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Globalization and Perceptions of Policy Maker Competence: Evidence from France Author(s): Timothy Hellwig Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Mar., 2007), pp. 146-158 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623814 . Accessed: 10/01/2011 03:53
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Globalization and Perceptions of Policy Maker Competence


Evidence from France
TimothyHellwig
University of Houston, Texas

Political Research Quarterly Volume60 Number 1 March2007 146-158 ? 2007 Universityof Utah 10.1177/1065912906298814 http://prq.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Does globalization affectperceptions policy makercompetence? of attention connections to Despiteconsiderable betweenglobalization policyefficacy, research and no connections betweenthe worldeconomyandconfiexplores dencein politicians. article This threenovelarguments. by constraining makes administrative control policy over First, economic reduces levelsof publicconfidence national in executives. a outcomes, Second, signaling globalization by morecomplex to worldmarkets increases volatility policymaker the of evaluenvironment, policy-making exposure ations. Andthird, economic affectspublicpreferences policyby shifting over openness policydemands-awayfrom domains constrained market liberalization toward and areaswherenational remains Time-series by autonomy strong. of publicopiniondatafromFrance research As the firststudyto linkeconomic analyses support expectations. globalization policyperceptions, articlefindsthatthe political to this of the consequences engaging globaleconomyare morenumerous previously than implied.
Keywords:globalization;public confidence;policy demands;time-seriesmethods;France

It is clear to voters that the globalized economy is steerednot by politicians,but by banks, managers, and uncontrolledmarkets. -Dick Morrist The presentera, it is often said, is definedby globalization. Accordingly, many scholars have debated the consequences of the internationalintegrationof marketsfor goods, services,andcapital.Debatesoften are framedby questions of policy competency.Some contend that world marketstie the hands of national policy makers as attempts to pursue autonomous strategieswill be undercutby marketactors not held accountable to national electorates (e.g., Andrews 1994; Mishra 1999; Moses 2000; Strange 1996; see also Korpiand Palme 2003). Others,skepticalof this "globalization thesis," claim that engagement in world markets has little effect on domestic policy autonomy. Rather, by increasing the pressure on politiciansto respondto dislocations,marketopenness may facilitate government responsiveness (Garrett 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hicks and Zorn 2005; Swank 2002). Neither perspective, however, confronts the effects of globalizationon the public's attitudes towardtheir policy makers.As a consequence, fundamental between questionsaboutthe relationship
146

marketinterdependence perceptionsof democraand tic performance have been ignored. While studies examine the effects of the international economy on mass political behavior (Burden and Mughan 2003; Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels forthcoming; Scheve and Slaughter2004), none investigates how worldwidemarketactivity affects perceptionsof policy efficacy, policy makercompetency,or whatvoters demandfrom theirrepresentatives. This article provides the first investigationof the relationship between economic globalization and public perceptions of national policy efficacy. Does exposure to the world economy affect public confidence in nationalpoliticians?Whatis the relationship between globalizationand public demandsfor policy responses? Does globalization give the public cause to question whether national leaders are in control?

Author's Note:Parts thisresearch of werepresented the 2004 at Duke SummerInstitute the Politics of Globalization on and NC. and I Durham, For comments helpfuldiscussions, Equity, thank Brian Burgoon,Suzie De Boef, Nate Jensen,Robert and Keohane, LaynaMosley,Matt Slaughter, the anonymous reviewers. fromtheNational ScienceFoundation (SESSupport Statistical 0241824)is gratefully acknowledged. analyseswere 9.0 5.0. errors performed usingSTATA andRATS Anyremaining remain own. my

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 147

Or does it facilitate responsive policy making and improvethe standingof elected leaders? Insomuchas they addressimportantissues of popular sovereignty and policy responsiveness, these questions deserve our attention.To investigate these questions, this article develops and empirically tests three arguments.First,taking issue with claims made by globalizationskeptics,I arguethateconomic openness has an adverse effect on perceptions of policy efficacy.Second,by creatinga morecomplexpoliticaleconomic environment, I assert that globalization compromises the public's ability to assign responsibility for policy outcomes and leads to greatervolatility in policy maker evaluations.And third, I suggest that globalization shapes public demands for policy responses: as the dependence of national economies on world markets increases, rational citizens will redirect requests for policy action away from issue domainswherethis dependencehas a directbearingon policy efficacy and towardsareas where it does not. As evidence, I employ previously unexamined Frenchpublic opinion and economic data from 1985 to 2002. With a tradition-and continued public expectations-of government intervention in economic and social affairs, France is a good example for examining how exogenous constraints limit the influence of governments in advanced industrial democracies.For most of the postwarera, the French economy was characterized by protectionism and tight controlon capitalmovements.Over the past two decades, however, it has experienced privatization, And although deregulation,and marketliberalization. several studies address the effects of these developments on French politics and society (Berger 2002; Culpepper, Hall, and Palier 2006; Gordon and Meunier 2001; Meunier 2004; Spitz 2002), none empirically tests the linkage between globalization and the political perceptions of the electorate. Therefore, in addition to extending globalization research to consider public perceptions, this article also advances researchon the consequences of economic change in France. In the next section, I draw on developments in public opinion research to develop an argumentfor how globalization matters for how citizens evaluate theirpolicy makers.I then introducethe dataand present two sets of analyses, one for the determinants of policy makerconfidence and one for the determinants of policy demands. I conclude with implications of studies for researchon the international economy and democraticperformance.

