirety. There was too much focus on the first sentence of the provision only, and did not give weight on the following sentences, which is crucial considering that the position in question here falls under the second sentence. The records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive only and not conclusive. Strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An absurdity arises when those in a lower position require the approval of the COA while those who are higher in position would not.
CALDERON V. CARALE PONENTE: Padilla, J.: DOCTRINE: Confirmation by the COA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ART. VII NATURE: PETITION for prohibition to review the constitutionality and legality of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC FACTS: In March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) amended PD 442: Labor Code (Article 215) Section 13. xxx The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the COA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees fo the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, & shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Pursuant to RA 6715, President Aquino issued permanent appointments to the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon Issued Administrative Order 161, series of 1989 designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. ISSUE/S: May Congress, by law, require confirmation by the COA of presidential appointments to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987 Constitution? HELD: No. Petition DISMISSED. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the COA of the appointments of the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
1.) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of SEC. 16, ART VII of the Consti
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the COA;

2.) It amends by legislation, the 2nd sentence of SEC. 16, ART VII of the
Constitution by imposing confirmation by the COA on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only to the President.
The Court cited cases Endencia and Jugo V. David (1953), the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act of what the law was before its passage; cannot validate an unconstitutional law. Congress taxed salaries of judicial officers Violative of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers
1.
Confirmation by the COA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ART. VII Like: Teresita Quintos Deles, et. al. V. The Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et. al. (1989), - sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives by express provision of Section 8, ART. XVIII of the Constitution
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint Like: Mary Concepcion Bautista V. Salonga the Chairman and Members of the Commission of Human Rights (2nd group) Sarmiento III V. Mison, - the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (bureau head) (falls upon 3rd group)
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. (2nd group)
SEPARATE OPINIONS GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring: - Joined Justice Cruz in a dissent in Sarmiento III v. Mison. Reiterated his dissent in Bautista v. Salonga. Still believes that the majority was wrong in the Sarmiento and Bautista cases, but thought it was time to finally accept the majority opinion as the Court's ruling on the matter and one which everybody should respect. There will be no end to litigation if, everytime a high government official is appointed without confirmation by the CoA, another petition is filed with this Court. CRUZ, J., dissenting: Reiterated his dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, and calling for re-examination, instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original
adoption. Does not believe that SC should persist in error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound. legis interpretado legis vim obtinent the interpretation placed upon the writted law by a competent court has the force of law.
DE CASTRO v. JBC PONENTE: Bersamin, J.: DOCTRINE: Ban on appointments during elections excludes the appointments in the judiciary. NATURE: FACTS: The legal debate takes its root from the anticipated compulsory retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. Under the Constitution, the President is mandated to fill any vacancy in the Supreme Court within ninety (90) days from its occurrence from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for every vacancy. In view of this forthcoming vacancy, the JBC, on January 18, 2010, meeting en banc, resolved to commence the nomination process and subsequently announce the opening for application or recommendation for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura were automatically considered for the position. Others either applied or were nominated.
The JBC proceeded to the next step by publishing the names of the candidates in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star. In the said publications, the public was asked to file their sworn complaints, written report or opposition, if any, against the candidates not later than February 22. 2010. The looming vacancy in the highest court of the land became an instant headline. The issue as to whether the incumbent president may appoint the next chief justice despite the constitutional ban on appointments two months before the election elicited conflicting opinions and triggered an intense debate among legal luminaries. Wary of the possibility of having judiciary completely beholden to the incumbent, the public had never been more vigilant. Prompted by prudence, the JBC opted to defer its decision as to whom to send its list of nominees. From such prudence, however, sprawled several petitions to the Supreme Court asking the JBC either to submit its list of nominees to the current president or to prohibit the Council from continuing with the selection process and transmitting the names of the candidate to the ultimate appointing power. Dealing essentially with the same legal questions, the petitions were consolidated. The JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were directed by the Supreme Court to comment. ISSUE/S: 1) In view of Article VII, Section 15, which prohibits the president from making appointments two months before the election, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will endanger public service or public safety, may the incumbent president make appointments to the judiciary, including that for the position of Chief Justice upon the retirement of incumbent Chief Justice Reynato Puno, pursuant to Article VIII Section 4(1) of the constitution? 2) May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President? HELD: 1) Yes. Appointments in the judiciary is not covered by the appointment ban during elections. 2) No. Despite the clear existence of a duty on the part of the JBC, as enjoined in the Constitution, the element of neglect to perform such duty was neither present at the time of the filing nor at the time of the resolution of the petitions.
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Constitution was meticulously drafted, styled, and arranged to give effect to the principle of separation of powers. Placed under Article VII which is devoted to the Executive branch, the Court argued that the prohibition on midnight appointments was intended to apply to executive appointments only. The fact that prohibition was not mentioned in Article VIII of the constitution reveals that it was not meant to cover appointments to the Judiciary. Intent of the framers as can be gleaned from the records. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, as quoted in Valenzuela, do not support the Courts ruling therein. The records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution a command to the president to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence. The use of the word shall means that such command is imperative or mandatory. The implication is that the prohibition in Art VII, Section 15 would not apply to appointments made in pursuance of such mandate. The non-applicability of the prohibition was confirmed by Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. The Rationale of Art VII, Section 15 and the Creation of the Judicial and Bar Council. Citing Valenzuela, the court pointed out that Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution has a broader scope than the ruling in Aytona vs Castillo. It contemplates not only midnight appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election. The argument that there will still be 45 days left, of the 90 days provided in the Constitution, for the succeeding president, upon assumption of office, to appoint the next chief justice ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Affirming Valenzuela will undermine the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the judicial department from the executive and legislative departments Should the next chief justice be appointed by the next president, whoever the latter might appoint might become beholden to him thereby compromising judicial independence. The same risk, the ponencia explains, is not present should the incumbent president appoint the next chief justice. This is precisely because the incumbent presidents term would have ended by the 30th of June. Contention that there is no need for the President to appoint the next Chief Justice because the Judiciary Act of 1948 allows the assumption of an acting Chief Justice is contrary to the intent of the framers of the present Constitution. The Court further pointed out the Judiciary Act of 1948 was promulgated under a different context. At the time of its enactment, the appointment of the Chief Justice was still subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The provision allowing an acting Chief Justice to take over
responds to situations where, due to delays in confirmation, the new chief justice has not yet been appointed. 7. In order for mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be present: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Dissent Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction. Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary) While it can be conceded that the allocation of the articles in the Constitution was consciously adopted in recognition of the principle of separation of powers, Carpio-Morales argued that the equation does not end there. The present constitution is likewise a system of checks and balances. That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the President is a recognized measure of limitation on the power of the judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the political climate of presidential elections. 2. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary. The comprehensive ban on midnight appointments was drafted precisely because the JBC is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from politicization. Carpio-Morales concluded that the second ratiocination in the ponencia could thus not remove an added constitutional safeguard by pretending to have examined and concluded that the establishment of the JBC had eliminated all encompassing forms of political maneuverings during elections. 3. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia. The general rule as provided in Article VII, Section 15 is clear. The exception is likewise clearly stated in the same provision. There is no clear circumstance that would indicate that the enumeration in the exception was not intended to be exclusive. The fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language reinforces the exclusivity of the exception. 4. The 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court is suspended during the ban on midnight appointments.The ban on midnight appointments makes it legally impossible for the President to comply with the mandate of Article VIII, Section 4(1) thereby releasing her from the obligation. The 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court is deemed suspended during the period of the ban which takes effect only once in 6 years.
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The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice. The ponencias interpretation of the proviso Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof as pertaining only to the period within which the President should appoint is absurd as it takes the application and nomination stages in isolation from the whole appointment process. The filling of the vacancy only involves the President, and the JBC was not considered when the period was increased from 60 days to 90 days. The sense of the Concom is the exact opposite. The flaw in the reasoning is made more evident when the vacancy occurs by virtue of death of a member of the Court. In that instance, the JBC could never anticipate the vacancy, and could never submit a list to the President before the 90-day period. It is ironic for the ponencia to recognize that the President may need as much as 90 days of reflection in appointing a member of the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an acting Chief Justice in the interregnum as provided for by law, confirmed by tradition, and settled by jurisprudence to be an internal matter.
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA v.ANDRES V. CASTILLO PONENTE: BENGZON, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: Ban on appointments during elections includes appointments in the judiciary. FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal. ISSUE/S: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. HELD: Case Dismissed. Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or lastminute appointments.
In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively. PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J.: DOCTRINE: Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. NATURE: FACTS: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as were appointed as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. Their appointment was subjected to constitutional question in light of the appointment ban in the forthcoming presidential elections. Now, in view of the general prohibition in the first-quoted provision, how is the requirement of filling in the Court within ninety days to be construed? One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Section 4 (1), Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally, when there are no presidential elections which after all, occur only every six years Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission, is "(i)n order not to tie the hands of the incoming President through midnight appointments." Another interpretation is that put forth in the Minutes of the JBC meeting of March 9, 1998. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. 2) whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
HELD: Appointments declared void. 1) NO. Article VII of the Constitution "(t)wo months immediatey before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.: 8 Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party. xxx xxx xxx (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, 9 it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the transfer of authority to the incoming President." Said the Court: The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the
planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. 2) As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," 10 can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: CRUZ, J.: DOCTRINE: Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. NATURE: FACTS: Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor. This appointment was protested by Junsay, who contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. Complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution, the Commission held that Junsay had a preferential right to the position and ordered that he be appointed thereto. ISSUE/S: WON the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter. HELD: NO, the CSC was not authorized to do so. The Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
JUCO V. NLRC PONENTE:. Hermosisima, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over employees of GOCC which has no original charter. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari FACTS: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from Nov. 16, 1970 - May 14, 1975. He was separated from service for having been implicated in theft and/or malversation of public funds. Upon his complaint for illegal dismissal LA dismissed ground: no jurisdiction. NLRC reversed. On Jan. 1985, SC held that NLRC lacked jurisdiction. CSC held no jurisdiction, because NHC has no original charter. Thus Salas filed again with the NLRC. On May 21, 1990 the LA held that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as the criminal case was purely fabricated. The LA also held that the case is not barred by prescription because it was dependent on the decision of the CSC. NLRC reversed the LA on ground of lack of jurisdiction again. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the case? NLRC or CSC? HELD: NLRC has jurisdiction. It should not have dismissed the complaint. NHC was organized in 1959 in accordance with EO 399 Uniform Charter of Govt Corp. created under Act 1459 the former Corporation law. NLRC reversed. LA decision of May 21, 1990 Reinstated.
ARTICLE IX B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. In National Service Corp (NASECO) V. NLRC (1988) the 1987 Consti provision was applied because it was the law in place at the time of the decision. The new phrase with original charter means that GOCC refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. The SC held that the employees of NASECO are under the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Trade Union of the Philippines & Allied Services (TUPAS) V. NHC (1989) NHC is now within the jurisdiction of the DOLE, it being a GOCC without an original charter. The employees of the NHC (now NHA) have the right to form unions or employees organizations, and there is no impediment to holding of a certification election Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION BUREAU V. CA PONENTE: Purisima, J.: DOCTRINE: The Civil Service is comprehensive in score. It embraces all officers and employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities. Even employees in GOCCs with original charters are covered thereby. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS: On Oct. 13, 1988, CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required the Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). Commissioner of EIIB Jose T. Almonte replied with a request for confirmation of EIIBs exemption from CSC rules and regulations with respect to appointments and other personnel actions. Basis for exemption: PD 14588 & LOI 719. CSC denied Almontes request & reiterated its order in Resolution 89-400. CSC cited Almonte guilty of indirect contempt. CA affirmed CSC and denied Almontes Petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: WON EIIB is embraced by the Civil Service? HELD: Yes. EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as provided by The 1987 Administrative Code, Book IV. The Executive Branch, Title II. Finance, Chapter IV. BUREAUS Section 17. Therefore EIIB is within the ambit of the Civil Service Law. Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED. The Civil Service is comprehensive in score. It embraces all officers and employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities. Even employees in GOCCs with original charters are covered thereby. The Exemptions are only relative to appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil Service Law or Civil Service Rules & Regulations relative to any other matter. Almonte claims that being a member of the intelligence community and the personnel are occupying jobs highly confidential in nature that EIIB should not be required to submit the names of its personnel to the CSC. The NBI is also a member of the intelligence community but submits to the CSC in the appointments of all NBI personnel.
