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12-117784 2012
CIBC World Markets does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. See "Important Disclosures" section at the end of this report for important required disclosures, including potential conflicts of interest. See "Price Target Calculation" and "Key Risks to Price Target" sections at the end of this report, or at the end of each section hereof, where applicable.
CIBC World Markets Inc., P.O. Box 500, 161 Bay Street, Brookfield Place, Toronto, Canada M5J 2S8 (416) 594-7000
Table Of Contents
Executive Summary.................................................................................. 3 The Future Of North American Energy.Too Much Of A Good Thing Is Bad...... 12 Bottoms UpIntroducing The New CIBC Bottoms-Up Shale Model ............ 12 The U.S. Energy Renaissance ................................................................... 14 Background & Recent Trends................................................................. 14 Astonishing Shale Growth ................................................................ 14 Non-resource Play Production In Steep Decline ..................................... 18 Resource Play Trends ........................................................................ 20 Key U.S. Growth Plays ......................................................................... 23 The Eagle Soars.. ........................................................................... 25 Hayneville A Has Been? ..................................................................... 31 Marcellus The Beast In The East: Activity Moderating Somewhat But Still Going Hard ...................................................................................... 36 Bakken Booming ............................................................................ 41 Other Plays ...................................................................................... 45 Lots Of Activity On Emerging Resource Plays ........................................ 47 Allocating Capital Comparative Economics ............................................ 50 Where To From Here U.S. Resource Play Growth Forecasts ..................... 52 Scenario 1 Growth & Current Rig Counts ........................................... 53 Impact Of Emerging Plays, Long-term Fleet Expansion & Efficiency Gains.. 55 Scenario 3 Introducing Volatility & Pricing Impact With Monte Carlo Simulation ....................................................................................... 58 Key Takeaways ................................................................................... 62 GOM Shelf Declines But Deep Production Should Rebound In 2014-16 Time Frame................................................................................................ 65 Canadian Resource Play Growth............................................................. 67 Resource Play Development Canadian Style ....................................... 67 Canadian Tight Oil Through Inflection Point .......................................... 68 Canadian Natural Gas A Different Picture.............................................. 70 Canada Vs. The U.S. ......................................................................... 72 Allocating Capital Where Does The Canadian Resource Play Dollar Go?... 75 New Plays Could Lead To Eagle Ford-esque NGL Boom ........................... 76 Six Key Plays In Canada To Watch ...................................................... 76 Where To From Here Canadian Resource Play Growth ............................ 83 Key Takeaways For Canadian Resource Plays ........................................ 83 Oil Sands Vast Resource But Can It Compete?....................................... 86 Growth Plans Vs. Pipeline Constraints .................................................. 86 Labor Pains ...................................................................................... 88 Prices/Costs & Pipelines Will Rationalize DevelopmentIt Is Only A Matter Of How Far .......................................................................................... 89 Oil Sands Higher Cost Projects The First To Fall In A Competitive North American Market .............................................................................. 91 Oil Sands Are Down But Not Out Technology Optionality Is Still Large.... 92 Conclusions/Takeaways On Oil Sands Growth ....................................... 92 Impact Of North American Tight Oil Renaissance On Global Supply Demand Balances ............................................................................................ 94 High North American Growth Likely To Loosen Medium-term Oil Balances . 94 Impact Of Crude Renaissance On North American Regional Pricing.............. 97 Crude Glut Means Canada + PADD 2 Crudes Will See Excess Volatility & Periodic Discounting Through 2014...................................................... 98 Discounting Of North American Crudes Likely To Remain Long Term But Discounting Shifts To LLS Vs. Brent ................................................... 100 Canada Will Need Big Pipe Build To Escape Long-term Discounting......... 105 Oil Supply/Demand Balances Key Takeaways...................................... 114 North American Natural Gas Supply/Demand Balances............................ 116 Demand Drivers ............................................................................. 116 Supply/Demand Balances Tighter Markets Ahead .............................. 122 Takeaways From Natural Gas Supply Demand Balances........................ 125 Investment Conclusions...................................................................... 126
Executive Summary
We believe this is one of the most detailed reports of this kind, analyzing trends from 57,000 wells across 28 different North American resource plays.
In an effort to better forecast North American natural gas, natural gas liquids (NGL) and oil supply, we are introducing the CIBC Bottoms-Up North American Resource Play Model. Our analysis, as the name implies, is a bottoms-up approach looking at each of the major U.S. and Canadian resource plays (resource plays includes shales/tight resource plays and oil sands). We believe this is one of the most detailed reports of this kind, analyzing trends from 57,000 wells across 28 different North American resource plays. This model is a powerful tool for forecasting North American oil and natural gas deliverability.
Industry Cant Support Gas AND Oil Boom At Same Time: What has become abundantly clear through this report is that the U.S. industry has been running at very close to full utilization over the past 12 months. Within the full utilization, there has been a clear shift from gas to oil. However, what this also implies is that there is no way the industry can either fund or logistically support a boom in natural gas AND oil drilling when services are running at near full utilization, rigs will be allocated on the basis of returns and strategic value (primarily land retention). Liquids Lands25,000-40,000 Wells Needed To Hold New Oil Lands Leaves Little Flexibility To Move Rigs: Using an assumption of 1.0-1.5 wells to hold a section of land, implies the need to drill over 26,000-39,000 wells on new liquids plays to meet land commitments (generally within a three- to fiveyear time frame) an aggressive requirement. Overall, we believe the U.S. is in the early innings of a new land retention driven boom, this time focused on new liquids plays. What this means for gas prices is that, even if gas prices rise, producers are more likely to use the incremental cash flows to accelerate drilling on liquids plays (to meet commitments) rather than accelerate on dry gas plays where they already hold the majority of their lands. US E&Ps Addicted To Spending; More JVs Necessary To Meet Obligations: The Top 40 U.S. E&Ps that we track have outspent cash flow by $55 billion since the start of 2008. The gap has been funded by equity, debt and JVs. Since the start of 2008, we have seen $32 billion of JV announcements ($14 billion of upfront carry delivered). With current consensus capex for the U.S. Top 40 exceeding cash flow estimates by $26 billion (for 2012 and 2013), it is clear we will need to see substantial JV announcements to keep the party going. Recent JV announcements indicate the market is still open to such transactions but this could be at risk if macro conditions deteriorate. Warning To Regulators Changes In Frac Legislation Would Send U.S. Energy Renaissance Back To The Dark Ages: The biggest risk (albeit still quite remote) that we see to the development of unconventional resources is harsh changes to fraccing rules. We calculate declines on U.S. resource plays to be running in the 36% range, implying ~10 Bcfe/d of production additions per year just to offset declines. With high drilling activity, there will no problem keeping ahead of this curve, however, if there were any major changes to fraccing legislation (which would drop activity levels meaningfully), the U.S. energy renaissance would quickly return to the dark ages.
Key Canadian liquids plays we believe will drive growth include the Cardium, Tight Carbonates, and the Duvernay, while key Canadian natural gas plays to drive growth include the Montney, Deep Basin, and the Horn River. Canadian resource play economics are competitive with U.S. plays, as is the depth of Canadian development opportunities. Canadian dry gas plays are pretty far down the value chainbut LNG will still yield meaningful development. We expect that labor and services capacity in Canada will continue to be periodic bottlenecks, with the most notable required infrastructure builds including LNG export capacity on the West Coast as well as the Northern Gateway oil pipeline. We believe differences in land tenure are one of the reasons why development has been slower in Canada compared to the U.S. At least on the oil side of the equation, much of the rights to prospective tight oil acreage was already held by production when horizontal multi-stage fraccing rejuvenated the sector (i.e., operators producing from either the same zone or deeper zones were already holding the rights of emerging resource plays). With rights held by production in many cases (and in other cases held on five-year tenure with the government) operators in Canada have been able to afford a more measured pace of development compared to the U.S. As has already begun, we expect foreign capital will continue to flow into Canada to help fill the funding deficit faced in the development of and attractive set of resource play opportunities. This is a necessary factor for accelerated development in Canada, as for many Canadian operators capital is less accessible than it is for their American peers.
very low. If neither of these lines go ahead, oil sands growth targets for 2020 (company forecasts) would have to be rationalized approximately 1.7 MMBbls/d from current levels. Lower Cost SAGD Projects Competitive With Tight Oil: Oil sands resource quality is by no means homogenous. We calculate supply costs for higher-quality (lower-cost) SAGD projects to be in the $50-$60/Bbl range and very competitive with many North American tight oil opportunities. The only disadvantage is the bigger upfront investment (a typical SAGD project is a $1 billion decision vs. being able to manage capital well by well), which means operators need to be that much more confident in the macro environment. We continue to believe that we will see aggressive development of low-cost SAGD resources. Higher Cost SAGD & Mining Projects Likely First To Be Rationalized: In a market that is oversaturated with oil, there will no doubt be rationalization and the first projects to get squeezed will be those with higher supply costs and a riskier capital profile. Mining projects and lower-quality SAGD projects have supply costs in the $70-$90/Bbl range vs. most tight oil plays in the $50$70/Bbl range, leaving these project types as the first to be rationalized in a competitive market. Technology Impact Could Still Make Oil Sands More Competitive: There is unprecedented R&D going on in the oil sands, aimed at improving the economics and environmental footprint. Technologies range from evolutionary to revolutionary and any success could have a meaningful impact on supply costs similar to how frac technology changed the game for tight oil. Oil sands continue to offer a significant free option on technology. Oil Sands Transaction Parameters Will Reflect Riskier Outlook: Back in the 2005-2008 time frame, typical deals for long-dated oil sands resource were about US$1/Bbl. Despite higher oil prices, transaction parameters have actually been declining as risks (inflation/pipe) weigh on the outlook for resource and there is more competition for oil capital (tight oil vs. oil sands). Overall, we believe there is still room for oil sands M&A but likely continuing the recent trend of sub US$1/Bbl parameters.
Canada & PADD 2 Discounts To Remain Through 2014: We continue to believe Canadian and PADD 2 crudes will remain very susceptible to discounting through the 2014/15 time frame (when both the full Keystone XL and Flanagan/Seaway is built). PADD 2, and pipe within PADD 2, are at capacity meaning any pipeline curtailment or refinery outage will lead to meaningful discounts. Once the aforementioned pipes are built, we should see Canadian crudes settle into a transportation discount vs. WTI and Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS). PADD 2 Problems Will Soon Turn To PADD 3 Problems: PADD 3 is already nearly awash in light sweet crude (Eagle Ford, etc.). When Seaway and the south portion of Keystone XL come on-stream, PADD 2 will be sending over 1 MMBbls/d of crude into this market (a good portion of that being light) fully saturating the market. As it is prohibited by law to export crude oil from the U.S., this means that PADD 3 will become a trapped market for light oil and will soon lead to discounting of LLS to Brent. We Estimate WTI-Brent In US$10/Bbl Range Long Term: We recently changed our oil price forecasts to reflect a US$10/Bbl discount of WTI vs. Brent from 2014 onward, which consists of a US$5/Bbl discount for LLS-Brent plus ~US$5/Bbl transport differential back to Cushing. Downstream Remains Key: Our view that WTI-Brent differentials will remain long term in the $10/Bbl range also implies that inland North American refiners, and even Gulf Coast refiners, will see sustainably high crack spreads. We believe most investors are still treating current crack spreads (in the $30/Bbl range) as supernormal and will revert back to the $10/Bbl range in 2014+. If we are correct in our view on differentials, investors will gradually begin to place greater value on downstream assets to recognize the higher sustainable cash flows and strategic value of these assets. No Crude Is Untouched By This Theme: Generally speaking, there will be strong desire for Canadian heavy crudes by PADD 3 refiners, but this by no means is meant to imply that WCS has a reserved spot in the PADD 3 refinery system. Complex heavy refiners can (and will) take light oil over heavy for the right price leading to competition for this coveted refinery space. Directionally we believe WCS pricing is less impacted by this theme, but still impacted nonetheless as it is weighed down to a certain degree by pricing on the light complex. Canadian Crudes Should Be Transportation Discounts - But Only If Pipe Is Built: If adequate pipeline capacity is built, Canadian crudes should trade at transportation costs vs. U.S. equivalent crudes (SCO vs. WTI and WCS vs. Maya with slight quality adjustment). If pipeline capacity is not built, then Canadian prices will move to discounts large enough to eliminate much of the anticipated demand growth a disastrous scenario for Canadian producers. Whats The TAN Man? How Western Canada Select (WCS) or Access Western Blend (AWB)/Christina Lake Blend (CLB) gets priced vs. Maya is still a bit of a question mark. WCS and AWB are very similar in terms of API and sulphur content but have much higher TAN, particularly AWB. Globally, higher TAN can have a big impact on pricing, which may mean WCS and AWB get slightly bigger discounts than many investors presume. Our modeling suggests the quality differentials vs. Maya could be in the $4.75/Bbl range for WCS and up to $8/Bbl for AWB/CLB. Canadian Pipeline Pinch-point Closer Than Many Think: Pipeline capacity out of Western Canada is the biggest risk to Western Canadian producers in the medium and long term. We believe pipeline capacity could effectively be full in the 2014 time frame, highlighting that there is no room for error/politicking in bringing on new pipeline capacity.
Time To Smoke The Peace Pipe: There are currently ~2.9 MMBbls/d of longhaul pipeline proposals on the table (out of Western Canada). That sounds like a lot until one considers that two of the largest (the proposed 525,000 Bbls/d Gateway and 450,000 Bbls/d TMX expansion through B.C.) face ever-increasing political risk and we assign no better than 50/50 odds that these pipes are built before the end of the decade. The proposed TransCanada Mainline conversion (estimated ~600,000 Bbls/d) is compelling but very early stage and could also provoke some political backlash in Quebec. We also note that the 2.9 MMBbls/d proposed capacity gets used up quickly given our view of 100,000 Bbls/d per year growth in Canadian conventional oil and 230,000 Bbls/d per year growth in oil sands (or ~300,000 Bbls/d when blended). Overall, Canada needs pipe and lots of it to avoid the opportunity cost of stranding over a million barrels a day of potential crude oil growth. Rail Offers Good Insurance Policy: Railing oil today from Canada or PADD 2 offers a meaningful improvement in netbacks due to the premium of LLS to WTI. If our view of differentials is correct (i.e., that WTI-LLS closes to transportation differentials) but that LLS discounts vs. Brent, the economic advantage to railing will dissipate by the 2014 time frame if pipelines are built. Given the big risk on pipeline builds, we expect producers to maintain rail optionality even if the economic uplift is mitigated. If PADD 3 pricing significantly discounts vs. Brent (i.e., over $5/Bbl), we could see railed volumes focus more towards PADD 1 from the current focus of PADD 3.
2013-14 Nat Gas Balances Look Quite Tight: We expect Western Canadian gas exports to decline ~0.5 Bcf/d in 2013 and ~0.3 Bcf/d in 2014. Meanwhile, U.S. dry gas production should be relatively flat in 2013/14 (the first time in many years). This lower supply outlook points to a much tighter gas market in 2013/14. However, the one cautionary point is that if prices rise much above $4/Mcf in 2013, we may give back a meaningful portion of the ~4.5 Bcf/d Y/Y demand increase for natural gas for coal substitution. The other wild card is whether or not a rally back to the $4/Mcf range attracts a big increase in dry gas drilling. We believe producers will be relatively slow to return to natural gas drilling due to a combination of land retention drilling commitments on new liquids plays and skepticism over sustainability of any price increase. Gas Prices Unsustainably Low: The clear takeaway from our modeling (both the linear models and the simulation models) indicates that the current natural gas rig count and prices are unsustainably low. However, finding equilibrium remains a real balancing act. Based on our Monte Carlo simulation, at gas prices below $4/Mcf vs. oil in the $85-$95/Bbl range, we see insufficient gas growth to meet base case demand growth. On the other hand, above $6/Mcf triggers too much growth (unless oil prices are substantially higher as well). Overall, prices in the $4-$4.50/Mcf range seem sustainable in the pre-LNG era (i.e., up to 2015) with prices in the $5/Mcf in the LNG era.
Investment Conclusions
Global Investors Likely To Remain Luke Warm On Canada Due To Pricing/Infrastructure Risk: Global investors have generally been moving away from Canadian oil & gas exposure for many reasons. Generally speaking this decision is driven by a combination of macro fears (Greece, Spain, China slowing) along with fears regarding short-term differential risk for Canadian oil producers. With the dismal stock performance YTD in the Canadian large caps, one could argue that much of our macro thesis is already discounted in stock prices which is generally true. However, the general negative backdrop with increasingly limited growth visibility and rising pipeline/differential risk means that global investors are unlikely to flock back to Canadian oil and gas exposure anytime soon unless we see the recent flurry of M&A turn into a full blown wave (possible). Some Big Players May Adjust Strategies: If our macro view pans out, it will (or should) impact investment decisions by producers. The most likely adjustment will be to those planning mega projects such as upgraders or mining oil sands projects. We expect operators to move more cautiously on these projects, with a high chance of outright cancellation. On the one hand, lower growth is a negative. However, we believe investors have compressed valuations on many of these stocks due to concerns regarding low return investment. On balance, we actually believe investors would react favorably to large-cap producers moving to lower growth, but higher returning and higher free cash flow yielding strategies. For example, we can make a case that Suncor (SU-SO) would be worth 40%-50% more if it moved to a slower and more SAGD-oriented strategy and paid out excess free cash. Negative Backdrop For Long-dated Oil Sands: Much of our macro thesis is very bearish for the value of long-dated bitumen assets. As we highlighted, producer growth forecasts are wildly optimistic and we believe there will be big competition for pipe access and resources to build projects which leaves the longer-dated more fringe resources at a distinct disadvantage. Additionally, investors will likely remain much more cautious on providing the necessary capital for those growth ambitions, meaning that early-stage oil sands companies will face far more execution risk than better financed players. Value can still be obtained/recognized for long-dated resource, but this depends more on M&A or JV activity.
Downstream Value Becomes Very Apparent: Our macro view clearly favors companies with downstream assets. In Canada, there are no pure refiners so this by default means that integrated energy companies [Suncor, Cenovus (CVESO), Husky (HSE-SP) and Imperial Oil (IMO-SU)] are best positioned. The rationale is that in-land refineries capture much of the value of lower upstream pricing. We have seen the integrateds outperform PADD 2 exposed names YTD indicating that some of this theme is already reflected in share prices. However, we believe investor expectations are still generally that current downstream cash flows are supernormal and will revert to low levels again in 2014+. We believe that downstream cash flows will remain robust over the long term and that is not reflected in share prices. We highlight Suncor and Cenovus as two of the best positioned integrateds. Good Opportunity Still In Quality Gas Producers: For the first time in many years, the outlook for natural gas prices looks quite attractive. With tightening storage balances in 2013/14 and a rig count that will likely be slow to return to gas drilling, gas prices should move into the US$4/Mcf range in 2013. We note that some gas players like Encana (ECA-SP) are already reflecting ~US$4.50/Mcf natural gas so much of the upside is already built in. However, we still see good upside in some of the smaller-/mid-cap gas names. Among the dividend-paying corps, our top two ways to play natural gas include Trilogy (TET-SO) and Peyto (PEY-SO) with Trilogy as the more defensive gas play (due to its 45% liquids weighting) and Peyto as a higher torque gas pick (88% weighted to gas). In the junior/intermediate space, Celtic (CLT-SO) and Painted Pony (PPY-SO) are our top gas-weighted names. Both companies offer investor meaningful torque to gas prices as they control substantial resource potential from large contiguous land positions. We also highlight NuVista (NVA-SO) as another gasweighted pick for its undervalued asset base with 500 drilling locations identified in the Wapiti Montney liquids-rich gas play that is a strong M&A candidate. In addition, we believe the companys shares are trading inexpensively relative to its natural gas peers as measured by Core NAV (P+P reserves value). Light Oil Players Will See Lower-than-expected Pricing But Low-cost Players Will Still Make Very Strong Returns: Our thesis of lower light oil pricing will take some of the shine off domestic light oil producers. However, we note that producers with low costs and high-quality resources will continue to prosper (although consensus numbers may be overstated if our macro view holds). Light oil companies with high cost structures and high capital obligations such as Canadian Oil Sands (COS-SU) (opex in US$40/Bbl range with sustaining capex in the ~US$30/Bbl range through 2014) will see many challenges in this environment.