Policy Maker Confidenceand Policy Demandsin ExposedEconomies


What determines public support for policy makers? Mass sentimentfor political elites may be influenced by several factors, including socioeconomic background, partisan filters, and positions on the issues of the day. Regardingpolitical issues, research has found-among other things-that popular support depends not only on the party'spositions on the issues but on whetherit has the capacityto execute its program.Issue-ownershiptheories of political comvotersby emphasizing petition claimthatpartiesattract issue areas where they are believed to be competent (B6langerand Meguid 2005; Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996).2 Others contend that policy maker competence affects the salience of the economy for political support.In the model proposed by Alesina, Londregan,and Rosenthal (1993), voters must solve a signal extraction problem. While individuals can observe the state of the economy, they must rely on signals from policy makers to determinewhat share of observedeconomic performance due to the manis of elected officials and what agement competence share is due to shocks beyond their control (see also Duch and Stevenson 2006; Hibbs 1982). Ownership theories of issue voting and signaling models of retrospectivevoting point to a similar conclusion: Popular confidence in politicians is dependent on their ability to build and maintain a reputationfor policy competence. In self-contained political economies with clear lines of responsibility for policy outcomes, it is relatively easy for the citizen to gauge policy competence.3 how does globBut alization affect collective opinion about national policy makers? Building on developments in voting behavior and public opinion research, I make three arguments. First, I argue that economic globalization should affect public confidence levels in theirpolicy makers' ability to solve problems.All else equal, citizens prefer policy makers who demonstratecompetence on the issues to their less competentalternatives. Theoriesof issue ownershipandmanagement competence alike operateunderthe assumptionthat competency mattersinsomuch as it separatespoliticians who have greaterability to execute policy from those with less, thereby sharpeningthe lines of political competition.Whatmatters,then, is the competenceof one group of elites in control of policy levers relative to thatof the alternative. whatif neitheralternative But

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has the capacity to affect real outcomes?This is the case in politicaleconomies heavily exposedto international markets.Economic openness reducesthe share of economic activity occurringwithin state borders. By doing so, opennessmoderatesthe capacityof political elites to manageeconomicperformance outcomes, to takecrediblepositionson issues relatedto the economy and, as a consequence,to signal theircompetence to the public. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to hear politicians draw connections between globalization and the credibilityof theirpolicy-basedappeals.This has certainlybeen true in France. Observeda former Socialist governmentminister,"Becauseof decisions made in Brussels and at the WTO, the French don't have confidence. ... [They] have doubts in the abilA ity of nationalpolicies to solve problems." member of the Center-RightUnion for a Popular Movement (UMP) concurred:"Governmentsof all countries of the world are bound by the global situation-the economy is stronger than politics." "Thirty years ago," added a government advisor on finance, "the government had an influence on policy. Today, the room to maneuverhas narrowed,evidentially due to This brings us to the first research globalization."4 hypothesis: Exposure to the world economy reduces public confidencein nationalpolicy makers. Second, in additionto affecting the level of public confidence, I contend that globalization affects the volatility of confidence as well. The motivation for this claim comes from what we know aboutthe role of informationin political decision making.Most would agree that, deterred by the high costs of gathering information, political evaluations are always made with uncertainty.5 When deciding whetherpoliticians deserve their trust and confidence, citizens choose to be "rationally ignorant," employing only a handfulof accessible indicators,such as the state of their readily own materialwell-being. This notionof the minimally informedcitizen is consistent with studies that model some measureof collective support elites as a funcfor tionof some macrodata. microprocessesunderlying The macro-modelsassumethateconomicindicators-such as unemployment,inflation,or businessconfidenceare good predictorsof policy makerevaluationsinsomuch as they are easily observed and have a bearing on personal welfare. Competent policy making is therefore signaled to the public through a healthy macroeconomy,which, in turn, improvesthe welfare of the individualcitizen. This widely subscribedmodel of policy makerconfidencedependson two assumptions: thatindividuals (1)

can inferpersonal welfarefromaggregate indicators and the of (2)that performance thenational political economyhowevermeasured-is concentratedin the hands of elected officials. Both assumptionsmay be crediblein closed economies. This almost certainly is not the case, however,for economiesheavily exposed to international competition. First, under globalization, the of performance the nationaleconomy may only maraffect personal welfare. Instead, foreignginally denominated in assets,fluctuations currency prices,and the relocation production of centers all may have nontrivial welfare effects-effects not directly related to nationaleconomicindicators. And second,exposureto world marketssignals that control over performance outcomesis diffuse,causingcitizens to be uncertainif policy outcomesaredrivenby choices madeby elected leaders or, rather,by multinationalcorporationsand other global market actors. Manin, Przeworski,and Stokes (1999) describedthis situation: Suppose that there is something that people do not know,perhapsbecause only the government can observe it (e.g., the negotiating posture of foreign governments or internationalfinancial institutions)or because the informationis costly to obtain (e.g., the level of demandin the major recipients of the country's exports). If people are not certain about exogenous conditions or about the effect of policies on outcomes, then they cannot be sure which policies are in their best interestor how much they can expect from the government.(pp. 10-11) Put in the language of competency models, globalization makesthe signal extractionproblemmore difficult as the noise between policy maker decisions and performanceoutcomes increases. The implication is that globalization negatively affects the public's ability to make informedevaluations of theirpolicy makers.Being rationallyignorant is no longer sufficient for making policy makerevaluations.More informationis necessary-information many individualswill find too costly to obtain. In the aggregate, individualuncertaintyover how to evaluate nationalpolicy makersshouldincreasethe volatility of perceptionsof policy makerconfidence. This is our second hypothesis:Exposureto the international economy increases the volatility of public confidence in nationalpolicy makers.6 If globalization affects how the public evaluates policy makers,then it should also influencecollective preferencesfor policy responses.Empiricalstudies of

