GDI 07-Exec Order and Delegation CP

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007
1 Executive Order and Non-delegation CPs
Executive Order and Non-delegation Index

Executive Order and Non-delegation Index ..................................................................................................................1 Executive Order Shell....................................................................................................................................................6 Executive Order Shell....................................................................................................................................................7 XO Budget NB Shell .....................................................................................................................................................8 XO Budget NB Shell .....................................................................................................................................................9 A2: Perm Do Both .......................................................................................................................................................10 A2: Perm Do Both .......................................................................................................................................................11 A2: Perm Do Both .......................................................................................................................................................12 A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings...................................................................................................................13 A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings...................................................................................................................14 A2: Court Rollback......................................................................................................................................................15 A2: Court Rollback......................................................................................................................................................16 A2: Congressional Rollback ........................................................................................................................................17 A2: Congressional Rollback ........................................................................................................................................18 A2: Congressional Rollback ........................................................................................................................................19 No Roll Back- Agencies ..............................................................................................................................................20 A2: Delay.....................................................................................................................................................................21 A2: President Does Not Have Authority .....................................................................................................................22 Aff Does Not Solve: Congress Bad for Diplomacy.....................................................................................................23 Solvency: Economic ....................................................................................................................................................24 Solvency: Diplomacy ..................................................................................................................................................25 Solvency: Diplomacy ..................................................................................................................................................26 Solvency: Foreign Policy.............................................................................................................................................27 Solvency: Recognition.................................................................................................................................................28 Solvency: International Law........................................................................................................................................29 Solvency: International Negotiations...........................................................................................................................30 Solvency: Military .......................................................................................................................................................31 Solvency: Human Rights .............................................................................................................................................32 Solvency: Human Rights .............................................................................................................................................33 Solvency: Sanctions.....................................................................................................................................................34 Solvency: Generic........................................................................................................................................................35 Solvency: Generic........................................................................................................................................................36 Solvency: Generic........................................................................................................................................................37 Solvency: Generic........................................................................................................................................................38 Solvency: XO = Law ...................................................................................................................................................39 Solvency: Executive Branch Actions/Agencies...........................................................................................................40 Solvency: Executive Branch Actions/Agencies...........................................................................................................41 Solvency: Intelligence Organizations ..........................................................................................................................42 Solvency: Social Change .............................................................................................................................................43 Solvency: Social Change .............................................................................................................................................44 Solvency: Social Change .............................................................................................................................................45 Solvency: President Solves Better than Congress .......................................................................................................46 Solvency: Spur Congressional Action .........................................................................................................................47 Solvency: Executive Orders Perceived........................................................................................................................48 Solvency: Gag Rule .....................................................................................................................................................49 Solvency: Family Planning..........................................................................................................................................50 Solvency: AIDS Funding.............................................................................................................................................51 Solvency- Emergency Response..................................................................................................................................52 Solvency- Blood Diamonds.........................................................................................................................................53 Solvency: USAID ........................................................................................................................................................54 Solvency XO Can Give Foreign Aid ........................................................................................................................55 Solvency XO Can Give Foreign Aid ........................................................................................................................56 Presidential Power Links: Congressional Control of Agencies ...................................................................................57 Presidential Power Links: Congressional Control of Agencies ...................................................................................58 Presidential Powers Links: Unitary Executive ............................................................................................................59
Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power ...................................................................................60 Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power ...................................................................................61 Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power ...................................................................................62 Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power ...................................................................................63 Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power ...................................................................................64 Presidential Powers Links: XO Increases Pres Power .................................................................................................65 Presidential Powers Links: XO Increases Pres Power .................................................................................................66 Presidential Powers Links: XO Increases Pres Power .................................................................................................67 Presidential Powers Links: XO Increases Pres Power .................................................................................................68 Presidential Powers Links: Courts...............................................................................................................................69 Presidential Powers Links: Courts...............................................................................................................................70 Presidential Powers Links: Courts...............................................................................................................................71 Presidential Powers: Uniqueness.................................................................................................................................72 Presidential Powers: Uniqueness.................................................................................................................................73 Presidential Powers: Uniqueness.................................................................................................................................74 Presidential Powers Impacts ........................................................................................................................................75 Presidential Powers Impacts ........................................................................................................................................76 Presidential Powers Impact: Budget Train wreck........................................................................................................77 Presidential Powers: Key to War on Terror.................................................................................................................78 Presidential Powers: War Scenarios ............................................................................................................................79 Presidential Powers: War Scenarios ............................................................................................................................80 Presidential Powers: Key to Leadership/Foreign Policy..............................................................................................81 Presidential Powers: Key to Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................82 Presidential Powers: Key to Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................83 Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Now......................................................................................................................84 Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Brinks...................................................................................................................85 Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Key to Avoid Pork Barreling ...............................................................................86 Presidential Powers Impacts: Unitary Exec Key to Liberty/Democracy .....................................................................87 Presidential Powers Impacts: Unitary Exec Key to Liberty/Democracy .....................................................................88 Presidential Powers: Impacts A2: Congress Can solve ..............................................................................................89 Presidential Powers: A2: Pres Decreasing Importance................................................................................................90 Budget NB: Uniqueness ..............................................................................................................................................91 Budget NB: A2: Fiat takes out the link........................................................................................................................92 Budget NB: Links- Congress=Pork barreling..............................................................................................................93 Budget NB: Links- Congress=Pork barreling..............................................................................................................94 Budget NB: Links- Congressional Action= Amendments...........................................................................................95 Budget NB: Internal Links- Fiscal Discipline Key to Deficit Reduction ....................................................................96 Budget NB: CP Solves Pork Barreling ........................................................................................................................97 Budget NB: Impacts- Hurts Dollar ..............................................................................................................................98 Budget NB: Impacts: Deficits Lead to IR Hikes .........................................................................................................99 Budget NB: Impacts- Decreased Deficits key to econ stability.................................................................................100 Budget NB: Impacts: A2: Deficits Good for the economy ........................................................................................101 Budget NB: Impacts: A2: Deficits Good for the economy ........................................................................................102 Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism ..........................................................................................................103 Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism ..........................................................................................................104 Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism ..........................................................................................................105 Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism ..........................................................................................................106 Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism ..........................................................................................................107 Politics Links Help the President...............................................................................................................................108 Politics Links Help the President...............................................................................................................................109 Politics Links: Avoids the Link .................................................................................................................................110 Politics Links: Public Does not Perceive...................................................................................................................111 Politics Links: Public Perceives.................................................................................................................................112 Politics Links: Agenda Crowd Out............................................................................................................................113 Politics Links: Congressional Election Link..............................................................................................................114 XOs Are Constitutional............................................................................................................................................115 XO solves better than Agencies.................................................................................................................................116 XOs happen all of the time ........................................................................................................................................117
****Non-Delegation Counterplan****.....................................................................................................................118 Non-Delegation C/P Shell .........................................................................................................................................119 Non-Delegation C/P Shell .........................................................................................................................................120 A2: Perm Do Both .....................................................................................................................................................121 Deficits Net Benefit ...................................................................................................................................................122 Deficits Net Benefit ...................................................................................................................................................123 Apathy Net Benefit....................................................................................................................................................124 Trade Policy Links.....................................................................................................................................................125 Congress Key to Liberty/Democracy ........................................................................................................................126 Agency Rule Making Hurts Democracy/Liberty.......................................................................................................127 Agency Rule Making Hurts Democracy/Liberty.......................................................................................................128 Agency Rule Making Hurts Democracy/Liberty.......................................................................................................129 Agency Rule Making Hurts Democracy/Liberty.......................................................................................................130 Politics: Delegation Avoids Politics Links ................................................................................................................131 Politics: Delegation Avoids Politics Links ................................................................................................................132 Politics: Boosts Pres Image .......................................................................................................................................133 Politics: Pres Blamed For Agency Action .................................................................................................................134 Each Act Key.............................................................................................................................................................135 Agency Rule Making Slow........................................................................................................................................136 Delegation Hurts SOP ...............................................................................................................................................137 A2: Non-delegtion hurts policy making ....................................................................................................................138 Courts Will Not Strike Down ....................................................................................................................................139 Agency Rulemaking Links to Politics .......................................................................................................................140 Delegation Solves Agency Capture ...........................................................................................................................141 Agencies Will Always Abuse Power.........................................................................................................................142 Courts Will Strike Down The AFF............................................................................................................................143 A2: No delegation=gridlock ......................................................................................................................................144 A2: Hurts Pres Powers...............................................................................................................................................145 ******Aff Ans Executive Order****** ...................................................................................................................146 Pres Power Low Now ................................................................................................................................................147 Pres Power Low Now ................................................................................................................................................148 Pres Power Low Now ................................................................................................................................................149 Pres Power Low Now ................................................................................................................................................150 Limiting Pres Powers Good.......................................................................................................................................151 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................152 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................153 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................154 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................155 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................156 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................157 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................158 Pres Powers Bad ........................................................................................................................................................159 Pres Powers Bad: Will Abuse Power.........................................................................................................................160 XO Ans: Hurts Accountability ..................................................................................................................................161 XO Ans: Hurts Accountability ..................................................................................................................................162 Pres Powers Bad: A2 Congress Checks.....................................................................................................................163 Pres Powers Bad: Strong Congress Good..................................................................................................................164 Pres Powers Bad: Strong Congress Good..................................................................................................................165 Pres Powers A2: Terrorism Add On ..........................................................................................................................166 Pres Powers: A2 Leadership......................................................................................................................................167 XO Ans: Delay Extensions........................................................................................................................................168 XO Ans: Impact T/O to Pres Powers.........................................................................................................................169 XO Ans: XO hurts Pres Power ..................................................................................................................................170 XO Ans: Strong President Bad ..................................................................................................................................171 XO Ans: Cannot End Around Congress ....................................................................................................................172 XO Ans: Hurts Due Process/Accountability..............................................................................................................173 XO Ans: Court Strike Down......................................................................................................................................174 XO Ans: Oppresses Minorities..................................................................................................................................175
XO Ans: Generic Solvency .......................................................................................................................................176 XO Ans: Solvency: No Social Change ......................................................................................................................177 XO Ans: Solvency: Infighting ...................................................................................................................................178 XO Ans: Delay ..........................................................................................................................................................179 XO Ans: Rollback .....................................................................................................................................................180 XO Ans: Rollback .....................................................................................................................................................181 XO Ans: Rollback .....................................................................................................................................................182 XO Ans: Rollback .....................................................................................................................................................183 XO Ans: Backlog.......................................................................................................................................................184 XO Ans: Power of the Purse......................................................................................................................................185 XO Ans: Power of the Purse......................................................................................................................................186 XO Ans: Congress Solves .........................................................................................................................................187 XO Ans: SOP Links ..................................................................................................................................................188 XO Ans: SOP Links ..................................................................................................................................................189 XO Ans: SOP Links ..................................................................................................................................................190 *****Aff Ans- Non-Delegation***** ......................................................................................................................191 Non-Delegation Ans: Congress Bad for USAID .......................................................................................................192 Non-Delegation Ans: No Strike Down......................................................................................................................193 Non-Delegation Ans: NO risk of Agency Abuse of power .......................................................................................194 Non-Delegation Ans: NO risk of Agency Abuse of power .......................................................................................195 Non-Delegation Ans: NO risk of Agency Abuse of power .......................................................................................196 Non-Delegation Ans: Agency Rule Making Good ....................................................................................................197 Non-Delegation Ans: Agency Rule Making Good ....................................................................................................198 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................199 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................200 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................201 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................202 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................203 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................204 Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy.......................................................................................................................205 Non-delegation: Pres Power Links ............................................................................................................................206 Nondelegation Ans- A2: Apathy ...............................................................................................................................207 A2: Budget NBs ........................................................................................................................................................208 *****Separation of Powers***** .............................................................................................................................209 SOP: Weak Executive Links .....................................................................................................................................210 SOP: Links: Weak Executive ....................................................................................................................................210 SOP: Congressional Action Links .............................................................................................................................211 SOP Impacts: War .....................................................................................................................................................212 SOP Impacts: Liberty ................................................................................................................................................213 SOP Impacts: Liberty ................................................................................................................................................214 SOP Impacts: Liberty ................................................................................................................................................215 SOP: Not Zero Sum...................................................................................................................................................216 SOP: No Presidential Tyranny...................................................................................................................................217 SOP: No Presidential Tyranny...................................................................................................................................218 SOP: No Presidential Tyranny...................................................................................................................................219 SOP: Uniqueness Answer..........................................................................................................................................220 Democracy Good: Poverty ........................................................................................................................................221 Democracy Good: Solves War ..................................................................................................................................222 Democracy Good Development..............................................................................................................................223 Democracy Solves Terrorism ....................................................................................................................................224 Democracy Bad: Not Solve Terrorism ......................................................................................................................226 Democracy Bad: Leads to War..................................................................................................................................227 *******Normal Means******* ...............................................................................................................................228 Management of Foreign Aid......................................................................................................................................229 Congress Provides USAID/Foreign Aid Funds .........................................................................................................230 Congress funds and USAID manages the bulk of US foreign aid programs .............................................................230 Congress directly appropriates most foreign aid money............................................................................................230 Congress Provides USAID/Foreign Aid Funds .........................................................................................................231
Congress appropriates foreign aid .............................................................................................................................231 Congress Appropriates Money to MDBs...................................................................................................................232 USAID = Normal Means for Assistance ...................................................................................................................233 Congress = Normal Means for Malaria .....................................................................................................................234 Congress = Normal Means for AIDS ........................................................................................................................235 Congress = Normal Means for Water Sanitation.......................................................................................................236 Congress = Normal Means for Landmines ................................................................................................................237 Congress = Normal Means for Peace Corps..............................................................................................................238 Congress = Normal Means for Tuberculosis .............................................................................................................239 Congress = Normal Means for Blood Diamonds.......................................................................................................240 Congress = Normal Means for Debt Forgiveness......................................................................................................241 Congress = Normal Means for Desalination..............................................................................................................242 Congress = Normal Means for Sudan/Disaster Relief/Famine Prevention................................................................243 Congress = Normal Means for Endangered Species..................................................................................................244 Congress = Normal Means for Forestry ....................................................................................................................245 Congress = Normal Means for Child Soldier Laws...................................................................................................246
Executive Order Shell

Text: The president of the United States will issue an executive order [insert appropriate plan text]. It competes- counterplan solves all the case and avoids the disads to congressional action. The Net Benefit: Presidential Powers Congressional intervention in foreign policy hurts presidential control of foreign policy Powell, Professor of Law, 99
(George Washington Law Review March, 1999 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 ESSAY: The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective NAME: H. Jefferson Powell *Professor, Duke Law School, l/n)
Jefferson's subsequent discussion of the Senate's role in diplomacy made it clear that he did not believe that the Senate, any more than Congress as a whole, had a general duty or power to designate or direct the goals the President was to pursue in the "transaction of business with foreign nations." Jefferson's reasoning and conclusions were repeatedly echoed by other executive branch officials during the founding era, as well as by distinguished constitutionalists outside the executive branch. 87 In 1816, the Senate Foreign [*547] Relations Committee summarized this line of thinking in a report recommending that the Senate refrain from adopting resolutions urging the President to pursue negotiations with the United Kingdom on various matters. The committee reasoned that "the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations," even in so limited a form as a set of precatory resolutions, was "calculated to diminish [the President's] responsibility" for foreign affairs, and "thereby to impair the best security for the national safety." 88
Executive Order Shell

Powerful presidency is key to solving poverty, disease, ethnic conflict, and maintaining US leadership Deans, political correspondent, 00
(The Atlanta Journal and Constitution January 23, 2000, Sunday, Home Edition SECTION: Perspective; Pg. 2B HEADLINE: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: White House power growing BYLINE: Bob Deans, Cox Washington Bureau, l/n)
As President Clinton prepares to deliver the State of the Union address Thursday, officially slipping into the twilight of his time in office, many believe the presidency itself might be on the wane. The White House, some say, perhaps even government itself, is losing its steam as an engine of influence, hopelessly outpaced by the thundering convergence of technology, borderless information flows and the rise of the global marketplace. Yet the U.S. presidency, long regarded as the most powerful institution in the world, arguably has assumed more authority and reach than at any time in its history. While no one can doubt the growing impact of the Internet, Silicon Valley and Wall Street on the daily lives of all Americans, only the president can rally truly global resources around American ideals to further the quest for equality and to combat the timeless ills of poverty and war. It is that unique ability to build and harness a worldwide consensus that is widening the circle of presidential power. ''The presidency will remain as important as it is or will become more important,'' predicted presidential scholar Michael Nelson, professor of political science at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tenn. The voice of all Americans The taproot of presidential power is the Constitution, which designates the chief executive, the only official elected in a national vote, as the sole representative of all the American people. That conferred authority reflects the state of the nation, and it would be hard to argue that any country in history has possessed the military, economic and political preeminence that this country now holds. And yet, the nation's greatest strength as a global power lies in its ability to build an international consensus around values and interests important to most Americans. On Clinton's watch, that ability has been almost constantly on display as he has patched together multinational responses to war in the Balkans, despotism in Haiti, economic crises in Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and South Korea, and natural disasters in Turkey and Venezuela. The institutions for putting together coalition-type action --- the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization among them --- are hardly tools of American policy. But the United States commands a dominant, in some cases decisive, position in each of those institutions. And it is the president, far more than Congress, who determines how the United States wants those institutions to be structured and to perform. ''Congress is a clunky institution of 535 people that can't negotiate as a unit with global corporations or entities,'' said Alan Ehrenhalt, editor of Governing magazine. ''It's the president who is capable of making deals with global institutions.'' It is the president, indeed, who appoints envoys to those institutions, negotiates the treaties that bind them and delivers the public and private counsel that helps guide them, leaving the indelible imprint of American priorities on every major initiative they undertake. ''That means, for example, that we can advance our interests in resolving ethnic conflicts, in helping address the problems of AIDS in Africa, of contributing to the world's economic development, of promoting human rights, '' said Emory University's Robert Pastor, editor of a new book, ''A Century's Journey,'' that elaborates on the theme.
XO Budget NB Shell
Deficit shrinking now- opening the federal spending floodgate derails deficit reductions Bergman, Coordinator for Concord Coalition, 05
(Des Moines Register August 12, 2005 Friday SECTION: MAIN NEWS; Pg. 13A HEADLINE: Hold the applause for shrinking federal deficit;Iowa View BODY:Jeffrey Bergman, Iowa coordinator for the Concord Coalition, a citizens' group advocating fiscal responsibility in the federal government, l/n)
Yes, you heard correctly, the federal deficit is shrinking -but don't break out that bottle of bubbly just yet. The White House has released new projections showing a decline in the government's red ink, from $412 billion last year to $333 billion this year, fueled by higher tax revenues. Following the news, administration officials and members of Congress began patting themselves on the back for their "fiscal restraint." President Bush is said to be confident that his plan to cut the deficit in half before leaving office is on track. Yet if lawmakers get the idea that our fiscal problems are behind us, and view these numbers as a green light for new tax cuts or spending initiatives, they may yet make what is still a bad situation even worse.
Each bit of congressional spending snowballs [gender edited] Calabresi, professor of law, 95
(Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 ARTICLE: Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive NAME: Steven G. Calabresi ** Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, l/n)
The ability to add extraneous appropriations riders onto vital omnibus bills greatly enhances this effect. To the extent that it raises the "cost" to the President of vetoing a bill, it reduces the likelihood that the President's national, anti-factional voice will be heard. No president will be willing frequently to spend political capital threatening to shut the government down over extraneous appropriations riders. The end result is that more and more of these riders will go through, thereby exacerbating the unfortunate redistributive effects of the electoral system. As the size of government continues to grow, and as the amount of governmental wealth redistribution continues to grow, we can expect the redistributive congressional collective action problem to get progressively worse. The higher the percentage of the nation's wealth and gross national product that gets funnelled through Congress, the harder the scramble on the part of each district and state to make sure it is getting back its fair share. This in turn adds to the incentive to keep enlarging the government pie in the hopes that each member of Congress will have more to brag about in his [or her] next election when he must prove to his constituents his skills at pie-share reclamation.
XO Budget NB Shell
Sustained budget deficits hurt long term growth Orszag and Rubin 04
("Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run U.S. Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray Paper presented at the AEANAEFA Joint Session, Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meetings, The Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum, "National Economic and Financial Policies for Growth and Stability", January 5, 2004 Peter R. Orszag, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Robert E. Rubin, Office of the Chairman, Citigroup Allen Sinai, Chief Global Economist, Decision Economics, Inc." http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/orszag/20040105.htm)
Conventional analyses of sustained budget deficits demonstrate the negative effects of deficits on long-term economic growth. Under the conventional view, ongoing budget deficits decrease national saving, which reduces domestic investment and increases borrowing from abroad.1 Interest rates play a key role in how the economy adjusts. The reduction in national saving raises domestic interest rates, which dampens investment and attracts capital from abroad.2 The external borrowing that helps to finance the budget deficit is reflected in a larger current account deficit, creating a linkage between the budget deficit and the current account deficit. The reduction in domestic investment (which lowers productivity growth) and the increase in the current account deficit (which requires that more of the returns from the domestic capital stock accrue to foreigners) both reduce future national income, with the loss in income steadily growing over time. Under the conventional view, the costs imposed by sustained deficits tend to build gradually over time, rather than occurring suddenly.
Economic decline leads to nuclear war

Mead 1992 (Sir Walter Russell, New Perspectives Quarterly, p. 30 Summer) If so, this new failure the failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions billions of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles and drawn closer to the West because they believe our system can work for them. But what if it cant? What if the global economy stagnates or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.
A2: Perm Do Both

Links to the pres powers argument- The president must act alone to increase presidential power Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 223) The tangled history of the executive power points to the conclusion that executive orders matter. Presidents, particularly in the twentieth century (although there are crucial examples from earlier history), have pushed the boundaries of presidential power by taking advantage of gaps in constitutional and statutory language that allow them to fill power vacuums and gain control of emerging capabilities. Because of the inherent ambiguities of the constitutional vestments of executive authority, presidents have expanded their powers outward as a function of precedent, public expectations, and deference from the legislative and judicial branches. Executive orders have played a central role in this expansion.
Congress will use riders to limit presidential power Devins 00

(Saint Louis University Public Law Review 2000 19 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 65 SYMPOSIUM CONGRESS: DOES IT ABDICATE ITS POWER?: ABDICATION BY ANOTHER NAME: AN ODE TO LOU FISHER NAME: NEAL DEVINS* * Goodrich Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, l/n)
Another example of reactive congressional oversight is appropriations riders. By forbidding the expenditure of appropriations on activities that Congress disapproves of, appropriation riders allow Congress to derail presidential initiatives (without enacting freestanding legislation setting forth congressional policy). 22
A2: Perm Do Both

The perms hampers executive control over foreign policy Scowcroft and Kanter 93
(Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser under Presidents Bush and Ford. Arnold Kanter was undersecretary of state for political affairs in the Bush administration. They are associated with the Forum for International Policy.The Washington Post October 20, 1993, Wednesday, Final Edition SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A29 HEADLINE: Foreign Policy Straitjacket, l/n)
Maneuvering in the complex environment of a Somalia -- or of a Haiti, Bosnia or the other crises that loom on and just over the horizon -- requires the agility of a ballet dancer, not the Mack truck of legislation. In a world that increasingly places a premium on a rapidly adaptable foreign policy, codifying highly detailed requirements in a public law is a recipe for ineffectiveness. It undermines the president's ability to threaten, cajole and pressure our adversaries by publicizing the costs we will and won't pay and by broadcasting the conditions and constraints under which our forces will operate. At the same time, it leaves our friends and allies, whose cooperation we seek, to wonder whether Congress will permit the president to follow through on his promises and commitments. Finally, it stays on the books, continuing to tie the president's hands as circumstances change and Congress's attention shifts to other priorities. Now more than ever, trying to legislate foreign policy is simply a bad idea.
The perm risks rollback riders Higgs 88

(The Independent Institute Research Article Hard Coals Make Bad Law: Congressional Parochialism Versus National Defense March 1, 1988 Robert Higgs http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=110Robert Higgs is Senior Fellow in Political Economy for The Independent Institute and Editor of the Institutes quarterly journal, The Independent Review. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University)
Another important legislative strategy for facilitating the members diverse objectives is improvising a package deal. By attaching riders (that is, substantively unrelated provisions) to a comprehensive bill, such as the appropriation bill for an entire federal department, legislators are able to execute a hidden ball play. The broader the scope of the measure, the more chance there is of its carrying along to enactment provisions that would otherwise stand no chance of being enacted into law. Within omnibus billsrecent examples include appropriations measures covering funding for several departments, bills that may run to hundreds of pages and allocate hundreds of billions of dollarsriders occupying a few lines easily gain enactment with little effort by their sponsors. Nor do the sponsors of such riders need to worry about a presidential veto.17 An especially innocent-looking variant is the limitation rider, which restricts the use to which an agency may put appropriated funds. As political scientists Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek note, however, such riders actually make policy under the guise of restricting expenditures.18 Recent defense appropriations acts, for example, contain dozens, sometimes scores, of limitation riders. Behind each of them, there is a story; usually it is a story of particularistic benefits conveyed to a special interest group by an individual member or a small group of members of Congress.
A2: Perm Do Both

The perm causes the court to revisit the Youngstown decision and referee a separation of power dispute in favor of congress Bellia, professor of law, 02
(Constitutional Commentary Spring, 2002 19 Const. Commentary 87 SYMPOSIUM: EXECUTIVE POWER IN YOUNGSTOWN'S SHADOWS NAME: Patricia L. Bellia * * Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, l/n)
But courts and scholars put Youngstown to more work than this. The case has special significance for disputes involving the relative powers of Congress and the President in foreign affairs matters - where the Constitution says little, controversies are frequent, judicial resolutions are few, and the stakes are high. 16 [*91] Although not itself a paradigmatic foreign affairs case, Youngstown is thought to bear on separation of powers questions touching on foreign affairs in a number of ways. First, for those who would argue that the President lacks any independent, "implied" powers to formulate and carry out foreign policy, the Court's opinion in Youngstown stands as the high water mark. 17 Second, Justice Jackson's concurrence offers something of a blueprint for resolving disputes between the President and
Congress, bringing together, as the Court put it in 1981, "as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area." 18 Scholars who argue that the Constitution lodges most foreign affairs powers in Congress find in Justice Jackson's concurrence a recognition of congressional primacy - that presidential powers fluctuate, "depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." 19 I will argue that the lessons that the case - and in particular, Justice Jackson's concurrence - offers in the foreign affairs area are less clear and less helpful than is often believed. It is a mistake to assume that Youngstown carries a doctrinal weight equal to its rhetorical or symbolic power. First, to the extent that the Youngstown decision is thought to foreclose claims of implied presidential power in foreign affairs, the better reading of the case suggests otherwise. Second, Justice Jackson's tripartite framework for evaluating executive action is not a framework at all, nor did he necessarily intend it to be. 20 More important, Justice Jackson's opinion sends mixed signals about who is best able to police executive conduct Congress or the courts. Justice Jackson clearly envisioned a role [*92] for the courts in policing the boundaries between different categories of executive action, to determine which actions Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized or forbidden. Many scholars take this to mean that courts should narrowly construe statutes conferring foreign affairs authority on the Executive Branch; to do otherwise is to entrench a shift in power from Congress to the President. 21 Justice Jackson seemed to envision a smaller role for courts, however, when
Congress is silent. In that situation, he suggested, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 22 Even some scholars who believe that Congress has primary foreign affairs power acknowledge a diminished role for courts in this category of cases; they assume that the President possesses some "initiating" 23 or "concurrent" 24 powers and can exercise those powers until Congress acts. 25 As a result, Congress bears the primary responsibility for policing the Executive Branch. Those who believe that the President has more substantial foreign affairs authorities, of course, are likely to share this view that a court's [*93] role in reviewing executive action in the face of congressional silence is limited. 26 The guidance scholars draw from Justice Jackson's concurrence, I will argue, is precisely backwards. Courts faced with the question whether a statute authorizes challenged executive conduct should do no more than apply ordinary delegation principles, leaving Congress to legislate against the backdrop of those principles. To require courts to construe foreign affairs delegations narrowly solely to preserve supposed congressional foreign affairs prerogatives is to force courts to make policy judgments better left to Congress. When the question is how to evaluate presidential conduct not traceable under ordinary delegation principles to a statutory authorization, however, the calculus is different. Any such conduct must rest on the President's constitutional powers - whether Congress is silent or opposed. In other words, the notion that presidential powers "fluctuate" 27 is misleading. The Constitution either grants the President a particular power or it does not. Congressional silence cannot create power where none exists; at most, silence might indicate something about what Congress believes the President's constitutional authority to be.
A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings

President can easily circumvent Congress purse strings Pika et al 02
(Joseph A Pika, John Anthony Maltese, and Norman Thomas, all professors of political science, The Politics of the Presidency, 5th edition, p. 233)
In addition to budgeting, presidents have certain discretionary spending powers that increase their leverage over the bureaucracy. They have substantial nonstatutory authority, based on understandings with congressional appropriations committees, to transfer funds within an appropriation and from one program to another. The committees expect to be kept informed of such "reprogramming" actions.81 Fund transfer authority is essential to sound financial management, but it can be abused to circumvent congressional decisions. In 1970, for example, Nixon transferred funds to support an extensive unauthorized covert military operation in Cambodia. Nevertheless, Congress has given presidents and certain agencies the authority to spend substantial amounts of money on a confidential basis, the largest and most controversial of which are for intelligence activities.
President can spend without prior appropriations Raven-Hansen and Black 95 Iowa Law Review October, 1995 81 Iowa L. Rev. 79 ARTICLE: From
Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power * NAME: Peter Raven-Hansen **, William C. Banks *** BIO: ** Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.*** Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. l/n In contrast to reprogramming, the shifting of funds between programs within an appropriation, transfer is the shifting of funds between appropriations. From the very start of the republic, the Commander in Chief has spent funds without appropriations or in advance of them, 208 commingled or transferred funds for purposes other than those for which they were appropriated, 209 and spent all available funds early in the fiscal year, thereby justifying seeking a deficiency appropriation in order to continue to operate. 210 The transfer custom originates with the defeat of Gallatin's proposal for line-itemization in the debates with Hamilton and Wolcott around the turn of the eighteenth century. 211 The transfer custom was partly codified in an 1809 statute authorizing the President, "on the application of the secretary of the proper department . . . to direct . . . that a portion of the monies appropriated for a particular branch . . . in that department, be applied to another branch of expenditure in the same department." 212
A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings

President can transfer money to AID Raven-Hansen and Black 95 Iowa Law Review October, 1995 81 Iowa L. Rev. 79 ARTICLE: From
Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power * NAME: Peter Raven-Hansen **, William C. Banks *** BIO: ** Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.*** Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. l/n Transfer between appropriations without statutory authority is now prohibited. 222 But defense and foreign assistance agencies typically are given transfer authority, with a percentage limit on the amount of an account which may be transferred or increased. 223 DOD transfer authority appears in its annual appropriation act, which currently permits the Pentagon to transfer up to $ 1.5 billion when the Secretary of Defense determines it to be "necessary in the national interest." 224 Notwithstanding the current general statutory prohibition 225 and the various specific defense and foreign assistance controls, transfer authority abuses are fairly common. From 1962 to 1969, the United States supported a mostly secret war in Laos, funded largely by transfers from the Agency for International Development (AID) to a secret account for use by the CIA. 226 For the publicly announced intervention in Cambodia in 1970, President Nixon obligated more than $ 100 million by relying on Foreign [*112] Assistance Act transfer authority to siphon foreign aid funds budgeted for programs in Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. He then appealed to Congress for an appropriation, in part to restore the transferred funds. 227 After the 1973 cease-fire agreement and the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam seemingly eliminated the need for further military action, the President continued bombing Cambodia, this time financed in part by DOD transfer authority. At the time, transfer authority was subject to prior committee approval procedures, arrangements which were abused by tardy Pentagon reporting. 228 Eventually, after President Nixon requested a $ 500 million increase in transfer authority for the DOD in March of 1973, the Senate passed the Eagleton Amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill (which had already decreased the transfer authority request) denying the use of any funds to support United States combat activities in Cambodia or Laos. 229 After House passage and a Nixon veto, which Congress failed to override, a new compromise bill was passed which permitted forty-five more bombing days before a new Eagleton-like prohibition would take effect. 230 Ironically, the new bill did not repeat the original request for new transfer authority, causing some to conclude that the prior request had only been a guise for obtaining more bombing funds. 231 In 1974, Congress finally prohibited DOD transfers "where the item for which funds were requested had been denied by Congress." 232 Nonetheless, in 1975, after Congress had demonstrated its reluctance to provide further aid to South Vietnam, President Gerald Ford transferred to the Thieu regime $ 77 million designated for ammunition for the American-supported Laotian mercenary army. Because the Laotian war ended after the Paris accords in 1973, the Administration claimed that no law was violated by the transfer. 233 The Reagan Administration, after the fiscal 1984 Boland Amendment limited aid to the Contras to $ 24 million, also relied upon DOD transfer authority, but arguably violated the transfer restrictions when it charged the expense of mining Nicaraguan harbors to other accounts. 234 In short, significant national security spending has traditionally been permitted as an exception to the general rule against transfers between appropriations. Before 1974, the generous transfer loophole arguably [*113] permitted the Commander in Chief to spend for an activity that Congress would have been unwilling to support. Although the 1974 prohibition theoretically imposes some measure of control, on occasion intra-agency transfers have continued to circumvent appropriation restrictions.
A2: Court Rollback

courts will defer to the president Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 11) Nevertheless, in most circumstances presidents retain a broad capacity to take significant action on their own, action that is meaningful both in substantive policy terms and in the sense of protecting and furthering the president's political and strategic interests. Some of this authority, particularly in regulatory affairs, has been delegated to the president by Congress," but presidents have also simply assumed many policy-making powers, especially in national security and foreign policy matters .14 Although the courts do step in to block presidential action on constitutional grounds (with Youngstown the most notable case), the general pattern has been more one of judicial deference to executive action than of assertiveness."
A2: Court Rollback

Courts will uphold executive orders Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
(Phillip, University of Vermont, receiver of Charles A Levin Award from the American Society for Public Administration, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, p. 70)
There are often a variety of statutes that can be cited as authority for executive action in addition to the claim of a president to act under the authority granted by "the Constitution and laws" as the frequently used assertion of power. If an action is challenged, the tendency of the courts to look toward congressional acquiescence means that the odds are in the president's favor, unless there is significant legislative opposition on the record. That is particularly true when foreign policy-based orders are issued, even if their impact is domestic, as in the case of the Iran Hostage agreement orders. Even to make it to the point of a substantive legal evaluation of an order, the challengers often have a difficult time establishing standing to sue and a basis for judicial review of an order. That is even more true now that the Supreme Court has dramatically limited, or perhaps more accurately, all but eliminated legislative standing for members of Congress.
Courts defer to the president Mayer, professor of political science, 02

(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 56) The relative institutional capabilities of the presidency and Congress to adapt and respond have also played a role, as have long-standing judicial doctrines that give the president important advantages. In the past few decades the judiciary has through various decisions created a presumption that favors presidential initiative. Unless a presidential act contravenes a clear and explicit statutory or constitutional prohibition that directly addresses the action, the courts are likely to side with the president. In a series of decisions in the 1980s that expanded the scope of executive power, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to validate executive action in the absence of an explicit congressional prohibition (which must take legislative form), to find implicit congressional consent in legislation that provides authority to the president in tangential policy areas, and to uphold executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes unless Congress has spoken precisely to the issue in point. These patterns hold true in domestic as well as in foreign policy, but take on additional weight in foreign affairs when combined with the traditional deference to presidential action in that arena.
In the past 200 years, the courts have only rolled back two executive orders Olson and Woll 1999 (William J, Attorney specializing in constitutional and civil litigation; Alan, Attorney in Belvin, Arkansas; Executive Orders and National Emergencies How Presidents Have Come to Run the Country by Usurping Legislative Power; October 28; http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa358.pdf,
Although the practice of issuing presidential directives began in 1789, only limited judicial review of such directives has ever taken place. As noted above, federal courts have clearly invalidated presidential directives on only two occasions.4 8 For whatever reason, even when federal courts have been willing to hear challenges to presidential directives, they have been reluctant to act. More than 50 years ago, Justice Robert Jackson seemed to capture the Courts attitude in a case involving the war power: If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint.
A2: Congressional Rollback

Risk of overturn too low- judicial deference and Congressional laziness ensures this Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 26-27) The president's ability to win by default is, like his residual authority, reinforced by judicial doctrines that make it more difficult to challenge presidential action. The so-called Chevron rule determines how judges referee presidential-legislative disputes over statutory interpretation, and the rule provides clear advantages to the president. In Chevron U.S.A v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that an agency interpretation of a statute is "controlling unless Congress has spoken to the 'precise question at issue.' ""' Once the president, through the executive branch, has interpreted a statute, Congress can only override that determination through narrow, explicit legislation on the exact point in question. This requirement places a heavy burden on Congress in confronting unilateral presidential action, given that body's collective nature and inherent bias toward not changing the status quo.
Congressional rollback attempts legitimate the counterplan Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 24-25) Moreover, efforts to check presidential power through legislative restrictions often have had the counterproductive effect of legitimizing the very powers that Congress has tried to limit. I treat this problem in more detail in chapter two, but two examples highlight the problem that Congress faces. When Congress tried to limit the president's ability to carry out covert intelligence operations by imposing reporting requirements in the Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980, it inadvertently provided legislative recognition of the president's covert operations authority. The mere fact that Congress required the president to report on such activities was read by the courts as a congressional recognition of the president's right to conduct them. "So once again," concludes Gordon Silverstein, "Congress' attempt to control the executive's actions in foreign policy only provided fresh and unprecedented explicit authorization for executive prerogative.

First mover action makes overturn difficult Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 26) The second presidential advantage in the institutional setting is the ability to act first, leaving it up to other institutions to reverse what presidents have done. Whether presidents have effective plenary executive authority or not (an open question), there is no doubt that they can take action faster and more efficiently than either Congress or the courts. Congress as a collective organization takes definitive action through the legislative process, which is cumbersome, difficult to navigate, and characterized by multiple veto points. Even when Congress can create and sustain majorities at the subcommittee, committee, floor, and conference stages, the president can use the veto power to raise the bar from a simple majority to a two-thirds majority necessary to enact legislation over the president's objection. The president, at the same time, "has a trump card of great consequence in his struggle against Congress for control of government. He can act unilaterally in many matters of structure.""' The president, in effect, can often make the first move in these disputes, forcing Congress to take positive action to undo what the president has created. Similarly, the judiciary can overturn executive actions (as it did in rejecting Clinton's 1995 replacement worker executive order), but must wait for controversies to come to it, and definitive resolution can take years. Moreover, even after the judicial decision, enforcement is a matter for the president.
History proves the President will win struggles with Congress over executive orders Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 121) In 19S4 Richard Neustadt described the expansion of central clearance this way: "For more than thirty years now, central clearance has persisted, its history marked by a long series of 'accidental,' unforeseen accretions. Nothing once absorbed has been wholly displaced; each new element somehow encompasses the old ... overall, here is a record of great growth, successful adaptation-this under six successive Presidents, through every variation in national and governmental circumstance since Harding's term of office."" The presidential budget and growth of BOB power illustrates the pattern: societal and political pressures serve as the impetus for a new government capability; Congress and the president compete over the question of control; the president prevails and uses the new capability in unanticipated ways to develop even more power, and Congress can do little to stop him. Over time, the new powers-once so controversial-become institutionalized as a routine and accepted part of the presidency. The pattern has played out in a number of situations, across presidents and eras, and has less to do with specific presidential initiative than the motivations and incentives, relative positions, and inherent institutional qualities of Congress and the presidency.
It is very difficult for congress to challenge an executive order Cooper 1997. Phillip Cooper, November 1997. Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency.
Administration & Society. Beverly Hills: Nov 1997.Vol.29, Iss. 5; pg. 529, 28 pgs http://magmareport.net/organisation/camp/FULL_TEXTS/POWER%20TOOLS%20FOR%20AN%20EFFECTIVE %20AND%20RESPONSIBLE%20PRESIDENCY.rtf If Congress does challenge an executive order, then the president must either demonstrate that he properly interpreted the statute in question or that the action can be independently justified from executive powers delegated by the Constitution. However, it can, for a variety of reasons, be very difficult to get a legal challenge into court, and even if such a case does reach a judicial assessment, the broad kinds of grounds that can be asserted by the president can make it extremely difficult to challenge a presidential action. It has been done but it is not a simple matter (Note, 1987a).

Congressional attempts to overcome Executive Orders are constrained by the fact they must be signed by the President House of Representatives 1999 (Hearing of the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process: The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking?, October 27, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/rules_hear08.htm)
In certain instances since the practice began, Congress has taken action in response to executive orders, frequently to sanction by ensuing statute the policy implemented by an executive order or, on occasions involving controversial matters, to seek to withhold funding for the implementation of an executive order. The options available to Congress in the face of an executive order it opposes are constrained by the nature of a system that requires legislation emerging from the Congress to be signed or allowed to become law by the President. The Congress may seek to nullify, repeal, revoke, terminate or de-fund an executive order, but each such action requires the eventual concurrence of the President (most likely the same President that issued the order in the first place).
Congress will not rollback any Executive Orders dealing with aid to Africa because those are largely Fox 2005 (Jeffrey, Consultant for Catawba College, Congressional Resource, http://www.this nation.com/question/040.html)
Congress is less likely to challenge EOs that deal with foreign policy, national defense, or the implementation and negotiation of treaties, as these are powers granted largely to the President by the Constitution. As the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President is also considered the nation's "Chief Diplomat." In fact, given national security concerns, some defense or security related EOs (often called National Security Directives or Presidential Decision Directives) are not made public
No Roll Back- Agencies

As long as Bush can prove that his action is constitutionally justified, no executive agency can roll back his plan Risen 04 (Clay, Managing Editor of Democracy: a Journal of Ideas, The Power of the Pen, July 16, http://tapdev.browsermedia.com/cs/articles?article=the_power_of_the_pen)
Executive orders weren't systematically recorded until the 1920s, and the numbering system instituted in 1907 extends, retroactively, only to the Lincoln administration. (Executive Order 1, issued on April 15, 1961, established military courts in Louisiana.) What's more, many actions characterized as executive orders are actually presidential memoranda, directives, and proclamations, similar in use but legally distinct tools. (Ronald Reagan's so-called Mexico City policy, which blocked federal funds for international aid groups that provide abortion counseling, is one such memorandum often mischaracterized as an executive order.) But while the definition is vague and the limits are murky, the exercise of an executive order is pretty straightforward: The president can order an executive branch agency to do anything he wants, as long as he can cite a law or the Constitution to support his action.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 A2: Delay

Executive orders quick and easy and they solve. Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
(Phillip, University of Vermont, receiver of Charles A Levin Award from the American Society for Public Administration, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, p. 58-59)
Executive orders are often used because they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy mechanisms for moving significant policy initiatives. Though it is certainly true that executive orders are employed for symbolic purposes, enough has been said by now to demonstrate that they are also used for serious policymaking or to lay the basis for important actions to be taken by executive branch agencies under the authority of the orders. Unfortunately, as is true of legislation, it is not always possible to know from the title of orders which are significant and which are not, particularly since presidents will often use an existing order as a base for action and then change it in ways that make it far more significant than its predecessors. The relative ease of the use of an order does not merely arise from the fact that presidents may employ one to avoid the cumbersome and time consuming legislative process. They may also use this device to avoid sometimes equally time-consuming administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes required by the Administrative Procedure Act.84 Because those procedural requirements do not apply to the president, it is tempting for executive branch agencies to seek assistance from the White House to enact by executive order that which might be difficult for the agency itself to move through the process. Moreover, there is the added plus from the agency's perspective that it can be considerably more difficult for potential adversaries to obtain standing to launch a legal challenge to the president's order than it is to move an agency rule to judicial review. There is nothing new about the practice of generating executive orders outside the White House. President Kennedy's executive order on that process specifically provides for orders generated elsewhere.
President can act faster than Congress on foreign policy Trimble, professor of law, 89
(The American Journal International Law October, 1989 83 A.J.I.L. 750 SPECIAL ISSUE: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN ITS THIRD CENTURY: FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER NAME: Phillip R. Trimble ** Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, l/n)
Members also recognize that the executive branch can act quickly and has expertise and secret information unavailable to Congress. These are the classic justifications for presidential power. They are less persuasive today than they were in the 18th century, because of expanded congressional staffs, regular travel abroad, greater access to information and the effects of international interdependence generally. Nevertheless, the information/expertise gap must still induce members to be somewhat wary of taking responsibility for matters about whose consequences they feel less confident than they would in domestic affairs.
A2: President Does Not Have Authority

President can do plenty in foreign affairs without Congressional approval Powell, Professor of Law, 99
The constitutional law of foreign affairs and national security is fundamentally shaped by two realities. First, both Congress and the President possess significant constitutional authority in these areas. This factor sharply differentiates separation of powers questions in these areas from those that arise out of domestic issues. In the domestic sphere, the President's main constitutionally defined role is that of chief administrator: at least the principal officers of the administration are presidentially appointed, subject to Senate advice and consent, and the Take Care Clause presumably confers on the President some constitutional authority to supervise the activities of his or her subordinates. 63 The great bulk of the substantive powers wielded by the executive branch in the domestic arena stems from acts of Congress, and as long as Congress refrains from interfering with the President's constitutional duties of appointment and supervision it has substantial freedom to grant, withhold, and condition domestic authority to the executive. 64 Other than issuing pardons and making state of the union addresses, the President can do very little domestically without congressional authorization. 65 In the areas of foreign affairs and national security, by contrast, constitutional text 66 and structure vest the President with substantive constitutional authority not de [*541] pendent on congressional enactments, while Congress itself, of course, possesses a variety of relevant powers. When separation of powers questions arise in these areas, therefore, their resolution requires the interpreter to give due weight and proper respect to executive and legislative powers of equal constitutional dignity. These powers, moreover, overlap and thus create potential conflicts in which each branch can lay claim to a legitimate constitutional warrant for its actions.
Aff Does Not Solve: Congress Bad for Diplomacy

Congress is bad for diplomacy- legislation makes policies too rigid Trimble, professor of law, 89
Congress is subject to other obvious limitations in setting foreign policy, of which thoughtful members are certainly aware. 12 Diplomacy requires a long-term perspective, while Congress tends to be influenced by short-term interests. Congress often concentrates on narrow or immediate issues, dealing with broad problems as if a single factor should be of determinative significance. Congress acts through the blunt instrument of legislation, which can be modified only by more legislation. Once a policy has been legislatively directed, it remains in force until someone can overcome the inertia preventing new legislative action. When a problem vacates the headlines, it may not be easy to get the legislature to focus on the significance of changed circumstances.
Congress cannot force the president to take specific foreign policy actions Trimble, professor of law, 89
At the same time, the prerogative is not exercised in a vacuum. Congress can effectively influence the content of diplomatic communications. Congress and individual members have induced the Executive to advance claims or present positions of particular interest to the member. Congress may also legislatively declare policy, as it did on human rights, and through oversight assure that the Executive is in fact taking steps to implement that policy. This does not mean, however, that Congress may legally force the Executive to present a specified message to a specified government at a specified time regardless of the Executive's judgment as to its advisability in that particular context. For example, it would seem to be unconstitutional for Congress to require the President to deliver a message to China threatening loss of air transport rights unless China invited the Dalai Lama to Beijing to negotiate the future of Tibet within 30 days. But Congress may constitutionally require the President to take autonomy of minority groups into account in formulating foreign policy positions generally. By the same token, Congress would not be authorized to deny the President the right to deliver a particular message to China concerning the Dalai Lama. That is the heart of the executive power. As to general prohibitions against categories of communication, e.g., requests for support for the contras, the issue is more difficult to resolve.
Solvency: Economic
President controls trade and economic means of pursuing national security goals Karalis 04
(Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law Summer, 2004 12 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 109 ARTICLE: FOREIGN POLICY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE: EXECUTIVE ORDERS REGARDING EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT EXTENSION IN TIMES OF LAPSE AS A POLITICAL QUESTION NAME: Themes Karalis* * The author is a 2003 graduate of Brooklyn Law School and is currently practicing law at Duval & Stachenfeld LLP, l/n)
Presidents now consider trade controls, embargos, emergency powers and domestic regulation effective economic weapons in implementing national security policies. 268 Congress has acquiesced to presidential leadership by enacting laws with few limiting conditions on the President's power. 269 Finally, the courts, although not refusing to decide such cases, have tolerated both Congress's delegations of presidential authority and executive initiative. 270
Solvency: Diplomacy
President has sole authority in diplomatic relations Powell, Professor of Law, 99
The President has primary responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. "Primary" responsibility does not mean, and has never meant in any responsible executive branch statement, exclusive or un limited authority; Congress clearly has powers of great scope that concern or [*546] bear upon foreign affairs. But the presidency is the institution on which the Constitution places the duty to look to the Republic's interests in the international arena. The executive has independent responsibility for the maintenance of diplomatic relations with other nations, the protection of American rights and the fulfillment of American obligations, the gathering and analysis of information necessary to the formulation of goals and policies in the con duct of foreign affairs, and the formulation and execution of those goals and policies. Because of the intricate interplay and overlap between foreign policy and the preservation of national security, the President's primacy in foreign affairs implies a further primacy in ensuring the security of the Republic. Although the President is dependent on Congress for the provision of most of the tools of foreign policy - the executive cannot itself raise an army or appropriate funds for diplomacy - the President needs no legislative authorization to use such tools as may exist to create and pursue a foreign policy, and in some instances (though not all) is constitutionally entitled to adhere to presidential policy even in the teeth of the contrary wishes of the legislature.
The president shapes the modes and objectives of diplomacy Powell, Professor of Law, 99
Like the recognition power, the executive's power over negotiations vests in it the discretion to determine the goals as well as the modes of diplomacy: the power includes the "'exclusive authority to determine the time, [*559] scope, and objectives'" of all negotiations. 147 The range of subjects on which the President may negotiate, and thus on which the executive may formulate and pursue policy, is very broad. 148 The President may pursue domestic policy goals through international negotiations, 149 and in doing so may affect the practical choices open to Congress in carrying out its legislative responsibilities. 150 The President is equally free to choose the particular means and modes of diplomacy. Executive branch officers have repeatedly denied that the President is obligated to carry out diplomacy through officers appointed with Senate advice and consent, 151 and the Department of Justice has formally denied the validity of statutory limitations on the President's discretion to conduct negotiations secretly. 152
Solvency: Diplomacy
Executive has sole diplomatic negotiating power- can keep the content secret from Congress Trimble, professor of law, 89
A survey of the post-1945 practice shows the outlines of a constitutional common law of presidential foreign relations powers centering on protection of presidential leadership and initiative, subject to congressional review. The key to presidential leadership is the negotiation function. Everyone agrees that the President has the exclusive power of official communication with foreign governments. This power includes the related power to negotiate agreements -- on any matter -- subject to any necessary implementing action to give the agreement domestic legal effect. 18 The negotiation prerogative has been confirmed by recent practice. For example, the State Department opposed the 1973 Hartke resolution, which would have inserted the Senate into the negotiating process, 19 and the 1975 Snyder amendment, which would have denied funding for negotiations leading to the surrender of the Panama Canal Zone. 20 Executive branch officials, with congressional acquiescence, also construed the scope of the prerogative to include the right to preserve the confidentiality of diplomatic communications and related executive deliberations. 21 Similarly, the executive branch [*756] opposed measures to restrict the making of executive agreements; 22 and it terminated the Taiwan defense treaty without complying with a congressional resolution calling for prior consultation. 23 The President's negotiation function thus includes the ability to make official communications, even quite important ones that effectively make new foreign policy.
Solvency: Foreign Policy

