Lost in Corruption

Contents focused on Iranian vs. U.S clashes Home: http://secure.cryptome.us 1 October 2012

Who did the Stuxnet? Final Episode

We have previously referred to this issue briefly before. The previous page is here: https://secure.cryptome.us/2012/09/corrupt-ir-us-12-0922.htm Unedited Press.ir video referenced below , titled "30 US spies arrested in Iran-Iran Today-06-21-2011," in two parts (edited version published in Iran): https://secure.cryptome.us/2012/09/30-us-spies-01.zip (Zipped FLV, 58MB) https://secure.cryptome.us/2012/09/30-us-spies-02.zip (Zipped FLV, 65MB) We have received new information from credible sources within Iranian Judiciary that at least two Iranian Engineers have been captured and convicted for espionage against Iranian regime. These two young individuals are linked to Stuxnet attack to Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Our source has seen the final legal decision of Iranian judiciary issued to Families of these Two engineers and their conviction is reported to be "Working against national security with Foreign countries". Both received Life sentence, although the lawyers of the female individual reduced her charges to 15 years because she cooperated with MOIS, Iranian Intelligence. The case against these two specific individuals has been produced during a long investigation of Iranian authorities to unexpected access to Telecommunication infrastructure provided to Government. We are told the investigations have been started 4 years ago with focus on possible espionage activities in Government owned networks, but later revelations showed much deeper issues including but not limited to: A. Unreported overseas trips: both Government officers and contractor Personnel B. Unexpected activities in Government owned networks: Contractor Personnel and Foreign elements C. Unusual financial circulation: both Government officers and contractor Personnel The specific individuals that are linked to Stuxnet are mentioned in the Film. Their names are: 1. (Male, Contractor Personnel): Jamshid Sadegh-alhosseini MS in Civil Engineering, Project Manager, Born in Mashhad. Contracted by IAEO, Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. He was an employee of a "Highly Trustworthy" contractor company named Kalaye-Electric. This company is listed in International, U.S and EU sanctions due to its cooperation with IAEO. We are told that the company was in fact owned by IAEO and it never was a Private or Semi-private company. 2. (Female, Government Personnel): Ameneh Shirzad Computer Engineer, Software developers and maintainer of Billing Databases of ITC, Iranian Telecommunication Company. This company previously was owned by Government but later during the privatizations, it has been owned by a couple of powerful elements inside Iranian regime, including Bonyad-e-Mostazafin and Bonyad-e-Taavon-e Sepah. First directly operating under Iranian supreme Leader and the later belong to IRGC. Both individuals had profiles and CVs uploaded in a Website called "Iranian Expert Network". The owner of this website was arrested as well and he is in jail however our source does not have any clue about the legal case and statue of this individual and whether this individual was also linked to Stuxnet or not. Both individuals have been contacted by covered CIA officers, based on the CVs they uploaded publicly and mentioned their cooperation with Iranian sensitive elements as a part of their work history. We are told both individuals have clearly expressed that their initial intention was to get better Jobs hopefully outside Iran and revelations in their CVs didn't have secret agendas, initially. This is to the extent of our knowledge, was always the position of both convicts. Based on our intelligence, the female individual has been arrested first due to her unexpected behavior. She confessed and provided MOIS with a USB dongle containing a self-boot standalone SAO, Software and Operating system. The software shown in the pictures is actual CIA developed software given to a crowded ring of agents who have been caught in this wave. Based on Data obtained from the female individual and other investigations the Iranian authorities came to two realizations: A. U.S embassies neighboring Iran are super active in recruiting Iranian intellectual and skilled workers who had been involved