Application of WAPCO and Civil Service Rules Personnel of the FDIIB shall be exempted from WAPCO and Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions: Provided, That they shall be entitled to the benefits and privileges accorded to government employees . . .
9
LOI No. 71, the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 1458, reads:
10. It is further directed that personnel of the BII shall be exempt from OCPC and Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions; Provided, That they shall be entitled to the benefits accorded to government employees . . .
CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Padilla, J.: DOCTRINE: Positions in the Civil Service can be classified as Career and Noncareer. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the CSC. FACTS: Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Lydia Chua, believing herself covered by the Early Retirement Law 1. a full time employee, 2. with a permanent status of Personnel Assistant, and 3. has rendered 15 yrs of service, filed an application on Jan. 30, 1989 to avail of the benefits of the Program with the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), which denied it. She was offered separation benefits equivalent to month pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. The CSC dismissed her appeal, grounds: 1. her employment is co-terminus with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of the NIA; 2. she is not a regular or career employee of the NIA, not even qualified under GSIS law; 3. the purpose of RA 6683 is to reorganize & streamline government functions ISSUE/S: Whether the denial by NIA and CSC of Chuas application for early retirement is valid. HELD: Petition GRANTED. REMANDED to CSC for a FAVORABLE DISPOSITION of Chuas application for early retirement benefits under RA 6683. The denial by NIA and CSC of Chuas application for early retirement benefits under RA 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as she had filed an
application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of such law. Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in 4 successive projects during a span of 15 yrs. In Fegurin, et. al. V. NLRC, et.. al., workers who were hired and re-hired were considered regular and permanent employees. The Labor Code, Article 280: deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as: 1. permanent - one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;
2.
temporary - In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; (5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and (7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by: . . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Included in the non-career service are: 1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s); 3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. 5. emergency and seasonal personnel. There is another type of non-career employee: Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945) The employment status of personnel hired under foreign-assisted projects is considered co-terminus, for the duration of the project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following: a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is coexistent with the tenure of the appointing authority. c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished. Felwa V. Salas, equal protection clause applies to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where: (1.) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2.) these are germane to the purpose of the law (3.) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4.) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. Applying the criteria, the Early Retirement Law would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the SC sustains the denial to a class of government employees similarly situated to those covered. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est a person omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally - should not be the applicable maxim in this case; but the doctrine of necessary implication what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed; & Ex necessitate legis every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or primilege; & in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus the greater includes the lesser. Note that pending in Congress is a House Bill to extend the Early Retirement Law, and also the coverage includes contractual employees already which was admittedly overlooked before. A co-terminus employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
A co-terminus or project employee should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as: 1.) they file their application prior to the expiration of their term; 2.) comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose Memorandum Circular No. 14 Series of 1990 implementing RA 6850 requires as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of 7yrs of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminus, including military and polic service, as evaluated and confirmed by the CSC. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in RA 6683 of coterminus personnel who survive the test of time. CUEVAS V. BACAL PONENTE: Mendoza, J.: DOCTRINE: A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the 1st place, or, only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: Atty. Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On July 28, 1994, she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).On Jan 5, 1995, President Ramos appointed her to the rank of CESO III. On Nov. 5, 1997, she was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney. On Feb. 5, 1998 her appointment was confirmed by President Ramos. She took her oath and assumed office. On July 1, 1998, President Estrada appointed Carina J. Demaisip as Chief Public Defendor, and appointed Atty. Bacal as Regional Director, Public Defendors Office. Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement. CA ruled in her favor, saying that there was diminution of rank and salary. ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer of Bacal to the position of Regional Director of the PAO, which was made without her consent, amounts to a removal without cause? HELD: No. Bacal who holds a CES Rank III was properly appointed by the appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III. FIRST: Bacal is only a CESO III. As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. The Certifications issued in her favor from the Secretary of DBM, & Executive Directors of the CES Board clearly indicate that Atty. Bacal is a CESO III. The position of Chief Public Attorney with salary grade 30, requires a CES Rank Level I. Achacoso V. Macaraig is reiterated a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. xxx His appointment could be regarded as only temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority at a moments notice conformably to established jurisprudence. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the 1st place, or, only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. SECOND: Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service (CES) is acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The appointment depends on: 1. level of managerial responsibility, 2. performance The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept applicable only to 1st and 2nd level employees in the Civil Service but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Bacal was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance as Chief Public Attorney as required by the rules of the CES Board. Appointment to the appropriate rank confers security of tenure. THIRD: A CESO can be assigned from 1 CES position to another & from 1 department, bureau or office to another. The rule is that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office.
FOURTH: J. Puno makes much of the fact that Demaisip is not a CES eligible. For the same reason that the temporary appointment made to Bacal is valid under the IRP, PART III, CHAPTER 1, ARTICLE IV, PAR 5, So is the appointment to Demaisip. There is no claim that the appointment to Demaisip is permanent. In a quo warranto proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Since Bacal herself is not qualified, she has no personality to sue that Demaisip is not qualified.
PAGCOR V. RILLORAZA PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J:
DOCTRINE: Whether primarily confidential, policy determining, or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: On Nov. 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence were brought against several employees of PAGCOR. When Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of PAGCOR reported for his 6am-2pm shift on October 9, 1997, During his shift a small-time financier/player GAM Rene Quito was able to encash P5M worth of checks without authorization: from the Senior Branch Manager (SBM) or the Branch Manager for Operations (BMO) and the COM Carlos Gonzales who facilitated the checks was not on duty then. (He was on 10pm-6am duty) a.) He facilitated the encashment of 1 of the checks, worth P500K.
b.) He failed to stop a top-ranking officer BM Richard Syhongpan from placing
bets over and above the allowable limit of P5K/deal. c.) He failed to stop Syhongpan from playing in the big tables, and d.) He allowed Syhongpan to play beyong the allowable time limit of 6am. On Dec. 2, 1997, PAGCOR dismissed Rilloraza & several others. Rilloraza appealed. CSC modified the penalty into 1month & 1 day suspension, finding Rilloraza guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. CA affirmed the CSC, ordering PAGCOR to reinstate Rilloraza with backwages. ISSUE/S: Whether 1) Rilloraza is a confidential employee, hence he may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him, and such would not amount to removal but only to expiration of his term; 2) PAGCOR is exempt from Civil Service Law, rules and regulations by virtue of PD 1869 Consolidating & Amending PD Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 & 1632, Relative to the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR, July 11, 1983 Section 16. Exemption. All positions in the Corp, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the BOD. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as Confidential appointee.
HELD: 1.) He is not a primarily confidential employee, even though his position is above rank and file. Rillorazas duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of ability & dependability, and can hardly be characterized as routinary for he is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of authority. However, his position lacks the amplitude of confidence reposed by the appointing power as to qualify his position as highly confidential. He reports to the Branch Manager / Branch Manager for Operations (Metro Manila) and not to higher echelons. CSC was correct, Rilloraza only liable for simple neglect of duty, and in finding good faith as a mitigating circumstance in imposing only the minimum penalty to him. There is no evidence to sustain the charge of dishonesty, misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public. He acted as a prudent and reasonable man in the situation. 2.) No. Considerations vary as to make a position primarily confidential.
J. Regalados discourse in CSC V. Salas, 3 important points: 1st: the classification of a particular position as a.) Primarily confidential b.) Policy-determining c.) Highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. 2nd: whether primarily confidential, policy determining, or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. 3rd: Section 16, PD 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential is not absolutely binding on the courts.
AQUINO V. CSC PONENTE: Medialdea, J.: DOCTRINE: The appointing authority cannot revoke an appointment on mere ground that the protestant is more qualified. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CSC FACTS: Victor A. Aquino was holding the position of Clerk II, Division City of Schools of San Pablo City. On Feb. 16, 1984, he was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing duties and responsibilities of Supply Office I. Upon retirement of the Supply Officer I, DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo designated Aquino as OIC of the Division Supply Office. On Septermber 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent Milagros Tagle issued a promotional appointment to Leonarda D. De La Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS Dvision of San Pablo City. Civil Service approved her appointment as permanent provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment. Aquino questioned the appointment of de la Paz. DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of de la Paz,appointing Aquino instead. The Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) also upheld the appointment of Aquino as Supply Officer I. The CSC reversed the DECS Sec & MSPB, restoring de la Paz to her position as Supply Officer I. Ground: Security of Tenure had already attached to de la Paz. (CONSTI ART IX-B, SEC 2. PAR 3) ISSUE/S: Whether the appointing authority can revoke appointment on the ground that another is more qualified. HELD: The appointing authority cannot revoke the appointment to de la Paz on mere ground that the protestant is more qualified. PD 807: Civil Service Law, Section 19. provides the for cause grounds, Par. 6. (1.) That the appointee is not qualified (2.) That the appointee is not the next in rank (3.) In case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reason/s given by the appointing authority In addition the appointment of Aquino was tainted with irregularity, with undue haste, and is not valid because an appointment to an office which is not vacant is null and void. CSC Resolution No. 83-343 prohibits the issuance of an appointment to the protestant, if the protest case is not yet finally resolved.
DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE PONENTE: Tuason, J.: DOCTRINE: It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause must be related to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. NATURE: ORIGINAL ACTION in the SC. Quo Warranto
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos was appointed to the office of city engineer for the City of Baguio on July 16, 1946 by the President. This was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. On July 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment to the same office by the President.. De los Santos was transferred by the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Revised Administrative Code, Chapter 61. City of Baguio, Section 2545. authorizes the Governor General (President) to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. ISSUE/S: Is the RAC still in force? HELD: No. It is incompatible with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 4 No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended, except for cause as provided by law. for cause - it means for reasons which the law & sound public policy recognized as sufficient to warrant removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause must be related to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches of the Govt shall be provided by law. Appointments to the civil service, except (a b c) Shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination. Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting: Noted that private respondent's appointment on 19 September 1986 was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Regional Office IV subject to certain conditions, namely, "(1) that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee; (2) no pending protest against the appointment, (3) nor
any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of (the) appointment." Petitioner was thus appointed in place of private respondent whose appointment was deemed revoked. That was a decision by competent authority adversely affecting the approval of private respondent's appointment. Conditions Nos. 2 and 3 having supervened, namely, the timely protest and the decision by competent authority adversely affecting it private respondent could not have assumed the contested position under a completed appointment. Consequently, private respondent had acquired no legal right to security of tenure that would have entitled her to removal only "for cause. On the contrary, it was petitioner who was issued a permanent appointment by the DECS Regional Director on 11 August 1987, effective on 26 October 1987 when petitioner assumed the duties and functions of the position. That appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV on 27 October 1987, without any qualifications or conditions. In resolving private respondent's appeal to it, the CSC had substituted its own choice for that of the appointing authority. The general rule, therefore, must apply: the discretion exercised by the appointing power, in extending an appointment to a given position to one of two employees possessing the requisite minimum qualifications for the position, will not generally be interfered with and must be sustained. The CSC has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believes that another employee is better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority (Mantala v. Salvador citing Luego v. CSC; Central Bank v. CSC; and Santiago, Jr. v. CSC). There is no "restoration" as private respondent's appointment never attained permanency by reason of the conditions that effectively hindered it from acquiring that status. Thus, there was no completed appointment much less any security of tenure to speak of that would have entitled private respondent to the protection of the law against unjust removal.
TRIA V. SANTO TOMAS PONENTE: Feliciano, J.: DOCTRINE: The effects of characterizing a position as primarily confidential are two-fold: firstly, such characterization renders inapplicable the ordinary requirement of filling up a position in the Civil Service on the basis of merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinations; and secondly, while the 1987 Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle set out in Article IX(B) 2(3) of the Constitution that no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law, the cause provided by law includes loss of confidence. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CSC FACTS: Rogelio A. Tria has been employed with the Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation (later renamed Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau ["FMIB"]), now known as the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau [EIIB"] of the Department of Finance, Region 5, Legaspi City, as a Management and Audit Analyst I, a position expressly described in the letter of appointment as "confidential." On 27 September 1984, petitioner wrote a confidential report to the FMIB Deputy Commissioner detailing the nonfeasance of a FMIB lawyer assigned to Region 5. Petitioner's report recommended the lawyer's replacement "with a competent and able lawyer to handle the cases brought to his attention." He later submitted another confidential report, concerning the FMIB Region 5 Director, this time addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President.
