From Saddam to Maliki: the power of sectarian politics

A history of a narrative

Mylne Tisserant

Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Religiosity in post-Saddam Iraq ............................................................................................ 4 1.2 Research questions ................................................................................................................ 6 1.3 Definition and theoretical framework ................................................................................... 7 1.3.1 The reductionist- alarmist debate ................................................................................... 7 1.3.2 Sectarianism as essentialist phenomenon ....................................................................... 8 1.3.3 The constructed nature of sectarian identity ................................................................. 10 1.4. Structure of the thesis ......................................................................................................... 12 2. The legacy of Saddam regime: the seeds of sectarianism .................................................... 14 2.1 Authority through exclusivity ........................................................................................... 14 2.2 A Sunni leaning nationalism ............................................................................................... 17 2.3 A potential for sectarian awareness .................................................................................... 20 3. Inventing Iraq: an old political imagination for a new country ........................................ 23 3.1 Americas War on Iraq: the persistent myth of religious violence ................................... 24 3.2 The imposition of a sectarian order .................................................................................... 26 3.3 From historical grievances to political actions .................................................................... 28 4. The dangers of sectarian deterioration in post-Saddam Iraq ............................................ 31 4.1 A self-fulfilling prophecy: from an imagined political rhetoric to a social practice ........... 32 4.2 The absence of viable non-sectarian alternatives ................................................................ 34 4.3 Towards the downward slide of Lebanonization? .............................................................. 35 5. General findings and conclusion............................................................................................ 37 6. Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 39 7- Selected bibliography ............................................................................................................. 40

Abstract

This thesis investigates how post-2003 Iraqi institutions were designed along sectarian lines and how they are now manufacturing a sectarian culture. To this end, it has examined the drivers of sectarianism and sought to highlight specific circumstances in which political struggles take on distinctively sectarian overtones, both symbolically and sociologically. It has strongly rejected any prejudiced opinion that would overstate the role played by the Americans in 2003 in turning them into a political tool. It has given light to other potential drivers of sectarianism more deeply rooted in the history of Iraq. Sectarianism was pushed into the public realm in 2003 by external power brokers but its political foundations lie in a long-lasted process of ancient grievances and personal privileges. In a nutshell, politics of sectarianism in Iraq is the complex result of a mixed combination of both conscious and unconscious historical forces.

1. Introduction
1.1 Religiosity in post-Saddam Iraq
Nine years after Saddam Husseins fall, Iraq still remains an example of what states would resemble if they failed catastrophically. Hopes for any political stabilization seem to be dashed.1 Baghdad today finds itself in the midst of corruption and the ruling of power remains a fragile equilibrium; elites are obsessed with power and personal privilege while the level of anger increases daily.

Since the completion of the US military withdrawal at the end of 2011, and despite the recent wave of al Qaeda-in-Iraq terrorist attacks2, the Iraq that used to dominate news coverage seems to have slowly swept under the rug of the Arab Spring and fallen into oblivion 3. Yet, attention should be paid to the Iraqi domestic politics as the country is also experiencing its own version of the Arab spring.

Indeed, disappointed by the ruling elite, a small secular opposition group called February Youth Movement is a reflection of growing discontent slowly gaining the whole Iraqi society.4 They are calling for the improvement of public services and living standards. They are protesting against post-2003 political apparatus thought to be much more concerned about their own narrow partisan interests than about national stability. Protests that started in February 2011

1 2

H Al-Mousawi, Sectarianism in Iraq, Fair Observer, 19 March 2012. Al-Tamimi, Iraq faces a new cycle of violence after relative lull, GulfNews, 23 July 2012. 3 S Salloum, After the Arab Spring: Does Iraq's present day contain seeds of the Middle East's Future?, Niqash, 25 November 2011. 4 H Najm, February 25th is just the beginning, Niqash, 24 February 2011.

were rapidly quelled but frustration remains rampant and civil organizations today stress the necessity for continued demonstrations for democracy.5 Their discontent was fed by the latest political scandal6 in December 2011 when an arrest warrant was publicly issued for Tariq al-Hashimi, Vice-President, part of the Iraqiya bloc, accused of fomenting an assassination attempt on Nouri Al-Maliki, Shia Prime Minister and leader of the State of Law coalition. This was perceived as a new round of sectarian conflict as al-Hashimi is a Sunni Muslim and the Iraqiya bloc is considered mainly Sunni-supported while the State of Law coalition is mainly Shiite-supported. It was rapidly seen as part of a plot by Maliki to marginalize Sunni representation in Iraqi Parliament and more globally within the Iraqi politics. Once again, it reinforces the idea that current political situation is mainly apprehended through a confessional framework. Such a narrative fills the reservoir of the opposition calling for an alternative political change to challenge the political deadlock and the corrupted sectarian system.

Why did these religious differences suddenly become important, while they had never meant anything before?
Abdallah al-Shammani, coordinator of the February Youth Movement in H Najm, February 25th is just the beginning, Niqash, 24 February 2011.

Iraq is the birthplace of a range of confessional communities starting from Shia (with the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala) to Sunni Muslim not to mention several other religious sects7 (Christian, Yazidi, Alawite, Druze). Yet, despite this historical mosaic, it seems that religion has

5 6

Youth movement calls for demonstration tomorrow, Aswat al-Iraq, 24 February 2012. K Ramzi, Iraq in 2011: protests, political problems and farewell to the US, Niqash, 29 December 2011. 7 When discussing sects in Iraq, my focus will solely be on Iraqi Arab Sunnis and Shias. The exclusion of other confessional groups is a reflection of demographic realities and the politicization of both communities during the last decade.

never been publicly referred to by political actors before 2003. While religion under Saddam was a taboo and mainly restrained to the private sphere8, it rapidly took a more assertive9 form after his fall as it began to explicitly dominate Iraqi politics. Not only does sectarian narrative dominate the political imaginaire of post-2003 rulers, but it also becomes dramatically more salient in the everyday life. The political vacuum after the US-led invasion in 2003 represented a tremendous opportunity for Iraqi citizens to publicly express their religiosity and Shias anthems and symbols started to proliferate in public space few days after the fall of Baghdad. More than a mere philosophical category, religion became a new form of self-identification ordinary Iraqis were, until then, unconscious of. 10 People became suddenly aware of their religion and started identifying themselves as Shia or Sunni. They felt they could easily refer to these identities to define themselves. It became a new cause to fight for11 and the membership of specific religious communities appeared as a political question. It was suddenly pushed into the public domain as an affaire dEtat. In fact, since its politicization in 2003, the sectarian narrative has never been that salient and has never triggered that much significant violence and instability and not to mention, a civil war.

1.2 Research questions

The thesis therefore will try to understand the reasons of the emergence of confessional identification in post-Saddam politics. Why has religion become such a crucial component of national political expression in post-2003 Iraq? It will be aimed at explaining why sectarian narrative became so popular both in politics and in public mobilization in this decisive moment
8

R Zeidel, Iraq 2009: Some Thoughts about the State of Sectarianism, Center for Iraq Studies, University of Haifa, September 2009. 9 ibid. 10 F Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity, Hurst & Company, London, 2011. 11 ibid.

of Iraqi history. Why and how do confessional identities become the basis of sectarian politics? Where does al-taifiyya come from?