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Top Picks
Large Caps: Among the large caps, we continue to focus on Brent-focused producers and integrateds as our top picks. In order of preference, we highlight Suncor (inexpensive with high-quality downstream), Cenovus (highest quality oil sands and well positioned with downstream) and Talisman (TLM-SO) (turnaround story, gas assets will get re-rated if prices recover and enough Brent-priced growth projects in Colombia and Asia that will interest investors). Small- To Mid-cap Oil Sands: From a macro perspective, it is more challenging to get excited about the small- to mid-cap oil sands producers, however, we continue to highlight MEG Energy (MEG-SO) (innovative and one of lowest cost resources bases) and Athabasca Oil (ATH-SO). We remain positive on ATH primarily because we see it reducing oil sands exposure and believe the light oil assets will drive remaining value in short term. Dividend-paying Corps: Our top picks in this space include our highest netback domestic light oil producers such as PetroBakken (PBN-SO) (whose margins are better protected in a downside scenario in which crude oil sees pressure). We would also highlight Trilogy as a top pick owing to its strong growth profile and its ability to fund its development (and pay its dividend) within cash flow. Small And Mid Caps: Our top pick is Angle Energy (NGL-SO) as it offers exposure to a high netback Cardium oil play at Harmattan, which has become the largest focus area for the company. We highlight that the corporate liquids have increased from 39% at the end of 2010 to 46% projected for Q4/12. We also expect large year-end reserve growth associated with the active drilling program in Harmattan and area. International Producers: Our two top picks in the international producer space are Coastal Energy (CEN-SO) and Gran Tierra Energy (GTE-SO). Both companies produce over 90% high netback oil that track to Brent pricing. CEN has a strong balance sheet, good free cash flow generation from its producing properties and significant upside potential with booked P3, 2C and prospective resources. GTE trades at a 20% discount to its 2P NAV but has a surplus of cash on its balance sheet, is expected to generate free cash flow in 2013 and has an active H2/12 planned with potential for significant catalysts.
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Play Averages Vs. Select Producer Averages: In most U.S. plays, there are a large number of companies participating. Our data reflects the average of all wells drilled, not just a few select producers. In the appendices to this report, we break out factors such as IP by operator and by county so investors can see the variations. In most cases, the top operators (by size) typically do have meaningfully higher IP rates than the play average. Data Quality Varies: With any primary analysis such as this, you are at the mercy of data quality and data quality varies considerably by province or state. Overall, Canadian data quality is very high and very timely. Of the bigger plays in the U.S., we find data from North Dakota, Texas, Louisiana to be very high quality (covering Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Permian plays, etc.). On the weaker end of the spectrum lies Oklahoma (Anadarko plays, parts of the Mississippi lime). On the scale of inexcusably bad lies Pennsylvania, where data is released only once every six months for the Marcellus and even then only for a cumulative basis (i.e., no monthly production). Given the importance of the Marcellus, we were forced to take a different tact and rely on overall Marcellus gas production from Bentek, and back into type curves base on rates and wells completed.
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50,000
40,000
30,000
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford
20,000
10,000
Q1/08 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12
14
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford
1,000,000
500,000
Q1/08 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12
Source for Exhibits 2 and 3: HPDI and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Gas growth from 2008-2011 was led by the Haynesville & Marcellus. However, Haynesville growth is now giving way to the Eagle Ford as the other main gas driver. Oil growth has come from a renewed focus on the Permian basin as well as major growth from the Eagle Ford and Bakken.
As depicted above, the shale gas game changes quickly. In Q1/11, the Haynesville dethroned the Barnett as the largest producing shale in North America astonishing given the Haynesville was really only commercialized in 2008. However, Haynesville growth is stalling out as of late as the industry shifts rigs from this prolific but very dry (i.e., low liquids content) plays to higher returning liquids plays such as the Eagle Ford. The charts in Exhibits 4 and 5 depict Y/Y growth trends out of the key U.S. shales. As depicted, the Haynesville has been THE dominant growth driver in U.S. shales but the pace of growth is decelerating rapidly with newer plays such at the Eagle Ford, which by no coincidence enjoys a very high liquids content, picking up the slack. The Marcellus has been a consistent growth driver for a sustained period of time. On the oil side, growth has been more diverse, actually lead by the Permian basin, where production was up 737,000 Bbls/d from Q1/08-Q1/12, followed by the Bakken with production up 509,000 Bbls/d from Q1/08 to Q1/12) and the Eagle Ford where oil and condensate production
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increased 422,000 Bbls/d from Q1/08 to Q1/12 (note that other NGLs are accounted for in extraction losses from marketable gas production). We note, however, that Eagle Ford activity started later than the Bakken, and therefore has accounted for a bigger proportion of the more recent growth. Exhibit 4. Y/Y Changes In Marketable Gas Production By Play
10,000 8,750 7,500 6,250 5,000
Mmcf/d
Q2 /11
Source for Exhibits 4 and 5: HPDI and CIBC World Markets Inc.
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Q1 /12
With the initial stage of the resource play revolution focusing on dry gas plays such as the Haynesville, the natural gas market was quickly overwhelmed and natural gas prices plummeted. The focus over the past two years has gradually moved to liquids-rich gas plays as well as tight oil plays. The big focus on liquids-rich plays, particularly the Eagle Ford in Texas, has led to a boom in U.S. NGL production. As depicted in the following chart, U.S. gas plant production of NGLs (note: some gas liquids such as condensate are typically stripped out at the wellhead and are typically reported as part of the oil production stream above while other NGLs are extracted at natural gas plants) increased 120,000 Bbls/d (7%) in 2009, 164,000 Bbls/d (9%) in 2010 and 110,000 Bbls/d (5%) in 2011 substantial growth. There has been no meaningful shift in the composition of NGLs, with typical gas plant output being ~14% pentanes plus, 41% ethane, 29% propane and 17% butane and isobutene. From a regional perspective, NGL growth has been largest out of PADD 3 driven by the explosion of the Eagle Ford (high liquids content), which has accounted for ~42% of growth from Q1/08-Q1/12. The balance of growth is roughly evenly split from PADD 2 and PADD 3 production. Exhibit 6. U.S. NGL Production By Product
U.S. NGL Production By Type
3,000 2,750 2,500 2,250 2,000 ('000 Bbl/d)
('000 Bbls/d)
2,750 2,500 2,250 2,000 1,750 1,500 1,250 1,000 750 500 250 0
PADD 2 PADD 4
1,750 1,500 1,250 1,000 750 500 250 Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
The big boom in drilling liquids rich gas plays are starting to put very material pressure on NGL processing margins.
Once again, the market is showing efficiency as the big boom in drilling liquids rich gas plays are starting to put very material pressure on NGL processing margins. Despite the recent weakness in NGL prices, we are not yet seeing any slowdown in activity on liquids-rich plays just yet. We expect the U.S. NGL basket to remain weak (i.e., in the 45% range vs. WTI) for the foreseeable future. The specific issues vary by component of the NGL basket but the one commonality is clearly that the rapid growth has overwhelmed local demand and infrastructure. With the exception of ethane, the rest of the NGL basket is increasingly reliant on being exported into the global market as supply growth far eclipses domestic demand growth. Margins for ethane are at rejection levels (where ethane remains in the gas stream) reflecting the lack ethane demand. There is a large backlog of fractionation plants to be built and also for steam crackers (which are the main demand driver to turn ethane into ethylene for chemical uses) but these will only come on-stream progressively. Propane demand remains highly weather dependent and therefore is suffering from the same overhang of a warm winter that is depressing natural gas prices. We expect propane prices to increase seasonally but remain generally weaker than historical ranges given the limited domestic structural growth and continued supply pressures.
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For a more detailed discussion on NGLs, please refer to Appendix page 132. Exhibit 7. NGL Prices U.S. And Canada
$24.00 $22.00 $20.00 $18.00 $16.00 $14.00 $12.00 $10.00 $8.00 $6.00 $4.00 $2.00 $0.00 ($2.00)
Ethane at Mt. Belvieu Butane at Mt. Belvieu Natural Gasoline at Mt. Belvieu Propane at Mt. Belvieu Isobutane at Mt. Belvieu US Basket Price
$24.00 $22.00 $20.00 $18.00 $16.00 $14.00 $12.00 $10.00 $8.00 $6.00 $4.00 $2.00 $0.00 ($2.00)
US$/Mcf
C$/Mcf
Ja n1 Fe 1 b1 Ma 1 r-1 Ap 1 r-1 Ma 1 y-1 Ju 1 n11 Ju l-1 Au 1 g1 Se 1 p1 Oc 1 t-1 No 1 v- 1 De 1 c- 1 Ja 1 n1 Fe 2 b1 Ma 2 r-1 Ap 2 r-1 Ma 2 y-1 Ju 2 n12 Ju l-1 Au 2 g12
Canadian NGL margins, primarily for Butane and Condensate, have generally remained stronger than U.S. margins as Canada has several unique uses for NGLs.
One interesting point on NGLs is that although prices are linked between Canada and the U.S., they can still vary by significant margins. As depicted in the chart above, Canadian NGL margins have generally remained stronger than U.S. margins as Canada has several unique uses for NGLs. The primary difference is the demand within Alberta for condensate to dilute bitumen to pipeline specifications and for butane use as a recovery solvent in the oil sands. The big drivers for these NGLs mean that Alberta still imports large amounts of condensate from the U.S., which typically means that Alberta condensate is priced at a transportation premium to U.S. hubs (and the transportation premiums are large right now). Given the robust growth in outlook for oil sands, we see no change to the trend of increasing condensate and butane demand. In fact, with more producers experimenting with solvent assisted SAGD (SAP or SAGD+ and various other acronyms) butane demand could accelerate well beyond its historical growth. Overall, Canadian NGL pricing has come under pressure but is likely to remain elevated vs. U.S. margins.
Non-shale gas volumes declined 1.1 Bcf/d in 2009 (3%), 1.8 Bcf/d in 2010 (5%) and approximately 1.6 Bcf/d (4.5% in) in 2011. With virtually no rigs drilling conventional gas this trend will continue (or accelerate).
18
n11 Fe b11 Ma r-1 1 Ap r-1 1 Ma y-1 1 Ju n11 Ju l-1 1 Au g11 Se p11 Oc t-1 1 No v- 1 1 De c- 1 1 Ja n12 Fe b12 Ma r-1 2 Ap r-1 2 Ma y-1 2 Ju n12 Ju l-1 2 Au g12
Ja
Non-resource play oil production in the U.S. has been declining approximately 6%/year (~150,000 Bbls/d per year) since 2008.
The oil side of the equation looks very similar to natural gas, albeit with a slightly later starting point. Overall U.S. oil production increased 290,000 Bbls/d in 2009, 292,000 Bbls/d in 200 and a whopping 535,000 Bbls/d in 2011. The recent ramp-up towards 500,000 Bbls/d+ growth is very likely to continue given the continued high growth in oil-weighted rig counts (discussed in more detail in later sections). As highlighted previously, the key driver behind these large oil growth numbers is the boom in resource play production. Resource play production increased 216,000 Bbls/d (25%) in 2009, 354,000 Bbls/d (32%) in 2010 and 610,000 Bbls/d (42%) in 2011, while non-resource play production in the U.S. has been declining approximately 6%/year (~150,000 Bbls/d per year) since 2008.
Exhibit 9. U.S. Oil Resource Play Vs. Non-resource Play Production (Bbls/d)
5,000,000 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 Bbl/d 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 -
19
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
Gas Liquids
The other key takeaway from Exhibit 10 is the big increase in liquids yield as a proportion of the weighted average industry IP rate. With the big uplift in pricing available in liquids, it is no surprise that industry moved aggressively to harness this value so much so that liquids prices have recently come under significant pressure. However, even with the weakness in NGL pricing, the uplift is still meaningful enough for producers to continue to focus on liquids-rich plays.
20
180
180
160
160
140
140
120
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
180
180
160
160
140
140
120
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
Cycle times in the Haynesville (in recent months) and Eagle Ford are starting to show improvement but still have considerable room to improve on average. Bakken and Marcellus cycle times are actually getting longer, likely reflecting the intense (and climbing) activity levels. Based on depth and average completion designs, we believe in an unconstrained market, cycle times for these plays should be able to get down to ~40 days on average an important point to consider as we forecast production growth from these plays.
21
One interesting way to gauge the magnitude of excess capacity is to look at the differences in producing day production for the main plays vs. recorded actual calendar day averages. The difference is not necessarily all production that could be sustained if bottlenecks didnt exist, but it does provide an indication of how much production is being held back by infrastructure bottlenecks, etc. The following chart looks at the producing day vs. calendar day production data for the Eagle Ford and Bakken. As depicted, we have seen a steady increase in producing day production in both plays vs. calendar day, implying that infrastructure bottlenecks are weighing on production up to 100,000 Boe/d or approximately 8% on just these two plays alone.
Exhibit 12. Producing Day Vs. Calendar Day For Bakken & Eagle Ford Indicates ~100,000 Boe/d Held Back
1,400,000 1,300,000 1,200,000 1,100,000 Boe/d 1,000,000 900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000
1 Au g11 Se p11
Ap r-1 1 Ma y-1 1
1 No v-1 1 De c-1 1
-1 1 Fe b11
-1 2 Fe b12
r-1 1
Ju l-1
Oc t-1
Ja n
Ju n
Ja n
Declines On Resource Play Production Running 36% A Big Curve To Keep In Front Of
We forecast resource play decline rates at ~36% for 2012, implying the need for ~10 Bcfe/d of production additions just to offset declines a large undertaking. With such a big decline rate, any harsh changes to fraccing rules would quickly put the US energy renaissance back to the dark ages.
With the big push into high decline horizontal wells, the overall U.S. decline rate remains at very high levels. We calculate actual aggregate declines from the main U.S. shales plays at 34% in 2011 (measured from Q4/10 to Q4/11) and we forecast declines in the 36% range for 2012 (measured from Q4/11 to Q4/12). This implies the need for a large 10 Bcfe/d of production additions just to offset declines from resource plays a large undertaking. Although U.S. declines are steep, the industry has shown that if it sustains high levels of drilling activity that it can still not only offset declines but also grow production in a meaningful way. Given our outlook for reasonably robust commodity prices, we see no imminent risks of drilling not offsetting declines. However, this does highlight the intense volatility that U.S. resource play production does have vs. changes in commodity prices or changes to regulations. The biggest risk to the production outlook in our view is any legislation that bans or imposes undue restriction on fraccing, which is the heart of the U.S. production renaissance. With a decline rate in the 36% range, the shale production profile would quickly turn from a picturesque renaissance to the dark ages.
22
Ma
Ma
r-1 2
-1 1
0.54
0.49
ar ce l lu s
W oo df or d
Hz
Ba rn et t
Aa nd ar ko
23
Ha yn es vi lle
Fa ye t te vi lle
Pe rm ia n
Ea g
Ba kk en
le
Fo rd
Hz
130% 120% 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 2010 Capex 2011 2012e Capex/Cash Flow 2013e Capex/Cash Flow
Up-Front
Drilling Carry
ef (A u
CH K
KW K
CH K
&
CH K
Li
eR oc
ST
&
&
Ch i
&
TO T
BP
PX
&
ER
PD C
&
We believe the JV market is getting riskier given the large number of assets on the market and less certain macro environment.
The key question mark in todays environment is whether or not the large JVs can be counted on for funding? There have been several recent deals [Devon (DVN-NYSE) and Comstock (CRK-NYSE)] still depicting strong desire from external partners to gain North American resource exposure. The risk in our view is that if commodity prices correct once again (it was only a month ago that WTI was in the low US$70s) that external JV partners will become more disciplined at a time when there are huge demands for capital. Such a scenario could have a large impact on drilling activity, particularly in the 2013 time frame given the big funding void that exists.
24
Based on our regression of rig activity vs. oil and natural gas prices over the past few years, the current 2013 commodity strip of ~US$90/Bbl and US$3.75/Mcf natural gas would imply a rig count in the 1,700 range, down ~10% from current levels. Rig activity could remain in the current 1,900 range if sufficient external capital is tapped which is a reasonable assumption today given still robust prices. However, a drop in oil prices down to the US$80/Bbl range with no external capital would argue for a rig count in the 1,500 range.
The Haynesville rig count has declined from its high of 207 rigs down to 45 rigs now whereas the Eagle Ford has picked up all the slack and is now running 258 rigs the highest rig count of any major resource play.
Despite really only ramping up in later 2009, it is remarkable that the Eagle Ford is now producing over 770,000 Boe/d (416,000 Bbls/d of oil and 2.1 Bcf/d of natural gas).
Despite really only ramping up in later 2009, it is remarkable that the Eagle Ford is now producing over 770,000 Boe/d (416,000 Bbls/d of oil and 2.1 Bcf/d of natural gas). The actual liquids weight will be higher than this as well data only includes liquids separated at the well head while other NGLs will be extracted at gas plants. As the rig count continues to grow, the overall growth rate will continue to rise as well, with output in Q1/12 estimate to have been up approximately 500,000 Boe/d vs. Q1/11 and 180,000 Boe/d sequentially.
25
Q/Q Growth
1,000 900 800 700 600 Mboe/d Mmcfe/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
200 Gas Q/Q Production Liquids Q/Q Production 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Boe/d
26
The following charts depict the average IP rates and dispersion of rates for the entire Eagle Ford play.
MMcfe/d
10
80
50
90
60
20
30
00
40
10
70
80
50
20
90 6,2
37 0
74 0
1,1
1,8
2,9
1,4
3,7
2,2
2,5
4,8
3,3
5,5
4,0
4,4
5,1
5,9
The Eagle Ford is unique vs. many of the other shale plays in that the play has very large and very well defined windows for crude, liquids-rich gas and dry natural gas. The following map depicts the rough contour of each window based on observed liquids yields. While the bulk of activity has clearly been in the liquids window (68% of 2011 wells were drilled in oil window, 14% in liquidsrich or transitional window and 18% into the dry gas window see Appendix page 160), we are starting to see activity pick up in the liquids-rich part of the play as well.
Permian
TEXAS
Gonzales
Atascosa
Wilson
MEXICO
Webb McMullen
Live Oak
Major Producers
1 Dry Gas 2 Wet Gas 3 Crude Oil
27
6,6
60
Exhibit 20. Eagle Ford Drilling By Portion Of The Play (Eagle Ford Reconciliation)
100% 90% 80% Pct Of Wells Drilled 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Gas Window Q4/11
Oil Window
Source: HPDI and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Liquids Window
Supply Costs
The following charts depict supply costs for the Eagle Ford at todays costs. As depicted, the average Eagle supply cost of US$60/Bbl with top-quartile wells breaking even at US$50/Bbl and lower-quartile results breaking even at US$70/Bbl. Break-evens vary as to whether or not a well is in the oil or liquidsrich gas windows. Liquids-rich wells hit break-even returns at approximately US$60/Bbl with a US$5/Mcf gas price (assuming NGL prices at 45% of WTI) or ~US$70/Bbl with a US$4.50/Mcf gas price. Exhibit 21. Eagle Ford Economics (All Wells)
IRR - % 50%
40% 30% 20% 10% 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60 $7.00 $6.00 $5.00
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
28
120%
100%
80%
IRR - % 60%
40% $7.00 $6.00 20% $5.00 $4.00 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
Exhibit 23. Eagle Ford Wet Gas Economics (NGLs 45% Of WTI)
IRR - % 25%
20% 15% 10% 5% 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60 $7.00 $6.00 $5.00
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
29
Growth Projections
At current rig counts with static efficiencies we could see the Eagle Ford growing to the 2.0 MMBoe/d range (1.2 MMBbls/d of light oil and 4.8 Bcf/d of natural gas) by 2016 and 2.6 MMBoe/d (1.6 MMBbls/d of light oil and 6.1 Bcf/d of natural gas) by 2020.
The following charts depict growth scenarios out of the Eagle Ford. Our base case view is based on current rig counts while low and high scenarios vary rig counts up/down by 20% from current levels (alternatively, the low and high cases can be thought of as a 20% improvement/decrease in rig productivity/drilling efficiency). As depicted, at current rig counts with static efficiencies we could see the Eagle Ford growing to the 2.0 MMBoe/d range (1.2 MMBbls/d of light oil and 4.8 Bcf/d of natural gas) by 2016 and 2.6 MMBoe/d (1.6 MMBbls/d of light oil and 6.1 Bcf/d of natural gas) by 2020. With a 20% improvement in efficiency OR a 20% improvement rig count, we could see the Eagle Ford reach 2.3 MMBoe/d by 2016 and 3.1 MMBoe/d by 2020.
Wells Drilled
2,500 High Base Low
2,000
1,000
3,333 High Base Low 3,000 2,667 2,333 2,000 1,667 1,333 1,000 667 333 0 Mboe/d
30
From a Q1/08 average of only ~130 MMcfe/d, the play averaged ~7,500 MMcfe/d in Q4/11, making up approximately 11% of total U.S. gas supply.