with Government in a far more bigger plot that could be seen before B. CIA has made many mistakes during these recruitments most notably having direct contact with the agents outside diplomatically protected areas such as Hotels, highly suitable for surveillance and counter surveillance Based on our intelligence a small three figure number of individuals have been arrested during these investigations mostly in 2008 and 2010. According to our source MOIS has been working completely dark on this project so the arrests they made was not legal in the eyes of the Iranian judiciary. These illegal and silent moves, however, helped MOIS to make some of arrested agents to doubles and feed their handlers with disinformation, for at least two years. We are confident that infights inside MOIS and perhaps what happened in Iran after the famous questionable presidential election, leaked the unsupervised MOIS ops to Iranian judiciary. Our understanding is that to save face and prevent setbacks, MOIS had to go public. This set of events turned into serious embarrassments for both CIA and MOIS. The so-called defection of Shahram Amiri is one of them, based on our intelligence mostly not published, yet. IAEO controlled Stuxnet before it does what it was designed for and moved major parts of Iranian enrichment arsenal to Fordo, a highly protected site near Qom. Natanz Site that was the main target is almost an empty room. Siemens-made SCADA infrastructure that was sold to Iran via a proxy, with secret knowledge of Siemens and BND, German Clandestine intelligence service, are not being used by Iranians anymore. We posses information suggesting Iran is not the only country making such decision. We have had experience with Germany intelligence and Siemens links to BND was not even a secret for an informed Civilian. Unlike the popular belief, which is affected extensively by Hollywood and other influential Media flows, we are told by a first hand source credible enough for us, that Stuxnet was concluded as a CIA operation within Iranian eyes. Our experience with Iran shows they don't miss the slightest chance to stick an event to Mossad therefore we investigated more using other sources. It is now confirmed for us that Stuxnet was only one result of a lengthy CIA project. Later, Flamer family of APTs and our analysis on them reassured us we did not make a mistake. The insider information obtained from recruited agents helped CIA design a complex Cyber attack to Iranian infrastructures. Some of these operations came out partially successful but after the ring broke, the flow of information was closed down and U.S Intelligence is left with a mess of doubtful Data obtained during 2008-2010. The information is not actionable or might put U.S interests in danger with no outcome. According to our source, the male individual is spending his life sentence in Tehran at Evin prison but there is no record of where the female individual is being kept. Our source is highly skeptical about the female source, her identity, her role and what is reported about her to Iranian judiciary. Data does not match facts and there are many inconsistencies. We are looking forward to get more information about this individual and tips are appreciated, who ever you are. The vast revelation of U.S agents in Iran as we observed is historically unique. Based on our understanding CIA is still clueless how it went down. We are informed by former U.S intelligence community members that after 2010, U.S is almost "flying blind" in Iran and many changes have been made in the process of recruiting Agents in that region only to control damage. Interestingly, around the same Dates we received from our source, a Spy ring in Lebanon inside the body of Hezbollah was surfaced and apparently eliminated. The Lebanese Spies were in contact with their CIA handlers very much the same as Iranian agents . outdoor meets, using embassy's registered cars. As we see in the picture, faces of some CIA officers while they are smiling or drinking is captured in almost HD resolution. ABC news' revelations about CIA confirmation of the arrest of many agents in Iran and Lebanon due to "Poor Trade craft" suggests infight and unhappiness inside U.S. IC leading to leaks and cynical interviews. Our source says it is almost Impossible to get records of the many who have disappeared in Iran and to our mutual understanding, most of these people should have been engineers or technicians who could provide technical intelligence useful to design targeted attacks to dismantle power grids, airport and airplane management and navigation systems and nuclear facilities. Many tidbits could be learned from this film alone. Although we continued our investigations into CIA covers, mainly the websites and ended up with highly embarrassing information, including cover names that CIA officers were using during their trips to middle east stations as "State Department" officers. We have concluded that most if not all of these people were misrepresenting themselves to Iranians who had applied for U.S. Visa or their names were flagged previously. We learned parts of this group are still in middle east. We are all for revelation of corruptions, however, publication of these names will probably result in kidnapping, maybe more serious events, that we do not support anyway. Final Analysis: 1. To the best of our understanding , "Stuxneting Iran" started during the last year of Bush with a secret finding, that is no longer a secret. The fund and order, created a program in CIA to dismantle, disarm and cripple the Iranian strategic infrastructure, while politics are doing its own work. CIA suddenly tunneled a lot of money and agents into the region, which resulted in sudden raise of operations in Iran and respectively, Lebanon. They made mistakes and Iranians not only used them in their advantage, as a counterintelligence victory, this shortsighted management gave the Iranians an upper hand to burn opportunities, tunnels and potentials that could be used wisely. Publicized documents show Obama endorsed Bush's secret finding so the CIA in Obama's administration did not really have a different approach toward Iran. Considering the Iranian Leadership knew about this, we recommend Obama think again how Stupid he made himself sound like when he wrote "that" letter to Iran's supreme leader. 2. Mossad is not technologically and operationally modern enough to even find chances of making CIA-like mistakes. The Idea of an Israeli Stuxnet is stupid. We are observing the scene daily and we strongly suggest to whoever thinks otherwise to think again. We cannot deny possible roles played by Israelis and many lies and deceptions from the Iranian side is normally expected. We are expressing serious

concern that dogs of war, weapon lovers, the ones who get rich, powerful or spiritually happy by a wide area war take advantage of large-scale casual U.S stupidity to funnel a fresh blood to the ugly body of brutality once again. we have realized that instead of an empty gallon of WMDs, we may have to live with a Nuclear Winter this round of the game.