President can use executive orders to achieve foreign policy goals Daily News 06 November 8, 2006 SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: WINGS CLIPPED FOR LAME
DUCK. W SHOULD GIRD FOR PROBES, LOSS OF POWER BYLINE: BY THOMAS M. DeFRANK DAILY NEWS WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, l/n Although salvaging the Senate would ease the pain somewhat, Bush is now a certified lame duck, whose power ebbs with each tick of the political calendar. That doesn't mean he's a dead duck. Only a President can conduct foreign policy, so Bush will be busy his final two years wrestling with Iraq, Iran, North Korea and other geopolitical trouble spots. He can also create policy through executive orders and control the agenda to some extent through his bully-pulpit powers. And he can still thwart the Democrats by wielding his veto pen.
President has exclusive role in foreign affairs Powell, Professor of Law, 99

From an executive branch perspective, this historical background is of great importance in legitimating the executive primacy view; in addition, and crucially, the modern executive branch claims such authority for the President as a matter of constitutional right, and has done so for many decades, across many administrations of both political parties, and with great consistency. 96 A central feature of constitutional law from the executive branch perspective, therefore, is the proposition that the Constitution grants the President "plenary authority" over foreign affairs, "subject only to limits specifically set forth in the Constitution or to such statutory limitations that the Constitution permits Congress to impose by exercise of its enumerated powers." 97 The "authority of the President in foreign affairs" is "presumptively exclusive" and includes "far-reaching discretion to act on his own authority in managing the external relations of the country." 98 This constitutional authority, furthermore, is not limited to the management or execution of policies determined by Congress. Although Congress through legislation, and the President and Senate through treaty-making, may enunciate foreign policy goals and influence foreign policy decisions, it is the President who, as a general matter, is vested with the authority to determine the policies and objectives that the United States should pursue in its international relations.
Solvency: Recognition
President has sole power of recognition- any attempt of Congress to get involved will undermine presidential power Powell, Professor of Law, 99
The Constitution "authorizes the President to determine the form and manner in which the United States will maintain relations with foreign nations." 130 A fundamental aspect of that authority is the power to decide which foreign nations - or to be more exact, which foreign governments and would-be governments - the United States will recognize for the purpose of establishing and maintaining relations. This aspect of the President's foreign affairs authority is an autonomous power. "Political recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive." 131 The Constitution should be read to accord the President broad enough power under this heading to make recognition an effective tool "in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations," and thus to authorize the President to take actions in connection with recognition whenever denying the executive the ability to do so would mean that "the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted." 132 The recognition power also includes the independent discretion to determine what policies the United States will pursue through the extension or denial of recognition: "That authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition." 133 The President's recognition power, finally, extends to forms of interaction acknowledgment that fall short of full diplomatic recognition, and once again the decision of what form and level of dealings to have with a foreign government is exclusively executive. 134
Solvency: International Law

President responsible for representing US positions on International law Powell, Professor of Law, 99
As a member of the community of nations, the United States has both the power and the responsibility to participate in that community's collective endeavors and the ongoing evolution of public international law. The President's fundamental role as constitutional representative of the United States in that community carries with it the specific power to determine when and what the United States shall speak in international forums, and with respect to questions of international law. When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns. 181
Solvency: International Negotiations

Negotiating powers are sole jurisdiction of the President- Congress cannot force the Pres to enter into them Powell, Professor of Law, 99
The President's authority over foreign affairs encompasses the processes and purposes of diplomacy: the President has plenary and exclusive control over negotiation with foreign nations and other entities, subject to the Senate's role in the appointment of diplomatic officers. 142 Like the recognition power, the negotiation power is a direct and obvious corollary of the President's basic role as constitutional representative of the United States in foreign affairs, and the courts and the executive branch acknowledged it at an early point. 143 The executive branch has consistently maintained, further more, that the negotiation power is, in my terminology, an autonomous power: "'In the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments, it is imperative that the United States speak with one voice. The Constitution pro vides that that one voice is the President's.'" 144 The courts have agreed. "The President alone has the authority to negotiate treaties with foreign countries. 'Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.'... [The negotiation] power [is] exclusively granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitution." 145 Congress therefore cannot require "that the Executive initiate discussions with foreign nations" or "order[] the Executive to negotiate and enter into treaties" or other types of international agreements. 146
Solvency: Military
President has sole power of operational control of the military Powell, Professor of Law, 99
The President's power of operational control of the armed forces is autonomous, neither dependent on congressional authorization nor subject to congressional regulation that interferes with the President's discretion. 218 This principle is settled: the Supreme Court, for example, long ago stated that Congress has no authority to "interfere[] with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief." 219 Attorney General Jackson's 1941 opinion was equally emphatic: "in virtue of his rank as head of the forces, [the President] has certain powers and duties with which Congress cannot interfere. For instance, he may regulate the movements of the army and... of the vessels of the navy, sending them wherever in his judgment it is expedient." 220 Many other judicial and executive branch opinions are to the same effect. 221 The exclusive character of the President's operational control over the military rests on the assumption, embedded in the Constitution as it has been interpreted, that military success can depend on a clear, unified chain of command. "The object of the [Commander in Chief Clause] is evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over all the military forces, - such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war." 222 Congress therefore has no power to direct the President in the planning or execution of lawful missions, and it may not lawfully interfere with the President's decisions about which military units to employ: "This power or right of command extends as much to one portion of the Army as to any other, and includes the assignment of any portion thereof to such duty as the Commander in Chief deems best." 223 The power of operational control extends as well to choices about individual service members. 224 The executive therefore has consistently resisted congressional attempts to superintend or constrict the President's discretion.
Solvency: Human Rights

Executive orders can be used for human rights Fain 03
(Berkeley Journal of International Law 2003 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 607 BETWEEN EMPIRE AND COMMUNITY: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: HUMAN RIGHTS: Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence NAME: By Natasha Fain*J.D. Candidate, 2003, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, l/n)
The Clinton administration also demonstrated support for the international human rights legal regime by fulfilling treaty reporting requirements and establishing a new bureaucratic structure designed to strengthen U.S. compliance with treaty obligations.n29 The Clinton administration submitted the first reports to the treaty committees of ratified human rights conventions. n30 President Clinton issued an important executive order on December 10, 1998 in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the UDHR. n31 Executive Order 13107 reaffirmed U.S. commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR, the CAT, and the CERD. The order highlighted the responsibility of the federal [*611] government's domestic policy agencies to maintain awareness of U.S. international human rights obligations and implement any such obligations that fall under the purview of their particular agency.n32 To facilitate such agency implementation, the Interagency Working Group on Human Rights Treaties was established to provide guidance, oversight and coordination with respect to questions concerning implementation of human rights obligations. n33
Can use executive orders for international legal measures Noyes, professor of law, 04
(Spring, 2004 19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 293 SYMPOSIUM: THE NEW AMERICAN HEGEMONY?:: American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, and General International Law NAME: John E. Noyes * Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, l/n)
When the United States looks beyond its borders and evaluates the human rights conduct of other states and nonU.S. citizens, U.S. leaders have on occasion acknowledged international legal mechanisms. For example, one of President Clinton's executive orders broadly deemed it "the policy and practice of the Government of the United States to promote respect for international human rights, both in our relationships with all other countries and by working with and strengthening the various international mechanisms for the promotion of human rights."
Executive orders can be used to pressure countries on human rights deLisle 02

(DePaul Law Review Winter, 2002 52 DePaul L. Rev. 473 SYMPOSIUM: EXPORT/IMPORT: AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: EIGHTH ANNUAL CLIFFORD SYMPOSIUM ON TORT LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY ARTICLE: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL WRONGS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: A "SINICAL" LOOK AT THE USE OF U.S. LITIGATION TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ABROAD NAME: Jacques deLisle* * University of Pennsylvania Law School, l/n)
At least where the executive branch or the political branches endorse a critical view of a foreign regime's practices, the addition of a judicial voice through litigation may extend and reinforce the political branches' foreign policy. Opposition to and criticism of human rights abuses abroad are, after all, stated goals of U.S. foreign policy. These aims - and specific critiques of much of the behavior at issue in foreign human rights litigation - have been amply embodied in numerous statutes (including legislative directives to the President, the State Department, and other entities within the executive branch), executive orders and less formal statements of the United States' agenda in international relations.
Solvency: Human Rights

Executive orders can be used to impose sanctions because of human rights Friedman 01
(Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review February, 2001 23 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 81 NOTES AND COMMENTS: Cures to the Enigmatic Taliban Plague: Legal and Social Remedies Addressing Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan NAME: Talya Friedman* * J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, l/n)
The political rhetoric surrounding the Executive Order illustrates the willingness of the United States to impose sanctions against the Taliban when U.S. national security interests are at stake. 266 The United States, however, is unwilling to integrate statements into the Executive Order that condemn the Taliban's actions of stripping Afghan women of their essential human rights. 267 The President could have, however, incorporated language into the Executive Order that the grave abuses perpetuated by the Taliban were either the impetus for, or an ancillary factor behind, the severe sanctions. 268 Additionally, the President could have decreed that until the Taliban restores the rights of Afghan women, sanctions will remain in place and diplomatic relations will remain stagnant. 269 By taking this step, the United States would have set an example for the world that economic sanctions can be imposed to deter violations of human rights law. 270 By imposing economic sanctions against the Taliban for its human rights abuses, as well as terrorism, the Executive Order could have improved the human rights of Afghan women as well as encouraged the capture of bin Ladin. 271
Solvency: Sanctions
Can impose sanctions through executive order Malloy, professor of law, 95
(Administrative Law Journal Fall, 1995 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 515 ARTICLE: Economic Sanctions and Retention of Counsel * Michael P. Malloy ** ** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; l/n)
In November of 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis triggered the first use of IEEPA authority. This authority was deployed in stages -- unlike previous TWEA programs -- in a series of executive orders from November of 1979 through mid-April of 1980 successively increasing the sanctions. 139 In contrast to these very extensive sanctions, in 1985, IEEPA was invoked to impose a peculiarly limited set of trade sanctions against Nicaragua and the ruling Sandinista regime. 140 Also in 1985, the President invoked IEEPA as the authority for a range of sanctions against the government of South Africa, 141 largely in an effort to forestall congressional action. 142 This effort was ultimately unsuccessful; in 1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over the President's veto. 143
Executive orders used to impose sanctions Lau, professor of business, 04

(American Business Law Journal Summer, 2004 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 413 ARTICLE: TRIGGERING PARENT COMPANY LIABILITY UNDER UNITED STATES SANCTIONS REGIMES: The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting Approval and Facilitation NAME: Terence J. Lau * * Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration, University of Dayton, l/n)
n87 See 31 C.F.R. 537 (2004). The Burmese sanctions regime stems from two Executive Orders. The first, signed by President Clinton in 1997, declared a national emergency with respect to Burma. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997). The 1997 Executive Order prohibited new investment in Burma, with a grandfather provision for contracts in place before the effective date. Id. The second Executive Order, issued by President Bush in 2003, tightened the sanctions by declaring an import ban on Burmese products.
Solvency: Generic
President can make massive changes on his/her own Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 24) In the struggle for institutional control the president has two main advantages, both of which stem from the president's unique legal powers. The first of these presidential advantages is the formal vestment of executive authority in the office, something far more important than most studies of the presidency have allowed. "The simple fact that presidents are the nation's chief executives endowed by the Constitution and stature with certain formal powers, is of great consequence. For those powers enable them to make lots of important structural choices on their own without going through the legislative process.... They can organize and direct the presidency as they see fit, create public agencies, reorganize them, move them around, coordinate them, impose rules on their behavior, put their own people in top positions, and otherwise place their structural stamp on the executive branch.""'
President can issue anything as an executive order Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 34) WHAT, PRECISELY, is an executive order? In the most formal sense, an executive order is a directive issued by the president, "directing the executive branch in the fulfillment of a particular program,"' targeted at executive branch personnel and intended to alter their behavior in some way, and published in the Federal Register. Executive orders are instruments by which the president carries out the functions of the office, and every president has issued them (although there was no system for tracking them until the twentieth century). A 1974 Senate study of executive orders noted that "from the time of the birth of the Nation, the day-to-day conduct of Government business has, of necessity, required the issuance of Presidential orders and policy decisions to carry out the provisions of the Constitution that specify that the President 'shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' The lack of any agreed-upon definition means that, in essence, an executive order is whatever the president chooses to call by that name.'
Executive orders powerful and potent tool- no real boundaries to what can be done Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 65) Executive orders are a potent instrument of presidential authority. Their importance stems from the ambiguities of the president's constitutional powers, the deference to the president shown by the judiciary, and both legal doctrines and political realities that give the president a significant edge in disputes with Congress. No one is quite sure how far the executive power reaches; although the broad boundaries are clear enough, it has proved impossible to construct precise guideposts along those boundaries that allow us to predict with any certainty whether a president is about to step over the line. But what we do know-or should recognize-is that executive orders provide a window into the exercise of presidential power. Presidents think about them; staffers wrangle over them; executive branch officials worry about them. It makes sense, then, to survey the landscape in more detail to analyze how presidents have used them.
Solvency: Generic
Unilateral executive powers can solve a variety of issues Simendinger 02
(January 25, 2002 Results-oriented President uses levers of power By Alexis Simendinger, National Journal http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0102/012502nj2.htm)
In his first year in office, the President used his various unilateral powers to set an example in leadership for Congress on his domestic policy ideals: He set up a new White House office to bring faith-based social programs and government closer together, and he initially tried to jettison Bill Clinton-era offices dedicated to AIDS and race issues. (AIDS stayed.) He instructed his department Secretaries to reappraise some pending regulatory requirements, begun under the Clinton administration, that were deemed philosophically at odds with Republican constituencies. Bush put the brakes on a rule setting the acceptable level of arsenic in drinking water--later, he let the rule go forward--and on a number of environmental regulations. Bush used his authority over the federal bureaucracy to order that federal funding for research on embryonic stem-cell lines be limited to work on those lines that were in existence at the time of his decision. And he signed an executive order on his third day on the job overturning the Clinton administration's policy of giving federal aid to overseas family-planning groups that offer abortion counseling.
Executive orders key tool for policy making George Washington Law Review 87
(MARCH, 1987 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 659 NOTE: ENFORCING EXECUTIVE ORDERS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. *This Note was developed by Steven Ostrow, l/n)
In this era of the "Imperial Presidency," 1 executive orders have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking. 2 Because executive orders do not need congressional approval, they enable the President to bypass parliamentary debate and opposition. 3 Historically, most executive orders have related to routine administrative matters and to the internal affairs and organization of the federal bureaucracy. Since the 1930s, however, executive orders have assumed an ever increasing legislative character, directly affecting the rights and duties of private parties as well as those of governmental officials. 4 Scholars have referred [*660] to this recent use of the executive order as "presidential legislation" or "government by executive order." 5
Presidents use government structure to their own ends

Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p#106, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) Presidents are frequently in a position to use the structure of government to further their own ends. Franklin Roosevelt's involvement with affirmative action was apparent when he told State Works Progress Administrators on June 17, 1935 that "we have to be extremely careful not to make any kind of discrimination. We cannot discriminate in any of the work we are conducting either because of race or religion or politics. Politics, so far as we are concerned, is out. If anybody asks you to discriminate because of politics you can tell them that the President of the United States gave direct orders that there is not to be any such discrimination. "99
Solvency: Generic
Presidential decisions powerful
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p113-114, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) The chief executive role can affect a president's social agenda in major ways. As Jonathan P West and Glen Sussman argued after examining the chief executive and environmental policy, when a president makes "wise use of existing tools and power resources of the 'managerial presidency' he can, when coupled with action in the president's other roles (e.g., legislative leader) and when circumstances permit, have far-reaching impacts, especially at the implementation stage of the policy process."130 West and Sussman's conclusion applies equally to every other social policy in the president's social agenda that we have considered.
Executive orders are important tools to shape social policy

Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p164-165, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university)
Executive orders and proclamations are important tools of the chief executive. Executive orders carry the force of law and, though they are less powerful, proclamations can also be used to shape social policy. Roosevelt used the executive order to open up employment opportunities in the defense industry. While Kennedy issued an executive order to establish the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Johnson employed the tool as a means to establish "affirmative action" in the hiring of minorities seeking employment involving federal contractors. Both Bush and Clinton used the instrument to stop the international flow of firearms into the country. Presidential power leads to change
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p173, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) By taking a stand in shaping social policy, the president is challenging Congress, mobilizing organized interests, and educating and informing the public. By taking an activist position, the president is either encouraging fellow politicians and the electorate to support him or creating the conditions that cause opposition forces to line up against him.
Solvency: Generic
Executive orders lead to change
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p173, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) Second, presidents and the role they assume can make a difference in public policymaking. The role assumed by the president can lead to the pursuit or avoidance of social policies, and these policies in turn can have a profound impact on the exercise of presidential power. At the same time, however, the president must recognize the political and social context. For example, Democrats Truman and Clinton could use the chief executive role to open up opportunities in the armed forces. Although both presidents faced a hostile environment, Truman issued an executive order that desegregated the military, while Clinton refrained from issuing his promised executive order and settled instead on the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy on gays in the military The environment was addressed quite differently by Republicans Nixon and Reagan. Where Nixon saw a political opportunity in supporting environmental initiatives, Reagan pursued a developmentalist, anti-environment approach. Both Nixon and Reagan used the chief executive and legislative leader roles, for example, but in contrasting ways. Nixon used the executive order and signed legislation to promote environmentalism. Reagan used budget and appointment powers and the veto to thwart environmentalism. Likewise, partisans Reagan and Clinton used the opinion/party role in contrasting ways regarding abortion. Republican Reagan spoke on behalf of the "unborn child," whereas Democrat Clinton publicly supported a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.
President can easily shape national laws Sunstein 95 Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a
Twenty-First Century World NAME: Cass R. Sunstein * * Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. l/n By contrast, the modern President is a principal national lawmaker. The content of federal law has a great deal to do with the President's program and agenda. Much of this shift has occurred simply because of an unanticipated shift in power from the states to the federal government. The decline of limits on the power of the national [*5] government has helped to increase the authority of the President. 11 In implementing national law, the executive branch, therefore, issues an extraordinary range of regulations affecting the national economy.
The president can act more quickly, more decisively, and more consistently than congress Pika, 2002, Joseph A. Pika, University of Delaware, John Maltese, Norman Thomas, The Politics of the Presidency, Fifth Edition
However, U.S. economic, social, and technological transformations and emergence from international isolation during the twentieth century created problems and conditions that called increasingly for executive rather than legislative decision making. The president can act more quickly, more decisively, and more consistently than can Congress, which has difficulty ascertaining its institutional will and coherently pursuing its goals.
Solvency: XO = Law
Executive order has force of law Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
In the most general sense, the primary use of executive orders is to make legally binding pronouncements. There are many ways for a chief executive to communicate his or her wishes to subordinates, but executive orders are intended to be authoritative and lasting. In order to make use of the tool in this way, it is essential to understand the nature of the authority carried by orders. The legal force of an executive order derives from the statutory or constitutional authority cited by the president in issuing the decree.29 Indeed, many orders are issued pursuant to statute. In cases where the Congress has not specifically called for executive orders, presidents have usually claimed at least implied statutory authority for their actions, even when they were certain that they also had independent constitutional authority under Article 2's executive powers of the Constitution for their orders. If valid, presidential orders have also been recognized as acceptable authority for the issuance by executive agencies of substantive rules (rules having the force of law).10
Executive order same as legislation Mayer, professor of political science, 02

(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 4-5) Working from their position as chief executive and commander in chief, presidents have used executive orders to make momentous policy choices, creating and abolishing executive branch agencies, reorganizing administrative and regulatory processes, determining how legislation is implemented, and taking whatever action is permitted within the boundaries of their constitutional or statutory authority. Even within the confines of their executive powers, presidents have been able to "legislate" in the sense of making policy that goes well beyond simple administrative activity. Yale Law School professor E. Donald Elliot has argued that many of the thousands of executive orders "plainly 'make law' in every sense,"' and Louis Fisher finds that despite the fact that the Constitution unambiguously vests the legislative function in Congress, "the President's lawmaking role is substantial, persistent, and in many cases disturbing."'
Executive orders same as legislation Mayer, professor of political science, 02

(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 58-59) How do executive orders fit into this framework of presidential power? The legal connection is clear, since federal courts have long considered executive orders to be the equivalent of statutes when they are issued pursuant to the president's legitimate constitutional or congressionally delegated powers.122 Their validity stems from their status as an instrument through which the president exercises his legal authority; in effect, the president may use an executive order to do anything permitted within the bounds of this authority. Most often, executive orders consist of presidential instructions to officers of agencies and departments, directing them to take specified action. This description is less technical than it may seem, since even administrative rulings can have consequences that reach far beyond executive branch boundaries. Most of the time presidents are free to choose the instrument they wish to use to carry out their executive function (proclamations, administrative directives, findings, executive orders, and so on), although Congress can stipulate that the president use one or another of these instruments for a particular purpose. The federal courts do not distinguish between executive orders and proclamations and hold that the two formats are equivalent for the purposes of carrying out the president's legal authority."'
Solvency: Executive Branch Actions/Agencies

President can control agency policymaking Sunstein 95 Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a
Twenty-First Century World NAME: Cass R. Sunstein * * Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. l/n It is now generally agreed, however, that the President has broad power over almost all high-level officials who im [*7] plement the law. 20 To be sure, Congress has the constitutional authority to create "independent" agencies. 21 It is unclear, however, how "independent" the independent agencies really are, as a matter of law or practice. The Supreme Court has never told us, and in practice, the independent agencies are not so independent of the President. 22 In any case, the heads of the Cabinet, and of most executive agencies, can be discharged by the President whenever the President chooses. In practice, this means that the President has enormous authority to control their activities. Moreover, Congress has no power to discharge administrative officials on its own and little power to prevent the President from acting however he wishes. (Of course both the President and all implementing officials must obey the instructions laid down by Congress.) The result is that most administration of the laws - an extremely large and important category - is subject to the will of the President. When the President changes, the administration changes as well, at least as a matter of technical law and largely, too, as a matter of practice.
Executive orders can shape executive branch behavior Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 4) These chronicles of presidential decisiveness and unilateral action are at odds with the prevailing scholarly view of presidential power. Among political scientists the conventional wisdom is that the president is weak, hobbled by the separation of powers and the short reach of his formal legal authority. Presidential power, far from being a matter of prerogative or legal rule, "is the power to persuade," wrote Richard Neustadt in the single most influential statement about the office in the past fifty years.' Yet throughout U.S. history presidents have relied on their executive authority to make unilateral policy without interference from either Congress or the courts. In this book, I investigate how presidents have used a tool of executive power-the executive order-to wield their inherent legal authority. Executive orders are, loosely speaking, presidential directives that require or authorize some action within the executive branch (though they often extend far beyond the government). They are presidential edicts, legal instruments that create or modify laws, procedures, and policy by fiat.
Solvency: Executive Branch Actions/Agencies

President best at changing administrative processes Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 30) Put simply, presidents use their authority to reorganize the executive branch and revise administrative processes. In doing so they by design make some policy and procedural outcomes more likely than others. Here is where the presidential advantage over Congress is at its greatest, as presidents have often made unilateral decisions of major import. Examples include Roosevelt's establishment of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, the establishment of wartime agencies during World War 11, the various orders that organize government intelligence agencies, and Reagan's 1981 executive order requiring cost-benefit analysis and OMB review of major regulations. These orders fall squarely within the structure of rational choice institutionalism, as they involve cases where presidents have dedicated their efforts and expended scarce political capital to revise processes and institutions, something which if done wisely will spare them and future presidents the need to fight case-by-case political battles~ in the same areas. By altering institutional arrangements and the incentives that govern individuals, presidents can create structures that favor some outcomes over others.
Solvency: Intelligence Organizations

President has control over intel organizations- can out maneuver congressional controls Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 161) Control of the intelligence community has always been an executive function. From the earliest days of the Republic, presidents have had a free hand in structuring the intelligence community as they saw fit, establishing intelligence priorities, granting authority to units within the community, and creating new organizations on their own. Much of the time, this authority has been implemented through executive orders. Even when Congress has tried to impose statutory limits and requirements, presidents have maneuvered within these constraints to maintain executive control. Presidents have used their executive authority to reorganize the intelligence community, establish entirely new organizations and oversight mechanisms, and prescribe standards for intelligence activities. When challenged, presidents have issued executive orders to stall or preempt pending congressional action.
President can avoid control over intel agencies Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 170) Presidents have consistently opposed congressional restrictions on their ability to conduct intelligence functions, an opposition based more on broad separation of powers issues and a desire to maintain control rather than on the substance of any proposed legislation. Presidents have repeatedly and successfully preempted congressional efforts to impose a formal statutory framework on the intelligence agencies, and most of the legislation ultimately enacted has represented, at best, marginal reforms. Even when Congress has passed legislation, presidents have responded by using their organizational flexibility to outmaneuver congressional attempts to control-or even look intointelligence activities.
Solvency: Social Change

Executive orders send a signal for reform Clegg, general counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, 00
( Roger, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, December 13, 2000, p. online.) There were other considerations, too. The Clinton administration supports legislation to ban discrimination in the private sector on the basis of sexual orientation and parental status, and signing these executive orders was a good way to highlight its support for these bills.
The president can focus attention and shapes public mindset Riddlesperger, Professor of Political Science, 95
(Jim TCU, 1995, Presidential Leadership and Civil Rights Policy, p. 16) Research suggests that presidents can use such messages to set their own, if not always the broader government agenda. Much of what appears on the subsequent government agenda probably can be traced to presidential rhetoric. Public messages give presidents the opportunity to set the stage for policy innovations, which usually come from the White House. Communications provide an important opportunity for presidents to "go public" in a highly discretionary issue are like civil rights.
Executive orders diffuse controversy, increase popularity LeRoy, Professor of political science, 96
(Michael Illinois, Boston College Law Review, March, 1996, l/n) New laws and Supreme Court decisions are widely reported, sometimes with detailed analysis and commentary. In contrast, an executive order tends to be less visible unless a president decides to make it newsworthy. This low visibility may have checked otherwise hostile public opinion on race discrimination orders.
Presidential action on solves better by mobilizing the public Riddlesperger, Professor of Political Science, 95
(Jim TCU, 1995, Presidential Leadership and Civil Rights Policy, p. 19) Presidential capability to influence public opinion derives from his paramount position in the public's eye, his monopolization of the public space, media attention, and public reliance on his leadership, especially in discretionary policy areas. By their very nature, discretionary issues have a difficult time attaining agenda status. Therefore, the power of the president to focus attention should stimulate a stronger public reaction-for discretionary than for required policy areas. On required issues, the public is already -p'rimed. The president may be both primer and director on discretionary issues.

Public rhetoric makes presidential action more symbolic Riddlesperger, Professor of Political Science, 95
(Jim TCU, 1995, Presidential Leadership and Civil Rights Policy, p. 16) Such communications are particularly important early in the policyinaking process. Some presidential rhetoric, especially in an emotionally charged issue like civil rights, may be more symbolic than substantive. Yet, even symbolism can have important policy consequences by focusing public attention on the problem. Symbolic or not, communications may help presidents obtain support for their policy preferences. Such preferences as expressed in public rhetoric are often helpful in resolving societal conflicts.
If the president is perceived strong than solvency will occur and social change will happen. Edwards, 2000
George C. Edwards III, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Director of The Center for Presidential Studies in the Bush School, editor of Presidential Studies Quarterly, Presidential Power, Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century, March 2000 pg(s). 12-13
The notion of the dominant president who moves the country and the government by means of strong, effective leadership has deep roots in our political culture. Those chief executives whom Americans revere-Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and both Roosevelts-have taken on mythical proportions as leaders. Even though the American public has been frequently disillusioned with the performance of presidents and has recognized that stalemate is common, it has eagerly accepted what appears to be effective presidential leadership, as with Ronald Reagan in 1981, as evidence on which to renew faith in the potential of the presidency. After all, if presidential leadership works some of the time, why not all of the time? Behind such thinking is the implicit view that all it takes is the right person at the helm for the ship of state to sail smoothly. This perception directly influences expectations and evaluations of presidents. If it is reasonable to expect successful leadership from the White House, then failures of leadership must be personal deficiencies. If problems arise because leaders lack the proper will, or understanding, then the solution to the need for leadership is straightforward and simple: elect presidents willing and able to lead. Because the system can respond to appropriate leadership, it will function smoothly with the right leaders in the Oval Office.

Executive orders lead to social change
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p159, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) To better understand presidential behavior regarding the social agenda, we created a classification scheme that focuses on presidential action (Table 6.1). The first dimension- level of involvement- concerns the extent to which the president plays a role in social policy. In this case, the president can be assertive in his involvement, taking an active role in support of or in opposition to the dynamics of the social issue. Ronald Reagan, as an example, spoke frequently about the "unborn child" and the need for a Human Life Amendment; Bill Clinton strongly supported the Brady Bill in an effort to reduce the violence associated with firearms. Presidents can also choose to be involved in a passive way or can avoid the issue all together by ignoring it or rejecting it. The second dimension- policy outcomeconcerns whether a tangible or nominal result occurs. Harry Truman, as an example, issued an executive order to integrate the U.S. armed forces, which produced a tangible policy change. By contrast, despite Ronald Reagan's outspoken position on abortion, a Human Life Amendment never resulted.
Solvency: President Solves Better than Congress

Presidential action solves better than Congress Lansford and Pauly 03 Tom Lansford received his Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va.
Currently he is an assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast Campus. Robert J. Pauly, Jr., holds a Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, He is adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and Midlands Technical College. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html France and the United States have presidential systems which give their nations highest elected official wide powers to conduct foreign and security policy. To different degrees, the division of responsibilities for both nations highest office reflects Wildavskys concept of two-presidencies in which one facet represents domestic policy and one represents foreign policy.1 In writing about the U.S. chief executive, Wildavsky summarized contemporary scholarship on the foreign policy powers of the presidency and identified five main reasons for the concentration of power: 1) since foreign policy and security issues often need fast action, the executive rather than the legislative branch of government is the more appropriate decision-making structure; 2) the Constitution grants the president broad formal powers; 3) because of the complexities involved voters tend to delegate to the president their trust and confidence to act; 4) the interest group structure is weak, unstable and thin; and 5) the legislature follows a self-denying ordinance since tradition and practicality reinforce the power of the chief executive.2 Wildavskys work is echoed by many scholars, including Logan, who contends that in Western democracies, the mass public consciously or unconsciously cedes influence to politicians and policy elites.3
Solvency: Spur Congressional Action

Executive orders spur congressional action New York Times 00
(The New York Times July 5, 2000, SECTION: Section A; Page 13; Column 1; National Desk HEADLINE: Blocked by Congress, Clinton Wields a Pen BYLINE: By MARC LACEY, l/n)
"This president will be signing executive orders right up until the morning of Jan. 20, 2001," said Bruce N. Reed, the president's domestic policy adviser. "In our experience, when the administration takes executive action, it not only leads to results while the political process is stuck in neutral, but it often spurs Congress to follow suit."
Executive orders break the congressional logjam spurring action Reed 00

(FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents January 27, 2000; Thursday SIC-MAJOR-GROUP: 09 - General Classification Bruce Reed NATIONAL DOMESTIC POLICY ADVISOR BRUCE REED, l/n)
MR. REED: Sure. Well, in a host of areas over the last seven years, the President has used his executive authority to get things done for the American people with executive orders on privacy, on child support, on welfare reform, on medical errors and so on. We intend to continue doing that, for two reasons -- first, to get things done, to break the logjam in Washington, to not wait for the legislative process; but also our experience has been that every step we take through executive action also helps to build pressure for Congress to take action as well.
Solvency: Executive Orders Perceived

Presidential action is perceived globally Sunstein 95 Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a
Twenty-First Century World NAME: Cass R. Sunstein * * Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. l/n 6. With the emergence of the United States as a world power, the President's foreign affairs authority has become far more capacious than was originally anticipated. For the most part this is because the powers originally conferred on the President have turned out - in light of the unanticipated position of the United States in the world - to mean much more than anyone would have thought. The constitutionally granted authorities have led to a great deal of unilateral authority, simply because the United States is so central an actor on the world scene. The posture of the President means a great deal even if the President acts clearly within the scope of his constitutionally-granted power. Indeed, mere words from the President, at a press conference or during an interview, can have enormous consequences for the international community.
Solvency: Gag Rule

Can use executive orders to get around the gag rule Wilson 07 Tobias & Bush, Torturing Africa With Abstinence Posted by Bruce Wilson at 10:51 AM on April 30,
2007. http://www.alternet.org/blogs/peek/51263/ In August 2003, President Bush released an Executive Order specifically exempting U.S. global AIDS funds from gag rule restrictions. "The theme of World AIDS Day 2005 is `Keep the Promise.' In expanding the Global Gag Rule to U.S. global AIDS funding on the eve of World AIDS Day, the Administration has broken its own written commitment not to subject global AIDS funds to these onerous restrictions," stated Jodi Jacobson, Executive Director of CHANGE.
Executive orders used to restrict funds for abortion Daily Nexus 01 Culture of Life? http://www.dailynexus.com/article.php?a=260 Published Thursday, January
25, 2001 Issue 64 / Volume 81 At George W. Bushs presidential inauguration last Saturday, one could hear the sound of brakes screeching and gears shifting into reverse. This sound was the country taking one giant step backward. Bush lived up to expectations on his first day in office - he chose Jan. 22, the 28th anniversary of Roe vs. Wade, to issue an executive order rescinding federal aid to overseas organizations that provide abortion counseling or in any way help women obtain abortions. In one swift move, Bush signaled Americas descent into the depths of a Neo-Reagan era. When Clinton became president in 1993, one of his first actions was to reverse this same executive order, initially imposed by President Reagan in 1984. Bushs reinstatement of the ban came as little surprise to the nation; however, any lingering doubt about Bushs true devotion to the ultra-conservative right must now have vanished. The speed with which Bush issued this order indicates his desire to appease the conservative base that supported him throughout his presidential campaign.
Solvency: Family Planning

President has broad powers to shape family planning policies Goldfarb 03 J.D., with a Concentration in International Law, from California Western School of Law California
Western School of Law California Western International Law Journal, Spring, 2003, 33 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 345, 11144 words, COMMENT: Abstinence Breeds Contempt: Why the U.S. Policy on Foreign Assistance for Family Planning is Cause for Concern, Tobey E. Goldfarb* Shortly after taking office, President Bush announced that he would reinstate the "Mexico City Policy."n76 Although Congress had already appropriated $ 34 million to the UNFPA for fiscal year 2002, Bush delayed the release of the funds after he took office. n77 The delay was due to new allegations, made by a small group of pro-life extremists, regarding UNFPA involvement in China. n78 The Administration sent a fact finding team to investigate the allegations and to determine whether it was appropriate to release the funds. n79 In July of 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the decision to deny the release of $ 34 million that was appropriated for UNFPA family planning programs.n80 Based on an interpretation of Kemp-Kasten, as part of [*353] the Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, the funds were denied because UNFPA allegedly played a prohibited role in what has been interpreted as China's practice of coercive abortion.n81 This decision was made, even though UNFPA: certified that they in no way support coercive abortion; investigated allegations of coercive abortion and withdrew funding where appropriate; and sePted U.S. donations in different accounts, which certified that none of the money went to China. n82 The State Department promised instead to put the money towards the USAID Child Survival and Health Program Fund. n83 This decision was inconsistent with the findings set out in the fact finding team's report. n84 Also, USAID serves significantly fewer countries than UNFPA, n85 and the permissible scope of the Agency's work is limited. n86 The evolution of United States involvement in international family planning programs, rooted in global population concerns, has yielded a political forum for abortion policy making, unfettered by the constitutional restrictions imposed on the domestic abortion debate.n87 While the President has broad discretion to set policy in Foreign Affairs matters, this decision undermines broader policies of the United States regarding population, family planning and development. n88
Solvency: AIDS Funding

Executive orders can increase access to AIDS drugs and tech AP 00 May 10, 2000 Clinton Helps Africans With AIDS by JIM ABRAMS, Associated Press Writer
http://www.actupny.org/actions/urgent3-00.html President Clinton issued an executive order Wednesday making it easier for AIDS-ravaged Africa to obtain inexpensive drugs and medical technologies. The president took the action after nearly identical language in the order was taken out of an African trade bill that Congress is likely to pass and send to the White House this week. The order states that the U.S. government will not seek to overturn any intellectual property law or policy imposed by a sub-Saharan African government that promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals and medical technologies. ``Given the devastating impact of AIDS, the United States will not require or negotiate restrictive rules in the intellectual property rights area,'' said U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who proposed the AIDS drugs amendment to the trade bill with Sen. Russell Feingold, D-Wis., praised the executive order as ``the right thing to do.''
President can shape AID policies Ernsdorff 92 Washington Law Review JANUARY, 1992 67 Wash. L. Rev. 133 COMMENT: THE AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NEPA: A DUTY UNFULFILLED NAME: Gary M. Ernsdorff, l/n As an executive branch agency, A.I.D. is directly influenced by the president. Although the Administrator of A.I.D. is responsible for formulating and executing U.S. foreign economic assistance programs, all project and policy decisions by A.I.D. are subject to executive approval. 25 Executive orders directing policy implementation also influence A.I.D. decisions. 26 Thus, presidential decisions impact A.I.D.'s environmental policies as well as A.I.D.'s social, economic, and political agendas.
Solvency- Emergency Response

Executive order is only effective solution to combat emergencies
Library of Halexandria 2003 halexandria is a synthesis of new physics, politics, law, order http://www.halexandria.org/dward287.htm Presidential Executive Orders have been around since the time of Abraham Lincoln. The legality of such unilateral decisions (without the consent of Congress, the Supreme Court, or anyone else) is based on the idea that in times of crisis (wars, invasions, attacks, and so forth), Emergency War Powers may need be assumed, giving the President of the United States dictatorial powers. In times of real crisis, its not a good idea to have a lot of discussion or debate on actions to be taken. A single commander is the only effective means with which to combat the emergency. Lincolns Executive Order #1 seemed to be a reasonable decision on his part. With seven States walking out of Congress, and thus eliminating the possibility of the quorum needed for the Congress to act, the only choice seemed to be to declare a State of Emergency and issue whatever Executive Orders were necessary. In times of Civil War, this is reasonable.
Solvency- Blood Diamonds

Executive Orders used to combat blood diamonds DSouza 2003. Varsha Gupta dSouza. July 31, 2003. Global information network. New York. Africa: U.S.
Bans the import of conflict diamonds from Africa.
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=378075281&sid=11&Fmt=3&clientId=10553&RQT=309&VName=PQD
WASHINGTON, Jul. 31 (IPS/GIN) -- President George W. Bush has signed an executive order to ban the import of rough diamonds used to finance civil wars in Africa. The order, which went into effect yesterday, brings the US - the world's largest diamond importer - into compliance with an international agreement prohibiting trade in so-called conflict or blood diamonds. The agreement, approved by the UN, creates a paper trail so that rough stones can be traced to a legitimate mine. Diamond production has financed deadly conflicts in countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Cngo and Liberia. Human rights groups say rebels use forced labor to mine diamonds, then use the proceeds to buy weapons and finance military activity. "My executive order demonstrates the US's commitment to excluding conflict diamonds from international trade, while promoting the legitimate trade in rough diamonds that is so vital to many nations in Africa and elsewhere," Bush said before implementing a law he signed in April. The
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 Solvency: USAID
President controls USAID Morrison 06 The American Journal of Comparative Law Supplement, Fall 2006 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 443
SECTION IV: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Characteristics of International Administration in Crisis Areas: A View from the United States of America NAME: FRED L. MORRISON* * Fred L. Morrison is the Popham Haik Schnobrich/Lindquist & Vennum Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. United States aid programs are generally carried out by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A separate food aid program provided by the Department of Agriculture and administered by USAID provides food assistance. USAID is separate from the Department of State, although related to it. This separate status has given its personnel a character and mission different from those of traditional diplomatic and consular representatives. Its staff is clearly directed to humanitarian and development issues, rather than to the political and trade representation expected from a typical foreign office. USAID's program is based on four separate emphases, which it calls "pillars." 54 They are: (1) a "global development alliance," (2) promoting economic growth, agriculture, and trade, (3) addressing global health issues, and (4) promoting democracy, conflict resolution, and providing humanitarian assistance. For the purpose of this discussion, the last of these, "democracy, conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance" is most important. Under it the agency attempts [*456] to foster democracy and abate conflict in addition to providing more traditional forms of humanitarian assistance. Approximately $ 2 billion of its $ 8 billion annual appropriation is directed to these projects annually. In addition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture funnels provides nearly $ 2 billion in food aid. All USAID operations are subject to conditions contained in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Acts, which are passed annually by the Congress. These restrict the ability of the agency to provide assistance to States which have gross and persistent patterns of human rights violations, in which there are barriers to religious freedom or in which a military coup has displaced a democratic government. 55 USAID is an executive agency; in so far as there is no statutory limitation or direction, it is subject to the general policy direction of the President and his foreign policy advisers.
President has broad authority over USAID Jones 04 Boston College Third World Law Journal Winter, 2004 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 187 HEALING THE
WOUNDS OF SLAVERY: CAN PRESENT LEGAL REMEDIES CURE PAST WRONGS?: NOTE: The "Mexico City Policy" and Its Effects on HIV/AIDS Services in Subsaharan Africa NAME: ALLEGRA A. JONES *, l/n In 1961, Congress passed and President John F. Kennedy signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act, which authorized the president to provide funding for voluntary population planning programs on the terms and conditions determined by the president. 28 The president's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs provided the foundation for Congress's conferral of such broad discretion to the president. 29 [*193] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent federal government agency, was created by executive order that same year, and has since remained the main U.S. agency through which foreign assistance is granted for international economic growth and global health. 30
Courts defer to the president on aid policy Hayden 06 Georgetown Law Journal November, 2006 95 Geo. L.J. 171 NOTE: Mullahs on a Bus: The
Establishment Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid NAME: JESSICA POWLEY HAYDEN *, l/n It is clear that the Executive Branch may do things overseas that it would be prohibited from doing domestically. The President's Article II powers grant him broad latitude in making decisions respecting foreign relations and development assistance. 65 For example, the Mexico City Policy requires recipients of USAID [*184] funding to certify that they will "not, while receiving assistance under the grant, perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in [US]AID-recipient countries or provide financial support to other foreign nongovernmental organizations that conduct such activities." 66 NGOs that agree to this clause are prohibited from using government funds, or their own funds, for promoting or performing abortions. 67 While several organizations have raised constitutional challenges to the policy, none have been successful. 68 Courts have found that the decision whether or not to apply the requirement as a condition of receiving USAID funds is a nonjusticiable political question, and the President has authority to decide how to conduct foreign policy. While Congress can place similar restrictions on domestic clinics, 69 the President could not unilaterally apply the Mexico City Policy to domestic NGOs.
Solvency XO Can Give Foreign Aid

The President is authorized to provide aid to foreign countries or organizations for international disaster relief and rehabilitation Defense Threat Reduction Agency January 2007
http://www.dtra.mil/documents/newsservices/deskbook/pdf/FCMLegalDeskbook.pdf 1.1 Congressional Authority to Provide Foreign Assistance The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides authorization for United States Government (USG) foreign aid programs. Unless Congress enacts some other enabling legislation, United States foreign consequence management (FCM) assistance would likely be provided under the authorities established in this act. For example, Section 2292 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) authorizes the President to furnish assistance to any foreign country, international organization, or private voluntary organization, for international disaster relief and rehabilitation following natural as well as manmade disasters such as a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident.1 The types of assistance that may be provided under this section are not enumerated; however, assistance relating to disaster preparedness is expressly approved.
Solvency XO Can Give Foreign Aid

Here is an example of an executive order that establishes an aid policy to Sub-Saharan Africa Reagan 1987
Ronald, 40th president of the USA, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/reagan.html Executive Order 12599--Coordination of economic policies for Sub-Saharan Africa Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12599 of Aug. 12, 1987, appear at 52 FR 30325, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 233, unless otherwise noted. By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and in order to establish procedures for development of a common long-term goal for all United States economic programs and policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Establishment of the Coordinating Committee for Sub-Saharan Africa. (a) There is hereby established a Coordinating Committee for Sub-Saharan Africa ("the Committee"). (b) The Committee shall consist of the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who shall be Chairman; the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, who shall be Co-Chairman; representatives designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce; and representatives of the Office of Management and Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, the Peace Corps, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the United States Trade Representative, the African Development Foundation, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Policy Development. (c) Whenever matters being considered by the Committee may be of interest to Federal agencies not represented on the Committee, the Chairman may invite the head of such agencies to designate representatives to participate in meetings and deliberations of the Committee. (d) The Committee shall operate under the policy direction of the Secretaries of State and the Treasury. (e) All Executive departments and agencies shall keep the Committee informed in necessary detail as to the policies, programs, and activities relating to the functions of the Committee described in section 2. (f) Nothing herein shall be deemed to derogate from the responsibilities of the head of any agency in exercising the responsibilities vested in that person by law. Sec. 2. Functions of the Committee. (a) The Committee shall operate in a manner best deemed appropriate by its Chairman in order to ensure the following: (1) that all United States economic programs and policies for Sub-Saharan Africa are consistent with the goal of ending hunger in the region through economic growth, policy reform, and private sector development; (2) United States economic programs and policies for each country of Sub-Saharan Africa are tailored to the specific needs of that country, consistent with the goal presented in subsection (a)(1) of this section; (3) United States economic programs and policies for Sub-Saharan Africa are fully coordinated within the United States Government prior to implementation with other donors and potential recipients; and, (4) the overall level of aid the United States offers a country of Sub-Saharan Africa is related to continued performance of that country toward the goal presented in subsection (a)(1) of this section or willingness to undertake economic reform. (b) The Committee shall support the Secretaries of State and the Treasury in preparing the annual report to the President required in section 3 of this Order. (c) The Committee shall coordinate the preparation annually of a unified budget justification for transmittal to the Congress. This justification shall encompass all United States economic activities, strategies, and policies for Sub-Saharan Africa. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to affect the statutory authorities of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. (d) The Committee shall encourage and coordinate the alignment of United States food assistance programs in accordance with the goals presented in subsection 2(a) of this Order. (e) The Committee shall encourage and coordinate efforts to mobilize expanded humanitarian and business involvement in Africa, both United States and international, through an outreach effort with appropriate Federal agencies. (f) The Committee shall encourage and coordinate efforts of Federal agencies to expand United States business involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa by targeting trade and investment missions, prefeasibility and feasibility studies, sector and regional analyses, access to credit, and information on trade and investment opportunities in countries undertaking economic reform. Sec. 3. Annual Report to the President. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall make a joint report to the President annually on Sub-Saharan Africa. (b) The annual report shall discuss the economic condition of Sub-Saharan Africa and highlight progress being made in the region toward achieving the goal presented in section 2(a)(1). The annual report shall also affirm that all United States economic programs and policies conform with and support the goal of ending hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa through economic growth and private enterprise development.
Presidential Power Links: Congressional Control of Agencies