We estimate that Q1/12 was the first quarter of declines in the Haynesville with our calculations indicating average output of 7.3 Bcfe/d, down approximately 0.3 Bcfe/d (3%) from Q4/11
Q/Q Growth
1,595 1,450 1,305 1,160 1,015 Mmcfe/d Mboe/d 870 725 580 435 290 145 0 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
200 Gas Q/Q Production Liquids Q/Q Production 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Boe/d
31
The key attraction of the Haynesville is its prolific initial productivity rates from the play. As depicted below, our survey of 2,759 Haynesville wells shows the average IP for a Haynesville well at approximately 8 MMcfe/d and has been relatively consistent in that range since mid-2009. IP rates in 2011 tailed off somewhat to 7.7 MMcfe/d, likely to a slight change in operator practices towards limiting initial rates somewhat to achieve more moderate declines. The high IP rates are partly attributable to the greater depth and pressure of the play, which also leads to another trade-off higher decline rates. Our observed 12-month decline rate on a typical Haynesville well is approximately 75%, versus most other shales in the ~60% range (calculated from one-month average rate). As depicted below, IP rates in the Hayneville appear to be reasonably dispersed vs. other plays. Top-quartile IPs average 14.1 MMcfe/d, while bottom-quarter IPs average 3 MMcfe/d. IP rates vary by operator (see Appendix page 169 for more operator-specific information) but of the top 10 producers, which account for 90% of production, we see IP rates range from a low of 6 MMcfe/d for XTO [ExxonMobil (XOM-NYSE)] to a high of 12 MMcfe/d for Encana.
5.0 4.0
500 400 300 200 100 0 1 929 1,857 2,785 3,713 4,641 5,569 6,497 7,425 8,353 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
0.6
Supply Costs
The average Haynesville supply cost is ~US$4.00/Mcf with top-quartile wells breaking even at US$3.50/Mcf and lower-quartile results breaking even at US$4.50-US$5.00/Mcf.
Exhibit 27 depicts supply costs for the Haynesville at todays costs. As depicted, the average Haynesville supply cost is ~US$4.00/Mcf with top-quartile wells breaking even at US$3.50/Mcf and lower-quartile results breaking even at US$4.50-US$5.00/Mcf. In the early days, the Haynesville supply costs/breakeven costs were considered the lowest in the industry, however, while it is still low for a dry gas play, in the context of all plays (i.e., including tight oil and liquids-rich gas), the supply costs are uncompetitive. In general, we believe natural gas prices would have to get to the US$5.00/Mcf range for the Haynesville to begin pulling rigs back out of the Eagle Ford.
32
IRR - % 25%
20% 15% 10% 5% 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60 $7.00 $6.00 $5.00
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
Growth Projections
At current rig counts with static efficiencies, we expect to see the Haynesville declining until mid-2014.
Exhibit 28 depicts growth scenarios out of the Haynesville shale. Our base case view is based on current rig counts while low and high scenarios vary rig counts up/down by 20% from current levels (alternatively, the low and high cases can be thought of as a 20% improvement/decrease in rig productivity/drilling efficiency). As depicted, at current rig counts with static efficiencies, we expect to see the Haynesville continue to maintain a declining profile until mid-2014. After peaking in Q4/11 at 7.6 Bcfe/d, we expect production to drop to ~6.2 Bcfe/d by late 2012 and 5.7 Bcfe/d by late 2013. Production after this point will gradually moderate as the steep decline phase is largely complete. As declines stabilize, the current rig count could once again start to deliver moderate growth in the 2016-2020 time frame. With a 20% improvement in efficiency OR a 20% improvement rig count, we could see the Haynesville reach 5.6 Bcfe/d by 2016 and 6.2 Bcfe/d by 2020. The efficiency gain could be particularly important in the Louisiana portion of the Haynesville as current land regulations make it prohibitive to drill across section boundaries (i.e., limited to one-mile horizontals). The Louisiana state government is currently expecting to enact regulations to allow longer reach drilling, which could reduce cycle times meaningfully as producers move to bigger pads with longer reach wells characteristic of other resource plays.
33
Exhibit 28. Haynesville Activity Levels & Growth Projections Rigs Running
250 High Base Low
Wells Drilled
1,200 High Base Low
200
1,000
600
100
400 50
200
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Low
Base
High
1,333 1,167 1,000 833 667 500 333 167 0 Mboe/d 2020E
34
We believe parties who have made large LNG commitments from Sabine Pass (and more recently Freeport) will be interested in obtaining a physical hedge against US spot price risk and Haynesville is well positioned for that Hedge.
Haynesville-Bossier Tuscaloosa
Lake Charles LNG (TrunkLine LNG) Cameron LNG
Eagle Ford
35
Marcellus The Beast In The East: Activity Moderating Somewhat But Still Going Hard
The Marcellus is a monster. As with many shale plays, it started to get a lot of attention in early 2008 and activity has boomed since then. Unfortunately, the Marcellus earns the dubious distinction of having THE WORST data quality of any of the major shales, with data released only twice per year (which actually an improvement) and that data does not include month-by-month production as most states/plays report. This means that industry largely has to guess at overall production and well rate trends. Our approach to gauging Marcellus production has been to back the production out of regional pipeline flows. This approach is reasonable as there are no other major growth drivers in Pennsylvania. As depicted below, based on this approach, we estimate the Marcellus is producing approximately 6.2 Bcfe/d in Q1/12, which would make it the largest shale gas play in the U.S. The Marcellus grew ~1 Bcf/d in 2009/10 and an impressive 2.4 Bcf/d from 2010/11. Even if production held flat (unlikely as still many wells are still to come on-stream) from todays levels, it would still imply ~2.5 Bcf/d of growth in 2012 from 2011.
We estimate the Marcellus is producing approximately 6.2 Bcfe/d in Q1/12, which would make it the largest shale gas play in the U.S. The Marcellus grew ~1 Bcf/d in 2009/10 and an impressive 2.4 Bcf/d from 2010/11.
Q/Q Growth
1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
200 Gas Q/Q Production Liquids Q/Q Production 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Boe/d
0 Q1/08 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12
Marcellus rig counts have declined ~33%, but even at current levels it would still generate meaningful growth.
Even the mighty Marcellus is starting to feel the pinch of low natural gas prices, albeit it is faring far better than any other gas play, reflecting its strong economic attributes. As depicted in Exhibit 29, overall rig counts in the Marcellus have finally started to roll over. From a high of approximately 150 rigs running in late 2011, the play is now down to approximately 100 rigs running. As depicted, there is a major difference between rig counts depending on the part of the play. In the dry gas counties (primarily the northern part of the play), rig counts have fallen from a peak of 104 down to 56 while activity levels in the wet gas counties (primarily the SW of the play), rig counts have stayed relatively stagnant at 45-50 rigs running.
36
Exhibit 31. Marcellus Rig Count Wet Gas Vs. Dry Gas Counties
180 Dry Gas Rig Count 160 Marcellus Wet Gas Rig Count
140
120
Rig Count
100
80
60
40
20
Supply Costs
The average Marcellus dry gas supply cost is US$3.00/Mcf. Due to the large liquids subsidies, the average wet gas supply cost is in the US$2.00/Mcf range assuming NGLs at 45% of WTI.
Exhibits 32-33 depict supply costs for the Marcellus shale at todays costs. We have subdivided the play into a dry gas (northern) type curve as well as a wet gas curve. As depicted, the average Marcellus dry gas supply cost is US$3.00/Mcf. Due to the large liquids subsidies, the average wet gas supply cost is in the US$2.00/Mcf range assuming NGLs at 45% of WTI. While the wet gas break-evens are very low, we note that the wet gas window is a relatively small portion of the entire Marcellus play (approximately 3 counties from the entire play) and should not be construed as a proxy for the entire play.
37
Ja nu a Fe ry-1 br ua 0 ry Ma -10 rch -1 Ap 0 ril1 Ma 0 y-1 Ju 0 ne -1 0 Ju lyA u 10 Se gus pte t-1 mb 0 e Oc r-1 tob 0 No er ve -10 m De ber ce -10 mb e Ja r-10 nu a Fe ry-1 br ua 1 ry Ma -11 rch -1 Ap 1 ril1 Ma 1 y-1 Ju 1 ne -1 1 Ju lyA u 11 gu Se pte st-1 mb 1 e Oc r-1 to 1 No ber ve -11 m De ber ce -11 mb e Ja r-11 nu a Fe ry-1 br ua 2 ry Ma -12 rch -1 Ap 2 ril1 Ma 2 y-1 Ju 2 ne -1 2
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% $7.00 20% 10% 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $6.00 $5.00 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60
IRR - %
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
140%
120%
100%
80%
IRR - %
60%
40% $5.00 $4.00 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60
$7.00 $6.00
20%
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
38
Growth Projections
At current rig counts with static efficiencies, we expect to see a significant deceleration in Marcellus growth. The play averaged approximately 6.2 Bcfe/d in Q1/12 and we expect that to grow to 7.5 Bcf/d by Q1/13.
The charts in Exhibit 34 depict growth scenarios out of the Marcellus shale. Our base case view is based on current rig counts while low and high scenarios vary rig counts up/down by 20% from current levels (alternatively, the low and high cases can be thought of as a 20% improvement/decrease in rig productivity/drilling efficiency). As depicted, at current rig counts with static efficiencies, we expect to see a significant deceleration in Marcellus growth. The play averaged approximately 6.2 Bcfe/d in Q1/12 and we expect that to grow to 7.5 Bcf/d by Q1/13. While this is still quite a meaningful growth rate, it is down significantly from the 3 Bcf/d the play grew from Q1/11 to Q1/12. There is no doubt the Beast From The East will continue to deliver big volume growth. Based on current rig counts (which are off ~30% from highs), volumes can reach ~10 Bcf/d by 2016 and over 12 Bcf/d by 2020. If we layer in some combination of 20% productivity assumptions, rig counts or cycle times, our growth projects would jump to ~12 Bcf/d by 2016 and over 14 Bcf/d by 2020.
Marcellus production could reach 10-12 Bcf/d by 2016 and 12-14 Bcf/d by 2020.
39
Wells Drilled
2,500 High Base Low
2,000
1,000
Liquids (Right)
2,500 2,292 2,083 1,875 1,667 1,250 1,042 833 625 417 208 0 Mboe/d 1,458 Low Base High
500,000
400,000
400,000
300,000
300,000
200,000
200,000
100,000
100,000
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
40
Bakken Booming
The Bakken (we include Three Forks in all of our Bakken analysis) has been an amazing growth story thus far, increasing from only ~90,000 Boe/d in 2008 to approximately 590,000 Boe/d in Q1/12 (510,000 Bbls/d of oil and 500 MMcf/d of natural gas). Equally impressive is that the growth momentum is not yet waning, with the rig count on the play recently reaching 230 horizontal rigs, a big uptick from the already high 180 rigs running through 2011 and 124 in 2010. Additional background on the Bakken play can be found on page 152 of our Appendix, including detailed information on results by operator and county.
Q/Q Growth
1,000 900 800 700 600 Mboe/d Mmcfe/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /10 Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
200 Gas Q/Q Production Liquids Q/Q Production 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Boe/d
Our survey of 3,400 Bakken wells drilled since early 2008 indicates an average IP of 423 Boe/d (30-day calendar day average) with an 86% light oil weighting.
41
2.5
300
333
2.0 MMcfe/d
250 Frequency
Boe/d
1.5
250
200 150
1.0
167
100
0.5 83
50 0 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
0.0 00 03 06 09 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42
Months On Production
Supply Costs
The data table in Exhibit 37 depicts supply costs for the Bakken at todays costs. As depicted, the average Bakken supply cost of ~US$65-US$70/Bbl with topquartile wells breaking even at US$55-US$60/Bbl and lower-quartile results breaking even at US$70/Bbl+. We note that our analysis assumes Bakken Light pricing of approximately 5% discount to WTI over the long term, reflecting the more challenged market access vs. PADD 3 and many other light oil plays. This more conservative (arguably more realistic) view of pricing makes our estimated break-evens for the U.S. Bakken higher than is often suggested. Exhibit 37. Bakken Economics
45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% $7.00 10% 5% 0% $120 $110 $100 $90 $80 $6.00 $5.00 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $70 $60
IRR - %
US$/Mcf
US$/Bbl
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
42
Growth Projections
At current rig counts with static efficiencies, we could see the Bakken growing to the 1.2 MMBoe/d range (1.1 MMBbls/d of light oil and 1.1 MMcf/d of natural gas) by 2016 and 1.6 MMBoe/d (1.4 MMBbls/d of light oil and 1.4 MMcf/d of natural gas) by 2020
The charts in Exhibit 38 depict growth scenarios out of the Bakken. Our base case view is based on current rig counts while low and high scenarios vary rig counts up/down by 20% from current levels (alternatively, the low and high cases can be thought of as a 20% improvement/decrease in rig productivity/drilling efficiency). As depicted, at current rig counts with static efficiencies, we could see the Bakken growing to the 1.2 MMBoe/d range (1.1 MMBbls/d of light oil and 1.1 MMcf/d of natural gas) by 2016 and 1.6 MMBoe/d (1.4 MMBbls/d of light oil and 1.4 MMcf/d of natural gas) by 2020. With a 20% improvement in efficiency OR a 20% improvement rig count, we could see the Bakken reach 1.5 MMBoe/d by 2016 and 1.9 Boe/d by 2020. We believe there is little risk as to whether or not the Bakken has the resource to support over 1 MMBbls/d of production. The bigger question is relative economics. The Bakken is one of the most active U.S. plays but discounted pricing and higher transport costs weigh on economics vs. many competing light oil plays, particularly those in PADD 3. As more new plays mature in PADD 3, we would not be surprised to see more rigs reallocated from the Bakken southward. From a macro perspective, this would reduce the aforementioned production targets for the Bakken but on an aggregate basis would not likely have any major impact as we would see higher-than-forecast production from these other liquids plays.
Price discounting in PADD 2 is weighing on Bakken economics, which could see activity moderate from current levels.but there are many other plays eager to pick up these rigs.
43
Exhibit 38. Bakken Activity Levels & Growth Projections Rigs Running
300 High Base Low
Wells Drilled
2,500 High Base Low
250
2,000
150
1,000
100 500
50
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
250,000
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200,000
200,000
150,000
150,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
44
Other Plays
Thus far we have focused our attention on the Eagle Ford, Marcellus, Haynesville and Bakken with the rationale being that these are the fastest growing plays (Eagle Ford, Bakken, Marcellus) or the ones that have the potential to correct the most in the short term (Haynesville). However, the focus on these plays should not be taken to imply that they are the only plays that matter in the U.S. We have also done detailed models on the Permian Basin and Anadarko Basin plays aggregated within the respective basins but broken out into horizontal and vertical drilling as well as the Woodford/Cana Woodford and Fayetteville. We present a summary of each of these plays (IP rates in aggregate, by county and by operator, total production, etc.) in Appendix pages 148-186. As depicted in Exhibit 39, beyond the plays discussed above, aggressive development in the Permian Basin from both aggressive horizontal and vertical drilling has also led to very meaningful increase in oil production increase. Production in the Permian has grown by ~210,000 Bbls/d in 2010 and 2011 and seems to be on track to produce 1.5 MMBbls/d in 2012 (up 340,000 Bbls/d from 2011). The Permian is truly a variety of resource plays plus conventional targets with, in many cases, overlapping geologically making it difficult to separate out rig counts by play, etc. However, in many cases, the type curves arent wildly different so we have found it accurate enough to simply break out horizontal Permian vs. vertical Permian activity and build type curves around that. For the Anadarko Basin, we have broken out the Woodford and Cana Woodford separately and modeled all other Anadarko horizontal and vertical activity separately. Exhibit 39 shows the growth outlook by play for each of the other regions. For more details (IP trends, IP distributions, etc.), please refer to Appendix pages 148-186.
45
750 667 583 500 417 Low Base High 333 250 167 83 0
50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
292
80 Rigs Running 60 40 Mmcfe/d 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 1,000 750 500 250 0
Q1 /0 8
20
46
Our base case modeling includes approximately 300,000 Boe/d of production (70% oil weighted) from these emerging plays by 2016 and approximately 550,000 Boe/d by 2020. With a more aggressive rampup and improvements in cycle times production could be more in the 700,000 Boe/d range by 2016 and ~1.2 MMBoe/d by 2020.
47
100
60
40
20
250 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Q1 /08
Rigs Running
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
48
Q1 /08
Mboe/d
Exhibit 41. Emerging Plays Growth Outlook Improved Efficiencies & Continued Activity Expansion
Rigs Running Mississippi Lime
250 High Base Low
200
Rigs Running
100
50
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
250
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100
2,000 1,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
50
49
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Mmcfe/d
150
50
de ru -C s d or Ga e F rd et gl Fo W Ea gle us l ir Ea rcel zD Ma en H kk ko Ba ar a d rd An dfo s ir Ga oo W zD e t W nH ML mia rd r o Pe eF gl Ea a ic tt Ut e s rn Ba ellu le rc vil Ma es yn ille Ha ttev ye Fa de ru a s -C tG d or W e eF gl lus Ea rcel ord Dir z F Ma le koH g r Ea ada s lu An rcel rd Ma dfo s oo n Ga e W et kk -W Ba d or ir ML le F zD H g Ea ian e rm vill Pe tte ye t Fa et rn Ba Ut ica le vil es yn Ha
0%
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de ru a s -C tG d or W e eF gl lus Ea el d rc For ir Ma gle zD Ea ken oH k k s Ba ar ad rd Ga An odfo et o -W W d or ir ML le F zD H g ian Ea rm us Pe cell r Ma ica t Ut et ille rn Ba ttev e l ye vil Fa es yn Ha
s Ga et de - W ru us - C ell rd rc Fo Ma gle ord F Ea le us Dir g l z Ea rcel oH k Ma ar ad ord An df lle oo tevi W t s ye Ga Fa ken et k -W Ba d or ML e F gl r Ea ett Di rn nHz Ba ia le rm vil Pe es yn Ha ica Ut
20%
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51
$60 $60 $60 $70 $70 $80 $80 $90 $90 $100 $100 $110 $110 $120
$60
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$90
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$120
$60 $60 $70 $70 $80 $80 $90 $90 $100 $100 $110 $110 $120
Natural gas prices generally need to be in the US$4-US$6/Mcf range for dry gas plays to compete vs. the main liquids plays.
Natural gas prices being above break-even levels on dry gas plays alone will not dictate a return to dry gas drilling. Rather, the real relevant factor is whether or not gas plays can generate a high enough rate of return to draw resources away from liquids-rich or tight oil-focused plays. The following chart depicts some of the swing dry gas plays and how they compete for capital vs. the Eagle Ford and Bakken two of the largest oil/liquids-focused plays. As depicted, gas prices generally need to be in the US$4-US$6/Mcf range for dry gas plays to compete vs. the main liquids plays. We note our return assumptions for the Bakken are generally slightly lower than consensus reflecting our view of discounting for PADD 2 and Northern plays. This analysis reinforces our view that rigs will be slow to return to dry gas plays unless we see a substantial uptick in gas prices. The one exception being the Marcellus where we are approaching a range where it competes with some oil weighted plays like the Bakken (but is still a long ways from Eagle Ford returns).
Exhibit 43. Dry Gas Returns Vs. Main Oil Plays At US$90/Bbl Oil
110% 90% 70% 50% IRR - % 30% 10% -10% -30% -50% $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $/Mcf $5.00 $6.00 $7.00 Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus Woodford Barnett Bakken Eagle Ford
52
/08
/09
/14
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/13
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/15
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With current rig counts & efficiencies, total U.S. on-shore oil production would grow to ~6.6 MMBbls/d in 2016 (~485,000 bbl/d per year).
As depicted, in this scenario, we see oil production from resource plays growing by 2.9 MMBbls/d from 2011 to 2016 (~600,000 Bbls/d per year) and a further 1.1 MMBbls/d from 2016 to 2020 (~270,000 Bbls/d per year). After netting off anticipated declines in non-resource play production, total U.S. on-shore oil production would be grow to ~6.6 MMBbls/d in 2016 (~485,000 bbl/d per year) and 7.2 MMBbls/d by 2020 (an incremental 152,000 Bbls/d per year from 20162020).
Eagleford Haynesville Barnett Emerging Liquids Plays Mississippi Lime Anadarko Basin High
Q3
53
/20
/12
/16
/11
/19
Total Production 2016 4,255,899 4,939,280 5,627,452 1,658,504 5,914,403 6,597,784 7,285,956
Per Year Growth '16-'20 198,310 267,091 336,691 (114,521) 83,789 152,570 222,170
At current rig counts and efficiencies, dry gas production would only grow ~2.5 Bcf/d by 2016 or about 0.5 Bcf/d per year not sufficient to keep pace with demand growth.
With this scenarios big allocation of rigs towards liquids plays, there is no surprise that gas production growth decelerates massively from prior years. In this scenario, we expect dry gas production to be flat in 2013 as a decline in Haynesville production moderates increases from the Marcellus and gas from liquids-rich plays. As steep initial declines moderate though in the 2014 time frame, production from dry gas plays such as the Haynesville will likely return to moderate growth at current rig counts. At static rig counts, U.S. wet gas production from resource plays would grow 8.4 Bcf/d (1.7 Bcf/d per year) from 2011 to 2016 and 5.5 Bcf/d from 2016 to 2020 (1.4 Bcf/d per year). Production from non-resource plays would likely continue to decline approximately 4.4 Bcf/d (0.9 Bcf/d per year) by 2016 and extraction losses due to NGL would increase approximately 1.4 Bcf/d (0.3 Bcf/d per year) implying total dry gas production growth of 2.6 Bcf/d (0.5 Bcf/d per year) through 2016 and 0.4 Bcf/d per year through 2020.