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 149

have shown thatpolicy makersrespond representation to the preferencesof the electorate. Representatives receivepolicy signalsfromthe publicandrespondwhen and masspolicypreferences MacKuen, change(Stimson, Erikson 1995), and preferencesfor "more"or "less" levels of government response policy dependon current While most havestudiedtheAmerican (Wlezien 1995). for case, recentworksfind support dynamicrepresentationin othercontextsas well (HoboltandKlemmemsen 2005; SorokaandWlezien 2005). The conclusionfrom these studies is reassuring:the supply of policy from political elites is, at least partially,shaped by public demands. Researchon representation, however,stops shortof whether the public believes politicians to be asking competentto supply policies in the first place. If, per hypothesis 1, globalizationaffects the public's faith in theirrepresentatives' abilityto supplypolicy solutions, then it may also influence the natureof public policy demands. Specifically, I argue that by signaling a reductionin the quantityof policy suppliedin a particularpolicy area,globalizationshouldcause citizens to reducedemandsfor policy action in that domain.But ratherthan simply letting politicians off the hook, a rational public should compensate by increasing demandsfor policy responsesin otherissue domains-domainsnot directlyaffectedby globalization. To clarify the intuition, consider the supply and demandfor policy responses:by constraining room the to maneuver,economic globalizationcauses the supply curve for policies directlyaffectedby openness to shift to the left. In economiesexposedto externalmarket pressures, "less"policy is suppliedand-assuming a downward-sloping demand curve-at a higher relcost ativeto closedeconomies(i.e., the same quantityof policy outcomes achieved under a closed economy is moreexpensivein morein exposedeconomies).Public policy demands, as a consequence, will migrate to other areas. A third hypothesis may be advanced: Exposure to the world economy reduces public demands policy responsesin domainsperceivedto for be directly affected by economic globalization and increasesdemandsin domainswhereit has little or no effecton the government's capacityto deliver.

The Global Economyand Confidencein French Executives: Data and Methods


Hypothesesare tested using aggregateFrencheconomic and public opinion datafrom 1985 to 2002. To

examine what moves public confidence, I employ a uniqueset of surveyson the public'sconfidencein the and varipresident the primeminister(PM).Dependent ables are constructed from aggregateresponsesto the question,"Do you have a lot of confidence,some confidence,not muchconfidence,or no confidenceat all in nameof PM] to solve the problems [nameof president/ facing Francetoday?"'The series used in analysisone for the presidentand one for the PM-is the percentage of those responding "a lot" and "some" confidenceeach month.Unlikethe approval seriesused in opinion studies of the Americanpresident,which taps only "a general impression about the way the incumbentseems to be handlinghis job at the present moment"(Mueller1970, 18), the Frenchpublic confidence series focuses the respondent's attentionon the executive's capacity to solve problems, making it a more appropriate indicatorfor examiningpolicy efficacy and responsiveness than more commonly employedmeasuresof aggregate publicopinion.8 I regress public confidence on measures of economic openness and a set of controls.I estimatemodels with both major components of economic globalization,tradeand capitalflows. TradeOpenness is measuredusing exportsplus imports.CapitalFlows is the sum of total inflows and outflows of foreign direct and portfolio investment.Both series are standardizedas a percentageof GDP.DataarefromFrench NationalInstitutefor Statisticsand Economic Studies (INSEE) and the IMF's International Financial Statistics.9 hypothesis1, I expect these variablesto Per have a negativeinfluenceon public confidence. Models include controlsfor the domestic economy and for politicalevents.Politicalconfidenceshouldbe affected by economic confidence. I thereforeinclude the monthly consumerconfidence indicatorfrom the European Commission's Business and Consumer Survey. The measure is the average of responses to questions about the financialsituationof households, the generaleconomic situation,unemployment expecand household savings over the next twelve tations, months. Preliminary analyses found, not surprisingly, thatconsumerconfidenceexplainedmore model variance than any of its indicatorsseparately.To capture the effects of political events I create a series which measures+1 for monthsin which an event expectedto increaseevaluationsof the executive occurred,-1 for months in which an event expected decrease these evaluationsoccurred,and 0 otherwise. error Analyses are performedusing single-equation correction models (ECMs). The ECM specification enables us to test for both the contemporaneous and