Petitioner later filed an application for vacation leave for 100 working days, seeking to take advantage of a Civil Service Circular which allows employees who propose to seek interim employment abroad, to go on prolonged leave of absence without pay without being considered separated from the service. When petitioner was already in Manila attending to the processing of his travel papers, a Memorandum was sent to him in Legaspi City from the FMIB Central Office in Quezon City by respondent Assistant FMIB Commissioner, referring to the confidential report sent out directly to the Office of the President, and requiring him to submit an explanation. Since petitioner had failed to receive and hence to respond to the above Memorandum, another Memorandum was issued, reminding petitioner of his duty to submit the required written explanation. The Memorandum also informed him that his application for sick [should have been vacation] leave. has been disapproved pursuant to the Civil Service Rule which provides that 'Leave of absence for any reason other than serious illness must be contingent upon the needs of the service.' He was directed to report for work thereat within ten (10) working days from the date of this Memorandum otherwise, this office will be constrained to drop you from the rolls of FMIB for prolonged unauthorized absence and noncompliance with office rules and regulations." As petitioner had already left the country, he was unable to comply with the express directives of the second Memorandum. He was therefore considered to be on absence without official leave (AWOL). Respondent EIIB Commissioner to issue Letter Order No. 06-87 informing petitioner of the termination of his services retroactive to "1 November 1986 for continuous absence without official leave and for loss of confidence." The cause were: (1) having gone on an extended unauthorized leave of absence; (2) having bypassed official channels in transmitting a report concerning alleged misfeasance or non-feasance on the part of a superior officer of the EIIB directly to the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive Secretary, rather than through the respondent EIIB Commissioner. It was upon his return to the country sometime in May 1987 that petitioner came to know of the abovementioned Letter-Order and of the two Memoranda. Petitioner asked for reinstatement, stating that his application for vacation leave had been approved by his immediate chief and the personnel officer. He also explained that his letter to the Office of the President was done in good faith. Reinstatement was, however, denied by respondent Rabina.
Petitioner's request for payment of the cash equivalent of his accrued leave credits corresponding to a total of 179 days was also denied on the ground that 6 of the Civil Service rules and laws provides that the removal for cause of an official or employee shall carry with it forfeiture of . . . other benefits arising from his employment. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with prayer for reinstatement and backwages before respondent CSC, which was denied, on the ground that the grant of petitioner's application for vacation leave, notwithstanding the accumulation of sufficient leave credits, was discretionary on the part of the approving official. Petitioners request for reconsideration was denied. came to this Court on the present Petition for Certiorari. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether petitioner Trias particular position of Management and Audit Analyst I is a primarily confidential position so as to render him removable upon, or the expiration of his term of office concurrent with, loss of confidence on the part of the appointing power who, as already noted, was the then Commissioner of the FMIB. 2) Whether there was legal cause provided by law for his dismissal from the service. HELD: Petition GRANTED. Letter-Order No. 06-87 of public respondent EIIB Commissioner, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public respondents are hereby ORDERED to reinstate forthwith petitioner to his former position, or to a position of equivalent rank and compensation, and to pay him the backwages, allowances and other benefits lawfully due him counted from May 1987, when he returned to the country from his leave of absence, until actual reinstatement, less one month's backwages. No costs. 1) NO. Petitioner challenges his dismissal as being arbitrary. The propriety of petitioners alleged unlawful dismissal boils down to the question of whether an employee holding a position considered as primarily confidential may be dismissed on grounds of loss of confidence by the appointing authority on the basis of the employees having gone on unauthorized leave of absence and of his having filed a confidential report on one of his superiors directly with the Office of the President. The effects of characterizing a position as primarily confidential are two-fold: firstly, such characterization renders inapplicable the ordinary requirement of filling up a position in the Civil Service on the basis of merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinations; and secondly, while the 1987 Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle set out in Article IX(B) 2(3) of the Constitution that no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law, the cause provided by law includes loss of confidence.
Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of their term of office. The positions which this Court has in the past characterized as primarily confidential include: private secretaries of public functionaries; a security officer assigned as bodyguard of the person of a public officer and responsible for taking security measures for the safety of such official; City Legal Officer of Davao City vis--vis the Davao City Mayor; Provincial Attorney or Iloilo Province vis--vis the Governor of Iloilo Province. It is also instructive to refer to some of the positions which the Court has refused to designate as primarily confidential: members of the Customs Police Force or Port Patrol; Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, in charge of the Export Department; Senior Executive Assistant; Clerk I and Supervising Clerk I and stenographer in the Office of the President. There thus appears nothing to suggest that petitioners position was highly or even primarily confidential in nature. The fact that petitioner may, sometimes, handle confidential matters or papers which are confidential in nature, does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential. 2) NO. The constitutional prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil Service "except for cause provided by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that suspension or dismissal come, as a general rule, only after notice and hearing. The Court considers that, under the circumstances of this case the subsequent investigation constituted substantial compliance with the demands of procedural due process. Substantive due process requires, among other things, that an officer or employee of the Civil Service be suspended or dismissed only "for cause." The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public." (Mallare) It must be noted that his immediate superiors were the persons in the best position to ascertain whether his presence in the Regional office during the
period covered by his application for leave without pay was really demanded by imperious exigencies of the service. The real and efficient cause of his dismissal from the service was the fact that he had bypassed official channels in rendering the confidential report addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, concerning the then Regional Director of FMIB, Region 5. That act of petitioner did not constitute lawful cause for his dismissal from the service. Petitioner sent his confidential (privileged communication) report to an office having overall administrative supervision and control over the FMIB (i.e., the Office of the President); the report was not, in other words, sent either to the media or to an office or agency having no administrative jurisdiction over the public official or office complained of. Petitioner's act did not constitute serious misconduct but rather, on the contrary, was an act of personal and civic courage by which petitioner exhibited his loyalty to the FMIB as an institution and ultimately to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
LAUREL V VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: A private citizen who does not claim any better right to the position file a verified complaint with the CSC to denounce a violation by the appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and Rules. NATURE: PETITION to review a resolution of the CSC FACTS: Jose C. Laurel V is the Provincial Governor of Batangas, and he appointed his brother Benjamin Laurel as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. The position of Provincial Administrator became vacant due to the resignation of Mr. Felimon C. Salcedo III, and Governor Laurel designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator, to continue until the appointment of a regular Provincial Administrator, since allegedly there was none qualified at that time. He issued his brother a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a primarily confidential position. Sangalang, a private citizen wrote to CSC to bring to its attention the appointment of Benjamin Laurel by his Governor brother. Acting Provincial Attorney of Batangas, Jose A. Oliveros answered that the Governor did not violate the prohibition on nepotism because the positions the brother was appointed were confidential in nature and with respect to the position of Provincial Administrator the brother was merely designated. He also answered that there was no violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the the representation allowance of an Acting Provincial Administrator is strictly on reimbursement basis. CSC in Resolution 83-358 revoked the designation of Benjamin Laurel as Acting Provincial Administrator, on the ground of nepotism, what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. RA 2260, Section 24, (f) no person appointed to a position in the noncompetitive service (now noon-career) shall perform duties properly belonging to any position in the competitive service (now career service). The position of Provincial Administrator is a career position under RA 5185 Section 4. ISSUES: 1. Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential? 2. Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation?
3. May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to the position file a verified complaint with the CSC to denounce a violation by the appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and Rules? HELD & RATIO: 1. No, it is a Career Service position embraced under Section 4 of PD 807. The Manual of Position Descriptions also require high qualifications and definition of duties. It is characterized by: (a) Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as much as practicable by competitive examinations or based on highly technical qualifications (b) Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions (c) Security of tenure It is an open career position, for appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate examination. It falls within the 2nd major level of positions in the career service. PD 807 SECTION 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. (a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into 3 major levels as follows: xxx (2.) the 2nd level shall include professional, technical and scientific positions which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least 4 years of college work up to Division Chief level; xxx. In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is: a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical. Plus Governor is bound by estoppels, he himself admitted it was a career position. NCC Article 1431 through estoppels an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Not being a confidential position it is subject to the rule on nepotism. 2. Yes.
The rule on nepotism does not distinguish between appointment and designation, if it does it would be toothless. the manner of filling up the vacancy is only either by a.) Permanent appointment or b.) Temporary appointment, The designation in this case is done to fill up the position temporarily. Designation is also defined as an appointment or assignment to a particular office (Citing: Borromeo V. Mariano, Binamira V. Garuccho) 3. Yes, CSC - role as the central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training nad discipline of civil servants, with the power and function to administer and enforce the constitutional & statutory provisions on the merit system. PD 807 Section 37 expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the CSC a complaint against a government official or employee This gives teeth to the constitutional exhortation that a public office is a public trust and public off/ees must at all time sbe accountable to the people. The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
GRINO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Gancayco, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: PETITION for review a decision of the CSC FACTS: Acting Governor of Iloilo, Tirador appointed: 1.) Teotimo Arandela as Provincial Attorney 2.) Cirilo Gelvezon was promoted to Senior Legal Officer 3.) Teodolfo Dato-on & 4.) Nelson Geduspan were appointed as Legal Officer II.
New Governor Simplicio Grino terminated their services due to loss of trust and confidence, basis: an article that appeared in Panay News. The Merit Systems Board held that the terminations were illegal and ordered reinstatement with back pay. CSC affirmed. ISSUE/S: 1.) Is the position Provincial Attorney confidential or career positions? 2.) What about the subordinate positions? HELD: Arandela is ordered to vacate his position. However, CSC is AFFIRMED with regard to: Gelvezon, Dato-on and Geduspan who are to be reinstated. 1.) Confidential, cited Cadiente V. Santos RA 5185 Section 19. Creation of Positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal Officer. To enable the provincial and city governors to avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of provincial attorney and city legal officer may be created and such officials shall be appointed in such manner as is provided for under Sec 4 of this Act. For this purpose the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and city fiscals in serving as legal advisor and legal officer for civil cases of the provinces and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney and city legal officer, respectively. The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. 2.) No, because these subordinate positions are highly technical in character, career positions dependent on the skill of the legal staff to be hired. The legal staff are subordinate positions under the administrative supervision and control of the Provincial Attorney, and are remote in relationship from the appointing authority. They are entitled to security of tenure.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SALAS PONENTE: Regalado, J.: DOCTRINE: In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS: On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and is subject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who only implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 grounds: loss of confidence. Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting in affidavits of 2 customers, claiming to have been used as gunners. CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannot be dismissed on that ground, applying the proximily rule enunciated in Case 63: Grino V. CSC & Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare10. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the Consti. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether Salas is a confidential employee? 2. Whether the Pinero doctrine11 is still applicable? HELD:
10
Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office, but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
1 11
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is: a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical. Senator Tanada: in the 1st instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position. In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or not. Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, which is part of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions are primarily confidential.
1. No. Salas position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description is ordinary, routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 per month. He does not enjoy that primarily close intimacy which characterizes a confidential employee. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, the fact that sometimes, private respondent may handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhat confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential. 2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in cases of conflict. 1986 Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examinations as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness. CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential, merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement. In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 COnsti. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the Civil Service Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as Confidential appointees. While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959 Rule XX Section 2 The power to declare a position as: a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical, as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987 Book V. Civil Service Commission Section 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers and functions: xxx (9). Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily confidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 PD 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing. Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were 2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarily confidential: 1: when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; 2: in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointing power which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State. RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959) Section 5. The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.12
12
General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service Rules Section 1. appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.
SEPARATE OPINIONS VITUG, J ., concurring: - Highlighted the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against (Salas) if warranted," found in the dispositive portion of the decision of the appellate court. It would seem to me that the adverse findings arrived at by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR which the Board of Directors relied upon to terminate the services of Salas on ground of loss of confidence could well be constitutive of the administrative infractions that the appellate court must have had in mind. The case should be remanded to the CSC to specifically meet head-on PAGCOR's foregoing findings and to thereby fully ventilate, as well as pass upon, the appeal to it (CSC) on the basis with an opportunity for a hearing adequately accorded to Salas.