Q1 /08 Q3 /08 Q1 /09 Q3 /09 Q1 /10 Q3 /10 Q1 /11 Q3 /11 Q1 /12 Q3 /12 Q1 /13 Q3 /13 Q1 /14 Q3 /14 Q1 /15 Q3 /15 Q1 /16 Q3 /16 Q1 /17 Q3 /17 Q1 /18 Q3 /18 Q1 /19 Q3 /19 Q1 /20 Q3 /20
Total Production 2016 2020 35,113 38,530 40,258 45,759 45,606 53,263 29,802 4,466 60,448 65,593 70,941 26,420 4,601 60,348 67,578 75,082
Per Year Growth '16-'20 854 1,375 1,914 (845) 34 (25) 496 1,035
54
In the above scenarios, we have included a sensitivity of +-20%, which can be thought of as improvements in initial productivity rates and/or rig efficiency. If we saw some combination of 20% improvements in initial productivity rates or rig efficiency, U.S. tight oil production could grow to 5.6 MMBbls/d by 2016 or 740,000 Bbls/d per year instead of ~5 MMBbls/d or 600,000 Bbls/d as in our base case. On the downside, a decrease in IP rates and productivity (seemingly unlikely) would still see U.S. tight oil production grow to 4.3 MMBbls/d by 2016 or 460,000 Bbls/d per year still above pre-2011 grow rates.
Scenario 2 Impact Of Emerging Plays, Longterm Fleet Expansion & Efficiency Gains
This scenario expands on the base case output from Scenario 1 (which is labeled Scenario A in the following tables) by incorporating different assumptions around rig counts and cycle times. Scenario B begins by taking all the assumptions laid out in Scenario A, but assumes that emerging plays such as the Utica, Niobrara and Tuscaloosa continue to ramp up activity. We assume that these plays collectively ramp up from ~100 rigs today to ~300 rigs by end of 2014. Ramp-up times in new plays have been steadily decreasing as the industry gains experience and confidence in building out new resource plays and implementing the necessary supply chains to support them. As shown in Exhibit 51, Scenario C builds on B and also assumes gradual decreases in cycle times on the remaining plays, most notably the U.S. Bakken and Eagle Ford where we continue to measure cycle times in the 60- and 80-day range, which could theoretically be reduced by ~33%. Scenario D takes the previous two scenarios and also assumes the rig fleet continues to expand by ~5% per year from 2014 to 2020 a reasonable assumption given producer production would be growing in excess of 5% per year.
180
180
160
160
140
140
120
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
55
Incorporating rig fleet expansion, improved cycle times etc would see US resource play oil growth in the 670,000-832,000 Bbl/d per year range through 2016 (556,000-717,000 Bbl/d per year after deducting nonresource play declines).
As depicted, with these scenarios, we see a very wide range of outputs, which reflects the many moving parts in this type of exercise. In Scenario B, we would see oil production from resource plays increase ~670,000 Bbl/d per year from 2011-2016 (vs. ~600,000 Bbls/d per year from 2011 to 2016 under Scenario A). Scenario C, which adds in gradual cycle time improvements would see resource play growth jump to 758,000 Bbl/d per year from 2011-2016 and Scenario D, which incorporates long-term growth in the US rig fleet could deliver oil growth of 832,000 Bbl/d per year through 2016. From 2016-2020, oil production from resource plays would increase anywhere from 320,000 Bbls/d to 865,000 Bbls/d per year. The main cause for the wide variance in the 2016-2020 forecasts is whether or not one assumes that the U.S. rig fleet continuously expands. If no expansion is assumed, then the current rig fleet is spread over a larger production base and not able to deliver as much growth (although even the lower end numbers are still quite impressive) whereas if the assumption is made that the U.S. rig fleet gradually expands in line with industry production and cash flows (a reasonable assumption), the higher growth rates can be sustained for longer.
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Liquids Rich Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford High Case Low Case
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Liquids Rich Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford
4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 Q1 /08 Q3 /08 Q1 /09 Q3 /09 Q1 /10 Q3 /10 Q1 /11 Q3 /11 Q1 /12 Q3 /1 2 E Q1 /1 3 E Q3 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q3 /1 4 E Q1 /1 5 E Q3 /1 5 E Q1 /1 6 E Q3 /1 6 E Q1 /1 7 E Q3 /17 E Q1 /1 8 E Q3 /18 E Q1 /19 Q3 E /1 9 E Q1 /20 E Q3 /20 E
300,000 200,000 100,000 0 -100,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
The following table depicts overall onshore U.S. oil production after taking into account continued declines in other U.S. oil production. As depicted, after deducting declines from other production, we could see U.S. onshore production grow at a rate ranging from 557,000 Bbls/d to ~720,000 Bbls/d per year from 2011-2016 (2.8 MMBbls/d growth to 3.6 MMBbls/d growth). Growth in the 2016-2020 time frame slows in Scenario A, B & C as it largely reflects a static rig fleet on a significantly larger production base (lower ability to grow). In these scenarios, onshore growth would still average 85,000-285,000 Bbls/d per year. Scenario D, which assumes the U.S. rig fleet continues to expand at 5%/year beyond 2015, would be able to sustain growth in the 750,000 Bbls/d per year range.
56
Total Production (bbl/d) 2011 2016 2020 1,937,841 4,939,280 6,007,644 1,937,841 5,303,505 6,578,417 1,937,841 5,729,262 7,322,741 1,937,841 6,103,513 9,571,809 2,239,159 1,658,504 1,200,421
Per Year Growth (bbl/d) '11-'16 '16-'20 '11-'20 600,288 267,091 452,200 673,133 318,728 515,620 758,284 398,370 598,322 833,134 867,074 848,219 (116,131) (114,521) (115,415)
Dry gas growth rates drop to only 0.5-1.4 Bcf/d per year from 20112016 in Scenarios A-C and 2 Bcf/d per year in Scenario D.
As emerging plays have meaningful amounts of associated gas or are liquids-rich in nature, the acceleration in rig count on these plays does impact natural gas growth, albeit not to the same extent as oil. In Scenarios A,B, & C, we see U.S. gas production from resource plays increasing ~1.7-2.5 Bcf/d per year through 2016 with rates slowing to a range of 0.5-1.3 Bcf/d per year from 2016-2020. Scenario D, which assumes expansion of the rig fleet, would see gas production accelerate significantly to 2.3 Bcf/d on average in the 2011-2016 time frame and 4.8 Bcf/d per year from 2016-2020. After layering in declines in nonresource play production and NGL extraction losses, dry gas growth rates drop to only 0.5-1.4 Bcf/d per year from 2011-2016 in Scenarios A-C and 2 Bcf/d per year in Scenario D.
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Liquids Rich Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford High Case Low Case
7,500
5,000
Anadarko Basin Permian Mississippi Lime US Bakken Emerging Liquids Rich Plays Woodford Barnett Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus PA Eagleford
2,500
-2,500
Q1 /08 Q3 /08 Q1 /09 Q3 /09 Q1 /10 Q3 /10 Q1 /11 Q3 /11 Q1 /12 Q3 /12 E Q1 /13 E Q3 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q3 /14 E Q1 /15 E Q3 /15 E Q1 /16 E Q3 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q3 /17 E Q1 /18 E Q3 /18 E Q1 /19 E Q3 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q3 /20 E
-5,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
57
Scenario 3 Introducing Volatility & Pricing Impact With Monte Carlo Simulation
Our Monte Carlo simulation introduces the impact of price volatility and the dynamic reallocation of capital (gas vs. oil drilling) according to price signals.
The main shortfall of most industry growth forecasts (and the aforementioned examples) is that it ignores the impact of volatility and unpredictability/uncertainty and ignores the dynamic reallocation of rigs according to price signals (i.e., producers reallocating rigs to gas plays if gas prices rise sufficiently to make economics competitive with liquids-rich or tight oil). As an example, as recently as three years ago, the consensus view was that natural gas prices will be in the US$8/Mcf long term and that the U.S. would be short natural gas. Clearly that proved wrong. At least once a year for the past five years there has been some major political uncertainty leading to spikes in oil prices. None of these types of things can be captured by typical linear type forecasts. Additionally, most forecasts suffer immensely from adaptive expectations (i.e., where forecasters are overly influenced by todays environment in making long-term projections). To provide a different perspective, we have built a fairly sophisticated simulation tool that introduces a degree of randomness, volatility and then inter-relationship of rig allocation to changes in relative economics.
58
Once both the oil and natural gas prices are determined for a period, we then apply a historical correlation of oil rigs vs. oil prices and gas rigs vs. gas prices to determine the overall rig count operating in the specific price scenario. Once the rig count has been determined from the Monte Carlo price simulation, the complexity is how to allocate rigs across different plays? For this we use the economic analysis discussed in the company sections to allocate rigs within certain constraints. For instance, in a scenario where the simulation generates an oil price of US$95/Bbl in a given quarter and a natural gas price of US$2/Mcf, the model would rank the plays according to the IRR generated at that price deck and allocate rigs accordingly. In the scenario of high oil and low gas prices, the model would clearly see a heavy allocation of rigs to oil plays and low allocation to gas plays. If we saw a scenario of US$85/Bbl oil and US$5/Mcf gas, our model would begin to move rigs out of more marginal oil plays into gas plays. To better simulate real world conditions, we assume that no play can handle more than 20% of total U.S. rigs (today that would be approximately 300 rigs and for context the Eagle Ford and Bakken seem to be peaking in the 275 and 240 range, respectively). We also assume that rigs are not perfectly mobile and only react to price signals if conditions have persisted for more than one quarter. Key inputs into the Monte Carlo analysis are the long-term direction of oil prices and the volatility around those prices. We have run three different baseline scenarios using flat prices of US$75, US$85 and US$95/Bbl along with gas price of US$3/Mcf, US$4/Mcf and US$5/Mcf. Volatility is also a key variable in the Monte Carlo simulation and for this we have used 35% volatility for natural gas and 28% for crude oil, both based on the implied volatility in the futures curve for both commodities.
$ $ $
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59
As with the growth scenarios discussed in the previous sections, the Eagle Ford remains a dominant driver for both oil and natural gas growth and the Marcellus for natural gas. The one interesting observation is that the Bakken figures as a less prominent growth driver in this simulation, which uses economic returns to allocate rig activity. The key reason for this is our assumption that WTI remains ~US$5/Bbl discounted vs. PADD 3 plays with Bakken realizing approximately 95% of WTI reflecting transportation challenges. This lower price assumption has a significant impact on relative economics. From a macro forecasting perspective, the overall impact is relatively negligible as it implies that if activity slows in the Bakken due to weaker relative economics, we will see those rigs absorbed by other emerging resource plays in PADD 3 such as the various Permian and Anadarko plays (i.e., if Bakken oil growth forecasts decline, higher growth in other oil plays offsets leaving overall oil projections unchanged).
Exhibit 55. Growth Drivers By Play Through 2016 In Monte Carlo Simulation #1
Contribution to 2012 - 2016 Average Y/Y Gas Growth By Play (mmcf/d) Contribution to 2012 - 2016 Average Y/Y Oil Growth By Play (Bbls/d)
Marcellus PA 1,202 Note: - Average Y/Y Haynesville production declines (32)mmcf/d during the given time period. - Average Y/Y Woodford production declines (97)mmcf/d during the given time period. - Average Y/Y Permian/Anadarko production declines (159)mmcf/d during the given time period.
US Bakken 63,232
Marcellus PA 323 Barnett 12,136 Woodford 1,768 Emerging Liquids Plays 8,070
Note: - Average Y/Y Haynesville production declines (181)bbls/d during the given time period.
A key benefit of the Monte Carlo approach is to assess probabilities around a range of outcomes. The following charts depict the distribution of growth forecast outcomes from our 500 iteration Monte Carlo approach (based only on the US$85/Bbl and US$4/Mcf scenario. As depicted, high commodity price volatility and the ability to move rigs between plays as economics warrant leads to a wide degree of forecast variability for both oil and natural gas (wider for natural gas primarily reflecting the higher implied volatility in the commodity.
60
30 20 10 0
Frequency
40
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61
86 8 ,1 8,1 50 50 -8 82 26 6,3 ,30 00 0 -7 78 84 4,4 ,4 5 50 0 -7 74 42 2,6 ,6 0 00 0 -7 70 00 0,7 ,75 50 0 -6 65 58 8,9 ,9 0 00 0 -6 61 17 7,0 ,05 50 0 -5 57 75 5,2 ,2 0 00 0 -5 53 33 3,3 ,3 5 50 0 -4 49 91 1,5 ,5 0 00 0 -4 44 49 9,6 ,6 5 50 0 -4 40 07 7,8 ,80 00 0 -3 36 65 5,9 ,9 5 50 0 -3 32 24 4,1 ,10 00 0 -2 28 82 2,2 ,25 50 0 -2 24 40 0,4 ,4 0 00 0 -1 19 98 8,5 ,55 50 0 -1 15 56 6,7 ,7 0 00 0 -1 14 ,85 0 <7 3,0 00 86
> 1 ,20 2,20 0 011 11 ,40 ,40 0 010 10 , ,60 600 09 9,8 ,80 0 00 -9 9,0 ,00 0 00 -8 8,2 ,20 0 00 -7 7,4 ,40 0 00 -6 6,6 ,60 0 00 -5 5,8 ,80 0 00 -5 5,0 ,00 0 00 -4 4,2 ,20 0 00 -3 3,4 ,40 0 00 -2 2,6 ,60 0 00 -1 1,8 ,80 0 00 -1 ,0 1 ,0 0 0 00 -2 00 20 0 (6 - (60 00 0) ) (1 - (1, ,40 40 0 0) -( ) 2 ,2 00 ) < (3 ,00 0)
12
>
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Key Takeaways
U.S. Onshore Oil Production Can Grow 500,000-700,000 Bbls/d Per Year Through 2016:
We have conducted a number of scenarios ranging from status quo drilling (current rig counts held flat) to a very detailed Monte Carlo simulation. While the results vary considerably by scenario, the general takeaway is that U.S. onshore oil growth is capable of big growth for a long period of time. Our lowest growth scenario (current rig counts with a 20% reduction in IPs) would yield oil resource play growth of 460,000 Bbls/d per year, which after deducting declines on nonresource play production, would yield onshore U.S. growth of 350,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016. Our highest growth scenario, which incorporates moderate rig fleet expansion and cycle time improvements, would yield resource play growth of 830,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016. After deducting non-resource play declines this would leave onshore production growth in the 700,000 Bbls/d per year range through 2016. Our base case view is U.S. resource play production growing in the 650,000 Bbls/d per year range yielding annual growth of approximately 530,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016. We note that these outcomes reflect liquids only from the well head; we expect NGL production from gas plants to also grow ~200,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016. Forecasts beyond 2016 start to involve an even greater level of uncertainty but generally speaking our scenario analysis yields growth ranges from 267,000 Bbls/d per year from 2016 to 2020 (assuming todays rig count simply held flat) to 867,000 Bbls/d if we continue to model gradual improvements in cycle times and rig fleet expansion in line with U.S. production growth rates. By this point, declines in non-resource play production will likely be in the 115,000 Bbls/d per year range (lower decline rates on a smaller base) bringing the 2016-2020 onshore U.S. oil growth rate to 152,000-750,000 Bbls/d per year (and an average of 336,000730,000 Bbls/d per year from 2011-2020). See Exhibit 51 for a full breakdown.
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year from non-resource play production along with anticipated extraction losses for increasing NGL output, leaves U.S. dry gas production relatively flat with current levels. To believe this outcome is sustainable assumes no growth in demand which we do not believe is realistic.
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Industry Cant Support Gas Boom AND Oil Boom At Same Time
What has become abundantly clear through this report is that the U.S. industry has been running at quite close to full utilization over the past 12 months. Within this full utilization, there has been a clear shift from gas to oil. However, what this also implies is that there is no way the industry can either fund or logistically support a boom in natural gas and oil drilling simultaneously when services are running at near full utilization, rigs will be allocated on the basis of returns and strategic value (primarily land retention).
Liquids Lands; 25,000-40,000 Wells Needed To Hold New Oil Lands Leaving Little Flexibility To Move Rigs
A key factor that has exacerbated the natural gas price weakness over the past few years is the need for producers to drill wells to hold shale gas lands. This need prodded companies to drill wells that, in many cases, made no economic sense but had to be done to secure future opportunities. Fortunately, after three years of pain, we believe the land retention driven programs on most of the key dry gas-focused plays such as the Haynesville and Marcellus have largely been met by industry. A common view is that there is no upside in natural gas. This view supposes that as soon as natural gas prices rise, industry will react by locking in higher prices and quickly ramp up drilling, immediately re-exacerbating the supply problem. We have generally agreed with this view in the past, however, there are two new developments that could impact this thesis and make natural gas prices rebound to the US$5-US$6/Mcf range sustainably. These factors are: 1) the need for the new liquids-focused players to drill to meet land commitments on liquids plays; and 2) the fact that even at US$5/Mcf, most dry gas plays do not compete with the many of the newer liquids plays. The need for producers to maintain active levels in liquids plays, regardless of price, should not be underestimated. Producers have moved VERY aggressively over the past 18 months to lock up positions on oil or liquids-rich resource plays, many of which have the same short land tenure that the dry gas plays had. Based on our analysis of just the Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, Utica and Mississippi Lime, producers have locked up over 17 million acres (26,000 sections) of land. Using an assumption of 1.0-1.5 wells to hold a section of land, implies the need to drill over 26,000-39,000 wells on these plays to meet land commitments (generally within a three- to five-year time frame) an aggressive requirement. Overall, we believe we are on the cusp of a new land retention driven boom, this time focused on new liquids plays. What this means for gas prices is that, even if gas prices rise, producers are more likely to use the incremental cash flows to accelerate drilling on liquids plays (to meet commitments) rather than accelerate on dry gas plays where they already hold the majority of their lands.
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GOM Shelf Declines But Deep Production Should Rebound In 2014-16 Time Frame
Within North America, oil sands and tight oil are the main growth focal points. This is true particularly in the post-Macondo world, which put a multi-year delay in front of any big growth out of the U.S. GOM. However, it is important to not leave out the GOM as it does have important (albeit delayed) growth potential. The following chart depicts Wood Mackenzies outlook for U.S. GOM oil and natural gas production. We have sorted the data to reflect the profile from currently producing assets vs. future planned projects. While the base deep GOM profile moves to meaningful declines, it is important to make note of the large project inventory that lies behind it. Based on these forecasts, the Deep GOM is expected to grow from 980 MBbls/d in 2011 to 1.7 MMBbls/d in 2016 (150,000 Bbls/d per year) and relatively flat thereafter. Predictably, most of the focus in the GOM is towards oil but associated gas production will keep overall Deep GOM natural gas supply relatively flat from 2.3 Bcf/d in 2011 to 2.2 Bcf/d in 2016 but dropping to 1.5 Bcf/d by 2020.
Based on these forecasts, the Deep GOM is expected to grow from 980 MBbls/d in 2011 to 1.7 MMBbls/d in 2016 (150,000 Bbls/d per year). We assume 80,000 Bbl/d per year growth in our modelling.
2,750 2,500 Natural Gas Production (Mmcf/d) 2,250 2,000 1,750 1,500 1,250 1,000 750 500 250 0 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
As depicted above, the growth in Deep GOM production is split between many projects with the biggest growth drivers through the 2016 time frame being the Hadrian field (operated by Exxon), Vito operated by Shell, Lucius operated by Anadarko (APC-NYSE), Jack/St. Malo operated by Chevron (CVX-NYSE), and Bucksin operated by Chevron. Of these projects, only Lucius and St. Malo is actually under construction today with the remainder likely to see sanction within the next 18 months. As with any unsanctioned growth, there is risk of deferral and, as such, in our GOM forecasts (incorporated into overall U.S. oil balances in a later section of the report), we generally risk growth projects in the 50% range leading to a growth rate more in the 80,000 Bbls/d per year range through 2016. As with any projects, growth depends on price and economics. The half cycle break-evens for Deep GOM average US$65/Bbl very competitive with onshore tight oil and generally better than Canadian oil sands costs. We note that the big exploration costs and very long cycle times for Deep GOM would weigh on full cycle costs more than other projects, however, the main point of this exercise is
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to determine which projects at FID are most likely to proceed and from this perspective GOM developers (as with tight oil and oil sands developers) will focus primarily on the half cycle costs. Unsurprisingly, activity levels remain low in the shallow GOM. As depicted below, we expect reinvestment in the shallow GOM production to decline from ~266,000 Bbls/d in 2011 to 190,000 Bbls/d in 2016 (annual decline of 15,000 Bbls/d) and 77,000 Bbls/d by 2020 (annual decline of ~21,000 Bbls/d). The shallow GOM is more meaningful from a gas price perspective as it accounts for approximately 4% of total U.S. gas production (vs. shallow GOM that accounts for only 2% of U.S. oil production). Natural gas production in the shallow GOM is steep decline, and is expected to go from 2.6 Bcf/d in 2011 to 2.4 Bcf/d in 2016 and 1.1 Bcf/d in 2020.