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long-run multipliereffects of exposure to the global economy on public confidence. There is reason to believe thatthe effects of the international domesand tic economies on publicconfidencearenot (only) conbut over time.Additionally, temporaneous, accumulate indicatedthatmany of the series preliminary analyses of interest are strongly autoregressive.Estimates of the fractional d, differencing parameter, indicatethatthe null hypothesisof a unit rootcannotbe rejectedfor the two public confidenceseries (for the presidentand for the PM), for consumer confidence, and for capital flows. Furthermore, cannotrejectthe null hypothewe sis thattradeopennesshas a d value of > .5, indicating o thatit also may be nonstationary. The single-equation in ECM has been shown to be appropriate this situation (De Boef 2001; Clarkeet al. 2004)." The model is of the following form: = + APUBCONF, ao+ a PUBCONF,,1 oAGLOB, + + PIGLOBt_ 2ACONS, + + + P3CONSt,-P4EVENTS, E,, (1) where PUBCONF = public confidence in the French executive (eitherthe presidentor PM), GLOB= exposure to the international economy (either Trade Opennessor Capital Flows), CONS= consumerconfidence, and EVENTS= political events interventions series. The immediate effect of shock to GLOB at time t on PUBCONF is equal to P0and the long-run multipliereffect is equal to the coefficient on lagged GLOB divided by the coefficient on lagged PUBCONF multipliedby negative one, or 1/(-a1).12 The speed at which the system returnsto its equilibrium following a temporaryshock is given by the adjustment coefficient, ao. The errorterm, E,,is assumed to be normallydistributedwith mean zero and variance &a. Modelers usually assume that the variance is constant, that is, that o= = o2 = . = 02 for a model estimated on series with T time periods. However,to test hypotheses 2 on the effect of economic openness on the volatility of collective confidence, I relax this assumptionand model the disturbanceas a function of exogenous predictors.The variancecomponent is modeled as o = exp(o + Z~y)such that is a funcot tion of a constant, 0, and a vector of exogenous factors, Z, (Harvey 1990).13 I include the globalization measures-trade openness and capital flows-as in covariates the varianceequation.Per hypothesis 2, the expectationis thatthese variablespositively influence model variance indicating greatervolatil(o2/), efficacy. ity in perceptionsof policy

Two additionalvariablesare included in the variance equationas controls.First,Frenchelectoralrules have producedperiods of divided executive government, or cohabitation,wherethe president'spartydiffers from the PM's. Research suggests that under unifiedgovernment publicperceivesthe president, the as leaderof the party,to be the policy-relevant incumbent. During cohabitation,the president's influence over policy is displacedby the PM (Lewis-Beck 1997; Conley 2006). This effect can be accommodatedin the varianceequation:for models with confidence in the presidentas the dependentvariable,I expect the variance during periods of divided government to increase, reflecting more uncertaintywith the president as policy maker.14 Conversely,for models with confidencein the PM as dependentvariable,cohabitation periods should be characterizedby lower variance as partisan differenceshelp the public to evaluate his or her policy proposalsindependentlyfrom those of the president. Second, the ability of citizens to develop informed evaluations should increase over time as opportunities for the public to judge the executive's policy performance accumulate. To control for policy maker familiarity, I include a variable that measures the fraction of years since the last presidentialor (in the case of confidence in the PM) legislative election.

Results
Table1 reports estimatesfor modelswith confidence in the French president as the dependent variable. Model 1 employs TradeOpennessas the globalization indicator,and model 2 includes Capital Flows. Per equation (1), the globalizationand consumer confidence seriesareenteredinto the model both in firstdifferencesand in levels lagged one period. First consider models for the mean of public confidence in the president. For both regressions, estimated coefficients on the differenced series (ATradeOpenness,and ACapital Flows,) are imprecisely estimated,meaningthateconomic globalization does not have an immediateeffect on aggregatepublic opinion. Exposure to world markets,however, does matterin the long run. Consistentwith hypothesis 1, the long-runeffects of globalizationare negative and statisticallysignificantin both models. In model 1, the -.17 parameterestimate on lagged Trade Openness means andthe -.18 for the ECM adjustment parameter = [-.17/-(-.18)] = is thatthe long runmultiplier [~/(--) -.96, with standarderror .34.'5 For each 1 percent

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 151

Table1 and EconomicGlobalization Public Confidence in Variable:APublicConfidence the President Dependent


Model 1 Coefficient Mean equation Constant Tradeopenness Difference, Level, , Capitalflows Difference, Level, , Consumerconfidence Difference, Level,, Errorcorrectionmodel (ECM) adjustmentt Political events, Varianceequation Constant Tradeopenness, Capitalflows, Cohabitation, 1986-1988 1993-1995 1997-2002 Time since presidentialelection, Waldtest Ljung-Box Q Ljung-Box Q2 0.34 0.07** 1.19 0.03 3.13** 0.01 0.45 -0.02 -0.30 -0.17** 39.44** 2.28 0.26 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.06 0.20 0.37 0.37 -0.21** 31.85** 1.77 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.06 19.08** -0.36 -0.17** 4.33 1.57 0.06 0.02 -0.08** 0.23* 0.18** -0.18** 1.93** 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.75 0.20* 0.13** -0.15** 1.77** 0.41 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.73 10.49** 2.50 StandardError Coefficient Model 2 StandardError

Note: Series is monthly from March 1985 to December 2002. Cells reportmaximumlikelihood estimates with standarderrors.T = 214. *p < .10. **p < .05 (two-tailedtests).