TARROSA V. SINGSON PONENTE: Quiason, J.:
DOCTRINE: Quo warranto as a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another. NATURE: Original Action in the SC. FACTS: Tarrosa as taxpayer files a petition for prohibition, questioning the appointment of Singson by Ramos as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition is based on Sec 6 of RA7653, which established the BSP as the Central Money Authority of the Philippines. The said provision stated that the appointment of the Governor should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE/S: Whether the action may prosper. HELD: NO. The action is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of Singson and alleges the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the office. A quo warranto proceeding may only be commenced by the SolGen or a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another. It is obvious that the instant petition was improvidently brought. To uphold the position would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to courts , thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery. Obiter: For the information of all concerned, in Calderon v. Carale, the Court ruled that Congress by law cannot expand the confirmation powers of the CoA and require confirmation for positions not expressly mentioned in Art VII, Sec 16 of the Constitution.
MENDOZA V. ALLAS AND OLORES PONENTE: Puno, J.: DOCTRINE: The rule that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office is not applicable in quo warranto cases. The writ of quo warranto is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person. NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Mendoza worked in the Bureau of Customs as Director III. He was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector in Cagayan de Oro. Allas was appointed as Acting Director III by President Ramos so Mendoza was terminated. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas and won in the RTC. While the action was pending in the CA, Allas was promoted and Olores now occupied the position so CA denied the Motion for Execution. ISSUE/S: Whether the CA can execute the judgment. HELD: NO. Quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced by the Sol-Gen or the fiscal or by an individual who claims to be entitled. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer with regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable to quo warranto cases , The judgment does not bind the respondent's successor even if the latter may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office. In the case at bar, the petition was solely against Allas.
ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Padilla, J.: DOCTRINE: An action for quo warranto should be brought within 1 year after ouster from office, the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subject to continued uncertainty. NATURE: Special Civil Action for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner started working with PNB in 1972 as special assistant . After several promotions she was appointed Senior Vice President. In 1986, E.O. No. 80 was approved restructuring PNB. Pursuant to said EO the division where petitioner belonged was abolished. Petitioner was then notified of her separation from service. CSC affirmed this decision. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether there was bad faith in her dismissal using the test articulated in Dario v. Mison ; 2) Whether RA 6656 may be invoked; 3) Whether there was erroneous application of the 1 year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings HELD: 1) There was no bad faith. PNBs reorganization was by virtue of a valid law. It was due to the critical financial situation of the bank. The abolition of petitioners department was a valid exercise of management prerogative. 2) RA 6656 cannot also be invoked since it took effect after PNBs reorganization had already been implemented. Assuming arguendo, petitioner did not have sufficient qualifications to be retained. 3) No. It was correctly applied. Since the action of petitioner was really quo warranto. A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action for quo warranto. The petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another.
An action for quo warranto should be brought within 1 year after ouster from office, the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subject to continued uncertainty. An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed employee (Cristobal vs Melchor).
BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.: DOCTRINE: The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION IN THE SC. Certiorari. (R64). FACTS: The Resident Auditor (Leyte) of the BWD disallowed payments of per diems in excess of those authorized by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and PD 198, RATA (representation and transportation allowance) and rice allowances granted to the members of the board of directors of the BWD, as well as duplication of claims for cash gifts as part of the Christmas bonus of the general manager and traveling allowance of the officers of the BWD. The petitioners here members of the board, other similarly situated officers and Board Members of BWD who had approved the release of these benefits, were served with notices of disallowance. Petitioners request for reconsideration was denied. The CoA Regional Office at Tacloban City affirmed the findings of the Resident Auditor. The CoA also affirmed. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE/S:1) Whether the term compensation in P. D. No. 198, 13, as amended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479 does not include the allowances and per diems which had been disallowed in this case, considering 2(i) of P. D.
No. 1146 as amended by RA 8291, which provides that compensation means the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic pay which are not integrated into the basic pay under existing laws. 2) Whether the prohibition in PD 198, 13 against the grant of additional compensation to board members must be deemed repealed by virtue of 22 of R. A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, which took effect on July 1, 1989. * If yes to 1 and 2, then the members of the board of directors of water districts are entitled to receive benefits in addition to those authorized to be paid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA after the effectivity of R. A. No. 6758 3) Whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportation allowance of various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, rice allowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors of BWD, would impair vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine the management prerogative of water districts; and HELD: 1) NO. The definitions of the term compensation in the statutes relied on by petitioners are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemed to comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in the provisions thereof. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are used. The provision petitioners cite as basis refers to the basis for the computation of employer and employee contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits to which such employees are entitled. In the same manner, under 32 of the NIRC, compensation includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and similar items for purposes of recognizing taxable income. The definitions of the term compensation in these statutes are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemed to comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in the provisions thereof. Under P. D. No. 198, 13, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing No director shall receive other compensation than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.
2) NO. The Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the districts, as provided by 18 thereof. R. A. No. 6758, 4 specifically provides that the Salary Standardization Law applies to positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including GOCCs and GFIs. The Salary Standardization Law adopts a Position Classification System classifying positions into four main categories, namely: professional supervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its implementation. A review of the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law will reveal that the Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the districts. The fact that 12 and 17 of the Salary Standardization Law speak of allowances as benefits paid in addition to the salaries incumbents are presently receiving makes it clear that the law does not refer to the compensation of board of directors of water districts as these directors do not receive salaries but per diems for their compensation. 3) NO. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. Management prerogative refers to the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work. Clearly, the existence of such right presupposes the existence of an employer-employee relationship. As to the BWD board of directors: The BWD board of directors are not employees of BWD. As already noted, their function, as defined by P. D. No. 198, is limited to policy-making. Moreover, as also noted before, the right of directors of water districts to the payment of compensation is expressly provided for in PD 198, thus preempting the exercise of any discretion by the water districts. As to the officers and employees of BWD: The terms and conditions of employment of government employees are governed by law.
Thus, the exercise of management prerogative by government corporations are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to them. The cash gift granted to the general manager as part of his Christmas bonus was in excess of that authorized by R. A. No. 6686. It cannot be justified by the exercise of management prerogative as it is contrary to law. The disallowance of the duplication of claims for transportation allowance does not fall under management prerogative as this does not pertain to the power of management to determine the terms and conditions of employment but pertains to whether or not the claims are properly accounted for.
RODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them the preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. NATURE: PETITION for review a decision of the CSC FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by petitioner Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Cabolan for the sum of P486,386.18. Petitioner MPDC Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the said project was 97.5% accomplished. This report was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. Based on said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer Facundo, to Philwood Construction. Later, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor for the amount of P160,910.46 who found that as per CoA evaluation, only 60% of the project (equivalent to only P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. The Provincial Auditor did not act on petitioners request for lifting and reinspection. Thereafter, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against the Mayor, the MPDC, the Treasurer, as well as the President/General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction. The Acting Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of 3 (e) of RA 30196 [The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act] before the Sandiganbayan. While the complaint was pending at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioners and ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite. ISSUE/S: 1) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in filing the information against petitioners, or the Sandiganbayan in allowing the litigation of the criminal information for conspiracy in violating 3(e) of the AntiGraft Act (RA 3019) when the notice of disallowance still pends with the provincial auditor under petitioner' protest supported by certificate of completion and acceptance of the required element 2) WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction HELD: 1) NO. Disallowance v. Suspension: At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension.
A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations, either in whole or in part. Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. The suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown." The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them the preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the CoA, their purposes distinct from each other. The preliminary investigation involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the audit investigation relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds. Misinterpretation of 44.6.4., which provides for the Auditor's Responsibility re Evaluation of Disallowance: (1) petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance. (2) the "written explanation" referred to in said is "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Hence, 44.6.4., finds no application in this case. 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he
institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. 2) YES. The Municipal Mayor is assigned a Salary Grade of 27 under RA 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989), which includes in the list Municipal Mayor as under Salary Grade 27. The Supreme Court further held that having been charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Mayor Rodrigo is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a., of P.D No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. The Supreme Court held that with regards to Mayor Rodrigos co-accused, by virtue of Section 4 a., of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, are also subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Grade is a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." Salary Grades is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class. An official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his position - the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work. As a consequence of the amendment of 4 of PD 1606 by the passage of 2 of RA 7975, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of RA 3019, as amended, and Chapter II, 2, Title VII of the RPC. It retains only cases where the accused are those specifically enumerated in the amendment and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under RA 6758. Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty.
It is enough that these are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection, 4 above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with enumerate Eos related to the PCGG and the recovery of Marcos wealth. These amendments intended to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti-Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial "big fish." The present structure is also intended to benefit these official of lower rank, especially those residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro Manila. To distinguish the "big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts. Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a catchall in 4 a. (5), thus: All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the DBM pursuant to RA 6758 (An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and Other Purposes. RA 6758 lists positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of "Municipal Mayor I". 2 of RA 6758 declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." To give life to this policy, Congress adopted the Grade system. The Grade is a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." Congress, under 8 of RA 6758, fixed the Salary Grades, which is defined as "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class."
RA 6758 provided for the salaries of officials holding constitutional positions (the President, Vice-President, President of the Senate and Senators, Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission and its Members). Congress delegated the task of fixing Salary Grades to the DBM. Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary Grade 27. - A local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule under 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective LGU. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade.
TEJADA V. DOMINGO PONENTE: DAVIDE, J.: DOCTRINE: An office is a public charge or employment, an employment on behalf of the government in any station or public trust, not merely transient, occasional or incidental. NATURE: PETITION for review a decision of the CSC FACTS: Petitioners Roseo U. Tejada and Radito C. Ching are senior clerks of the COA assigned to the auditing units of the PNB and Central Bank, respectively. Before the effectivity of RA 6758, Tejada's gross monthly
compensation was P3,673.20, which includes basic salary, COLA, bank equity pay, longevity pay, amelioration pay and meal allowance. Ching's was P3,134.00, which includes, basic salary, COLA, bank equity pay and amelioration pay. Only the basic salary and the COLA, in the total sum of P2,323.00, were due each of them as senior clerks in the COA. The other benefits were voluntarily given to them by the PNB and the CB, respectively. The passage of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines), as reiterated by EO 19, implemented a new policy to instill institution loyalty -direct payment by COA of the salaries and other benefits, incorporated in the national government budget and to be sourced from the contributions from the GOCCs. It did away with the direct receipt of compensation from the GOCCs and the requirement of a common position and compensation plan, which was both chaotic and unjust. The contributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit services which are based on the actual cost of the audit function in the corporation concerned plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead expenses. The allowances and fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA personnel assigned to the former's auditing units shall be directly defrayed by COA from its own appropriations. Pursuant to 18 of RA 6758 providing for standardized salary rates, respondent ordered for the deletion from the COA Centralized or Special Payroll their allowances, fringe benefits and other emoluments. Petitioners sent a former letter-request asking for reconsideration, be restored, or at least considered in the determination of their respective compensation rates as of July 1, 1989, so that they will not suffer any salary deduction when the standardized salary rates are finally implemented. Respondent denied and as a consequence, each of the petitioners presently receive the reduced salary of P2,323.00. Petitioners here contend that: (a) Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758 authorize their continued receipt of the extra allowances from the GOCCs. (b) Since, in respect to GOCCs and GFIs, the law does not seem to make a distinction between an incumbent therein who is an organic personnel thereof and an incumbent who is a COA personnel assigned to their auditing units, petitioners must, for purposes of 17, be considered "incumbents" of the PNB and the CB.
They appeal to the rule on statutory construction that where the law does not make any distinction, no distinction should be made. ISSUE/S: Whether under RA 6758 COA personnel may still be allowed to receive from any government agency, local or national, including GOCCs and GFIs, other allowances, emoluments and fringe benefits over and above their legally set salaries and allowances as COA employees. HELD: NO. Petitioners contention that Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758 authorize their continued receipt of the extra allowances from the GOCCs to which they are assigned are patently untenable. 12 refers to the regular allowances and compensation which an instrumentality, entity or agency of the government grants to its organic personnel. In the case of COA personnel, such allowances and compensation cannot include allowances, fringe benefits or extra emoluments, such as those claimed by petitioners, which are granted by GOCCs or GFIs. 18 of the Act itself bans the COA personnel from receiving them even as it also prohibits GOCCs and GFIs from granting such benefits to personnel of other government instrumentalities, entities or agencies assigned to them to perform the regular functions of their mother units. It would have been absurd and illogical for the law to impose the prohibition and at the same time mandate its integration in the standardized salary rates of the personnel of the COA. The DBM Secretary has certified that "other than those authorized/mandated by law, the allowances, fringe benefits and other emoluments that were directly received by COA personnel from the various GOCCs, including GFIs, to which they are assigned, were not provided under the regular appropriations of the Commission in the General Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990." They were not so provided because there was no legal basis therefor. The questioned law is clear enough. Frankly, its interpretation is not even called for. Under 17, the additional compensation or fringe benefits and other emoluments referred to therein are those granted by the mother or parent unit to the incumbents thereof, i.e., the organic personnel, which include benefits absorbed from LGUs. As correctly observed by respondent, the law does not mention benefits absorbed from GOCCs or GFIs, as these were prohibited from granting them to non-organic personnel. A distinction is not in order for the meaning of incumbent is not doubtful nor susceptible of more than one interpretation.
