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Collusion
Oligopoly
A. Few Sellers / Recognized
Interdependence
B. Cournot Model
Firms choose quantity Assume that other firm does change output Example compared to PC and Monopoly
maximize joint profits but so is the incentive to cheat. If any member can secretly violate the agreement, he will gain larger profits than by conforming to it. Therefore enforcement, i.e. detecting significant deviations from the agreedupon prices, is paramount
Stigler example
Suppose 3 identical firms with zero costs ,
facing a market demand curve of Q=180-5P. The monopoly price and quantity is $18 and 90 and the three firms agree to each supply 30. The $1620 industry profits are split $540 to each.
Oligopoly
Oligopoly
d is the demand curve when everyone knows (everyone makes 533.33), d' is when there are secret cuts(if offered to all his customers then $640, if only to "new" customers - $700), d'' is secret cut that steals away other firms customers without the other firm reacting - $800). Conclusion - there is a great temptation to secretly cut prices. Key is detection and response.
Butch and Sundance are arrested and put in separate cells unable to communicate. If one confesses while the other does not, the one who confesses is granted immunity and goes free and the other goes to jail for 20 years. If both confess they both go to jail for 5 years. If both are silent, both go to jail for only one year, for a lesser crime (concealed weapons). The payoff matrix looks like this:
Oligopoly
Whatever Butch does, Sundance is better off confessing. Whatever Sundance does, Butch is better off confessing. Both they are both better off if they both remain silent. How can this be?
Oligopoly
Duopolist's Dilemma
Firm A
Firm B
Dominant Strategy is to cut price but both firms are better off by fixing prices.
It reduces uncertainty in profit rate , demand uncertainty in the face of production indivisibilities Example
Indivisibilities in production. Other problems - large fixed and some avoidable costs with uncertain demand.
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade illegal. Price-fixing and related practices were judged illegal per se i.e. in and of themselves. There is to asking of whether there were extenuating circumstances no test of reasonableness
Cases
Addyston Pipe and Steel Trenton Potteries Socony-Vacuum Interstate Circuit American Tobacco