increase in trade as a share of GDP, aggregateconfidence levels in the presidentdecline by about 1 percent. The cumulativeeffect of a 5 percent increase trade-which occurredover exposureto international the courseof 2000-would thereforecause confidence in the presidentto dropby about4.8 percent.In model 2, the coefficienton lagged CapitalFlows is -.08. The long-run multiplier has a coefficient of -.56[ = error.31. A positive shock -.08/-(-.15)] with standard to Capital Flows negatively influences the public's faith in the presidentto solve problems.For example, a 5 percentincreasein exposureto international capital markets leads to a cumulative reduction in the public's confidence in the presidentby nearly 3 percentagepoints. The errorcorrectionmodels highlight differences in the dynamic effects of the domestic and international economies. Exposure to the world economy registers only a long-run effect on confidence in the

president. But a shock to consumer confidence has both contemporaneousand long-term consequences. This difference squares with intuitions: while the domestic economy is of greaterimmediateconcernto voters' material interests, with time the economy beyond national borders also shapes evaluations of policy maker control, above and beyond that due to the domestic economy alone. The bottom half of Table 1 reportsresults of the variance equations. Consistent with hypothesis 2, coefficients on Trade Openness (model 1) and Capital Flows (model 2) are both positively signed, though only the formerattainsconventionallevels of statistical significance. In both models, cohabitation periods appearto have no effect. Contraryto expectations, cohabitation does not increase model variance, indicating that divided government has no effect on the certaintyof mass evaluationsof the president as policy maker. Presidentialtenure, however,

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Table2 EconomicGlobalization Public Confidence and DependentVariable: in APublicConfidence the Prime Minister
Model 3 Coefficient Mean equation Constant Tradeopenness Difference, Level,_, Capitalflows Difference, Level,_, Consumerconfidence Difference, Level,_, Errorcorrectionmodel (ECM) adjustment,_ Political events, Varianceequation Constant Tradeopenness, Capital flows, Cohabitation, 0.39 0.08** 1.17 0.03 3.48** 0.05** 0.28 0.02 0.35** 0.18** -0.17** 2.06* 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.87 15.80** -0.75 -0.08 5.10 1.96 0.07 0.29 -0.06 0.30* 0.18** -0.17** 2.03** 0.43 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.82 12.71** 3.59 Standard Error Coefficient Model 4 StandardError

1986-1988 1993-1995
1997-2002 Time since legislative election, Wald statistic Ljung-Box Q Ljung-Box Q2

-0.13 0.43
-2.09** -0.06 29.16** 0.23 0.43

0.46 0.28
0.40 0.07

-0.69** 0.23
-1.91** -0.11** 26.98** 0.22 0.70

0.33 0.20
0.44 0.05

Note: Series is monthly from March 1985 to December 2002. Cells reportmaximumlikelihood estimates with standarderrors.T= 214. *p < .10. **p < .05 (two-tailed tests).

does affect model variance.In both models the variance declines as the president's time in office progresses, suggesting that familiarity helps the public clarify policy assessments. Table 2 replicates the analysis using public confidence in the PM as the dependent variable. Mean models show that economic openness has no significant effect on confidence levels, either contemporaneously or over the long run. But this does not mean that exposure to global markets has no effect on prime ministerial confidence. Variance equations show that both tradeand financialmarketintegration have positive and statisticallysignificanteffects. This supportshypothesis 2: economic openness increases the volatility of aggregate public confidence in the French PM. Moreover, additional analyses indicate that the apparentlack of supportfor hypothesis 1 on mean confidence may be masked by whether or not the PM and presidentbelong to the same party.The

effects of globalization might matter more for PM confidence when the cohabitationdesignates the PM as the executive responsible for policy outcomes rather than the president (see Lewis-Beck 1997). Accordingly, I reestimatedmodels 3 and 4 only on data from the 1997 to 2002 cohabitationperiod-the longest of the three periods of divided executive rule, lasting 59 months. Estimates show that trade exposure has a negative and statisticallysignificant effect on PM confidence.The long-runmultiplierfor Trade Openness is -1.73 with a standard error of 0.52. Results of these additionalmodel runs are available on request. Table 2 also shows that the effect of domestic factors on PM confidenceis considerable.In fact, a comparison across tables shows that consumer confidence has a stronger effect (on the order of about50 percent)on the PM's confidence levels than on those of the president.This confirmsconventional

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 153

notions regardingthe division of powers within the French dual executive, where the PM oversees matters of domestic economic policy and the president represents the Republic as head of state. Finally, resultsshow thatthe varianceaboutmean evaluations was smallerduringthe 1986 to 1988 and (especially) 1997 to 2002 cohabitationperiods. At least some of the time, the public is more certainin its evaluations of the PM's policy effectiveness when the premier can drawon partisandifferencesto separatehis or her policies from those of the president.16 Overall, these results provide solid support for research expectations. Unsurprisingly,the public's confidence in the presidentis affectedby perceptions of the nationaleconomy. Connectionsbetween policy maker evaluations and integration with the world economy, however,have previouslygone unexplored. Findings also suggest that globalization affects the volatility of collective confidence: In each instance, estimates of the effect of economic openparameter ness on model varianceare positive and, in three of the four models, estimatedwith precision.These findings provide us with motivationfor investigatingthe consequencesfor globalizationfor policy preferences.