An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office; one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office. Insofar as petitioners are concerned, they are incumbents of the position to which they have been appointed senior clerks of the COA and not of the PNB or the CB to which they are merely temporarily assigned.
SANTOS V. CA PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.: DOCTRINE: For the purpose of computing or determining petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7294, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the Metropolitan Manila Authority. NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari FACTS: On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired under RA 910 from the Judiciary as Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City after having served since 18 January 1983. He received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the CSC (CSC). On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted RA 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). The MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the implementation of RA 7924. Petitioner opted to be separated from the service. MMDA then issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that he would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under 11 of the MMDA Law. Petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under RA 7924.
The CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of petitioners separation pay cannot be subject to the prohibition against the double compensation in cases when officers and employees who were previously granted said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government Agency or Office. MR denied. The CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266 affirmed. MR denied. CA affirmed. ISSUE/S: Whether petitioners separation pay under 11 of RA 7924 should be limited to the number of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension HELD: YES. First, 11 of RA 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months of salary for every year of service allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected. Second, if petitioner were convinced that that 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government service, he he could have opted to apply for retirement benefits under the third paragraph of 11, which provides that if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. Third, petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides that "Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under RA 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under RA 910, as amended, would
be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services, in violation of the first paragraph of 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which reads: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law 11 of RA 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
PANIS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Quiason, J.: DOCTRINE: The "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of promotion. In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was employed as Administrative Officer of the Hospital, while private respondent was Administrative Officer of the City Health Department detailed at the said hospital. The Mayor appointed private respondent to the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration of CCMC. Petitioner, a candidate for the said position, promptly protested the appointment before the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC Regional Office, however, indorsed
the matter to the Office of the City Mayor, which in turn referred it to the Office of the City Attorney. The City Attorney dismissed petitioner's protest and upheld the appointment of private respondent. This dismissal was affirmed by the CSC Regional Office and later on appeal, by respondent CSC. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the appointment of private respondent was made in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudence because (1) the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration was not legally created; (2) assuming that it was, there was no qualification standard nor valid screening procedure; and (3) the seniority and next-in-rank rules were disregarded. ISSUE/S: WON the appointment was valid. HELD: YES. The position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration is the very same position of Hospital Administrator created by Ordinance No. 1216. The Office of Hospital Administrator was not extinguished, but the designation thereof merely corrected to reflect the proper classification of the position under existing rules. The Office of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration therefore was created and existed in accordance with law. The determination who among the qualified candidates should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority. The Mayor of Cebu City, in the instant case, chose to appoint private respondent. In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position. An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created position, is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Once a candidate possesses the minimum qualities required by law, sufficient discretion, if not plenary, is granted to the appointing authority. It is markworthy that private respondent was detailed at the CCMC primarily to help in upgrading the level of performance of the said hospital. DIVINAGRACIA v. STO. TOMAS PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.: DOCTRINE: Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Private respondent was the Budget Officer of Pili for almost eight (8) years from August 1980 until her transfer in July, 1988. Nacario appeared to be satisfied with her work and felt fulfilled as Budget Officer until Mayor Prila
appointed her MPDC to fill up the position, which was not even vacant at that time. It was only seven (7) days after Nacario's appointment when Mayor Prila informed Mancita that her services were being terminated. ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer is valid. HELD: No. Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the commission. (emphasis supplied) According to Nacario she never applied or sought appointment by transfer to the position of MPDC since she even had no prior knowledge of her appointment. 28 She assumed the new position only in order to comply with the move of Mayor Prila to supposedly "reorganize" the municipal government of Pili. Nacario did not question her transfer because she revered the mayor and did not in any way intend to displease him. The submissive attitude displayed by private respondent towards her transfer is understandable. Although Nacario was not informed of the reasons therefor she did not complain to the mayor or appeal her case to the CSC if in fact the same was not made in the interest of public service. For it is not common among local officials, even those permanent appointees who are more secured and protected in their tenurial right, to oppose or question the incumbent local executive on his policies and decisions no matter how improper they may seem. Simply put, Mayor Prila was so determined in terminating Mancita that he conveniently pre-arranged her replacement by Nacario. Although Nacario continued to discharge her duties, this did not discourage her from trying to regain her former position. Undaunted, she applied with the Office of the Budget Secretary for the position of Budget Officer upon learning that it was placed under the Department of Budget and Management. She was not however successful. Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure. When Nacario was extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and she assumed the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution 32 and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice. The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial reprisal.
SANTIAGO JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.: DOCTRINE: One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: CSC revoked the promotional appointment of petitioner from Collector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III and directing instead the appointment of private respondent to the same position. When petitioner was promoted, respondent filed a protest with the MSPB. MSPB upheld petitioners promotional appointment on the grounds, among others, that: (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant; and (3) existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud. Respondent appealed to the Board then overturned its earlier decision. The Commission ruled that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs Collector III, JOSE has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. ISSUE/S: Whether the revocation of petitioners appointment was valid. HELD: No. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment." One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment
ABILA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Feliciano, J.: DOCTRINE: A vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement and re-employment or appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-in-rank rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled by promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was appointed after Admin Officer retired. Private respondentfiled a protest with the MSPB. The same was dismissed. Upon appeal, MSPB reversed. It found that both petitioner Abila and private respondent Eleria met the minimum eligibility and education requirements for Administrative Officer IV, but ruled that respondent Eleria had the edge in terms of rank and experience as an Administrative Officer. The Board also held that respondent Eleria was holding a position next in rank to that of the vacancy, which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4 of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343, gave her "promotional priority" over petitioner. ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent Commission has authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the official authorized by law to make an appointment to the government service, in the matter of weighing an appointee's qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shown that the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed for the position. HELD: No. CSC has no such authority, the power of appointment, which is essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the office concerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot. He occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post and discharge its functions in the government agency he heads. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the
organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement and re-employment or appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-inrank rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled by promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary. A promotion involves a situation quite different from the situation in the case at bar where the appointment of petitioner Abila was effected through lateral transfer from a position in one department of the city government to a position of greater responsibility in another department of the same government. The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had been filled by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next in rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next in rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807, the Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion."
MEDENILLA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power, another person has better qualifications for the job. NATURE: Petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the CSC FACTS: Petitioner was a contractual employee of the DPWH occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. A reorganization ensued within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. This included the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer to which position petitioner was appointed. Respondents lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of the petitioner to the position. CSC revoked appointment. ISSUE/S: Whether there is merit in the protest. HELD: No. While the appointing authority is given the wide latitude of discretion, to sustain the appointment of Medenilla may give the appointing power unnecessary opportunities to act capriciously and thus thwart the
natural and reasonable expectation of the officer next-in-rank to any vacant position, to be promoted to it. We have already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee is qualified, the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power, another person has better qualifications for the job. Once the function is discharged, the participation of the Civil Service Commission in the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of attestation is to determine whether the appointee possesses the requisite civil service eligibility, no more than that is left for the Civil Service Commission to do. The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary. The discretion to be granted to the appointing authority, if not plenary must at least be sufficient.
LUSTERIO v. IAC PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.: DOCTRINE: Appointing authority had the discretion to determine who of those qualified should be appointed to the contested position. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Plaintiff protested the appointment of private respondent to Supply Officer. Protest was denied. Upon appeal, CSC reversed and revoked appointment. However, when it went to the TC, the trial court ruled that (a) pursuant to Section 19(3) of P.D. No. 807 (The Civil Service Decree) and the Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on 20 November 1975 on nextin-rank positions, the position of Supervisory Fiscal Clerk previously occupied by private respondent, is immediately next to the contested position in the organizational chart of the Division of Quezon for the Administrative Staff.
Upon the other hand, petitioner, prior to his appointment to the contested position, was Supply Officer I in Lucban National High School in Lucban, Quezon; consequently, he does not belong to the organizational unit where the vacancy exists. Circular No. 5, Series of 1963 of the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports provides that "for reasons of equity and morale, fully qualified employees within the organizational unit, all circumstances being equal, should have first call upon promotional opportunities," (b) Moreover, Palomar is a college graduate with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce with three units in Master of Arts; he has participated and completed in service training courses along supply and property management; held the positions of Clerk-Helper, Clerk-Typist, Clerk I, Fiscal Clerk III and Supervising Fiscal Clerk; performed the duties of a Supply Officer III since his appointment in April 1977 until October 1979 with a latest performance rating of very satisfactory; and a first grade civil service eligibility. He thus meets all the requirements for appointment to the contested position. (c) Finally, the appointment of petitioner, made pursuant to the decision of then Presidential Executive Assistant, Hon. Jacobo Clave, as recommended by the Civil Service Commission, is not in accordance with law, for as noted, the Chairman of the Commission at the time of the recommendation was Honorable Clave himself. Pursuant then to Anzaldo vs. Clave, G.R. No. 54597, 119 SCRA 353, Palomar was denied due process. Petitioner appealed but IAC dismissed his appeal from TC. ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner and private respondent meet the minimum requirements for the position of Supply Officer III. HELD: No. Even if We grant for the sake of argument that petitioner is also qualified, the appointing authority had the discretion to determine who of those qualified should be appointed to the contested position. Per the settled doctrine adverted to above, the Merit Systems Board, the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, committed an error, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, when they rescinded the appointment of the private respondent and directed the appointing authority to appoint the petitioner. More specifically, the only act these bodies were authorized to do, if they were convinced otherwise, was to disapprove the appointment of private respondent. They cannot have gone any further to encroach on the discretion of the appointing authority to appoint another who is qualified. This is practically analogous to a situation where two or more aspirants are qualified for a vacant position and the Commission finds them to be so. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. PEOPLE V. REYES PONENTE: Puno, J.: DOCTRINE: The transfer of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. If the transfer or detail of a government officer or
employee be done to promote efficiency in the government service, then it will not be penalized. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus FACTS: Ebio was transferred to the Office of the Deputy of Collector of Customs. He filed a letter-complaint with the COMELEC for his transfer claiming that it was prohibited because of the COMELEC ban. Upon investigation, COMELEC charged respondent Maniego of a violation of the election on transfer. Maniego moved to quash the information. TC granted. ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer during election period ipso facto is an election offense. HELD: No. Section 261(h) of BP 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. The transfer of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. If the transfer or detail of a government officer or employee be done to promote efficiency in the government service, then it will not be penalized. In the case at bench, respondent transferred Ebio before the promulgation of necessary rules on how to get approval on transfer or detail were issued by COMELEC. It cannot be said that Section 261(h) of BP 881 was already enforceable before the effectivity of these rules.
VINZONS-CHATO v. NATIVIDAD PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.: DOCTRINE: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of service may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulation. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: On December 10, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, citing the "exigencies of the revenue service," issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 80-93 (RTAO 80-93), directing ninety revenue district officers to report to new assignments in the redesignated and renumbered revenue district offices nationwide. Private respondent Salvador Nori Blas was ordered to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In turn, petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No. 21. Blas Contention All that he asserts is his constitutional right to protection from a demotion not for cause, and without his consent under the guise of a "transfer in the exigencies of the service". He contends that his transfer constitutes a demotion because, in effect, his span of control in terms of jurisdiction and personnel has been considerably diminished. He claims that he has earned, through hard work, as evidenced by his service record, the position at San Fernando, Pampanga which has a larger staff and revenue capacity and is much closer to Manila. Chatos Contention 1. Private respondent did not have any vested right to his station in San Fernando, Pampanga since he was only designated to the post and not appointed thereto. Neither did private respondent show any right to be exempted from the reorganization. 2. Neither was the transfer a demotion, since there was no reduction in duties, responsibilities, status, rank, or salary. ISSUE/S: 1. WON there is a reduction in duties and responsibilities 2. WON there was a demotion and dislocation on the part of the plaintiff when the public defendant Chato issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) No. 80-93. HELD: (NONE) 1. Blas transfer to the Tuguegarao revenue district did not really entail any diminution in rank, salary, status and responsibilities. Private respondent's claim that the Tuguegarao revenue district is smaller than that in San Fernando, Pampanga has no basis because, as already noted, the classification of RDOs' into Class A-1, A, B, C and D has been abolished and all RDO's are now considered to be of the same class.