Congressional grants of agency independence undermines presidential control over the executive Calabresi, professor of law, 95
The risk of factional domination has been particularly recognized with respect to the well known problem of agency capture. Thus, Professors Miller, Lessig, and Sunstein are especially careful to warn against agency independence in contexts where agency capture by those who are being regulated is a threat. I agree with them on this point, and I further agree that the value and even the possibility of a neutral, expert administration of the laws is open to the highest doubt. But, I would also go somewhat further than I think they have gone and would condemn all attempts to remove law administration from the President's control. As Lessig and Sunstein, in particular, are aware: [agency] independence can be understood as a form of [congressional] aggrandizement. Congress might make agencies independent not to create real independence, but in order to diminish presidential authority over their operations precisely in the interest of subjecting those agencies to the control of congressional committees. Independence, in short, might be a way of increasing legislative power over agencies. 145 To this statement I would only add that I am mortally certain that Congress makes agencies independent for this reason. As I have said before, there are no "independent" [*84] government actors in Washington, D.C. 146 There are only actors influenced by the President, actors influenced by the Congress and its committee shadow governments, and actors who are tugged one way or the other. Anything that weakens the presidential set of incentives and controls strengthens Congress and vice versa. There is no such thing as a truly independent agency in Washington, D.C. 147
Agency independence risks congressional capture Calabresi, professor of law, 95

What I think this means is that agency independence today creates not only a risk of industry or interest group capture of the law execution function, it creates as well the risk of geographic congressional committee interests capturing the law execution function. It creates a risk that a "defense state" senator like Sam Nunn will run the Pentagon (influencing base closings and military employment policy); that a "Wall Street" senator like Patrick Moynihan will gravitate to the head of the Finance Committee where he can lean on the supposedly "independent" Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Department; that a "pork barrel" senator like Robert Byrd (from a poor publicworks dependent state like West Virginia) will gravitate to the head of the Appropriations Committee; that an "automobile state" representive like John Dingell will set national energy policy; that socially liberal and conservative members of Congress like Ted Kennedy, Strom Thurmond, and Orrin Hatch will gravitate to the Judiciary Committee where they can hope to influence what is in effect the "national Bill of Rights policy"; and so on. 148 [*85]
Presidential Power Links: Congressional Control of Agencies

Administration of policy key to executive power Rivkin 93 Adminstrative Law Journal Summer, 1993 7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 309 The Unitary Executive and
Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking NAME: David B. Rivkin, Jr. * , he served (in the Reagan and Bush Administration White House Counsel's Office, the Vice President's Office, and the Departments of Energy and Justice, l/n I think the Vesting Clause of Article II did place the totality of executive power with the President. 53 The majority of the Framers basically subscribed to the view that, to ascertain what powers the President has, all one had to do was look at the specific facets of executive power that were parceled out to Congress, pursuant to Article I's provisions. 54 These exceptions were to be strictly construed; the remainder of the executive power was in the President. 55 I believe that the power to "ex [*319] ecute and administer" is the very essence of executive power, and I am aware of no original document, chronologically close to the date of the Founding, that made any distinctions between the terms "execute" and "administer." Nor am I aware of any political theorists, like Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hobbes, or Machiavelli, all of whom greatly influenced the Framers, who drew any such distinctions. 56
Congressional interference in agency politics leads to balkanization of the executive Rivkin 93 Adminstrative Law Journal Summer, 1993 7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 309 The Unitary Executive and
Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking NAME: David B. Rivkin, Jr. * , he served (in the Reagan and Bush Administration White House Counsel's Office, the Vice President's Office, and the Departments of Energy and Justice, l/n Another argument, often invoked by the critics of presidential regulatory oversight, is that rulemaking is lawmaking when performed by an administrative agency, and lawmaking is still a task that is constitutionally Congress's. 57 To this, my response is simple: rulemakings, when [*320] carried out by executive branch officials, are executive activities. One of the more interesting remaining puzzles is how to reconcile the Unitary Executive paradigm, that I just sketched, with Congress's enumerated power to establish government departments and prescribe rules for the conduct and regulation of government. These powers, taken by themselves, seem to support Professor Sunstein's notion that Congress may "balkanize" the executive branch and divest the President of his ability to control the actions of, for example, the Secretary of Agriculture. But it is an accepted tenet of constitutional interpretation that all constitutional provisions must be construed together, and in a way that does not destroy the meaning of the overall edifice. Even such seemingly absolute congressional powers, such as the Appropriations Clause, 58 or the Necessary and Proper Clause, 59 cannot be read in ways that do violence to other constitutional provisions. 60
Presidential Powers Links: Unitary Executive

Unitary executive key to energy, accountability and presidential power Calabresi, professor of law, 95
I turn first to the Framers' reasons for creating a strong unitary executive and then consider how those reasons bear on the matter of bolstering the national presidential voice of the American people against the regional voice of their representatives in Congress. The Federalist Papers set forth three now classic arguments in favor of the unitary executive created by Article II of the United States Constitution. First, a unitary executive was said to be necessary to ensure energy in government; second, a unitary executive was said to be necessary to ensure accountability for all exercises of executive power; and third, a unitary executive was said to be necessary to enable the President to defend himself from constitutional encroachments on his powers by the legislature. I will briefly summarize the continuing relevance of each of these arguments in order.
Presidential Power Links: Congress Hurts Presidential Power

Congressional process makes appropriations riders inevitable weakening the president Calabresi, professor of law, 95
Second, even aside from the matter of legislative oversight hearings, there exists the matter of the appropriations process. Appropriations hearings by congressional committees and subcommittees are a routine part of everyday life in Washington as, increasingly, are the so-called appropriations "riders" that sometimes come out of those hearings. The appropriations rider may be a highly specific provision of an appropriations bill that seems to use Congress's power of the purse to affect directly the President's exercise of what would otherwise appear to be his core executive powers. Once again, an example that comes to mind may help to illustrate how this process works.
Legal constraints fetter executive powers Crovitz, assistant editor to the Wall Street Journal, 89
(L Gordon, Introduction, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 2) Much of the discussion, therefore, is weighed down with the oppressive sense that after all its earlier successes, the Reagan administration, too, had finally fallen victim to the mysterious political curse that had brought down each of its predecessors of the previous two decades. This curse, of course, relates to the general theme of a fettered executive branch and how legal constraints adversely affect its performance and thus the performance of government generally.
Congressional restraints on the president snowball out of control Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to the Department of State, 89
(Abraham D. Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 21) Finally, changes of this sort in the basic structure of our government jeopardize the president's ability to withstand congressional control over all executive powers, making possible the legislative tyranny that Madison, Hamilton, and the other framers worked to prevent. In considering arrangements such as the War Powers Resolution-to the extent they are effective-a great deal more is at stake than whether we should act militarily in one situation or another. Our legislators are no less aggressive in the endless battle for power than are presidents and those who serve the executive branch. Nothing has happened in history to suggest that the unflattering view of human nature shared by men as diverse in their views as Madison and Hamilton is no longer justified. To the contrary, we now realize that our moral perversity goes beyond even our conscious capacity to perceive.

Congressional micromanagement of foreign policy undermines presidential powers CNN 06 Analysis: Power struggle between Bush, Congress POSTED: 1:42 p.m. EDT, October 27, 2006 By John
King CNN http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/25/king.brokengovernment/index.html "Nixon, Watergate and Vietnam led to a decline in presidential power and an increase in congressional micromanagement of foreign affairs in particular," said John Yoo, a critical behind-the-scenes Justice Department lawyer who spoke to CNN as part of our "Broken Government" series.
Congressional action on military policy undermines presidential powers Ku 06 Associate Professor of Law at Hofstra University Law School. Is There an Exclusive Commander-in-Chief
Power? Julian G. Ku, March 01, 2006 These critics are wrong. As President Clinton recognized, the President does possess an exclusive Commander-in-Chief power that authorizes him to refuse to execute laws and treaties that impermissibly encroach upon his inherent constitutional power. The existence of this exclusive power is supported by the text of the Constitution as well as judicial precedent and the practice of past presidents. Rather than deny its existence, the critics of the Administration should reframe their arguments to define reasonable limitations on the scope of this exclusive but important presidential power. Article II of the Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief. But even without the Commander-in-Chief clause, the President would still be the chief of the armed forces because the President is vested with a general executive power. So what is the purpose of designating him as Commander in Chief? The most sensible textual inference is to read the Commander-in-Chief clause as a constitutional constraint on the other two federal branches, especially Congress, from interfering with the Presidents command of U.S. military forces.
Congressional micromanagement of foreign policy undermines presidential flexibility Crovitz, assistant editor to the Wall Street Journal, 89
(L Gordon, Introduction, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 6) Virtually all contributors to this volume were mindful of this reality, often giving little attention to other aspects of the problem. Many tend to treat law as essentially a shorthand term for the power of lawmakers in Congress and discretion as power under the control of the president. The abstract issue of law versus discretion thus is often treated as the balance of power between the two political branches. The frustrations of the Reagan administration are generally described in terms primarily of an excess of congressional muscle flexing or an excess of congressional ambition to manage the details of policy rather than as an excess of "law."

Congressionally mandated foreign policy undermines presidential flexibility Weinberger, former Secretary of State, 89
(Casper, Dangerous Constraints on the Presidents War Powers, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 99)
Worse than the confusion is the signal it sends of a lack of American resolve. I am not sure that that is the signal we want to send to the Ayatollah, the Soviet Union, NATO, or any of our other allies. In the collegial chambers of the Senate and House, exercises in foreign policy making makes for rousing debate. But when the time comes to act, all too frequently the debate ends in indecision, contradiction, or inconclusiveness. Congressional measures can enfeeble the presidency Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p.226) . Next the chapter catalogs some of the ways in which Congress has eroded presidential power, through a variety of "complicated and indirect measures," weakening the president, enhancing the strength of the legislature, and producing the kind of enfeebled, disorganized, and unaccountable executive establishment feared by the framers.

Need to minimize congressional involvement in foreign policy Calabresi, professor of law, 95
(Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 ARTICLE: Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive NAME: Steven G. Calabresi * Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, l/n)
It is one thing to say that one region of the country should not be burdened with the disproportionate costs of war, embargo, trade sanctions, or defense build-up without national legislative involvement. It is quite another thing to say that the costs having been allocated and the policy having been set, one region of the country should get to implement national policy in a way that is skewed to its own peculiar needs and concerns. National foreign policy, defense policy, and trade policy must be implemented with national majoritarian concerns in mind and minimal legislative oversight and micromanagment on matters that are fairly administrative. Congressional committee involvement has to begin and end with policy setting. It is the President's responsibility to make sure that it does.
Congressional restraints on executive foreign policy risks war- weakens our allies and emboldens our enemies Weinberger, former Secretary of State, 89
(Casper, Dangerous Constraints on the Presidents War Powers, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 97) With this in mind, one must recognize that the history of the country shows without any doubt that the primary responsibility for international affairs and foreign policy lies with the president. The founders placed this responsibility with the president because they had a far different view of presidential power than did the legislators who enacted the War Powers Act. Hamilton, of course, argued in The Federalist that the prime characteristic of the presidency is energy. By that, of course, he meant the capacity for prompt, unambiguous, and decisive action. In the conduct of foreign affairs, among the greatest errors that can be made are indecision, delay, or frequent shifts in policy. These weaknesses quickly dispirit our allies. They send a signal of weakness that encourages our foes and invites aggression. A body whose principal strength is debate, working out compromises, or forming or determining consensus and that is under constant pressure for favorable political support will necessarily lack an ability-or even a willingness-to act decisively in a way that may be thought unpopular. This is not to say that public opinion should be flouted, but some situations require quick action, where debate and deliberation, which are the strengths of the Congress, cannot occur without potentially serious consequences to the nation's very ability to survive.

Congress legislation hampers effectiveness of the Executive Branch Yoo et al 05
(Iowa Law Review January, 2005 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601 ARTICLE: The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004 NAME: Christopher S. Yoo*, Steven G. Calabresi** & Anthony J. Colangelo*** * Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. ** Professor of Law, Northwestern University. *** Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, l/n)
Bush also asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing the regulatory review program established by Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 during the Reagan Administration. Bush supplemented these Executive Orders by creating an interagency task force known as the Council on Competitiveness, which was charged with coordinating regulatory policy and mediating disputes arising between OIRA and the agencies during the [*707] regulatory review process. n691 Through this mechanism, the Bush White House was able to exert its control over the entire executive branch in an extremely effective manner. David Lewis reports that the Council on Competitiveness so irked Congress that in "1992, the House voted to delete funding for the salaries of staffers on the council, but the Senate restored the funds when President Bush threatened a veto." n692
Congressional involvement in foreign policy hurts presidential powers Calabresi 95 Arkansas Law Review 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 ARTICLE: Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive NAME: Steven G. Calabresi * * Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, l/n Second, some Presidentialists claim that changed circumstances have given the President too little control over the administration of the government, particularly in the area of foreign policy. Thus it is said that Congress has taken to micromanaging all of the executive departments (including those charged with running our foreign policy which is said to be the President's exclusive prerogative) through the holding of oversight hearings and by the attaching of extraneous riders to bills that the President cannot veto without shutting the government down. 30 This whole effort is greatly enhanced by the enormous growth in recent years in the size of the congressional staff. The thousands and thousands of congressional employees today run circles around the 3000 or so presidential appointees, making it nearly impossible for the President to administer the government as originally contemplated.
Presidential Powers Links: XO Increases Pres Power

Exercise of executive powers key to powerful president Cross, associate director, Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies, 90
(Frank B. Cross, associate director, Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies, HOUSTON LAW REVIEW, vol. 27,1990, p. 694-5.) History confirms the value of executive vigor. Those Presidents regarded as the greatest are typically those who made the greatest use of Presidential power. Summarizing a survey of Presidential "greatness," Arthur Schlesinger observed that "every one of [the great Presidents] left the Executive branch stronger and more influential than he found it." Conversely, Presidents who have hesitated to exercise Presidential power have "turned out to be the least respected Presidents." Presidential vigor may not always be essential to our nation's well-being, but a reservoir of vigorous power may be critical at certain times. Vigorous Presidential direction of the executive is especially important in a time of crisis. Had America lacked "a single hand at the helm, it is far from clear that our national government could have responded decisively to the great exigencies (e.g., the Civil War, Great Depression) facing our nation . . . ." Political analysts have identified a cyclical ebb and flow of Presidential powers, responding to public demand and exigencies of crises. In times of changing technological capabilities and values, "it is all the more important to protect the remaining potential for executive energy."
Assertive presidents lead best Cronin 99

(Mark, Brookings Institution, The Paradoxes Of The American Presidency, p.55) The strategic governance of the strong President thus will take into account what may be achieved through the administrative presidency and what may need to be done through a legislative presidency, just as it will attend to what lawfully may be accomplished administratively in the implementation of new legislation. Not only the President but also his subordinates, in the White House and the departments and agencies, must think both administratively and legislatively. And so must the White House systems the President establishes to help him govern.
Executive orders demonstrate presidential leadership LeRoy, Professor of political science, 96

(Michael Illinois, Boston College Law Review, March, 1996, l/n) The diffusing thing of still other orders was their lofty character, which may have put them above the plane of political discourse and debate. Roosevelt's orders putting government in the delicate position of effectively approving labor agreements illustrate this point. Rhetorical flourishes filled lengthy policy preambles, putting the nation above seemingly crass self-interest. They also expressed unifying appeals. In short, they were drafted as if to be read from a patriotic pulpit set high above political parties and ordinary politicians. It is hard to imagine legislation with more effective moral incantations than these orders, Their overarching appeals were more suited to the public's recognition of the President, and not the Congress, as the nation's leader.

Presidential action key to overcome current leadership blocks Rose 97
(John Rose, Professor at Sacred Heart, The American Presidency Under Siege, 1997, p. 110 ) Quite often, writers identify the nature of the political system as the principal factor behind the disturbing pattern of failed presidencies. Forrest McDonald, one of the nation's preeminent American historians, states: "The presidency is often described as the most powerful office in the world. That is the stuff of nonsense. Power is the capacity to do things, to cause one's will to be transformed into action, and by that criterion the president has precious little power."
Getting things done necessary to regain power Campbell, Professor at Oxford, 98

(Richard Campbell, The Us Presidency In Crisis, 1998, p.220 ) In examining these leaders the conclusion that our systems have encountered considerable slippage in the capacity of leaders to deliver appears inescapable. And much of the responsibility seems to rest with the leaders themselves. Generally, it appears that style has supplanted substance.
Executive energy needed for effective leadership Rose 97

(John Rose, Professor at Sacred Heart, The American Presidency Under Siege, 1997, p.114) The fourth prerequisite of Hamilton's "energy in the executive" has become problematic for the modem presidencythe need for "competent power." In Federalist #73-7, Hamilton devoted a substantial amount of attention to those presidential powers he considered essential for dynarhic national leadership. Such powers, in Hamilton's view, included the ability to veto Proposed legislation, the capacity to serve as the nation's commander-in-chief, the authority to negotiate treaties, and the power of appointment.

Assertiveness key to presidential leadership Rose 97
(John Rose, Professor at Sacred Heart, The American Presidency Under Siege, 1997, p.10) Richard E. Neustadt, professor of Government at Harvard University whose seminal work on the American presidency essentially redefined the meaning of presidential power, views presidential authority this way: "Weakness is still what I see: weakness in the sense of a great gap between what is expected of a man (or someday woman) and assured capacity to carry though. Expectations rise and clerkly tasks increase, while prospects for sustained Support from any quarter worsen as foreign alliances loosen and Political parties wane.
Executive order boosts presidential power - it shows who's in charge Woodward 90

(Mary, University of New Mexico Law Librarian, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES QUARTERLY, 1990, p. 127) While many presidents flexed their executive muscle by issuing EOs, [Executive Orders] they also issued other directives with the effect of EOs. Sometimes these directive we known as EOs or Proclamations and sometimes they were not; still they all fell under the general classification of executive directives and seemed to establish who was in charge.

Executive energy needed for effective leadership Rose 97
(John Rose, Professor at Sacred Heart, The American Presidency Under Siege, 1997, p.114) His contention that "energy in the executive" is absolutely essential for sound national leadership is among the many classic passages of the Federalist papers: Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks, it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.
Expanding president's role key to power Cronin 99

(Mark, Brookings Institution, The Paradoxes Of The American Presidency, p.34 The president has vast responsibilities, with high public expectations and limited power resources. But as an institution, the presidency has proven to be elastic; it stretches to accommodate skilled leaders in situations of high opportunity, but contracts to them in less skilled leaders. Noting the variable nature of the power potential in the presidency, Robert Dahl has write, "The Presidency is like a family dwelling that each new generation alters and enlarges. Confronted by some new need, a President adds on a new room, a new wing; what began as a modest dwelling has become a mansion; every President may not use every room, but the rooms are available in case of need."
Presidential Powers Links: Courts

Court Decisions dangerously hurt presidential policy and undermine efforts to fight the war on terror Eggen 04
(Dan. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Nov 13, 2004. pg. A.06 ProQuest) Attorney General John D. Ashcroft said yesterday that federal courts have endangered national security by ruling against the Bush administration on issues related to the war on terrorism. In his first public remarks since he announced Tuesday that he would resign, Ashcroft told a meeting of conservative lawyers here that court decisions limiting President Bush's powers are part of "a profoundly disturbing trend" in which the judicial branch is injecting itself into matters that should be up to the executive branch. "The danger I see here is that intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing of presidential determinations in these critical areas can put at risk the very security of our nation in a time of war," Ashcroft said in a speech at the Federalist Society's national convention. He added later: "Our nation and our liberty will be all the more in jeopardy as the tendency for judicial encroachment and ideological micromanagement are applied to the sensitive domain of national defense." Anthony D. Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, which has frequently criticized the attorney general, said the remarks were reminiscent of Ashcroft's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001, when he said criticism of administration antiterrorism policies "only aids terrorists."

Judicial interference must be limited to protect the president and all of civilization BORK AND RIVKIN 05
(Robert H. and David B. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Jan 21, 2005. pg. A.17 ProQuest) As speculation mounts about President Bush's nominees to the federal judiciary, and particularly to the Supreme Court, one factor that should be of paramount importance is too often overlooked. Curbing or reversing the Supreme Court's usurpation of so many domestic issues is crucial. But perhaps even more important is avoiding judicial micromanagement of America's war against radical Islamic terrorists. Already there are disturbing signs of judicial overreaching that is constitutionally illegitimate and, in practical terms, potentially debilitating. Rasul v. Bush, on the other hand, was a disaster for the war effort. Aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, not a part of the United States or within the jurisdiction of any federal court, were held to have a right to a habeas petition. The result would seem to be that captured alien combatants held by the U.S. military anywhere in the world can henceforth litigate their status in federal courts. Nearly 70 years ago, the court held in a famous decision (Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. v. United States) that the executive branch's extensive prerogatives in foreign affairs are grounded in its unique expertise, information and unitary nature. Courts have neither the constitutional authority nor the expertise and information to override the president's determinations on issues such as whether we are in armed conflict or what kind of anti-terrorist cooperation we should engage in with foreign governments. For obvious reasons, the executive cannot share all the relevant information with judges. Nor has the judiciary the necessary unitary nature, unless every case is decided by the Supreme Court. Thus, in addition to fighting legal battles in court, the administration would be well-advised to make a far stronger public case for its detention policies, which are designed not only to prevent enemy combatants from returning to fight against us but also to obtain intelligence that might save the lives of American soldiers and civilians as well as shorten the war. Although current detention and interrogation procedures can surely be improved, and additional safeguards against abuses should be adopted, these ought to be matters for the political branches. Freezing policies through constitutional rulings should be a last resort. The executive and Congress, as circumstances change and experience accumulates, can debate and resolve in a flexible manner the policy imperatives of individual liberty and America's reputation overseas, on one hand, vs. the demands of collective safety. But in doing so they must avoid trampling on the president's constitutional prerogatives. Congress should not lay down detailed prescriptions on what interrogation techniques are appropriate. And it should resist the temptation to grandstand; passing exhortations against torture is not the way to proceed. Sensitivity to these matters and the crucial but limited role of the judiciary should be taken into account in the choice of nominees to the courts and in the confirmation process. Too much is riding on the outcome of this war -ultimately, perhaps, the survival of Western societies -- to choose judges who are unaware of the complexities of what is at stake.

Judicial Oversight Destroys Presidential Powers Ashcroft 2004, (John, Former attorney General, REMARKS BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT
AT THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY CONVENTION, Federal News Service, 11/12/2004) I regret to say, however, that we are now confronted by a profoundly disturbing trend in our national political life, and that is the growing tendency of the judicial branch to inject itself into the areas of executive action that were originally assigned to the discretion of the president in the Constitution. These encroachments include some of the most fundamental aspects of the president's conduct of the war on terrorism. These days it seems that some are unwilling to accept an idea fundamental to our Constitution -- the idea that there are certain decisions the framers reserved to our elected and accountable president, who stands accountable, has the flexibility and the agility to act, and upon whose actions the people have the right to speak regularly. Yet, despite centuries of constitutional and judicial precedent, judicial activists refuse to acknowledge the constitutional design of our government, which gives deference to the president's interpretation of treaties. They have dismissed as somehow illegitimate or tainted the factual findings that the president makes in carrying out his duty to enforce our treaties. In some cases, they have found new and expansive private rights in treaties where they never existed. As the Federalist Society has shown in its own research and review, ideologically driven courts have disregarded and dismissed the president's evaluations of foreign policy concerns in favor of theories generated by academic elites, foreign bodies, and judicial imagination. Now, these innovations conflict with the original vision of the framers. They throw out the collective wisdom and humility of judges of past generations, and they threaten the president's constitutional responsibility to defend American lives and liberties. Since the time of the Jay Treaty in the opening days of the Republic, it has been understood that it is the president who is given the essential and primary role in the making of all treaties and other international agreements for the United States. The president is the first judge of the meaning of those agreements, and his interpretations are owed deference by the courts. In defending President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, for example, Hamilton declared that -- and I quote -- "the president is the constitutional executor of our laws. Our treaties and the laws of nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning." Close quote. Moreover, the idea that a treaty must be judicially enforceable if the executive branch views itself as bound by the treaty, in the absence of implementing legislation, flies against the century's old understanding of treaties. Chief Justice Marshall put it this way in 1829; he said -- and I quote -- "When the terms of the treaty import a contract, whether either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political not to the judicial department." That's wisdom on the part of John Marshall. The danger I see here is that intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing of presidential determinations in these critical areas of treaties can put at risk the very security of our nation in a time of war.
Presidential Powers: Uniqueness

Presidential Power high now. Lee Iacocca, 2007, an American industrialist,
http://www.bordersstores.com/features/feature.jsp?file=wherehavealltheleadersgone, Where Have All the Leaders Gone? A leader has to be a person of character. That means knowing the difference between right and wrong and having the guts to do the right thing. Abraham Lincoln once said, "If you want to test a man's character, give him power." George Bush has a lot of power. What does it say about his character? Bush has shown a willingness to take bold action on the world stage because he has the power, but he shows little regard for the grievous consequences. He has sent our troops (not to mention hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi citizens) to their deathsfor what? To build our oil reserves? To avenge his daddy because Saddam Hussein once tried to have him killed? To show his daddy he's tougher? The motivations behind the war in Iraq are questionable, and the execution of the war has been a disaster. A man of character does not ask a single soldier to die for a failed policy.
Presidential powers are at an all time high. Melinda Wenner, July 3, 2007, Special to LiveScience,
http://fe4.news.sp1.yahoo.com/s/livescience/20070703/sc_livescience/presidentialpowerat60yearhigh Presidential power is spiraling out of control, making George W. Bush the most powerful American leader since at least WWII, according to a new analysis. But the current president, now entangled in a controversy over his recent decision to assert Executive Privilege, cant take full credit for the power grab, the researchers argue. A number of factors have converged over the past 60 years to turn the American presidency into a position of incredible influence that has a negative effect on American politics and which won't change just because someone else takes charge of the White House.
Bush has unprecedented levels of presidential power Allen 07 Brooklyn Law Review Spring, 2007 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871 ARTICLE: George W. Bush and the
Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change NAME: Michael P. Allen + + Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; l/n Yet the fact that the Bush administration's effort is not unique does not mean that the current debate concerning its assertions of power is merely a regurgitation of arguments from the past. First, the modern presidency is a far more powerful office than the presidency during much of the country's history. Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt simply did not hold in their hands the type of power President Bush possesses. Second, while I have indicated that the assertions of presidential power go beyond the "war on terror," the ever-present fear of terrorism (whether real, imagined or somewhere in between 18) has a significant impact on executive power more generally. For example, President Bush's reservoir of power has been enhanced in the post-9/11 world, making him more powerful in some measure than even his closest contemporary in office, Bill Clinton. Indeed, September 11th has served as a catalyst (or excuse) for arguments in favor of expanding presidential power that might not otherwise have been possible.
Pres powers high now, but Congressional action could erode it Christian Science Monitor 07 July 3 SECTION: USA; Pg. 2 HEADLINE: Bush and Congress locked in
power dispute BYLINE: Gail Russell Chaddock Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor l/n "It feels like a climactic moment," says Julian Zelizer, a congressional historian at Princeton University. "The Bush administration has been about presidential power since they took office - even before 9/11." "We've seen a push by Vice President Cheney to reverse everything that happened in the 1970s and fully restore the powers of the presidency. Now, Congress is responding to what he has done," he adds.

Pres Powers are high now Rivkin and Casey 06, David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New
York, N.Y.: Jun 30, 2006. pg. A.12 The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, invalidating for now the use of military commissions to try al Qaeda and associated detainees, may be a setback for U.S. policy in the war on terror. But it is a setback with a sterling silver lining. All eight of the justices participating in this case agreed that military commissions are a legitimate part of the American legal tradition that can, in appropriate circumstances, be used to try and punish individuals captured in the war on terror. Moreover, nothing in the decision suggests that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay must, or should, be closed. Indeed, none of the justices questioned the government's right to detain Salim Ahmed Hamdan (once Osama bin Laden's driver), or other Guantanamo prisoners, while hostilities continue. Nor did any of them suggest that Mr. Hamdan, or any other Guantanamo detainee, must be treated as civilians and accorded a speedy trial in the civilian courts. Precisely because opponents of the Bush administration's detention policies have advanced these, or substantially similar claims, Hamdan has dealt them a decisive defeat. Together with the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld -- directly affirming the government's right to capture and detain, without criminal charge or trial, al Qaeda and allied operatives until hostilities are concluded -Hamdan vindicates the basic legal architecture relied upon by the administration in prosecuting this war.
Bush expanding powers now. IndependentCourt, January, 17, 2006, a project of The Coalition for a Fair & Independent Judiciary,
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:6T1cVFiPWUJ:www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Behind_20the_20Headlines.pdf%3FdocID%3D1000+cou rts+increase+presidential+powers+-blog&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us, Behind the Headlines Alito reads the Constitution and finds more power for the government and fewer rights for individuals. This apparent indifference to individual rights is disturbing. It runs counter to American history, which proves that human rights are won through political and legal struggle. Alito's point of view has implications beyond the hot-button issues that dominated the hearings. For example, he has not been sympathetic to the rights of individuals or interest groups to bring environmental lawsuits. This fits his perceived judicial philosophy, favoring institutions more than individuals. Alito's apparent sympathy for a more powerful executive is especially worrisome in this regard. George Bush has pushed presidential power to levels not imagined by any of his predecessors, and a Supreme Court sympathetic to that position could give him license to go farther.
Bush expanding powers now. Scott Shane and Adam Liptak, September 30, 2006, Journalists for New York Times,
http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/64/22870, Detainee Bill Shifts Power to President Rather than reining in the formidable presidential powers Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have asserted since Sept. 11, 2001, the law gives some of those powers a solid statutory foundation. In effect it allows the president to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely and interrogate them albeit with a ban on the harshest treatment beyond the reach of the full court reviews traditionally afforded criminal defendants and ordinary prisoners. Taken as a whole, the law will give the president more power over terrorism suspects than he had before the Supreme Court decision this summer in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that undercut more than four years of White House policy. It does, however, grant detainees brought before military commissions limited protections initially opposed by the White House. The bill, which cleared a final procedural hurdle in the House on Friday and is likely to be signed into law next week by Mr. Bush, does not just allow the president to determine the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions; it also strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to his interpretation.

Bush has consistently enforced unitary executive policies Yoo et al 05
Despite the political controversy that accompanied Bush's accession to the presidency, Bush emphatically endorsed the unitariness of the executive branch. His defense of the president's sole authority over the administration [*723] of the law was evident in his signing statements, in which he relied on unitary executive theory to continue the objections raised by previous Presidents to the legislative veto, 783 independent agencies, 784 the insulation inspectors general from presidential control, 785 and attempts to vest executive functions in the Comptroller General. 786 He also used his signing statements to oppose congressional attempts to limit OMB review of regulatory initiatives, 787 to control the resolution of interagency disputes, 788 to direct the actions of subordinate executive officers, 789 to limit the president's untrammeled power over prosecutions, 790 and other efforts to micromanage executive affairs. 791 Bush also invoked the unitary executive to [*724] oppose congressional attempts to limit his exercise of the president's Commander-in-Chief and foreign affairs powers by placing limits on the manner certain troops could be used 792 or by attempting to direct the Administration to adopt certain foreign policy positions. 793 In addition, the President repeatedly insisted that congressional requests that executive agencies submit legislative proposals 794 or reports 795 did not interfere with [*725] the president's ability to exert sole control over the affairs of the executive branch. Bush also routinely included clauses in his executive orders requiring that they be implemented in a manner consistent with "the President's constitutional authority to ... supervise the unitary executive branch." 796 And his Administration staunchly protected the autonomy of the executive branch in the courts. 797
Bush administration will continue to defend unitary executive Yoo et al 05

The fact the Bush Administration has made such extraordinary claims of presidential power - claims that go way beyond a claim of control over the removal and law execution powers defended in this Article - shows that there has been no acquiescence in any diminution in presidential power during the Administration of George W. Bush. The fact that at times Bush may have pushed an overly vigorous view of presidential power that expanded far beyond the logical boundaries of the unitary executive implicitly confirms his determination to defend the prerogatives of the executive branch.
Bush administration has locked in executive power Tobias 07 Prof of Law at Richmond Christian Science Monitor March 27, 2007, SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 9
HEADLINE: The battle over executive privilege BYLINE: Carl Tobias The Bush administration's defense of executive privilege is part of its broader program to magnify presidential power. This approach has provided the framework for many White House initiatives, from energy policy to the NSA domestic surveillance program. It's not an effort the Bush team will easily jettison. Nor will future administrations. The era of the "imperial presidency" continues.
Mid-terms loss did not limit presidential power Krugman 07 The New York Times January 19, 2007 SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 23
HEADLINE: Surging And Purging BYLINE: By PAUL KRUGMAN, l/n The broader context is this: defeat in the midterm elections hasn't led the Bush administration to scale back its imperial view of presidential power. On the contrary, now that President Bush can no longer count on Congress to do his bidding, he's more determined than ever to claim essentially unlimited authority -whether it's the authority to send more troops into Iraq or the authority to stonewall investigations into his own administration's conduct.
Presidential Powers Impacts

Strong executive powers are needed to protect against foreign attacks Crovitz, assistant editor to the Wall Street Journal, 89
(L Gordon, Introduction, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 1) This book addresses the proliferation of legal constraints on policy making in the executive branch of the federal government and highlights the risks and dangers this poses for public policy. To some extent, this subject is as old as the republic. The Federalist calls "energy" in the executive branch "a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws." Energy encompasses many virtues-the ability to move quickly, to alter course, to maneuver amid changing conditions. Laws that limit executive discretion reduce the protections of individual liberty and equally cripple the efficient pursuit of national goals. Good government requires a vibrant executive branch free of improper constraints.
Strong president key to peace Weinberger, former Secretary of State, 89

(Casper, Dangerous Constraints on the Presidents War Powers, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 101) Our responsibilities and capabilities as a superpower are fundamental to the powers of the presidency but are now being challenged in an impractical, risky, and unconstitutional way. Unless this issue is resolved, our presidents will not be able to fulfill their intended role. Consequently the United States will not be able to take the actions that can keep our freedom and our peace.
Good Presidents Require Power Cronin President of Whitman College, Political Scientist and Genovese Professor of Political Science, 04
(Thomas, Michael The Paradoxes of the American Presidency), Pg. 110 Thus, Presidential Power held out hope that a shrewd and artfully manipulative leader could and would be a powerful Hamiltonian engine of change. An aggressive, ambitious politician, determined to get his way and ever distrustful of the motives of others, seemed to be the remedy for the post Eisenhower years. Neustadt concluded that a key problem of the presidency at the time was how the presidency could regain control over the drifting Washington Policy apparatus. Forceful leadership was needed, and only the president could fill the leadership vacuum.
Presidential Powers Impacts

Energy in the executive key to preventing foreign attacks Calabresi, professor of law, 95
The Framers of the Constitution of 1787 believed adamantly that some degree of energy was absolutely vital both to good government generally and to good execution of the laws in particular. Alexander Hamilton stated the case for energy in the executive memorably in The Federalist No. 70: Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes [*38] of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome. 37 Energy in the executive is defended here as being essential for both foreign policy reasons and to protect the polity as a whole from factional strife. Thus, Hamilton clearly stated that a single strong leader is vital to protect both property and "the steady administration of the laws" from efforts by ambitious individuals or seditious classes to get their own way at the public's expense.
Presidential Powers Impact: Budget Train wreck

Strong/unitary president key to preventing budgetary trainwrecks Calabresi, professor of law, 95
The key point, however, is that I do not believe either side has even remotely begun to perceive the most important and relevant way in which circumstances have changed since the Revolution of 1937. The key difference is that while federal lawmaking and spending powers have grown astronomically, the electoral system and the set of incentives that it creates have stayed essentially the same. Put another way, the size, and even the content and nature, of the federal pie have changed beyond recognition since the New Deal, but the incentive structure for pie division is almost exactly the same as it was 200 years ago. The net result, I will argue below, is an unmitigated redistributive disaster that no one would defend if they thought about it and that as a practical matter can only be ameliorated by strengthening presidential power, at the very least in the four limited ways argued for by Presidentialists above. To clarify this point, suppose we assume that a very significant goal of presidents and members of Congress is to please the constituency that elected them by rewarding that constituency with federal largesse and by shielding it from federal burdens and obligations. The optimal electoral structure for an individual officeholder who sought to accomplish this goal would be one where the constituency he represented would be as small and as distinct as possible relative to the size and population of the country as a whole. As is well known, this results in a situation where burdens and obligations can be placed on the country as a whole, while a disproportionate share of the resulting largesse is funnelled back to a particular constituency which then has a financial interest in reelecting its member of Congress "provider". Now imagine a whole Congress of such officeholders, all of whose careers depend in significant part on their abil [*35] ity to get back more for their small electoral constituency than their constituents pay in. The net result is a collective action problem in which every member of Congress's career depends on an ability to be ever more creative in funnelling federal resources back to their constituencies while imposing the cost in federal taxes, borrowing, or regulation on someone else's constituency or on the nation as a whole. The collective action problem exists because most of the constituencies might be better off with less largesse and lower levels of taxation, borrowing, and regulation. But no member of Congress will dare vote for this absent an effective mechanism of collective enforcement for fear that other members of Congress will cheat and will continue to steer national pork to their local interests. The only official with any incentive under our present electoral structure to stop this game is the President who is (along with the Vice President) our only nationally elected official. 33 Representing as he does a national electoral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources toward the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again), thereby mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of Congress. In fact, most modern presidents probably see their potential electoral base as comprehending up to 60% of all voters 34 and perhaps as many as 90% of all state electoral college votes. 35 Moreover, elections over the last thirty years suggest that virtually every state in the nation is in fact in play in these contests. Thus, the President is our only constitutional backstop against the redistributive collective action problem described above. [*36] Now how does this fact bear on the quite different fact that because of a change in circumstances since 1937 the federal government has grown exponentially in wealth and power? Well, in brief, the huge increase in the amount of federal largesse has greatly exacerbated the collective action problem created by the congressional electoral system. It has transformed members of Congress into constituent service agents whose raison d'etre is to recover for their constituencies as much federal largesse as possible, even if the end result is only to set off a race with other members of Congress that ultimately intensifies the growth in the size of the federal pie thereby requiring ever higher levels of constituent service. The only practicable way out of this situation is to strengthen presidential power and unitariness. 36 The essential ingredient to combating the congressional collective action problem is the President's national voice, because he, and he alone, speaks for the entire American people.
Presidential Powers: Key to War on Terror

Sole presidential control of foreign policy is essential to combating terrorism Lansford and Pauly 03 Tom Lansford received his Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va.
Currently he is an assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast Campus. Robert J. Pauly, Jr., holds a Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, He is adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and Midlands Technical College. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_04-06/lansfordpauly_exec/lansfordpauly_exec.html Furthermore, American foreign policy is rooted in the notion of the sole organ theory which holds that the president is the sole source of foreign and security policy.15 This theory has served as the underpinning for the dramatic twentieth-century expansion of executive power. For instance, the Supreme Court decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936) gave executive agreements the weight of law (and thereby bypassed the senatorial approval required of treaties), while Goldwater v. Carter (1979) confirmed the ability of the president to withdraw from international treaties without congressional consent.16 The result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military throughout the nations history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased preference by both the executive and the legislature for such actions.17 One feature of this trend was consistency in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the United States experienced divided government, with the White House controlled by one political party and all or half of the Congress controlled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop and implement foreign and security policy with only limited constraints.18 Given the nature of the terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, such policy habits proved useful since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic in terms of the specific identification of the foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat operations beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq.
Presidential Powers: War Scenarios

Prez power solves India Pakistan, North Korea, Middle East nuclear wars South China Morning Post 00, 12-11-00, p. L/N
A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.
Indo pak war = global nuclear war Washington Times 01, The most dangerous place, 7-8-01, p. L/N
The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
Korean war = destruction of planet Lee, 9-13-99, Is Kim Jong Il About To Give Away His Last Trump Card?,
http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/lee0913.htm Meanwhile, Kim Dae Jung should tell his Japanese friends to keep their mouth shut and tone down their antiNorth Korea rhetoric. Kim should hire specialists on American legal terms - fight fire with fire - lawyers against lawyers. As long as Kim is represented by amateurs, he will be clobbered by America's Harvard lawyers - the most bright, cunning and vicious negotiators on Earth, the consummate masters of forked-tongues. The Korean peninsula sits on an atomic powder keg and any misstep will ignite it into a global NBC war and tens of millions of people - Koreans, Japanese, Chinese and Americans - will die horrible death. The Earth day after will not be suitable for human habitation.
Presidential Powers: War Scenarios

Middle east war = global nuclear war John Steinbach, March 2002, Centre for Research on Globalisation
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
Presidential Powers: Key to Leadership/Foreign Policy

An active foreign policy requires a strong president Crovitz, assistant editor to the Wall Street Journal, 89
(L Gordon, Introduction, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 7) In the nature of world affairs and our constitutional scheme, an active foreign policy requires an active president. Even were Congress eager to see an interventionist foreign policy, it could do little to achieve this beyond leaving the president a great deal of maneuvering room and urging him to use it. But a Congress inclined toward passivity and restraint in foreign affairs is inherently better situated to achieve its ends because legal constraints on the executive branch can certainly inhibit action. For liberal Democrats in Congress in the 1980s, the ambitions of their party were very well matched with the opportunities afforded by their institutional place.
Strong executive best for foreign policy Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 228) Thus the delegates in Philadelphia were familiar with governments with powerful legislatures, which tended to strangle government through preoccupation with trivia, and with impotent, divided executives. When they turned to the task of describing the qualities they intended to establish in the executive component of the new national government, several criteria were repeatedly expressed: "energy [or vigor,] dispatch and responsibility. 1113 In short, the framers expected the executive power of the new government to ensure strong, decisive, efficient, and accountable decision making.
Flexible president powers needed due to the shifting tides of foreign policy Bork, professor of law, 89
(Robert, JMU, Foreword, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. xi-xii) Since we would and should condemn a president who tried to freeze Congress's powers with such a proclamation, shouldn't we also condemn a Congress that did the same to the power of the president as commander in chief and as the nation's leader in foreign affairs to use armed forces abroad? The conduct of foreign policy often requires that troops be committed to action or be placed in areas where hostilities may commence. The president's powers are not susceptible of definition in advance. Changes in power relations, the shifting nature of alliances and adversarial postures, and, most certainly, the rapid development of military technologies mean that he must often act in ways that no one can foresee even a day in advance, much less in the ages to come.
Presidential Powers: Key to Foreign Policy

State of the world makes strong president more important than ever Bork, professor of law, 89
(Robert, JMU, Foreword, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. ix) The chapters contained in this volume demonstrate that the office of the president of the United States has been significantly weakened in recent years and that Congress is largely, but not entirely, responsible. Some recent presidents have failed to defend their office's prerogatives, allowing Congress to establish easements across the constitutional powers of the presidency that time and use may make permanent. This is a deeply worrisome development, for America has usually prospered most in eras of strong presidents, and the state of today's world makes the capacity for strong executive action more important than ever.
Executive branch produces more consistent and better policy Crovitz, assistant editor to the Wall Street Journal, 89
(L Gordon, Introduction, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 10)
Two hundred years later it remains a very plausible-and perhaps proven-argument that the executive branch is more capable of developing consistent and considered policy direction than Congress. The top officials of the executive all owe their allegiance to the winner of one national election; Congress derives its authority from 535 local elections, and none of its members can easily force the others to cooperate in a common scheme. This argument for forceful executive authority is at its strongest, however, only where the actual direction of public policy is already agreed on by all concerned. This is not an argument likely to impress those who strongly disagree with the policies of the incumbent administration. But then, of course, appeals to constitutional requirements are appeals precisely intended to avoid partisan differences. A constitutional system presupposes that legal obligations will be honored by all parties, regardless of the immediate consequences. Congress ill suited for foreign affairs- need executive discretion Weinberger, former Secretary of State, 89
(Casper, Dangerous Constraints on the Presidents War Powers, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 101) But many in Congress seem to want something beyond consultation: they really want to run foreign policy. Yet Congress is not a body designed to deal with rapidly moving day-to-day events that are the hallmark of foreign policy and national security. It is an inherent and perfectly proper part of our system for lengthy debate to be held and consensus reached on all kinds of domestic policy. It is perfectly proper for the president to have to report to the Congress and to the American people. It is also proper, nevertheless, as the founders directed, that the president have the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and that he not be fettered in a way that prevents him from fulfilling this duty.
Presidential Powers: Key to Foreign Policy

Executive is a better policymaker than Congress Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 226) The first section of this chapter explores the framers' decision to vest all executive power in a single individual, partly to ensure that executive decisions would be effective and efficient, partly to provide strength to counterbalance the power of the legislature, and partly to focus responsibility and accountability.
Strong Presidential Powers are key to a unified government that can exercise world leadership Paul 1998 (Joel, Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, July, California Law Review, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=c53d3a5b7f084178c546eb3113303f62 &_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVk&_md5=c1139bb13bd20ed14010bf09198e7860, lexisnexis)
The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in power from Congress to the executive. "Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to implement integrated and responsible [*748] policy." 389 In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a powerful executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the new world environment, the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy took precedence over the deliberative process: Executive officers, who are charged with the task of conducting negotiations with other governments, must be able to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, without being subjected to delays, obstructions, and disintegrating efforts by minorities... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly characteristic of past eras when economic and political change proceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the interests of the United States. 390
Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Now

Bush administration has perfected the Unitary Executive model Kelly 05 Rethinking Presidential PowerThe Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency. Paper
prepared for the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association April 7-10, 2005 Chicago, IL Christopher S. Kelley, Ph.D. Department of Political Science Miami University http://www.pegc.us/archive/Unitary%20Executive/kelly_unit_exec_and_bush.pdf This section will focus on how the unitary executive has been perfected in the current Bush presidency. I will start by demonstrating just how the Bush team approached the challenges of governing after the 2000 election and how this differs from the Neustadt approach. I will then discuss how the Bush administration has aggressively protected presidential prerogatives via use of the presidential signing statement, before turning my attention to how the administration has gained leverage over the executive branch, both in pushing its policy preferences as well as protecting information from outside forces, such as Congress or public watchdog groups.
Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Brinks

Any deviation undermines unitariness Calabresi, professor of law, 95
I began this section by saying that I would show why it is at least as important that there be a unitary presidency as that there be a strong presidency. I think the groundwork has now been laid for defending that claim. Any deviation from the principle of unitariness in the executive structure immediately opens up a crack into which the state and local pressures described above will tend to insinuate themselves. The minute some portion of the executive is cut free from the President and the national electoral constituency which he and he alone represents, it tends to become swallowed up by the state and local political pressures that drive the congressional committees and subcommittees. Deviations from executive unitariness thus necessarily hold the risk [*66] that different regional concerns will attach themselves to the disassociated interest, especially if it somehow seems important to their region. Thus, an "independent" Defense Department would likely be a target of opportunity for members of Congress from a state with a lot of defense spending or with voters who care strongly about the military. An "independent" Federal Reserve Board will be a target for members of Congress who represent large financial interests, and so on. Any deviation, however slight, from the Framers' organizing principle of executive unitariness will be filled by regional, anti-national concerns.
Each deviation from unitariness undermines the executive Calabresi, professor of law, 95
Again, this illustrates what necessarily happens once we depart from executive unitariness as an organizing principle. Differing regional and local interests insinuate themselves into the breach. I am quite confident that if we had a three-headed executive council, both parties would run slates for the council with geographically diverse sets of candidates. The less unitary the structure, the more diverse the slates would become. Every deviation from the principle of executive unitariness will necessarily undermine the national majority electoral coalition. In some circumstances that might not be bad; I would not want (for reasons I will explain later) to have all 435 members of Congress elected at-large by a national majority. But, I do want, as our Constitution contemplates, the President and [*67] chief law executor to be elected that way. When the unitariness of the office is threatened in any way, so too are the interests in impartial law execution of the national electoral majority for which the President speaks.
Presidential Powers: Unitary Exec Key to Avoid Pork Barreling