1.3 Definition and theoretical framework

Throughout the research, I will address the questions raised above by openly criticizing the ways in which Western analysts, whether academics, media or policy-makers, have approached Iraqi politics.12
1.3.1 The reductionist- alarmist debate

First, while studying the impact of sectarian narrative in Iraq, it is essential to recall the existence of two dichotomist perspectives, a reductionist and an alarmist one.13 While, on one side of the spectrum, some scholars reduce the essence of Iraqi society to a struggle based on ethno-confessional conflict,14 others tend to ignore or even deny its existence.15 Therefore, constant efforts have to be made not to fall into none of the extremes above, neither to relying solely on sectarianism (alarmist perspective) nor denying its importance in Iraq (reductionist perspective). The durability of these epistemological flaws are attributed to Western intellectual laziness that has led to misappropriate shortcomings. It would appear comfortable from an alarmist perspective to short-circuit the complexities of contemporary Iraqi politics by reducing them to a self-explanatory and yet misleading black and white dynamic16. Thus, it is important to underline that Iraq is not all about sectarianism17. While
12

H Al-Khoei, Iraqi Sectarianism needs reporting, but not like Associated Press did, The Guardian, 10 April 2012. 13 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 2011. 14 E Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010, p. 229. 15 Davis, Pense 3: A sectarian Middle East?, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 04, 2008, p.557. 16 ibid. 17 R Visser, The Territorial aspect of Sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010.

manifestations of sectarianism within the political and public realms are hardly deniable as they consistently gained more significance this past decade, sectarianism should not be presented as the one and only slant to explain Iraqi politics. It remains, along with tribalism and ethnic loyalties, one aspect of a much more complex multi-faceted reality.

1.3.2 Sectarianism as essentialist phenomenon

When explaining the roots of sectarianism in Iraq, two alternative explanations could be provided: a primordial versus a constructivist perspectives.18 Primordialist scholars identify the sectarian nature of Middle Eastern politics as essentially linked to the nature of Islam. Regardless of conflicting evidence, it remains nowadays very popular among academics. It refers to a broader tendency within Western academia that tends to emphasize the predominant role attributed to religion19 and systematically applies Islam () (to explain) every aspect of Arab culture and society.20 In this respect, from the hot-tempered inhabitants of Montesquieus Egypt21, to Gellners Muslim Society22, from the Islamic world of Bernard Lewis23 to Salvatores ingrained religious traditions of Muslim world24, a series of scholars believe in an innate disposition justifying sectarian violence in Arab countries, taking it as a given since these regions are located on one of the Huntingtons fault lines.25 This literature

18 19

Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, p.230. S Zubaida, Beyond Islam: a New Understanding of the Middle East, London: I.B Tauris, 2011, p.1. 20 ibid. 21 Montesquieu, Spirit of Law, originally published anonymously. 1748. Eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 22 E Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 23 B Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, The Atlantic, 1990. 24 A Salvatore, The Public Sphere, Palgrave, New York, 2007, p.10. 25 S Huntington, The Clash of Civilization, Foreign Policy, 73 (3), 1993, p.29.

derives from an Orientalist trap26 that asserts that Arabs have a natural propensity toward sectarian conflict because they are less developed and come from a different civilization. Sectarian politics, from this viewpoint, would be seen as innate,

Neither Islam nor any other primordial factor means that the sectarianism of the region is inevitable or natural but rather that external factors have influenced the region, creating the politics we are seeking to explain
Y Bassam, The political of economy of sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010.

unchangeable and locked in long-lasting

rivalries.27 Many argue that the only way to overcome these essential forces and help these countries to access modernity would be to impose a sovereign entity, a Leviathan28 that enshrines sectarianism in law. It would, in that sense, equally reflect confessional differences and preserve an artificial order as humans are believed to be oriented by nature towards war and chaos.29 * The shortcomings and incongruities of such a theory are demonstrated when further unfolding the idea to its logical conclusion. Assuming that sectarian divides are innate and unchangeable, why has conflict not taken place all over the region, at all times? How to explain the relative period of peace or moments of symbiotic communities30, during which sectarian dynamics were absent? The 1920 unrest against British colonizers in Iraq managed to put aside supposedly innate religious differences. Historical examples of cross-confessional cooperation show that primordialism is not an adequate theory as it remains unable to explain why a

26 27

E Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1977. Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2005. 28 T Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed Richard T., Cambridge University Press, 2006, 9 th Edition. 29 ibid. 30 G Corm, Liban : les guerres de lEurope et de lOrient 1840-1992, Paris : Editions Gallimard, 1992, p. 55.

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particular conflict, at times, mobilizes along sectarian lines while others do not.31 The presence of sectarian logics is therefore neither as natural nor as constant as the mainstream literature may suggest.
1.3.3 The constructed nature of sectarian identity

For these reasons, I shall approach the topic of sectarianism by rejecting primordialist explanations and adopt a more dynamic perspective. I will suggest focusing on the poststructuralist counter-argument. I will argue that the concept and the realities of sectarianism in Iraq, far from being explained by essentialist theory, are not the causes but rather the products of a political construction led by complex power actors. The concept of sectarianism should therefore be defined as a top-down rather than a bottom-up phenomenon.32 The presence of sectarian sensibilities in the society is, in any case, natural. They do not inhere in any Arab psyche. If they happened to get salient in the political realm, it is mainly because elites decided to manipulate them for their own political interests. As such, the slightly overlapping notions of religion and sectarianism now neatly appear distinct from each others. While religious identification may not be political in its wider sense, sectarianism is implicitly a political term of analysis that suggests a political manipulation aimed at enhancing religious identification to construct imagined communities.33

31

P Stuglett, The British, The Sunnis and the Shis: Social hierarchies of identity under the British mandate, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010. 32 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.9. 33 B Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 1984, p.6.

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Furthermore, whereas communal communities have existed in Iraqi society for ages, the manipulation of religious diversity for political reasons_ that we will call sectarianism_ is a modern phenomenon34. It fractures the horizontal class-based alliances, traditionally structuring the Middle East to generate an imagined community35 defined as a new horizontal comradeship36 that cross-cuts old social divisions. When power used to be based on economy37 and Iraqi politicians used to be afraid of a communist-led mobilization,38 power now seems to lie in sectarianism and Iraqi politicians are rather more afraid of a religion-based mobilization. States are now able to reshape the traditional self-definition of each community along religious lines and re-create, ex-nihilo, new associations in a form that suit them better.39 In other words, sectarianism is a political artifact, an imagined sociological concept for the state and an imagined social formation that shapes society.40 Therefore, it shall be interesting to touch on instrumentalist approach to seek deeper explanations of political strategies deployed by Iraqi elites seeking to ignite religious divisions to gain power. How are sectarian entrepreneurs41 playing upon religious overtones and sharpening societal sensibilities for their own political win?42 What benefits do they draw from it? In others words, sectarian origins should be found in the manipulation of social diversity rather than in actual cleavages. As a consequence, better focus should be given to the
34

U Makdisi, Reconstructing the Nation State: the Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon, Middle East Report, Vol. 26, Issue 03, 1996. 35 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.6. 36 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.7. 37 K Marx, Capital: The Process of Capitalist Production, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981. 38 H Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A study of Iraqs Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bathists and Free Officers, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1978. 39 N Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, London: IB Tauris, 1995. 40 J Suad, Pense 2 : Sectarianism as Imagined Sociological Concept and Imagined Social Formation, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40, Issue 04 (2008), p.554. 41 ibid. 42 B Salloukh, Democracy in Lebanon: The Primacy of the Sectarian System. In The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East, edited by Nathan Brown, and Emad El-Din Shahin, London: Routledge Press, 2009.

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instrumentalisation of sectarianism rather than to sectarianism itself. And yet, such a theory needs to be handled with precious care, as it could be assumed that sectarianism is nothing else that a mere artificial manifestation and that elites are creating a social order, somehow unnatural and illegitimate.