3,000 Natural Gas Production (Mmcf/d) 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 2011
Future Production Current Production
2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
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Canadian lands have much more generous tenure, leaving producers with more flexibility as to how and when they develop resources.
Exhibit 60. Production Growth In Canada Coming, But Not Quite As Fast As In The U.S.
1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000
Mmcf/d
20,000 18,000
Historical
Forecast
Bbl/d
12 E
20 09
20 10
20 11
13 E
14 E
15 E
16 E
17 E
18 E
19 E 20
20
20
20
20
20
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20
20
20
20 E
Q2
Looking Back Saskatchewan Bakken & Cardium Have Shown The Biggest Growth
The Bakken has been supplanted by the Cardium as the fastest growing Canadian play.
As with development in the U.S., the drivers behind the resurgence in Canadian light oil production are easy to identify tight oil plays. As illustrated below in Exhibit 62 (which breaks down growth by play), growth has thus far been relatively widespread (i.e., many contributors as opposed to one dominant driver). The Saskatchewan Bakken stands out as having been the biggest grower in the past. However, we note that growth in the Bakken has plateaued in recent quarters and the Bakken has been supplanted by the Cardium as the fastest growing Canadian play.
/08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12 Q2 /12
Non Resource Play Oil Production Resource Play Oil Production
140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 (20,000) 2009 2010 2011 2012E Cardium Shaunavon Bakken Montney
Montney 0 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12
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Looking Forward Cardium, Carbonates, And The Duvernay Likely The Biggest Sources Of Growth
Looking into the future as far as 2020, we expect the Cardium will continue to be one of the principal drivers of light oil growth in Canada. In addition, the Tight Carbonates (principally on the Alberta Swan Hills and Slave Point trends of Alberta) and the Duvernay are expected to be principal drivers of liquids growth. Honorable mention also goes to the Viking, which (while its individual wells have lower productivity) we also think will be a material contributor to growth in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin. Exhibit 63. Forecast Canadian Oil Production Growth By Resource Play To 2020
1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 Bbls/d 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E Bakken Montney 2020E
180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 Viking Bbls/d Cardium Duvernay 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 (20,000) 2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Historical
Forecast
E 20 19
20 0
20 1
20 1
20 12
20 13
20 14
20 15
20 16
20 17
20 18
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20 20
Looking Back The Montney & Deep Basin Have Shown Biggest Growth
Most notable have been the Deep Basin and the Montney. In the Montney, growth has been nothing short of dramatic since 2008, with the play growing over 700% to 2.2 Bcf/d.
While total natural gas production in Canada has declined 8% overall since 2008, there have undoubtedly been bright spots from a number of gas resource plays. Most notable have been the Deep Basin and the Montney. In the Deep Basin, HZ multi-stage fraccing has seen the multi-zone play grow production by over 200% to 1.0 Bcf/d since 2008. In the Montney, growth has been nothing short of dramatic since 2008, with the play growing over 700% to 2.2 Bcf/d.
Exhibit 66. Canadian Natural Gas Production Growth By Resource Play To 2012
5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 Glauc. Horn River Deep Basin Mmcf/d
Mmcf/d
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11
Q2 /0 8 Q3 /0 8 Q4 /0 8 Q1 /0 9 Q2 /0 9 Q3 /0 9 Q4 /0 9 Q1 /1 0 Q2 /1 0 Q3 /1 0 Q4 /1 0 Q1 /1 1 Q2 /1 1 Q3 /1 1 Q4 /11 Q1 /12 Q2 /1 2
Non Resource Play Gas Production Resource Play Gas Production
1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 Montney 200 (200) Q1/12 Q2/12 2009 2010 2011 2012E Montney Horn River Deep Basin
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Looking Forward Duvernay And Horn River Also Potential Growth Drivers
As shown in Exhibit 67 below, we expect the Montney and the Deep Basin will continue to be the principal drivers of resource play natural gas growth in Canada. Beyond 2015, however, we note that we expect both the Duvernay and the Horn River will begin to be much bigger contributors to Canadian supply. Exhibit 67. Forecast Canadian Natural Gas Production Growth By Resource Play To 2020
18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 Mmcf/d 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Montney
2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 (200) 2009 2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Low Natural Gas Prices Weigh On Near Term, But Growth On The Horizon
We see Canadian natural gas production growing by 1.4 Bcf/d from 2011 to 2016 (~240 MMcf/d per year) but primarily driven by LNG development.
As depicted in our aggregate base case scenario below in Exhibit 68, we see total Canadian natural gas production growing by 1.4 Bcf/d from 2011 to 2016 (~240 MMcf/d per year). In this scenario, total Canadian natural gas production would be 16 Bcf/d in 2016 and 19 Bcf/d by 2020. We note that Exhibit 68 also provides a status quo development scenario, which assumes no acceleration in the pace of development. We note that the majority of natural gas growth is growth being developed for LNG export projects. Exhibit 68. Canadian Gas Production Flat In Near Term, But Growing Long Term
20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 Mmcf/d 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 -
E 20 19
20 0
20 1
20 1
20 12
20 13
20 14
20 16
20 15
20 17
20 18
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20 20
18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 Mmcf/d 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 -
Eagle Ford (Crude) Marcellus (Wet Gas) Bakken (US) Mississippi Lime Eagle Ford (Wet Gas) Permian Hz Anadarko Hz Woodford Marcellus Barnett Fayetteville
72
8 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12 Q2 /12
Non Resource Play Gas Production Resource Play Gas Production
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
Q2 /0
Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12 Q2 /12
Non Resource Play Oil Production Resource Play Oil Production
Midcycle PROFITABILITY
A-Tax Profit/Investment Ratio (P/I) (US$90/Bbl, US3.50/Mcf, C$3.00/Mcf)
Eagle Ford
(Resource In Place)
Total Resource In Place (Bln barrels) Recovered-to-Date
15.0 15.0 7.5
28% 4% Viking 1% Bakken (SE Sask.)
(Resource In Place)
Optimistic Resource Estimate (Tcf) Conservative Resource Estimate (Tcf)
300 250 250 250 239
15.0
10.0
10.0
218
6.0
200
5.0
164 69 65 25 15
4.3
7% Lower Shaunavon
4.0
5% Pekisko
16%
2.5
2% Amaranth
2.5
2% Montney Oil
5
Glauconite
In Fact, We Would Argue That Canada Has An Ironic Advantage In Resource Play Quality
Rather then being disadvantaged on profitability and the number and size of quality resource play prospects, we believe Canada (on the contrary) is ironically advantaged on the liquids side by the fact that our conventional oil pools have had lower recoveries in the past. As such, we expect that there is a greater amount of low hanging fruit in Canada in the form of legacy redevelopments. Ironically, what once could be thought of as bad conventional pools, are now some of the very best prospects for development with horizontal multi-stage fraccing today. With tongue in cheek we like to say, Bad rock is good, and Canada has a lot of bad rock and that is Canadas ironic advantage in the resource play game. Below are 4 key points that we believe characterize the opportunity for brownfield redevelopment of our liquids plays in Canada:
1. Bad rock is good the ironic Canadian advantage: Compared to the
U.S., Canadian conventional reservoirs are generally tighter in nature, and ideally suited to multi-stage fraccing for the same reasons that the technology has worked so well in unconventional tight oil plays such as the Bakken play in southeast Saskatchewan.
2. Tight oil does not equal oil shale: In contrast to many of the shale oil
plays in the U.S. (such as the Niobrara or the Tuscloosa plays), most Canadian tight oil plays are tight sands rather than shales (and therefore have better reservoir characteristics).
3. Low geological risk: Resource is there, question is economics. Since
legacy pools have already been delineated with vertical wells and older technology, we already know where to find the resources, and geological uncertainty is minimal.
4. Expansion of legacy pool boundaries possible: Since the limits of many
pools were defined by economics in the past, we believe that many of Canadas legacy pools can now be expanded with more efficient technology, and resource in place estimates in many legacy pools are likely to increase.
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Canadian Disadvantages More Related Services & Infrastructure Capacity, As Well As Access To Capital
We have summarized the key disadvantages that we believe have contributed to slower growth in Canada vs. the U.S. below:
1. Oilfield services capacity: Perhaps the biggest difference between
Canada and the U.S. is the far greater capital intensity possible in the U.S. due to the size of its oilfield services sector. In the Eagle Ford alone, 2012 saw the rig count exceed 270 drilling rigs. Such a pace of development in one play is simply impossible in Canada, as our total deep drilling fleet sits at just ~400.
2. Infrastructure constraints: In some cases, such as the Horn River shale
gas play in northeast B.C., while the resource is widely considered to be of high quality, infrastructure does not yet exist to economically bring production to market.
3. Access to capital: For many Canadian operators, capital is less accessible
Canadian disadvantage, they do explain why development has been slower in Canada. At least on the oil side of the equation, much of the rights to prospective tight oil acreage was already held by production when horizontal multi-stage fraccing rejuvenated the sector (i.e., operators producing from either the same zone or deeper zones were already holding the rights of emerging resource plays). With rights held by production in many cases (and in other cases held on five-year tenure with the government), operators in Canada have been able to afford a more measured pace of development compared to the U.S.
5. Seasonality: There is significant seasonality in Canadian drilling, with
many parts of the WCSB only accessible in the winter months and even those areas that do have summer drilling, they are still prone to long breakup periods that curtail activity. In contrast, most U.S. plays have very little seasonality allowing for much more efficient resource development by keeping crews fully employed year-around and allowing producers to keep ahead of decline curves. At root, we believe Canada has a large, attractive inventory of resource play opportunities; however, unlike the U.S. the rights to much of these resources were already held by legacy production and we have a smaller oil & gas sector and less access to capital with which to pursue these opportunities.
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Allocating Capital Where Does The Canadian Resource Play Dollar Go?
As discussed in the U.S. section, industry has demonstrated an ability to shift capital quickly in response to price signals. The rapid pace with which capital can be reallocated from play to play makes it very important to understand the relative economics of various plays to get an understanding of where producers will favor oil plays vs. liquids-rich gas plays vs. dry gas plays. Exhibit 72 below is a useful tool in understanding economic sensitivities and where producers will allocate capital for the main Canadian resource plays. We note that the size of the potential prize and repeatability are equally as important considerations as profitability when allocating capital. As depicted, the gap between oil plays and dry gas plays remains very wide. For plays such as the Horn River (which is far from infrastructure and has dry gas with high CO2 content), we would need to see natural gas prices of AECO $6.00/Mcf (roughly equivalent to US$5.50/Mcf NYMEX) to close the gap of returns. However, we note that Horn River is unique in that its development could still be secured depending primarily on the success of West Coast Canada LNG as key Horn River players such as Apache (APA-NYSE), EOG and Encana are partnered in the proposed 1.4 Bcf/d Kitimat LNG project, which would be fed from the Horn River. Exhibit 72. Potential Size Of The Prize Just As Important As Economics In Deciding The Allocation Of Capital
(Resource In Place)
Total Resource In Place (Bln barrels) Recovered-to-Date
15.0 15.0 7.5
28% 4% Viking 1% Bakken (SE Sask.)
(Resource In Place)
500
15.0
10.0
10.0
218
6.0
200
5.0
164 69 65 25 15
4.3
7% Lower Shaunavon
4.0
5% Pekisko
16%
2.5
2% Amaranth
2.5
2% Montney Oil
5
Glauconite
3.5x
Midcycle1 PROFITABILITY
A-Tax Profit/Investment Ratio (P/I) (MID: US$90/Bbl, C$3.00/Mcf)
Seal Multi-Lateral (Cold) Montney Oil (Kaybob) Seal (Cold) Amaranth Bakken Pekisko Shaunavon Cardium Oil Viking Montney Oil (Base) Duvernay Shale Seal (Thermal) Cardium Gas Glauconite Tight Carbonates Oil (Swan Hills) Montney Gas (Liquids Rich) Tight Carbonates Oil (Slave Point) Tight Carbonates Gas Bluesky Wilrich Deep Basin VT Ellerslie Deep Basin HZ Nikanassin VT Notikewin Cadomin Montney Gas (Dry) Horn River Nikanassin HZ Colorado Shale
1.5x
-0.5x 0.0x 0.5x 1.0x 1.5x
Doig
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We estimate the size of the prize in the Duvernay could be over 150 Tcf of gas and 10 billion Bbls of liquids with a 20%50% recovery rate.
We estimate the size of the prize in the Duvernay could be over 150 Tcf of gas and 10 billion Bbls of liquids with a 20%50% recovery rate. Key risks in the Duvernay include, in our view, stabilization rates for new wells, breadth of productive liquids-rich window, prospectivity of the oil window, potential services constraints, and identity of land owners. While it would be nearly impossible for the Duvernay to be developed the same pace as the Eagle Ford where activity ramped up to over 250 rigs in three years, we do believe Duvernay development could proceed more aggressively than in many Canadian resource plays as this is one liquids play where big players (such as Encana, Talisman) are all major owners and which have big incentive to build out their liquids exposure. In addition to the Duvernay, we also have our eyes on the Northern Alberta Muskwa, which has many similar properties to the Duvernay. Recent land sale activity around Rainbow Lake in northern Alberta has shown growing interest in the Muskwa shale (the Duvernays northern equivalent). In November 2009, EOG brought a Muskwa well on production near Rainbow Lake. The Muskwa well was drilled for close to $12MM and was brought on production in November 2009 and has been producing at between 50 Bbls/d and 200 Bbls/d. Since then, land sale activity has begun to pick up in the area. While we consider the northern Rainbow Lake area to be at an earlier stage of development and in an area with limited infrastructure, we would highlight Rainbow Lake as an area to watch for future Muskwa/Duvernay development.
With these assumptions we see the Duvernay ramping to ~300 MMcfe/d in 2013, 750 MMcfe/d in 2014 and over 1 Bcfe/d in 2015 (all approximately half liquids) although we note the margin of error on these forecasts is quite high.
We have included quite aggressive growth forecasts for the Duvernay, reflecting our view that results have been encouraging enough to support accelerated development in 2013. We model Duvernay drilling (wells coming on stream) going from ~34 in 2012 to 100 in 2013 and 200 in 2014. Our Duvernay type curve is 7.5 MMcfe/d IP rates, with approximately 50% being crude and well head condensate with additional liquids being extracted downstream. With these assumptions, we see the Duvernay ramping to ~300 MMcfe/d in 2013, 750 MMcfe/d in 2014 and over 1 Bcfe/d in 2015 (all approximately half liquids).
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15 15.0 10
5
<1% <1% 16% <1%
4.3
28% 4% 1% 7% 5%
2%
0
Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Amaranth Bakken (Alberta) Cardium Tight Carbonates Seal Duvernay Pekisko Viking
Cardium
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
Montney Oil
450 400 350 300
300
Actual
250 200 150 100 50 -
Forecast
250 200 150 100 50 0
Note: Map updated as of August 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Distribution Curve
2009 (46 Wells) 2010 (405 Wells) 2011 (737 Wells) 2012 (156 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
Count
800
(Boe/d)
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
50
Well Count
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
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Penn West Bonavista PetroBakken Pengrowth Angle ConocoPhillips NAL Vermilion ARC Whitecap Vero Bonterra Bellatrix Fairborne Sinopec NuVista Anderson Talisman Exxon/Imperial Compton Paramount Suncor TriOil TAQA North Spartan Crocotta Apache Devon Enerplus Perpetual KNOC(2) Crew Husky BP Delphi Equal
300 265 219 209 204 195 149 132 124 120 118 110 102 100 91 81 80 75 71 67 60 57 52 51 50 49 48 47 40 38 27 25 20 17 13
150
300
450
600
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Exhibit 74. The Tight Carbonates: Slave Point And Swan Hills Trends
Tight Carbonates - Area Map (Circa August, 2012) Tight Carbonates - Resource Potential
25 25.0
Total Resource In Place (Bln barrels) Recovered-to-Date
15 15.0 10
5
<1% 16% <1% <1%
4.3
4.0
28% 4% 1% 7% 5%
2.5
2%
2.5
2%
0 Cardium Seal Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Viking Pekisko Tight Carbonates Amaranth Duvernay Bakken (Alberta)
Carbonates
2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
125
Actual
Forecast
Montney Oil
175 150 125
100
100
75
75
50
50
25
25
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of Aug. 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; Sherwin; CIBC World Markets Inc.
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Distribution Curve
C ount
200
400
600
800
2008 & Earlier (8 Wells) 2009 (12 Wells) 2010 (81 Wells) 2011 (241 Wells) 2012 (64 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
(Boe/d)
23
14
30
29
23
15
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400
Well Count
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout Estimate. Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
78
Yoho 14-16 Yoho 13-22 (~105Bbl/Mmcf) (109Bbl/Mmcf) Athabasca 07-18 (390Bbl/d oil & 1.5Mmcf/d gas) Shell 09-34 (+100Bbl/Mmcf) Celtic 13-36 (~80Bbl/Mmcf) Celtic 05-20 (~45Bbl/Mmcf) Trilogy 03-13 (80Bbl/Mmcf) Talisman 01-18 (~0Bbl/Mmcf)
6.0
4%
5.0
1%
4.3
7%
4.0
5%
<1%
<1%
<1%
16%
2.5
2%
2.5
2%
Amaranth 25 Nikannassin
Pekisko
500 300
CBM Mnvl
Horn River
CBM HSC
Montney
Duvernay
Deep Basin
Colorado Shale
Cordova
Doig
Utica Shale
The million dollar question for the Duvernay is the extent of the prospective liquids window. Recent data points from Encana and Athabasca (in the oil window to the north) have added confidence to the liquids story of the play.
Conoco 11-16
2,400 2,100 1,800 1,500 1,200 900 600 300 Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013
Duvernay
2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
400 350
300
Actual
Forecast
Note: Map updated as of June 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
86
79
79
73
70
59
58
43
43
31
23
Conoco Phillips
Bonavista
Talisman
Enerplus
Chevron
Bellatrix
Connacher
Longview
Athabasca
Birchcliff
Petrobakken
TAQA North
Penn West
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. (3) Due to licensing data we believe Shell has acquired 42.6 sections from PetroBakken; however, we believe Shell likely has much more land. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
79
Cequence
Westfire
Shell (3)
Delphi
Chinook
Trilogy
Sinopec
Encana
Husky
Celtic
Guide
Angle
Sonde
CNRL
Terra
Crew
Yoho
Vero
Glauconite
Montney Oil 5
200 164
200
100
69
65 25 15 Notikewin
0
5 Glauconite
1,200 1,080 960
0 Colorado Shale Utica Shale Duvernay Montney CBM HSC Cardium Gas Deep Basin Cordova Doig Nikannassin Horn River CBM Mnvl
Montney Gas
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
5,040 4,320 3,600 2,880 2,160 1,440 720 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
840
Actual Forecast
Note: Map updated as of August 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Distribution Curve
12,000
9,000
10
12
14
(Mcfe/d/d)
6,000
16
2008 & Earlier (210 Wells) 2009 (254 Wells) 2010 (415 Wells) 2011 (456 Wells) 2012 (124 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
Count
80 78 70 67 55
3,000
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
Well Count
1450
50
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
80
200 164
200
100
69
65 25 15 Notikewin 5 Glauconite
250 225 200 175
0 CBM HSC Cardium Gas Montney Duvernay Deep Basin Cordova Doig Utica Shale Colorado Shale Nikannassin Horn River CBM Mnvl
Horn River
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
1,350
1,200
1,050
900
Actual
Forecast
150
750
125
600
100
450
75
300
50
150
25
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of August 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Horn River - Distribution By Peak I.P. Rates 30,000 27,000 Peak I.P. Rate (Mcfe/d) 24,000 21,000 18,000 15,000 12,000 9,000 6,000 3,000 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Well Count
Source: GeoScout and CIBC World Markets Inc.