EconomicGlobalizationand Policy Demands


In this section, I provide a test of hypothesis 3 on how exposure to the world economy affects public policy demands. Recall that the expectation is that globalization lowers demands for economic policy responses while, in compensatingfashion, heightening the electorate's desires for solutions to noneconomic concerns. Testing this hypothesis requires identifying issue domains that vary in the extent to which they are susceptible to external economic shocks.I assumethat,at leastin the mindsof the public, marketintegration a strongeffect on government has control over economic policy and only a weak (or zero) effect on social or "noneconomic"issues. To measureeconomic policy demands,I use dataon mass To preferencesfor policies to reduceunemployment.'7 measure demands for responses in a noneconomic domain,I examinepublic demandsto reduceviolence and crime. As above, analyses are performedusing monthly time-series data.'"The dependent variables, policy demands, are taken from the following question: "Amongthe following, which do you think the governmentshouldbe most concernedwith at the present time?"'9Unlike Gallup's "most importantproblem"

(MIP) series of the Americanpublic, this surveyitem for fruitfullylinks issue concernsto preferences policy action. And with an explicit referenceto "the government,"it avoids the ambiguitythat plagues the utility of the MIP series (Wlezien 2005). The item has five response categories:"fighthigh prices,""fight unempurployment,""fightviolence and crime,""maintain and socialpeace." chasingpower," "maintain Aggregate responses to "fight unemployment"and "fight violence and crime"exhibitthe most variationover time. From these response categories,I constructmeasures of net public demand for policy to fight unemployment and to fight violence and crime, respectively. Demand is the percentage of those Unemployment minus those who responding "fight unemployment" with other policy concerns, and Crime responded Demandis the percentwho answer"fightviolence and crime" less all other responses.20 The expectationis that economic exposurewill be negatively associated with demandsfor unemployment policy but positively relatedto demandsto fight violence and crime. To control for the effect of objective performance, I include the seasonally adjustedunemploymentrate. As the unemployment rate increases, the share of respondentswho demand policies to combat unemployment should rise as well. I also include partisan dummy variables for Frangois Mitterrand'spresidency and periods of Left-led governments. Following issue ownershiptheories of partycompetition, the public may increase demands for action to combat unemployment when the left is in control, while increasing demands to stymie violence and crime when the right is in power.21 I again use an ECM specification to assess the dynamics of expressed public policy demands. This model is of the form
+ = ADEMAND, to + oIDEMANDtQ PoAGLOBt + ,GLOB,_, 2AUNERATE, + + P3UNERATE,_ P4MITT, + + P5LEFTPM, + a,, (2)

where DEMAND = public demands for policy

responses (to addresseither unemploymentor crime = and violence), UNERATE the unemploymentrate,
MITT = Mitterrand presidency indicator, LEFTPM =

indicator variable equaling 1 for periods with a Socialist PM and 0 otherwise. All else is as previously defined. Since the policy demands series are constructed using aggregate responses to the same closed-ended survey question, unmeasured shocks may affect both regressions.Accordingly, I estimate

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Table3 EconomicGlobalization and PublicPolicyDemands,SeeminglyUnrelatedRegression(SUR)Estimates


DependentVariable: AUnemploymentDemand Model 5 Coefficient Constant Tradeopenness Difference, Level,1, Capitalflows Difference, Level,tUnemploymentRate Difference, LeveltErrorcorrectionmodel (ECM) adjustment,~, Mitterrand presidency, Left government,
R2

DependentVariable: ACrimeDemand Model 7 Standard Error 11.55 2.81 0.16 -0.83 0.20** 5.44 -5.47** -0.39** -3.63 -1.73 0.16 6.38 0.88 0.04 2.27 1.38 6.56 -4.91"* -0.36** -7.13** -1.38 0.16 0.52 0.10 6.30 0.86 0.04 1.80 1.45 Model 8 Standard Error 8.92

Model 6 Standard Error 10.87

Standard Error 12.09 2.53 0.14

Coefficient -72.26**

Coefficient 14.56 -1.91 0.51**

Coefficient 31.55**

-62.68** -1.54 -0.44**

0.37 -0.18** 1.22 8.33** -0.37** 5.27** 3.42** 0.17 5.73 1.07 0.04 2.06 1.25 1.88 7.38** -0.33** 7.97** 3.24** 0.16

0.47 0.09 5.69 1.03 0.04 1.70 1.31

Q Ljung-Box
Ljung-Box Q2

0.79
1.46

1.55
2.33

0.07
2.99*

0.36
4.38**

Note: Series is monthly from March 1985 to March2002. Cells reportordinaryleast squares(OLS) estimates with standarderrorsestimated using SUR. T = 207. *p < .10. **p < .05 (two-tailed tests).

models using seemingly unrelatedregression (SUR), a multiequationversion of ordinaryleast squaresthat correctsfor correlatederrors.22 Table 3 displays the results. The first two models examinethe effect of economicglobalization public on As concernsfor unemployment. we would expect, the actual rate of unemploymenthas a positive and substantialinfluenceon the net percentageof respondents who think the governmentshould be most concerned with unemployment.Also consistent with expectademandsare higherduringperitions, unemployment ods when the Socialist Party controls the executive, whetherit is the presidency(MITT) the PM's office or Ourchief interest,however,is the effect of (LEFTPM). the global economy. Results show that the long-run impact of economic globalizationis to reduce public demands for policies aimed at amelioratingFrench Model 5 shows that,all else equal,the unemployment. effect of a 5 percentshock to TradeOpennesslowers Demand by 6 percent.And model 6 Unemployment shows thata shock to CapitalFlows of the same magnitudereducesthe dependentvariableby nearly3 perUnderconditionsof heightened cent, ceteris paribus.23 market integration,fewer people demand that their

do government somethingaboutand (by extension)be held responsiblefor unemployment. CrimeDemand is the dependentvariablein models 7 and 8. In these models, the unemploymentrate is again statisticallysignificant, though this time the coefficient is negatively signed. All else equal, respondentsare more likely to identify crime and violence as an issue deserving of governmentattention when other concerns-namely, the unemployment rate-are under control. Coefficients on Trade Opennessand CapitalFlows are now positive:public demands for addressingcrime and violence increase as the Frencheconomy becomes more integratedinto global markets. What accounts for this globalization-Crime Demand relationship? Do individuals believe globalization "causes" crime and violence? Probablynot. More likely the observedrelationshipis a byproductof changingperceptionsof policy maker capacity. While economic concerns have dominated French politics during the postwar era (Anderson reforms 1995, 35-36), liberalizationand privatization thatgovernments now do less to affect ecocan imply nomic growthandjob creation. Accordingly, globalization has meantthatcitizensdemandrelativelyless from