1.4. Structure of the thesis

Instead of picturing sectarianism as an inevitable reality, it is essential to look back to the history of Iraq to elaborate a cumulative argument looking at the roots of sectarianism. Sectarianism is not a self-evident phenomenon, nor has it been a political construction imposed by the United States after the fall of Saddam Hussein. I will rather argue that sectarianism was the complex result of a mixed combination of both conscious and unconscious historical forces. It is a social formation in history43 and its unforeseen origins are deeply rooted in the last 23 years of the Baathist rule. Sectarianism in its current form is new to Iraq but the practices of the current regime built on those of its predecessor in ways that need to be explored further.44 This research will thus examine the history of Iraq starting from the Baathist coup of 1968 to trace the origins of the political imagination and emotions that potentially contributed to the strengthening of sectarian identities in the post-invasion context.
*

43 44

Suad, Pense 2 : Sectarianism as Imagined Sociological Concept and Imagined Social Formation, p. 554. D Rizk Khoury, The Security state and the practice and rhetoric of sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010, p. 336.

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This thesis is divided into four chapters: The first one has been so far a broad introduction, offering a survey of literature about the

problem of sectarianism in post-2003 Iraq. It provides an adequate departure point for the following discussion on the roots of sectarianism. The next chapter will provide a beginning of an answer and will be dedicated to events

prior 2003 that help to understand how sectarianism was pushed into the public realm after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In other words, how did Saddams organization of power become an avenue to unleash religious identifications within politics and public domain after 2003? The third chapter will deal with sectarianism as a political tool institutionalized after

2003 and will argue that politics of sectarianism are being shaped by historical grievances, distorted perceptions and rational choice. The final one will summarize the argument45 and offer a broader scope to examine the

process of sectarianism as a whole, trying to understand why such a political discourse has found resonance in social practices.46 Creating divisions within society where none of these really existed before have generated process of its own. What was strictly a political tool has now potentially reached popular sense, out of Iraqi elites control. To sum up, it is not the phenomenon of sectarianism itself that demands analysis but how it has been constructed as a state discourse, and how, once created, this political narrative was transplanted, with various degrees of self- consciousness, to the social terrain.47

45 46

Cf. Appendix Zubaida, Beyond Islam, p.1. 47 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 8.

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2. The legacy of Saddam regime: the seeds of sectarianism

Initial part of the dissertation will be dedicated to events post-2003 that help understanding how sectarianism was pushed into the public domain in the 2003 aftermath. These events were not intrinsically and purposely sectarian but had, implicitly, sectarian outcomes. In other words, Saddams regime was not founded on a sectarian basis but throughout its authoritarian form of power, it has accelerated the formation of sectarian grievances. What effects did this ordering of power have on perceptions of sectarian privilege and persecution?

2.1 Authority through exclusivity

In order to understand the emergence of sectarianism as an outcome of Saddam regime, one has to understand the concept of shadow state48 to apprehend its interactions with the society. Instead of using state-centered approaches that consider power to be located in state institutions49, we will argue to a concept of power that is embedded in series of networks of power.50 Power is neither located in the elite class that detains the material means of production51 nor in the public institutions of the state. It is located elsewhere, mediated within the networks that stand behind, within and through the public institutions.52

48

C Tripp, After Saddam, Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 44, no.4, Winter 200203, p. 25 49 M Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1905. Translated by Stephen Kalberg (2002), Roxbury Publishing Company, pp.19-35. 50 T Mitchell, The Limits of the State Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, The American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.1, 1991. 51 K Marx, Capital: The Process of Capitalist Production, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981. 52 Tripp, After Saddam, p.25.

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From this perspective, the network theory of power is offering a much more adequate analytical tool to examine the nature of the dual state in Iraq of Saddam. We need to determine the nature of networks that sustain the regime, although they are, most of the time, not openly asserted. If we fall short of doing so, we will focus only on the visible coastline of politics and miss the continent that lies beyond.53 As a result, a different image of Iraq emerges beyond public rationale. Behind the faade of public institutions, the actual ruling of power under Saddam appears to be captured by those who seized power in 1968. It is here that real power resides.54 These political circles were drawn from the north-east of Iraq and Saddam appointed a number of his clan members at the top of the military and bureaucratic ranks. Circle of power was so restricted that the Baathist party quickly became a family party55. Saddam took care of surrounding himself of people of trust _ahl-al thiqa_56 to secure his personal ambitions and maintain his power from internal and external rivalries. It was a clientelist state based on a fragile equilibrium in which individuals, close to the elite realm, were manipulated by the regime.57 As soon as they were considered as potential threat to the regime, they were likely to be eliminated. Saddam knew exactly who to trust, whom he should favor and when58. This exclusivist enterprise was taking to an extreme in 1991 when Saddam ordered purges within his party to execute Baathist officials he mistrusted (including members of his own family in 1996) and replaced them by reliable personalities. The regime also appeared very vulnerable from the very beginning since it faced a growing tension between its ideological position and its pragmatic need to consolidate its power. Unable to rely
53 54

JC Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden transcripts, New Haven, Yale, 1990, p.199. C Tripp, What lurks in the shadows, Times Higher Education, 18 October 2002. 55 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 2011. 56 C Tripp, A History of Iraq, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 57 A Baram, Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Bathi Iraq: the search for a New Balance, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.19, No.2, April 1983, pp. 188-200. 58 C Tripp, What lurks in the shadows, Times Higher Education, 18 October 2002.

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on a large enough popular support, Iraqi state had to rely on these networks to strengthen state legitimacy. * While certain strata of society derived considerable benefits from the exclusivist state, a peripheral social field was excluded from regime patronage. Marginalized individuals started to gather in similar structure of informal associations to protect their own interests and cope with the authoritarian regime. The exclusionist nature of the states distribution of benefits creates a parallel organization of vanguards networks of associations59 promoting its own political project. In other words, the regime created its own resistance.60 Therefore, system theorists should not focus on the shadow state but rather on the shadow structures present in the network of trust at the heart of power as well of resistance61 as individuals outside the elite networks also position themselves in shadow structures. Asef Bayat62, taking the example of the disenfranchised people in Iran, demonstrated that individuals would not have constituted these informal networks as competitive circle of power if given the choice. In other words, such a parallel culture was not essential, it was constructed. They were forced to do so to resist network of power elites and further their interests63. These networks became a sphere of security, a safety net64 and a plausible alternative when state failed to address people needs. It directly compensated each others: the more the state welfare benefits became weakened, the more the need for alternative shadow networks grew.65 This is why shadow organizations were very vivid

59 60

S Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State, Third edition, Routledge, London and New York, 200966) M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, Random House Vintage Books, New York, 1995. 61 D Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995. 62 A Bayat, Street Politics: Poor Peoples Movements in Iran, Columbia University Press, 1997, p.6. 63 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 1990. 64 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.105 65 S Zubaida, Democracy, Iraq and the Middle East. Open Democracy, 18 November 2005.

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among the lower and more vulnerable social classes in the 90s in Iraq as a response to the economic deprivation. 66 * The appearance of the shadow structures of resistance within society under Saddam took the form of the resurgence of traditional solidarities,67 mainly in the Shia communities, as they felt more and more marginalized by the regime. Indeed, a communal logic started to be perceived within the manipulation of power. Circle of power was progressively given a sectarian light: when Saddam recruited most of his security apparatus from his community, it was assumingly believed that, as they were all coming from a similar background, they were sharing similar confessional identity. More than a family-based minority rule, it was assumingly perceived as a religious-based minority in which circle of power was mainly drawn from Sunni cities which left Shia excluded from politics.

2.2 A Sunni leaning nationalism

Although tribes close to power comprised both Sunni and Shia, the Saddam shadow state had a clear potential for religious interpretation. Haddad argues that public rationale as defined by the ruling elites, by referring to Arab nationalism, was likely to overlap68 with the Sunni identification at the expense of the Shia one. *

66 67

Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, p.233. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, p.167. 68 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.17.