25 20 15 10 5 0 0.0 1.5 Count
(Mcfe/d/d)
60
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
81
Deep Basin Hz + Vt
2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
6,000 5,400 4,800 4,200 3,600 3,000 2,400 1,800 1,200 600 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Actual
Forecast
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout, Sherwin Geoedges, Canadian Discovery Digest, The Edge, Geological Atlas of Western Canada, Core Laboratories, Company reports, CIBC World Markets
82
Historical
Forecast
18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 Mmcf/d 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 -
Historica
Forecast
Bbl/d
09
10
11
20 16
20 15
20 17
20 12
20 18
E 20 19
20 13
20 14
20 20
20 12 E
20 13 E
20 15 E
20 16 E
20 17 E
20 14 E
20 18 E
20 19 E
83
20 20 E
20 09
20 10
20 11
20
20
20
84
Exhibit 80. Forecasts For Individual Canadian Plays To 2015 LIQUIDS PLAYS
85
Exhibit 81. Forecasts For Individual Canadian Plays To 2015 NATURAL GAS PLAYS
Producing
Construction
Approved
Submitted
Disclosed
CIBC Estimates
86
2011 Producing
2012E Construction
2013E
2014E Approved
2015E Submitted
2016E Disclosed
2017E
2018E
2020E
On an unrisked basis, oil sands would grow from 1.6 MMBbls/d in 2011 to 3.0 MMBbls/d by 2016 and to 5.0 MMBbls/d by 2020.
As depicted above, there is no shortage of oil sands growth projects competing for development. On an unrisked basis (i.e., if corporations collectively followed through with current plans), oil sands would grow from 1.6 MMBbls/d in 2011 to 3.0 MMBbls/d by 2016 (280,000 Bbls/d per year growth) and to 5.0 MMBbls/d by 2020 (380,000 Bbls/d per year growth). On the other end of the spectrum, CAPP foresees oil sands reaching a more conservative 2.5 MMBbls/d by 2016 (180,000 Bbls/d per year growth) and 3.2 MMBbls/d by 2020 (180,000 Bbls/d per year growth). When plotted against planned pipeline capacity, it becomes abundantly clear that not all company planned oil sands projects can proceed. Even if Keystone XL, TransMountain, Northern Gateway and the tentative TransCanada (TRP-SP) West Coast Line were all built, there would still not be enough pipeline capacity to handle planned growth through 2020! Layering in the very real risk that at least one of these pipelines (likely two) may not be built in this time frame implies the need for 1.5 MMBbls/d of projection rationalization/cannibalization from current company forecasts. Another way of looking at oil sands growth is maximum possible growth given pipeline capacity. If Keystone XL is built and Alberta Clipper is expanded, western Canadian oil production can grow ~1.2 MMBbls/d from current levels. This sounds like a lot but when one considers our forecast of Western Canadian light oil growth of ~100,000 Bbls/d per year and oil sands producers are aiming to grow by over 260,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016 (or ~340,000 Bbls/d including diluent), the capacity goes away quite quickly. From there, the main pipelines are West Coast options (Northern Gateway and TransMountain) both of which carry very high political risk and a very early-stage proposal from TransCanada to send crude east. IF these pipelines are not built, oil sands producers would have to rationalize their 2020 growth targets downward by 2.5 MMBbls/d.
When plotted against planned pipeline capacity, it becomes abundantly clear that not all company planned oil sands projects can proceed.
87
5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E CAPP Current Capacity Enbridge Northern Gateway Enbridged Mainline Expansion 2 2015E 2016E 2017E Company Forecasts TranscCanada Keystone XL TransCanada Eastern Canada 2018E 2019E 2020E CIBC Estimates Kinder Morgan TMX Enbridge Mainline Expansion 1
Labor Pains
The third major question mark for oil sands development is labor availability. The oil sands is a massively labor intensive project type. A typical 100,000 Bbls/d non-upgraded mine requires peak labor of approximately 5,000 workers. A typical upgraded mine can require anywhere from 5,000-10,000 peak labor force depending on pace of construction (historically peak was 10,000 but more companies are planning to stretch construction to have better work force control). SAGD is less labor intensive but, even still, a typical 35,000 Bbls/d SAGD project still requires a peak labor force of approximately 700 workers over a two- to three-year construction period (smaller projects at shorter end of scale) and with so many projects in the queue, the labor needs are still massive. There are no longer any good public sources for anticipated labor needs for the oil sands over the very long term. The Construction Owners Association of Alberta (COAA) publishes estimates that seem reasonably credible for the short term but lack needs for the planned projects post 2014. Given this limitation, we have constructed our own oil sands labor model incorporating COAA data historically along with calculated labor needs for future growth projects. While the margin of error is admittedly quite high, it still provides a useful idea of the real labor requirements that come along with current oil sands growth plans.
88
To meet industry growth forecasts to the 2016/17 time frame, the available labor force in the oil sands would need to expand approximately 80% from 2012 levels
The following chart depicts the anticipated construction labor needs through 2020 to complete current operator growth forecasts (i.e., the unrisked sum of all individual company plans). The key takeaway is that to meet industry growth forecasts to the 2016/17 time frame, the available labor force in the oil sands would need to expand approximately 80% from 2012 levels. Clearly, at face value, these forecasts entail a massive external labor need and we note this does not include the potential for the North West upgrader (potentially another 5,000 people) or competing labor demands for LNG construction on the BC Coast or potential for GTL (admittedly a far less likely venture).
70,000 60,000 Construction Craft Personnel 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 2009 Additional Labour Needs (CIBCe) COAA Forecasts .
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Prices/Costs & Pipelines Will Rationalize DevelopmentIt Is Only A Matter Of How Far
As discussed previously, there are a massive amount of projects on the planning board that cannot simply be taken at face value given the major development constraints such as pipeline capacity and labor. This implies a need for major projection rationalization/cannibalization that will be accomplished through some combination of accelerating inflation, lower prices or more stringent/discerning external capital. To first gauge what the price impact is on oil sands development, we must understand the approximate break-evens. Exhibit 86 depicts the break-even oil price at todays cost for a variety of in situ and mining oil sands projects. Recognizing that break-even costs are not a static figure, we also depict expected break-evens in five years assuming 5% per year cost inflation. As depicted, there is wide range of outcomes. At todays costs, high-quality SAGD (i.e., similar to Cenovus Foster Creek and Christina Lake) break even at ~US$40/Bbl while more marginal projects (i.e., SOR in the 3.5 range with lower productivity wells) require an oil price in the US$70/Bbl range. Non-upgraded mining projects (Kearl) require an oil price in the US$70/Bbl range to break even while upgraded mining projects require an oil price in the US$85/Bbl range.
89
We also note that these break-evens are hyper sensitive to realized price discounts. For non-upgraded projects, the sensitivity relates to the light-heavy oil differentials. The aforementioned break-evens were assuming 20% WCS discount to WTI. If we increase the WCS discount to 25%, the break-evens increase to US$49/Bbl for a high-quality lease to as high as US$82/Bbl for lower-quality leases. For upgraded projects, the sensitivity relates to the SCOWTI discount. Historically, this has been zero but in the past six months we have seen it average ~7% reflecting the changing light oil balances in PADD 2. If we assume a 5% SCO discount to WTI long term, the break-even price increases to US$88/Bbl.
15% WCS & 0% SCO Discount Today 5-Years $43.47 $56.02 $72.13 $66.96 $83.30 $47.95 $61.99 $79.60 $76.67 $95.58
20% WCS & 5% SCO Discount Today 5-Years $46.19 $59.52 $76.64 $71.14 $87.68 $50.95 $65.87 $84.57 $81.47 $100.61
25% WCS & 10% SCO Discount Today 5-Years $49.27 $63.49 $81.75 $75.89 $92.56 $54.34 $70.26 $90.21 $86.90 $106.20
If oil prices fell to US$70/Bbl, there would be over 1 MMBbls/d of planned production that would not justify proceeding.
In an efficient market, price or costs will rationalize the supply/demand balance and oil sands is no exception. As recently as the 2005-2008 cycle, we saw inflating costs substantially rationalize the pace of planned oil sands development and we will see that again. We need to see that again. The following chart depicts our aggregated oil sands growth forecasts (the unrisked sum of corporate forecasts), grouped by our assessment of supply costs. As depicted, to achieve all company growth targets would require long-term oil in the $100/Bbl range. As oil price assumptions drop, meaningful amounts of planned oil sands growth would be curtailed. For instance, if oil prices fell to US$70/Bbl, there would be over 1 MMBbls/d of planned production that would not justify proceeding.
90
Oil Sands Higher Cost Projects The First To Fall In A Competitive North American Market
In a market that is oversaturated with oil, there will no doubt be rationalization and the first projects to get squeezed will be those with higher supply costs and a riskier capital profile. Unfortunately, higher cost oil sands projects seem like the first to get rationalized.
The North American market is clearly saturated with oil resource development opportunities ranging from tight oil to deep Gulf development to oil sands. In a market that is oversaturated, there will no doubt be rationalization and the first projects to get squeezed will be those with higher supply costs and a riskier capital profile. Unfortunately, higher cost oil sands projects seem like the first to get rationalized. The oil sands fall short in terms of capital profile risk as operators have to make significant investments for three to five years before production is realized far different than a tight oil operator that can manage capital well by well and realizes cash flow very quickly. This means that oil sands operators, when approving a project, are making bigger and riskier decisions. Smaller projects cost half a billion dollars while bigger investment decisions will be approaching $10 billion in stark contrast to tight oil where capital can essentially be managed well by well. The different scale of investment decision means that operators must have a higher degree of confidence in the macro environment or a bigger economic cushion to feel comfortable making that spending commitment. From a supply cost perspective, oil sands cover a very wide spectrum and it is grossly misleading to group all the projects in one basket. Lower cost/higher quality oil sands projects can compete in terms of rate of return vs. tight oil development and will no doubt remain in the race to develop resource. Higher supply cost oil sands assets such as many mining projects and higher cost in situ assets will face a much more challenging time justifying investment as planned and will likely be the first projects to be rationalized.
91
Exhibit 89. Oil Sands Supply Costs vs. Tight Oil Supply Costs
$100 $90 $80 $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0
Vi kin g Oi l( Sw an Hi lls ) SA Ca GD rd iu -L m Ti ow gh Oi tC l Co ar st bo Pr na od te uc sO er il ( Sl av eP oi nt ) Am ar an th n isk o yO il ( Ka yb ob ) Pr od uc er Mi ni ng Sh au na Oi l( Ba s ro du c Ba kk e Mi ni n Pe k Se al er g vo n e)
US$/Bbl
Up gr ad ed
tP
Co st
Mo nt ne y
Co s
SA GD
SA GD
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.(SAGD & Mining based on 20% WCS Diff & 5% SCO Diff both Vs WTI)
Oil Sands Are Down But Not Out Technology Optionality Is Still Large
There is an unprecedented amount of R&D dollars flowing into oil sands looking at technologies.
Although much of our top-down macro view of the oil sands is quite bearish, there is one very real theme that needs to be highlighted the potential role of technology. We have just seen (and discussed) how completion technology has had a profound impact on opening up shale and tight resources. The oil sands share similarities to shales in that they are another big, discovered resource but where R&D efforts are still in the very early innings. There is an unprecedented amount of R&D dollars flowing into oil sands looking at technologies ranging from evolutionary (solvent assisted SAGD, in-fill drilling, non-condensable gas, etc.) to revolutionary (combustion technologies, pure solvent techniques, electrical conductive technologies, technologies to eliminate diluent, etc.). Importantly, we are just starting to see the impact of technology. Cenovus has had very good, quantifiable results with its in-fill wells and will soon be the first to roll out SAP on a commercial scale. MEG recently surprised the market with its emSAGP approach, which uses non-condensable gas injection with in-fill wells to dramatically lower the SOR and free up more steam to add low-cost production. The overall point is that current supply costs do not reflect the potential of technology to change the oil sands landscape. This is a dynamic theme that we will continue to monitor, which could have an impact on the competitiveness of oil sands vs. tight oil resources.
Technology could be instrumental in reducing oil sands supply costs to more competitive levels with tight oil.
92
Ti
gh tC ar
bo na te s
Mo nt ne
-H ig h
-A vg
Gateway and TransCanadas gas pipeline conversion), there would still not be enough capacity to meet company targets! The obvious conclusion is that growth will need to be rationalized the only question is by how much? No company voluntarily gives up the quest for growthBut Some Will Have To. This leaves the onus on market forces to rationalize that growth. The main market drivers will either be hyper inflation, regulatory delays and/or lower pricing either due to lower global benchmark pricing or localized discounting due to insufficient pipeline capacity. The most likely outcome is some combination of all these factors but our biggest concern at the moment is pipeline access. Pipelines will likely be the biggest factor to dictate the pace of oil sands growth. We continue to believe that Keystone XL (the full line) will get built but one cant deny there is still a level of risk to that. The Enbridge Alberta Clipper and Line 9 reversals are also clear go-aheads in our view. Access to the West Coast, either through the proposed TMX expansion or Northern Gateway, is looking riskier by the day as provincial governments squabble over revenue sharing and broad based political support in B.C. appears very low. If neither of these lines go ahead, oil sands growth targets for 2020 (company forecasts) would have to be rationalized by approximately 1.7 MMBbls/d from current levels. TransCanadas idea (not yet formally proposed) of converting one of its natural gas pipelines to oil is gaining a lot of traction. This is loosely estimated to be capable of ~650,000 Bbls/d and could carry oil to Eastern Canada and could be put on ship in Quebec or in the Maritimes for export. This pipeline though is generally better for light oils as the Eastern Canada market or the Eastern U.S. or European market has little heavy oil coking capacity. In any case, moving more light oil east would effectively ease access for heavies into PADD 2 and 3, which would be still beneficial to oil sands. If this pipeline, as well as the West Coast pipelines, did not proceed, we would need to see oil sands growth rationalized 2.4 MMBbls/d from current planned activity levels. More Challenging Macro Environment For Oil Sands Likely To Continue To Impact M&A Parameters: Oil sands were once a hot focus for M&A activity. Back in the 2005-2008 time frame, typical deals for long-date oil sands resource were about US$1/Bbl. With higher prices in recent years, we have seen deal parameters steadily decrease particularly in recent months. The rationale behind this divergence is increasing awareness from prospective buyers of the pipeline takeaway uncertainty and cost inflation risk. Additionally, many of these same buyers have many opportunities to invest in tight oil resources, which have created more competition for M&A/JV dollars for the oil sands. This trend will likely continue although we note there are many factors that will impact transaction parameters in the oil sands such as scale of the resource for sale (smaller resources typically get less interest and lower value), quality and state of regulatory approval. Overall, we believe there is still room for oil sands M&A but likely continuing the recent trend of sub US$1/Bbl parameters.
93
Impact Of North American Tight Oil Renaissance On Global Supply Demand Balances
High North American Growth Likely To Loosen Medium-term Oil Balances
As unconventional natural gas supply boomed, it took many years for investors to fully come to grips with the likelihood that North American natural gas would be severely pressured for the foreseeable future. The question now is: will the boom in North American tight and oil sands upset the global supply/demand balance the same way we saw North American gas prices react to the supply boom? There are certain parallels between the tight oil boom and the gas boom but there are many differences as well. The key difference is the size of the market. U.S. demand at the start of the shale boom was approximately 63 Bcf/d or, in oil terms, approximately 10.5 million Boe/d versus the current global oil market of 89.1 MMBbls/d of demand. This clearly implies a much larger market to absorb the impacts of booming North American supply versus what occurred in the North American gas market. However, while the global oil market is much larger than the U.S. gas market, that does not mean that the U.S. boom will not alter the global supply/demand equation. Rapidly growing North American oil production will have an impact the question is how big? As depicted in Exhibit 90, we believe tight oil growth can drive U.S. onshore production growth of ~500,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016, oil sands should grow ~230,000 Bbls/d per year while conventional Canadian production (driven by tight oil) should easily grow 100,000 Bbls/d per year and GOM production growth should be up ~40,000 Bbls/d per year on average. All told, it is not hard to get to a North American growth assumption in the 800,000-900,000 Bbls/d per year range through 2016.
We believe North American oil production can grow 800,000900,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016 well above current consensus of ~340,000 Bbls/d.
94
2011
2020
'11-'16
'11-'20
Exhibit 91 depicts the consensus view of medium-term call on OPEC. As depicted, the official consensus view is that North American oil production growth will average 343,000 Bbls/d per year through 2015 (note that not all the same forecasters are encapsulated in both estimates as disclosures and forecast horizons vary considerably). As mentioned above, we believe it is not hard to see a scenario where North American growth is more in the 800,000-900,000 Bbls/d per year range well above current consensus expectations. Even our low-case scenario of ~650,000 Bbls/d per year is well above current consensus forecasts. Exhibit 91. Consensus North American Production & Call On OPEC
Consensus Supply View (mbbl/d)
Canada US Total Canada + US Mexico Total North America Other Non-OPEC Growth Total Non-OPEC
2011
3,639 8,478 11,389 2,953 15,096 38,380 52,985
2015
4,261 9,442 12,851 2,576 16,490 39,122 55,208
Annual Growth
144 227 343 (88) 334 185 536
2011
2,220 19,203 21,423 2,204 23,542 55,815 9,626 88,983 35,998 35,998 35,998 35,998
2015
2,203 19,027 21,230 2,274 23,526 58,500 11,753 93,779 38,572 37,312 36,392 35,596
Annual Growth
(5) (30) (35) 15 (0) 637 511 1,148 612 328 98 (101)
95
Using our assumptions for North American supply growth would reduce the consensus call on OPEC through 2015/16 from 600,000 Bbls/d to 0-300,000 Bbls/d a very significant change.
Medium-term Spare Capacity Expands Should Take SOME Of The Political Premium Out Of Oil
If we extend the analysis to the implied call on OPEC (i.e., leaving all other parts of consensus unchanged but updating to reflect our range of North American deliverability), it becomes quite apparent that North American growth can have an impact on medium-term markets. Using our assumptions for North American supply growth would reduce the consensus call on OPEC through 2015/16 from 600,000 Bbls/d to 0-300,000 Bbls/d a very significant change. In our view, this change implies that as global forecasters move to more realistic North American supply growth assumptions that the consensus view of tightness in the market will also change with a slightly bearish undertone. These weaker medium-term balances are the key reason we recently trimmed our long-term Brent assumption from US$100/Bbl to US$95/Bbl. Political risk is always one of the most important variables in the global oil price equation. Obviously there is no way of predicting long-term political risk; however, we can reasonably estimate the OPEC spare capacity cushion and how that will change over the coming years. As discussed previously, we believe as major forecasters incorporate more realistic North American production growth over the next five years, the view of market tightness will change as the call on OPEC is reduced to 0-300,000 Bbls/d per year. In addition to this, OPEC will more than likely continue to reinvest in production capacity. As depicted in the chart below, if OPEC builds production capacity, as stated, combined with the lower call on OPEC, the spare capacity cushion builds quite meaningfully reaching ~8 MMBbls/d by 2015, which would be one of the widest levels in many years. This is not to say that the political premium, which is variable but ever-present in oil prices, will evaporate. After all, OPEC will still make up ~40% of global oil production through 2015 (i.e., OPEC remains extremely important) and, while unpredictable, odds are high that political turbulence in the Middle East is not going to disappear anytime soon.
If OPEC builds production capacity, as stated, combined with the lower call on OPEC, the spare capacity cushion builds quite meaningfully reaching ~8 MMBbls/d by 2015, which would be one of the widest levels in many years.
Higher NA growth will take pressure off OPEC but will by no means reduce OPEC to irrelevancy as it will still produce ~40% of global oil production through 2015
Exhibit 92. OPEC Spare Capacity Sensitivity To North American Growth Scenarios
Consensus OPEC Spare Capacity (mbbl/d) Consensus OPEC Production Capacity Consensus Spare Capacity Spare Capacity - % Of Global Demand Spare Capacity With CIBCe Low North American Growth Spare Capacity - % Of Global Demand Spare Capacity With CIBCe Base Case North American Growth Spare Capacity - % Of Global Demand Spare Capacity With CIBCe High North American Growth Spare Capacity - % Of Global Demand
Source: EIA and CIBC World Markets Inc.
2011 40,229 4,231 4.8% 4,231 4.8% 4,231 4.8% 4,231 4.8%
2015 45,446 6,875 7.3% 8,135 8.7% 9,055 9.7% 9,851 10.5%
U.S. Reliance On Imports Lessens Considerably (But Pure Oil Independence Is Still A Long Ways Off)
We see U.S. required imports dropping from ~11 MMBbls/d in 2011 (and nearly 13 MMBbls/d in 2008) down to ~7.6 MMBbls/d by 2016 and 4-6 MMBbls/d by 2020
The recent boom in tight oil and liquids-rich resource play drilling has raised the possibility of the U.S. achieving oil independence or, at the very least, significantly reducing the need for imported oil. We generally agree with this thesis but not that the U.S. achieving pure energy independence is still a long ways off. Our base case view, which assumes relatively flat demand (in line with the EIA long-term energy outlook), we see U.S. required imports dropping from ~11 MMBbls/d in 2011 (and nearly 13 MMBbls/d in 2008) down to ~7.6 MMBbls/d by 2016 and 4-6 MMBbls/d by 2020 (depending on growth scenarios).