Non-unitary executive ensures pork barrel politics Calabresi, professor of law, 95
In sum, the anti-unitarian, anti-bundling argument does not work over time. 114 A unitary, nationally representative executive is preferable to a plural, regionally dominated executive. Law execution by congressional committee, or by the lower federal courts, is certain to be law execution by a plural, regionally dominated executive. And that, in practice, is our only alternative to law execution by the President and his agents. Such a plural executive, regionally dominated regime, is guaranteed to be characterized by the most gross and irremediable conflicts of interest. It is, as I said, a fail-safe recipe for pork barrel politics in the execution of the laws. 115 [*71]
Presidential Powers Impacts: Unitary Exec Key to Liberty/Democracy

Unitary executive key to prevent terminal weakening of government Calabresi, professor of law, 95
Unity was desirable in the executive, Hamilton explained, as a complement to the plurality of the legislature. This is because unity leads to energy, which is the most desirable trait in an executive, while plurality leads to deliberation and to the securing of the people's privileges and interests, 43 which is the most desirable trait in a legislature. Hamilton defended his conclusion that unity fosters energy by noting that it led to "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch." 44 Plurality in the executive, on the other hand, must lead to "the most bitter dissentions" which "lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide." 45 The end result may be to weaken fatally the government or, "what is still worse," to "split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering to the different individuals who composed the magistracy." 46
Unitary executive key to accountability Calabresi, professor of law, 95

The other key consideration for Hamilton was accountability to the electorate. And here again, Hamilton deemed unitariness to be vital. "One of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive," and an objection that is fatal to the idea of an executive council as well as to the idea of two or three coequal executives, "is that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility." 51 Plurality in the executive thus makes it more difficult both to detect policy errors and to punish those who are responsible for them. As Hamilton further explained: It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon [*43] the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. 52
Presidential Powers Impacts: Unitary Exec Key to Liberty/Democracy

Unitary executive key to maintaining liberty Calabresi, professor of law, 95
In other words, plurality in the executive defeats accountability not only because it becomes more costly to figure out who to blame when there exist two or more candidates for blame, but also because the two or more candidates may very well conspire among themselves to create ambiguity about the locus of blame. Thus, plurality in the executive will greatly raise the costs to the "zealous citizen" who would expose wrongdoing, which costs may already be [*44] overly high given that the exposure of government wrongdoing is often, for other reasons, an "unpromising task." 55 These costs may be further raised by the increased number of bad actions or inactions that a plural executive may take. Thus, plurality defeats accountability because it means there are both more actions, and more actors, that require public scrutiny. The multiplication of actions and actors to be overseen contradicts the idea that "power [is] safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man." 56 Thus, Hamilton asserted: "the executive power is more easily confined when it is one": That it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and in a word that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. 57
Presidential Powers: Impacts A2: Congress Can solve

Congress Cant Lead, Only a Strong President Can Cronin President of Whitman College, Political Scientist and Genovese Professor of Political Science, 04
(Thomas, Michael The Paradoxes of the American Presidency), Pg. 123 In the aftermath of the wounded or imperiled presidency of the Watergate era, could Congress furnish the leadership necessary to govern the country? Most scholars and writers said no. Even in the wake of the -Gingrich-led Republican House of the mid-1990s, most commentators questioned the ability of Congress to present coherent national policies. The conventional answer was that "we will need a presidency of substantial power" if we are to get on top of our domestic problems and maintain our leadership position in foreign affairs.
Presidential Powers: A2: Pres Decreasing Importance

Presidency resilient to change Deans, political correspondent, 00
Others counter that the presidency is, by design, resilient to moments of great change. That, in fact, is part of the genius of the founding fathers, said Nelson. ''In the 20 years that I've been teaching political science, a recurrent prophecy is that the presidency is being weakened by this or that,'' said Nelson. ''It just doesn't seem to happen.''
Budget NB: Uniqueness

The budget deficit is under control the US has the smallest deficit yet this decade. Vincent Del Giudice June 12, 2007 Economy and Treasury Reporter, Washington Bureau, Bloomberg News
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=auyTKUJRBBgQ&refer=us Since the start of the fiscal year on Oct. 1, the budget deficit totaled $148.5 billion, down 35 percent from a shortfall of $227 billion a year earlier. For all of this year the shortfall could narrow to $150 billion, the Congressional Budget Office said May 4. That would be the smallest deficit this decade. In fiscal 1998-2001, the Treasury posted yearly budget surpluses. ``It's a healthy economy; more people are working and paying more taxes,'' said Gary Thayer, chief economist at A.G. Edwards & Co. in St. Louis. ``The basic strength of revenues comes from jobs.'' The Treasury has been awash in cash, reflecting increased tax revenue from rising wages and stock market gains. In April, the government posted a surplus of $177.7 billion -- the highest in six years and 50 percent higher than the April 2006 surplus. Individual tax payments are due in April.
The budget deficit is going down and is on track to turn into a surplus by 2012. Shanghai Daily 13/6/2007
http://english.eastday.com/eastday/englishedition/business/userobject1ai2904993.html The US federal budget deficit is running much slower through the first eight months of the current fiscal year, which began Oct. 1, 2006, the Treasury Department reported yesterday. Data released by the department showed that the budget deficit through May totaled US$148.5 billion, down 34.6 percent from the same period a year ago. The improvement came as growth in revenues outpaced the growth in spending. So far this fiscal year, revenues have increased by 8 percent from a year ago to an all-time high of 1.6688 trillion dollars, while outlays have rose at a slower pace of 2.5 percent to 1.8172 trillion dollars, also hitting a record. For May, however, the deficit surged to US$67.7 billion, up 57.8 percent from the same month of 2006. The surge resulted from the fact that the Internal Revenue Service was more efficient in processing tax returns this year, meaning more revenue was collected in April with fewer tax collections left to be counted in May, according to analysts. At present, the Bush administration is expecting the budget deficit for all of the current fiscal year to be US$244 billion, slightly below the US$248.2 billion in the 2006 fiscal year, which had been the lowest imbalance in four years. But the Congressional Budget Office now is projecting the deficit for the full fiscal year to be US$177 billion. US government budget deficit set a record of US$413 billion in 2004. In the budget sent to Congress in February for 2008, the Bush administration projected the government could eliminate the deficit completely and return to a surplus by 2012. The federal budget was in surplus for four years from 1998 through 2001.
Budget NB: A2: Fiat takes out the link

All bills are subject to amendment Thomas 03
(Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, How Our Laws Are Made XIV. SENATE ACTION http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/senate.action.html Last update: Wed, 19 Nov 2003)
While a measure is being considered it is subject to amendment and each amendment, including those proposed by the committee that reported the bill, is considered separately. Generally, there is no requirement that proposed amendments be germane to the subject matter of the bill except in the case of general appropriation bills or where "cloture" has been invoked. Under the rules, a "rider", an amendment proposing substantive legislation to an appropriation bill, is prohibited. However, this prohibition may be suspended by two- thirds vote on a motion to permit consideration of such an amendment on one day's notice in writing. Debate must be germane during the first three hours after business is laid down unless determined to the contrary by unanimous consent or on motion without debate. After final action on the amendments the bill is ready for engrossment and the third reading, which is by title only. The Presiding Officer then puts the question on the passage and a voice vote is usually taken although a yea-and-nay vote is in order if demanded by one-fifth of the Senators present. A simple majority is necessary for passage. Before an amended measure is cleared for its return to the House of Representatives, or an unamended measure is cleared for enrollment, a Senator who voted with the prevailing side, or who abstained from voting, may make a motion within the next two days to reconsider the action. If the measure was passed without a recorded vote, any Senator may make the motion to reconsider. That motion is usually tabled and its tabling constitutes a final determination. If, however, the motion is granted, the Senate, by majority vote, may either affirm its action, which then becomes final, or reverse it.
Budget NB: Links- Congress=Pork barreling

All congressional bills risk supplemental spending Calabresi, professor of law, 95
Again, it seems to me the answer is plainly yes. All legislation by its nature has the potential for factional, redistributive inequity that is present with spending bills. Tax bills, regulatory bills, foreign policy bills, and debt ceiling extension bills all can impose burdens on the nation while benefiting only some part of it. The "loot" from such bills may be less liquid than the loot that results from an appropriations bill, and, accordingly, it may be harder and more costly to divvy it up among different regional and local interests. But, the same basic principle will frequently be in operation. Accordingly, I see no difference between appropriations bills and other types of legislation that warrants a difference in the discriminatory strength of the President's veto power. Because all legislation is by its nature redistributive, all legislation should have to undergo the line-by-line, item-by-item scrutiny of the President's veto pen. The representative of the nation's latest majority electoral coalition should have to approve any redistributive line or item that a congressional majority favors.
Congress is locally biased leading to pork barreling Calabresi, professor of law, 95

The key problem then with both the congressional committees and with the federal judiciary as "law executors" is that these institutions are regionally and geographically biased. The involvement of these institutions in law execution thus invariably brings with it the inequity, and the waste, of pork barrel politics. Some states and districts get a lot of attention on certain law execution matters, while others get very little. 105 Distributional inequity is and will always be the order of the day. 106 The system has built into it a fundamental conflict of interest. Members of Con [*65] gress and judges who are state and local agents are helping to administer the national honey pot. Why is anyone surprised to learn in which states and districts the honey always ends up being consumed?
Congress always at risk of being coopted by local interests Calabresi, professor of law, 95
But, in making this statement, I should be clear that it is the senator's or representative's state or local electoral base that is really by far the most important. Leadership and committee assignments in the two houses are distributed almost entirely by seniority (entirely so in the Senate), and so it is usually not very meaningful to think of the party caucuses as electoral bases for members of Congress. In contrast, a senator's or representative's state or district electoral base is always potentially in jeopardy, either in a primary or in a general electoral contest. Even the most powerful and most senior senators and representatives must attend to their local electoral bases all of the time or risk finding themselves surprised and out of a job. Every electoral cycle always includes some senior, powerful member of Congress who has had to learn that hard lesson to his distress.
Budget NB: Links- Congress=Pork barreling

Congressional law making gets coopted by local interests Calabresi, professor of law, 95
In other words, one overwhelming problem with law execution by the shadow quasi-parliamentary regime of the congressional oversight committees, is that the members of those committees will be interested first and foremost in the policy preferences of their very small and often atypical districts and states. The interests of those atypical districts and states will start to affect greatly national policy through the usurped congressional role in the law execution process. Thus, a senator from Georgia will take the lead on issues like gays in the military, a representative from Michigan (John Dingell) will take the lead on energy policy, as it bears on car making, a senator from New York (Daniel Patrick Moynihan) will take the lead on finance as it bears on the interests of Wall Street, and a senator from Montana (Max Baucus) will take the lead on federal environmental and public lands policy. Indeed, the one thing the shadow executive system of the congressional standing committees [*63] can guarantee us is that the most affected regional interests will try to kidnap the federal law execution processes that most affect them. Thus, the combination of a state or local electoral base and a partial federal law execution responsibility and power means an incentive to find that portion of federal law execution and administration that is most related to the pork barrel parochial concerns of one's home state or district. And, having found that portion, one's obligation and duty to "the folks back home" becomes clear. Get on the relevant committee, acquire seniority, and then administer the laws of the nation to the benefit of your state or region. And, if the President, or his agents, get in your way yell bloody murder, hold oversight hearings, write appropriations riders, and make document requests until they back down. It is the American way.
Budget NB: Links- Congressional Action= Amendments

Amendments to congressional legislation are normal means Sinclair, Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics, 00
(Barbara, UCLA, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, second edition, p. 224-225)
Amending marathons are associated with legislative success. Bills subject to ten or more Senate amendments decided by roll call votes are as likely to pass the Senate and more likely to become law than are other measures (see Table 12.4). The adoption of floor amendments may enhance a bill's chances of ultimate legislative success; amendments may make a bill more broadly attractive or at least give the sponsors of successful amendments a greater stake in the legislation's enactment. However, the substantial differences in success rates between bills subject to high amending activity and those subject to low amending activity (regardless of whether the amendments that were offered passed) strongly suggest that senators engage in amending marathons on bills highly likely to become law; senators use such bills as vehicles for lawmaking. Senators sometimes use the Senate's permissive amending rules to try to kill legislation, but that is not their primary use.
Senate rules ensure the plan will be used to attach amendments Sinclair, Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics, 00
(Barbara, UCLA, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, second edition, p. 232)
Individuals and small groups of senators have frequently used the Senate's permissive amending rules in combination with extended debate to highlight neglected issues and policy proposals. Their aim has been to get their issue on the public agenda, to push it to the center of debate, and perhaps to pressure the Senate into legislative action. Now the minority party regularly uses this strategy to force onto the agenda issues the majority party would rather not consider. The minority party's aim is to raise the issue's visibility, to compel a wide-ranging debate, and to pass legislation if possible. Yet within the current climate, the result more often than not is neither debate nor legislative action on either the minority's or the majority's agenda. The majority uses procedural devices to prevent debate and action on the minority's agenda, and the minority reciprocates by blocking the majority's agenda. This state of affairs requires remedy if the Senate is to function at all adequately. A deal in which the minority party receives a right to full floor consideration of its issues in return for the majority party's eventually getting a simple majority vote on passing its bills would seem to be to the advantage of both.
Budget NB: Internal Links- Fiscal Discipline Key to Deficit Reduction

Tight controls on discretionary spending are key to deficit reduction Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, 05
(REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATA August 11, 2005 Thursday HEADLINE: THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SNOW PREPARED REMARKS AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, l/n)
This agenda is ongoing, and we see results every day. For example, tight controls on discretionary spending and increased Treasury receipts - which are a result of economic expansion - have kept the government on track to cut the budget deficit in half by 2009. In fact, a mid-year budget report recently showed that we are ahead of schedule on that goal. All of the strong economic indicators, and our ability to pay down debt, point to the fact that reducing the tax burden proved to be a successful economic stimulus. And when the economy is growing and spending is controlled, we can also reduce our deficit. But the job of keeping our economy unencumbered is a never-ending one, indeed. From tax cuts to regulations, we need to work on it every day, and we need to work on keeping it strong for the future, for the long-term.
Federal debt hurts the economy and foreign trade.

Rolf Clark economist No Date Instant Economics: Memos to Clarify the Topic, http://www.geosteppes.com/images/DrRolfs_Econ_Sample.pdf The federal debt is the accumulation of the governments annual deficits. Too much debt hurts the economy as interest must be paid on the debt. If the debt-to-GDP ratio is too high, then much of a nations GDP goes toward paying interest on the debt. Interest payments go to those who hold government securities sold to fund the debt. Some of these are foreign debt holders, thus some funds leave the country. These funds end up as extra dollars in foreign bank reserves. This increases the supply of dollars held abroad, making dollars more available on the international market. That causes the dollar exchange rate to fall in value. It will take more dollars to buy a fixed basket of foreign goods.
National Debt leads to major socioeconomic crisis. Med Yones March 15th, 2007
IIM, President CEO Club, Director MTC Group, Director, International Institute of Management, http://www.iim-edu.org/u.s.economyrisks/index.htm In 2000, the U.S. Government had a surplus (profit) of about $237 billion (the largest in U.S. history). In 2006, the budget deficit was about $390 billion (loss). For information on Whitehouse budget details please visit http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/tables.html Although the 2006 budget deficit (loss) was only about 3% of GDP, the problem is the accumulation of losses over multiple years, hence the need for debt to finance the deficit. By the end of 2006 (over a period of 6 years), the accumulated national debt was about $8.3 trillion (the largest in U.S. history!). The U.S. Government has borrowed that money to pay for tax breaks, new Medicare drug benefits, the war in Iraq and other policies. A large national debt is bad. Why? The Government has to pay interest on the debt. As the debt and the interest payment grow, eventually all the Government can afford to do is pay the interest payments, with no money left over for other critical expenditures. If uncontrolled, this could leads to national bankruptcy and major socioeconomic crises. Suring the 2006 fiscal year, the U. S. Government spent $406 Billion of its budget on interest payments to the holders of the national debt. Compare that to Education at $61 Billion, and Department of Transportation at $56 Billion. When interest payments become larger than other critical socioeconomic budgets, this calls for major concern.
Budget NB: CP Solves Pork Barreling

Executive order ensures the plan will be done as is no riders Rodgers, professor of law, 01
(Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law 2001 21 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 13 ARTICLE: Executive Orders and Presidential Commands: Presidents Riding to the Rescue of the Environment NAME: William H. Rodgers, Jr. * Stimson-Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washington. L.L.B., l/n)
Wallace Stegner has identified several of the advantages of the executive order. They afford the president opportunity for personal expression and decisive response. They reinforce the president's other responsibilities as opinion leader. They give the president full authority over timing, content, staging, and characterization of the event. They allow him to depict the crisis and to solve it in a single utterance. They enable a president, in an afternoon, to set aside millions of acres of land and thus ascend in the twinkling of an eye to the esteemed heights of a Theodore Roosevelt. 13
President is the only backstop to pork-barreling Calabresi, professor of law, 95

(Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 ARTICLE: Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive NAME: Steven G. Calabresi * Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, l/n)
Now imagine a whole Congress of such officeholders, all of whose careers depend in significant part on their abil [*35] ity to get back more for their small electoral constituency than their constituents pay in. The net result is a collective action problem in which every member of Congress's career depends on an ability to be ever more creative in funnelling federal resources back to their constituencies while imposing the cost in federal taxes, borrowing, or regulation on someone else's constituency or on the nation as a whole. The collective action problem exists because most of the constituencies might be better off with less largesse and lower levels of taxation, borrowing, and regulation. But no member of Congress will dare vote for this absent an effective mechanism of collective enforcement for fear that other members of Congress will cheat and will continue to steer national pork to their local interests. The only official with any incentive under our present electoral structure to stop this game is the President who is (along with the Vice President) our only nationally elected official. 33 Representing as he does a national electoral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources toward the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again), thereby mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of Congress. In fact, most modern presidents probably see their potential electoral base as comprehending up to 60% of all voters 34 and perhaps as many as 90% of all state electoral college votes. 35 Moreover, elections over the last thirty years suggest that virtually every state in the nation is in fact in play in these contests. Thus, the President is our only constitutional backstop against the redistributive collective action problem described above. [*36]
Budget NB: Impacts- Hurts Dollar

Continued budget deficits weakens the dollar Financial Times 05
(August 12, 2005 Friday London Edition 1 SECTION: STOCK MARKETS & CURRENCIES; Pg. 40 HEADLINE: Deficit fears see dollar lose shine CURRENCIES BYLINE: By STEVE JOHNSON, l/n)
The dollar continued its recent slide yesterday as the market refocused on the long-term structural problems of the US ahead of today's trade data. The greenback's rally from Dollars 1.345 against the euro in March to an early July high of Dollars 1.188 was largely driven by excitement over the dollar-bullish cyclical dynamics of the US, which boasts higher growth rates and bond yields than most of Europe. Repatriation flows under the Homeland Investment Act (HIA) - a temporary tax break for US multinationals - also played a part. However, the dollar's failure to rally even off the back of strong economic data suggests that structural factors, namely the external and budget deficits of the US, are back in vogue. "The purple patch for the dollar is over," said David Bloom, currency analyst at HSBC. "Strong growth does not necessarily mean a strong dollar."
Budget NB: Impacts: Deficits Lead to IR Hikes

Continued deficits lead to debilitating interest rates hikes Dattalo 04
(When the Debt Bomb Explodes By Fred Dattolo http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=article&id=1024 May 2004 )
"Both political parties distanced themselves from Greenspans comments. This is one hot potato no one wants to handle, for obvious political reasons. So as deficits continue to pile up around us, what we have to look forward to, in Greenspans words, could well be a very debilitating rise in interest rates. When that happens, it will be the catalyst that will put multiple millions of Americans, already drowning in debt, completely under."
Sustained deficits ensures ratcheting up interest rates undermining long term growth CNN 04
(Greenspan warns against deficits Moves that would cut Social Security benefits among recommendations made by Fed chief. February 26, 2004: 10:28 AM EST By Mark Gongloff, CNN/Money staff writer, http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/25/news/economy/greenspan/) Greenspan said the deficit spending of recent years has helped the economy recover from the 2001 recession, and some economists don't think the deficit is a short-term problem for the economy. But Greenspan and other economists have warned that, over time, persistent deficits and high government debt will push interest rates higher, hurting economic growth and the nation's living standards. "If no action is taken at all ... we're going to be confronted within a few years with a marked upward ratcheting of long-term interest rates, which is very debilitating to long-term economic growth," Greenspan said in response to a lawmaker's question.
Budget NB: Impacts- Decreased Deficits key to econ stability

Deficit reduction necessary to keep economy stable Dattalo 04
(When the Debt Bomb Explodes By Fred Dattolo http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=article&id=1024 May 2004 )
Greenspan said ``terrorism and geopolitical risk have become enduring features of the global landscape.'' He also warned of ``growing evidence of anti-globalization sentiment and protectionist initiatives'' which might reduce economic flexibility.And he repeated his call for government officials to cut the federal budget deficit before the retirement of the Baby Boom generation puts the economy ``on an unsustainable'' path.
Budget NB: Impacts: A2: Deficits Good for the economy

Sustained budget deficits snowball to all other sectors of the economy- we will swamp any potential turn they have Orszag and Rubin 04
The adverse consequences of sustained large budget deficits may well be far larger and occur more suddenly than traditional analysis suggests, however. Substantial deficits projected far into the future can cause a fundamental shift in market expectations and a related loss of confidence both at home and abroad. The unfavorable dynamic effects that could ensue are largely if not entirely excluded from the conventional analysis of budget deficits. This omission is understandable and appropriate in the context of deficits that are small and temporary; it is increasingly untenable, however, in an environment with deficits that are large and permanent. Substantial ongoing deficits may severely and adversely affect expectations and confidence, which in turn can generate a self-reinforcing negative cycle among the underlying fiscal deficit, financial markets, and the real economy: * As traders, investors, and creditors become increasingly concerned that the government would resort to high inflation to reduce the real value of government debt or that a fiscal deadlock with unpredictable consequences would arise, investor confidence may be severely undermined; * The fiscal and current account imbalances may also cause a loss of confidence among participants in foreign exchange markets and in international credit markets, as participants in those markets become alarmed not only by the ongoing budget deficits but also by related large current account deficits; * The loss of investor and creditor confidence, both at home and abroad, may cause investors and creditors to reallocate funds away from dollar-based investments, causing a depreciation of the exchange rate, and to demand sharply higher interest rates on U.S. government debt; * The increase of interest rates, depreciation of the exchange rate, and decline in confidence can reduce stock prices and household wealth, raise the costs of financing to business, and reduce private-sector domestic spending; * The disruptions to financial markets may impede the intermediation between lenders and borrowers that is vital to modern economies, as long-maturity credit markets witness potentially substantial increases in interest rates and become relatively illiquid, and the reduction in asset prices adversely affects the balance sheets of banks and other financial intermediaries; * The inability of the federal government to restore fiscal balance may directly reduce business and consumer confidence, as the view of the ongoing deficits as a symbol of the nation's inability to address its economic problems permeates society, and the reduction in confidence can discourage investment and real economic activity; * These various effects can feed on each other to create a mutually reinforcing cycle; for example, increased interest rates and diminished economic activity may further worsen the fiscal imbalance, which can then cause a further loss of confidence and potentially spark another round of negative feedback effects.
Budget NB: Impacts: A2: Deficits Good for the economy

Spending increases now make future responses to budget crisis harder Orszag and Rubin 04
Conventional analyses of budget deficits also do not put enough emphasis on three other related factors: uncertainty; the asymmetries in the political difficulty of revenue increases and spending reductions relative to tax cuts and spending increases; and the loss of flexibility in the future from enacting tax cuts or spending increases today. Budget projections are inherently uncertain, but such uncertainty does not provide a rationale for fiscal profligacy. The uncertainty surrounding budget projections means that the outcome in the future can be either better or worse than expected today. Such uncertainty can actually increase the incentive for more saving ahead of timein other words, for more fiscal discipline. In addition, it is much harder for the political system to reduce deficits than to expand them. As a result of this asymmetry, enacting a large tax cut or spending increase today is costly because it reduces the flexibility to adjust fiscal policy to future events. Therefore, large tax cuts or spending increases today carry a cost typically excluded from traditional analysis: They constrain policy-makers' flexibility to respond to unforeseen events in the future.
Political realities make it impossible to deal with deficits without massive financial instability swamping your turn Orszag and Rubin 04
Thus, in our view, to ensure healthy long-run U.S. economic performance, substantial changes in fiscal policy are needed to deal preemptively with the risks stemming from sustained large budget deficits and the economic imbalances they entail. The political system, however, seems unwilling to address the threat posed by future deficits and to make the necessary choices to put the nation on a sustainable fiscal course.4 Failing to act sooner rather than later, though, only makes the problem more difficult to address without considerable instability, raises the probability of fiscal and financial disarray at some point in the future, and runs the risks of further constraining policy flexibility in the future.
Politics Links: Cost Capital/Lead to Criticism

Executive order=lightening rod for criticism Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Even more broadly, the decision to act by executive order rather than through a cabinet agency by rulemaking, for example, often makes the White House the lightning rod for criticism. It is one thing for critics to fight limited conflicts with agencies over particular actions, but quite another when the White House decides to interpose itself into the fray.
Executive orders spark controversy Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02

Rule by presidential decree has been the subject of serious controversy since the administration of George Washington, however, and the debates continue. Even though it is a little known fact, the truth is that some kind of presidential direct action has been at the root of some of the most intense debates in American history. It should be noted that executive orders issued by governors and mayors have also been at the heart of major controversies. Examples include orders issued by Florida governor Jeb Bush and California governor Pete Wilson seeking to end affirmative action programs and a number of controversial orders issued by New York City mayors, like Ed Koch and Rudolph Giuliani.4
Executive orders increase criticism of the White House Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Significant problems can accompany the use of executive orders. In general terms, they include creating or exacerbating interbranch and intergovernmental tensions, inviting external criticism of the White House, weakening cabinet department credibility and effectiveness, undermining the administrative law system, possibly exposing administrators and the government more broadly to liability, and being seen in certain instances as taking the easy way out.

Executive order leads to backlash against the president Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 8-9) Executive discretion cuts both ways, of course, and opponents of a particular case of presidential initiative will view these pen strokes quite differently. After President Clinton issued an executive order that barred government contractors from hiring permanent replacement workers '14 congressional Republicans were in no mood to congratulate him on either his energy or his dispatch. On the House floor the next day, Representative Bill Barrett (R-Neb.) condemned the president for overturning fifty years of labor law "with the stroke of a pen."" Observers who are even less sympathetic cast executive orders in an altogether sinister light, seeing in them evidence of a broad conspiracy to create a presidential dictatorship. The common theme of these complaints is that the executive order is an example of unaccountable power and a way of evading both public opinion and constitutional constraints. In the more extreme manifestations, executive orders are portrayed as an instrument of secret government and totalitarianism. The president says "Do this! Do that!" and not only is it done, but the government, the economy, and individual freedom are crushed under the yoke of executive decree.
CONGRESS HATES EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Michael Posner. National Journal, January 1, 2000 (DRGCL/E255A) President Clinton's broad use of executive orders on a range of issues is prompting a move by some conservatives in Congress to curb the next President's ability to sidestep Capitol Hill. It's a familiar complaint by lawmakers, who jealously guard their legislative turf.' They gripe that Presidents who excessively issue directives are overstepping their authority and making an end run around Congress. Since the adoption of the Constitution, Presidents have been issuing executive orders to declare official U.S. policy or to direct Cabinet officers to take certain actions. George Washington issued the first directives in 1789, including one declaring Thursday, Nov. 26, 1789, as a day of Thanksgiving.

Executive order makes the president an easy target for criticism Rodgers, professor of law, 01
The downside of the executive order's capacity for decisive declaration is that it offers a clear target for policy critics and a baseline for measuring policy failure. President Franklin Roosevelt's wartime executive order on internment of the Japanese-American population 32 was one of the most sweeping and decisive decrees in the history of the American presidency, affecting thousands of lives in profound ways. It was also one of the most denounced and regretted official acts in U.S. history. When this executive order officially died, in the administration [*19] of Gerald Ford, it was banished with a pledge that the United States would never again see an executive order like this one. 33 There is risk also in the heroic potential and personal stamp inherent in the executive order. Turned in a bad light, heroism looks like cronyism and flamboyance becomes tawdry personal advantage. The cowboy rides close to the outlaw. Richard Nixon would learn this bitter lesson in 1970 with his Executive Order 11523, 34 creating the National Industrial Pollution Control Council in Maurice Stans' Department of Commerce. 35 This was an important introductory move in a series of policy misfortunes that became known as Watergate. This bad lesson was apparently forgotten by June 15, 1990, when President George Bush repeated the pattern with his Council of Competitiveness, 36 chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, to pursue the same sort of regulatory relief that was the motivation for President Nixon's National Industrial Pollution Control Council. 37
The president is setup to fail and will be blamed for when things go wrong. Edwards, 2000
George C. Edwards III, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Director of The Center for Presidential Studies in the Bush School, editor of Presidential Studies Quarterly, Presidential Power, Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century, March 2000 pg(s). 13
The public can indulge in high expectations of its chief executives and freely criticize them if they fail; for example, presidents may be chastised if they unable to bring around Congress or the public to their point of view. The blame lies clearly in the leader rather than the environment. Americans need not concern themselves with broader forces in American society that may influence presidential leadership. Because these forces are complex and perhaps even intractable, to focus on the individual as leader simplifies analysis and evaluation of the problems of governing.
Executive Orders create tensions with congress Cooper 1997. Phillip Cooper, November 1997. Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency.
Administration & Society. Beverly Hills: Nov 1997.Vol.29, Iss. 5; pg. 529, 28 pgs http://magmareport.net/organisation/camp/FULL_TEXTS/POWER%20TOOLS%20FOR%20AN%20EFFECTI VE%20AND%20RESPONSIBLE%20PRESIDENCY.rtf Despite the fact that executive orders are seemingly efficient and effective tools, they carry dangers as well as opportunities. The first problem is the temptation to do things in what appears to be the easy way. Second, the use of executive orders poses dangers of political tensions with Congress and within the executive branch. Third, the use of the orders poses threats to the system of administrative law.

Executive order spark criticism of the president Branum 2002. Tara L. Branum 2002. attorney for the American Freedom Center and writer/editor for the Texas
review of law an politics. President or king? The use and abuse of executive orders in modern-day America. Journal of Legislation. L/N Presidents since the time of Truman have generally maintained an expansive view of presidential power and have used this power to implement policy, even when the orders have been somewhat controversial. For instance, Eisenhower issued 452 executive orders. 137 Kennedy used executive orders to establish many federal
agencies and to prohibit racial discrimination in federally subsidized housing. 138 Johnson and Nixon used executive orders to wage the war in Vietnam. 139 Nixon ordered the FBI to spy on Americans not agreeing with the war, but Ford later revoked the order. 140 Carter used an executive order to create [*31] the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 141 Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II have each issued controversial orders on subjects ranging from labor relations disputes to abortions. 142 The war on terrorism has led to still more controversial orders. Broad use of executive orders became so prevalent in the second half of the 1900s that a special Senate Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers was authorized to investigate the matter in 1974. 143 The committee made several findings, including the fact that the United States had been governed under emergency rule since FDR called a state of emergency in 1933. 144 Upon completion of the study, committee co-chairman Senator Frank Church of Idaho stated, "Presidents could manage every aspect of the lives of all American citizens." 145 The study resulted in legislation that ended all then existing states of emergency. The legislation also gave Congress the ability to terminate any future states of emergency by joint resolution. 146 The cure was temporary. Thirteen states of emergency were still in effect in late 1999. 147 In addition, the legislation allowing termination of emergencies by Congress has never been used. 148 The most significant trend in the use of executive orders over the years has been the change in the tenor of the orders. 149 Whereas Washington worked diligently [*32] to avoid issuing any order that would constitute more than an administrative order to those in the government, presidents since then have used orders to create agencies, promulgate racial policies and seize private property. This trend has created a dangerous new problem that must be addressed by Congress before it escalates out of control. III. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM One of the most important developments in the twentieth century has been the growth of presidential power. 150 As the power of the federal government has grown, the power of the President has increased exponentially along with it to such a point that he is now often called "the most powerful man in the world." 151 The President's power has grown to such an extent that he might now be
called the "Chief Lawmaker," exercising legislative power in violation of the Constitution. In recent decades, presidents have taken the initiative to set policy--even when Congress has opposed the policy or refused to address a particular area. 152 This is not a violation committed by one president or one political party. All
have done it. 153 [*33] The question to be addressed is not whether these policies are good or bad; there are doubtless some of each. The real question revolves around what damage is done to the country and to our democratic system when presidents can unilaterally make policy--any policy--without the consent of Congress. 154 What possible justification is there for the implementation of laws without regard to the normal legislative process? In short, there is no
justification and no emergency so great that it requires that Congress be completely disregarded. 155 President Taft once cautioned against exactly this situation when he warned that allowing the President to have an "undefined residuum of power" would allow him to become a "Universal Providence" setting "all things right." 156 The field of action of such an executive could not be limited. While some might use the power faithfully, others might become tyrants. The best way to protect ourselves from arbitrary and tyrannical rule is to demand that our officials remain true to the democratic legislative process outlined in
the Constitution. [*34] A. Presidential Lawmaking President Taft once stated, "The truth is that great as his powers are, when a President comes to exercise them, he is much more concerned with the limitations upon them than he is affected, like little Jack Horner, by a personal joy over the big personal things he can do." 157 This was arguably once true. In recent years, however, as the power
of the presidency has grown, presidents have seemingly fallen prey to the dangers of possessing too much power, as our Founders once warned against. 158 No longer are many presidents focused on the limitations to their power. Instead, they use their power as expansively as possible to impose their policy decisions single-handedly upon the nation. 159 Executive orders that were once issued based on specific statutory or constitutional
grants of power are now issued based on sweeping claims of authority. 160 For instance, one informal count of Clinton's executive orders showed that nearly one-third of his orders relied on no statutory grant of authority whatsoever. 161 Although the basis for presidential action is sometimes unclear, these actions nevertheless often go unchallenged. Most modern presidents have used their powers more expansively than the Founders intended. However, only in the past few decades have such expansive powers been used in the absence of a true emergency. 162 President Clinton perhaps [*35] used his powers more expansively than any president to date. 163
Continues....

....Continued
It is a well-documented fact that the Clinton administration perceived executive orders as a legitimate means to press its own agenda. 164 President Clinton himself once stated: Congress has a choice to make in writing this chapter of our history. It can choose partisanship, or it can choose progress. Congress must decide. . . . I have a continuing obligation to act, to use the authority of the presidency and the persuasive power of the podium to advance America's interest at home and abroad. 165 The Clinton administration used the executive order as a tool to circumvent an "intransigent" Congress and implement policy single-handedly. 166 For instance, [*36] when the Children's Environmental Protection Act stalled in the Senate, Clinton incorporated provisions from the legislation into an executive order that he issued on Earth Day in 1997. 167 When Congress refused to pass legislation prohibiting employers from employing permanent replacements for striking workers, Clinton issued an order implementing this policy instead. 168 Unfortunately, these actions have been just been the tip of the iceberg. 169 Such usage completely ignores the principles that the Founders fought so hard to protect. Intransigent Congresses are not hindrances, but rather safeguards from arbitrary rule. 170 Clinton may have misused executive orders more blatantly than his predecessors, but he is, unfortunately, not the only offender. When FDR faced resistance to his Emergency Price Control Act, he stated, "In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act." 171 An aide to President Kennedy similarly expressed the view that [*37] "everybody believes in democracy until he gets to the White House and then you begin to believe in dictatorship, because it's so hard to get things done. Every time you turn around, people just resist you, and even resist their own job." 172 Perhaps some presidents abuse their
executive power because they legitimately believe their policy will help the country, while others do so out of frustration or because they are blinded by power. The reason for the abuse is not important. What is important is that policies are being imposed on Americans outside of the democratic process. No good can come out of such a situation, and, in fact, many orders have caused much controversy as a result. B. Controversial Orders Every president since the time of FDR has issued controversial executive orders, and many presidents before him issued executive orders that were disputed. 173 Famous examples of controversial orders include Washington's neutrality order, the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas, the Emancipation Proclamation, the internment of JapaneseAmerican citizens, the desegregation of the military, the creation of the Peace Corps, and various affirmative action executive orders. 174 Although some uses have been more egregious than others, no administration in modern times has been exempt from the criticism that it has sometimes sought to make policy through executive order. Only three Presidents have had executive orders overturned in their entirety by the courts. Of these three, two of them are our most recent Presidents. 175
Politics Links Help the President

Executive orders can be used to build the presidents personal image Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
There is little question that presidents use executive orders in the face of strikes for public relations purposes as well as out of concern for the impact of the work stoppages themselves. Many presidents have employed executive orders to build or protect their image. President Clinton took several such actions as he came to office. His decision to make the first action of his presidency (even before leaving Capitol Hill after inauguration) the signing of an executive order on ethics,44 his order calling for the elimination of one hundred thousand public service positions'45 and his order mandating elimination of one-half of all executive branch internal regulationS46 are classic examples of the tactic. The signing of such orders is often done with great flourish as a media event, as when President Clinton and Vice President Gore crossed the White House lawn to stand between two forklifts laden with what were presumably federal documents to sign the order calling for elimination of half the government's internal regulations. Of course, what the president did not say was that he was not taking action to reduce the number of executive orders that imposed significant burdens on the ability of executive branch agencies to carry out their duties. Not only did Clinton retain the orders imposed by his predecessors, but he even added to the requirements agencies had to meet, forcing, among other things, more of the mountains of paper that the White House lawn ceremony decried.
Executive order sends key signals and builds presidents image Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Often presidents issue executive orders in what may appear to be a public relations event for reasons other than those announced when the order is issued. Presidential orders can be effective devices for paying political debts, demonstrating action for a constituency, responding to adversaries, or sending political signals-real or symbolic. Orders that are largely symbolic rewards for support often make strong statements of policy but provide no new resources. They typically call for awareness by federal authorities of some concern and frequently create interagency or advisory committees for consultation, but they rarely require much beyond consultation and reporting. They also commonly contain clauses serving notice that the order establishes no legally cognizable rights that would justify judicial review.
Executive order puts opposition on the defensive Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Executive orders can also be used to hit quickly with policies aimed at important problems, providing a strong and immediate sense of momenturn for a new administration. These messages are sent to reassure an administration's supporters that the issue positions for which they campaigned are going to be acted upon. In the case of symbolic orders, which are often used for this purpose, the reward can be given to allies without a serious commitment of political resources in Congress, legal resources in administrative rulemaking, or financial resources associated with building really substantive programs. They also serve to send a message to potential adversaries that the administration is truly in charge and moving. Those seeking to mobilize opposition in such conditions find themselves reactive and defensive.
Politics Links Help the President

Executive order avoids Congressional opposition while allowing the president to gain support of lobbies Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 90) For the same reasons, presidents who have low levels of public approval may be more likely to resort to executive orders. Doing so offers a way of getting around other institutional actors who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak White House, and also provides presidents with a method of positiontaking, framing policy questions, or delivering on promises made to key constituencies.
EXECUTIVE ORDER BOOSTS PRESIDENTIAL POWER IT SHOWS WHOS IN CHARGE

Mary Woodward, University of New Mexico Law Librarian, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES QUARTERLY, Vol. 10, 1990, p. 127. (DRGCL/E195) While many presidents flexed their executive muscle by issuing EOs, they also issued other directives with the effect of EOs. Sometimes these directive we known as EOs or Proclamations and sometimes they were not; still they all fell under the general classification of executive directives and seemed to establish who was in charge.
Politics Links: Avoids the Link

Executive order allows the president to avoid political attention Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Few people regard executive orders as important, which has made them a vehicle that can be used to take significant actions that are at least technically, but that are unlikely in most instances, to attract much attention, unless they are particularly sweeping in character. It is the presidential policymaking version of hiding in plain sight. Moreover, unless there is a formal legal challenge, there appears to be a tendency not to look too closely at the authority claimed by the president to support an order.
Executive orders allow the president to avoid congress Clegg 00

(Fulton County Daily Report December 13, 2000, Wednesday HEADLINE: Clinton Executive Orders Foster Bias; Ethnic, racial groups singled out for preferential treatment Roger Clegg is general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a Washington-based think tank, l/n)
Executive orders enable presidents to change the law without having to deal with Congress or even with regulatory rule-making. As presidential adviser Paul Begala summed it up with the reverence for legal process that is one of the hallmarks of the Clinton administration: "Stroke of the pen. Law of the land. Kind of cool."
EXECUTIVE ORDER SPENDS NO POLITICAL CAPITAL AND AVOIDS PARTISAN BICKERING

GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, March 1987, Vol. 55, p. 659. (DRGCL/E192) In this era of the Imperial Presidency, executive orders have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking. Because executive orders do not need congressional approval, they enable the president to bypass parliamentary debate and opposition. Historically, most executive orders have related to routine administrative matters and to the internal affairs and organization of the federal bureaucracy. Since the 1930s, however, executive orders have assumed an ever increasing legislative character, directly affecting the rights and duties of private parties as well as those of governmental officials. Scholars have referred to this recent use of the executive order as presidential legislation or government by executive order.
Politics Links: Public Does not Perceive

Public does not perceive executive orders Cooper 99
(Federal News Service OCTOBER 28, 1999, THURSDAY HEADLINE: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF PHILLIP J. COOPER GUND PROFESSOR OF LIBERAL ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, l/n)
Few Americans, even those normally considered part of the informed public, know anything about executive orders. That is true even for many experienced public service professionals at all levels of government. When informed that there are now some 13,140 numbered executive orders in which the chief executive has sought to issue directives having binding legal force to agencies in the executive branch, a very common response is that no one ever explained to them that the president could make law with the stroke of a pen.
Politics Links: Public Perceives

Executive orders are visible Bedell 99
(Federal News Service OCTOBER 27, 1999, WEDNESDAY SECTION: IN THE NEWS HEADLINE: PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT BEDELL ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, l/n)
Accordingly, Executive Orders may be thought of as a particularly visible and transparent mechanism, among many similar mechanisms available to the President, by which he may announce a policy and attempt to rally public support behind it, in the hope that the policy will attract sufficient public support that by the time Congress exercises its power to review and modify the policy, the President's policy preference will have made sufficient headway that the status quo can never be re-instituted, and the ultimate policy outcome will be advanced somewhat along the lines the President prefers.
New technology means that the public is fully aware of Executive Orders Goss 1999 (Porter, Congressman, The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking?, October 27, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/rules_tran08.htm)
Additionally, a by-product of modern technology appears to have been greater public awareness of and interest in the unilateral actions taken by the executive. Today we have cable television, talk radio and the Internet as a means to provide unprecedented access to a wealth of information for the average citizen with an interest. I have found in recent years that more and more of the people that I represent in southwest Florida are contacting me to discuss concerns with executive orders, and indeed I would say that every time I go to a town hall or radio talk show we now have questions about executive orders. So it is something that has captured the imagination of the people we serve.
Politics Links: Agenda Crowd Out

Congressional action leads to agenda crowd out- presidential action does not
Howell, 2003 Power Without Persecution; 2003 Princeton University Press Policy making is not a seamless process. Substantial costs are incurred. These costs, however, are not equally distributed across the branches of government. For Congress, they are frequently prohibitive, making involvement in a whole host of policy matters virtually impossible. For the president, meanwhile, these costs are relatively quite small, and rarely, if ever, do they force him to choose between competing policy initiatives- a decision Congress faces everyday Because of this asymmetry, the president has an important advantage in the politics of unilateral action.
Politics Links: Congressional Election Link

Deference to the president insulates Congress from voter backlash on foreign policy Trimble, professor of law, 89
It does not do so for good reason. Congress is above all a political body. Its members are practical politicians who see themselves as responsible for the effective functioning of the Government, in addition to being accountable to their particular constituencies. Because of their role as national statesmen -- occasionally enhanced by a desire for higher office -- they recognize that many foreign policy problems are truly national problems and do indeed require "one voice," which a legislative body cannot provide. Being practical politicians, they also understand that foreign policy decisions require compromises of competing interests and often trade-offs between regional or factional constituencies to promote the overall national interest. More fundamentally, the strictly political interests of Congress lead it to expect and to defer to presidential leadership. Those interests include, most obviously, reelection. 9 To that end, a member must advance particular special interests and also maintain a favorable public posture as an effective legislator and politician. Those interests inevitably dictate some positions, for example on trade and military programs, or aid to Greece and Israel. But most foreign policy is far removed from immediate political concerns. Senator Case repeated a quip, perhaps apocryphal, by one of his colleagues to the effect that "I go to the Health, Education and Labor Committee to help my constituents, and I come here [to the Foreign Relations Committee] [*753] to have fun." 10 Politically, there is often no advantage in having to take a position, through a recorded vote, on pressing foreign policy questions with no immediate implication for local constituencies and with uncertain long-term consequences. To the contrary, it may be preferable to accept presidential leadership and preserve the ability to criticize decisions that turn out wrong. That can enable a person to take credit for popular decisions and to criticize, gathering helpful publicity and stature, those that go awry. 11 Thus, a member may see no advantage in having to vote on support for the opposition in Angola or Cambodia. Stopping communism may be popular; but if victory results in advancing the fortunes of South Africa or Pol Pot, it may not be so desirable. Voting for a policy necessarily entails taking responsibility for its failure.
XOs Are Constitutional

Executive Orders Are Constitutional Cronin President of Whitman College, Political Scientist and Genovese Professor of Political Science, 04
(Thomas, Michael The Paradoxes of the American Presidency), Pg. 273 Using executive orders, memoranda, signing statements, and a variety of other administrative devices, presidents have been able to make policy without legislative approval and sometimes even against the will of Congress. The Supreme Court has held that executive orders have, under most circumstances, the full force of law (see Jenkins v. Collard, LAS U.S.) 560-561 [18911).
XO solves better than Agencies

Executive Orders Improve Agency Decision Making Process Blumstein, 01
REGULATORY REVIEW BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: AN OVERVIEW AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ISSUES James F. Blumstein, Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dlj/articles/DLJ51P851.HTM#FA0 This legal and institutional policy analysis of centralized presidential regulatory review has made the case that the development of centralized presidential review of agency regulatory activity is an appropriate and desirable fixture of the modern American presidency. It can play a useful role when a president seeks to pursue an activist regulatory agenda, shaping agency rulemaking agendas and priorities. It plays an essential and legitimate role when a president seeks to pursue a regulatory policy that reins in what the White House perceives as excessively intrusive regulatory initiatives that emerge from agency staffs. It is now widely recognized that centralized presidential review can improve the functionalist or technocratic decision making process of agencies by managing regulatory externalities, achieving better quality analysis in the rulemaking process, and providing a mechanism for establishing appropriate regulatory uniformity across agencies on commonly faced issues (such as assessing risk).
XOs happen all of the time

Bush just passed an unpopular executive order St. Louis Post-Dispatch 6/24/07 SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. B2 HEADLINE: False choice, l/n
Most Americans favor federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. President George W. Bush does not. This week, for the second time in a year, he vetoed a bill that would have allowed it. Mr. Bush coupled his veto with an executive order of little value. It directs the Department of Health and Human Services to support studies on alternative sources of so-called pluripotent stem cells, those with the ability to develop into any type of tissue in the body. Despite his order and the president's contention that adult stem cells are the most promising, Mr. Bush didn't propose any new funding. Instead, he and his supporters cling to a false dichotomy. They argue that research can proceed either with adult stem cells or embryonic stem cells, but not both - or, as Mr. Bush put it, with "ethically responsible" research or work that will "destroy human life."
Bush has issued tons of XOs

Howell, 2003
Power Without Persecution; 2003 Princeton University Press
National crises, however, are not the only opportunity presidents have to unilaterally dictate public policy. Before there was a war on terrorism, Bush unilaterally instituted a wide array of important policy changes. During the first months of his administration, he issued an executive order that instituted a ban on all federal project labor contracts, temporarily setting in flux Boston's $14 billion "Big Dig" and dealing a major blow to labor unions. He later required federal contractors to post notices advising employees that they have a right to withhold the portion of union dues that are used for political purposes. Bush created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, which was charged with "identify(ing) and remov(ing) needless barriers that thwart the heroic work of faith-based groups." In August 2001, he set new guidelines on federal funding of stem cell research.
****Non-Delegation Counterplan****
Non-Delegation C/P Shell

Text: The US congress will develop laws that (insert aff mandates) and have (insert aff agency) enforce them. 1. Courts will not uphold new lawmaking by agencies- Only congressional action can uphold the plan Richardson 00
(Catholic University Law Review Summer, 2000 49 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1053 NOTE: AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS V. EPA: THE PHOENIX ("SICK CHICKEN") RISES FROM THE ASHES AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IS REVIVED NAME: David M. Richardson+ BIO: + J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, l/n)
The American Trucking decision, coupled with the D.C. Circuit's earlier Lockout/Tagout I decision and the Supreme Court's Benzene ruling, provide for a new jurisprudence governing the nondelegation doctrine and claims of broad rulemaking authority by the federal agencies. These decisions declare that the federal judiciary will not ignore an administration's assertion of carte blanche authority to implement expansive new policies without articulating an "intelligible principle" in a federal statute that appropriately channels its discretion. Unlike the Schechter decision [*1085] in which the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute, the nondelegation doctrine is now enforced by remanding regulations for reformulation when agencies step beyond their traditional rulemaking function and venture into the realm of lawmaking. Such a modest application of the nondelegation doctrine will likely serve to promote political accountability without ignoring the practical needs of Congress to delegate certain matters to the agencies, which are generally rich in manpower and technical expertise.
Non-Delegation C/P Shell