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Ironically, the Baathist party was to create a united nation for a modern state. It was believed to move against tribal, regional and religious identities that divided Iraq to create a sense of being Iraqi. Saddam was willing to downplay religious differences in the political sphere to build a cohesive Iraqi nationhood.69 Religion was considered as an obstacle for the transformation of Iraq into a modern and secular state.70 Nevertheless, despite a clear attempt to escape any sectarian-based power dynamics, the nationalist narrative, as it was constructed and perceived by official circles, only exacerbated discrimination against Shia community and ended up fostering a sense of sectarian victimization among Shia, long before 2003. * The myth of Iraqi identity goes back to the Arab nationalism as it was defined by the Ottoman Empire that coined the notion of arabit in strong opposition to the Persian identity. It was based upon the resistance against European interference in the region and in opposition to external rivalry against a united Arab nation.71 Back in those times, only Arabs were believed to be true Muslims. Not only was Arab nationalism deeply rooted in Islam, it particularly did in Sunni Islam72: Shia subjects living in the Ottoman Empire were not considered to be part of the Arab project as strictly defined, because of their religious ties with the Persian enemy. Ottoman Shia laymen and clergy were closely tied to the Iranians marjas and these transnational confessional affinities were undeniably about to last. This constantly represented a cause of anxiety for the Ottoman Empire as they suspected Shia of being a Trojan horse of their enemy

69

A Dawisha, Identity and Political Survival in Saddams Iraq, The Middle East Journal, Vol.53, No.4, Autumn 1999. 70 A Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies, 1991-1996, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.29, no.1, 1997, p.1. 71 S Al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 7475. 72 ibid.

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interests. In 1921, the first Iraqi constitution institutionalized this discrimination and Shia were relegated to second-class citizens73. The establishment of an Arab nationalist discourse in which they were openly persecuted led to their progressive political marginalization. * Saddam Hussein had a profound admiration toward this Ottoman legacy and was willing to revive the Arab myth. State propaganda under Saddam, from its early beginning, offered the same internal contradiction as the one inherent to the Ottoman project and led to a similar misleading amalgam between religion and ethnicity. 74 Indeed, in its efforts to downplay sectarian divisions, Saddam played heavily on these historical ethnic differences between Arabs and Persians. And yet ironically, as the Ottoman discourse did, the public rationale was progressively appreciated through a religious perspective.75 In other words, being Iraqi under Saddam means being a descendant of the Ottomans, hence, being Sunni. Because Iraqi state nationalism referred to the Ottoman definition of arabit, it was likely to capture a larger Sunni constituency76 and exclude Shia identity, because of their allegedly Persian legacy. State nationalism disproportionally overlapped with the definition of the Sunni identity 77 and those who were not Arab_Sunni_ were excluded from circle of power. The Islamic Revolution and the establishment of a Shia Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 had landmark impact in the definition of state nationalism of Iraq. It fuelled an already active
73 74

Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 2011. ibid. 75 W.R. Polk, Understanding Iraq: the Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khans Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation, HarperCollin, 2005, p. 93. 76 Cf. Appendix. 77 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 2011.

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nationalism in the country and sharpened a long-dated discrimination against Shia, although not officially recognized as such. Once again, it reactivated the endless myth of Shia association with Iran. Saddam suspected Tehran to help Iraqi Shia to foment a revolution. The anti-Iranian narrative was reduced to an anti-Shia narrative and the security concern argument was quickly interpretated into religious terms. Nevertheless, the fact that some Shias in the Gulf states had maintained theological ties with Iran did not necessarily mean that there was a systematic Iranian influence over the Shia population. Although it was true that some Shia families in Iraq were Iranian, they were not intrinsically subservient to Iranian foreign power. And yet, misperceptions over Iranian influence led Saddam to institutionalize series of misleading discriminatory constraints against Shia communities to pre-empt the rise of any Iranian fifth column. Manipulation of power under Saddam and the way in which state interacted with its society, although not sectarian in intent, took a sectarian light. Although it may not have been a conscious design of part of the policy makers78, Iraqi nationalism was, from its early beginning, an exclusivist discourse unequally restricted to Sunni citizens. During the Iran-Iraq war, domestic policies were not legitimized by sectarian logic but rather driven by realist security concerns. And yet, it led to undeniable consequences in terms of sectarian identification in Iraq.

2.3 A potential for sectarian awareness

Sunni communities did not perceive any imbalance in the State-sect relations as Sunni identity found its place within the States narrative of nation.79 Their identity intertwined with the Iraqi nationalism.80 Yet, the regime, through its nationalist project, generated a strong sense

78 79

Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.36. ibid, p.55. 80 Appendix

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of frustration among the outsiders who could not identify with it.81 Shia community started to realize they were denied an access to power because they were coming from the wrong religious community. Although it may not have been officially asserted, they felt they were marginalized because of their religious belongings. Since then, they started to portray Saddam regime as sectarian, willing to maintain a religious minority on the top of power. Shadow state was framed in sectarian terms. Shia militancy groups operating from within or from abroad were not historically initiated in religious terms.82 They were not all created, sui generis, to defend their religion.83 They were a response to the secular project of the Baathist party. Al Daawa, initially founded in 1958, was a traditional Shia opposition group initially proposing an alternative to state nationalism as defined by Saddam. They rejected Islamist politics and moved against secularism, atheism and modernity. Eventually, as they begun to misinterpret the religious lines of the State project, confession turned into a priority cause to defend. The salience of communal sensibilities in opposition group was a response to the perceived religious group-discrimination84. More, embracing a sectarian narrative became the only way for the opposition to potentially survive the worsening repression as logic of trust and survival were deeply grounded in traditional solidarities. Sectarianism became a raison dtre for Shia parties. The opposition group Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), founded in 1982 in Teheran by Mohammed Baqir alHakim, became an umbrella opposition groups for Iraqi Shia in exile. Deeply influenced by Iran,

81 82

Iraqs Shiites under Occupation, International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing, 9 September 2003. F Jabar, The Shite Movement in Iraq, Saqi, London, 2003, p.73. 83 ibid, p. 75. 84 Ibid, p.441.

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it was, in its organization, ideology as well as recruitment, explicitly sectarian.85 Its identity was grounded on the biased memory of repression in a Sunni-Arab regime86 and engaged, by any means, against the Saddam regime. It even fought alongside Iranian forces in the war with Iraq to put an end to the oppressing regime. Traumatized by what they regarded as sectarian discrimination, perceptions of Shia living in exile were narrowed to a monolithic religious narrative. Whether in exile or underground, the pre-2003 oppositionists had a sect-centric identity that was doubtless fostered by pre-2003 sectarian victimhood both real and perceived.87 Unfortunately, these were to compose the political backbone of the new Iraq following the ouster of Saddam.

85 86

Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2007. Davis, Memories of State, 2005. 87 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.149.

23

3. Inventing Iraq: an old political imagination for a new country

To understand the salience of sectarian identities in post-2003 Iraq, most of the constructivist scholars are looking for answers in the political arrangement made by the US occupation and Iraqi policymakers after Saddams fall. It is undeniable that his removal opened up a window of opportunity for outsider actors such as American and the Iraqi Shia elites that fled the Saddam regime to impose their own views and gain power in their home country. Nevertheless, it would have been too reductionist to focus on this period as the salience of sectarianism in post-2003 Iraq has to be understood by excavating Iraqi history since the Ottomans. One should not underestimate the importance of pre-2003events. They are primordial component_ not in essentialist terms_ but in terms of continuity of forms of historical memory that reflect the persistent forms of discriminations and repression. They form a suitable avenue for the liberation of sectarian identities within politics and public sphere following the fall of the regime. In fact, American decisions, influenced by

If the current outbreak of sectarianism does no flow directly from the sectarian politics of the previous regime, it arguably follows from that regimes very nature
The next Iraqi war? Sectarianism and civil conflict, International Crisis Group, 52, 27 February 2006, p.7.

the exiled community, could not have been fully understood without paying attention to them. Much of the sectarianism that emerges after 2003 plays upon ancient grievances to divide population and bolster their standings.88 Post-2003 factors have to

88

Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, 2010.