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 155

nationalpoliticiansin the economy andrelativelymore in other issues not primarily considered economic. These include health care, old-age pensions, and, as demonstrated here, violence and crime. In short, the Resultsreported Table3 support in publiccompensates. the is that arguments economicglobalization reshaping salience of issue concerns in advanced industrial democracies.

Conclusion
Observers of French politics have for some time suspectedthat the fruits of marketliberalizationhave come at a cost to Frenchdemocracy.Globalizationis thoughtto limit the options availableto policy makin ers, particularly lean times. Calling attentionto this former interior minister Jean-Pierre straightjacket, Chevenement recently equated the situation facing French policy makersto that of a being held captive in a "Bermudatriangle" caused by a recessionary international constraint economy,a budgetary imposed by the EuropeanUnion, and domestic spendingcommitments(The Economist,September2, 2002). More fundamentally,a narrow policy room to maneuver may affect public confidence in Frenchpolitical institutions. Economists Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret recently identified a loss of confidence in French society-a phenomenon that, they asserted, "results from the combination of two main factors: and globalization ... accountability," addingthat"there is a strong correlationbetween the rising power of globalization and the erosion of sentimentsof confidence" (Le Figaro, February24, 2003). This article marks the first direct examinationof how globalizationshapes citizen assessmentsof their policy makers. Findings show that exposure to the global economy lowers public confidencein the president and contributesto uncertainty over how to evaluate the president'sand PM's policy-makingcapacity. Whatis more,exposureto international tradeandcapital flows lead voters to reducetheirdemandsfor economic policy solutions-captured in termsof fighting unemployment-while compensating by increasing demands in noneconomic areas-measured here in terms of fighting violence and crime. These findings lend credence to remarksmade by punditsregarding connections between international economics and national politics while at the same time questioning scholarship that has suggested that openness and responsivegovernmentare compatible(e.g., Cameron 1978; Katzenstein1985; Garrett1998).

Resultshave implications severalareasin politifor cal science. First, findings bear on how we judge the effect of globalization policy efficacy.Today,globalon izationskepticsoutnumber of proponents the globalization thesis.Mostpoliticaleconomistsassertthat,overall, the policy effects of integrated marketsremainlimited. to revisionistarguments, marketintegration According may even improvepolicy efficacy.Accordingly,many contributors the globalizationliterature to have ceased whethereconomic openness constrainspolicy asking room to maneuverand insteadexamine why race-tothe-bottom scenarioshave failedto materialize. takBy ing public perceptionsinto account,this study shows thatthis shift in focus is premature best and perhaps at unwarranted. Researchthat addressespolicy efficacy (e.g., Clark2003) and policy retrenchment (e.g., Hicks and Zorn 2005) should be revisitedin the context of of publicevaluations policy makercompetence. Second, study results indicate that studies of mass political behaviorshould include measuresof globalization in their models. Many observers of French political behaviorclaim thatdespite frequentchanges in rules, governments,and partynames, the enduring forces of class, religion, and ideology mean thatvoter evaluationsof political elites remainpredictable(see, to e.g., contributions Lewis-Beck 2004). The reliabilof these and other predictors,however, may be ity contingent on the economy beyond nationalborders. Furtherresearchat the micro level should investigate how globalization affects voting decisions and election outcomes. Finally, results have implications for democratic accountability.Empirical investigations of electoral accountability in industrial democracies typically focus on some aspect of the economy,with the expectationthatvoterspunishpoliticalincumbents when the economy performsbelow expectations. Referendum models of retrospectivevoting, however, rely on an that assumption votersbelieve theirgovernmentshave some controlover the levers thataffect economic performance. Findings from this study question this assumption.Analyses of policy demandsshowed that public preferences for improving the economy are strong when exposure to world marketsis low. But when the economy becomes more exposed to international competition,public demands migrate to other concerns-concerns that are only indirectlyrelatedto the economy. The upshot is that globalization may diversify the demandsplaced on politicians.Whether this is a good thing for representation remainsopen to On interpretation. one hand,globalization may expand the set of issues the governmentis held accountable