2. Agency rulemaking hurts liberty Hamilton, Professor of Law, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 807 SYMPOSIUM: DELEGATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics NAME: Marci A. Hamilton * Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, l/n)
A different, though equally compelling justification for application of the nondelegation doctrine can be found when Congress delegates its lawmaking power to administrative agencies. The dangers posed by the administrative state are not only that it may act arbitrarily and capriciously, but also that such officials are less accountable to the voters. n78 The President is checked to some degree by the voting booth and public opinion, but the administrative agency suffers little deterrence from either. There is no constitutional structure that ensures deliberation or accountability, and the agencies are not constitutionally required to report their activities. [*821] These agencies comprise a bureaucracy, which makes them less likely to take decisive action - the advantage offered by the President on certain issues. Yet, they are so removed from accountability that the branch's size does not generate the deliberative advantages provided by the structure of the legislature. Agencies are prone to be arbitrary and unaccountable as they spin in their self-executed bureaucratic orbits. The nondelegation doctrine in this scenario is crucial to liberty, because it prohibits general lawmaking from occurring in a structure both capable of arbitrary action and removed from the national scrutiny to which both Congress and the President are exposed by the constitutional structure. From a constitutional, structural perspective, delegation to agencies is even worse than delegation to the President. n79
3. Loss of liberty outweighs all other concerns Petro, prof of law, 1974
(Sylvester, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism an the NRLA Univ of Toledo Law Rev. Spring 74, p. 480) However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway I believe in only one thing: liberty. And it is always well to beat in mind David Humes observation: It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus, it is unacceptable to say the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.
A2: Perm Do Both

1. Still links to the net benefitExtend the Hamilton evidence from the shell- the agency action of the permutation is not accountable to anyone. 2. Each act of agency rule making snowballs. Lowi, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University, 87
(The American University Law Review WINTER, 1987 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 295 A SYMPOSIUM ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: "THE UNEASY CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES", APRIL 4, 1986: PART I: DELEGATION OF POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: PRINCIPAL PAPER: TWO ROADS TO SERFDOM: LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER. * NAME: THEODORE J. LOWI **** John L. Senior Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University, l/n)
There are relatively uncontrollable spillover effects from delegated power. Delegation of power does something to the giver and to the receiver. Delegation of power is an inevitable and necessary practice in any government. No theory of representative
government is complete without it. An absolutist position against delegation [*296] would be utter foolishness. On the other hand, from the very first to the very last act of delegation, delegation is a calculated risk. If it is to be done rightly and in proportion, its consequences must be understood. The consequences in question are of constitutional importance. As far as I am concerned, they are collectively the key constitutional issue of our time -- precisely in the spirit of Madison's epigraph. The intent of the framers is not what is at issue; the concern of the framers is. The purpose of the Constitution is the regulation or regularization of power, in at least three ways. First, and foremost, the Constitution regulates through limitations on power. This is the essence of "the social contract" n2 as understood by Americans. Second, substantive calculability is used to regulate power. This translates into "rule of law" n3 as understood by Americans, and as embraced as the main antidote to tyranny, that being defined as arbitrariness. Third, power is regularized by procedural calculability. This means relatively rigid formalism defined as due process. This is captured very well in Professor Richard Stewart's notion of constitutive law, which "consists of rules that make legally recognized practices possible." n4 In my thesis, I emphasize that the delegation of broad and undefined discretionary power
from the legislature to the executive branch deranges virtually all constitutional relationships and prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of limitation on power, substantive calculability, and procedural calculability.
n5 Although a hypothesis about tendencies, my argument has appeared to be absolutist to several if not all of the commentators. n6 But fortunately, that is a consequence of my style rather than inherent in the proposition itself. Let me meet my critics and contribute to constructive exchange [*297] by one important point of clarification, which is that because the delegation of power is a matter of degree, the change of relationship between giver and receiver is also a matter of degree, until some indeterminate point when the relationship can be said to be deranged. I like the way Dean Ernest Gellhorn puts it, with some slight translation to meet my needs. He states that delegations become excessive when they are "used to create private goods." n7 My version would be that all discretion delegated to administrative
agencies, by degree, provides the conditions for the creation of private goods. This is the very essence of patronage,
n8 in the feudal sense of the term, therefore of serfdom -- the capacity to distribute material resources or privileges on a personalized, individualized basis. This incorporates Gellhorn's theory as a clarification of my own criterion: At what point can duly constituted authority be turned into patronage? Although it would be improbable that the precise point would be the same for each agency, it may be possible to agree that the question of the relationship between authority and patronage is the right question.
Deficits Net Benefit

Delegation exacerbates budget deficits Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 19) Many problems other than delegation plague the governance of our nation. These problems include voter apathy, the tendency of many interest groups to insist parochially on what they see as their rights rather than to seek compromise," the power of concentrated interests, the ineffectuality of laws aimed at preventing campaign contributions from functioning as bribes, stalemates about policy choices, the willingness of members of Congress to mortgage the future by incurring massive budget deficits, the creation of equally massive unfunded federal insurance liabilities, and the neglect of our publicly owned infrastructure and its consequent deterioration. Veteran observers of the political scene also note that controversies now get settled less often through electoral choices than by "revelation, investigation, and prosecution," while elections often are about false ideological choices. 30 Some of these problems are so deeply rooted in human nature that they cannot be eliminated; the elimination of others would require reforms quite different from ending delegation. Still, delegation exacerbates most of these problems: It helps to shield elected lawmakers from blame for harming the public at the behest of the interests that have given them campaign contributions. Because by means of delegation politicians promise every interest group that it will get its way, groups are encouraged to insist on what they then see as their "rights" rather than to compromise. Meanwhile, responsibility for resolving the dispute has been shifted onto an agency, which often has less real power to impose a solution than Congress does. Instead of taking positions on real disputes, legislators are free to talk about "values" and " goals," which helps to explain why elections revolve around false ideological choices. The inevitable failure of agencies to deliver all that Congress has promised also helps set the stage for "revelation, investigation, prosecution.
Sustained budget deficits hurt long term growth Orszag and Rubin 04
Conventional analyses of sustained budget deficits demonstrate the negative effects of deficits on long-term economic growth. Under the conventional view, ongoing budget deficits decrease national saving, which reduces domestic investment and increases borrowing from abroad.1 Interest rates play a key role in how the economy adjusts. The reduction in national saving raises domestic interest rates, which dampens investment and attracts capital from abroad.2 The external borrowing that helps to finance the budget deficit is reflected in a larger current account deficit, creating a linkage between the budget deficit and the current account deficit. The reduction in domestic investment (which lowers productivity growth) and the increase in the current account deficit (which requires that more of the returns from the domestic capital stock accrue to foreigners) both reduce future national income, with the loss in income steadily growing over time. Under the conventional view, the costs imposed by sustained deficits tend to build gradually over time, rather than occurring suddenly.
Deficits Net Benefit

Economic decline leads to nuclear war
Mead 1992 (Sir Walter Russell, New Perspectives Quarterly, p. 30 Summer) If so, this new failure the failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions billions of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles and drawn closer to the West because they believe our system can work for them. But what if it cant? What if the global economy stagnates or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.
Apathy Net Benefit

Delegation leads to voter apathy Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 19-20) I also believe that delegation contributes to voter apathy. The most important reason for voters to pay attention to public affairs and to vote is not self-interest -because any one vote hardly ever makes a difference-but the civic duty that we all owe to each other to keep tabs on the officials upon whom we have conferred power. The satisfaction that fulfilling our civic duty should confer turns into depression when those officials elude our control. According to contemporary surveys, many citizens "[believe that] the present political system [is] impervious to public direction" and "do not believe that they are living in a democracy."12 Delegation helps to explain why so many people feel this way. Undelegated lawmaking requires our elected representatives to stand up and be counted, sometimes in dramatic confrontations. With delegation, lawmaking even on the most controversial subjects becomes, for most of us, an incomprehensible bore. And, by allowing lawmakers to give us ideological self-portraits rather than hard information on where they are prepared to stand, delegation helps them fool us and allows them to mortgage the nation's future to prolong their own time in power.
Apathy is the path to extinction Fiala 01

(Stephen Fiala's NYC City Council member, speech before the City Council March 15, 2001 as he cast the deciding vote on whether to repeal the term limits law, taken from his handwritten manuscript: http://www.gothamgazette.com/searchlight2001/fiala_transcript.html)
The promise of our great city - like our nation - has always rested on the shoulders of her people, their commitment to our shared values and our unique principles of self-government. When that commitment wavers, our democracy loses a little bit of its shine, and thus the prospect for a brighter tomorrow moves closer to extinction. Citizen apathy and frustration are not new to our nation - or our city - but the level of contempt for and disengagement from our democratic institutions are new and pose a real threat to our way of life.
Trade Policy Links

-Congress shapes limits on executive trade powers Cohen, Blecker, and Whitney 03
(Stephen, prof. of international relations at American University, Robert A, prof. of economics at American University, Peter, economist in residence at American University, Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 2nd edition, Westview Pres: Cambridge, p. 3)
Foreign trade policy is a convergence point. In the broadest sense, trade policy is the end product of governmental decisions that need to reconcile economic and political substance while seeking to advance governments' domestic and foreign concerns. These decisions are seldom taken independently of the numerous trade statutes and international agreements that playa critical role in determining the content of trade policy's substance and process. In the United States, the trade laws passed by Congress set guidelines and boundaries for the executive branch's conduct of policy. Although they are often a factor in shaping specific policy decisions, trade statutes have a larger significance: They represent a political interpretation of what good economic policy should be at a particular time.
Executive can only enact policies Congress has granted to them Cohen, Blecker, and Whitney 03
(Stephen, prof. of international relations at American University, Robert A, prof. of economics at American University, Peter, economist in residence at American University, Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 2nd edition, Westview Pres: Cambridge, p. 20-21)
In the first place, shared political authority imposes a unique balancing act in formulating and administering U.S. trade policy. The constitutionally mandated separation of powers among branches of government assures that the joint roles of the executive and legislative branches (and occasionally the judicial branch), as well as the number of laws guiding executive branch behavior, are unlike anything found in any other country. One of the most common misperceptions about U.S. trade policy is that the president is fully in charge and does as he sees fit. In fact, presidential trade power is legally limited to the authority Congress specifically consents to transfer through trade legislation (see Chapters 2 and 5).
Congress Key to Liberty/Democracy

-Congressional rulemaking best way to ensure individual voice in government MEZHBURD 00
(BIO: * Managing Editor, NYU Annual Survey of American Law, New York University Annual Survey of American Law 2000 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 361 ARTICLE: THE UNINTELLIGIBLE STANDARD: RETHINKING THE MANDATE OF THE FTC FROM A NONDELEGATION PERSPECTIVE NAME: SERGE MEZHBURD*, l/n)
It is true that the Administrative Procedure Act ensures public participation by providing notice and opportunity to comment [*379] before administrative rules are promulgated. n96 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that legislators, whose jobs depend on the support of their constituents, will be more sensitive to the effects of certain legislation on those constituents than will bureaucrats working for regulatory agencies, structured to maximize the bureaucrats' political independence. n97 Furthermore, confusion as to what constitutes sufficient notice has driven agencies to conduct much of the substantive process of rulemaking before such notice is given, to some extent effectively circumventing the Administrative Procedure Act requirements. n98 There does not seem to be a structural incentive for non-accountable administrators to take into account the input they receive during a public hearing, unless that input comes from insiders, such as legislators, officers of the executive branch, or, on a more cynical note, from lobbies for the regulated industries. n99 Although in some cases the lobby input may be consistent with the market pluralist variant of democracy, where intensity of interest is a legitimate source of democratic pressure, the ultimate structure of agency rulemaking is simply less sensitive to outside input than the structure of an elected Congress.
-The more voices involved the more democratic the decision Greene, professor of law, 94
(University of Chicago Law Review Winter, 1994 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking NAME: Abner S. Greene ** Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, l/n)
Diversifying the voices heard in government not only helps to prevent one point of view from becoming too strong, but also promotes the affirmative goal of democratizing governmental decisionmaking. n27 Diversification expands the portfolio of interests that [*133] will be represented by governmental agents. Just as the expansion of citizen involvement in government through aggressive assertion of speech, press, petition, and voting rights broadens the scope of positions represented during public debate, so too can an enlarged dialogue within the government serve this democratizing end. In this way, we can see the important analogy between the rights and the powers contained in the Constitution. For just as the assertion of individual rights against the government helps to diffuse power "vertically"--from the government back to the authorizing citizens--so does the fracturing of power among governmental agents diffuse power "horizontally"--within government itself. n28
Delegation undermines liberty Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93

(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 16) Delegation negates the protection of liberty afforded by the legislative process not just in the case of abortion counseling but throughout the entire gamut of federal regulation, as the constraints placed on Sunkist's competitors illustrate.
Agency Rule Making Hurts Democracy/Liberty

-Agency rule making threatens liberty- Congress checks Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 861 SYMPOSIUM: Delegation as a Danger to Liberty NAME: Nadine Strossen * * Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union, l/n)
In significant respects, liberty is threatened when the law-making function of government is delegated to unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats. In his pivotal opinion in the landmark case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, n1 Justice John Marshall Harlan reminded us that members of Congress, along with state legislatures, are "ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." n2 Justice Harlan's statement prompts this question: What exactly is Congress's essential constitutional role as a guardian of liberty? And this question, in turn, triggers another: What is the relevant concept of liberty? For the Framers of the Constitution, liberty was essentially the right to be left alone by government unless some important public purpose warranted intervention. n3 The modern Supreme Court has embodied this concept in the so-called heightened scrutiny standards of judicial review. n4
-Agency rule making threatens liberty in four ways Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 861 SYMPOSIUM: Delegation as a Danger to Liberty NAME: Nadine Strossen * * Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union, l/n)
Delegation of this constitutionally defined lawmaking power to regulatory agencies undercuts its important protection of liberty in four ways. First, delegation shifts power from Congress and the President - two highly visible institutions that are responsive to a broad spectrum of interests - to various agencies, commissions, and boards lower-visibility institutions that are attuned to only a small subset of all the interests. According to the political science literature, agencies are dominated by their top officials, a small group of persons from the private sector, and a few key members of Congress. n10 As John Hart Ely observed, "one reason we have broadly based representative assemblies is to await something approaching a consensus before government intervenes." n11 But no such consensus is needed when legislative power is delegated. Second, delegation allows legislators and the President to shift much of the blame for unpopular government policies to the agencies. Therefore, an important deterrent to enacting unpopular laws does not deter unpopular regulations. n12 Third, delegation makes it far easier to impose new laws. In James Madison's words, Article I was meant to curb the "facility and excess of law-making" by requiring that statutes go through a bicameral legislature and the President. n13 Madison's view that the legislative process would tend to discourage narrowly partisan laws - though not eliminate them - has been borne out by much [*864] recent political science literature. n14 The differing constituencies of representatives, senators, and the President - and the differing lengths of their terms in office - make it likely that they will be partial to varying interests. This diversity of viewpoint, coupled with the greater difficulty of prevailing in three forums rather than one, means that popular support sufficient to produce a bare majority in a unicameral legislature would probably fail to get a statute through the Article I process. n15 The fourth respect in which delegation threatens liberty is consolidation of lawmaking and law enforcement power in the same hands. n16 I do not mean to suggest that agencies can make whatever laws they want, whenever they want.

-Delegation unconstitutional- reinforcing it now key to preventing future abuses and upholding the constitution Niskanen, Chair of the CATO Institute, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 939 SYMPOSIUM: Legislative Implications of Reasserting Congressional Authority Over Regulations NAME: William A. Niskanen * * Chairman, Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. The author is an economist, l/n)
The delegation of legislative authority to executive agencies is clearly unconstitutional and should offend those who care about the Constitution. Such delegation, however, is an inherent characteristic of big government. I do not expect the attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine to have much of an effect on the scope and character of the federal budget and regulations. On the other hand, a serious attempt to restore the doctrine of limited, enumerated powers is necessary to reduce the incentive for Congress to delegate its legislative authority. In the meantime, the best that can be expected is to allow the Executive to make a lot of minor fiscal and regulatory decisions, but to insist that a positive approval by Congress is necessary for all major fiscal and regulatory decisions. That is a challenge that merits serious attention, however messy the process.
-Nondelegation key to stopping presidential abuses of power Hamilton, Professor of Law, 99

When lawmaking is delegated to the President, the deliberative possibilities and the many ports of entry available through the legislature are quelled. n67 The President can take unilateral action, which is less likely to be filtered through the society's various interests that affect the law under consideration. n68 The principle of nondelegation meets the Framers' concern that the presidency would be the "fetus of a monarchy" by prohibiting the President from taking over decisions structurally more appropriate to the legislature. n69 It is a critical check on the Executive's likely abuses of power forecast by the Framers.

-Nondelgation key to separation of powers Hamilton, Professor of Law, 99
The Constitution sets into play a competing set of institutions intended to share and check national and state power. It rests on the presupposition that no entity can be trusted with too much power, because any "concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty." n84 The plasticity of power makes it necessary to craft mechanisms to meet the inevitable abuses of power that arise despite the constitutional structure. The line item veto was one attempt, but misguided. Such mechanisms must be monitored to ensure the constitutional structure is not doubly offended by abuses of power cured by unconstitutional means. The principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine, which keep congressional, presidential, and bureaucratic power cabined and are drawn from each structure's peculiar characteristics, are valuable weapons in the courts' separation of powers arsenal. The nondelegation doctrine could move the constitutional balance of power back toward the balance envisioned by the Framers by forcing legislators to make the law and by rendering it more difficult for the executive branch to enlarge its sphere of power. By threatening laws that are made by the executive branch, rather than the legislative, the nondelegation doctrine encourages the executive branch to move closer to the one-man show envisioned by the Framers. If properly functioning, the nondelegation doctrine leads to representation of factions, the people, and the Zeitgeist. Instead of interring the doctrine, it is time to get back to basics.
-Delegation of environmental laws undermines democratic norms Wagner, Professor of Law, 03

(University of Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law Fall, 2003 11 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 25 ARTICLE: AMERICAN TRUCKING: THE "NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE" IS DEAD (LONG LIVE THE OLD ONE?) NAME: David M. Wagner+Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. AB Yale 1980, MA Yale 1984, JD George Mason University School of Law 1992, l/n)
By playing this game, a legislator can achieve popularity among environmentalists and business interests alike, but he avoids his graver duty in a democratic system: making the hard choices. Advocates of a strong nondelegation doctrine - including this writer - are angered less by regulations (though, yes, these do sometimes frost our shorts) than by the unaccountable decision making that rampant delegation enables. Environmental protection is valuable and therefore it has costs. Delegation creates the illusion that it is costless; or at any rate, it allows politicians to revel in that illusion. The officials chosen by the people to represent them end up making only the vaguest legislative decisions (clean air is good; the EPA should make it happen), while the more specific and more difficult decisions (e.g., should factory emissions be measured on a factory-wide basis, or on a smokestack-by-smokestack basis? n12) are made by unelected officials, often with civil-service job protection. Whether this transfer of technical decision making from the people to the experts results in better decision-making is arguable; that it results in a weakening of democratic values is relatively clear.

Congressional delegation to the agencies key to democracy Stack 06 Columbia Law Review March, 2006 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 ARTICLE: THE PRESIDENT'S
STATUTORY POWERS TO ADMINISTER THE LAWS NAME: Kevin M. Stack* * Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, l/n Part V addresses how these statutory conclusions in turn influence Congress's choice of delegate and defends the appeal of these constructions. Whenever Congress grants authority, it faces a choice: Should it grant authority to the agency alone, to the President, to the agency subject to the President's control, or to some other institutional arrangement? That question of institutional design requires an understanding of the legal implications of Congress's choice of delegate. The narrower statutory constructions this Article defends bolster both democratic and rule-of-law values. These constructions emphasize that the scope of the President's statutory authority (as well as of judicial deference) is in Congress's control by way of its choice of delegate. 19 The implication that a delegation to an executive branch official creates a duty under the law, not to the President, enforces a check, internal to the executive branch, on the President's power. Structural advantages of the President over Congress - such as the capacity to act unilaterally and poor congressional incentives to monitor expansions of presidential power - provide grounds to embrace such constraints on executive power.
Politics: Delegation Avoids Politics Links

-Delegation allows Congress to pass unpopular plans without taking the heat MEZHBURD 00
While agreeing that the Constitution mandates congressional lawmaking, public choice theorists add that congressional lawmaking is also crucial to representative democracy. n66 Using the economist-styled [*374] rational actor model, public choice theory argues that reelection serves as the major motive for all decisions made by legislators while in office. n67 Consequently, publicly elected officials who may be held accountable to their electorate should be promulgating the laws that affect such an electorate. Further, public choice theorists argue, Congress may have selfish and even sinister reasons for delegating. n68 For example, a statute setting universally desirable goals and broadly delegating the lawmaking authority to implement such goals is politically beneficial, since it enables Congress to claim support for uncontroversial issues, such as protection of children or the environment, while removing itself from politically unpopular but necessary costs, such as the consequent rise in prices of consumer goods and services. n69 As nondelegation proponents are fond of saying, delegation provides Congress with an escape route from making "hard choices." n70
-Delegation allows congress to get all of the credit ad avoid any of the political fallout Wagner, Professor of Law, 03
For members of Congress, the benefits of delegation are clear - clearer, one may speculate, than for environmentalist activists. Activists' goals may or may not be well served by the EPA's use of its delegated powers; a considerable literature has developed on the co- [*27] optation of regulatory agencies by the industries they regulate. n10 But for members of Congress, delegation is what popular business writers call a "win-win". They can vote for legislation such as NEPA, and thereby claim credit with the "green" lobby. But when their business constituents are menaced by particular EPA regulation, the legislator can shift the blame to the agency, which, in fact, made the regulation. A true master of the game can take it even further: he can pose (for his business constituents) as a white knight against "regulatory excesses," undertake "constituent service" work to soften the regulation, or even hold hearings at which "out-of-control regulators" are called on the carpet. n11
Politics: Delegation Avoids Politics Links

Delegation shields Congress and the President from blame Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 4) In 1933 Congress and the president enacted a statute that delegated to the secretary of agriculture the power to make laws, called "agricultural marketing orders, that limit how much each grower of an agricultural product may ship. One such law led to Sunkist's oranges being fed to cattle rather than people. That law illustrates how delegation shields Congress and the president from blame for harming their constituents.2
Delegation shields lawmakers from blame Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 9) Delegation can shield our elected lawmakers from blame for harming the public not only when a regulatory program, such as the navel orange marketing order, serves no legitimate public purpose, but also when a regulatory program should serve an important public purpose. Then the consequences of delegation for the public can be even greater because lawmakers can use delegation to escape blame both for failing to achieve that purpose and for imposing unnecessary costs.
Delegation allows the president to avoid blame Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 95) The president, who of course influences the design of legislation through recommendations and vetoes, has different incentives from legislators. When legislators shift blame or credit to an agency, they shift it to presidential appointees. The incentives for legislators to delegate might appear to be disincentives for the president. However, three factors work to attract the president to delegation. First, statutes often are structured so that the disappointed expectations of would-be beneficiaries and the costs to others are perceived after the next presidential election. For instance, the 1970 Clean Air Act was structured so that the EPA administrator would deal with states' failures to adopt plans only after the 1972 election.
Politics: Boosts Pres Image

Delegation allows lawmakers to get all the credit and none of the blame Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 10) Congress and the president delegate for much the same reason that they continue to run budget deficits. With deficit spending, they can claim credit for the benefits of their expenditures yet escape blame for the costs. The public must pay ultimately of course, but through taxes levied at some future time by some other officials. The point is not that deficits always have bad economic consequences, but that they have the political consequence of allowing officials to duck responsibility for costs. Likewise, delegation allows legislators to claim credit for the benefits which a regulatory statute promises yet escape the blame for the burdens it will impose, because they do not issue the laws needed to achieve those benefits. The public inevitably must suffer regulatory burdens to realize regulatory benefits, but the laws will come from an agency that legislators can then criticize for imposing excessive burdens on their constituents. Just as deficit spending allows legislators to appear to deliver money to some people without taking it from others, delegation allows them to appear to deliver regulatory benefits without imposing regulatory costs. It provides "a handy set of mirrors-so useful in Washington-by which a politician can appear to kiss both sides of the apple * ""
Delegation helps the president Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93

(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 82) STATUTES THAT PURPORT TO GIVE LAWMAKING power to an agency actually entail a sharing of lawmaking power among several groups, including the agency, the most powerful members of the legislative committees with jurisdiction over the agency, their counterparts in the White House, and concentrated interests. Concurrently, political benefits accrue to legislators and the president. First, they can claim credit for the promised benefits of a regulatory program, yet shift blame for the disappointments and costs of the program to the agency. Second, with delegation they increase their opportunities to obtain campaign contributions and other favors from concentrated interests.
Politics: Pres Blamed For Agency Action

President held accountable for agency action Stack 06 Columbia Law Review March, 2006 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 ARTICLE: THE PRESIDENT'S
STATUTORY POWERS TO ADMINISTER THE LAWS NAME: Kevin M. Stack* * Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, l/n Presidents do not live by constitutional authority alone. Many of the most important presidential initiatives involve claims of statutory authorization. 1 In our constitutional system, the significance of the President's assertions of statutory powers should come as no surprise. The Constitution grants the President relatively few independent powers, at least in comparison to Congress. 2 Yet presidents are held politically accountable for how the federal government as a whole functions, and in particular for how administrative agencies exercise their vast delegated powers. 3 That combination - a dearth of independent constitutional powers and political pressure to utilize the bureaucracy effectively - provides strong incentives for presidents to claim that already-existing statutes authorize them to implement policy. Moreover, locating an existing statutory power as a basis for action saves the President the potentially costly and slow process of assembling a majority in Congress to enact legislation. Thus to understand the scope of the President's powers we must understand the President's statutory powers. That, in turn, requires interpreting statutes.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 Each Act Key
-Each act of delegation risks upsetting the entire constitutional balance Lowi, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University, 87
There are relatively uncontrollable spillover effects from delegated power. Delegation of power does something to the giver and to the receiver. Delegation of power is an inevitable and necessary practice in any government. No theory of representative government is complete without it. An absolutist position against delegation [*296] would be utter foolishness. On the other hand, from the very first to the very last act of delegation, delegation is a calculated risk. If it is to be done rightly and in proportion, its consequences must be understood. The consequences in question are of constitutional importance. As far as I am concerned, they are collectively the key constitutional issue of our time -- precisely in the spirit of Madison's epigraph. The intent of the framers is not what is at issue; the concern of the framers is. The purpose of the Constitution is the regulation or regularization of power, in at least three ways. First, and foremost, the Constitution regulates through limitations on power. This is the essence of "the social contract" n2 as understood by Americans. Second, substantive calculability is used to regulate power. This translates into "rule of law" n3 as understood by Americans, and as embraced as the main antidote to tyranny, that being defined as arbitrariness. Third, power is regularized by procedural calculability. This means relatively rigid formalism defined as due process. This is captured very well in Professor Richard Stewart's notion of constitutive law, which "consists of rules that make legally recognized practices possible." n4 In my thesis, I emphasize that the delegation of broad and undefined discretionary power from the legislature to the executive branch deranges virtually all constitutional relationships and prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of limitation on power, substantive calculability, and procedural calculability. n5 Although a hypothesis about tendencies, my argument has appeared to be absolutist to several if not all of the commentators. n6 But fortunately, that is a consequence of my style rather than inherent in the proposition itself. Let me meet my critics and contribute to constructive exchange [*297] by one important point of clarification, which is that because the delegation of power is a matter of degree, the change of relationship between giver and receiver is also a matter of degree, until some indeterminate point when the relationship can be said to be deranged. I like the way Dean Ernest Gellhorn puts it, with some slight translation to meet my needs. He states that delegations become excessive when they are "used to create private goods." n7 My version would be that all discretion delegated to administrative agencies, by degree, provides the conditions for the creation of private goods. This is the very essence of patronage, n8 in the feudal sense of the term, therefore of serfdom -- the capacity to distribute material resources or privileges on a personalized, individualized basis. This incorporates Gellhorn's theory as a clarification of my own criterion: At what point can duly constituted authority be turned into patronage? Although it would be improbable that the precise point would be the same for each agency, it may be possible to agree that the question of the relationship between authority and patronage is the right question.
Agency Rule Making Slow

-Agency rule making takes 3 years Lowi, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University, 87
For all of these reasons, the time span of agency decisionmaking, from the moment a rule is proposed to the point where it is adopted and published in the Federal Register is now exceeding an average of thirty-five months. This is used in the arguments against the legitimacy and efficiency of administrative agencies when in fact a good part of that decisionmaking span is attributable to the deliberate, strategic antagonistic or dilatory imposition of procedures.
Delegation Hurts SOP

-Delegation hurts separation of powers Zellmer, Professor of Law, 00
(Arizona State Law Journal Fall, 2000 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941 ARTICLE: The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal NAME: Sandra B. Zellmer* *Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law, LL.M., l/n)
The primary criticism of congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies is that such delegations erode the separation of powers among the branches. Agency officials are not elected by the public and are generally viewed as less accountable than the legislative branch, yet they frequently wield policy-setting and rule-making authority. n49 Prior to the [*954] enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, n50 unelected agency officials made important decisions largely free from public scrutiny and judicial review, giving rise to separation of powers and due process concerns. n51
A2: Non-delegtion hurts policy making

-Cost to democracy outweighs the policy effects and Congressional aides solve the expertise problems Wagner, Professor of Law, 03
One underlying irony is that a revival of the (old) nondelegation doctrine might have its effect, not on whether experts can have major input into federal regulation, but on which branch they do it for. Congress already employs experts, especially on its committee staffs as distinct from its personal staffs, and these experts play a major role in drafting legislation. Though there is controversy over the use, by [*28] courts, of staff-written "committee reports," n13 there is no controversy about these experts' advisory role in helping their bosses draft legislation. This is because their bosses - the elected legislators - vote up or down on the final work-product. To delegate, by contrast, is to give force of law in advance to what experts (employed by an agency of indeterminate constitutional status n14) will decide on. Delegation puts the cart of expertise before the horse of democratic legitimacy; the nondelegation principle sets this anomaly back to rights. That it might do so at the cost of greatly enlarging an already large congressional staff hierarchy is of small concern to nondelegation advocates, as long as it would depopulate the constitutionally and democratically dubious administrative "branch."
Courts Will Not Strike Down

-Courts will uphold delegations Bergin 01
(Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 2001 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 363 COMMENT: Does Application of the APA's "Committed to Agency Discretion" Exception Violate the Nondelegation Doctrine? NAME: Amee B. Bergin* * Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2000-01, l/n)
Despite the urging of nondelegation supporters to the contrary, the Court has given no indication that it will return to a stricter view of the doctrine. n106 Instead, the Court has continued to uphold broad grants of legislative authority, n107 sometimes even avoiding the delegation issue altogether by reading statutes narrowly. n108
Agency Rulemaking Links to Politics

-Agency review means they link to politics also Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775 SYMPOSIUM: DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY: COMMENTS ON DAVID SCHOENBROD NAME: Peter H. Schuck * Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School; John Marshall Harlan Visiting Professor, New York Law School (Spring 1999), l/n)
Even before agency policies and rules see the light of day, the significant ones are vetted with the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") - and, in a few highly controversial and delicate cases (e.g., FDA regulation of tobacco), with the President and his closest political and policy aides. This may take the form of budgetary review, if the agency action would entail significant fiscal impacts; legislative review, if it requires statutory change; or regulatory review, if it meets the OMB criteria. Once again, the greatest impact of these processes is not so much the reviews themselves as the anticipatory reactions of the agency officials and the reviewers. They are keenly mindful of the policy concerns of the relevant congressional committees and key members, who often are consulted informally as part of these processes and usually receive drafts of the review documents before they are released to the public. Although the review process works somewhat differently with respect to the independent regulatory agencies, their vaunted (but to some extent, illusory) independence is designed to make them even more dependent on Congress and responsive to its policy priorities.
-Agency decisions face public scrutiny Schuck, Professor of Law, 99

Every agency is surrounded by organs of public communication that focus on its decisions. Some of these media report to a mass audience while others serve highly specialized audiences, including regulated firms, trade associations, consultants, "public interest" groups, Congress, administrative lawyers, and the like. In addition to using conventional journalistic methods of investigation, these media enjoy a legal right of access to agency proceedings under sunshine laws, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, n44 the Freedom of Information Act, n45 and other such laws. In effect, the media help to police the activities of agencies in ways that enable both interest groups and Congress to keep the agencies in line. Agencies, then, know that their actions are likely to come under public scrutiny and must tailor their conduct and decisions accordingly. This is not to deny, of course, that agencies would often [*790] prefer to conduct their business in secret and that they sometimes succeed in doing so. It is to say, rather, that intensive media coverage of agency actions makes it almost impossible to shield from public notice the important decisions that deviate significantly from congressional intent.
Delegation Solves Agency Capture

-Delegation solves agency capture Kahan, Professor of Law, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795 SYMPOSIUM: Democracy Schmemocracy NAME: Dan M. Kahan * * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, l/n) But even assuming this "agency capture" story is well-founded empirically - an issue that many dispute n25 - it does not [*803] unambiguously demonstrate that delegation is undemocratic. To say that delegation makes Congress more responsive to interest groups than to citizens generally is akin to saying that delegation connects the law more reliably to the preferences of the parties who care about the law the most, since they are the ones who will have the incentive to form an effective interest group. Thus, relative to a nondelegation baseline, the "agency capture" story suggests that agency lawmaking actually enhances democracy according to the market variant of pluralism. n26 Indeed, some means of structuring agency proceedings, including "negotiated rulemakings," adopt this rationale explicitly. n27
Agencies Will Always Abuse Power

-Agencies will always reach beyond the scope of the delegation Gelhorn and Verkuil 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989 SYMPOSIUM: DELEGATION: WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT? Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations NAME: Ernest Gellhorn * and Paul Verkuil ** * Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. ** Dean & Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, l/n)
Such a rule of interpretation is more consistent with constitutional and prudential norms, and we urge that agencies should adopt it. But we are skeptical that this recommendation will carry the day. History clearly shows that, except in highly unusual circumstances, n17 agencies read their authority expansively and often pursue agendas far beyond that envisioned when the agencies were created. n18 These many causes include: pressure from the President or congressional committees; bureaucratic imperatives; and public (i.e., interest group) demands. n19 Neither the President nor Congress is likely to narrow agency discretion to limit such tendencies when it is in their self-interest not to do so. n20 In addition, we do not believe that courts are likely to expand the clear statement doctrine beyond its current limited scope where an agency interpretation raises serious constitutional questions.
Courts Will Strike Down The AFF

-Courts have revived the nondelegation doctrine Richardson 00
(Catholic University Law Review Summer, 2000 49 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1053 NOTE: AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS V. EPA: THE PHOENIX ("SICK CHICKEN") RISES FROM THE ASHES AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IS REVIVED NAME: David M. Richardson+ BIO: + J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, l/n)
The D.C. Circuit's holding in American Trucking breathed new life into a constitutional doctrine that many legal scholars once considered dead or at least comatose. n176 Although the court's holding fell short of returning to the standard articulated in Schechter, n177 if the decision stands, it likely will have a significant impact on future attempts by federal agencies to implement or modify broad regulatory policies. n178 If anything, the American Trucking decision demonstrates that Lockout/Tagout I and Benzene were not anomalies. n179 Instead these cases may be the beginning of a new nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence, in which the federal judiciary looks harder at regulations that are broad in scope and devoid of [*1081] any congressionally-prescribed standards. n180
A2: No delegation=gridlock
NO risk of logjam from the lack of delegation Schoenbrod, professor NYU Law School, 93
(David, Power Without Responsibility, p. 135) THE SUPREME COURT HAS SAID THAT TIME limitations require Congress to delegate but supports this conclusion only with the observation that the federal government does delegate.' Modern scholars who agree with the Court wrongly assume that the only alternative to delegation is for Congress to take over the entire workload of agencies and that the federal government must enact laws as complex as those the agencies now promulgate.' Most agency work, however, does not involve the exercise of legislative power. I will discuss this point in detail in Chapter 12. And, while Congress and the president do have to undertake one big portion of the agencies' current workload- making laws -Congress need not enact laws as complex and intrusive as those that it now requires the agencies to promulgate. Despite their busy schedules, legislators could find the time necessary. If circumstances do not permit a total abolition of delegation, there is a way to allow some delegation yet still largely achieve the goals of the delegation doctrine.
A2: Hurts Pres Powers

Delegation does not check presidential influence over agencies Stack 06 Columbia Law Review March, 2006 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263 ARTICLE: THE PRESIDENT'S
STATUTORY POWERS TO ADMINISTER THE LAWS NAME: Kevin M. Stack* * Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, l/n In contrast, when Congress grants power to an executive branch official, Kagan notes that it delegates to an official that the President nominates, may remove at will, and may subject to extensive procedural requirements. 55 In view of these controls and the norms of deference executive branch officials give to the President's views, Kagan reasons that "when Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some necessary and obvious sense also delegates to the President." 56 The difficulty in distinguishing between the President's ability to influence agency officials and actually directing their exercise of delegated authority "provides reason to doubt any congressional intent to disaggregate them, in the absence of specific evidence of that desire." 57
******Aff Ans Executive Order******
Pres Power Low Now

Showdown with Congress coming over document subpoenas Irish Times 07 June 29, 2007 Friday HEADLINE: President and Congress head for showdown, l/n
President George W. Bush is heading towards a constitutional showdown with Congress over the limits of presidential power after he refused to hand over documents demanded by congressional committees investigating last year's dismissal of nine federal prosecutors, Denis Staunton writes from Washington. The White House yesterday also rejected a move by Congress to subpoena documents from the offices of the president and the vice-president, Dick Cheney, about a programme to eavesdrop on Americans without a warrant. In a letter to the chairmen of the House and Senate judiciary committees, White House counsel Fred Fielding said that the White House would not hand over documents about the prosecutors and that Mr Bush was prepared to assert executive privilege to prevent two former senior White House aides from testifying on the matter. "For the presidency to operate consistent with the constitution's design, presidents must be able to depend upon their advisers and other executive branch officials speaking candidly and without inhibition while deliberating and working to advise the president," Mr Fielding wrote. Tensions between presidents and Congress over the confidentiality of executive branch information have been common throughout US history, but they have usually been resolved through negotiation and without court intervention.
Bush conceding presidential powers to Congress now Washington Post 07 February 16, 2007 Friday SECTION: A Section; A05HEADLINE: Bush, Congress Could
Face Confrontation on Issue of War Powers; BYLINE: Michael Abramowitz, Washington Post Staff Writer, l/n President Bush has not been shy about asserting robust powers for the presidency in waging war, but lately he has seemed to concede that Congress has a role to play as well. Lawmakers, he has indicated, are within their rights to try to cap total deployments or limit where troops can go in Iraq. "They have the right to try to use the power of the purse to determine policy," the president told editors of the Wall Street Journal recently, in an interview that took some of his strongest conservative supporters by surprise. For a president who has asserted broad executive authority to conduct aggressive interrogations of detainees and electronic surveillance of terrorism suspects without a court warrant, such comments may reflect as much pragmatism as any serious legal analysis. White House aides concede they are not interested in unduly antagonizing lawmakers at a time they need all the help they can get on Capitol Hill. But as the debate in Congress shifts from nonbinding resolutions of disapproval for adding troops in Iraq to attaching conditions on funding for the war, a constitutional clash between the legislative and executive branches may be inevitable, say lawmakers and legal scholars with close ties to the administration.
President losing powers now Washington Post 07 February 16, 2007 Friday SECTION: A Section; A05HEADLINE: Bush, Congress Could
Face Confrontation on Issue of War Powers; BYLINE: Michael Abramowitz, Washington Post Staff Writer, l/n "The administration might try to be as accommodating as possible on issues short of a complete shutdown of the war, but if Congress clamps down on a core commander-in-chief power that the president thinks might be necessary to use in the war on terrorism, I do not think pragmatism will prevail," said one former top administration lawyer, who conditioned his comments on anonymity.David B. Rivkin Jr., a White House lawyer in the George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan administrations, described the proposed congressional restrictions as the "epitome of micromanagement." He said he thinks "the White House will end up fighting the congressional micromanagement and, if it continues, will publicly articulate the view that it is unconstitutional and not binding on the executive." Others speculate that Bush may be backpedaling a bit from his broad assertions of presidential power, some of which the Supreme Court rejected last summer when it struck down his plan for trying terrorism suspects in military tribunals. "He had said on quite a number of occasions that he's the decider," said Sen. Arlen Specter (Pa.), ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee. "He [is] not the sole decider. . . . As this debate has progressed, the president is acknowledging the constitutional role of Congress."
Pres Power Low Now

Presidential Powers low now. Jim Abrams, June 29, 2007, Associated Press, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/4933660.html,
Free trade powers expire President Bush loses his power today to seal "fast track" trade agreements without intervention from Congress, where Democrats blame recent deals for sending U.S. jobs abroad. Since 1975, only one other president, Bill Clinton, has been stripped of that authority, designed to speed the reduction of trade barriers and open new markets. Bush won't get it back again, and the next president might not either. House Democratic leaders, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and Rep. Charles Rangel of New York, whose Ways and Means Committee handles trade policy, said in a written statement Friday their legislative priorities "do not include the renewal of fast track authority." "Before that debate can even begin, we must expand the benefits of globalization to all Americans," they said. In the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., said he had other pressing trade issues, such as extending relief to trade-hit American workers.
Pres Power Low Now

Courts limiting presidential power. David E. Sanger and Scott Shane, June 30, 2006, journalists for the New York Times,
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/sf/nyt7_1_06_2.htm, Court's Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations Over Presidential Power The Supreme Court's Guantnamo ruling on Thursday was the most significant setback yet for the Bush administration's contention that the Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath have justified one of the broadest expansions of presidential power in American history. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney spent much of their first term bypassing Congress in the service of what they labeled a "different kind of war." Now they will almost certainly plunge into negotiations they previously spurned, over the extent of the president's powers, this time in the midst of a midterm election in which Mr. Bush's wartime strategies and their consequences have emerged as a potent issue. The ruling bolsters those in Congress who for months have been trying to force the White House into a retreat from its claims that Mr. Bush not only has the unilateral authority as commander in chief to determine how suspected terrorists are tried, but also to set the rules for domestic wiretapping, for interrogating prisoners and for pursuing a global fight against terror that many suspect could stretch for as long as the cold war did. What the court's 5-to-3 decision declared, in essence, was that Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney had overreached and must now either use the established rules of courts-martial or go back to Congress this time with vastly diminished leverage to win approval for the military commissions that Mr. Bush argues are the best way to keep the nation safe. For Mr. Bush, this is not the first such setback. The court ruled two years ago that the giant prison at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba, was not beyond the reach of American courts and that prisoners there had some minimal rights. Then, last year, came the overwhelming 90-to-9 vote in the Senate, over Mr. Cheney's strong objections, to ban "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment of prisoners. That forced Mr. Bush, grudgingly, to reach an accord with Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, on principles for interrogation, which are still being turned into rules. As seen by Mr. Bush's critics, the court has finally reined in an executive who used the Sept. 11 attacks as a justification or an excuse to tilt the balance of power decidedly toward the White House. "This is a great triumph for the rule of law and the separation of powers," said Bruce Ackerman, a professor of law and political science at Yale. "The administration will have to go back to Congress and talk in a much more discriminating fashion about what we need to do." Some allies of Mr. Bush reacted bitterly on Thursday, asserting that it was the court, rather than Mr. Bush, that had overreacted. "Nothing about the administration's solution was radical or even particularly aggressive," said Bradford A. Berenson, who served from 2001 to 2003 as associate White House counsel. "What is truly radical is the Supreme Court's willingness to bend to world opinion and undermine some of the most important foundations of American national security law in the middle of a war." At least rhetorically, the administration is giving no ground about the reach of the president's powers. Just 10 days ago, speaking here in Washington, Mr. Cheney cited the responses to Watergate and the Vietnam War as examples of where he thought Congress had "begun to encroach upon the power and responsibilities of the president," and said he had come to the White House with the view that "it was important to go back and try to restore that balance." Since taking office, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney have largely tried to do so by fiat, sometimes with public declarations, sometimes with highly classified directives governing how suspects could be plucked from the battlefield or, in the case decided on Thursday, how they would be tried.
Pres Power Low Now

Bushs executive power is slowing but surely being taken away Associated Press, June 2007,
www.theeagle.com/stories/063007/nation_20070630029 President Bush losing his seal "fast track" trade agreements without intervention from Congress, where Democrats blame recent deals for sending U.S. jobs abroad. Since 1975, only one other president, Bill Clinton, has been stripped of that trade promotion authority, designed to speed the reduction of trade barriers and open new markets with other countries. Bush won't get it back again, and the next president might not either.House Democratic leaders, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and Rep. Charles Rangel of New York, whose Ways and Means Committee handles trade policy, said in a written statement riday that their legislative priorities "do not include the renewal of fast track authority.""Before that debate can even begin, we must expand the benefits of globalization to all Americans," they said.In the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, DMont., said there are other pressing trade issues, such as extending relief to trade-hit American workers. "I have always said hat it is more important to get trade promotion authority done right than to get it done fast."Rather than promoting new free trade accords, the government should concentrate on rewriting old deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, going after countries such as China that manipulate their currencies, strengthening product safety and pushing anti-sweatshop legislation, said Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio.Nonetheless,
The modern presidency is not strong Aberbach and Peterson 2005. Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson. 2005. Aberbach is co-chair of the
Research Committee on Structure and Organization of Government of the International Political Science Association. Peterson is a scholar of American politics and works for Harvard University and the University of Pittsburgh, he is also an assistant to the U.S. senate. The Executive Branch. Oxford university press. Pg. 4 Independence, discretion, and wide-ranging responsibility are three constituent features of the modern presidency that help lay the predicate for the contemporary exercise of executive Leadership. They have also helped to feed exaggerated characterizations of American government as "presidential government" and America itself as a "presidential nation."' While certainly not without empirical referents, such notions overstate the relative power of the office. The modern presidency is not a terribly strong presidency, let alone an imperial one. As an institution, it is inadequately endowed to meet the high contemporary expectations for national leadership; it is not fashioned for success. Of itself, independence does not create its own power resources; discretion does not necessarily yield political influence; and responsibility does not automatically foster its own requisite capacity. In the end, the modern presidency is a curiously paradoxical institution, one in which intrinsic institutional weakness stokes a latent cultural antipathy to executive power, as presidents in urgent search of ever greater political control erode public trust and fuel perceptions of an arrogant and aggrandizing office.
Limiting Pres Powers Good

Turn: limiting prez powers leads to better decision making by the executive branch Aberbach and Peterson 2005. Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson. 2005. Aberbach is co-chair of the
Research Committee on Structure and Organization of Government of the International Political Science Association. Peterson is a scholar of American politics and works for Harvard University and the University of Pittsburgh, he is also an assistant to the U.S. senate. The Executive Branch. Oxford university press. Pg. 3 These impediments to effective leadership simply make presidents work harder, prompting them to explore the available mechanisms of political control and to challenge the political and cultural conventions that define appropriate presidential behavior. The results of these leadership efforts have been consequential. Historically, the presidential struggle for political influence has wrought several fundamental changes and, in the process, helped lay the foundations for the modern presidency: a profound conceptual reworking of the office, one that stresses the popular underpinnings of presidential authority; the rise of a powerful and centralized presidential establishment; and basic alterations in the patterned relationships between presidents and Congress, presidents and the permanent bureaucracy, and presidents and citizens at large. On different occasions, presidential improvisation has also set presidents against public law, the standard operating procedures of government, or the Constitution itself, often in the name of shortterm political success.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 Pres Powers Bad