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be seen therefore as additional events that cumulatively help to sharpen the process of sectarianism into a political tool. 2003 did not dishevel any of the sectarian process, it rather accelerated it.

3.1 Americas War on Iraq: the persistent myth of religious violence

An overview of the American misperceptions can today explain most of the mistakes undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority of Paul Bremer. The policies of the US-British occupation have embodied a series of primordial and alarmist misbeliefs that have been dominating Western views of Iraq since the colonial times89. Following the events of September 11, the sudden concern about the potential vulnerability of the United States led the Bush neoconservative administration to suspect any threat that might hit the American territory in the same way again. The Middle East region was catapulted to the top of the political agenda. Jihadist movements sprouting up all over the region were regarded as the new adversaries the US would have to eradicate in the forthcoming decade. As the declared global war against on terrorism was aimed at justifying any American foreign policy, officials started to emphasize the role of Islam in politics in the region. An overtly religious imaginary90 gained resonance to explain any political mobilization in Arab countries. From that perspective, Iraq quickly appeared as a potential symbol of defiance. Saddam regime was viewed as an amalgam of religions that respectively fit into political groups. 91 The Sunni Arabs were assumingly believed to be the Baathist supporters while the Shia communities
89 90

P Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, Verso, 2006. T Dodge, Iraq at crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change, London, Routledge, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 12. 91 The next Iraqi war? Sectarianism and civil conflict, International Crisis Group, 52, 27 February 2006, p.8.

25

were excluded from the political circle. It offered a very nave image of the complexities of the networks of power under Saddam. It presented Saddams regime as a sectarian enterprise that purposely kept power in the hands of a Sunni minority over a Shia majority. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair truly believed that part of their mission was to liberate the oppressed religious community and restore a democratic regime in Iraq. They assumed Shia would welcome the invading forces. In reality, they did not pay much attention to what Iraqi people could potentially think and Iraqi citizens were expected to play a spectator92 role. In defence of the officials that took these crucial decisions,93 the Americans were not alone in distorting reality. Their misunderstandings about sectarianism in Iraq can partially be explained by the close ties they maintained with long-exiled opposition figures. Ironically, although their authority within Iraq was totally valueless, they constituted the sole intermediaries in Washington.94 Because their organization and ideology were, explicitly sectarian, they comforted the American visions about Iraq. * Sadly, this was pure fallacy.95 It demonstrated the lack of knowledge the Bush administration had about regime and about Iraqi society. Few American officials knew about the history of the Middle East. More, presumably none of them felt it could have been relevant for their enterprise. Whether they were short of Arabic speakers or lacking of political experts, they were not able to establish any meaningful contact with insiders. They instead find complacency with the political forces in exile

President Bush has reportedly expressed surprise and interest when told that there were two sorts of Muslim in Iraq, Sunni and 92 Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, p.32. 93 ibid, p .13. Shia 94
95

Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 279. Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, p.33 Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, p.4.

26

because they were sharing a familiar narrative. Although their political imagination of exiled Iraqis may have been distorted by historical grievances and desires of revenge, the US administration took it for granted.96 They made no effort to further understand the nature of the country they were about to invade.97 In a very orientalist imagination, they used their western set of standards to frame Iraq and did pay little attention to its history and its legacy.98 All in all, Americans repeated similar mistakes made by their British predecessors a century ago.99 While trying to make sense of a society they barely know, they fell into the dangers of primordialisation. They theorized a world divided into cultural blocs, divided by one specific marker: religion.100 Religious divisions were believed to be rooted in old-age rivalries that were exacerbated by Saddams privileging of sectarian loyalties.101 Supported by the opposition groups, they created a new imaginary102 that was to be imposed as the mainstream way of thinking Iraq.103 Yet, these atavistic miscalculations quickly unabled them to accomplish what they initially planned to do: build a modern, democratic and secular state.

3.2 The imposition of a sectarian order

The overtly religious narrative strongly shaped the American visions about an Iraqi future. They were convinced that Sunni was responsible for the previous regime and a sectarian reasoning underlay any of the CPA policies.

96

T Dodge, Inventing Iraq: the Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, p.43. 97 Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, p.12. 98 Said, Orientalism, 1977. 99 Dodge, p.158. 100 Jabar, The Shite Movement in Iraq, p.18. 101 Dodge, p.159. 102 Ibid. 103 Dodge, US Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures, Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol.45, no.3, Autumn 2003, p.114.

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In charge of the construction of the new Iraq, the CPA, with no former Middle Eastern experience104 was desperately lacking a political model. The only way for them to put an end to the political chaos was to establish a sovereign state, a Leviathan105, that would enshrine essential religious divisions in law.106 They found a convenient compromise in the Lebanese consociational political formula in which political representation is structured along specific quota lines. Such a system appeared as a remedy to the risk of a permanent exclusion of religious communities from power. It was the guarantee for stability and pluralism.107 They believe that if sectarianism was not taken into account by politics, it would generate a durable chaos within society.108 In other words, political institutionalization of sectarianism was the panacea to address societal sectarianism. * The Interim Governing Council was the first step to the politics of sectarianism as its composition was based on ethno-sectarian quotas. As the IGC was given the responsibility to draft the Interim constitution, it was agreed that it would proportionally represent each confessional group so they would all have a say in the making of future Iraq. It was established that 13 out of the 25 members of the IGC were Shiite Arab109, 5 Sunni Arab, 5 Kurd and 1 Turkoman and 1 Christian. Furthermore, politics of sectarianism was sharpened with the

adoption of the 2005 Constitution. It formalized the idea of an equal representation of every community in the executive institutions, in the bureaucracy, the army and police. Today, an informal power sharing agreement seems to have emerged among religious and ethnic lines. It is
104 105

Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 280. Hobbes, Leviathan. 106 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 280 107 Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, 2000. 108 Hobbes, Leviathan. 109 Iraqs Shiites under Occupation, International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing, 9 September 2003, p.2

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now accepted that the ownership of the state Presidency is allocated to the Kurd community, and that Sunni and Shia Muslims have a guaranteed presence in the cabinet and in the Parliament. This would not have been without consequence: a monolithic approach to the previous regime only initiated what it was seeking to avoid.110 It pushed religious diversity into the public scene and paved the way to the institutionalization of sectarian politics. This certainly provided an advantage to sectarian leaders willing to exploit these interpretations.

3.3 From historical grievances to political actions

The fall of Saddam on April 9 allowed the return of exiled Iraqis, mainly the Daawa and SCIRI followers.111 As they hurried back to step in112, they eagerly sought to make it to the top to play a role in the post-Baathist politics.113 Despite hostilities, they believed they had the legitimacy to do so because they represented the disenfranchised Shia majority outcasted by Saddam. In fact, in the aftermath of 2003, Shia opposition groups were the only remaining political force that could fill the political vacuum as the Baathist party was dissolved and the Communist party of Hamid Majid Mousa slowly falling into decay. When the US and British handed sovereignty back to Iraq in June 2004, former exiles Iraqis integrated the political institutions freshly designed by the Americans. Ayad Allawi, who had enjoyed a long popularity along the American intelligences services, was appointed Prime Minister. Ayatollah Hakims brother, Abd Aziz Al-Hakim, chairman of SCIRI returned to Baghdad after two decades in Iran to become member of the Government Council. Similarly, Bayan Kaber Solagh, SCIRIs representative in Damascus, was named Interior Minister. Finally,
110

Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, 26 September 2005. 111 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.297. 112 Iraqs Shiites under Occupation, p.2. 113 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.209.