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The picture changes yet again when one considers the impact of Canadian production. As highlighted above, with Canadian based imports expected to grow meaningfully over the coming years, foreign oil imports (which we define as imports other than Canada) decline from 8.8 MMBbls/d to 2.1 MMBbls/d by 2020. We note that the Canadian wedge on this chart could be much larger if the U.S. government were to allow more unfettered access of Canadian crudes into the U.S. market. This highlights the often contradictory U.S. energy policy which wants to wean itself off foreign oil, yet at the same time is forcing Canadian producers to look to market oil into Asia.
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Crude Glut Means Canada + PADD 2 Crudes Will See Excess Volatility & Periodic Discounting Through 2014
In the short term, basis differential risk remains very high for Canadian and PADD 2 U.S. crudes (primarily Bakken). As we published in our report on March 6, The Double Discounting Of Canadian Crudes, we expect Canadian differentials versus WTI to remain exceptionally volatile through the 2014 time frame. As depicted in Exhibit 94, volatility has been extreme with three cycles of widening differentials over the past six months. There is little doubt in our minds that we will see several more cycles over the coming months as supply pressures mount and infrastructure scrambles to keep up. With PADD 2 pretty much at full capacity, every refinery hick-up (planned or unplanned) or pipeline restriction will result in discounting as depicted in the following charts:
Why The Canadian Discount?: Reasons for last years widening of the BrentWTI differential are well documented, driven by Cushing inventories reaching very full levels in addition to the limited ability to move barrels out of Cushing into PADD III. A bigger question is: why have Canadian crudes started to discount relative to WTI? We believe there are a number of factors but the simplest explanation is that pipeline capacity into Cushing from other parts of PADD II is limited, which is backing up crudes further in the system and, consequently, discounting Canadian crude prices.
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Ja n11 Fe b11 Ma r-1 1 Ap r-1 1 Ma y11 Ju n11 Ju l-1 1 Au g11 Se p11 Oc t-1 1 No v11 De c11 Ja n12 Fe b12 Ma r-1 2 Ap r-1 2 Ma y12 Ju n12 Ju l-1 2
Ja n11 Fe b11 Ma r-1 1 Ap r-1 1 Ma y11 Ju n11 Ju l-1 1 Au g11 Se p11 Oc t-1 1 No v11 De c11 Ja n12 Fe b12 Ma r-1 2 Ap r-1 2 Ma y12 Ju n12 Ju l-1 2
US Bakken Light
WTI
Syncrude Blend
Dated Brent
WCS
US Bakken Light
Syncrude Blend
Dated Brent
WCS
Volatility Highlights How Tight PADD 2 Is: The main triggers behind differentials widening or narrowing comes down mainly to refinery maintenance on the demand side and oil sands outages on the supply side. Year-to-date refinery throughput in PADD 2 & PADD 4 has averaged ~162,000 Bbls/d higher than last year. The difference is that even with higher throughput, every bit of refinery downtime is having significant pressure on PADD 2 & Canadian pricing. In our view, this provides a very clear look at how over saturated the PADD 2 market remains. Bakken & Oil Sands Production Pressures Continue To Mount: We believe U.S. Bakken production will continue growing at ~10,000 Bbls/d20,000 Bbls/d per month, with the natural market being PADD 2. SAGD oil sands volumes will likely continue to grow at ~7,000 Bbls/d per month in 2012 and close to 10,000 Bbls/d per month in 2013. Mining output will also receive a big boost in late 2012 with the start-up of the 110,000 Bbls/d Kearl oil sands mine. Overall, production from key plays where PADD 2 is the natural market could increase 550,000 Bbls/d750,000 Bbls/d from current levels by year-end 2013. PADD 2 Refinery Maintenance Will Be A Big Issue In 2012: PADD 2 refineries have been running at very robust rates to date in 2012. We are somewhat concerned by the high levels of planned maintenance in PADD 2, with current plans detailing 186,000 Bbls/d offline over the remainder of 2012 versus 85,000 Bbls/d last year and the five-year average of 131,000 Bbls/d. A similar story exists in PADD 4 where there are plans for 29,000 Bbls/d to be offline over the remainder of 2012 versus 12,000 Bbls/d last year and normal levels of ~16,000 Bbls/d. Exceptionally strong crack spreads may prompt refiners to defer maintenance as they did last year, but there are likely limits as to how far maintenance can safely be deferred. Changing Crude Diet In PADD 2 Solidifies The Balance Of Power For Refiners: Refinery demand within PADD 2 is just embarking on a major change. ConocoPhillips (COPNYSE) recently brought on the CORE refinery conversion project, adding ~160,000 Bbls/d of heavy capacity but displacing ~130,000 Bbls/d of light capacity. Over the next ~12 months, we will see an additional 310,000 Bbls/d of increased heavy capacity in PADD 2 at the expense of 300,000 Bbls/d of light oil capacity at a time when light oil production is rapidly increasing. However, refiners that have added this new heavy capacity can still move back to light crude oil slates if pricing warrants such a move. With refiners gaining greater flexibility with their crude slates, there is little doubt they will use this to create crude-on-crude competition and drive down prices for light streams, such as SCO and Bakken, and WCS. Seaway Provides Relief But Largely Playing Catch-up: Many investors believe that the Seaway pipeline reversal will fix the WTI-Brent disconnect and the more recent disconnect of Canadian pricing versus WTI. The more analysis we undertake, however, the more we believe this is not going to be the case. Seaway will provide some important relief but will largely be playing catch-up to existing supply pressures within PADD 2. Keystone XL South Should Alleviate Brent-WTI Diff But Canadian Discounting Could Last Until 2014: Overall, we believe the Brent-WTI differential should largely be resolved with the start-up of the southern portion of Keystone XL in H2/13 (likely in the mid to latter part of that range). Canadian prices would rise at least partially with WTI but could still face some discounting until 2014 when either Keystone XL or Flanagan South is built (there are still capacity constraints within PADD 2 to Cushing).
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There is no magic formula to determine the appropriate short-term discounts for WTI versus Brent and for Canadian Crudes versus WTI as this is largely uncharted territory. Directionally, we believe the market is still generally presuming 0% SCO differentials and ~20% differentials between WCS and WTI and the risk is clearly tilted toward wider differentials. We would not be surprised to see a scenario over the next 18 months whereby SCO/Bakken Light differentials bounce around a 0%15% discount versus WTI and where WCS resides around a 15%20% discount to SCO (i.e., a 15%30% discount versus WTI). Where in the range the crude slates trade depends on supply build versus timing of relief valves coming online (i.e., Seaway and southern portion of Keystone XL).
Discounting Of North American Crudes Likely To Remain Long Term But Discounting Shifts To LLS Vs. Brent
As we look deeper into North American oil balances post 2014, we now believe North American oil basis differentials will remain wide over the long term although manifesting in different ways than we are currently experiencing.
Our previous report (Double Discounting Of Canadian Crudes) examined the oversupply issue facing PADD 2 through the 2014/2015 time frame. Our general view at that time was that once there was sufficient infrastructure connecting PADD 2 to PADD 3 (south part of Keystone XL and full Seaway reversal) as well as better mobility within PADD 2 (full Keystone XL and Flanagan South) that the big discounts versus global benchmarks would dissipate. As we look deeper into North American oil balances post 2014, we now believe North American oil basis differentials will remain wide over the long term although manifesting in different ways than we are currently experiencing. We expect WTI to move towards transportation discounts versus LLS in the 2014 time frame (once Seaway and south part of Keystone XL are built) but we believe the new discount that will emerge is LLS starting to disconnect versus Brent oil. The basic issue that will emerge in PADD 3 is an influx of oil from PADD 2 (Bakken) and Canada (Tight oil and oil sands) plus dramatic growth out of PADD 3 plays such as the Eagle Ford, Permian, Mississippi Lime and potentially other emerging plays such as the Tuscaloosa. Basically, with U.S. oil production growing ~600,000 Bbls/d per year through 2016, coupled with severe export constraints, makes a massive wave of oil supply in a large but stagnant market.
When PADD 3 Stops Importing Light Oil (In Next 6-12 Months)The Natural Link Of LLS-Brent Dissipates
Canadian companies have long looked at PADD 3 access as the Holy Grail of the North American energy markets. However, by the time we get there, it will already be flooded with light oil.
Canadian companies have long looked at PADD 3 access as the Holy Grail of the North American energy markets. The appeal of PADD 3 is obvious in that it is a large refining market with 8.6 MMBbls/d of capacity, including about 3.2 MMBbls/d of heavy crude capacity. PADD 3 remains a very import driven market and the need for imports will not likely be completely eliminated through the 2020 time frame. However, the nature of the imports is changing very quickly and will start to have an impact on Gulf Coast pricing very soon. Exhibit 95 depicts the trend of oil imports into PADD 3 by type from Q1/08 to Q1/12. As depicted, not only have imports declined but the type of crude being imported is changing meaningfully.
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PADD 3 - Light Sweet PADD 3 - Light Sour PADD 3 - Med & Heavy
2,500
2,000
1,500
49%
1,000
39%
500
0
Q1 /08 Q2 /08 Q3 /08 Q4 /08 Q1 /09 Q2 /09 Q3 /09 Q4 /09 Q1 /10 Q2 /10 Q3 /10 Q4 /10 Q1 /11 Q2 /11 Q3 /11 Q4 /11 Q1 /12
PADD 3 - Light Sweet PADD 3 - Light Sour PADD 3 - Med & Heavy
While most of the decline in PADD 3 imports to date has been because of smaller draws from PADD 2, this will change dramatically over the coming years as PADD 3 production booms and PADD 2 production begins being dumped into PADD 3 following the Seaway expansion and South Keystone XL (Historically PADD 2 took about 1 MMBbls/d from PADD 3 and this will soon be completely reversed). Exhibit 96 depicts the need for foreign oil imports into PADD 3 through 2020 based on our various scenario analyses. As depicted, within the next 12 months, there will be no need to import light sweet crude into PADD 3 (most recent monthly imports were already down to only ~532,000 Bbls/d). At this point, we believe there will start to be more pressure on LLS pricing to begin competing more aggressively with lower grade crudes that price at lower levels.
As depicted, within the next 12 months, there will be no need to import light sweet crude into PADD 3 (most recent monthly imports were already down to only ~532,000 Bbls/d). At this point, we believe there will start to be more pressure on LLS pricing
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Within the next six months, we will likely no longer see any requirement for light sweet imports into PADD 3, at which point, the natural link between Brent-LLS breaks
Once the Brent-LLS spread opens up, it will start to make sense to consider moving under priced PADD 3 crude oil into the U.S. East Coast (PADD 1) refinery system by ship or, alternatively, for Bakken producers to rail more volumes to PADD 1.
Shipping PADD 3 Light Oil To East Coast Refineries Or Railing U.S. Bakken Direct To PADD 1: Once the Brent-LLS spread opens up, it will start to make sense to consider moving under priced PADD 3 crude oil into the U.S. East Coast (PADD 1) refinery system by ship (i.e., from Gulf Coast to East Coast) or, alternatively, for Bakken producers to rail more volumes to PADD 1 from their current focus of railing into PADD 1. The biggest challenge to shipping from Gulf Coast to PADD 1 is the Jones Act. Under current regulations (the Jones Act), to move crude (or refined products) between U.S. ports it must done on a U.S. built, manned and flagged ship. Needless to say there are not very many of those in existence and many of those that are, are already serving other routes. The EIA estimates there are fewer than 40 tankers capable of the Gulf Coast-East Coast route, and many of those are in operation. Additionally, there are a few new Jones Act tankers coming on later this year but there are few plans and this point to invest in the fleet expansion.
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Au g0 No 7 v-0 Fe 7 b0 Ma 8 y-0 Au 8 g0 No 8 v-0 Fe 8 b0 Ma 9 y-0 Au 9 g0 No 9 v-0 Fe 9 b1 Ma 0 y-1 Au 0 g1 No 0 v-1 Fe 0 b1 Ma 1 y-1 Au 1 g1 No 1 v-1 Fe 1 b1 Ma 2 y-1 2
The only real viable way for the option of moving discounted PADD 3 crudes to the East Coast is if the U.S. government was to waive Jones Act shipping requirements for crude oil. This would make sense in that it would help ensure the viability of East Coast refineries (lower priced feedstock), which implies job sustainability, etc. However, our understanding is there is very limited will in Washington to push for a relaxation of the Jones Act. Overall, this remains a key factor to watch but it would only make sense to ship LLS priced crudes to the East Coast if they were at a discount to Brent. However, this would likely moderate the level of discounts that could otherwise be quite substantial. We have already seen an explosion in crude oil by rail, primarily from the U.S. Bakken into PADD 3 where producers can currently receive Brent (and LLS currently on par with Brent) type pricing. If LLS starts to discount meaningfully vs. Brent (which we expect), we will likely see more crude volumes by rail diverted directly to PADD 1 instead of the PADD 3 market. However, we believe the rail cost of going east is approximately $5/Bbl higher than going South into PADD 3 and to do this would require a build out of receiving terminals. Simple Refinery Runs To Re-label Crude As Product To Allow Exports: Another potential factor that could in theory mitigate a Brent-LLS spread, is the ability of refiners to do very simple crude runs to effectively be able to re-label crude oil as refined product, which is allowed to be exported from the U.S. (in fact the U.S. net-exports of refined product are 2.8 MMBbls/d). A simple refinery run would basically take crude through the distillation tower, just enough refining to be able to label it as refined product. The idea of PADD 3 refiners moving to simple runs to get around crude oil export restrictions is appealing, but likely only has limited opportunity in practicality as: 1) there are limits to excess refining capacity in PADD 3 as GOM refinery capacity is running about 88% of current capacity. While this still leaves ~1 MMBbls/d of notional capacity if PADD 3 refineries ran at 100%, but it is virtually impossible to achieve these kind of rates as a calendar day average (note that with all-time record crack spreads over the past 18 months in PADD 2, refiners have tried with utilization averaging 91%); and 2) the motivation of the refiner is not necessarily aligned with the motivation of the producer. The refiner is motivated to get as big a margin as possible, which, in all but the most dire of scenarios, would be for a refiner to take discounted PADD 3 light crude and run a full slate to export into the global market a full suite of refined product, rather than just running lower margin exports. Refinery Blending: Refineries routinely blend different types/grades of crude oil to maximize margin. The threshold to blending is driven by a complex mix of yields and price. Refinery blending is one factor that could limit the magnitude of Brent-LLS spread but we do not see this as a specific floor value. The logic is that if light sweet oil is over-abundant in PADD 3 (which it will be), once it becomes sufficiently discounted refiners will start to blend light sweet barrels with medium-heavy barrels to approximate light sour imports. Such a measure would generally be beneficial to light sweet pricing in the near term (next few years) but would actually accelerate the rate at which imports of light to medium sour crudes are imported, and over the longer term would mean that, in the baseness of any of the aforementioned factors materializing, LLS would lose any of its link to global light oil prices. The Refinery X-Factor & Balance Of Power: As highlighted before, quantifying price discounts is a complex matter. The logic is relatively straight forward when it is simply transportation and quality related. However, the third component is the most difficult to define, and that is what we term the refinery X factor. What we mean by this is that when a situation arises in which a product is oversupplied into a constrained market, the consumer (refineries in
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this case) have the balance of power. With hundreds of market participants all fighting for limited refinery capacity, discounting emerges and it is largely at the hands of the refiner as to where the magnitude of those discounts. A prime example of this today is the market conditions in PADD 2. There is no quality or transportation cost that can argue why SCO and Bakken Light have averaged 4% and 9% discounts YTD vs. WTI. They are generally quite comparable quality products. The challenge though is that there are very few options outside of this market to sell their oil, and with many different sellers representing many different product slates, refineries have the ability to play sellers against each other to the detriment of pricing. Unless the U.S. government were to allow U.S. light oil exports (or as a shorter-term issue waive Jones Act requirements to at least move more crude across U.S. ports), the same type of dynamic will emerge in PADD 3. We do note however that the PADD will not be as dire as the current PADD 2 situation as PADD 3 will still need to import crude oil through 2020 (just low amounts and increasingly weighted towards heavy). The Fight For Refinery Access In PADD 3, Lots Of Coking Capacity But Refiners Have Flexibility: PADD 3 is the largest Coking market in the world with approximately 3.2 MMBbls/d of heavy oil capacity. With this much installed capacity, it seems quite a natural fit for lower-quality Canadian crudes such as WCS or for continued intake of Maya. However, just because PADD 3 is home to significant coking capacity, doesnt mean it will all be used. Any refinery that has coking capacity can take a higher-quality crude oil slate (the opposite clearly doesnt hold true though). There are many tradeoffs involved in the equation but it basically boils down to margin. A high complexity coking refinery may opt to run at slightly lower rates by taking a higher slate of light oils. The decision will be governed almost entirely by their margin analysis, which would incorporate the higher yield typically obtained from a lighter barrel together with factors such as lower wear and tear on the refinery and fewer catalyst costs, etc. In our discussions with refiners, we have typically heard that heavier barrels like Maya could not sustain a differential vs. light barrels of anything beyond US$5US$9/Bbl. Indeed this seems to correlate with historical Maya vs. LLS differentials, which have averaged in the US$10/Bbl range. The overall point from this discussion is that there will be significant competition from not only WCS vs. Maya for access to the PADD 3 market, but also for light oil trying to get access to higher complexity refineries. As discussed previously, this multifaceted competition shifts the balance of power to the refiners which they will use to their advantage (as we have seen already in PADD 2).
There will be significant competition from not only WCS vs. Maya for access to the PADD 3 market, but also for light oil trying to get access to higher complexity refineries. A complex refiner will take light oilif the price is right.
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WTI should be discounted in the US$4-US$5/Bbl range versus LLS reflecting pipeline tolls and bringing the long-term Brent-WTI differential to the ~US$10/Bbl range (~US$5/Bbl LLS plus ~US$5/Bbl transportation costs).
With this backdrop, WTI discounting to LLS should be relatively close to marginal pipeline shipping costs (i.e., what an uncontracted party would pay to ship on those pipelines). From this perspective, WTI should be discounted in the US$4/Bbl-US$5/Bbl range versus LLS reflecting pipeline tolls and bringing the long-term Brent-WTI differential to the ~US$10/Bbl range (~US$5/Bbl LLS plus ~US$5/Bbl transportation costs). In periods where production capacity has outpaced pipeline capacity start-ups, differentials will temporarily balloon to the US$15+/Bbl range (similar to what we have seen over the past 18 months).
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Time To Smoke The Peace Pipe Plenty Of Proposals On The Table But Political Risk Mounting
CIBCs pipelines analyst Paul Lechem published a very detailed report on longerterm pipeline initiatives in early March and will provide a more detailed follow-up in the not too distant future (reflecting TransCanadas emerging plans and recent Enbridge announcements). The general conclusion is that there are plenty of pipeline proposals on the table longer term but many of those proposals are facing increasing levels of political risk. The following table provides an overview of the main current export proposals.
Northern Gateway
Bruderheim, AB to Kitimat, BC
TMX
Edmonton, AB to Burnaby, BC
Hardisty, AB to Superior, WI
350,000
Hardisty, AB to Montreal, PQ
600,000 (est.)
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc. (Paul Lechem)
Sadly, all but the Albert Clipper expansion remain mired in politics. Any decision on the main portion of Keystone XL is unlikely until early in 2013. Rhetoric towards both the West Coast pipelines is running rampant and at this point we would regard the West Coast pipelines as no better than 50/50 odds that they are built before the end of this decade. Even though the federal government ultimately maintains the right to push the projects through, we are not fully convinced the political will is lasting long term particularly if the B.C. provincial government opposes the pipeline. TransCanadas emerging plan to convert a portion of its West-East gas pipelines to oil service is appealing in many ways, but its still too early to gauge the risks/benefits for sure.
We estimate that the pipeline pressures really could hit in the 2014 time frame illustrating that there is NO room for further slippage of the Keystone XL build.
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From a longer-term perspective, the key observation is that it is virtually impossible for companies to execute the sum of their plans as even with every pipeline that is currently proposed is built, there would still not be enough capacity. Additionally, in our view, the two proposed West Coast pipelines still face considerable political and regulatory risk. TransCanadas East Coast pipeline (conversion of natural gas lines) is still at a very early stage and therefore more difficult to count on and could also face additional political risk particularly the element of exporting oil sands output from Quebec City. Overall, this once again highlights the need for rationalization of growth expectations down to available pipeline capacity. The only question is, does that mean industry growth expectations through 2020 need to be cut by 1 MMBbls/d or 3 MBbls/d (only Keystone XL gets built).