2. Blas transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of revenue district officers designed to improve revenue collection. His new assignment should therefore be considered by him a challenge to his leadership as revenue district officer rather than a demotion or a penalty. 3. Private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the Commissioner constituting violation of his right to security of tenure. To sustain his contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion simply because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects. VINZONS-CHATO v. ZENOROSA PONENTE: Buena, J.: DOCTRINE: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of service may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulation. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order which reassigned respondents from Assistant Revenue District Officer to Assistant Division Chief, and assigned in her place, as Assistant Regional District Officer of RDO No. 34 was Jacinto T. Marcelo. Respondent filed an injunction to restrain petitioner Marcelo from assuming the post of Assistant Regional District Officer of RDO No. 34. According to private respondent, petitioner Chato, in a clear act of spite, whim, and vindictiveness against a subordinate employee who dared to question petitioners' unlawful acts, issued the now questioned RTAO 8-95. Acting on the petition, the trial court issued a TRO. Private respondent on November 10, 1998, she claims that she was compelled to use her accumulated leave credits amounting to over 350 working days in order to resist the order of petitioner Chato. Thus, she prays for the nullification of the unlawful orders of Petitioner Chato so that private respondent's accumulated leave credits will be restored. ISSUE/S: Whether the TC erred in issuing a TRO. HELD: Yes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of service may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulation. The primary reason why private respondent refuses to comply with RTAO 8-95 was because she took it as an act of vindictiveness and reprisal on the part of the Commissioner, consequent to her filing a complaint against the assigned RDO of RDO No. 34 Isidoro Tecson, Jr. (now deceased), on the basis of a prior assignment order issued by the Commissioner. Nowhere in the assignment order, RTAO 8-95, can it be gleaned
that the reassignment was for the purpose of harassing private respondent. In fact, private respondent was not the only one reassigned to a new post. There is no merit in the argument of private respondent that she will be demoted by her transfer We therefore find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
CRISTOBAL v. MELCHOR PONENTE: Munoz Palma, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the CSC FACTS: Petitioner was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office, Malacaang, Manila, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 Then Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were "terminated effective today." ISSUE/S: Whether or not Appellant Cristobal his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court HELD: No. (a) Jose Cristobal consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his separation from the service; (b) he was give n assurance that would be recalled at the opportune time; and (c) that he sudden termination of his employment without cause after eight years of service in the government is contrary to law following the ruling Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the benefit of Cristobal who is similarly situated as the plaintiffs in said case and who merely desisted from joining the suit because of the assurance given him that he would be recalled to the service - with all these factors, We repeat, there is justification for not applying existing jurisprudence to his case. This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the conditions or
exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to grant a relief that will serve the ends of justice.
SABELLO v. DECS PONENTE: Gancayco, J.: DOCTRINE: The absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. She, together with the barrio captain, were charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I. ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position. HELD: Yes. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office. In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher. However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them. In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN PONENTE: Fernan, C.J.: DOCTRINE: In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
NATURE: Petition to review resolution of the Deputy Executive Secretary FACTS: Petitioner (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4 ISSUE/S: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. HELD: No. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
CABAGNOT v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Romero, J.: DOCTRINE: The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. NATURE: Petition seeks the reversal of CSC Resolutions FACTS: A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government of Aklan was approved by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration. The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364) regular plantilla positions from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with the Office of the Governor allocated one hundred forty four (144) from the previous sixty (60) positions. Petitioner herein, issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officials and employees to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffing pattern for the evaluation and assessment of the Provincial Placement Committee. 21 supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to petitioner pursuant to Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the Civil Service Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656 (1988) entitled An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. They prayed that they be appointed to the positions they applied for to which they are eligible, having the required educational background, training and experience. They likewise sent petitioner individual letters reiterating their qualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments to positions lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization. Petitioner denied their plea. Upon appeal, CSC found that irregularities attended the election of the two members representing the first and second level personnel to the Placement Committee based on the affidavit executed by one Nida E. Melgarejo and the letter appeal of some thirty-seven (37) employees of the provincial government of Aklan. Furthermore, it found petitioner to have violated Sec. 7 of the Rules on Reorgnization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. of 1988 providing preference for appointment of employees holding permanent positions considering that private respondents who were all holding permanent appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization were proposed to positions much lower than their former items despite the fact that their old items were carried over in the new staffing pattern. The Commission found no reason for displacing the services of private respondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84) additional positions for the Office of the Governor alone.
The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private respondents were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former positions held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner. ISSUE/S: Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the dismissed employees. HELD: Yes. With respect to the sixteen private respondents, respondent Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be "immediately appointed and restored to their positions or positions of comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights with back salaries reckoned from dates they should properly have been appointed thereto effective the date of the reorganization of said province." It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service. However, with respect to private respondent Oczon, we hold that respondent Commission did commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering his reinstatement with back salary, considering that he was not terminated as a result of the reorganization.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.: DOCTRINE: A "detail" is the movement from one Department or Agency to another which is temporary in nature whereas a "re-assignment" is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same Department or Agency. NATURE: Petition for Review on certiorari FACTS: Without proper authorization, respondent returned to his former position as Assistant Director which prompted petitioner to issue two (2) Memoranda: The first was addressed to the CYRC Staff advising that Respondent Lopez would not be considered an active member of the Staff until he first secured the proper authorization for his transfer. The other was addressed to Lopez himself requesting him to submit an official order terminating his "detail." Respondent insisted on the validity of his resumption of office stating that "no one can be detailed for more than three (3) months without the written consent of the employee concerned" and that "detailed assignment beyond six (6) months has to be approved by the CSC and the Office of the President." He also admonished Petitioner Corpuz to recall and/or rectify her memoranda. Petitioner withheld a portion of respondents salary on the ground that respondents attendance is not considered official. On 1 April 1985, Respondent Lopez filed a Petition for mandamus with Damages against Petitioner Corpuz, Minister Laya, and the Chief, Administrative Services, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135 of Makati, Metro Manila.
ISSUE/S: (1) whether or not Petitioner Corpuz was justified in refusing to take official cognizance of Respondent Lopez's attendance as Assistant Director at the CYRC and in withholding his salaries corresponding to the period; and (2) whether or not she can be held liable in damages for such acts. HELD: 1) Yes. It will be recalled that Respondent Lopez returned to the CYRC at his own instance without any authorization from higher authorities. Petitioner Corpuz as CYRC Director, officially advised him to secure that clearance, but he adamantly refused to obey a directive from his immediate superior. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Corpuz as head of the office, was left with no alternative but to withhold recognition of his attendance at the CYRC. To maintain discipline in the office, and in the interests of the service, she could do no less. Indeed, a "detail" is the movement from one Department or Agency to another which is temporary in nature whereas a "re-assignment" is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same Department or Agency. Respondent brought upon himself the withholding of his salaries. When he reported back to the CYRC on 18 February 1985 he did so at his own instance without prior authorization. He was advised to secure such clearance on 21 February 1985 but he refused. The directive to obtain the same was reiterated on 27 February 1985 by Petitioner Corpuz. Instead of complying, he addressed a letter on 6 March 1985 to the Deputy Minister requesting clarification.
TEOTICO v. AGDA PONENTE: Davide, Jr. J.: DOCTRINE: Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or assigned to any other place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more effectively. NATURE: Original petition for certiorari and prohibition, FACTS: Lanuza "temporarily re-assigned" Agda, "in the interest of the service," at the main office of the Administrator to perform special functions which may be assigned to him, and one Mr. Epitacio Lanuza, Jr., Assistant Fiber Regional Administrator, was designated Officer in Charge of FIDA Region I. Agda prepared for filing with the CSC an Urgent Petition To Stop Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, s. '87, alleging therein that the Special Order is (a) devoid of legal basis as it does not preserve and maintain a status quo before the controversy, (b) against the interest of public service considering that Epitacio Lanuza has been cited for two cases both involving dishonesty, abuse of privileges and character unbecoming a
government official, (c) improper, inappropriate and devoid of moral justification, and (d) a violation of Civil Service rules and regulation considering that it violates the rule on nepotism since Epitacio Lanuza and Administrator Lanuza are cousins. Petitioner as Acting Administrator of FIDA issued a Memorandum to Agda directing him to immediately submit his development programs Also, Mr. Seguritan, requested Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him (Seguritan) the keys of the vault in FIDA Region I. Teotico referred the request to Agda with the note: "For immediate compliance pls. so as not to hamper the conduct of our operations and service in Region I." Agda refused and so Teotico formally charged him for insubordination and conduct prejudical to the best interest of the service. Agda filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC alleging, in substance, that Special Order No. 219 of 13 November 1987 issued by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is null and void for having been issued in violation of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) which prohibits the detail or re-assignment of civil service personnel within three months before an election and Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which prohibits transfer or detail of officers and employees in the civil service within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission on Elections, and that all succeeding orders or memoranda issued in connection with or by reason of such Special Order or in implementation thereof are likewise null and void. The election referred to was the January 18, 1988 local election. He further alleges therein that he "is filing" with the COMELEC criminal charges for violation of Sections 3, 261(h) and 264 of B. P. No. 881 against former Administrator Lanuza and Teotico and applied for an injunction. RTC upheld Agda saying that the latter was denied due process. ISSUE/S: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion . HELD: Yes. Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER; he was not appointed to any specific station. He was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II. Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or assigned to any other place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more effectively. The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and reassignment. If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the CSC. We are not persuaded by Agda's claim that the questioned detail was done in violation of Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) Considering that (a) he raised this matter for the first time only in his Amended Petition, or five (5) months after the issuance of the Special Order.
No evidence has been presented, or at least strongly and convincingly suggested, to prove or show that no prior approval was obtained by Administrator Lanuza from the COMELEC for such detail, or that a case for violation of Section 261(h) was in fact filed against Lanuza or Teotico. All that Agda can show are his alleged letter to the COMELEC to inquire if Special Order No. 219 had been referred to it and an alleged answer dated 14 April 1988 of Atty. Horacio SJ Apostol, Manager of the Law Department of the Commission, to the effect that the records of the Department do not show, as of that date, that the Special Order was submitted or referred to the Commission. The latter is not conclusive proof that no prior authority was in fact obtained by Administrator Lanuza for the reassignment or detail of Agda. No law requires the submission. to the COMELEC of special orders reassigning or detailing employees within the prohibited period. What is needed is "prior authority," the request for which and its approval may be in separate documents or papers. The writ was improvidently and capriciously issued. The issuance of the writ, although addressed to the sound discretion of the court, is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right which should be protected.
CARIO v. DAOAS PONENTE: Kapunan, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is true that the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority and that it can be done as the exigencies of the public service may require. NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Cristina Jenny Cario was appointed Accountant III in the National Commission for Indigenous People. She was later reassigned by Daoas to the position of Technical Assistant of the Socio-Economic Division. She alleged that her reassignment was an offshoot of her refusal to sign a Disbursement Voucher for the travel expenses to Indonesia of RD Rosalina Bistoyong. She further alleged that the position was non-existent. She filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against Bistoyong. Daoas issued a Notice/Order of Separation, dated 25 April 1997, and received by Cario on 13 May 1997 informing her that she was dropped from the rolls because of her absence without leave for more than thirty (30) days. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether the termination is valid; 2) Whether the reassignment is null and void HELD: No. As correctly stated by the CA, the validity of the reassignment of petitioner was already settled by the pronouncement of the CSC that such reassignment was not valid and that she could not be transferred to another region without her consent. It is true that the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority and that it can be done as the exigencies of the public service may require. As such, this Court in a number of cases allowed the reassignment of personnel but in such instances, they were not appointed to a specific station or particular unit or agency. The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station, such as in the case of herein petitioner who was appointed as Accountant III in Region I. Hence, she could not be reassigned to another station or region without her consent. Otherwise, the unconsented transfer would amount to a removal.8 2) No Petitioner has good cause for not complying with the reassignment order. In this case, petitioner, instead of complying with the reassignment order, continued to report to her workstation in Region I. For her failure to report to Region II, she was considered AWOL and was dropped from the rolls. The dropping of petitioner from the rolls was sustained by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court cited Resolution No. 98-0488 of the Civil Service Commission which mandates that "a reassigned employee who does not agree with the order must nevertheless comply until its implementation is restrained or it is declared to be not in the interest of the service or have been issued with grave abuse of discretion." According to the appellate court, petitioner should have
asked the Commission to enjoin the effectivity of her reassignment order, and for her failure to do so, she had only herself to blame. It was not petitioner who appealed to the Commission as there was no need for her to do so.