156 Political ResearchQuarterly

for, suggesting a broaderbase for policy responsiveness. On the other hand, to the extent that it contributes to uncertaintyover the policy control, the diversificationof demandsmay contribute a loss of to

democratic accountability. Notes


1. Adolf GrimmeInstitutpress release, August 8, 2002. 2. Parties on the Left, for example, are typically viewed as more competenton mattersof educationand welfare, while parties on the Right have strongerreputationson crime and defense. 3. Individual-and institutional-levelfactors may also affect the citizen's ability to evaluatepolicy makers.For purposeshere, however, I hold these factors "constant"and draw comparisons between closed and open economies. 4. Personalinterviews,Febuary/March 2003, Paris. 5. Where scholars differ is regardingthe consequences of public ignorancefor the functioningof democracy(e.g., Althaus 2003; Page and Shapiro 1992), a topic beyond the scope of this article. 6. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not inconsistentwith one another. Hypothesis 1 states that globalizationshould reduce mean levels of aggregateconfidencebecause nationalpolicy makersno longer exercise as much control.Some individualsprocess this reduction of control,while others,faced with a more complex political environment,become less certainof how to evaluatepolicy makers. 7. "Faites-voustout a fait confiance, plutOt confiance, plut8t pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance 'a[nom de president/ nom de premierministre] pour rdsoudreles problemes qui se posent en France actuellement?"The data are from SOFRES and are publishedmonthly in Le Figaro Magazine. 8. In theircomprehensive studyof the Americanmacro-polity, Erikson,MacKuen,and Stimson (2002, chap. 2) were requiredto resort to content analysis to develop a similar measure for the control." Americanpresident,which they called "presidential 9. Trade Openness and Capital Flows are available only at quarterlyincrements.Linearinterpolationis used to create series monthly series. I reanalyzed all models with quarterlydata and found no substantivedifferences from what is reportedin Tables 1 and 2. These results are availableupon request. 10. Semiparametricestimates of the fractional differencing (d) parameter for the series are as follows: publicconfidencein the president,.78; public confidence in the PM, .78; tradeopenness, .51; capital flows, .63; consumerconfidence, .94, all statistically at significant p < .05. When 0 < d < .5, the series is said to be longWhen 1.0 > d 2 .5, the series is said to memoriedbut stationary. be variance nonstationary,but shocks eventually decay to zero (Phillips and Xiao 1999; Box-Steffensmeierand Smith 1998). 11. While many errorcorrectionmodel (ECM) applicationsin political science proceed after demonstratinga co-integrating relationship,De Boef and Keele (2005) showed this is not a prerequisite for estimatingan ECM. 12. As a ratio of two coefficients, the standarderrorfor the long run multipliereffect of X, on Y,is not providedby regression output but can be approximatedusing the formula Var(alb) = + (1/b2)Var(a) (a2/b4)Var(b)-2(alb3)Cov(a,b). 13. The ECM specificationpresentsno particular problemsfor the variancecomponent. To see this, note that the ECM can be

rewrittenas the more familiar first-orderautoregressivedistributed lag (ADL) with exogenous series entered at time t and at = + + t - 1 as + PUBCONFt ao a1PUBCONF,_ OoGLOB, + + P4EVENTS e, using the + PIGLOB,_1 P2CONSt + Bardsentransformation P3CONS,1_ 1993; De Boef and Keele et (Bannerjee al. esti2005). Whetherestimatingthe ADL or the ECM, parameter mates of the variancemodel are identical. 14. Conley (2006) suggested that during the cohabitation period of 1997 to 2002, President Jacques Chirac was able to maintainbetterthan expected approvalratingsprecisely because he emphasizedhis nonpolicy role as guardianof the constitution while downplayinghis role as chief policy maker,a role he had embracedduringthe 1995 to 1997 period of unified government. for 15. Calculations long-run are multipliers basedon unrounded parameterestimates on the variablesof interest. Standarderrors are calculatedper the equationin note 12. 16. The exception is the 1993 to 1995 cohabitationperiod, which, of the three, witnessed the least amountof partisandeadlock as the policies of Socialist PresidentFrancoisMitterrand and GaullistPM EdouardBalladurwere generally in accordwith one on another,particularly mattersof the economy. 17. Unemployment is of interest for several reasons. First, unemploymentranksas one if not the most salient and protracted problemfacing politicalelites over the past thirtyyears (Anderson 1995, 35-36). Second, unemploymentdata are widely reported andeasily interpreted, providingthe potentialfor a high degree of responsiveness.Third, perceptionsof the salience of unemployment often do not correspondto national unemploymentrates, meaning that unemployment salience is a distinct issue from objective unemployment(Baxandall2001). 18. Regressions on quarterlydata yielded the same substantive findings as what is reportedbelow with the exception thatthe effect of Capital Flows on CrimeDemand is not statisticallysignificant. Results of these model runs are availableupon request. 19. "Parmiles choses suivantes,quelle est celle dont le gouvernement doit, selon vous, s'occuper en priorit6 a l'heure actuelle?" The data are collected by SOFRES and published monthly in Le Figaro. 20. An alternativemeasure would be to construct aggregate data from responses to an open-ended survey question. Such a question has not been regularly asked in France. But even if it were, the use of open-ended questions does not eliminate problems of interdependence among categories of responses. As Wlezien (2005) has shown, there are high levels of interdependence among categories of mentions in the open-ended Gallup most importantproblem (MIP) time series. 21. I initially included consumer confidence, inflation, and the political events series as regressors.These were found to have no effect on model results and are not included in the models reportedbelow. While crime statisticswould also be appropriate, these data are availableonly at annualincrements. 22. For a discussion of seemingly unrelatedregression(SUR), see Greene (2000, 614-36). Applications in political science include Clarke et al. (2004) and Tomz, Tucker,and Wittenberg (2002). 23. These interpretations based on the long-runmultiplier are effects of the variables.The coefficientsare -1.18 [= -.44/-(-.37)] for model 5 and -0.55 [= -.18/-(-.33)] for model 6. Multiplying these coefficients by 5 produces the effects reported in the text.

Hellwig / Globalizationand Policy MakerCompetence 157

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