Bush views constitution as blueprint to dictatorship St. Louis Post-Dispatch 2005
St. Louis Post-Dispatch January 12, 2005 editorial L/N
For more than three years, President George W. Bush has been using the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and legal sophistry produced by attorneys appointed to key positions in the White House, Justice Department and the Department of Defense to justify the exercise of essentially unlimited and unchecked presidential power. In the spring and summer of 2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the president's chief legal adviser, presided over discussions of abusive techniques military
and civilian U.S. interrogators could use to extract information from prisoners in their custody. Out of these discussions emerged the official legal position of the American government, spelled out in a Justice Department memo to Gonzales dated Aug. 1, 2002. It has come to be known as the "torture memo." After its contents became public last summer, the memo provoked widespread outrage, mostly over the nauseating perversion of language that rationalized a definition
of torture so narrow that virtually all conduct by interrogators was lawful. The fruits of this cynical exercise have been grimly apparent since the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted last May. Last month's court-ordered release of thousands of government documents and records demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that abuse has been widespread. It stretches back to 2002 and well into 2004 and involves hundreds of prisoners, probably more, under American control on at least two continents. And that doesn't include those secreted by the CIA at clandestine facilities in unspecified locations all over the globe and those shipped by the United States to countries where torture is routine. But even more chilling
than its winking at torture was the broader legal finding at the heart of the August 2002 memo: The U.S. Constitution -- rather than enshrining the structure of a representative democracy, balancing the limited authority of government among three branches and protecting the rights of the individual -- actually is a blueprint for dictatorship. The memo states that the Constitution empowers the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, to violate laws passed by Congress, to betray the word and bond of the United States by ignoring its ratified international treaties and to authorize anyone else to commit any act he deems necessary -- any act -- absolved of responsibility and free from the risk of criminal prosecution and punishment. This memo stood as the official position of the United States for more than two years. Briefly embarrassed by its disclosure, the Bush administration seemed to disavow portions of it last summer. But not until Dec. 30 did the Justice Department issue a superseding legal opinion that restored common sense to the definition of torture. The new memo said nothing, however, about authoritarian presidential power. Six months before the 2002 torture memo was issued, Bush used opinions from the same legal team in declaring that the Geneva Conventions, treaties signed and ratified by the United States and obeyed by presidents for more than 50 years, were optional obligations to be applied or ignored as he saw fit. Prisoners taken in the course of actions he chose to label as the war on terrorism -whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere -- would be entitled to Geneva protections only if he judged them deserving of it. And they would be held, questioned and treated as he determined they should be. Prisoners sent to the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- including Afghans, Iraqis, suspected terrorists from assorted Arab countries, Australians, Brits, Canadians, Germans and even American citizens -- could be kept there indefinitely on the president's order alone. They could be denied access to a lawyer, denied access to the courts and denied the ability to challenge their imprisonment. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this claim last spring, ruling in a case involving Guantanamo prisoners that the president may not exercise absolute and arbitrary power to rob people of their freedom, even in wartime. But the administration doesn't seem to be taking the Supreme Court very seriously. The Washington Post recently reported that
officials in the Bush administration are having serious discussions about keeping some suspected terrorists imprisoned without trial for life, possibly in prisons built abroad, despite an absence of evidence against them or reason to believe they possess any useful information. And this week, Newsweek reported that strategists at the Bush Pentagon, faced with the failure of current tactics against insurgents in Iraq, are considering training Iraqi death squads to assassinate or kidnap insurgent leaders. This has been dubbed "the Salvador Option," patterned after comparable notorious operations employed by former
dictators in El Salvador -- also with U.S. assistance -- Honduras, Chile and Argentina. At last week's Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Gonzales to be attorney general, Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina tried to explain the danger of such cynical thinking. "I think you weaken yourself as a nation," he told Gonzales, "when you try to play cute (with the law) and become more like your enemy, instead of like who you want to be." Weakness is exactly the point. For all their bullying assertions of power and
moral superiority, these are frightened little men who lack faith in the elemental principles of the most noble and heroic nation in human history. They're afraid that American ideals are too weak to prevail against the ruthless rage of terrorists, afraid that the rule of law is inferior to the rule of violence and intimidation. In this, they are terribly terribly wrong.
Congressional check on presidential foreign policy necessary to prevent war Eland 07 Bush Out of Line in Scolding Pelosi By Ivan Eland April 3, 2007 Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent
Institute and Assistant Editor of The Independent Review. Dr. Eland has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, Evaluator-in-Charge (national security and intelligence) for the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/040307a.html
Curiously, although the expansion of executive power in foreign policy has not served the nation well, it often has the counterintuitive effect of serving the interests of Congress. If the President is always in charge of U.S. foreign policy, members of Congress can duck responsibility for tough issues that might pose risks to their paramount goalgetting reelected. For example, by allowing presidents to fight even major conflicts without constitutionally required declarations of wara phenomenon that began when Harry Truman neglected, with a congressional wink and nod, to get approval for the Korean Warthe Congress conveniently throws responsibility for the war into the Presidents lap. The founders would be horrified at the erosion of a major pillar of their system of checks and balances. To fulfill their constitutional responsibility as a check on the President, members of Congress do have a responsibility to be heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. Instead of publicly condemning Speaker Pelosi for carrying out the bipartisan Iraq Study Groups heretoforelanguishing recommendation of actually talking to Syria to resolve bilateral issues, the President should be happy that someone in the U.S. government is willing to take risks with one of Americas major adversaries in the region.
Executive power is dangerous and undermines our government

David Epstein, department of Political Science and Stanford Graduate School of Business at Columbia and Stanford University and Sharyn OHallora, Department of Political Science and the School of International and Public Affairs and Hoover Institution at Columbia and Stanford University, 1999
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW: THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: A POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/epstein.htm
Thus, proponents of a revitalized doctrine protest that congressional delegation of authority to the Executive is real, and that it undermines the very foundations of our representative government. Professors David Schoenbrod and Marci Hamilton, for instance, argue in their amicus curiae brief for Raines v. Byrd[9] (an earlier version of Clinton v. City of New York) that, in delegating authority to the Executive, Congress generally avoids accountability by leaving the hard policy choices to unelected and unaccountable agencies.[10] Delegation thus leads to a dangerous concentration of power in one branch of government, hidden from public scrutiny and operating at the expense of the public good for the benefit of a few well-placed individuals.
Executive power threatens constitutional stability

Martin S. Flaherty, Author of The Most Dangerous Branch and Associate Professor of Law, 1996 The Most Dangerous Branch, Yale Law Journal, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/flaherty/main.htm
Americans seeking to remain faithful to the Founding, according to Professor Flaherty, should therefore abandon the formalist approach and instead apply the original separation of powers values to the different governmental circumstances we confront today. The Executive long ago replaced Congress as the branch that most threatens constitutional balance. The President's claim to electoral mandates resembles the type of simple accountability that the Founders came to suspect rather than celebrate, and the growth in federal and executive power make eighteenth-century concerns about governmental energy antiquated. Translating Founding values into this modern setting requires a two-fold approach to separation of powers. First, the Supreme Court should require a high threshold before intruding into institutional arrangements established by the political branches. Second, the Court should only intervene to further the general goals originally attributed to separation of powers.
If Bush gets more power he will use military within US territory Parry 2005
Roberts & the 'Apex of Presidential Power' Nat Parry Consortiumnews.com, September 6, 2005 http://www.consortiumnews.com/2005/090605.html
Then, in August 2002, the Justice Department asserted that international laws against torture dont apply to interrogations of al-Qaeda suspects. In congressional hearings in summer 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to show the Senate Judiciary Committee the administrations memos arguing that Bush has the inherent authority to order torture whenever he deems it necessary. The Wall Street Journal, which obtained a draft of the torture memo, summarized its contents this way: The president, despite domestic and international laws constraining the use of torture, has the authority as commander in chief to approve almost any physical or psychological actions during interrogation, up to and including torture. The Journal also reported that a military lawyer who helped prepare the report said that political appointees heading the working group sought to assign to the President virtually unlimited authority on matters of torture to assert presidential power at its absolute apex, the lawyer said. [WSJ, June 7, 2004]While these arguments pertained to foreign nationals, it follows logically that U.S. citizens could be swept up as well. The Bush administration argued before the federal courts that the United States is a battlefield where even U.S. citizens can be designated as enemy combatants and stripped of their legal rights, as happened to Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested in May 2002 on suspicions of plotting a terrorist attack. Meanwhile, the Bush administration is laying plans for deploying the military inside the United States as part of the war on terror. A recent Department of Defense document includes plans for pre-emptive efforts within the United States, reversing a long-standing U.S. policy against using the military in domestic law enforcement. The Pentagon plan states that when directed by the President or the secretary of defense, the U.S. military will defeat direct threats within U.S. airspace and on U.S. territory. The new strategy promises to transform U.S. military forces to execute homeland defense missions in the U.S. homeland. It envisions pre-emptive action to defeat potential challengers before they threaten the United States, which would entail increased reconnaissance and surveillance conducted by the military within the United States. [See Consortiumnews.coms Bushs Grimmer Vision.]Considering his deference toward the Executive Branch, Judge Roberts would presumably be a reliable vote on the U.S. Supreme Court to grant George W. Bush whatever power he wants as the President picks and chooses who gets detained without trial and what means are used to extract information.
Bush administration use of power undermines democratic accountability Allen 07 Brooklyn Law Review Spring, 2007 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871 ARTICLE: George W. Bush and the
Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change NAME: Michael P. Allen + + Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; l/n Before one is able to do so, one must get a better understanding of the Bush administration's specific conception of executive authority. Part III is a descriptive exercise devoted to distilling the single dominant theme and three distinct but related sub-attributes of President Bush's constitutional Chief Executive. The dominant and overarching theme of the Bush administration's stance is a strongly unilateral executive who is constitutionally empowered to take a wide array of actions without "interference" from any other power center in American government. The three distinct sub-attributes associated with unilateralism are: (1) the unilateral authority is often exercised in secret, greatly reducing transparency in government (such lack of transparency applies to citizens as well as to other institutions of government); (2) the administration is highly intolerant of criticism and questioning associated with its exercise of power; and (3) the administration is disciplinarian and retributive with respect to those people and entities that do challenge its exercise of authority. [*878]
Bush gaining Pres Powers leads to torture, war, and letting the terrorists win Washington Post 07 July 6, 2007 Friday SECTION: EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A15 HEADLINE: The
Commuter in Chief BYLINE: Eugene Robinson, l/n What led us to this point -- when a lifestyle maven, a bling-bedecked rapper and a table-dancing celebrity are held more accountable than a powerful member of the White House inner circle who functioned as Dick Cheney's right-hand man -- was an abuse, or at least a misuse, of presidential power. It's true that the Libby affair pales beside other recent abuses of power -- the war in Iraq, intrusive domestic surveillance, secret CIA prisons, Guantanamo, torture "lite" and whatever else Bush and Cheney have done to the Constitution that we don't know about yet. But we can't accept presidential rule-by-fiat as the norm. If we do, our way of life is threatened, and the terrorists have won. I'm joking, but I'm serious. Bush and his erstwhile ally, Tony Blair, often defended their war in Iraq by saying they were fighting terrorists who hated our "way of life" and wanted to destroy it. Leave aside the question of whether this is really the terrorists' motivation (and, by the way, if they're bothered by uppity women such as Martha Stewart, Lil' Kim and Paris Hilton, they can relax; we've taken care of them). Isn't the rule of law an aspect of our way of life that's worth defending?
Continued concentration of political power in the executive in violation of the separation of powers will result in a widespread assault on individual liberties by a tyrannical executive and war - the magnitude of this impact outweighs other concerns Redish and Cisar 91, MARTIN H. REDISH (the Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy
at Northwestern University School of Law), ELIZABETH J. CISAR, Duke Law Journal, 41 Duke L.J. 449, December, 1991, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES: ARTICLE: "IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERN" *: THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY. In any event, the political history of which the Framers were aware tends to confirm that quite often concentration of political power ultimately leads to the loss of liberty. Indeed, if we have begun to take the value of separation of powers for granted, we need only look to modern American history to remind ourselves about both the general vulnerability of representative government, and the direct correlation between the concentration of political power and the threat to individual liberty. n127 [*473] The widespread violations of individual rights that took place when President Lincoln assumed an inordinate level of power, for example, are well documented. n128 Arguably as egregious were the threats to basic freedoms that arose during the Nixon administration, when the power of the executive branch reached what are widely deemed to have been intolerable levels. n129 Although in neither instance did the executive's usurpations of power ultimately degenerate into complete and irreversible tyranny, the reason for that may well have been the resilience of our political traditions, among the most important of which is separation of powers itself. In any event, it would be political folly to be overly smug about the security of either representative government or individual liberty. Although it would be all but impossible to create an empirical proof to demonstrate that our constitutional tradition of separation of powers has been an essential catalyst in the avoidance of tyranny, common sense should tell us that the simultaneous division of power and the creation of interbranch checking play important roles toward that end. To underscore the point, one need imagine only a limited modification of the actual scenario surrounding the recent Persian Gulf War. In actuality, the war was an extremely popular endeavor, thought by many to be a politically and morally justified exercise. But imagine a situation in which a President, concerned about his failure to resolve significant social and economic problems at home, has callously decided to engage [*474] the nation in war, simply to defer public attention from his domestic failures. To be sure, the President was presumably elected by a majority of the electorate, and may have to stand for reelection in the future. However, at this particular point in time, but for the system established by separation of powers, his authority as Commander in Chief n130 to engage the nation in war would be effectively dictatorial. Because the Constitution reserves to the arguably even more representative and accountable Congress the authority to declare war, n131 the Constitution has attempted to prevent such misuses of power by the executive. n132 It remains unproven whether any governmental structure other than one based on a system of separation of powers could avoid such harmful results. In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the existence of separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question is whether we wish to take that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that might result. Given both the relatively limited cost imposed by use of separation of powers and the great severity of the harm sought to be avoided, one should not demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just as in the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, "I told you so."
Inherent powers justification guarantees eventual miscalculation and nuclear war maintaining constitutional checks on the executive is key to avoid this
Ray Forrester 89 (Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. Former dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Cornell), Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636, AUGUST, 1989, l/n A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. ... Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President. Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which such a decision has been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail.
Court deferment to the president leads to nuclear war Kellman '89 (Barry, Prof - Depaul, Duke Law Journal, December, Lexis)
In this era of thermonuclear weapons, America must uphold its historical commitment to be a nation of law. Our strength grows from the resolve to subject military force to constitutional authority. Especially in these times when weapons proliferation can lead to nuclear winter, when weapons production can cause cancer, when soldiers die unnecessarily in the name of readiness: those who control military force must be held accountable under law. As the Supreme Court recognized a generation ago, the Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders. .... . . . We cannot close our eyes to the fact that today the peoples of many nations are ruled by the military. We should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution. n1 Our fears may be rooted in more recent history. During the decade of history's largest peacetime military expansion (1979-1989), more than 17,000 service personnel were killed in training accidents. n2 In the same period, virtually every facility in the nuclear bomb complex has been revealed [*1598] to be contaminated with radioactive and poisonous materials; the clean-up costs are projected to exceed $ 100 billion. n3 Headlines of fatal B-1B bomber crashes, n4 the downing of an Iranian passenger plane, n5 the Navy's frequent accidents n6 including the fatal crash of a fighter plane into a Georgia apartment complex, n7 remind Americans that a tragic price is paid to support the military establishment. Other commentaries may distinguish between the specific losses that might have been preventable and those which were the random consequence of what is undeniably a dangerous military program. This Article can only repeat the questions of the parents of those who have died: "Is the military accountable to anyone? Why is it allowed to keep making the same mistakes? How many more lives must be lost to senseless accidents?" n8 This Article describes a judicial concession of the law's domain, ironically impelled by concerns for "national security." In three recent controversies involving weapons testing, the judiciary has disallowed tort accountability for serious and unwarranted injuries. In United States v. Stanley, n9 the Supreme Court ruled that an Army sergeant, unknowingly drugged with LSD by the Central Intelligence Agency, could not pursue a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights. In Allen v. United States, n10 civilian victims of atmospheric atomic testing were denied a right of tort recovery against the government officials who managed and performed the tests. Finally, in Boyle v. United Technologies, n11 the Supreme Court ruled that private weapons manufacturers enjoy immunity from product liability actions alleging design defects. A critical analysis of these decisions reveals that the judiciary, notably the Rehnquist Court, has abdicated its responsibility to review civil matters involving the military security establishment. n12 [*1599] Standing at the vanguard of "national security" law, n13 these three decisions elevate the task of preparing for war to a level beyond legal [*1600] accountability. They suggest that determinations of both the ends and the means of national security are inherently above the law and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed by these determinations. This conclusion signals a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. The very underpinnings of constitutional governance are threatened by those who contend that the rule of law weakens the execution of military policy. Their argument -- that because our adversaries are not restricted by our Constitution, we should become more like our adversaries to secure ourselves -- cannot be sustained if our tradition of adherence to the rule of law is to be maintained. To the contrary, the judiciary must be willing to demand adherence to legal principles by assessing responsibility for weapons decisions. This Article posits that judicial abdication in this field is not compelled and certainly is not desirable. The legal system can provide a useful check against dangerous military action, more so than these three opinions would suggest. The judiciary must rigorously scrutinize military decisions if our 18th century dream of a nation founded in musket smoke is to remain recognizable in a millennium ushered in under the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear holocaust.
Pres Powers Bad: Will Abuse Power

Crimes of Watergate era grew from imperial presidency Bush is now seeking same powers Shapiro 2002
Restoring the imperial presidency by Bruce Shapiro June 17 2002 http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/06/17/bush_watergate/
It is fashionable now to blame Watergate on Nixon's paranoia and rogue personality. But the crimes of Watergate grew directly from the kind of unchecked presidential powers now sought by the Bush administration both at home and abroad. FBI spying on political rallies and religious communities? The White House plumbers practiced their tradecraft breaking into the psychiatric records of dissident Defense Department analyst Daniel Ellsberg. The "enemies list" grew from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover's decades of spying on religious, civil rights and peace groups. Expanded paramilitary covert operations abroad? The Watergate break-in team was conscripted from the CIA squad for covert Cuban operations. Restrictions on the flow of information to Congress and the public? The direct complicity of Nixon and other high officials in Watergate was proved only because senators who had subpoenaed White House records refused to knuckle under to claims of executive privilege -- a drama being replayed this month with Sen. Joseph Lieberman's subpoenas regarding the involvement of Cheney and other White House officials in Enron.
XO Ans: Hurts Accountability

Executive order undermines accountability in rulemaking and due process Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
In addition to these internal and external responses to orders, there is also the fact that proceeding by orders undermines the administrative law processes that have been developed over the years to serve a variety of important purposes. For some people in the White House, this hardly sounds like a downside to the use of presidential decrees. Indeed, Vice President Gore's National Performance Review argued for the use of presidential directives because of a desire to avoid those processes. However, while it may seem that this is the appropriate strategy, it carries with it a number of difficulties. It is also worth noting that administrative law processes are so burdensome and time consuming these days in no small part because of the burdens placed on them by a series of executive orders from Carter through Clinton. Administrative law processes were designed to ensure that the authority on which important actions are taken is clear. They were also intended to ensure that when the executive branch adopts rules having the force of law, the process for creating them is open, orderly, and participative. When government brings its power to bear on particular persons or organizations, administrative law is expected to ensure that the rudiments of due process are available. Finally, administrative law provides a means for judicial review, not only to provide a check on administrative arbitrariness and abuses but also to integrate important decisions that emerge from executive branch agencies into the larger body of law by reconciling them to appropriate constitutional and statutory provisions. And through all of that extends a concern to have a process that provides an appropriate level of deference to expert and professional civil servants charged with implementation of a host of legislation in technically difficult and politically contentious fields. The nature of executive orders and the processes by which they are issued run in a very different direction. They are usually not open, provide little or no procedural regularity, and have limited participation. Indeed, they invite political appeals to do off the record and behind closed doors that which would be on the record and public in an agency proceeding. Executive orders often not only do not pay heed to these important concerns, but they also often create problems. For example, they can muddy the discussion of legislative history. Claims to authority can be an issue, not merely because of what the White House does today but as a result of past practice by other administrations. It was with no small bit of irony that the Supreme Court in 1989 reached back to an executive order promulgated by President Kennedy more than a decade before the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was passed to interpret the statute. 121 Among the many ironies in that case was the fact that the act was passed to deal with the complete failure of the executive order to protect the public interest. Moreover, the Court had to recognize that the interpretation it sought to place on the statute plainly violated a literal reading of the legislation in favor of the failed executive order's approach. 127 Recent presidents have moved in quite a different direction from a concern with the real validity of their actions to assert broad claims to constitutional authority or implied statutory authority. As we have seen, that can create more difficulties than it solves.
XO Ans: Hurts Accountability

Bush will expand the scope of powers beyond those of the counterplan Allen 07 Brooklyn Law Review Spring, 2007 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871 ARTICLE: George W. Bush and the
Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change NAME: Michael P. Allen + + Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; l/n The core principle underlying the administration's view of executive authority is unilateralism. The President is said to have independent or inherent authority under the Constitution to undertake a wide range of actions. 83 This authority does not [*892] require the action or acquiescence of other centers of political authority under the Constitution. 84 Indeed, it appears to be largely immune from even meaningful oversight of such other centers of authority. 85 As this theory was colorfully put by an unidentified Republican lobbyist: "It's we just want it our way and we don't want to be bothered by talking to other people about it." 86 The constitutionality of such unilateral assertions of power is widely debated, placing the core of the Bushian vision of executive authority at the frontier of constitutional law. 87 At its most general level, however, maintaining that the President has at least some unilateral authority to act is entirely consistent with well-established constitutional law. Most significantly in this regard, over fifty years ago, Justice Robert Jackson articulated his now-famous spectrum of presidential authority. 88 A key attribute of Jackson's approach is that the [*893] President had "independent powers" to act when Congress was silent and even in some cases when it had spoken in a manner inconsistent with the President's actions. 89 The remarkable feature of the Bush administration's unilateralism, then, is not novelty. Instead, what is significant is its scope. 90 As will be apparent from the specific examples considered below, Bushian unilateralism implicates two broad dimensions. First, it applies without regard to the "domestic" or "foreign" nature of the matter at hand. Second, Bushian unilateralism operates with respect to all of the other centers of political authority under the Constitution both vertically and horizontally. Thus, when the courts act in response to the Bush vision of executive authority, these two elements of unilateralism must be taken into account.
Pres Powers Bad: A2 Congress Checks

Congress incapable of checking abuses of presidential powers Schwarz and Huq 07 The Washington Post April 1, 2007 Sunday SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. B01
HEADLINE: Where's Congress In This Power Play? BYLINE: Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr. and Aziz Huq Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., a lawyer with New York University's Brennan Center for Justice, was chief counsel for the Church Committee in 1975-76. Aziz Huq is a Brennan Center fellow, l/n In the past five years, we have learned that the executive branch has circumvented federal bans on torture, abandoned the Geneva Conventions, monitored Americans' phone conversations without the required warrants and "outsourced" torture through "extraordinary rendition" to several foreign governments. Recently we learned that the FBI recklessly abused its power to secure documents through emergency national security letters. Once again, congressional oversight of the growing national security, intelligence and law enforcement establishments has fallen short. But there are now obstacles to reestablishing effective oversight that did not exist three decades ago. For one thing, the country and Congress are far more polarized. There was a high degree of bipartisan unity on the Church Committee, and Republican President Gerald R. Ford generally cooperated in the effort to expose abuses and create remedies. The committee, formally known as the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, was created in Watergate's wake and had a Democratic majority. But it focused on abuses by administrations of both parties. Indeed, its inquiries revealed that three Democratic icons, Presidents Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, all knew about or approved questionable activities. Howard Baker Jr., a senior Senate Republican who served on the panel, disagreed with some proposals but said it had carried out its task "responsibly and thoroughly." But Congress now faces an even bigger problem than heightened partisanship. Past presidents have never claimed that the Constitution gave them power to set aside statutes permanently. (Richard M. Nixon was no longer in office when he declared: "When the president does it, it means that it is not illegal.") The Bush administration, however, appears committed to eliminating judicial and congressional oversight of executive action at all costs. This pernicious idea, at odds with the Founders' vision of checks and balances, lies at the heart of many of today's abuses.
President is locked in a war to defend presidential powers- he will protect his power at all cost New York Times 07 March 22, 2007 SECTION: Section A; Column 5; National Desk; WHITE HOUSE
MEMO; Pg. 21 HEADLINE: Bush's Big-Picture Battle: Presidential Prerogatives BYLINE: By SHERYL GAY STOLBERG; l/n Ever since Republicans lost control of Congress, President Bush has known a fight like this could come. The battle over the Congressional inquiry into the dismissal of federal prosecutors is not one of Mr. Bush's choosing. But now that it has been thrust upon him, Mr. Bush is defiantly refusing to allow Karl Rove and other top aides to testify publicly and under oath, as Democrats are demanding. And he is standing by Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, despite calls for Mr. Gonzales to quit. In doing so, the president is sending a message to the new Democratic majority on Capitol Hill: He may be a lame duck and his poll numbers may be down, but he will protect those closest to him, defend his presidential powers and run his White House the way he sees fit in his remaining 22 months in office. ''George W. Bush will rue the day if he lets Al Gonzales go,'' said Ari Fleischer, Mr. Bush's former press secretary, ''because that will be the first scalp that the Democrats on the Hill will gather and collect, and then the door will then be opened to show that if you can put enough pressure on President Bush, anybody can go. This is a crucial first test.'' Mr. Bush is also waging what he views as an even bigger war over presidential prerogatives. He has moved aggressively to expand presidential powers, claiming authority to eavesdrop on Americans without court warrants and try terror suspects before military tribunals. To avoid divulging the membership of Vice President Dick Cheney's energy task force, the administration even went to the Supreme Court. The president does not intend to backtrack now that Democrats are in charge.
Pres Powers Bad: Strong Congress Good

Now is the critical time- Congress must become more assertive in foreign policy making to prevent future Iraqs Holt 07 Christian Science Monitor February 1, 2007, SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 9 HEADLINE: Between
Congress and the president, a power seesaw BYLINE: Pat M. Holt former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, l/n American involvement in Iraq appears to be an unresolvable dilemma: the United States can neither stay in nor get out. It cannot stay in because the public will not support it. It cannot get out because, after four years there, the US has wrecked the country. It would be unconscionable now simply to walk away and leave a nation of impoverished Iraqis among the ruins. America cannot start writing a new policy on a clean slate. But what it can do is adjust the imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Too much deference to the White House got the US into this predicament. A more-assertive Congress might help bring about a solution, and more important, avoid a similar situation in the future. The Iraq war represents a constitutional failure of American government, but it was not the institutions of government that failed; it was the people who were supposed to make those institutions work. The Constitution provides for a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is the separation of powers that creates the crucial checks and balancesthat enable one branch to keep another in line. A good deal of the thinking that went into this structure was based on skepticism and distrust. From long experience, the framers of the Constitution were skeptical and distrustful of power, and they wanted to build this into the new government. Perhaps the biggest failure with respect to Iraq was in Congress. Members were far too deferential to the White House; they failed to question President Bush's reactions to 9/11 as they were duty-bound to do. Among Republicans on Capitol Hill, there was an exaggerated sense of party loyalty to the president. Among both parties, there was an exaggerated sense of partisanship. The party system and the separation of powers are incompatible. Parties do not work well without cohesion and discipline. The separation of powers does not work well without independence. This conflict was foreseen by the framers. In one of the Federalist papers, James Madison warns against "the pestilential influence of party animosities." The Constitution has been called "an invitation to struggle" between the president and Congress for the control of foreign policy. On Iraq, Congress did not accept the invitation. Republicans reveled in Mr. Bush's popularity. Democrats were afraid of it. Only after the public began to turn against the war did Congress began to follow. Meanwhile, the president was left unchecked. The history of the constitutional struggle between president and Congress is a seesaw with first one branch up and then the other. Congress probably reached its post-World War II high at the end of the Vietnam War when it used its control of money to force the US to end its support of South Vietnam. When President Johnson left office in 1969, a congressional observer remarked that it would take to the end of the 20th century to restore presidential powers to where Johnson found them. Bush became president in 2001 determined to hasten that restoration. He showed his hand early when he supported Vice President Dick Cheney's refusal to name the participants in a committee studying energy policy. The war on terror provided further opportunities. By 2006, the president's end of the seesaw was at a post-World War II high. Now there is an opposite movement propelled, as before, by an unpopular war. With respect to both Vietnam and Iraq, Congress did not assert itself until corrective action became prohibitively difficult. The principal lesson we can learn from the Iraq dilemma is that Congress should join the struggle with the president earlier in the development of a problem. It should combat the natural tendency to let the president take the lead in foreign crises.
Pres Powers Bad: Strong Congress Good

STRENGTHENING CONGRESS IS KEY TO CHECK MILITARISTIC ADVENTURISM Joel R. Paul, 98, (Prof, U Conn Law) July, 1998, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 671, l/n
The Constitution "diffuses power...to secure liberty." n27 Constitutional checks and balances create resistance to the exercise of power. n28 [*679] So long as constitutional authority over foreign affairs remained divided between the executive and Congress, neither branch was able to commit the nation abroad without a popular consensus. n29 These institutional obstacles are not merely quaint vestiges of an earlier era of relative isolationism. They serve the normative value of discouraging foreign adventures to which the nation is not fully committed. The discourse of executive expediency undermined this constitutional structure. n30 Specifically, the expansion of executive power allowed Congress to avoid public accountability for U.S. foreign policy, facilitated more frequent foreign interventions, undermined the coherence of our foreign policy, and exposed foreign policy-making to "capture" by foreign governments.
Pres Powers A2: Terrorism Add On

Congressional powers key to effective war on terror JOHN W. DEAN 02 (a FindLaw columnist, is a former Counsel to the President of the United States), TOM
RIDGE'S NON-TESTIMONIAL APPEARANCE BEFORE CONGRESS: Another Nixon-style Move By The Bush Administration, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020412.html, Apr. 12, 2002 Congressional oversight and the collective wisdom of Congress are essential in our dealing with terrorism. Presidents don't issue press releases about their mistakes. Nor do they report interagency squabbles that reduce executive effectiveness. They don't investigate how funds have been spent poorly or unwisely. And they're not inclined to explain even conspicuous problems in gathering national security intelligence. When did anyone hear of a President rooting out incompetent appointees (after all, they chose them in the first place)? In contrast, Congress wants to do all these things, thereby keeping a President on his toes. Its oversight is crucial - for the Presidential and Executive Branch limitations I've suggested are only a few of the myriad problems that might hamper the efficacy of the Executive in its efforts to deal with terrorism, and that Congress can help to correct. Justifiably, Americans are worried, but they are getting on with their lives. Shielding and hiding the man in charge of homeland security from answering the questions of Congress is entirely unjustified. This talk of "separation of powers" and "executive privilege" is unmitigated malarkey. It is a makeshift excuse to keep the Congress from policing the White House.
Pres Powers: A2 Leadership

Prez powers kills public faith in leadership Joel R. Paul 98 (Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law), The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive
Expediency and Executive Agreements, California Law Review, July, 1998, l/n Second, the growth of executive power has created a bias in favor of internationalism that has often led to failure. Possessing a virtual monopoly power over foreign relations has tempted presidents to send troops abroad or to make foreign commitments. Time and again the executive has stumbled into foreign conflicts, like Bosnia, Lebanon, Iran and Somalia, with tragic results. n32 At a minimum, congressional [*680] participation might have slowed decision-making, leaving time for public deliberation. n33 Third, the absence of congressional debate has often accounted for the lack of public support for foreign commitments. When U.S. forces have suffered casualties, such as in Somalia or Beirut, public opinion turned against the executive. Without the popular will to stay the course, presidents have withdrawn U.S. forces in some cases. As a result, U.S. policy has often lacked coherence. Though Congress was blamed for this inconsistency in many cases, one reason members of Congress so readily changed their minds was that they were not politically invested in the policy.
XO Ans: Delay Extensions

Backlog takes out solvency
Campbell, 1998. Colin Campbell. The US presidency in Crisis: A Comparative Perspective. 1998 Oxford University Press, Inc. Page 49. The monotonic nature of the U. S. executive branch-focused as it is on the president-greatly limits the potential benefits of cabinet dynamics toward improvement of greater coherence and consistency even when employed. Since so much of what the executive branch does requires the president's formal approval, the circuits to the Oval Office easily become overloaded (Hess 1988). With so much discretionary authority resting in one person, Congress takes every opportunity to define narrowly how agencies must respond to specific circumstances. This multiplies exponentially the requests to the president to intervene in response to special pleading, or to seek corrective legislation or regulations.
XO Ans: Impact T/O to Pres Powers

Tech revolution undermining the importance of the presidency Deans, political correspondent, 00
Many scholars argue that global shifts are undermining the authority of all sorts of traditional institutions, even while making it possible for nontraditional groups to step in and assume important new roles. Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams, for example, used e-mail to generate a worldwide grass-roots consensus for her International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Her high-tech end run around White House policy-makers left Clinton virtually alone among world leaders in not supporting the ban. Under Clinton's presidency, the Internet has gone from an obscure tool of the Pentagon and academia to potentially the most powerful communications medium in the history of the world. The Internet, moreover, has both accelerated and come to symbolize a much broader set of economic, political and social changes sweeping the world. Nearly $ 7 trillion worth of goods and services will be sold across borders this year as workers from some of the poorest countries in the world bid for a growing share of wealth. Currency traders move an estimated $ 1 trillion around the world each day, making decisions about the futures of markets and entire national economies. Nearly 4 billion people, two-thirds of the earth's population, now participate in some form of democratic system. Put it together, and the world is undergoing a populist revolution of historic proportions. More and more it is people, not governments, who are taking control of the issues affecting their lives, as politicians often appear to be watching from the sidelines. ''In many respects, political systems are increasingly at the mercy of technology,'' said presidential scholar Michael Genovese, political science professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. ''What it probably will do is make central governments less important and, therefore, presidents less important,'' said Genovese, author of the forthcoming ''Power and the American Presidency.''
Constitution prevents effective use of pres powers Edwards, 2000

George C. Edwards III, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Director of The Center for Presidential Studies in the Bush School, editor of Presidential Studies Quarterly, Presidential Power, Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century, March 2000 pg(s). 13
On the other hand, presidential leadership may not be preeminent in American government. The national preoccupation with the chief executive may be misplaced and the belief in the impact of the individual leader may be largely a myth-a product of a search for simple solutions in an extremely complex, purposefully inefficient system in which the founders' handiwork in decentralizing power defeats, by constitutional design, even the most capable leaders.
XO Ans: XO hurts Pres Power

EXECUTIVE ORDERS UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Cooper, (Professor of Liberal Arts in the Department of Political Science at the University of Vermont), 2002 (Phillip J., By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, p. 70-71) Significant problems can accompany the use of executive orders. In general terms, they include creating or exacerbating interbranch and intergovernmental tensions, inviting external criticism of the White House, weakening cabinet department credibility and effectiveness, undermining the administrative law system, possibly exposing administrators and the government more broadly to liability, and being seen in certain instances as taking the easy way out. The practice of using executive orders to make an end run around Congress has a mixed record of success, as the saga of the Clinton striker replacement order demonstrates. Indeed, Clinton, Reagan, Carter, Nixon, and Johnson, among recent presidents, encountered significant difficulties, both political and legal, by challenging the legislature using executive orders. It is true that if an administration's primary purpose is to put up a symbolic fight in defense of a constituent group, the White House may not consider it all bad to wage a battle, knowing full well that the administration will ultimately lose.
Turn: presidents gain lasting power by working with congress

Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p63, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) A president as legislative leader can easily become involved in political contentiousness and competitiveness with Congress. While this role is one of the president's weaker roles, lacking in both authority and resources, it is, nevertheless, a role of lasting consequence to most presidents -and a role that can build a president's social agenda. So significant is this role that presidency scholars Edward Corwin and Louis Koenig once suggested that "virtually all presidents who have made a major impact on American history have done so in great degree as legislative leaders."'
Presidential defiance of Congressional will in foreign policy sparks impeachment hearings Friedman and Hansen 07 http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/01/executive-power-congress-andiran.phpLawrence Friedman and Victor Hansen of New England School of Law Fisher was right then and his argument has lost none of its force today, notwithstanding the events of September 11. The Constitution does not allow decisions regarding military operations to be made outside the system of checks and balances upon which our constitutional democracy depends. That system ensures that decision-makers remain accountable, and it prevents the accretion of too much power in any one branch of the federal government. It is true as Justice Jackson famously remarked that the Constitution should not be viewed as a suicide pact. But neither should it be seen as a mere technicality: members of the Bush administration may well believe that military operations in Iran are necessary to protect the citizenry, but the government the framers designed does not permit them to act on that belief when the peoples Congressional representatives, in their collective wisdom, conclude that it is ill-considered. And, if the President were to ignore Congressional will as expressed in a condition on military or national security appropriations, then, as Fisher argued almost two decades ago, he would be inviting impeachment proceedings. See id. at 765.
Backlash against assertive president is worse than the boost the CP would give CNN 06 Analysis: Power struggle between Bush, Congress POSTED: 1:42 p.m. EDT, October 27, 2006 By John
King CNN http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/25/king.brokengovernment/index.html One question now is whether there will be a backlash for future administrations, something University of Texas scholar Bruce Buchanan believes is likely. "When presidents are very assertive, there tends to be, in the aftermath of that assertiveness, for a year or two or 10 years or more, kind of a backlash -an effort to rein the president in," Buchanan said.
XO Ans: Strong President Bad

Overly strong president hurts democracy and liberty Mathews 02
(Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy Spring, 2002 23 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 455 CURRENT PUBLIC LAW AND POLICY ISSUES: Restoring The Imperial Presidency: An Examination Of President Bush's New Emergency Powers NAME: Melissa K. Mathews** Journal Associate 2001-2002, J.D. anticipated Spring 2003, l/n)
Arthur Schlesinger, in his book The Imperial Presidency, warned that the American democracy is threatened by a "conception of presidential power so spacious and peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional polity." n248 It is of utmost importance, the nation has a strong president who can withstand the awful temptation "to override the separation of powers and burst the bonds of the Constitution." n249 It is necessary [*492] to have a strong president for leadership, and the separation of powers for liberty. If this democracy built on the importance of freedom is to survive, the imperial presidency cannot.
XO Ans: Cannot End Around Congress

Cannot end around congress Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
The practice of using executive orders to make an end run around Congress has a mixed record of success, as the saga of the Clinton striker replacement order demonstrates. Indeed, Clinton, Reagan, Carter, Nixon, and Johnson, among recent presidents, encountered significant difficulties, both political and legal, by challenging the legislature using executive orders. It is true that if an administration's primary purpose is to put up a symbolic fight in defense of a constituent group, the White House may not consider it all bad to wage a battle, knowing full well that the administration will ultimately lose. In some instances, the administration may effectively dare Congress to act, as when Truman issued his steel seizure order but sought congressional action even as he did so. This tactic did not help to save his order. In general, with the passage of time, so many statutes have accumulated that there is not quite as much room for a president to succeed with deliberate attempts to evade or confront Congress except in cases of foreign policy or under conditions of emergency. Not only is there a need for the president to avoid direct legislative pronouncements that run counter to an order, but he or she must also identify the claimed basis of authority to support an action. In matters of foreign or military affairs there is a good deal of freedom in this respect, but the same often cannot be said for domestic matters. Still, presidents have found other ways to challenge Congress by direct action and get away with it.
XO Ans: Hurts Due Process/Accountability

Executive order undermines accountability in rulemaking and due process Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
In addition to these internal and external responses to orders, there is also the fact that proceeding by orders undermines the administrative law processes that have been developed over the years to serve a variety of important purposes. For some people in the White House, this hardly sounds like a downside to the use of presidential decrees. Indeed, Vice President Gore's National Performance Review argued for the use of presidential directives because of a desire to avoid those processes. However, while it may seem that this is the appropriate strategy, it carries with it a number of difficulties. It is also worth noting that administrative law processes are so burdensome and time consuming these days in no small part because of the burdens placed on them by a series of executive orders from Carter through Clinton. Administrative law processes were designed to ensure that the authority on which important actions are taken is clear. They were also intended to ensure that when the executive branch adopts rules having the force of law, the process for creating them is open, orderly, and participative. When government brings its power to bear on particular persons or organizations, administrative law is expected to ensure that the rudiments of due process are available. Finally, administrative law provides a means for judicial review, not only to provide a check on administrative arbitrariness and abuses but also to integrate important decisions that emerge from executive branch agencies into the larger body of law by reconciling them to appropriate constitutional and statutory provisions. And through all of that extends a concern to have a process that provides an appropriate level of deference to expert and professional civil servants charged with implementation of a host of legislation in technically difficult and politically contentious fields. The nature of executive orders and the processes by which they are issued run in a very different direction. They are usually not open, provide little or no procedural regularity, and have limited participation. Indeed, they invite political appeals to do off the record and behind closed doors that which would be on the record and public in an agency proceeding. Executive orders often not only do not pay heed to these important concerns, but they also often create problems. For example, they can muddy the discussion of legislative history. Claims to authority can be an issue, not merely because of what the White House does today but as a result of past practice by other administrations. It was with no small bit of irony that the Supreme Court in 1989 reached back to an executive order promulgated by President Kennedy more than a decade before the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was passed to interpret the statute. 121 Among the many ironies in that case was the fact that the act was passed to deal with the complete failure of the executive order to protect the public interest. Moreover, the Court had to recognize that the interpretation it sought to place on the statute plainly violated a literal reading of the legislation in favor of the failed executive order's approach. 127 Recent presidents have moved in quite a different direction from a concern with the real validity of their actions to assert broad claims to constitutional authority or implied statutory authority. As we have seen, that can create more difficulties than it solves.
XO Ans: Court Strike Down

Courts will strike down Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the so-called Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation after World War I provide examples of just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case, the Supreme Court subjected government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests during the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized the mines in 1943.133 Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with both the validity of orders and with addressing the consequences of admittedly legitimate decrees.
XO Ans: Oppresses Minorities

Executive orders can be used to oppress minorities Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
The use of executive orders may be arbitrary and discriminatory and encourage that kind of behavior by others. Perhaps one of the best-known examples here is President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066, which led to curfews, removal from homes and businesses, and ultimately incarceration in what were euphemistically called "relocation centers" but were in fact concentration camps. Roosevelt claimed no other authority for this order than his power as president of the United States and as commander in chief. 134 The order was later affirmed by Congress. 115 The result was that one hundred seventeen thousand Japanese Americans were placed in the camps. 136 It denied the people victimized by it even the barest rudiments of due process. Executive Order 9066 was not actually rescinded until 1976,137 and it was another dozen years after that before Congress finally acknowledged wrongdoing and provided some limited recompense for the survivors of the camps. 138 Other exclusionary practices also were carried out through executive orders. Thus, E.O. 589 issued in 1907 prohibited Japanese and Korean laborers who had passports that permitted entry to Hawaii, Mexico, or Canada from entering the continental United States. 139
Presidential decree lawmaking leads to minority oppression Calabresi, professor of law, 95

I think it is not normatively desirable to give presidents a decree lawmaking power to alter what Professor Monaghan calls the background distribution of private rights. As I explained at various points above, 166 there is too great a risk that popular presidents backed by national majorities will impose unfair burdens on individuals or on small and unpopular groups. This problem is one that my friend and colleague Tom Merrill calls "the Takings Clause" problem. It is implicated when government tries to confer benefits on the many, while imposing costs on the few or on the one. Presidential decree lawmaking is particularly likely to cause problems of this type because presidents are national, majoritarian creatures with a national majority base. That means that somewhere, probably in a particular region, there exists a national minority that did not vote for the President and is not likely to vote for his reelection. A presidential decree lawmaking power would institutionalize a risk that those periodic shifting national minorities could get really hurt during a particular presidential administration. That would be bad institutionally, and, accordingly, I think it does not make sense to give presidents a decree lawmaking power to alter the distribution of the background set of private rights entitlements. Filtering such alterations through a bicameral, federal legislature backed up by judicial review provides protection from the Takings Clause problem. That is why our core lawmaking process is, and has to be, as cumbersome and time-consuming as it is.
XO Ans: Generic Solvency

Presidents lack the tools to deal with executive orders
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p21, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) Government's size and complexity can also be frustrating to an administration. As Harry Truman once exclaimed, after showing some visitors a wall chart that pointed out more than 100 offices that were to report to him: "I cannot even see all these men, let alone actually study what they are doing."96 Given the multiple number of federal employees who interrelate with the chief executive, one would think that the president would need powerful tools to handle the workload. In truth, he has few resources and little constitutional authority.
The legislative branch is unable to work effectively with the executive.

Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p111, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) The chief executive's expertise gives the president some leverage with Congress in structuring a social agenda. However, the legislative branch lacks the capability to detail administrative regulations in highly technical areas and must seek advice from outside sources.
XO Ans: Solvency: No Social Change

Presidents will not make any progress on a social agenda
Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p22, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) Both authority and influence are critical to the role of chief executive and have had an effect on the president's ability to establish a social agenda. While a few presidents have been able to use this role to enhance social values, overall the role has not been extremely productive in reinforcing a president's social agenda since no president has been able to master the "institutionalized presidency"
XO Ans: Solvency: Infighting

Counterplan sparks infighting that prevents agency action Cooper, Gund Professor of Liberal Arts, 02
A president who is focused on the short-term, internal view of a possible decision may elect a power management approach. The emphasis is on efficient, effective, prompt, and controlled action within the executive branch. This is an increasingly common approach employed by new administrations; certainly it has been by Reagan and his successors. Whether spoken or unspoken, the tendency to adopt a power management perspective as the base for the use of presidential direct action tools may grow from an assumption that alternative approaches will simply not work or not work rapidly enough because of recalcitrant administrative agencies or opposition by other institutional players inside or outside the Beltway. The executive orders on rulemaking issued by presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton and the Bush memoranda on the rulemaking moratorium are clear examples of this approach. The tendency to use this approach may also stem from the idea that the situation confronting the White House is a real or a perceived emergency in which the executive branch must be mobilized for action. Another tendency is to use this type of approach in national security matters where the White House holds the view that time is of the essence and a particular window of opportunity exists that must be seized. This kind of action is common in the use of national security directives. Control of sensitive materials, personnel practices, or communications is often the focus of this kind of activity. Another feature of the power management approach is the attempt to use the policies of the executive branch to make a wider political point. Certainly the Reagan administration's Drug Free Workplace order is an example, as are many of the Clinton-era orders and memoranda associated with the reinventing government initiative. Still, the power management approach presents many of the dangers and challenges of the various types of instruments. The costs can be high, and the damage both within government and to people outside it can be significant. The rulemaking orders have tied administrative agencies up in knots for years and have trapped them in a cross fire between the Congress that adopted statutes requiring regulations to be issued and presidents who tried to measure their success by the number of rulemaking processes they could block. Reagan's NSD 84 and other related directives seeking to impose dramatically intensified controls on access to information and control over communication during and after government employment incited a ininirebellion even among a number of cabinetlevel officials and conveyed a sense of the tenor of leadership being exercised in the executive branch that drew fire from many sources. The Clinton ethics order was meant to make a very public and political point, but it was one of the factors contributing to the administration's inability to staff many of its key positions for months.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 XO Ans: Delay

Executive orders take years Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 61) In contemporary practice, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action. For particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over an inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.
History proves the President will win struggles with Congress over executive orders Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 121) In 19S4 Richard Neustadt described the expansion of central clearance this way: "For more than thirty years now, central clearance has persisted, its history marked by a long series of 'accidental,' unforeseen accretions. Nothing once absorbed has been wholly displaced; each new element somehow encompasses the old ... overall, here is a record of great growth, successful adaptation-this under six successive Presidents, through every variation in national and governmental circumstance since Harding's term of office."" The presidential budget and growth of BOB power illustrates the pattern: societal and political pressures serve as the impetus for a new government capability; Congress and the president compete over the question of control; the president prevails and uses the new capability in unanticipated ways to develop even more power, and Congress can do little to stop him. Over time, the new powers-once so controversial-become institutionalized as a routine and accepted part of the presidency. The pattern has played out in a number of situations, across presidents and eras, and has less to do with specific presidential initiative than the motivations and incentives, relative positions, and inherent institutional qualities of Congress and the presidency.
XO Ans: Rollback
OPPOSITION TO EXECUTIVE ORDER RISKS OVERTURN
NATIONAL JOURNAL, January 1, 2000, p. Online Perhaps the most strenuous opposition to a Clinton executive order came in response to his 1996 proclamation, under a 1906 law, setting up the 1.7 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah. Westerners and property-rights activists screamed, "land grab"-even though much of the land was federally owned. On other domestic fronts, Clinton has issued an order barring federal contractors from hiring replacements for strikers (a federal court of appeals later overturned this order); set up the American Rivers Heritage Initiative; and created the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for gays in the military. Another order outlined procedures to assist federal agencies dealing with states, but the states objected that their authority would be usurped and the order was withdrawn.
COURTS CAN AND DO ROLLBACK EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON SEPARATION OF POWERS GROUNDS

NATIONAL JOURNAL, January 1, 2000, p. Online Federal courts have in some cases acted to curb executive orders. In 1952, for example, the Supreme Court stopped the seizure of steel mills ordered by Truman. In another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down Clinton's executive order prohibiting federal contractors from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. The court ruled that the order amounted to legislation.
XO Ans: Rollback
UNPOPULAR EXECUTIVE ORDERS SPARK BACKLASH AND PROMPT ROLLBACK EFFORTS EXECUTIVE PAPERS ORDER PROVES
Christopher Dreher, columnist, SALON.COM, April 10, 2002, p. online. After Nixon left office and tried to maintain control of his papers -- along with his infamous tapes -- Congress eventually set limits to executive privilege by passing the Presidential Records Act (PRA) in 1978, which legally established that the papers of an outgoing president were public property. Instead of presidents deciding what should be released, the PRA set specific release guidelines and entrusted the papers to federal archivists, assuring that historians and researchers have access to source materials without the vanity and prejudices of the former president impeding the process. It was supposed to be the final word on the subject, but an executive order by President George W. Bush that modifies the PRA has brought forth a lawsuit and the anger of the historians and writers who use the documents for their work. E. O. 13233 has also drawn the ire of Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans resent this re-expansion of executive power. In fact, Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA) plans to unveil a new bill that would nullify E. O. 13233 at an April 11 hearing of the House Committee on Government Reform. The bill is supported by members from both sides of the isle, including Henry Waxman (D-CA), Dan Burton (R-IN), and Barney Frank (D-MA). On Jan. 20, 2001, former President Ronald Reagan's papers were to be the first complete set of publicly available documents about the workings of a presidential administration released under the PRA. But shortly after taking office, the newly elected Bush administration delayed the release in order to "review" the issue. The release was delayed two additional times over a number of months and then on Nov. 1, 2001, Bush signed Executive Order 13233, which effectively takes control of the papers away from archivists and returns it to the incumbent and former presidents. It also allows for the family or designated representatives of a former president to restrict the release of his records and extends the same executive privilege to vice presidents to control their own records. "It's appalling and clearly destructive to writing history responsibly," said Stanley Katz, professor of public and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and former president of the American Council of Learned Societies. "You simply can't write an accurate picture of what happened without all the information. It's a deliberate attempt to reverse and restore the conditions of secrecy. They don't have the right to rethink what Congress thought."
Unpopular orders will get rolled back LeRoy, professor of law, 96

(Boston College Law Review March 1996 37 B.C. L. Rev 229 ARTICLE: PRESIDENTIAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,954 DEBARMENT OF CONTRACTORS WHO HIRE PERMANENT STRIKER REPLACEMENTS NAME: Michael H. LeRoy * Associate Professor, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations and College of Law, University of Illinois, l/n)
It follows, therefore, that the constitutionality of an executive order is not determined by its popularity with Congress. But this popularity test is precisely the kind of simple equation that the Chamber of Commerce is suggesting in its separation-of-powers argument. Experience shows that a president's control over federal contracting can promote broad policy goals that Congress opposes. If the President has acted against the will of Congress, it remains to that body, and not the courts, to restrict or repeal an offensive executive order.
XO Ans: Rollback
Courts will defer to Congress is if the executive order contradicts legislation Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 35-36) It is more useful to think of executive orders as a form of "presidential legislation"" or "executive lawmaking,"" in the sense that they provide the president with the ability to make general policy with broad applicability akin to public law." For over a century the Supreme Court has held that executive orders, when based upon legitimate constitutional or statutory grants of power to the president, are equivalent to laws." In Youngstown, the Court concluded with some force that executive orders lacking a constitutional or statutory foundation are not valid, and longstanding judicial doctrine holds that when an executive order conflicts with a statute enacted pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority, the statute takes precedence."
Next president will roll back the plan Rodgers, professor of law, 01
Despite its advantages, the executive order also has a welladvertised downside. It is a fragile source of legal power, vulnerable to being swept aside by the next resident of the Oval Office. The half-life of President Jimmy Carter's executive order on the export of hazardous substances was measured in days with the arrival in the White House of Ronald Reagan. 20
Challenges to executive orders inevitable ensuring rollback Rodgers, professor of law, 01

The presidential executive order is forever constrained by legal doubts since presidents cannot make "law" in a traditional sense. This guarantees that any executive order that hits hard at a particular constituency will not only meet resistance, but assures that objections will be framed as an offense to constitutional boundaries. In 1981, Ronald Reagan moved aggressively to implement a policy of regulatory review in Executive Order 12291. 21 He thus unhesitatingly entered the land of constitutional ghosts and shadows that haunt presidential executive orders. He would be reminded of this by a well-known dictum on this topic uttered by the court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas: The use of E.O. 12291 to create delays and to impose substantive changes [in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules] raises some constitutional concerns. . . . Under E.O. 12291, if used improperly, [the Office of Management & Budget] could withhold approval until the acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of any new EPA regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence and expertise of EPA. Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capital Hill can still be pursued administratively by delaying the [*17] enactment of regulations beyond the date of the statutory deadline. This is incompatible with the will of Congress and cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the President's Article 11 powers. 22
XO Ans: Rollback
Congress can roll back an Executive Order by underlying the Presidents statutory authority or by withholding funds for the implementation of a policy House of Representatives 1999 (Hearing of the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process: The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking?, October 27, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/rules_hear08.htm)
The Congress may also seek to repeal the underlying statutory authority upon which a particular executive order was based. If the underlying statute is repealed, any ensuing executive order based upon that law is no longer valid. Another tool available to the Congress is to seek to implement a sunset or termination date for statutory authority upon which an executive order is based. In this way, when the sunset date is reached, it is up to Congress to determine whether to renew the provision or let it die. A major tool in the arsenal of the Congress with regard to executive orders lies in the power of the purse. Congress may withhold funds for the implementation of an executive order, thereby directly challenging the President's ability to put in place a particular policy.
Even if Congress doesnt oppose the law, they can still take credit for any XO House of Representatives 1999 (Hearing of the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process: The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking?, October 27, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/rules_hear08.htm)
On the other hand, in instances where the President issues an executive order that Congress does not oppose, but rather Congress wishes to exert its legislative authority in that area, Congress may seek by statute to sanction the action taken by the President. Similarly, the Congress may wish to sanction portions of an executive order, modify others and repeal others. Congress has the option, through the legislative process, of imposing its own stamp on a policy area staked out by executive order.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 XO Ans: Backlog

Backlog takes out solvency
Campbell, 1998.
Colin Campbell. The US presidency in Crisis: A Comparative Perspective. 1998 Oxford University Press, Inc. Page 49. The monotonic nature of the U. S. executive branch-focused as it is on the president-greatly limits the potential benefits of cabinet dynamics toward improvement of greater coherence and consistency even when employed. Since so much of what the executive branch does requires the president's formal approval, the circuits to the Oval Office easily become overloaded (Hess 1988). With so much discretionary authority resting in one person, Congress takes every opportunity to define narrowly how agencies must respond to specific circumstances. This multiplies exponentially the requests to the president to intervene in response to special pleading, or to seek corrective legislation or regulations.
XO Ans: Power of the Purse

POWER OF THE PURSE: CONGRESS HAS THE POWER OF THE PURSE TO EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, Stanford political science professor and Hoover Institution fellow and PhD. student, PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, December 1, 1999, p. online. Constituency and the corresponding incentives toward presidential moderation do not change the fact that, in the politics of unilateral action, presidents hold virtually all of the cards. When presidents act and Congress must reverse, presidents are heavily advantaged to get what they want. There is one crucial consideration, however, that we have yet to discuss and that gives Congress a trump card of far-reaching consequence. This is the fact that Congress has the constitutional power to appropriate money--which means that, to the extent that unilateral actions by presidents require congressional funding, presidents are dependent on getting Congress to pass new legislation that at least implicitly (via appropriations) supports what they are doing. When appropriations are involved, in other words, presidents cannot succeed by simply preventing Congress from acting. They can only succeed if they can get Congress to act--which, of course, is much more difficult and gives legislators far greater opportunities to shape or block what presidents want to do.
If Congress does not like the executive funding they will cut and ban it Raven-Hansen and Black 95 Iowa Law Review October, 1995 81 Iowa L. Rev. 79 ARTICLE: From
Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power * NAME: Peter Raven-Hansen **, William C. Banks *** BIO: ** Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.*** Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. l/n In national security appropriations, Congress has often sought to plan for the unforeseeable by providing the Commander in Chief with separate accounts to cover contingencies. However, to recognize that national security contingencies will arise is one thing, to monitor and control the use of a blank check for contingencies is quite another. As was said during a 1906 debate in Congress, creating such an untethered fund "is like giving a child more money than he wants for a trip uptown and back; he will [*100] surely spend the balance of it before he gets home." 134 While contingency funds created during times of declared war have not been controversial, abuses have occurred at other times. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) contingency fund, available to the President for uses "in the national interest," 135 was particularly vulnerable to abuse. President Kennedy established the Peace Corps by executive order and financed it from the FAA contingency fund for seven months until an explicit appropriation was forthcoming. 136 Presidents Johnson and Nixon also relied, in part, upon the FAA contingency fund to pay for items as diverse as the President's Commission on Civil Disorders and the Bahamas Livestock and Research project. 137 As Congress grew more disturbed with the diverse uses of the FAA fund, it inserted restrictions prohibiting use of the fund for any activity previously rejected by Congress, decreased the size of the fund, and beginning in 1973, stated that it was "primarily for disaster relief purposes." 138 Before 1974, Presidents apparently had not employed a contingency fund for an expressly prohibited purpose. Such an abuse may have occurred that very year, however, in President Nixon's gift of a helicopter to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. The President found most of the money for the gift in the Agency for International Development contingency fund, the FAA fund noted above, which was to be used "primarily for disaster relief purposes." Congress reacted by establishing a separate famine and disaster relief account, again reducing the amount of the contingency fund, and explicitly prohibiting its future use as a source of funds to pay for gifts to foreign officials. 139
XO Ans: Power of the Purse

Congress can cut off funds to enforce the order Newsday 7/5/07 July 5, 2007 Thursday SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A28 HEADLINE: Bush, Dems clash over new
powers; BYLINE: THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, l/n President George W. Bush this month is giving an obscure White House office new powers over regulations affecting health, worker safety and the environment. Democrats running Congress call his move a power grab and are intent on stopping him. Last week, the House voted to prohibit the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs from spending federal money on Executive Order 13422, signed by Bush in January and effective July 24. The order requires federal officials to show that private companies, people or institutions failed to address a problem before agencies can write regulations to tackle it. It also gives political appointees greater authority over how the regulations are written. The House measure "stops this president or any president from seizing the power to rewrite almost every law that Congress passes - laws that protect public health, the environment, safety, civil rights, privacy and on and on," said its sponsor, Rep. Brad Miller (D-N.C.). The House science investigations subcommittee, chaired by Miller, said in an April report that "OIRA has quietly grown into the most powerful regulatory agency in Washington."
XO Ans: Congress Solves

A presidents foreign policy cannot succeed without congressional support Calabresi 2006. Stephen Calabresi. the president: lightening rod or king? The Yale Law Journal. New
Haven: 2006. Vol.115, Iss. 9; pg. 2611, 12 pgs http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1162454641&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=10553&RQT=309&VName=PQD A skeptic might say that the President has the dominant voice in foreign policy. Perhaps it is this formidable presidential power that justifies our quadrennial year-long presidential selection spectacle? Consider, however, just how little power a President really has even in this realm. Presidents can start military actions, but those military actions can be waged successfully only to the extent that Congress is willing to pay for them. Presidents can offer foreign aid, but again only to the extent that Congress is willing to foot the bill. Presidents can propose free trade zones, but only if Congress is willing by a vote of both Houses to go along. Presidents can negotiate treaties, but they become law only if two-thirds of the Senate approves.10 In short, while the President is the dominant player in foreign policy, there is almost nothing vital that the President can do even in this realm without some help from Congress. On its face, the power that voters grant to a President every four years is less than is generally supposed.
Congress is best to pass issues

Daynes and Sussman, professors of political science, 01 (p23, The American Presidency and the Social Agenda, Byron W., Bringham Young Unversity, Glen, Old Dominion university) Despite the veto power of the president-even if only threatenedCongress normally has most of the advantages when it comes to passing legislation. Article 1 gives Congress many more specific enumerated powers for shaping public policy than it gives the president. The success of Congress as it confronts the president has been documented in several early studies. One examined how Congress was the primary initiator of legislation between the years 1880 and 1940 despite the fact that during this time a number of strong presidents were elected, including Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt."' A later study by Moe and Teel of the period 1940-67 also concluded that Congress had an important impact in each issue area.101 While this might not be as true in foreign affairs, in domestic policy112 Congress clearly tends to have the advantage over the president in most issue areas.
Impossible for the President to avoid Congress in making foreign policy Friedman and Hansen 07 http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/01/executive-power-congress-andiran.phpLawrence Friedman and Victor Hansen of New England School of Law Fisher argued that the beginning and end of the discussion lies in the appropriations power: Congress has the sole power of the purse. Article I, section 9, provides that No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations Made by Law. The President enjoys no similar authority. Further, while the President is the Commander-in-Chief, the text and practice make clear that his power in respect to foreign affairs and national security is not unilateral: in addition to the power to declare war, the Constitution permits Congress to provide for the common defense, U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 1; to raise and support armies, see id. 8, cl. 12; and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, see id. 8, cl. 14. Though it would be possible for the President to conduct federal operations with funds gathered from non-Congressional sources, such action still must be approved by Congress: as Fisher concluded, the Constitutional design simply does not suggest that either the executive or legislative branch of the federal government could involve the nation in military operations and fund those operations without any reliance upon the other. See Fisher, supra, at 762.
XO Ans: SOP Links

UNAUTHORIZED EXECUTIVE ORDERS CRIPPLE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Ronald Turner, University of Alabama School of Law professor, JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS, Winter 1996, p. 1. (DRGCL/E264) The increased and aggressive presidential use of executive orders can present serious constitutional questions when there are no congressional or constitutional bases for a particular order. Orders not tethered to or derived from statutes or the Constitution raise issues about the legitimacy of presidential legislation because, as noted previously, lawmaking is a legislative function. Thus, the issuance of an executive order by a President without a clear statutory or constitutional basis can be inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers and the sequential trumping inherent in the constitutional system. A baseless and unauthorized order provides a means for the President to subvert the system of checks and balances, for she can make laws free from congressional involvement or agreement and is "able to make sweeping policy value choices without any check by either the federal courts or by a majority of Congress." Such unchecked executive power allows a President to "alter the distribution of the background set of private rights entitlements" and to evade the filtering mechanisms of the bicameral legislature and judicial review. Evasion is particularly problematic when different political parties dominate different branches of government. An executive order issued by the President of one party that declares national policy that is opposed by the opposition party with a legislative majority can result in a clash of ideologies and views as to the law that should govern the nation. As a result "strengthening a particular institution may not only improve its effectiveness but also the relative influence of a particular political party or ideology."
EXECUTIVE ORDERS ALLOW FOR DICTATORIAL RULE AND TYRANNY

James Hirsen, Professor of Law at Trinity Law School, Personal Update News Journal, April, 1999, http://www.khouse.org/articles/political/19990401-236.html (DRGCL/E264A) What do we call a government where a single individual has the power to create laws merely by uttering a few words or issuing some sort of written decree? Most of us would respond that this describes a monarchy. The founders of our nation clearly wanted to depart from the kind of despotic control that can be imposed by a royal ruling class and established a republic to achieve that. Authority was divided among three branches of government to provide checks and balances and avoid an inordinate concentration of power in any one branch. In light of this history, it is highly disturbing to discover that there is a readily available tool available to the president which could facilitate a form of dictatorial rule. This instrument of power is known as an executive order. Executive orders have a worthwhile purpose when correctly applied, but their use has been corrupted over time, often-times for political gain. Precisely how many executive orders have been issued throughout our country's history remains unknown, since executive orders issued before 1907 were unnumbered. Beginning in that year, a number was assigned to each executive order, and the orders were filed chronologically by the State Department. Estimates of unnumbered executive orders range from 15,000 to as high as 50,000. Today executive orders contain up to five digits, and since 1907 over thirteen thousand have been issued.
XO Ans: SOP Links

Executive Orders Unconstitutional, Get Rid of Checks and Balances OLSON, 1999
TESTIMONY of William J. Olson William J. Olson, P.C., Attorneys at Law to the Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking? October 27, 1999 http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-wo102799.html My first personal experience with an unconstitutional exercise by the executive of a legislative power arose in the mid-1980's, shortly after I completed serving three part-time positions in the Reagan Administration, when I filed suit against the Reagan Administration for usurping the Senates power to ratify treaties before they became effective. The case was The Conservative Caucus v. Reagan, litigated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Our client had sought to prevent Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger from ordering the Pentagon to unilaterally implement the SALT II treaty which the Senate had thus far refused to ratify. President Reagan had announced his determination to implement the treaty, notwithstanding the Senate's constitutional role. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain a review on the merits, as the suit was dismissed, as so many similar suits have been, on the theory that our client lacked standing to bring suit. The simple truth is that the courts cannot be counted upon to check Presidential power our research has been able to identify only two cases in the history of the country in which the courts have struck down completely an executive order.
Executive Orders Abuse Congressional Powers BOAZ, 2005

January 18, 2005 Congress Should Restrain the President by David Boaz David Boaz is executive vice president of the Cato Institute and author of Libertarianism: A Primer (Free Press, 1998). http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3527 Presidents have increasingly used executive orders to make law, a clear usurpation of both the legislative powers granted to Congress and the powers reserved to the states. Facing a Republican Congress, President Clinton used executive orders to create a 1.7-million-acre national park, impose environmental regulations, and wage war in Yugoslavia. President Bush has used executive orders to grant himself extraordinary powers to deal with terrorism.No matter what agenda the president seeks to impose by executive order, Congress should put its foot down. The body to which the Constitution delegates "all legislative powers herein granted" must assert its authority.
XO Ans: SOP Links

Executive Orders Limit Liberties, Create Dictatorship Green, 2000
Executive Orders: A Blueprint for Dictatorship? By Tanya L. Green, J.D. Revised: March 30, 2000 http://www.millennium-ark.net/News_Files/Exec.Orders/EOs.Blueprint.for.dictator.html What began as a narrow use of executive orders under extreme national crises has grown into executive discretion bordering on dictatorial powers." This growth in executive discretion is largely due to Congress' reluctance to exercise its legislative responsibilities. Congress has delegated broad discretionary authority in the name of flexibility, effectiveness or efficiency." Because of its neglect, the president has rarely been held accountable for his orders. In the words of Justice J. Jackson in Youngstown v. Sawyer: "We may say that power to legislate belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers." Now, with the "stroke of the pen," an executive order effectively becomes the "law of the land." While some executive orders are appropriate uses of presidential authority, others violate the Constitution and threaten our civil liberties.
Executive Order allows the president to override the constitution Freedom America, 95 http://sonic.net/sentinel/gvcon5.html
Many of the fears of the founding fathers may now be coming to fruition. Today, the executive branch of the government is immensely powerful, much more powerful than the founding fathers had envisioned or wanted. Congressional legislative powers have been usurped. There is no greater example of that usurpation than in the form of the Presidential Executive Order. The process totally by-passes Congressional legislative authority and places in the hands of the President almost unilateral power. The Executive Order governs everything from the Flag Code of the United States to the ability to single-handedly declare Martial Law. Presidents have used the Executive Order in times of emergencies to override the Constitution of the United States and the Congress.
Executive Order allows bush to be dictator Global Researcher 2007 database that provides single topic reports covering global affairs
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5816 The Bush administration has released a directive called the National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive. The directive released on May 9th, 2007 has gone almost unnoticed by the mainstream and alternative media. This is understandable considering the huge Ron Paul and immigration news but this story is equally as huge. In this directive, Bush declares that in the event of a Catastrophic Emergency the President will be entrusted with leading the activities to ensure constitutional government. The language in this directive would in effect make the President a dictator in the case of such an emergency, writes Lee Rogers for Global Research. The language written in the directive is disturbing because it doesnt say that the President will work with the other branches of government equally to ensure a constitutional government is protected. It says clearly that there will be a cooperative effort among the three branches that will be coordinated by the President. If the President is coordinating these efforts it effectively puts him in charge of every branch. The language in the directive is entirely Orwellian in nature making it seem that it is a cooperative effort between all three branches but than it says that the President is in charge of the cooperative effort. In short, Bush may now declare himself absolute ruler at any moment and Congress can like it or lump it. Naturally, this act of betrayal is of so little importance and consequence, the corporate media believes you are better served knowing Justin Timberlake is in love.
*****Aff Ans- Non-Delegation*****
Non-Delegation Ans: Congress Bad for USAID

Congressional earmarking of USAID funds leads to lack of flexibility in the program undermining flexibility
Financial Times 05 USAID to push democratisation agenda By Edward Alden in Washington Published: December 23 2005 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/34dc2af8-73e0-11da-ab91-0000779e2340.html He said earmarking in which Congress allocates US aid funds to specific countries and sectors was a very serious problem. According to a just-completed internal analysis of the $4.5bn based budget for USAID, only $200m is subject to discretionary control by the agency, he said. The difficulty is how do you do strategic budgeting when you dont have the discretion to shift money around from one sector to another and from one region to another? The agency, for instance, had struggled this year to move money from other accounts to support the democratic transformations in the Ukraine and Lebanon, two high priorities for the State department. American foreign aid is driven to some degree by domestic constituencies and domestic interests in a way which is not necessarily responsive to the problems of the developing world, which is the purpose of the programme. It responds to our culture wars and our issues here domestically. He said the sectors that are most important usually receive the least funding because there were no organised interests championing those programmes. Agricultural development had been particularly difficult to fund, he said, in part due to opposition from environmental groups.
Congressional oversight of USAID budgets undermines the agency

Stovall 97 DEVELOPMENT, TRADE EXPANSION, AND U.S. AGRICULTURE: POLICIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Report of the Working Group on International Trade and Development http://www.ncfap.org/reports/trade/IDTRT01T.html John G. Stovall Executive Director of the Commission on International Trade, Development and Cooperation National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy February 1997 Too Much Congressional Micro-management. Congress hamstrings and overburdens USAID by establishing too many competing objectives. A 1989 report from the House Foreign Affairs Committee actually identified 33 different and independent statutory goals and objectives for USAID and (believe it or not) 75 different "priority" areas. Congressional earmarking is also a burdensome practice. As of FY 1993, approximately 57 percent of Development Assistance (DA) from USAID and 84 percent of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and 96 percent of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was earmarked. Sometimes it is the non-responsiveness of the USAID bureaucracy that forces Congress and outside groups to resort to the earmarking approach, but it is an unfortunate approach all the same, since it gets in the way of flexible decision making. Earmarks take discretionary authority away from officials on the scene and generate irrationalities in the expenditure of funds. Congress decided many years ago that it should not try to micromanage U.S. monetary policy (when it created the semi-autonomous Federal Reserve Board), and it later reached the same conclusion in the area of U.S. trade policy (when it created the semi-autonomous Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). Regrettably it has not yet overcome the temptation to mico-manage U.S. development cooperation policy abroad.
Non-Delegation Ans: No Strike Down

Court refuses to enforce the nondelegation doctrine meaning the CP will never be struck down Sunstein 95 Arkansas Law Review 1995 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a
Twenty-First Century World NAME: Cass R. Sunstein * * Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. l/n 2. In issuing regulations and indeed in all of his official acts, the President needs congressional (or constitutional) authorization. He cannot exceed any limits that Congress has laid down. 12 He must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully Executed." 13 But often Congress offers very vague guidance. The President has a great deal of discretion. Perhaps this discretion violates the Constitution, as a violation of the grant of legislative power to Congress. 14 Perhaps this is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. But the twentieth century has witnessed a judicial refusal to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, 15 which required clear standards from the legislature. The downfall of the nondelegation doctrine has meant that the President can exercise tremendous policymaking discretion in the domestic sphere. This sphere includes regulation of the environment, energy, occupational safety and health, communications, and much else besides.
Non-Delegation Ans: NO risk of Agency Abuse of power

-Protections better with delegation than without it Epstein and OHalloran 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947 SYMPOSIUM: The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Seperation of Powers: A Political Science Approach NAME: David Epstein * & Sharyn O'Halloran ** * Department of Political Science and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Columbia and Stanford University. ** Department of Political Science and the School of International and Public Affairs and Hoover Institution, Columbia and Stanford University, l/n)
Note that our theory, if correct, contradicts the key predictions of the nondelegation forces. Rather than portraying Congress as delegating ever-increasing authority to executive actors, we assert that levels of delegation will rise and fall over time in response to changing external factors. Instead of assuming that legislators have no interest in monitoring delegated authority, we assert that they will empower interest groups, the courts, and other actors to challenge agency actions through administrative procedures as well as direct oversight. Finally, a revitalized nondelegation doctrine would have the effect of shifting back to Congress precisely those policy areas, such as the reduction of pork barrel benefits, that it handles poorly relative to the Executive, so limits on delegation would only tend to diminish the efficacy of the political process.
-Checks always in place on delegation Epstein and OHalloran 99

This Article provides three responses to this requirement. First, our data show that Congress does not delegate wholesale to the Executive. Even on important policy issues, some of which, like the budget and tax policy, require considerable time and expertise, Congress takes a major role in specifying the details of policy. Second, when Congress does delegate, it also constrains executive discretion with restrictive administrative procedures. In fact, legislators carefully adjust and readjust discretion over time and across issue areas so as to balance the marginal costs and benefits of legislative action against those of delegation.
Multiple checks on agency power prevent abuse Schuck, Professor of Law, 99

Federal agencies, however, are hardly at liberty. They are surrounded by watchdogs with sharp, penetrating teeth. Indeed, what most clearly distinguishes the American administrative state from that of other countries is the pervasive public philosophy of mistrust of government bureaucracies and the subordination of bureaucracy to numerous, diverse, external, power-checking institutions and processes. These institutions, moreover, are remarkably powerful; they routinely shape policy and delve into the intricate details of administration. Their broad array of inducements, both positive and negative, enable them to guide and often determine the agency's exercise of discretion. In this fundamental sense, the structural preconditions for democratic delegation are satisfied: the legislature is delegating power to a branch whose decisions the legislature and its other agents - for example, the courts [*784] and interest groups - can effectively influence, if not wholly control. n28 I do not claim that this control is complete, nor should it be if the advantages of technocratic administration are to be realized. Agencies enjoy some leeway and sometimes abuse it. The controls, however, are extensive. Some of these external constraints on bureaucratic policymaking are: (1) Congress; (2) the Executive Office of the President; (3) judicial review; (4) interest group monitors; (5) media; and (6) informal agency norms. It is important, moreover, to remember that these and other constraints on bureaucracy's freedom to "do as it pleases" all operate simultaneously. My consideration of them can be brief, as a vast political science literature exists on each.

-Multiple checks on agency power prevent abuse Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
Federal agencies, however, are hardly at liberty. They are surrounded by watchdogs with sharp, penetrating teeth. Indeed, what most clearly distinguishes the American administrative state from that of other countries is the pervasive public philosophy of mistrust of government bureaucracies and the subordination of bureaucracy to numerous, diverse, external, power-checking institutions and processes. These institutions, moreover, are remarkably powerful; they routinely shape policy and delve into the intricate details of administration. Their broad array of inducements, both positive and negative, enable them to guide and often determine the agency's exercise of discretion. In this fundamental sense, the structural preconditions for democratic delegation are satisfied: the legislature is delegating power to a branch whose decisions the legislature and its other agents - for example, the courts [*784] and interest groups - can effectively influence, if not wholly control. n28 I do not claim that this control is complete, nor should it be if the advantages of technocratic administration are to be realized. Agencies enjoy some leeway and sometimes abuse it. The controls, however, are extensive. Some of these external constraints on bureaucratic policymaking are: (1) Congress; (2) the Executive Office of the President; (3) judicial review; (4) interest group monitors; (5) media; and (6) informal agency norms. It is important, moreover, to remember that these and other constraints on bureaucracy's freedom to "do as it pleases" all operate simultaneously. My consideration of them can be brief, as a vast political science literature exists on each.
-Statutory constraints prevent agency abuses Schuck, Professor of Law, 99

Congress, of course, writes the statutes that confer and govern agency authority. In doing so, it prescribes the substantive content of that authority, the structure of agency decisionmaking, the procedures through which it occurs, and the informational, budgetary, and other controls to which the agency will be subjected. As Terry Moe, n29 McNollgast, n30 and many other political scientists have shown, Congress uses these controls to shape the administrative [*785] process in ways that serve its electoral and policy interests and make it difficult for agencies to threaten those interests.

-Congressional oversight prevents abuses Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
Congressional oversight of administration is one of the central pillars of the constitutional schemes of checks and balances - or in Richard Neustadt's phrase, "separate institutions sharing powers." n33 While the nature, quality, and intensity of legislative oversight vary from committee to committee, it is often used to signal congressional preferences on agency policy issues and to extract policy commitments from agency officials. Agencies fear intrusive oversight and their decisions and behavior often reflect what political scientists refer to as "anticipatory reaction" to those controls.
-Terminal impacts from delegation will never happen Kahan, Professor of Law, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795 SYMPOSIUM: Democracy Schmemocracy NAME: Dan M. Kahan * * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, l/n) Obviously, it isn't the case that every conceivable form of delegation can be justified as making government more democratic according to some plausible conception of democracy. Just as we wouldn't accept the claim that an individual could, in the name of self-determination, agree to become another person's slave, so we wouldn't accept the proposition that a community could, in the name of self-government, vote to relinquish its sovereignty to a benevolent dictator. But it would be hyperbole bordering on hysteria to describe the types of delegations that are familiar to American law as equivalent to that. Indeed, my guess is that no democratically organized community would ever enact a delegation scheme that couldn't be seen as making its government more democratic under some plausible conception of that term. But in any case, the critics of delegation have yet to identify an existing delegation scheme in American law that can't be seen this way.
-Democracy bad standard to reject delegation Kahan, Professor of Law, 99

(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795 SYMPOSIUM: Democracy Schmemocracy NAME: Dan M. Kahan * * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, l/n) My goal in this essay is to expose the vacuity of this argument. Democracy, I'll argue, is an empty standard for judging the desirability or constitutionality of the delegation schemes familiar to American law. This is so because democracy is an essentially contested concept: there is not just one, but rather a plurality of competing conceptions of democracy, each of which emphasizes a different good commonly associated with democratic political regimes. Delegated lawmaking schemes never disregard these goods entirely but rather give more or less prominence to one or another relative to some nondelegation alternative. Thus, before someone can persuasively criticize a delegation scheme on grounds of democracy, she must normatively justify the particular conception of democracy that informs her critique. That means that any democracy-grounded critique of a particular delegation scheme will turn out to be derivative of some independent normative critique. It also means that if we feel we do have good normative grounds to delegate, democracy will never be a persuasive reason against delegating.
Non-Delegation Ans: Agency Rule Making Good

Agency rulemaking key to accountability and public participation- swamps all of their liberty claims Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
The administrative agency is often the most accessible site for public participation because the costs of participating in the rulemaking and more informal agency processes, where many of the most important policy choices are in fact made, are likely to be lower than the costs of lobbying or otherwise seeking to influence Congress. Moreover, the institutional culture of the administrative agency, despite its often daunting opacity, is probably more familiar to the average citizen, who deals with bureaucracies constantly and probably works in one, than the exotic, intricate, unruly (and "un-ruley"), insider's culture of Congress.
-Agency rule making key to legitimacy Schuck, Professor of Law, 99

The agency is often a more meaningful site for public participation than Congress, because the policy stakes for individuals and interest groups are most immediate, transparent, and well-defined at the agency level. One can scarcely exaggerate the importance of this consideration to the legitimacy of democratic politics and [*782] to the substantive content of public policy. After all, it is only at the agency level that the generalities of legislation are broken down and concretized into discrete, specific issues with which affected parties can hope to deal. It is there that the agency commits itself to a particular course of action; because only there does it propose the specific rate it will set, the particular emission level it will prescribe, the precise restrictions on private activity it will impose, the exact regulatory definitions it will employ, the kinds of enforcement techniques it will use, the types of information it will collect, and the details relating to the administrative state's myriad other impacts on citizens and groups. In short, it is only at the agency level that the citizen can know precisely what the statute means to her; how, when, and to what extent it will affect her interests; whether she supports, opposes, or wants changes in what the agency is proposing; whether it is worth her while to participate actively in seeking to influence this particular exercise of governmental power, and if so, how best to go about it; and where other citizens or groups stand on these questions. God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important things - and the details are to be found at the agency level. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency grappled with and defined them.
Non-Delegation Ans: Agency Rule Making Good

-Agency rule making key to public participation Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to acquire) the information necessary to identify, explicate, quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws' policy consequences. Indeed, first-order effects of policies usually are less significant than the aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society. When policies fail, it is usually not because the congressional purpose was misunderstood. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not fully appreciate how the details of policy implemen [*783] tation would confound its purpose. Often, however, this knowledge can only be gained through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level where these implementation issues are most clearly focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest.
-Multiple democratic checks on agency decisions Linde, Senior Judge, Oregon Supreme Court (1977-1990), 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 823 SYMPOSIUM: Structures and Terms of Consent: Delegation, Discretion, Separation of Powers, Representation, Participation, Accountability? *; Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Willamette University College of Law, l/n)
Public sector management is public policy as much as regulation of private management is. Democratic control over this delegated policymaking is pursued by many devices: making an agency responsible to an elected chief executive, direct election of agency heads, transparency and access through procedures of open policy-making, legislative control of budgets, and plebiscites on the policy itself n45 - but not, to my knowledge, by a nondelegation doctrine. If a private utility must go through a regulatory process with comprehensible policy standards to build a power plant or to change its bus service, why should a municipal bus line or electric utility not have to use a comparable policy process for its own plans? Yet, procedural solutions cost time and money and invite lengthy review for alleged errors unrelated to the merits, without really satisfying those who lose the policy dispute.
Nondelegation Bad- Hurts democracy

-Reviving nondelegation undermines accountability- checks prevent any abuses of delegation Epstein and OHalloran 99
If our theory of delegation as a balancing of competing inefficiencies is correct, the balance of power between the branches will be continuously recalibrated to reflect changing contingencies of the day. As political factors - such as constituent demands, legislators' policy goals, and partisan control of the branches of government - change, so too will the terms of delegation. In our view, this state of affairs is a testament to the health of our political system, allowing neither committees nor agencies to dominate policymaking. Congressional delegation is, therefore, a selfregulating system, and any attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine would merely strengthen the hands of congressional committees, sub-committees, and interest groups at the expense of agencies, thereby reducing accountability and forcing Congress to make policy in exactly those areas that it handles least effectively relative to executive agencies. Delegation should, thus, be seen as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the separation of powers.
Delegations key to preventing concentration of power in the hands of committees undermining liberty Epstein and OHalloran 99
Third, delegation is not only a convenient means to allocate work across the branches, but it is also a necessary counterbalance to the concentration of power in the hands of committees. In an era where public policy becomes ever more complex, the only way for Congress to make all important policy decisions internally would be to concentrate significant amounts of authority in the [*986] hands of powerful committee and subcommittee leaders, once again surrendering policy to a narrow subset of its members. From the standpoint of floor voters this is little better than complete abdication to executive branch agencies. As it now works, the system of delegation allows legislators to play off committees against agencies, dividing the labor across the branches so that no one set of actors dominates. Given this perspective, a resuscitated nondelegation doctrine would not only be unnecessary, but also would threaten the very individual liberties that it purports to protect.

-Strict nondelegation undermines democracy by putting too much power in the courts MEZHBURD 00
Finally, some delegation proponents argue that strict nondelegation damages democracy by providing a more active role for the courts: because there is no clear distinction between well-tailored statutes and unconstitutional delegations of lawmaking, courts hiding behind the nondelegation doctrine may entangle themselves in policymaking by declaring statutes that they don't like to be too broad and green-lighting statutes they favor. n106 When courts become the final arbiters of policy, democratic accountability suffers even more. n107
-Nondelegation leads to less accountability Stewart, Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard, 87

(The American University Law Review The American University WINTER, 1987 A SYMPOSIUM ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: "THE UNEASY CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES", APRIL 4, 1986: PART I: DELEGATION OF POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: PRINCIPAL PAPER: BEYOND DELEGATION DOCTRINE. RICHARD B. STEWART *Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago,l/m)
I do not believe, however, that the federal courts will invoke the delegation doctrine to invalidate congressional statutes. Nor should they. There are two principal reasons why the courts are justified in refusing to enforce this long somnolent doctrine in any but the most unusual and infrequent circumstances. The first is the absence of judicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations. The second is that requiring Congress to write detailed commands in statutes could well produce unsound and less responsible government.

-Lack of delegation leads to subdelegation increasing the risk of interest group capture Stewart, Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard, 87
Second, and in my view much more likely, Congress would respond by subdelegating the legislation function to congressional committees or subcommittees whose decisions would in most cases be ratified with little or no review by the entire Congress. n42 Because [*332] the costs of agreement would be lower at the subcommittee level than in Congress as a whole, internal delegation would enable Congress to maintain its legislative output despite the greater specificity required by the courts. If, as Professor Schoenbrod asserts, there is an "iron law of political intervention" in which organized interest groups will inevitably exert an effective demand for government measures which favor their interests, n43 then we should expect that Congress, if faced with stringent judicial enforcement of delegation doctrine, would resort to internal subdelegation in order to meet that demand. Subdelegation, however, creates serious problems of political responsibility. Decisional power is shifted to congressional subcommittee chairmen and staff and their bureaucratic and interest group allies. n44 Policy is made through a submerged micropolitical process without open and regular procedures. The hazards of subdelegation are apparent already in highly detailed tax or environmental regulatory statutes. n45 Although Professor Schoenbrod finds the Clean Air Act insufficiently specific to meet constitutional requirements, n46 the 115 pages that it occupies in the United States Code n47 contain a host of detailed "Christmas Tree" provisions designed to benefit particular regions, industries, and interest groups. n48 Judicial requirements that all regulatory statutes consist of detailed rules of conduct would encourage far broader congressional use of such provisions.

-Delegation better at upholding accountability that subdelegation Stewart, Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard, 87
The iron laws of transaction costs make it impossible to achieve adequate political accountability in a system of centralized command and control directives of conduct. Congress must in such a system delegate most of the key decisions. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis was among the first to grasp this fact and argue that delegation to administrative agencies was preferable to subdelegation within Congress, provided that agencies were required to observe procedural and other requirements designed to serve open, responsive, and reasoned decisionmaking. n51 This view was adopted by the courts. n52 Instead of enforcing the constitutional doctrine against legislative delegation, the courts have restructured administrative law to extend procedural rights and judicial review to a wide range of affected interests, create new procedures in rulemaking, and more carefully scrutinize agencies' exercise of discretion. n53 Does internal delegation to congressional subcommittees produce sounder, more responsible government than delegation to agencies backed by hearing requirements and judicial review? Although I doubt that any firm, general conclusions can be reached, there are good grounds for supposing that internal delegation does not on balance lead to more desirable results. Unlike administrative decisionmaking, subdelegated congressional decisionmaking often is not subject to public input through regularly established procedures. It is not required to be based on a public record, and is not subject to "hard look" judicial review. These requirements are not imposed on legislators because of the supposed efficacy of political [*334] checks. These checks, however, are weakened grievously when decisions are made through congressional subdelegation.

-Delegation key to political accountability and democracy Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
I know David Schoenbrod, and he is no Owen Fiss. Yet, if the United States Supreme Court were to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine as Professor Schoenbrod proposes, it would radically increase judicial power over vast areas of American life at the expense of the "political" branches (as we quaintly call them). Fiss, my beloved but occasionally misguided colleague, would probably applaud this change, but Professor Schoenbrod, usually so sensible about such things, would surely deplore it. Fortunately, the Court is most unlikely to adopt Professor Schoenbrod's perverse proposal. Besides, even if the Court did revive the nondelegation doctrine, it would surely want to neuter it. Like Buddy, our First Dog, the Court lacks the balls to do what the doctrine would require. So much the better for the Court - and for the rest of us (though not for poor Buddy). In explaining why this is so, I have - we all have - the advantage of Jerry Mashaw's recent and excellent book, Greed, Chaos, and Governance. n1 There, Mashaw reviews the arguments for and against delegation using the public choice literature and Professor Schoenbrod's book n2 as analytical foils. I do not accept all of Mashaw's claims about delegation. He argues, for example, that voters can more readily discern and police a legislator's preferences through statutory standards like "protect the public health" and "fair and reasonable" than they can through statutory language that prescribes more specific tradeoffs of competing values. This claim is quite implausible as a general matter, although it is surely correct in some subset of cases depending on the particular statutes being compared. Additionally, his statement that his point has not been "to decide the nondelegation doctrine issue conclu [*776] sively one way or the other" n3 strikes me as disingenuous, for his analysis plunges a long, sharp knife deep into the doctrine's heart, leaving it near death's door. Nevertheless, I accept almost all of Mashaw's arguments. Our agreement, I presume, is not due to something in the New Haven water supply. Instead, it reflects administrative law scholars' familiarity with a wide variety of regulatory schemes and public administration arrangements. It also reflects our common understanding that the ubiquity of broad delegations denotes much more than the undoubted desires of politicians to eat their cake and have it too. In my view, delegation - when backed (as it is in our system) by many powerful institutional and informal controls over agency discretion - constitutes one of the most salutary developments in the long struggle to instantiate the often competing values of democratic participation, political accountability, legal regularity, and administrative effectiveness.

-Nondelegation destroys separation of powers by overly empowering the courts Schuck, Professor of Law, 99
The consequences of a robust nondelegation doctrine would not be pretty. First, it would greatly strengthen the power of the federal courts relative to that of Congress and the agencies. Ironically, it would do so in the name of the separation of powers while undermining that very principle. Such a massive shift of power to unelected federal judges should trouble us deeply. n47 It is particularly obnoxious when, as in this case, it is not essential to the vindi [*791] cation of enumerated constitutional rights, and when the courts would be guided by Professor Schoenbrod's principles, which are as unhelpful as "Congress need only state the law" n48 and as slippery, manipulable, and epistemologically incoherent as the distinction between "lawmaking and law interpretation." n49 How general is too general, how specific is specific enough - these are, contrary to Professor Schoenbrod's claim, questions of degree, not kind. They are preeminently questions of politics and of policy that courts are poorly equipped to answer as a functional matter and that they are disabled from resolving as a constitutional matter. Resolution of these questions, moreover, depends entirely on context - or as Professor Schoenbrod recognizes, on a "number of other factors." n50
-Nondelegation undermines democracy Schuck, Professor of Law, 99

In the end, then, the nondelegation doctrine is a prescription for judicial supervision of both the substance and forms of legislation and hence of politics and public policy, without the existence [*793] or even the possibility of any coherent, principled, or manageable judicial standards. This leads us to three other ironies. n53 The nondelegation doctrine utterly lacks the intelligible standards that it demands of legislation. It invites and empowers judges to render the legislative process even more chaotic and opportunistic than the doctrine's advocates think it already is. And it does so at a cost to democratic politics - the very touchstone of those advocates - that can scarcely be imagined.

-Delegation more democratic than Congressional actions Kahan, Professor of Law, 99
(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795 SYMPOSIUM: Democracy Schmemocracy NAME: Dan M. Kahan * * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, l/n) Start with the civic republican conception of democracy. Civic republicans tend to see Congress as excessively responsive to interest groups and insufficiently attentive to the common good; the role of money in contemporary electoral politics has defeated Madison's deliberative aspirations. Delegation to agencies, however, may be one way to restore it. Administrative rulemakings afford all interested citizens an opportunity to voice their views, and the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard n19 obliges agencies to address the substance of these views, instead of merely aggregating the preferences of interest groups, when it makes law. This deliberative conception of delegated [*801] lawmaking furnishes a plausible description of what at least some agencies do. n20 Indeed, it's possible to see at least some delegations as making Congress itself more deliberative.
-Delegation enhances accountability Kahan, Professor of Law, 99

(Cardozo Law Review January, 1999 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795 SYMPOSIUM: Democracy Schmemocracy NAME: Dan M. Kahan * * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, l/n) These arguments undermine any claim that delegation is antidemocratic merely because it diminishes "congressional accountability." Too much legislative accountability, the civic republican view suggests, can disserve certain democratic goods and experiences; when that is so, it perfects democracy for elected representatives to delegate some of their power to agencies structured to respect those goods and experiences. To be sure, this is not an uncontestable account of what democracy requires. But precisely because the concept of democracy is contestable, the preference for congressional accountability over delegated lawmaking can't be justified as compelled by democracy.
Non-delegation: Pres Power Links

Congressional delegations of authority boost presidential powers Kelly 05 Rethinking Presidential PowerThe Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency. Paper
prepared for the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association April 7-10, 2005 Chicago, IL Christopher S. Kelley, Ph.D. Department of Political Science Miami University http://www.pegc.us/archive/Unitary%20Executive/kelly_unit_exec_and_bush.pdf The Take Care clause requires the president, with the advice and assistance of his inferior officers, to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. As Michael Herz has argued, the Take Care clause insures that the president will not only execute the law personally, but also it obligates him to oversee the executive branch agencies to insure that they are faithfully executing the laws.23 And this explicitly means that the agencies are executing the law according to the presidents wishes, as opposed to some independent policy goal.24 Why is this? It is because the president is the only nationally elected official and as such, is independently responsible to the electorate. As Elena Kagan argues, When Congress delegates discretionary authority to an agency official, because that official is a subordinate of the President, it is so granting discretionary authority (unless otherwise specified) to the President.25 After Congress has passed a bill, it lacks the ability of oversight, thus leaving it to the president to ensure it is faithfully executed.
Nondelegation Ans- A2: Apathy

apathy is very high, especially for younger people. South Maine Online, 2007 The Young and the Restless Youth voting in America,
http://www.southmainonline.com/youthvote/national.html Despite the expressed discontent with Congressional progress during the present administration, many Americans still arent exercising their right to vote. Statistics show 18-24 year olds are even less likely to vote than older demographics. Electoral participation of Americans under 25 has declined since 1972 when 18-21 year olds were first awarded the right to vote, according to the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). Apathy is not a new problem with college students, Jones said. Generally, people dont get involved in politics until they settle down, start a family and start paying taxes. CIRCLE statistics show a 13 percent decline in young voter turnout from 1972 to 2000. (Fifty-five percent of 18-21 year olds cast ballots in the 1972 Presidential election, according to the YouthVote Coalition. In 2000, only 42 percent of 18-24 year-old citizens voted, compared to 70 percent of voters over the age of 25.) (At James Madison University, only 3.5 percent of eligible student voters participated in the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election.)
Millions of Americans arent voting right now. McGovern 2004 Matt, authored and edited numerous books, My Two Cents--Did You Exercise Your Voting
Muscle? http://www.articlecontrol.com/my_two_centsdid_you_exercise_y-a18751.html Whether or not you are pleased with the results of the 2004 election, the season of high intensity politicking has mercifully come and gone . . . for now. This election day, tens of millions of Americans exercised their voting muscle--more than 120 million by some estimates, or 60-percent of eligible voters--and that's encouraging. Kudos to you if you can count yourself a member of this group! Still other tens of millions of Americans did not vote--many of them between the ages of 18 and 30, the same people who one day will become the future leaders for our country--and that's most disappointing. It's clear that many Americans take their right to vote for granted, or simply don't care. They have become complacent, reciting the all-too-familiar, "My one vote won't make a difference." But tell that to Al Gore who, had 537 voters in Florida not turned out and voted for George W. Bush in 2000, would most likely have been this year's incumbent.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007 A2: Budget NBs
The current out of control budget deficit threatens US economic interests around the globe. Maurice R. Greenberg 07.01.2007
vice chair of the Council on Foreign Relations, influential business leader National Interest online, http://www.nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=14808 IT IS TIME the United States wakes up to a serious problem. The dollar is increasingly losing the position it has enjoyed for nearly half a century as the worlds currency of last resort. And as that happens, the advantages we have gleaned from that statusthe ability to finance our twin fiscal and trade deficits while keeping our interest rates lowwill also be lost. And yet no one, particularly in Washington, seems overly concerned. The world is awash in dollars right now, and the situation cannot last. My concern is that many in this country continue to have unrealistic views about the sustainability of the status quo. Yes, our domestic economy is doing reasonably wellwe have modest but real growth, inflation is quiet, the stock market is booming. But we also have not done anything to address an out-ofcontrol federal government budget deficit and the ongoing huge trade deficits we run up with other nations. How long will other countries continue to provide us with our credit card? Other countries may no longer be willing to provide Washington with a blank checkliterally.
The US budget deficit is rising, but this doesnt affect the economy. AHN News, March 12, 2007
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7006723303 Washington, D.C. (AHN) - The U.S. economy is picking up, however the budget deficit for February continues to rise from where it was in 2006. Capitol Hill reports a deficit of $120 billion, up from $119.2 billion last year; however, the deficit fell just short of the $121 billion financial experts expected Washington to post for the second month of 2007. The budget year begins in October, and for the first five months the U.S. has been slashing the deficit by 25.5 percent. According to Congress, Uncle Sam has made $1.117 trillion and spent $954.4 billion, with the rest of the deficit going to repaying America's debt.
*****Separation of Powers*****
SOP: Weak Executive Links SOP: Links: Weak Executive

Weak executive risks tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 229) A single individual was also perceived as better able to check the ambition and the natural tendency toward encroachments by the legislature. If the executive were divided, it would be weak; if weak, it would become dependent on the legislature. That, in turn, would render the legislature the executor as well as the maker of laws. As a result, according to James Madison, "Tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner."'
Legislative tyranny worse than presidential tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 226) Because the legislature's powers are "at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits [than the other branches], it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate departments.
SOP: Congressional Action Links

Congressional intrusions into foreign policy violate separation of powers Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to the Department of State, 89
(Abraham D. Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 20) More fundamentally, however, in this our Constitution's bicentennial we should be especially sensitive to the importance of avoiding efforts to advance particular political perspectives by changing the balance of powers the framers so carefully crafted. The Constitution already enables Congress to control the president, when the legislative consensus to do so actually exists. Congress needs no War Powers Resolution to assert this ultimate authority. But when Congress does not form a definitive judgment, for whatever reason, the Constitution was designed to allow the president to act. Hamilton said in Federalist No. 23, the authorities essential to the "common defense ... ought to exist without limitation; because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of natural exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.17 Congress was not intended to assume primary responsibility for military initiatives, especially those short of war, and that it has seldom overcome the reluctance to do so has characterized its conduct throughout American history.
Legislative expansion of power risks tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 227) In his Notes on Virginia, written during 1782 and 1783 and published in 1784, Thomas Jefferson, who had served as governor of Virginia during the period 1779 to 1781, described the Constitution of Virginia as having been formed "when we were new and inexperienced in the science of government. It was the first ... which was formed in the whole United States. No wonder then that time and trial have discovered very capital defects in it."' Among those defects was the fact that: All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government .... An elective despotism was not the government we fought for .... 10 During the Constitutional Convention James Madison argued that state governments tended to "throw all power into the legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent."
SOP Impacts: War

A flawed model of separation of powers causes global wars Zakaria, 97, (Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs and a Contributing Editor for Newsweek.) 97, Foreign Affairs,
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, l/n Republicanism, for Kant, meant a separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and some level of representation in government (though nothing close to universal suffrage). Kant's other explanations for the "perpetual peace" between republics are all closely linked to their constitutional and liberal character: a mutual respect for the rights of each other's citizens, a system of checks and balances assuring that no single leader can drag his country into war, and classical liberal economic policies -- most importantly, free trade -- which create an interdependence that makes war costly and cooperation useful. Michael Doyle, the leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism, democracy itself has no peace-inducing qualities: Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argument offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities -- democracies -- should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For two thousand years before the modern age, popular rule was widely associated with aggressiveness (by Thucydides) or imperial success (by Machiavelli) . . . The decisive preference of [the] median voter might well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities. The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies sheds light on another striking statistical correlation. Political scientists Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield contend, using an impressive data set, that over the last 200 years democratizing states went to war significantly more often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hyper-nationalism and war-mongering. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed that they must rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, which often drag countries into confrontation and war. Noteworthy examples range from Napoleon III's France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan to those in today's newspapers, like Armenia and Azerbaijan and Milosevic's Serbia. The democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy.
SOP is key to prevent government violence Joseph Rowlands 2001 , the creator of Rebirth of Reason, a website for Objectivists
http://importanceofphilosophy.com/Politics_SeparationPower.html Understanding that a government's role is to protect individual rights, but acknowledging that governments have historically been the major violators of these rights, a number of measures have been derived to reduce this likelihood. The concept of Separation of Powers is one such measure. The premise behind the Separation of Powers is that when a single person or group has a large amount of power, they can become dangerous to citizens. The Separation of Power is a method of removing the amount of power in any group's hands, making it more difficult to abuse. The US government has a partial Separation of Powers. It distinguishes between three groups. The Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial. They are distinguished by the kind of power they wield. The Legislative branch has the ability to enact laws. The Executive branch has the ability to see those laws enforced. The Judicial branch has the ability to decide the guilt of a party, allowing punishment. If a single group shared all three powers, they would have unlimited power. They could specify any law, arresting the 'criminal', and then decide that they are guilty. Through the Separation of Powers, though, no group can have more than one of these powers. Only through the combined use of all three can the government use force. By requiring the consent of all three branches, it increases the likelihood that the government will not initiate violent force. There are many different ways to separate the powers of a government. The US, for instance, requires those that declare war to be different from those that execute the war. Only by combining the two can a war be declared. Also, the Legislative branch is further broken into two, each with separate responsibilities and powers. By any number of possible separations, a government can be made safer for its citizens.
SOP Impacts: Liberty

Separation of powers solves tyranny Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to the Department of State, 89
(Abraham D. Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 21) So the basic structure, conceived by the framers, must be preserved. I celebrate it. It helps ensure, through the balanced conflict of the political branches, that we will remain free of the tyranny that would result from unbalanced government, however well intended.
Need balanced power to avoid tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 225) The single most important characteristic of the U.S. Constitution, responsible for the preservation of individual freedom and liberty for 200 years, is its carefully balanced structure of divided yet interdependent powers. One principle with which most Americans found themselves in agreement in 1787 was that "no political truth is ... of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that ... [t1he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. "
Separation of Powers is necessary to prevent tyranny George W. Carey, 1989

(In Defense of the Constitution; http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/HTML.php?recordID=0008)
While these and related matters will be explored more thoroughly below, what is apparent from what has been said is that separation of powers was primarily intended to perform a function other than controlling majorities. That function, as I make clear below, was to prevent tyranny and to prevent the governorsthose who wield the powers of governmentfrom ruling arbitrarily and capriciously to abuse and oppress the governed. And to accomplish this, they believed that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions had to be exercised by separate departments. This much at least must be understood to comprehend fully the role of separation of powers in the context of the difficulties confronting the Founders. To begin with, we see why the Founders had to scrap the Articles entirely rather than simply amend them. Once the decision had been made to establish a truly effective national government to provide for common goals such as defense, a concentration of powers in a unicameral legislature was, by their best lights, simply out of the question. Or, to put this the other way around, the structure of the Articles was perfectly satisfactory as long as the government could not effectively exercise the powers granted to it.