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Ibrahim al-Jaafari, official spokesman of the Islamic Daawa Party, returned to Iraq from London to become Governing Councils first chairman. Nevertheless, none of these Shia influential elites had to be regarded as figureheads appointed by the Americans. Apart from their common goal of removing Saddam regime, they had little in common with the Bush administration. Attention should be therefore paid to their individual agency as they had their own political agenda. They were sectarian entrepreneurs.114 Coming back to Iraq was part of a rational decision.115 They had an invested benefit to do so116 . By presenting themselves as the oppressed religious majority, they cleverly played upon the American mistakes117 and comforted their preconceptions.118 Their strategy was also sharpened by personal feelings of revenge_ many lost members of their communities under Saddam_. They exploited the constructed memory of Shia martyrdom under Saddam to increase sectarian grievance and mobilize followers. Moqtada Al Sadr, although not an exiled opponent, could be regarded as an entrepreneur as well. He revived the dormant Sadrist Shia organization initially founded in 1991 and saw it as an opportunity to fill the political vacuum created by the dismantling of the former regime. While providing social services among Shia poorest communities, he manipulated the sectarian vocabulary to gain support and impose himself as a major Shia actor within the political landscape of the new Iraq.119 *

114 115

Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, p.231. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.281. 116 M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. 117 Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, p. 224. 118 Cockburn, The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, p.55. 119 Iraqs Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge, International Crisis Group, 72, 7 February 2008, p.1.

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Finally, sectarian entrepeneurs were not only to be found in the backbone of the new Iraqi circle of power, but could also refer to regional power brokers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ironically, the Shia-Muslim who ruled Iranian government and the Sunni-Muslim who ruled Saudi government were both finding willing complacency with the US policies. While systematically vilifying each others, they indeed frequently resort to this Sunni-Shia sectarian narrative to justify their security policy and distract attention from genuine domestic political reforms.

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4. The dangers of sectarian deterioration in post-Saddam Iraq

A combination of factors relating to both pre- and post-2003 Iraq have served to galvanise

sectarian identity120, heighten its salience and turn it into a political tool. Iraqi politicians, whether it be Baathist officials or the US- led administration in the post -2003 context, have sought to exploit sectarian identification, actively or unintentionally, to promote their political ambitions. The concept of sectarianism as a political tool is largely a result of national and international power plays, at the crossroads of historical grievances and rational choice. * This research would not have been complete without some considerations on the consequences of the institutionalization of sectarianism, without examining the reasons of the salience of sectarianism not only within the narrow confined circle of political elites, but also within society: once created, this political artifact invaded any societal discourse.121 It is ultimately shaped and shapes a specific reality in return.
122

For a sectarian politics to cohere, for it to become hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, it would have to become an expression of everyday life; it would have to stamp itself indelibly on geography and history
Makdisi, U., The Culture of Sectarianism, p. 78.

In this respect, sectarianism needs

120 121

Fanar, Sectarianism in Iraq, p.143. U Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, p.6. 122 U Makdisi, Reconstructing the Nation State: the Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon, Middle East Report, Vol. 26, Issue 03, 1996.

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to be apprehended in its vertical dimension, in a Gramscian definition of hegemony.123 More than a political strategy, it should be portrayed as a social process emanating from the ruling realm that becomes slowly embedded124 in social and cultural institutions.125 Once created, sectarianism started to reinvent the state-society relations as it was integrated by the society that started to act along sectarian lines. 126

4.1 A self-fulfilling prophecy: from an imagined political rhetoric to a social practice

State elites, through institutions, organize and generate power to mold citizens and shape them along their preferences without using coercion or violence.127 The power of sectarian politics imposes its set of narratives and enforces a specific regime of truth 128 that hinders citizens freedom. It appears as a form of oppression that impedes members of a society to act as they wish. They have no other choice than to accept sectarianism as part of their culture.129 Power is therefore diffuse130 as it is distributed through a variety of everyday practices. Sectarianism as a political construction is now being internalized by citizens and sectarian political discourse is creating new behaviors within society 131 where none of these really existed before. More Iraqis tend now to think about their homeland as divided along sectarian lines. They end up accepting such a political imagination, and strongly believe that these new forms of

123

A Gramsci, The Gramsci reader: selected writing 1916-1935,Ed. David Forgacs, New York University Press, New York, 2000. 124 Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, p.78 125 Zubaida , Beyond Islam, p.1. 126 Gramsci, The Gramsci reader, 2000. 127 M Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Ed. Colin Gordon, Random House, New York, 1980, p.83. 128 ibid. 129 M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, New York, Random House Vintage Books,1995, p.27. 130 ibid. 131 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.6.

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identifications are their own independent choice.132 Sectarianism is not imposed anymore, it is unconsciously assimilated by the society as it now appears inherently present in everyday discourse. Let there be no mistake: it does not mean that sectarianism is now primordial. It is still constructed, although its construction is no longer in the hands of conscious entrepreneurs, it is now a much more diffuse phenomenon, innervating the whole society. This could have quite dangerous consequences as Iraqis now found themselves imprisoned in an everyday life sectarian culture. Politics of sectarianism dictates how people vote. The political system, imposed by sectarian entrepreneurs, has forced citizens to identify themselves with their religion identity as they redirect individual allegiances to sectarian communities.133 It has fractured the organization of the civil society along religious lines and Sunni, that had always remained unaware of their religious belongings under Saddam, were forced to think about their political loyalties on a confessional basis. This accelerates the formation of new political solidarities and contributes to Sunni identity awakening. Iraqis are no longer voting for political ideas, freely choosing those representing their ideological interests. Hence the two elections of 2005 brought to power political parties based on ethnic and confessional identities. Majority of the votes favored the United Iraqi Alliance, a Shia coalition supported by the Shia demographic majority. Everyone votes for those they believe will best defend their confessional interests, which inexorably tend to hinder democratic participation at the expense of sectarian identities. Furthermore, sectarianism seems to have a dynamic on its own and can no longer be stopped: it has now become an irreversible force, set in motion and gaining momentum. It did not need to be combined with any instrumental faction to operate in its most brutal way in 2006
132 133

Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980. The next Iraqi war? Sectarianism and civil conflict, International Crisis Group, 52, 27 February 2006.

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during the civil war. The irreversible spiral has precipitated people into committing sectarian cleansings: having the wrong name134 or simply being a Shia or a Sunni, indistinctively of any social, ideological background was a good enough reason to kill or to be killed. Still today, sectarianism seems to dictate Iraqi behavior. It has penetrated the public space in Baghdad City135 and become a spatial marker136 that designates where Shia and Sunni can safely live, move and work.137

4.2 The absence of viable non-sectarian alternatives

Will Iraqis be, one day, able to question their belongings to sectarian communities? How far will the sectarian narrative be accepted? This is for another chapter. All we can say for now is that any change seems illusionary.138 Great hope was put in the Iraqi List of former Shia Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in the elections of 2005, as he sought to propose an alternative project for the future Iraq that would escape from the framework of sectarianism to promote a national secular unity. It failed dramatically and only won 25 seats at the Iraqi Parliament in December 2005, against 40 in January of the same year. The 2009 provincial elections saw the victory of Malikis State of Law coalition, running under secular and all-Iraqi banners. Yet, this was another post-sectarian illusion.139 Maliki tried to recast himself as a secular leader but he was not able to draw enough support from Sunni personalities to give its coalition a truly secular character. In fact, none of the existing leaders are likely to be charismatic enough to defy the
134 135

Whats in a name? Iraqis at risk for having dangerous first names, Niqash, 23 May 2012. C Pieri, Between Art and Alienation, the Painted T-Walls in Segmented 2012 Baghdad, SOAS, London Middle East Institute, 28 February 2012. 136 M Damluji, Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad, TDSR, Volume XXI, Number 11, 2010. 137 S Tavernise, Sectarian hatred pulls apart Iraqs mixed towns, The New Yorker, 20 November 2005. 138 Zeidel, Iraq 2009: Some Thoughts about the State of Sectarianism, September 2009. 139 ibid.