PASTOR v. CITY OF PASIG PONENTE: Mendoza, J.: DOCTRINE: It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. CSC ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city government, the CA set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE/S: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be set aside and that of the CSC reinstated. HELD: Yes. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioner's reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the same was "due to petitioner's long years of experience in finance" which especially fitted her for studies regarding the city's revenues. For the same reason, petitioner's reassignment to various offices should be considered more than merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment, lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.
TUPAS v. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION PONENTE: Regalado, J.: DOCTRINE: The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed in the MR. Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S:WON a certification election may be conducted among the NHC employees HELD: Yes. Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
SSS v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Cortes, J: DOCTRINE: Employees of GOCCs with original charter are prohibited from engaging in strikes. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241]. The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37]. Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152]. The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision. The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute. On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.
Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking. In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike. ISSUE/S:1) Whether or not the RTC can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. 2) Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. HELD: 1) The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it. 2) No. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
BANGALISAN v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Regalado, J.:
DOCTRINE: While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals FACTS: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. The Secretary of the (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately. It was later modified to suspension for nine months without pay. ISSUE/S: Whether the teachers have the right to strike. HELD: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but were merely exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. We find such pretension devoid of merit. The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has been decided by this Court in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held "that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons."
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. BORROMEO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions who retired or shall retire on or after the February, 1986 political upheaval shall be based on highest monthly salary plus COLA and RATA. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to COA Chairman, coursed through the CSC Chairman, requesting an opinion on whether or not the money value of the terminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should include the allowances received at the time of retirement. The petitioner, in his letter, further stated that while retired members of other Constitutional Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basis of highest monthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal leave was computed solely on the basis of highest monthly salary. Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential representing the unpaid COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC Chairman informed the petitioner that the release of the corresponding advice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his terminal leave differential had already been requested from the DBM. In a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential for the following reasons, among others: 1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on "basic pay" or "basic salary" pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1081. 2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay or salary received by an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay and allowance. 3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot be validly invoked as precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action since said claims were processed without prior involvement of the DBM. Faced with the DBM refusal to release the corresponding allotment, the CSC yielded to DBM instead of asserting its initial determination. It issued Resolution No. 90-514 dated May 30, 1990 wherein the Commission deemed it proper not to rule on the issue on "ethical considerations" and "compulsions of
delicadeza" and advised the petitioner to file an action for declaratory relief (sic) on the issue with the Supreme Court. ISSUE/S: Whether or not RATA and COLA should be added to the highest monthly salary in computing the petitioner's terminal leave pay. HELD: The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions who retired or shall retire on or after the February, 1986 political upheaval shall be based on highest monthly salary plus COLA and RATA. It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based on highest monthly salary plus transportation, living and representation allowance. "Commutation of salary" as used in Section 286 is, however, not the same as "commutation of leave credits." The former is applied for by an employee during employment when he goes on ordinary leave. VITAL-GOZON v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Davide Jr., J.: DOCTRINE: Under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. NATURE: Petition seeks to reverse the CA Resolution FACTS: In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by president Corazon C. Aquino reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971). On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr." Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended
each and every hearing of the mandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it was not the proper forum for the claim for damages, at which point then the necessity of an answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27 September 1989 that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for damages; (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she could not have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the adverse decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her motion for admission of the answer had been pending since 18 October 1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to present her evidence on the claim for damages. ISSUE/S: 1) whether petitioner was denied due process when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and 2) whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were proper. HELD: 1) No. The record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29 December 1998, the Court of Appeals gave due course to private respondent's petition and required herein petitioner and the other respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of the resolution. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's failure to file the answer to the petition was due to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals, required to file answers to both the original petition and the Supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions. 2) It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Children's Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and private respondent's two official demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commission's decision were merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, "she did not answer [private respondent's] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await 'legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.'"
MANCENIDO v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.: DOCTRINE: Only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney NATURE: This is a petition for review. FACTS: Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and damages with the RTC against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases. Respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23, 1994, granting the appeal of petitioners, (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3) granting their motion for partial execution.
Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition. and injunction with the Court of Appeals with the prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal be given due course and the trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of its judgment. Said petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34331. Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads: ISSUE/S: 1) Whether a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities; and 2) Whether a Notice of Appeal filed through private counsel and with notice to petitioners and not to their counsel is valid. HELD: 1) The Court has previously ruled that only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney; 2) No, service of notice when a party is represented by counsel should be made upon counsel, and not upon the party. The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the prosecution of a party's case. We find petitioners' reliance on Riego proper and to the point.
LOPEZ, JR., v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.: DOCTRINE: The option of retiring under Section 12(c) or Section 12(e), in the circumstances of this case, belongs to private respondent Manapat and not to his employer, the City of Manila. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Private respondent retired from the government service as Chief of the Legal Division of the office of the Municipal Board of Manila. He retired under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended, having then rendered twenty (20)
years of service to petitioner City of Manila and received the amount of P24,479.02 representing his full retirement benefit. Manapat was reemployed by the City of Manila this time as Secretary of the City of Manila Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, with a monthly salary of P3,993.33. He occupied that position until he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 27 June 1989. The City of Manila extended his period of service for six (6) months, i.e., up to 27 December 1989. During this additional period of service, i.e., on 1 July 1989, the Salary Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758) took effect and increased Manapat's monthly salary from P3,993.33 to P11,385.00. Upon expiration of private respondent Manapat's six (6)-month extended period of service, he filed with the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") an application for retirement under R.A. No. 1616, as amended. This application was approved by the GSIS on 6 April 1990, initially on the basis of his previous salary of P3,993.33 per month; on that basis, he was entitled to a total retirement gratuity of P179,274.04, less the amount of P24,479.02 previously received as retirement pay when he first retired on 29 February 1972, making a net balance of P154,795.02. On 16 May 1990, the GSIS adjusted Manapat's approved application for retirement to conform with his last standardized monthly salary of P11,385.00. This adjustment resulted in a total collectible retirement pay or gratuity of P486,634.84 for Manapat. The approved adjusted claim of Manapat for retirement benefits was forwarded by the GSIS to the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals of the City of Manila. The Assistant Department Head of that Board in turn transmitted the papers to the Chairman of the Committee on the Settlement of Claims for Retirement Gratuity and Terminal Leave Pay ("Committee") by an Indorsement dated 21 May 1990. The next day, however, the Chairman of that Committee returned the papers to the Manila Board of Tax Assessment Appeals without acting on the retirement gratuity claim of Manapat, upon the ground that it was existing policy of the City of Manila that an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years must retire under R.A. No. 660 and not under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended. Manapat appealed the action of the Chairman of the Committee to the City Budget Officer. Manapat then commenced in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, a special civil action for mandamus to compel petitioner officials of the city of Manila to allow Manapat to retire under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and issued a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner officials to pay the retirement claim of Mr. Manapat in the amount of P486,636.84 with legal interest from the time of filling of the petition for mandamus and awarded as well Mr. Manapat P30,000.00 as moral damages and another P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether a government employee, who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, may opt to retire under R.A. No. 1616 as amended or, alternatively, is entitled only to retirement benefits under the mandatory retirement clause of R.A. No. 660; and (2) Whether the City of Manila as employer may be compelled to pay the retirement benefits of its employees under R.A. No. 1616, notwithstanding lack of available funds for that purpose. HELD: 1) We consider, therefore, and so hold that an employee who shall have satisfied the requirements for retirement under more than one (1) subsection of Section 12 of C.A. No. 186 as amended is entitled to choose the subsection (whose requirement he has complied with and) under which he shall retire. The option of retiring under Section 12(c) or Section 12(e), in the circumstances of this case, belongs to private respondent Manapat and not to his employer, the City of Manila. That option cannot be taken away from the retiree by the employer, which is precisely what petitioners purported to do through the medium of the "policy" of restricting the options open to a retiree who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) to retirement under Section 12(e) even though such retiree simultaneously satisfies the requisites of retirement under some other subsection or subsections of Section 12. To sustain the petitioners' alleged "policy" would in effect constitute an amendment of the terms of the applicable statute something which neither this Court nor petitioners are authorized to do. 2) We expressly reject the argument of petitioners that the funding of private respondent's retirement gratuity under Section 12(c) is "discretionary" on the part of such employer. The fact that petitioner City of Manila may have no item in its General Appropriation Ordinance specifically earmarking an amount of P486,634.84 for payment to Mr. Manapat, presents no legal obstacle. In Baldivia, et al. v. Lota, etc., 6 the petitioners were denied payment of their terminal leave pay because allegedly the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, had no budget or appropriation ordinance setting aside the sums necessary to pay petitioners' terminal leave pay.
SANTOS v. CA PONENTE: Davide, Jr., C.J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: After the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed as judge. He optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. In 1993, he re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. In 1995, Congress reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) which provides that the national government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder pursuant to the reorganization. MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated from the service his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law. Petitioner asserts that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. CSC argued that petitioner cannot be retirement benefits twice. He can only exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924. These options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under R.A. No.
910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the government, that is 9 years and 2 months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his services as Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and one-fourth salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum dated 30 August 1996; or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from the former MMA for his entire government service. ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner is precluded from receiving double gratuity. HELD: Yes. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA. In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months of salary for every year of service cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government service. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11, which pertinently reads: Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 910, as amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension. The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.
Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA.
PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: DOCTRINE: Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. NATURE: Motion FACTS: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. ISSUE/S: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? HELD: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
CENA, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Medialdea, J.: DOCTRINE: Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner entered the government service as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First
District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer. He was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the CSC whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. CSC denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service. ISSUE/S: May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age pension? HELD: Yes. Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement.
RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PONENTE: Feliciano, J.:
DOCTRINE: Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter." Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." This request was denied. ISSUE/S: Whether Rabor may be allowed to extend? HELD: No. Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
NERI v. SENATE PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.: DOCTRINE: Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China. Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE/S: 1) Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? 2) Does it violate right to information? 3) May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with particularity? 4) Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid? HELD: 1) Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive Privilege. xxx we are convinced that the communications elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 2) No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. 3) No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. 4) No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
COJUANGCO JR., v. CA PONENTE: Panganiban, J.: DOCTRINE: Public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. NATURE: Petition for Review FACTS: Petitioner horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes. He sent letters of demand to the defendants for the collection of the prizes due him. Defendants answered that prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG Commissioner. The matter was brought to court. RTC held that PCSO had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. CA reversed the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, it held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained. It also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his
prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally disposed as follows: 10 ISSUE/S: Whe award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law HELD: The petition is partly meritorious. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxx xxx xxx Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.
TECSON v. SANDIGANBAYAN PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Upon the offer of petitioner, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business. Tecson extorted money from Lanuza for the issuance of their business permit but this was later revoked by the Sanggunian Pangbayan which was also presided over by Tecson. This prompted Lanuza to file a case Tecson for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), a civil case for damages and a complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act with the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan found Tecson guilty. ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan; 2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy; and 3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: 1) No. First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. 2) No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie. 3) Yes. Sandiganbayan, all of the aforementioned elements concur in the instant case. Its findings on this concurrence are as follows: First, Tecson was in September 1989 a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Second, in his official capacity as Mayor, he signed and issued on September 27, 1989, a Mayor's Permit to and in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their investment business in which he does not appear
to have made any contribution to the capital. Third, before he released the Mayor's Permit to Mrs. Luzana, he requested and received on that same day, September 27, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., the amount of P4,000.00 to be used by him in the fiesta to be held on September 29, 1989. And, fourth, Tecson requested and received the amount of P4,000.00 as cash advance in consideration of the help he gaveviz, issuance of Mayor's Permit which he would not deliver to Mrs. Luzana unless she acceded to his request.
OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN PONENTE: Buena, J.: DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration conducted trainings and received the payment corresponding therefor. When NIACONSULT president, Tiongco, demanded the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. Petitioner was given several chances to respond to the letter of the Ombudsman but he continuously failed to respond giving rise to the assailed Resolution. While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed. ISSUE/S: Whether the dismissal of the criminal complaint against petitioner forecloses the administrative case against him. HELD: No. Such manifestation is not well taken. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the
quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
RODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J. DOCTRINE: The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them the preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. NATURE: PETITION for review a decision of the CSC FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by petitioner Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Cabolan for the sum of P486,386.18. Petitioner MPDC Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the said project was 97.5% accomplished. This report was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. Based on said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer Facundo, to Philwood Construction. Later, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor for the amount of P160,910.46 who found that as per CoA evaluation, only 60% of the project (equivalent to only P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. The Provincial Auditor did not act on petitioners request for lifting and reinspection. Thereafter, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against the Mayor, the MPDC, the Treasurer, as well as the President/General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.
The Acting Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of 3 (e) of RA 30196 [The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act] before the Sandiganbayan. While the complaint was pending at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioners and ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite. ISSUE/S: 1) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in filing the information against petitioners, or the Sandiganbayan in allowing the litigation of the criminal information for conspiracy in violating 3(e) of the AntiGraft Act (RA 3019) when the notice of disallowance still pends with the provincial auditor under petitioner' protest supported by certificate of completion and acceptance of the required element 2) WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction HELD: 1) NO. Disallowance v. Suspension: At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations, either in whole or in part. Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. The suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown." The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them the preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the CoA, their purposes distinct from each other.
The preliminary investigation involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the audit investigation relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds. Misinterpretation of 44.6.4., which provides for the Auditor's Responsibility re Evaluation of Disallowance: (1) petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance. (2) the "written explanation" referred to in said is "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Hence, 44.6.4., finds no application in this case. 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same.
LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PONENTE: Martinez, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petition for prohibition and mandamus FACTS: The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249. 11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. All the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997. ISSUE/S: Whether Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 is constitutional. HELD: The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents.
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. However, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
ORTIZ v. COMELEC PONENTE: Fernan, J.:
DOCTRINE: Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the COMELEC by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective immediately." After the presidential acceptance of said "resignations," the new COMELEC was composed of Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as Chairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Leopoldo L. Africa, Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986. To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits, all seven former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Republic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and re-enacted by Republic Act No. 6118 COMELEC denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. Petitioner filed an MR, contending that he was entitled to the benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his] office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to retirement benefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Code which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He invoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation No. 3 and cited the cases of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receive retirement benefits. COMELEC denied. ISSUE/S: Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. ESTRADA v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO PONENTE: Puno, J.: DOCTRINE: Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS: After the failed impeachment proceedings. The people marched to the streets resulting in EDSA 2. President Estrada stepped down from the palace and then Vice-President Arroyo took her oath as the incoming President. Estrada assails the authority of Arroyo saying that he was merely on leave and Arroyo is merely an acting President. ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President. HELD: Yes. We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE PONENTE: Gonzaga- Reyes, J.: DOCTRINE: No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975. Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Since their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure. ISSUE/S:Whether RA 8551 otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998" is constitutional. HELD: Section 8 of RA 8551 is unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners' right to security of tenure. The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void.
The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners' offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization. It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress. As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid. FABELLA v. CA PONENTE: Panganiban, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petition for review on Certiorari FACTS: DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. Administrative cases were filed against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. They were also placed under preventive suspension. RTC decided in favour of petitioner-appellees and this was affirmed by the CA, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them.
ISSUE/S: Whether private respondents were denied due process of law. HELD: Yes. In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not wheter private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS PONENTE: Nocon, J.: DOCTRINE: Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. He was charged with disloyalty for acts he allegedly committed during the 1989 coup. He was found guilty and was consequently removed. He assailed the DILG Secretarys decision. While this case was pending, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections and won. ISSUE/S: Whether his removal as Governor by the DILG is valid. HELD: No. Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
SALALIMA v. GUINGONA PONENTE: Davide, J.:
DOCTRINE: Public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, NATURE: Petition to annul and set aside Administrative Order No. 153 FACTS: Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints against the petitioners, who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed with the Office of the President and later docketed as O.P. Cases Nos. 5450, 5469, 5470, and 5471. Acting thereon, the President issued Administrative Order No. 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the charges and to thereafter submit its findings and recommendations. The suspension imposed on respondents shall be served successively but shall not exceed their respective unexpired terms, in accordance with the limitation imposed under Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code. ISSUE/S: 1) Did the Office of the President act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioners for periods ranging from twelve to twenty months? 2) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding O.P. cases Nos. 5450, 5469, and 5470 despite the pendency of the petitioners' appeal to the COA en banc from Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-11 and the Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB)? 3) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioners guilty of abuse of authority in denying the Municipality of Tiwi of its rightful shore in the P40,724,471.74 which the Province of Albay had received from the NPC under the Memorandum of Agreement? 4) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending in O.P. Cases Nos. 5469 and 5450 petitioner Salalima, who was reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term; and in suspending in O.P. Case No. 5469 the other petitioners, some of whom were elected and others reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed in 1989? 5) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioners in O.P. Case No. 5469 guilty of grave abuse of authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code of 1991 although they were charged under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and Section 60(d) of the Local Government? Code of 1991, thereby depriving them of due process of law? HELD: 1) No. Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the subject four administrative cases are correct, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners.
2) The pendency of the appeal was no obstacle to the investigation and resolution of their administrative cases. 3) We cannot therefore fault the public respondents with grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioners guilty of abuse of authority for failure to share with the municipalities of Tiwi and Daraga the amount of P40,724,471.74 paid by the NPC. We thus rule that any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances. As to petitioners Victoria, Marcellana, Reyeg, Osia, and Cabredo who became members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only after their election in 1992, they could not beheld administratively liable in O.P. case No. 5469, for they had nothing to do with the said resolution which was adopted in April 1989 yet. Having thus held that the petitioners could no longer be administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469, we find it unnecessary to delve into, and pass upon, the fifth issue.
GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former positions. Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of private respondents salaries during the period of their appeal. His motion was, however, denied by the appellate court in its resolution of October 6, 1997. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE/S: There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4)). Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.i[10] It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges
against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.
A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if Employee is Exonerated
Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of suspension? As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated. The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that the employee concerned should be paid his salaries after his suspension. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35 read: Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension.ii[11] However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) read: Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
This provision was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be without pay. Sec. 24 reads: Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory construction that As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.iii[12] The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the evident legislative intent to deny payment of salaries for the preventive suspension pending investigation. First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of preventive suspension would be to reverse the course of decisions ordering the payment of salaries for such period. However, the casesiv[13] cited are based either on the former rule which expressly provided that if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspensionv[14] or that upon subsequent reinstatement of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid,vi[15] or on cases which do not really support the proposition advanced. Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who have been preventively suspended is proof that there was no reason at all to suspend them and thus makes their preventive suspension a penalty.
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechems A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows: 864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services.vii[16] Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.viii[17] The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified, even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated. Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny employees salaries on the frivolous ground that the law does not provide for their payment would be to provide a tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent, may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses. Indeed, the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the recognition of the existence of power. As Justice Story aptly put it, It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere - wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse.ix[18] It may be added that if and when such abuse occurs, that would be the time for the courts to exercise their nay-saying function. Until then, however, the public interest in an upright civil service must be upheld. Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the law provides that employees who are unjustly dismissed are entitled to reinstatement with full pay. But that is because R.A. No. 6715 expressly provides for the payment to such employees of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and . . . other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.x[19] In the case of the public sector, as has been noted, the provision for payment of salaries during the preventive suspension pending investigation has been deleted.
B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal if Employee is Exonerated
But although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states that respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended. Indeed, to sustain the governments theory would be to make the administrative decision not only executory but final and executory. The fact is that 47(2) and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending appeal under Rule 39, 2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, 5 provides that in the event the executed judgment is reversed, there shall be restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may require. Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative decision meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be immediately executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall be considered as being merely under preventive suspension if eventually he prevails is taken from 37 of the Civil Service Decree of 1975 (P.D. No. 807). There was no similar provision in the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it the Commissioner of Civil Service could order the immediate execution of an administrative decision in the interest of the public service.xi[20] Nor was there provision for immediate execution of administrative decisions ordering dismissal or suspension in 695 of the Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. No. 598, 1.xii[21] Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the payment of salaries was
ordered in cases in which employees were found to be innocent of the chargesxiii[22] or their suspension was held to be unjustified, because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was executed without a finding by the Civil Service Commissioner that it was necessary in the interest of the public service.xiv[23] On the other hand, payment of back salaries was denied where it was shown that the employee concerned was guilty as charged and the immediate execution of the decision was ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner in the interest of the public service.xv[24] Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries for the period of preventive suspension. We have said that an employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries because his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot be unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be found innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But though an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with full pay. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.xvi[25]
II. Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although Found Guilty of Violation of Office Rules and Regulations and Reprimand
Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against them for acts connected with the teachers strike of September and October 1990. Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike. For being absent without leave, they were held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand. Their case thus falls squarely within ruling in Bangalisan, which likewise involved a teacher found guilty of having violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Explaining the grant of salaries during their suspension despite the fact that they were meted out reprimand, this Court stated: With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service Commission will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave, for his participation in the mass actions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive
suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service. However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the mass actions but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school of his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering such absences. Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the service.xvii[26] In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,xviii[27] a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes. Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that respondents Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in which they admitted having taken part in the mass action. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil Service Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of individual letters written by the three citing reasons for their absences, to wit: Abad, because she decided to stay home to correct student papers; Bandigas, because she had to accompany her brother to the Commission on Immigration, and Somebang because of economic reasons. Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling. Hence, he is bound by the factual findings of the CSC and the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.
ISSUE/S: HELD:
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONv. COURT OF APPEALS PONENTE: Purisima, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petitions for review on certiorari FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in the National Capital Region who incurred unauthorized absences in connection with or in furtherance of their then on-going "mass action" held sometime in September 1990. Confronted with the strike which threatened to disrupt classes in public schools, former DECS Secretary Isidro Cario issued a Memorandum ordering them to return to work under pain of dismissal. But the said Memorandum was ignored by petitioners, prompting the DECS Secretary to lodge administrative complaints against them for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of the Civil Service law and rules and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the public interest, and absence without leave.
CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" but it imposed only six (6) months' suspension without pay, which was affirmed by CA with modification. ISSUE/S: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC. HELD: No. In light of the foregoing disquisition and jurisprudence in point, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the Court of Appeals erred not in affirming the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding the petitioning public school teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Evidently, the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the public school teachers involved are "entitled to back salaries for the period they were not allowed to teach, except for the six (6) months period during which they were suspended for cause", does not accord with prevailing jurisprudence. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.xix[10] It is a salutary and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts sued upon are substantially the same.xx[11] It is beyond cavil that the public school teachers before the Court participated in the September 1990 mass actions and refused to obey the return to work order of the DECS Secretary. It is equally undisputed that they were not completely exculpated of the charges against them, as they were adjudged guilty of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently, with the ground for their suspension duly stated, the denial of their prayer for exoneration and payment of back wages is in order.
HAGAD v. GOZO-DADOLE PONENTE: Vitug, J.:

DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14. FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints against respondent officials. Councilors Dionson and
Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. Respondent officialsprayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. ISSUE/S: Whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. HELD: No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. 17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom."
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix
THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS v. MARTINEZ

xx
PONENTE: Chico- Nazario, J.: DOCTRINE: NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari FACTS: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay administratively charged Martinez with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. It also filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a void order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of the remedy of Special Civil Action, where the order assailed was a patent nullity. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. HELD: No. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,16 the legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125) (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
FRANCISCO JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PONENTE: DOCTRINE: NATURE: FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." ISSUE/S: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. HELD: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and
(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
GARCIA v. COMELEC PONENTE: Puno DOCTRINE: NATURE: FACTS: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded. Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the requirements under the LGC. The comelec dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is
unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. ISSUE: Whether all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its meeting HELD: Yes The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the members known to be political allies of Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They justified these selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice. We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan. ISSUE: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional HELD: No. A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease.

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