Separation of powers key to liberty Allen 07 Brooklyn Law Review Spring, 2007 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871 ARTICLE: George W. Bush and the
Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change NAME: Michael P. Allen + + Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; l/n The centerpiece of the American constitutional order is the existence of multiple centers of political authority that are capable of meaningfully checking the accretion of power in any one governmental entity. 46 These centers are oriented both vertically and horizontally to one another. Thus, we have the concepts of federalism, or the relationship between the states and the federal government as well as the relationship among [*883] the states themselves, and separation of powers, which denotes the relationship between and among the three coordinate branches of the federal government. In the balance of this sub-part, I discuss each of these aspects of the first foundational principle. Before doing so, however, it is worth recalling that this foundational principle is about more than structure. Instead, the principle is in many respects instrumental; it is a means by which citizens' liberty is protected. 47 Thus, when a court acts as an agent of structural equilibrium and enforces this first foundational principle, it is acting in a liberty-protecting manner. There are certainly dangers of which the courts need to be aware (as I discuss in this sub-part), but those dangers should not dissuade courts from taking on such an important liberty-protecting role.
SOP key to preventing tranny

Gray, Leslie and Wynell Burroughs. "Constitutional Issues: Seperation of Powers." Social Education 51, 1 (January 1987): 28-30. http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/separation-powers/ It is safe to say that a respect for the principle of separation of powers is deeply ingrained in every American. The nation subscribes to the original premise of the framers of the Constitution that the way to safeguard against tyranny is to separate the powers of government among three branches so that each branch checks the other two. Even when this system thwarts the public will and paralyzes the processes of government, Americans have rallied to its defense.
SOP prevents government from gaining too much power

Social Studies Help Center April 5 2007 Adult education resources http://www.socialstudieshelp.com/Lesson_13_Notes.htm As we have already seen our Constitution is very much a reaction to the events that came before it. Our founding fathers had several goals, foremost among those goals was to avoid tyranny. In order to do this several different systems were set up to prevent the abuse of power. Federalism was one of these systems. Federalism was designed to balance the power of the national and State governments and thus limit the powers of the national government. Jefferson and others were convinced that state government was closer to the people and thus more democratic. Another system that was developed was the system of checks and balances. Checks and balances, or the separation of powers, is based upon the philosophy of Baron de Montesquieau.. For example: In this system the government was to be divided into three branches of government, each branch having particular powers. Not only does each branch of the government have particular powers each branch has certain powers over the other branchs. This is done to keep them balanced and to prevent one branch form ever gaining too much power.

-Separation of powers key to checking manipulation by interest groups Zellmer, Professor of Law, 00
(Arizona State Law Journal Fall, 2000 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941 ARTICLE: The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal NAME: Sandra B. Zellmer* *Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law, LL.M., l/n)
Thanks to Schoolhouse Rock, an entire generation of Americans grew up secure in the knowledge that the United States government is divided into three branches, each of which plays a role in a democratic society. n20 Article [*949] I of the Constitution specifically provides that "[a]ll legislative powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." n21 In other words, elected representatives in Congress have the power to make laws of general applicability. n22 Meanwhile, executive power-the power to implement the law-is held by the President, n23 and the power to review the activities of the other branches, in the context of cases or controversies, is vested in the judiciary. n24 A primary reason for the constitutional separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches is to provide checks and balances against the capture of any one branch by another. n25 Separation of powers deters government excesses through arbitrary or tyrannical rule and promotes accountability. It also minimizes the potential for manipulation of governmental processes by special interest groups and protects individual citizens from the effects of factionalism. n26
SOP: Not Zero Sum

No zero sum game between Congress and the President Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 220) "Energy in the executive," insisted Hamilton in Federalist 70, "is a leading character in the definition of good government." The president's ability to reorganize institutions, alter administrative procedures, and generally act like a chief executive is an important power, one with consequences beyond what appears to be, at first glance, the sort of issue that could only be of interest to bureaucratic junkies or devotees of organizational theory. Presidents, by using their formal powers to capture new capabilities as they develop and by reshaping processes to link their preferences more directly with outcomes, have taken advantage of their unique position and powers to exert significant control over federal government activities. This does not deny the realities of separated powers, or what presidency scholar Charles 0. Jones calls the "separated system," and we need not view the executive-legislative relationship as a zero-sum game. It does suggest, however, that studies of presidential power should pay more attention to the legal and institutional sources of presidential authority, and that political scientists should mend the split in the literature between the legal and the political aspects of the institution and individual presidents.
SOP: No Presidential Tyranny

No risk of imperial presidency Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 220-221) Such a concentration of power, especially in combination with an inefficient Congress and a deferential judiciary, poses the clear risk for misuse.' Can presidents use executive orders to resurrect the imperial presidency? My answer is no. The key is that the use of executive orders is conditioned on presidents' overall political situation: presidents balance the benefits of issuing an order against the costs of doing so. Despite fears that executive orders can undermine popular sovereignty, it is also possible that they can enhance accountability by creating a clear decision trail that leads directly to the president.' Despite the often arcane language and obscure provisions in many executive orders, the orders themselves leave no doubt about who is speaking. There are limits to what presidents can accomplish with executive orders (as Truman discovered in Youngstown), but this does not negate the fact that presidents can use them strategically. It is, ultimately, possible to unite the legal approach to presidential power with the behavioral approach epitomized by Neustadt's Presidential Power. In that connection lies the ultimate protection against abuse of executive authority, for it is not simply words on a legal document that give rise to power, but the context that surrounds them as well.
Congress will check over reaches of executive authority Mayer, professor of political science, 02
(Kenneth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive orders and Presidential Power, second printing, p. 222-223) The ultimate check on executive energy is-and should be-political. Congress can step in to reclaim the ground it has lost to the executive, and its failure to do so is much more a function of political will than of any flaws in constitutional arrangements. If, say, the 105th Congress had successfully overturned the affirmative action requirements in Executive Order 11246, the ban on assassinations included in the intelligence orders, or the secrecy regulations in Executive Order 12356, its success would not be viewed as a destruction of constitutional foundations (although, to be sure, there would be vigorous debate about the merits). More important, a president would be hard pressed to defy such a legislative statement, although we might expect chief executives to exploit any residual discretion that Congress left them. When presidents have ignored statutory limits on their power, as exemplified by the ineffective 1973 War Powers Resolution, they are often able to do so because Congress has either left them with more than enough residual decision space (or, to use a less technical term, "wriggle room") to permit broad discretion or has passed legislation with poorly worded or ineffective restrictions. The history of executivelegislative relations strongly suggests that overreaching by one branch often leads to a clear response from the other. Fisher notes: "At some point, after passing beyond a threshold of common sense and prudence, aggressive actions become counterproductive. They trigger revolts, leading to the recapture of ground taken not only in the most recent assault but in earlier offenses as well."" The boundaries of executive power might be ambiguous, but they are not invisible.

Zero risk of executive tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89
(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 229) The final vote reflected a clear and conscious decision that effectiveness in government would be best ensured and liberty best preserved by a single executive. A unified chief executive authority would be more effective, forceful, energetic, efficient, and, because more accountable, less dangerous. As James Wilson later explained to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention: We may discover from history, from reason, and from experience ... executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen.... [W]e have [created] a responsibility in the person of our President; he cannot act improperly, and hide either his negligence or inattention; he cannot roll upon any other person the weight of his criminality; no appointment can take place without his nomination; and he is responsible for every nomination he makes.
No risk of executive tyranny Olson, former assistant Attorney General, 89

(Theodore B. The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch, ed. Crovitz and Rabkin, p. 228-229) While those who participated in the debate seemed to agree that energy and efficiency were best served by a single executive, some delegates expressed concern that accumulation of too much power in a single individual would, as Edmund Randolph of Virginia stated, become "the foetus of monarchy. 1114 George Mason argued in favor of a three-person executive, which, in his view, would help prevent cabals and provide a check against the aspirations of "dangerous and ambitious men."" Several delegates called for a council to advise the executive and share in the executive responsibilities. James Madison apparently favored the motion for a unitary executive but leaned toward adding a council "who should have the right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control [the executive's] authority."" These concerns were overridden. The proponents of a unitary executive responded that "unity in the Executive instead of being the foetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny" because responsibility for executive decision making could readily be fixed. It would be easier for the public to monitor the performance of a single executive and therefore control abuse.

The public will keep the president in check Burgess 94
(Texas Law Review February, 1994 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 NOTES: When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law? NAME: Christine E. Burgess, l/n)
Eventually, if any one branch exercises too much raw power, the public will object. It is unlikely that average citizens will be vigilant in keeping a proper constitutional balance among the branches in day-to-day operations. But if one branch goes too far, the public is likely to protest. n156 If the public feels that the President is overreaching the bounds of his authority, Congress will likely respond. Ultimately, if the public is outraged by presidential usurpation of power, Congress may impeach him. n157 The threat of impeachment is not the only public factor that will temper presidential actions. Presidential desires to be re-elected, to be treated favorably by history, to maintain influence, and to avoid harming his political party all influence the President's actions. n158 The public response to the Iran-Contra controversy n159 is an example [*663] of when public opinion -- or at least criticism from the press -- has rebuked the President for using the enforcement power to "step over the line" of presidential power. n160 In response to the discovery of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's actions in contravention of congressional policy, Congress held highly publicized hearings delving into what the President actually authorized and what actions were undertaken by other segments of the executive branch of their own volition. Arguably, the Iran-Contra controversy played at least a part in President Bush's 1992 presidential election defeat. n161
SOP: Uniqueness Answer

Bush already overstepping bounds of presidential authority with executive orders Yuhan 04
(New York University Law Review October, 2004 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1570 NOTE: THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY STRIKES BACK: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,233, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, AND THE CAPTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL HISTORY NAME: Stephen H. Yuhan * Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, l/n)
In issuing Executive Order 13,233, President Bush has overstepped the bounds of presidential authority. Under Youngstown, all assertions of presidential power must be based on an act of Congress or the President's inherent constitutional authority. Unfortunately, [*1604] the dichotomy between statutory and constitutional powers begins to collapse when dealing with questions regarding presidential control over agencies, and Youngstown itself fails to provide adequate guidance as to defining the limits of this authority. Looking to the removal cases, however, yields some important insights regarding the relevant doctrinal and normative considerations that must guide any inquiry into presidential control. In particular, a concern for arbitrariness emerges as a paramount consideration in determining whether an assertion of presidential authority violates separation of powers. Looking at executive orders generally and 13,233 specifically, it becomes clear that the Bush Order creates too strong a risk of arbitrary decisionmaking to fall within the President's constitutional authority. Executive Order 13,233 (13,233 or Bush Order), 3 which makes it considerably more difficult for members of the public to obtain access to the papers and records of former presidents.
Presidents Have Too Much Power Now Cronin President of Whitman College, Political Scientist and Genovese Professor of Political Science, 04
(Thomas, Michael The Paradoxes of the American Presidency), Pg. 164 From early August of 1990 through much of January 1991 Preside.--George H. W. Bush deftly maneuvered the United States in the direction, what became known as Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait. Bush said initially his decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia was a "wholly defensive" mission. Yet he increasingly enlarged our military presence, and he rallied both the United States and a twenty-eight-nation coalition to prepare for war against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. In December of 1990 Bush signaled cabinet officials that he wanted to go to war to liberate Kuwait. He is reported also to have told foreign leaders in the coalition that if he decided to go to war, he would do so whether Congress agreed or not. Congress eventually, after heated arguments, passed resolutions supporting the use of military force to liberate Kuwait. There was, however, no formal declaration of war. Critics assert that American presidents now have more personal power to make war than do the leaders of any other major democracy. And they lament that this is precisely what the framers of the Constitution set out to prevent.12
Democracy Good: Poverty

Democracy good for the poor Prof. Michael Ross, 2004, UCLA Department of Political Science,
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:akhSl91SYXQJ:www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004-BB/papers/RossCSAE-BB2004.pdf+%22democracy+is+good%22+filetype:pdf&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=us There is a large body of research on the determinants of poverty in general, and infant and child mortality in particular. Many studies pay little attention to politics; among those that link politics to poverty, the most common claim is that democracy is good for the poor. Several studies also suggest that civil wars are bad for the poor.
Democracy Good: Solves War

Democracy solves all wars everywhere. Rummel, 2003, Ph.D. in Political Science, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
It is true that democratic freedom is an engine of national and individual wealth and prosperity. Hardly known, however, is that freedom also saves millions of lives from famine, disease, war, collective violence, and democide (genocide and mass murder). That is, the more freedom, the greater the human security and the less the violence. Conversely, the more power governments have, the more human insecurity and violence. In short: to our realization that power impoverishes we must also add that power kills.
Democracy reduces risk of war

MICHAEL D. WARD & KRISTIAN GLEDITSCH 1996 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington, Professor of Political Science Ph.D. University of Colorado-Boulder) http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/Manuscripts/warornot..htm Moving from a weak to a strong democratic authority structure reduces the risk of war involvement by approximately 75%. Polities that move from a highly authoritarian structure to a highly democratic one reduce their risk of war by approximately 50%. To reach these conclusions, we developed and applied a logistic model linking authority characteristics and war involvement using data from the recently revised Polity III and from the Correlates of War data sets. The findings demonstrate that democratizing polities, even those going through mild reversals, are substantially less war prone than previously argued (e.g., Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a,b). In short, the risks of war are reduced by democratization, both in the long term and while societies undergo democratic change as well. We also show that reversals of democratization are associated with a slight increase in the risk of war.
Democracy key to peace. James Ostrowski, 2002, Attorney and writer in Buffalo
,http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:QHCsLtY5QAoJ:www.mises.org/asc/2002/asc8ostrowski.pdf+democracy+creates+conflict&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=5&gl=us A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.
Democracy is key to peace. Gus diZerega ,Jaunary 2000, Third-Degree Gardnerian Elder,
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:L_0rJ2IoOngJ:www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/20_democracy.pdf+ democracy+creates+peace+filetype:pdf&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us Looked at closely, what Carpenter argues are rebuttals to Rummels argument about democracies' peaceful relations with one another support my reasons for why democracies do not war with one another. The structural features of American government farthest removed from the basic self-organizing characteristics of democratic government are those most responsible for its belligerent behavior . It is not democracy as such which creates peace, it is the systemic relationships within and between democracies generated by their self-organizing political processes which are conducive to lasting peace.
Democracy Good Development

Democracy good for development
UN Chronicle 2006 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_3_43/ai_n17094050 CAN DEMOCRACY DELIVER? The good news is, yes, it can. Most of the countries with the highest level of human development are democracies, while most of the poorest are autocracies. But democracy is not necessary for development. Singapore and South Korea, considered to be among the world's richest countries, prove the point: the reasons for their rapid progress range from high levels of education to sound economic policies. On the other hand, China and India, the world's most populous nations, are both medium-level development countries. Authoritarian China (ranked 85 in the 2005 Human Development Index) is ahead of India (127), but far behind Japan (11), which along with India has been one of Asia's most stable democracies since the end of the Second World War. If there is no obvious link between dictatorship and economic progress, or between democracy and poverty reduction, why is democracy better for development? Democracy is about the means used to achieve goals. Democratic values and processes imply peace, reconciliation, dialogue, consensus and, above all, intellectual and political choice.The stability of democracies does not depend on force, but on the consensus of the governed. And consensus can only be forged through democracy. From 1950 to 1990, riots and demonstrations in many countries but caused greater destabilization in dictatorships. Moreover, authoritarian States experienced more wars, with their high economic
Democracy Solves Terrorism

Democracy is key to solving terrorism
Paula J. Dobriansky 2004 Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2004/29184.htm Promoting democracy is a key component of the National Security Strategy initially released in September 2002. This document, which outlines the Administrations overall plan for defending the United States and advancing its interests and values, declared that America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for private property. It noted further that We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. President Bush is committed to these objectives not only because they are right, but also because they are essential to winning the War on Terror. In his speech at Whitehall Palace in London last November, the President said that We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance. In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.
Democracy Bad: Not Solve Terrorism

Democracy is bad for peace. Sandeep Baliga, 2006, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS). Research,
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:c6MVztrNPlMJ:www.bu.edu/econ/seminars/microeconomics/pdffall06/dempe ace.PDF+%22democracy+is+bad%22+filetype:pdf&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us Our key prediction is that limited democracy is bad for peace. We test this prediction using the Correlates of War data on the incidence of conflict and the Polity data on regime types. We primarily study military interstate disputes between directed dyads. Military interstate disputes include not only wars but also, for example, the firing of a missile. This maximizes the amount of data available. The directed dyad data splits countries into pairs, and reports not only when a dyad is at conflict but also which country initiated the conflict. Most empirical studies use Polity scores of dyads, and relate them to the probability a dyad is at war. Our theoretical model provides support for the idea that limited democracies, young or old, are more aggressive than autocracies. The data also seems to support our hypothesis. Future empirical work may distinguish our hypothesis from Mansfield and Snyders.
Democracy does not solve terrorism International Herald Tribune 2005 http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/12/news/edgause.php
The Bush administration and its defenders contend that the push for democracy throughout the Middle East will not only spread American values but also improve U.S. security. But is it true that democracy is an antidote to terrorism? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Although little is known about the causes of terrorism, available data does not show a strong relationship between terrorism and democracy. The political scientists William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg have shown that most terrorist incidents in the 1980s occurred in democracies and that generally both the victims and the perpetrators are citizens of democracies. In his recent book "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," Robert Pape argues that the targets of suicide bombers are almost always democracies, but that the motivation of the groups behind those bombings is to fight against military occupation and for self-determination. Terrorists are not driven by a desire for democracy but by their opposition to what they see as foreign domination. In the 1970s and 1980s, several brutal terrorist organizations arose in democratic countries: the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Ireland and Britain, and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. It appears that three of the suicide bombers in the July 7 London attacks were born and raised in Britain. And a memorial in Oklahoma City testifies to the fact that even U.S. democracy has not been free of terrorism of domestic origins. Those who assert that democracy will reduce terrorism presumably believe that potential terrorists and terrorist sympathizers, given the opportunity to participate openly in competitive politics and have their voices heard in the public square, will not resort to violence to achieve their goals
Democracy Bad: Leads to War

Democracy is most dangerous form of government Joseph Rowland 2001 creator of rebirth of reason, a website for objectivists
http://importanceofphilosophy.com/Bloody_Democracy.html Democracy is a political system through which the majority of the population rules. It differs from other forms of dictatorship by the size of the ruling class. It is believed that democracy leads to freedom, peace, and prosperity. This is not the case. Democracy is potentially the most dangerous of the political systems. Democracy is rule by the majority. There are no limits to what the majority is allowed to decide. It can decide laws based on whim, with no respect for rights It can pass laws against painting your house white as easy as it can pass laws against murder. There is no guarantee of a just democracy. There is one distinction between a democracy and many other forms of dictatorship. A minority dictatorship must fear the majority. If they oppress the people too much, the people will rebel. No dictatorship can stand against the full will of the people. Those that are ruled think in terms of justice. Those that rule think in terms of power. When the majority rules, they stop thinking in terms of right and wrong. They're claim to power is "the will of the people". Wherever that power leads, they follow obediently. If slavery is the price of power, they take it willingly. Those that suffer the most under a democracy are the minorities. The smaller the group, the less say they have in policy. But majority and minority change with each issue or policy. Everyone finds themselves as part of the minority at some point
Democracy fails to deter ideological civil wars. James Ostrowski, 2002, Attorney and writer in Buffalo
,http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:QHCsLtY5QAoJ:www.mises.org/asc/2002/asc8ostrowski.pdf+democracy+creates+conflict&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=5&gl=us Though ethnic conflict is the primary instigator of intrastate war, democracy also fails to deter ideological civil war. Ironically, democracy was supposed to avoid just such wars by allowing people to resolve their disputes through elections. Evidently, this works better in theory than in reality.
*******Normal Means*******
Management of Foreign Aid

USAID, the Department of Treasury and the Department of State manage foreign aid Institute for International Economics 2001
http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/321/1iie2911.pdf US bilateral economic assistance programs include Development Assistance, intended primarily to promote economic and social progress in recipient countries; Economic Support Fund (ESF) monies, used mainly in support of diplomatic purposes (e.g., peacemaking in the Middle East); food aid (called Public Law 480 (PL 480)) primarily for disaster relief and nutrition intervention in poor countries; programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to support economic and political transitions in these countries; funding for the Peace Corps, which sends US volunteers who usually work in communities in poor countries or countries in transition to help improve social and economic conditions there, and for the African Development Foundation and the InterAmerican Foundation, which work on community development and empowerment in their respective regions. USAID has policy leadership in Development Assistance and food aid and manages the implementation of those programs as well as the ESF and aid in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. US contributions to and participation in multilateral development banks are managed by the Department of Treasury. The Department of State manages funding for international organizations and programs for refugees.
Foreign aid is the responsibility of USAID and the Department of State Leahy, October 2, 2003
US Senator, Vermont, http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200310/100303a.html Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. That is why I didn't follow the usual procedure where amendments are simply deemed read. This was a short enough one that I wanted it read. It does what many of us feel we should have done 5 months ago when we appropriated the first $2.5 billion in foreign aid for Iraq. At the time we gave that very substantial amount of foreign aid to Iraq, many of us urged the Secretary of State--not the Secretary of Defense-- should have authority over the reconstruction program. No matter who is Secretary of State, no matter who is Secretary of Defense, when you are going to give enormous amounts of foreign aid for reconstruction, the aid should be under the Department of State. After all, foreign aid is the responsibility of the State Department. Also, it is the responsibility of USAID. That is what they know how to do. That is what their people are trained to do.
Congress Provides USAID/Foreign Aid Funds

Congress earmarks USAID funds for particular programs Boufford and Lee 01 Dean of the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, Senior Scholar at the
Institute for Health Policy Studies Health Policies for the 21st Century: Challenges and Recomendations for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Jo Ivey Boufford and Phillip R. Lee September 2001 http://www.milbank.org/010910healthpolicies.html#authors The State Department pays U.S. membership dues in international agencies, but funding for international health activities comes largely from annual congressional appropriations to the Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent agency. Health funds are a very small part of the USAID budget. Congress largely earmarks these funds for family planning, infectious disease, and HIV/AIDS. The DHHS has limited authority for international spending and only in specific areas that Congress approves, such as peer-reviewed research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a few public health programs of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) concerning polio and HIV/AIDS, and FDA regulatory activities relating to imported food and drugs. This divided authority makes it very difficult to develop coherent international health policy.
Congress funds and USAID manages the bulk of US foreign aid programs Tarnoff and Nowels 2004
Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf The largest component of U.S. foreign aid finances bilateral economic assistance programs managed directly by USAID, or in some cases jointly by USAID and the State Department. This cluster of assistance roughly matches the combined two categories of bilateral development aid and economic political/security programs illustrated in Figure 1, above, that are managed by USAID and the Department of State.5 Congress appropriates funds for these activities in seven accounts included in annual Foreign Operations appropriation measures: Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), the Global AIDS Initiative (GAI), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Assistance for the Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and alternative development programs implemented through the Andean Counter-narcotics Initiative (ACI). Collectively, these programs total $8.1 billion, or roughly 40% of total FY2004 foreign aid appropriations.
Congress directly appropriates most foreign aid money Tarnoff and Nowels 2004
Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf Congress appropriates most foreign aid money through the annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill. Each year it represents the most direct congressional action on foreign assistance spending decisions, although small amounts of foreign aid are funded in other legislation.11 Similar to the other measures of how much the United States spends on foreign assistance programs, Foreign Operations appropriations declined in the mid-1990s to slightly below $14 billion, the lowest level during the past decade in real terms (Table 2). Appropriated amounts rose beginning in FY1998 and averaged about $17.4 billion through the next four years. The combination of additional funding for the war on terrorism, Afghanistan reconstruction, and new foreign aid initiatives focused on HIV/AIDS and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, pushed average annual amounts, excluding Iraq reconstruction, above $20 billion in FY2003/2004. Including Iraq funding makes FY2004 the largest Foreign Operations appropriations, in real terms, in at least 30 years.
Congress Provides USAID/Foreign Aid Funds

Congress appropriates foreign aid The National Academy of Public Administration 2006 is the preeminent independent, non-profit
organization for public governance, http://www.napawash.org/haiti_final.pdf In the U.S. system, Congress appropriates aid to specific programsHIV/AIDS, disaster relief, food, democratizationsometimes on its own initiative, and sometimes in support of the Administration. Even when appropriating against an Administrations plan, Congress expects to allocate funding to specific programs. Congressional and Administration aid allocation practices may cause problems. Countries may neither need nor want donor-determined programs. Situations in countries may suddenly and dramatically change, making aid ineffective or irrelevant. Donors may duplicate one anothers programs and leave gaps in other areas. Policymakers should consider making aid more flexible and non-programmatic, then hold aid managers accountable for performance.
USAIDs budget is appropriated by Congress USAID 2007 (Budget Justification to the Congress, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/ cbj2007/)
On behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) I am pleased to transmit to the Congress the Administration's budget justification for authorization and appropriations for the programs administered by the Agency in fiscal year 2007.
Congress Appropriates Money to MDBs

Congress handles US contributions to Multilateral Development Banks Bank information center 2003
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.304.aspx Congress is responsible for approving the US financial contribution to the MDBs. Congressional involvement in MDB issues is divided between "authorizing" committees and "appropriating" committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. (An "appropriation," in the language of the US Congress, is a US financial contribution to a program or institution.) The authorizing committees are responsible for the enactment of legislation to authorize US participation in, and annual contributions to, the MDBs, while the appropriations committees are charged with the allocation of budgetary resources. Appropriations committees have enacted most of the relevant MDB reform legislation in the last 15 years (MDB funding is included in larger appropriations laws that cover all US foreign aid). Authorizing committees have also been important to the MDB reform campaign, however. In particular, House authorizing legislation was used to enact the 1989 Pelosi Amendment, and the House authorizing subcommittee played the key role in successfully linking adoption of the World Banks Inspection Panel and information disclosure policy to the authorizing legislation for the 10th replenishment of IDA. The authorizing committees responsible for the MDBs are the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy. The relevant appropriations committees are the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs.
USAID = Normal Means for Assistance

USAID is normal means for development assistance Tarnoff and Nowels 2004
Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/98-916_010406.pdf The bulk of the U.S. bilateral economic aid program is administered by the Agency for International Development (USAID), working under the guidance of the Secretary of State. USAID is responsible for most development assistance, Title II of the food aid program, and, in conjunction with the State Department, ESF, SEED, and NIS assistance. In FY2000, USAID had roughly 5,456 staff members, of which only about 2,052 were U.S. citizens hired directly by the agency. The majority of USAID staff consist of foreign nationals working in overseas missions and representational offices who oversee the implementation of hundreds of projects undertaken by thousands of contractors, consultants, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).10 Appropriations for USAID-managed programs amounted to $7.76 billion in FY2000.
Congress = Normal Means for Malaria

Congress has appropriated all malaria funding thus far
DATA 2006 (The Presidents Malaria Initiative and US Efforts to Fight Malaria, December, http://www.data.org/issues/governmentFunding_for_Malaria.html)
To date, total U.S. funding for malaria has doubled between FY02 and FY06, from $112 million to $250 million. Bilateral funding for malaria has remained fairly flat over this time period, while contributions to the Global Fund have increased dramaticallyU.S. malaria spending through the Fund has more than tripled from $47 million in FY02 to $147 million in FY06. The Presidents request for FY2007 is approximately $303 million with $222 million in bilateral spending and an estimated $81 million from the Global Fund. Congress has not yet finalized its FY2007 budget though the House has approved a total of $299m through bilateral and multilateral programs and the Senate has approved $414m in total. But planned increases in malaria funding, as well as other global health programs, are less certain now that Congress has announced its intention to pass a Continuing Resolution for FY2007 which will flat line funding for FY2007 at FY2006 levels. If an exception is not made for malaria funding, PMIs plans to reach an additional 30 million Africans in 2007 will not materialize.
Congress = Normal Means for AIDS

The President has not appropriated any AIDS funds without Congresss support Bush 2007 (George, Africa: President Bush Announces Five-Year, $30 Billion HIV/Aids Plan, May 30, http://allafrica.com/stories/200705301017.html)
The United States has responded vigorously to this crisis. In 2003, I asked Congress to approve an emergency plan for AIDS relief. Our nation pledged $15 billion over five years for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care in many of the poorest nations on Earth. In the years since, thanks to the support of the United States Congress and the American people, our country has met this pledge. This level of assistance is unprecedented, and the largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in human history. This investment has yielded the best possible return: saved lives. To date, the emergency plan has supported treatment for 1.1 million people infected with HIV. This is a promising start, yet without further action, the legislation that funded this emergency plan is set to expire in 2008. Today I ask Congress to demonstrate America's continuing commitment to fighting the scourge of HIV/AIDS by reauthorizing this legislation now. I ask Congress to double our initial commitment and approve an additional $30 billion for HIV/AIDS prevention, for care, and for treatment over the next five years.
Congress = Normal Means for Water Sanitation

Congress has funded water sanitation programs in the past
Kyriakou 2005 (Niko, Journalist at the Inter Press Service, US Congress Pledges to Double Funds to Fight Worlds #1 Killer: Unsafe Water, November 29, http://www. commondreams.org/headlines05/1129-01.htm)
SAN FRANCISCO - A widely unnoticed bill that makes access to clean water a central aim of U.S. foreign assistance was approved by the House of Representatives and Senate earlier this month. The Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 "puts water as a top priority and a cornerstone for foreign aid," and will get clean water "to people in greatest need," said Camille Osborne, director of public affairs for Water Advocates, a Washington, D.C.-based non-governmental organization (NGO). Named after the late Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), a water safety trailblazer, the House overwhelmingly passed the Water for Poor Act in early November and the Senate unanimously followed suit on November 16.
Congress = Normal Means for Landmines

Congress has empirically had full control over de-mining bills Stedjan and Wareham 2005 (Scott, USCBL Coordinator, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Mary, USCBL Chair, Human Rights Watch; U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines Calls on Congress to Support Increased Funding for Demining, September 19, http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=1543&issue_id=9)
While the Senate version of the foreign operations appropriations bill included the presidents full request of $72 million in the Nonproliferation Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs Account, the House version of the bill unfortunately cuts the presidents request by 22% to $56 million. We urge you to fund the program at the Senates level. Humanitarian demining is a critical first step for reconstruction of post-conflict countries. The U.S. governments humanitarian mine action program assists selected countries in relieving human suffering and in developing an indigenous mine action capability. By helping to remove lingering remnants of war, U.S. assistance allows refugees to return home, land to be used for farming, and critical infrastructure to be rebuilt. The U.S. has consistently been the worlds strongest financial supporter of humanitarian mine action, providing almost $800 million dollars to 46 countries or territories since 1993. We urge Congress to maintain U.S. leadership in this area by fulfilling the presidents pledge and providing $72 million to this essential life-saving program.
Congress = Normal Means for Peace Corps

Congress appropriates the budget for Peace Corps Tarnoff 2005 (Specialist in Foreign Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, The Peace Corps, Current Issues, October 19, http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/05oct/RS21168.pdf)
In each year from FY2003 to FY2005, Congress appropriated funds $22 million, $51 million, and $84 million, respectively, below the Administration request. Despite these shortfalls in funding, Congress has appeared supportive of continued expansion. The FY2005 foreign operations statement of managers calls for the establishment of new Peace Corps programs in Cambodia and other locations in Asia.
Congress = Normal Means for Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis programs have empirically been funded by Congress Market Wire 2006 (March, Lung Association Urges Congress to Restore Funding to Fight TB, March, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pwwi/is_200603/ai_n16114112) The American Lung Association today called on Congress to reject Administration plans to cut more than $1 million from funding to fight tuberculosis, warning that without stable support for state and local TB control programs, recent declines in the disease may not be maintained. "Funding for TB control is like keeping the New Orleans levees in good repair to prevent flooding. When we let our guard down, the disease predictably moves in and quickly," said Norman H. Edelman, M.D., chief medical officer of the American Lung Association. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that TB cases in the United States reached an all-time low in 2005, but progress toward eliminating the disease is slowing. In 2005, there were 14,093 new TB cases reported, down from the 14,517 cases reported in 2004. The national TB case rate -- 4.8 cases for 100,000 in 2005 -- was the lowest since reporting began in 1953. But the decline of 3.8 percent in the U.S. TB cases from 2004 to 2005 was one of the smallest declines seen in more than a decade. "While progress toward eliminating tuberculosis in the United States is slowing down, federal spending to fight the disease also is decreasing," said Edelman. The federal budget for fiscal year 2006 includes $137.7 million for TB programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) -- a 23 percent decline in the past decade when adjusted for inflation. The Administration's proposed budget for fiscal year 2007 cuts TB funding by $1 million. Additional assessments and rescissions may reduce the 2007 budget by another 2 to 5 percent, or more. Cutting funding by another $1 million or more begins a trend toward disaster," said Edelman. To reverse this trend, the American Lung Association is urging Congress to increase the CDC's TB budget by $115 million, raising it to $252.4 million for fiscal year 2007.
Congress = Normal Means for Blood Diamonds

Congress has empirically passed bills restricting the sale of blood diamonds Campbell 2001 (Greg, Author of Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the Worlds Most Precious Stones; Blood Diamonds; http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/ diamonds.html
Despite many meetings, the panel failed to reach a consensus on how to end the trade in blood diamonds. The U.S. Congress, too, faced intense lobbying. In 2000, Rep. Tony Hall (D-Ohio) introduced the Clean Diamond Act, a bill that sought to enact into law whatever import and export controls the Kimberley Process would adopt. The bill languished because of serious concerns over provisions added at the request of the Bush administration thataccording to NGOs, the industry, and some senators fatally compromised the bill. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, along with a blistering Washington Post investigation by Doug Farrah into Al Qaeda's large purchases of Sierra Leone diamonds, raised the stakes. While associating with bloodthirsty rebels was a formidable PR challenge for the diamond industry, funding the terrorists who attacked the U.S. was simply unspinnable. Last November, the Kimberley Process agreed to a set of regulations that would require that all cross-border diamond transactions be accompanied by a non-forgeable paper trail, indicating when and where every imported stone was discovered. The Clean Diamond Act followed suit and was passed by the House of Representatives 408- 6. It is currently awaiting a vote in the Senate.
Congress = Normal Means for Debt Forgiveness

Congress controls debt relief
Coats 2000 (Roosevelt, Council Member of the Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials, National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials Calls for Debt Cancellation for African Countries, June 8, http://www.africaaction.org/docs00/debt0006.htm) The National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials (NBC-LEO) adopted a resolution at its spring conference calling for active debt cancellation and relief for African countries. The resolution urges full appropriation of President Clinton's request for funding of the Cologne Initiative, an international effort of the G-7 industrialized countries to bring debt relief to highly indebted poor countries. The NBC-LEO resolution comes as Congress appears poised to appropriate only a small portion of the money requested for debt relief. NBC-LEO "requests that poor country debt cancellation be supported by the United States to improve the political and economic development of African countries and improve the lives of African people." The Clinton Administration has proposed a multi-year package for debt relief for the fiscal years 2000-2004 including $320 million for bilateral debt relief and $600 million for multilateral Cologne Initiative debt relief. To date, Congress has done little to support debt cancellation or relief - last year Congress only appropriated $110 million for bilateral debt cancellation and none for multilateral debt relief. The Senate Foreign Operations bill, now before Congress, has only $75 million for all debt relief for FY 2001 compared to the request of $435 million for multilateral debt relief ($210 million for FY 2000 and $225 million for FY 2001). The House Foreign Appropriations Committee, scheduled to take up the matter on June 13, is expected to adopt no more than one-third of the Administration request.
Congress = Normal Means for Desalination

Empirically Congress has been in charge of funding desalination programs
Reuther 2000 (Christopher G, Degree in Environmental Science; Saline Solutions: The Quest for Fresh Water, http://www.ehponline.org/docs/2000/108-2/innovations.html
The groundwork for reverse osmosis ystems and other membrane technologies was largely laid by the U.S. Office of Saline Water and its successor, the U.S. Office of Water Research and Technology, between 1951 and 1981. In 1981, however, Congress cut funding for these programs, and research on desalination membranes moved into the private sector. In 1996, Congress passed funding for the six-year Water Desalination Research and Development Program administered by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), but much of the membrane research taking place in this country remains within companies such as DuPont, Dow FilmTec, and Hydranautics.
Congress = Normal Means for Sudan/Disaster Relief/Famine Prevention

Congress appropriates funding for Sudan, disaster relief, and famine prevention USAID 2006 (International Disaster and Famine Assistance, http://www.usaid.gov/policy /budget/cbj2006/idfa.html)
The International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) account is the lead account for responses by the U.S. Government to non-food disasters in foreign countries. The funding for most of these USAID disaster responses is managed by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). In recent years, there has been a succession of disasters which have led to supplemental appropriations in the IDFA account. In FY 2003, Afghanistan and Iraq required substantial disaster assistance. In FY 2004, Liberia and Sudan received special funding ($200 million and $20 million, respectively) through the supplemental appropriations for Iraq. Most of the $200 million for Liberia was budgeted by USAID's Bureau for Africa, and is explained in more detail in the Africa section of the CBJ, as is an additional $70 million provided for Sudan in FY 2004 through the FY 2005 appropriations legislation for the Department of Defense. The $20 million Sudan funding has addressed two major disasters - the problems arising from the war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese people in the southern part of the country, and the requirements arising from the crisis in Darfur in the western part. IDFA funding in response to the needs in Sudan has been split three ways, with some of the funding transferred to the U.S. Department of State for peace- keeping operations in Darfur, and the rest of the funding divided between the Africa and DCHA Bureaus. Beginning in FY 2004, famine prevention and relief assistance was added to the account as a separate component. In FY 2004, $19.882 million was obligated by the USAID mission in Ethiopia for famine prevention activities. This is explained in more detail in the Africa section of the CBJ. For FY 2005, the Congress has appropriated $484.9 million in IDFA funding. Of this, $197.3 million has been budgeted for Sudan, including Darfur. Another $153.4 million will be used by the DCHA Bureau for general disaster response purposes. The $34.2 million famine prevention and relief funds for FY 2005 are currently being programmed in line with the Administration's guidelines that the funds seek innovative, catalytic opportunities and not be guaranteed to the same activity from one year to the next. The final component consists of $100 million in supplemental funding which the Congress appropriated in response to the disasters caused by hurricanes and tropical storms in the Caribbean region. The FY 2006 request for $655.6 million for IDFA also consists of four components. First there is the traditional component for responding to disasters around the world. This request for $235.5 million will be administered by OFDA. The next component ($100 million) is being requested for activities in Sudan as implementation of peace-related activities continues. The third component, $20 million for famine prevention and relief, is a contingency fund intended to mitigate or prevent famine, subject to White House concurrence. The final component consists of a request for $300 million for cash food aid to permit USAID to provide assistance in the most timely and efficient manner to the most critical emergency food crises. This assistance will be used in those instances where the rapid use of funds is critical to saving lives; such assistance may consist of purchasing food locally
Congress = Normal Means for Endangered Species

Congress has passed laws regarding the conservation of endangered species in the past Phillips 1998 (Mark, Biologist with the FWS Office of Management Authority; African Elephant Conservation Act; March, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ASV/is_1998_ March/ai_54023088)
In response to this alarming trend, Congress passed the African Elephant Conservation Act (AECA) in 1988. It provides two important mechanisms: (1) a review of African elephant conservation programs in each range country and a moratorium on the importation of ivory from any country that fails to maintain an adequate elephant conservation program, and (2) a grant program to support research, conservation, management, and protection of African elephants.
Congress = Normal Means for Forestry

Previous attempts at solving international deforestation have required approval by Congress
Edie.net 2000 (February 11, US proposes increased funding to protect worlds forests and biodiversity, http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=2323)
The global forest protection initiative, 'Greening the Globe', would cost the US $150 million, up from $80 million dollars this year. The initiative aims to help developing countries preserve irreplaceable forests. If approved by the US Congress, Greening the Globe would provide training and technical assistance to developing countries; support the exchange of debt for forest preservation schemes; protect endangered tropical species; and build the first complete set of satellite imagery tracking forest loss worldwide (see related story). Only half the tropical forests that stood in 1800 survive today. Tropical forests continue to disappear at a rate of more than 20ha a minute as a result of illegal logging, government logging subsidies and deliberate burning to clear land for agriculture. At present rates, most remaining tropical forests could be lost over the coming century. The bulk of the Greening the Globe's money will be spent on tropical forest and biodiversity conservation programmes through the US Agency for International Development (USAID). $100 million is proposed during 2001 (up from $62 million in FY 2000) to help developing countries across Latin America, Africa and Asia address the causes of deforestation and increase forest conservation and park protection activities. Projects include: Improvement in the management of the Indonesia's dwindling tropical forests, which are home to over 10 percent of the world's primate species and among of the most biologically diverse in the world. This initiative will enable USAID to expand its support of local forest management efforts, and will promote forest-friendly policies and agricultural practices. Indonesia is the world's leading exporter of tropical timber. Its forests face significant threats from logging, the conversion of natural forests to palm oil plantations and slash-and-burn agriculture. The expansion of efforts to conserve national parks like Bolivia's Madidi National Park in the Amazon. The Madidi National Park is considered to be the world's most biologically diverse national park, with 1,200 species of birds, nearly twice the total bird species breeding in the continental US. The initiative will allow USAID to work with conservation organisations, local park managers, and communities in many of these parks to address deforestation The enhancement of USAID partnerships with conservation organisations and governments to help African countries strengthen their national protected areas and promote conservation-based economic development. The funding of debt relief schemes designed to save forests. The US has increased funding for debt relief schemes under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) to $37 million. The US would grant reduction of debt owed by developing countries when they commit to invest local currency in conservation of tropical forests and promote economic reform. Interest payments on remaining debt will be channelled into local currency funds supporting tropical forest conservation programmes. Priority countries include Bangladesh, Peru, and the Philippines. Protection of endangered species: $3 million for US Fish and Wildlife Service International Biodiversity Conservation programmes to help conserve wildlife and protect global biodiversity. A programme led by NASA and USAID to use satellite imagery to compile the comprehensive maps of the world's tropical forests
Congress = Normal Means for Child Soldier Laws

Congress has already passed resolutions condemning child soldiers Capodaglio 1999 (Stefania, Ruth Floyd Intern for Human Rights at the foundations Santa Barbara Headquarters, Stop using Child Soldiers, December, http://www.wagingpeace.org /articles/1999/12/00_capodaglio_child-soldiers.htm)
Despite this, a gleam of hope has started to light the path towards change. The US Congress has already passed a resolution (S.Con.Res.72) introduced by Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN), which condemns the use of child soldiers, calls for greater support for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for ex-child soldiers, and urges the US not to block a ban on the participation of children under 18 in the armed forces. The resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on November 10, 1999.

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2007

1 Executive Order and Non-delegation CPs

Executive Order and Non-delegation Index

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Executive Order Shell

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Executive Order Shell

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Economic decline leads to nuclear war

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A2: Perm Do Both

Congress will use riders to limit presidential power Devins 00

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A2: Perm Do Both

The perm risks rollback riders Higgs 88

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A2: Perm Do Both

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A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings

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A2: Congressional Funding/Purse Strings

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A2: Court Rollback

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A2: Court Rollback

Courts defer to the president Mayer, professor of political science, 02

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A2: Congressional Rollback

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A2: Congressional Rollback

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A2: Congressional Rollback

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No Roll Back- Agencies

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A2: President Does Not Have Authority

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