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sectarian process, now accepted and deeply penetrating in everyones habitus.140 Sectarianism has become a culture, where religious affiliation is the defining norm for both political and social behaviors141.

4.3 Towards the downward slide of Lebanonization?142

Finally, I would argue that because the post-2003 Iraq was created to maintain the status quo, it will remain this way. Iraqi state is now too weak to even distance itself from a sectarian narrative and to be thought through a non-sectarian framework. In fact, ruling entrepreneurs143 in Iraq may not even be willing to break away from this status quo as they continue to exploit sectarianism for their own interest. Indeed, since they reached power, they have kept exploiting sectarian narrative for their personal
The exiled Iraqis are the exact replica

interest. Prime Minister Al Maliki finds in this narrative an appropriate vocabulary to sideline opposition associated with the Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc. It reached a crescendo last December when he called for a no-confidence vote again Deputy Prime

of those who currently govern us, with the sole difference that the latter are already satiated since they have been robbing us for the past thirty years. Those who accompany the American troops will be ravenous
Cockburn, The Occupation, p. 58.

Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq and issued an arrest warrant for the VicePresident Tariq al-Hashimi. These sectarian moves raise the fear of a growing authoritarian tendency from Maliki as he is clearly seeking to concentrate power in his own hands. The prevailing use of sectarian rhetoric is
140 141

P Bourdieu, Choses dites, Paris: ditions de minuit, 1987. Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, p.174. 142 Ibid. 143 Davis, Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, 2010.

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a convenient scapegoat to exclude any highest ranking Sunni from his circle of power. Nevertheless, in doing so, he is about to reproduce the very exclusivist structures of power set up by Saddam to guarantee his grip on power. * Therefore, until the actual political imagination of those ruling Iraq change, sectarianism is likely to remain. Abolishing such a system goes hand in hand with addressing clientelism and corruption in the political sphere. Through this institutionalization of sectarianism, political elites hinder any potential reform for the future. There is now a reasonable probability that Iraq, imprisoned in this sectarian culture for too long, will follow the path of Lebanon, a failed country where society systemically embraces sectarian identities rather than any trans-national Lebanese identity at the expense of national unity.144 Time has now come for Iraqi society to reject oppressing political structures narrowing Iraqi way of thinking and to liberate itself before it is too late. Time has come for Iraqi society to come up against sectarian political machinations before they turn into societal disintegrations.

144

Salloukh, Democracy in Lebanon: The Primacy of the Sectarian System., 2009.

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5. General findings and conclusion

This thesis investigates how post-2003 Iraqi institutions were manufacturing a sectarian culture and how it has strengthened Iraqi citizens allegiance to sectarian entrepreneurs. To this end, this dissertation has mainly examined the drivers of sectarianism and sought to highlight specific circumstances in which political struggles take on distinctively sectarian overtones, both symbolically and sociologically. It has strongly rejected the overstated role played by the Americans in 2003 in turning them into a political tool and has sought to shed light on other potential drivers of sectarianism more deeply rooted in the history of Iraq. Sectarianism may have been pushed into the public realm in 2003 by external powerbrokers but its political foundations lie in a long-lasted process of ancient grievances and rational choice. The unforeseen consequences of Saddams shadow state were reinforced by the nature of opposition groups and by sectarian entrepreneurs as well as American contributors. In that sense, as I try to diagram my general findings,145 sectarian construction is not only in the hands of few conscious elites but a much more diffuse power. Major part of the dissertation was to find the right balance while neither dismissing its outsider incidence nor underestimating its domestic dynamics. Analyzing the roots of this specific issue in Iraq was elementary to approach the complexity of the sectarian phenomenon in post-2003. It helps to detect early origins of the sectarian process to delineate what still can be done to halt Iraqs downward slide towards irreversible consequences. Since much of the final part remains speculative, conclusion can only be hedged and conditional. Iraqis are now facing a choice: they can either accept the political
145

Cf. Appendix

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system at it was imposed to them or resist it. Power of sectarian politics dramatically hinders the creation of a democratic society in Iraq. It squanders any democratic illusion. Without falling into the trap of fatalism, politics of sectarianism, coupled with the political inaptitude to empower secular change, is to gain more resonance within the Iraqi society, slowly distracting attention from genuine social and economic reforms.

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6. Appendix
The drivers of sectarianism
Daawa SCIRI
PERCEPTION OF MARGINALIZATION BY THE OUT GROUP

IRAQ OF SADDAM: THE BAATHIST IDEOLOGY

1968 Coup

Barometer of the salience of sectarian sensibility within the political and public space

MISLEADING AND DISTORTED REALITIES FROM A POLITICAL TOOL

TO A SOCIAL PRACTISE

USA
STRENGHTENED COMMUNAUTARIAN TIES VIA SHIA RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM

1979 Saddam Hussein President

Shia Iraqi Nationalism Iraqi State Nationalism Sunni Iraqi Nationalism

PASSIVE FORM sectarian sensibilities quasi-absent from politics and public sphere

historical grievances

BACKBONE OF THE POST-2003 POLITICAL ELITE sectarian entrepreneurs

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL STATE

REINSTATE RELIGION AS A NEW FORM OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION

A PROCESS OF ITS OWN: TOWARDS LEBANONIZATION?

revenge?

Al Sadr Movement INVASION & WAR & OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME

2003
ASSERTIVE FORM unrestrained assertion of religious identity into the public domain

Interim Governing Council from July 2003

Elections 2005 Constitution

SUNNI AWAKENING

2006-2007 Civil War

AGGRESSIVE FORM worst visible form: denigrating the others symbolically and physically

2012

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7- Selected bibliography

Books Al-Khalil, S., Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Allawi, Ali A., The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Loosing the Peace, Yale University Press, 2007. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 1984. Ayubi, N., Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, London: IB Tauris, 1995. Batatu, H., The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A study of Iraqs Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bathists and Free Officers, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1978. Bayat, A., Street Politics: Poor Peoples Movements in Iran, Columbia University Press, 1997. Beverley Milton, E. and P. Hinchcliff, Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945: The Making of the Contemporary World, Routledge, 2008. Bideleux, R. and I. Jeffries, The Balkans: a post-communist theory, 2007. Bourdieu, P., Choses dites, Paris: ditions de minuit, 1987. Cockburn, P. The occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, Verso, 2006. Cordesman, A.H, Iraqs insurgency and the Road to Civil conflict, Praeger Security International, 2008. Corm, G., Liban : les guerres de lEurope et de lOrient 1840-1992, Paris : Editions Gallimard, 1992. Davis, E., Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2005. Dodge, T., S. Simon, Iraq at crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change, London, Routledge, Oxford University Press, 2003. Dodge, T., Inventing Iraq: the Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

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Dodge, T., Iraqs Future: the aftermath of regime change, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005. Foucault, M., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Ed. Colin Gordon, Random House, New York, 1980. Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, Random House Vintage Books, New York, 1995. Gellner, E., Muslim Society, Cambridge University Press, 1983. Gramsci, A, The Gramsci reader: selected writing 1916-1935,Ed. David Forgacs, New York University Press, New York, 2000. Haddad, F., Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity, Hurst & Company, London, 2011. Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Ed Richard T., Cambridge University Press, 2006, 9th Edition. Jabar, Faleh A., The Shite Movement in Iraq, Saqi, London, 2003. Luizard, J-P., La Question Irakienne, Fayard, 2004. Makdisi, U., The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in NineteenthCentury Ottoman Lebanon, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000. Marx, K., Capital: The Process of Capitalist Production, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981. Migdal, J. S., State in Society; how state and societies transform and constitute one another, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. Montesquieu, Spirit of Law, originally published anonymously. 1748. Eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Nakash, Y., The Shiis of Iraq, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003. Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Polk, W.R., Understanding Iraq: the Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khans Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation, HarperCollin, 2005. Said, E., Orientalism, Vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1977. Salloukh, B. Democracy in Lebanon: The Primacy of the Sectarian System. In The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East, edited by Nathan Brown, and Emad El-Din Shahin, London: Routledge Press, 2009. Salvatore, A., The Public Sphere, Palgrave, New York, 2007.

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Scott, J.C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden transcripts, New Haven, Yale, 1990. Singerman, D., Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995. Tripp, C., A History of Iraq, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1905. Translated by Stephen Kalberg (2002), Roxbury Publishing Company, pp.19-35. Zubaida, S., Islam, the People and the State, Third edition, Routledge, London and New York, 2009. Zubaida , S., Beyond Islam: a New Understanding of the Middle East, London: I.B Tauris, 2011.

Journal Articles Baram, A., Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Bathi Iraq: the search for a New Balance, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.19, No.2, April 1983, pp. 188-200. Baram, A., Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies, 1991-1996, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.29, no.1, 1997, pp. 1-31. Bassam, Y., The political of economy of sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010. Damluji, M., Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad, TDSR, Volume XXI, Number 11, 2010. Davis, E., Reflections and Politics in Post-Baathist Iraq, Newsletter of the American Academic Research Institute in Iraq, No. 3-1, Spring 2008, pp.13-15. Davis, E., Pense 3: A sectarian Middle East?, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 04, 2008, pp. 555-558. Davis, E., Introduction: The question of sectarian identities in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010, pp. 229-224. Dawisha, A. Identity and Political Survival in Saddams Iraq, The Middle East Journal, Vol.53, No.4, Autumn 1999. Dawisha, A., National identity and sub-state sectarian loyalties in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010, pp. 243-256. Dodge, T., US Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures, Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol.45, no.3, Autumn 2003, pp.103-122. Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilization, Foreign Policy, 73 (3), 1993, pp. 22-49.

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Ismael, T. Y. and Max Fuller, The disintegration of Iraq: the manufacturing and politicization of sectarianism, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol. 2:3, 2010, pp. 443-473. Khadim, A., Efforts at cross-ethnic cooperation: the 1920 Revolution and sectarianism identities in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010, pp.275-294. Lewis, B., The Roots of Muslim Rage, The Atlantic, 1990. Lewis, B., Islam and Liberal Democracy, Atlantic Monthly, Vol.271:2, February 1993, pp. 8998. Luizard, P.-J., The Iraqi Question from the Inside, Middle East Report, No.193, 1995, pp.1822. Makdisi, U., Reconstructing the Nation State: the Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon, Middle East Report, Vol. 26, Issue 03, 1996. Mitchell, T. The Limits of the State Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, The American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.1, 1991. Rizk Khoury, D., The Security state and the practice and rhetoric of sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010. Stuglett, M. and Peter Sluglett, The Historiography of Modern Iraq, The American Historical Review, 96:5, pp. 1408-1421. Stuglett, P., The British, The Sunnis and the Shis: Social hierarchies of identity under the British mandate, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010. Suad, J. Pense 2 : Sectarianism as Imagined Sociological Concept and Imagined Social Formation, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40, Issue 04, 2008, pp.553-554. Tripp, C., After Saddam, Survival, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 44, no.4, Winter 2002-03, pp.23-27. Visser, R., The Territorial aspect of Sectarianism in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol.4:3, 2010. Zeidel, R., Iraq 2009: Some Thoughts about the State of Sectarianism, Center for Iraq Studies, University of Haifa, September 2009, <http://iraq.haifa.ac.il/index.php/articles/20-iraq-2009some-thoughts-about-the-state-of-sectarianism.html> Zubaida, S., Iraq: History, Memory, Culture, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 44, 2012, pp.333-345. Iraqs Shiites under Occupation, International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing, 9 September 2003. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-irangulf/iraq/B008-iraqs-shiites-under-occupation.aspx>

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Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, 26 September 2005. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-northafrica/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/B019-unmaking-iraq-a-constitutional-process-gone-awry.aspx> The next Iraqi war? Sectarianism and civil conflict, International Crisis Group, 52, 27 February 2006. < http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-irangulf/iraq/052-the-next-iraqi-war-sectarianism-and-civil-conflict.aspx> Iraqs Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge, International Crisis Group, 72, 7 February 2008. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/072iraqs-civil-war-the-sadrists-and-the-surge.aspx>.

Newspaper Articles Abdul-Ahad, G., Corruption in Iraq: Your son is being tortured. He will die if you dont stay, The Guardian, 16 January 2012. Al-Khoei, H., Iraqi Sectarianism needs reporting, but not like Associated Press did, The Guardian, 10 April 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/10/iraqisectarianism-shia-sunni-muslims> Al-Mousawi, H., Sectarianism in Iraq, Fair http://www.fairobserver.com/article/sectarianism-iraq> Observer, 19 March 2012, <

Al-Tamimi, Iraq faces a new cycle of violence after relative lull, GulfNews, 23 July 2012. Burns J.F., Iraqi shiite win, but Margin is less than projection, The New York Times, 14 February 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/14/international/middleeast/14iraq.html> Cave, D., In Baghdad, sectarian lines too deadly to cross, The New York Times, 4 March 2007. < http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/world/middleeast/04baghdad.html?pagewanted=all> Makiya, K. Present at the Disintegration, The New York Times, 11 December 2005. Mukhlis, H., Voting yes to Chaos, The New York Times, 18 October 2005. Najm, H. , February 25th is just the beginning, Niqash, 24 February 2011. < http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2787> Salloum,S. After the Arab Spring: Does Iraq's present day contain seeds of the Middle East's Future?, Niqash, 25 November 2011. <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2928 Ramzi, K., Iraq in 2011: protests, political problems and farewell to the US, Niqash, 29 December 2011. < http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2963> Tavernise, S. Sectarian hatred pulls apart Iraqs mixed towns, The New Yorker, 20 November 2005.

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Tripp, C. What lurks in the shadows, Times Higher Education, 18 October 2002. Zubaida, S. Democracy, Iraq and the Middle East, Open Democracy, 18 November 2005, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-opening/iraq_3042.jsp> Youth movement calls for demonstration tomorrow, Aswat al-Iraq, 24 February 2012. Whats in a name? Iraqis at risk for having dangerous first names, Niqash, 23 May 2012. < http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3056>

Websites http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulation Iraqi Constitution. http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf Films Iraq in fragments, documentary, James Langley, 2006 2007 Drakes Avenue Pictures Limited Lectures Pieri, C., Between Art and Alienation, the Painted T-Walls in Segmented 2012 Baghdad, SOAS, London Middle East Institute, 28 February 2012. Haddad, F., Sunni identity and sectarian relations in post-civil war Iraq, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, LSE, 25 April 2012.