5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E CAPP Current Capacity Enbridge Northern Gateway Enbridged Mainline Expansion 2 2015E 2016E 2017E Company Forecasts TranscCanada Keystone XL TransCanada Eastern Canada 2018E 2019E 2020E CIBC Estimates Kinder Morgan TMX Enbridge Mainline Expansion 1
The key takeaway from this analysis is that our current long-term forecasts of Canadian light oil discounting versus LLS of ~US$7/Bbl could face considerable risk if any of the aforementioned pipelines are cancelled or face long-term delays.
Canadian Light Should Price A Transportation Discount To Gulf Coast Or CushingIf Pipe Is Built
We assume Canadian crudes price at transportation discounts vs. U.S. long term, but this assumption is only valid if pipelines are built which is a bigger risk for Canadian crudes than for PADD 2 crudes.
We have already established the likely widening of Gulf Coast (LLS) pricing versus Global pricing (Brent) and further discounting of WTI versus LLS. What then for Canadian crudes? Western Canadian crudes will largely be tied to a combination of Cushing and Gulf Coast pricing. Transportation costs on Keystone XL are estimated at US$7/Bbl for light oil and approximately US$9/BblUS$10/Bbl for heavy oil and similar costs for the Enbridge Flanagan South and Seaway lines. Off LLS of US$90/Bbl (our current long-term assumption) this implies Canadian light oil pricing of US$83/Bbl range. However, we note that this assumption is only valid presuming pipeline growth keeps pace with production growth which is a bigger risk for Canadian crudes than for PADD 2 crudes.
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SCO In Asia Would Likely Sell At Brent: ~$95/Bbl Estimated Cost via VLCC to Asia ~$3/Bbl
Kitimat
($4.0 0-$5.0 0)
SCO Sold Into PADD 2: $86-$86.50/Bbl SCO Sold Into PADD 3: $82/Bbl SCO Sold Into Asia: $86-$87/Bbl SCO Sold Into California:$87-$88/Bbl SCO Sold Into East Coast US: $87/Bbl
.00 ($4
) .00 -$5
Estim ated C
osts T
o Eas
t Coa
st In
The ~
Estimated Cost via. VLCC From Kitimat to California: ~$1.00/Bbl Estimated Cost using Afromax From Vancouver to California: ~$1.50/Bbl
bl 0/ B $4.0 .50~$3 /Bbl 8 ing: us h GC : $ oC to Ed T om Ed m t Fro st Fr Cos ion Co t tion orta nsporta p a ans t Tr ight Tr L Ligh
$8/Bb
l Ran
ge
Chicago Flanagan
SCO Into California Would Likely Sell At Brent + Transport From Mid-East or Light oil From GC : ~$96-$97/Bbl Or Light
Cushing
Light Transportation uth Cost ~$3-$5/Bbl (So Segment Only)
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Refinery Conoco - Wood River CORE Marathon - Detroit HOUP BP - Whiting Refinery Modernization Project Total
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Fundamentally, PADD 3 refiners have a strong desire to run WCS, which is bullish for light-heavy spreads. However, we believe that the pressure on light pricing will still result in lower WCS pricing than we had previously modelled.
The WCS environment changes once again as industry gains access to PADD 3. As discussed previously, PADD 3 is a natural market for WCS given the high amount of coking capacity that exist in that market and lack of heavy oil production. Fundamentally, PADD 3 refiners have a strong desire to run WCS (reasonably equivalent to Mayan crude). However, as we have seen in PADD 2, when one oil slate is in oversupply, it can bring pressure on the whole oil complex as refiners play crude slates against crude slates (see prior comment entitled Balance Of Power Impacts Pricing). In PADD 3, the emerging big pressure on LLS will likely also put some downward pressure on Maya. In general, we believe that Maya will not likely price better than US$5/BblUS$9/Bbl off LLS (this historical Brent-Maya differential is US$9/Bbl), which in our conversations with refiners we understand to be the rough half-cycle costs for a refiner with cokers electing to take a light oil crude slate. Given this relationship, we can infer that once Canadian producers get access to the PADD 3 market, they will get the Mayan price link they have long sought but unfortunately Maya will not be as high priced as it had been historically due to the big discounting of light oil in PADD 3. Our best estimate is that off Brent, LLS will price ~US$5/Bbl lower and Maya ~US$5-US$9/Bbl below LLS and transportation costs to Western Canada are approximately US$10/Bbl. In an unconstrained transportation environment, this would imply WCS US$71/BblUS$75/Bbl or 75%-77% of Brent and 83%-88% of WTI.
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Oriente Arab Heavy Djeno Vasconia Souedieh Maya Access Western Blend (AWB) Christina Dilbit Blend (CDP) Western Canada Select (WCS)
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
API (Degrees) 29.2 27.4 27.0 24.5 24.1 22.2 21.8 20.9 20.6
Sulphur (%) 0.88% 2.80% 0.47% 1.01% 3.90% 3.30% 3.94% 3.73% 3.49%
TAN (mg/g) 0.39 0.10 0.77 0.30 0.15 0.28 1.7 1.49 0.93
Applying the crude characteristics in the aforementioned table to WCS and AWB/CLB would imply discounting vs. Maya in the US$4.75/Bbl range for WCS and ~US$8/Bbl for AWB/CLB.
There are many factors at play in crude quality differentials, ranging from refinery yield and price/desire for those feedstocks vs. refinery wear and tear, etc. In our research, we found an interesting study taking a statistical approach to global crude oil discounts (ESMAP Technical Paper 081 Crude Oil Differentials and Differences in Oil Qualities), incorporating API, sulphur and TAN. We back-tested this against several grades of global heavy oil and found that the statistical relationships still hold strongly even though the study was conducted in 2005. Using this multiple regression, the predicted discount of Maya vs. Brent is ~US$10.60/Bbl vs. the US$10/Bbl actual. The same study applied to Arab Heavy implied a US$6/Bbl discount vs. Brent vs. the actual of approximately US$6.80/Bbl. Overall, we conclude that while not perfect, it is a reasonable basis for quality discount assumptions. Applying the crude characteristics in the aforementioned table to WCS and AWB/CLB would imply discounting vs. Maya in the US$4.75/Bbl range for WCS and ~US$8/Bbl for AWB/CLB. For purposes of our netback analysis, we have assumed US$2.40/Bbl for WCS (mid-point of zero discount and our calculated) and US$4/Bbl for AWB/CLB (mid-point of zero discount and US$8/Bbl calculated). The point of this analysis is to highlight that the comparability of Canadian heavy crudes vs. Maya does arguably carry more risk than the market recognizes. The pricing for WCS into Asian markets or California is somewhat of a question mark. One of the more transparent heavier crudes into Asia is Arab Heavy. Using the pricing relationship established previously, it would be reasonable to assume meaningful quality discounts for WCS or AWB/CLB vs. this blend reflecting the significantly higher sulphur content and higher TAN. Our best estimate is that WCS would price ~US$9/Bbl off Arab Heavy and that AWB/CLB would price up to US$12/Bbl off Arab Heavy. For the purposes of our netback analysis, we have assumed US$6.75/Bbl discount for WCS and US$9/Bbl for AWB/CLB.
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Kitimat
Price (After Transport) Selling To: Cushing Or GC: $68-72/Bbl for WCS & $67-$71/Bbl for AWB To California: ~$75-79/Bbl fpr WCS & $72-$76/Bbl for AWB To Asia: ~$73-77/Bbl for WCS & ~$75-79/Bbl for AWB
$5.00 -$6.0 0
00 $6. 00$5.
Estimated Cost via. VLCC From Kitimat to California: ~$1.00/Bbl Estimated Cost using Afromax From Vancouver to California: ~$1.50/Bbl
Bbl 4-6/ l : ~$ b hing -$10/B Cus : $8 C d To m E Ed to G o t Fr Cos st From o tion orta tation C p rans por vy T ans Hea avy Tr e H
Chicago Flanagan
Priced Off: Arab Heavy $88/Bbl (~$7/Bbl Discount) or Maya + Transport ~$88/Bbl WCS Would Likely Sell ~$4.50-$9.00/Bbl Quality Discount AWB/CLB Would Likely Sell ~$6-12/Bbl Quality Discount WCS ~ $75-$79/Bbl AWB/CDB ~ $72-$76/Bbl
Maya in Cushing ~ $76-$82/Bbl WCS in Cushing ~$68-$72/Bbl (Slightly higher TAN) AWB or CDB ~$67-71/Bbl (Significantly higher TAN) Cushing
Heavy Transportation Cost ~$3-$5/Bbl
New Market Access (East Coast Canada Or West Coast) Keep Pricing From Blowing Out But Dont Lead To Big Upside
As depicted in the previous exhibits, opening up new market access whether it is through one or both of the proposed new West Coast lines, improved access to PADD 3 or even the newly proposed TransCanada East Coast line (converting gas pipeline to oil) are absolutely necessary for Canadian crudes. One generally held view is that this new market access will lead to substantial improvements in Canadian pricing. In our view, that is not necessarily the case as relatively high transportation costs on new build pipelines combined with some degree of quality discounting leads to acceptable pricing for Canadian crudes, but certainly not better than we have seen in recent history (other than the extremes we have seen thus far in 2012). No doubt this new market access will see improved prices or lower discounts than we are seeing today, but not necessarily significantly tighter discounting than we saw in 2010-2011. Overall, the big value of these new pipelines is ensuring that Canadian pricing doesnt turn into a complete disaster which would be the case if adequate pipelines are not built and producers were stuck competing for very limited access.
111
The appeal of rail in the current environment is obvious. If our call on differentials is correct, the economic advantage that we see from rail today will dissipatebut it still provides an important insurance policy against pipelines not getting built.
100,000
0
Ja n Ja n Fe b Fe b Ma r Ma r Ap r Ap r Ap r Ma y Ma y Ju n Ju n Ju l Ju l Au g Au g Se p Se p Se p Oc t Oc t No v No v De c De c
0
Ja n Ja n Fe b Fe b Ma r Ma r Ap r Ap r Ap r Ma y Ma y Ju n Ju n Ju l Ju l Au g Au g Se p Se p Se p Oc t Oc t No v No v De c De c
112
Although the rail financial arbitrage will likely dissipate, we believe there is a permanent role for rail in the North American transportation mix. The advantage that many producers have observed is having more flexibility to reach different markets and that is a key offering of rail vs. pipelines. Most likely once the Brent-LLS spread widens, we will see a shift of big Bakken volumes moving from the Bakken and Canada down to PADD 3 to a gradual focus to moving into PADD 1
Mexico & VenezuelaNo Threat To PADD 3 Market In Short Term But Not Necessarily Out Of The Picture
Declining production from Mexico, particularly for heavy oil, has created a bullish backdrop for heavy oil pricing in PADD 3. For Venezuela, the story is a bit different. Oil production (primarily heavy oil) is growing but increasingly, for political reasons, Venezuela is marketing its heavy oil to Asia (China in particular). While nobody is expecting a short-term rebound in Mexican or Venezuelan heavy deliveries into the Gulf Coast, one cannot remove them from the equation completely.
Venezuela Production
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 2,500
Exports To USA (Right) Total
2,500
2,000 MBbls/d
MBbls/d
1,500
1,500
1,000
1,000
500
0 Ma r-1 0 Ma y10 Ju l-1 0 Se p10 No v10 Ja n11 Ma r-1 1 Ma y11 Ju l-1 1 Se p11 No v11 Ja n12 Ma r-1 2 Ma y12 Ja n1
500
For Mexico, the issue on growing production is not a lack of resources as the country has an estimated 10.4 billion barrels of proved reserves with large unexplored potential. It is primarily funding issues surrounding Pemex combined with political squabbling. With a new government in Mexico, the factor to watch is whether or not there are any changes to funding/levels or more aggressive development plans. For Venezuela, the key issues are the next election and
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whether or not Chavez survives to that date. Recent headlines from opposition leaders suggest they would move to end Venezuelas preferential oil deals such as the deal they have to ship Venezuelan heavy crude to China. It remains to be seen if this is pure rhetoric or if this could mean the potential for more Venezuelan crude to be aimed at the U.S. market. PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.) estimates that 43% of its crude was marketed under these types of preferential deals that it is not paid directly for. In the short term, little is unlikely to change for either country as increasing production in any meaningful way is relatively long cycle time. However, over the medium to longer term though this is still a real risk that one or both countries finds its way back to growth. As the U.S. represents a whopping 55% of global coking capacity and the next largest market (other than Venezuela or Mexico) is Asia, which is 9,300 miles further away, this implies the U.S. GOM will remain THE destination of choice for Venezuelan, Mexican and Canadian heavy oil with all producers fighting for share of the same market (that is already over-saturated with light barrels).
US 55%
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Canada & PADD 2 Discounts To Remain Through 2014: We continue to believe that Canada and PADD 2 crudes will remain very susceptible to discounting through the 2014/15 time frame (when the full Keystone XL is built and Flanagan/Seaway). PADD 2 and pipe within PADD 2 are at capacity, meaning any pipeline curtailment or refinery outage will lead to meaningful discounts. Once the aforementioned pipes are built, we should see Canadian crudes settle into a transportation discount vs. WTI and LLS. PADD 2 Problems Will Soon Turn To PADD 3 Problems: PADD 3 is already nearly awash in light sweet crude (Eagle Ford, etc.). When Seaway and the south portion of Keystone XL are on-stream, PADD 2 will be sending over 1 MMBbls/d of crude into this market (a good portion of that being light) fully saturating the market. As it is prohibited by law to export crude oil from the U.S., this means that PADD 3 will become a trapped market for light oil and will soon lead to discounting of LLS to Brent. We Estimate WTI-Brent In US$10/Bbl Range Long Term: We recently changed our long-term oil price forecasts to reflect a US$10/Bbl discount of WTI vs. Brent, which consists of a US$5/Bbl discount for LLS-Brent plus ~US$5/Bbl transport differential back to Cushing. No Crude Is Untouched By This Theme: Generally speaking, there will be strong desire for Canadian heavy crudes by PADD 3 refiners, but this by no means WCS has a reserved spot in the PADD 3 refinery system. Complex heavy refiners can (and will) take light oil over heavy for the right price leading to competition for this coveted refinery space. Directionally we believe WCS pricing is less impacted by this theme, but still impacted nonetheless as it is weighed down to a certain degree by pricing on the light complex. Canadian Crudes Should Price A Transportation Discount; But Only If Pipe Is Built: If adequate pipeline capacity is built, Canadian crudes should trade at transportation costs vs. U.S. equivalent crudes (SCO vs. WTI and WCS vs. Maya with slight quality adjustment). If pipeline capacity is not built, then Canadian prices will move to discounts large enough to eliminate much of the anticipated demand growth a disastrous scenario for Canadian producers. Time To Smoke The Peace Pipe: There are adequate proposals being considered to move Western Canadian crudes to the U.S. and new markets such as Asia, California or the East Coast U.S. However, political risk and rhetoric is clearly ramping up, particularly against the crucial West Coast pipelines. We give only 50/50 odds (at best) of West Coast pipe being built before the end of the decade.
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Demand Drivers
Oil Sands
Depending on the oil sands growth scenario, we can see natural gas demand for oil sands rising by 0.20.4 Bcf/d per year from 2011 to 2016 (1-1.6 Bcf/d growth in absolute terms) and 0.2-0.6 Bcf/d per year from 2016 to 2020 (0.8-2.4 Bcf/d in absolute terms).
Canadian natural gas production is expected to remain relatively stagnant as reinvestment remains primarily targeted towards tight oil and oil sands growth. On the demand side though, things are different. Oil sands growth will continue to drive significant demand for natural gas in Western Canada. As identified in the previous sections, the outlook for oil sands growth remains highly variable reflecting the higher cost structure vs. other North American oil growth and higher transportation costs and need for infrastructure build. Depending on the oil sands growth scenario, we can see natural gas demand for oil sands rising by 0.2-0.4 Bcf/d per year from 2011 to 2016 (1-1.6 Bcf/d growth in absolute terms) and 0.2-0.6 Bcf/d per year from 2016 to 2020 (0.8-2.4 Bcf/d in absolute terms). The low end of forecasts corresponds to oil sands growth being rationalized to CAPP forecast levels which are roughly equal to capacity if Keystone XL is built. The CIBC case is roughly the mid-point of these lower scenarios and company forecasts (which we present as the unrisked case).
Producer Forecast
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Source: EIA.
Natural gas will clearly make very meaningful in-roads into the US power mix over the coming years. But what does this actually mean for natural gas demand? Here is where the opinions vary quite considerably. Exhibit 109 depicts the outlook from both the EIA and from IHSCera. The EIA is projecting demand growth of 0.26 Bcf/d per year from 2011-2016 and relatively flat thereafter. On the more optimistic side, IHSCera is forecasting 0.9 Bcf/d per year growth from 2011 to 2016 and 1.2 Bcf/d per year from 2016 to 2020.
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Overall, we have based our forecasts on 0.6 Bcf/d per year demand growth from 2011 to 2020.
Overall, we have based our forecasts on 0.6 Bcf/d per year demand growth from 2011 to 2020, which is based on historical growth rates plus roughly mid-point between EIA and IHSCera forecasts. We note that one of the reasons for the more conservative EIA outlook is its view that renewables grow from 10% of the U.S. power mix to 14% by 2020. If renewables were maintained at 10% rather than growing to the 14% range as forecast by the EIA, the increment would most likely be made up by natural gas which would add ~3.5 Bcf/d (0.4 Bcf/d per year to their growth forecasts) for natural gas.
Source: EIA.
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20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 E 20 13 E 20 14 E 20 15 E 20 16 E 20 17 E 20 18 E 20 19 E 20 20 E
As Expected; LNG Emerging As A Major Theme In 2012: We highlighted that a dominant theme in 2012 will be North American LNG moving from dream to reality. With the Sabine Pass facility recently just passing Final Investment Decision (FID), we now have one facility under construction. Kitimat has been delayed somewhat (from mid-2012 FID to tentative late 2012/early 2013), although we note site clearing and work has already begun. 20 Bcf/d+ Of North American Liquefaction Proposals On The Table: The following table highlights the potential for LNG exports that are currently on the table in North America. We have highlighted approved projects in green, projects that have currently entered the regulatory process in orange and preapplication projects in yellow. Overall, there are ~155 MMtpa (20.2 Bcf/d) of liquefaction facility proposals currently on the table with other proposals likely to emerge through 2012 [Nexen (NXY-SU)/Inpex (1605-T), Imperial/Exxon to name a few].
Approved Project
Total Fully Approved Projects Total In Regulatory Process Other Status Total Risked Canada Expectations Risked US Expectations Total Risked Expectations
In Regulatory Process
Pre-Application
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.6 1.7 2.2 0.8 4.1 0.3 5.2 0.8 2.9 3.7 1.6 7.1 1.8 10.5 1.7 4.4 6.1 1.6 11.3 3.1 15.2 2.4 5.1 7.5 1.6 13.7 3.9 17.6 2.9 5.6 8.5
We Believe ~8 Bcf/d Of LNG Exports By 2020: As depicted in Exhibit 111, we believe there is a reasonable likelihood of seeing approximately 62 MMtpa (8.5 Bcf/d) of export capacity by 2020, with 22 MMtpa (2.9 Bcf/d) likely from Western Canada, and 40 MMtpa (5.6 Bcf/d) from the U.S. (primarily Gulf Coast). Next DOE Non-FTA Export Approvals Rulings Will Be Major Milestone: The DOE surprised the market in early 2011 by granting approval to the proposed 18 MMtpa (2.4 Bcf/d) Sabine Pass facility, allowing LNG exports to non-free trade countries (a necessity for almost any U.S. LNG project). We are currently waiting on similar approvals for Freeport 14 MMtpa (1.8 Bcf/d), Lake Charles 15 MMtpa (2 Bcf/d), and Cove Point 7.6 MMtpa (1 Bcf/d). The DOEs primarily concern is security of supply, and with 2,543 Tcf of estimated resources in the U.S. representing 80 years at 2040 projected demand levels, we believe this will not be an issue. The DOE approval of Sabine Pass resulted in a meaningful move in long-term gas futures when it was announced and we could see a similar situation if and when further approvals are granted.
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We Expect To See 2-3 New Non-FTA Export Approvals In Early 2013: Price implications of LNG exports will also be a DOE concern and we believe the DOE is undergoing a substantial review, which it will use to base approval of proposed export facilities. We expect the review to depict similar results as other recent studies; essentially indicating that the price impact will be relatively modest, leaving gas prices at easily acceptable levels for consumers and industry. Overall, we believe there is a high chance the DOE approves 2-3 additional export facilities after the U.S. election in November (effectively early 2013 to announce approval). Most likely they will first grant approval to brownfield conversions of existing regas capacity in the GOM vs. greenfield developments. Asians VERY Interested In Opening North American LNG Markets: Skeptics continue to be proved wrong as Sabine Pass on the GOM has moved to FID. The project has signed contracts for 16 MMtpa (2.1 Bcf/d) of capacity with Asian consumers making big commitments, despite the very long shipping distance (approximately 11,000 miles). More recently, the proposed Freeport project announced tentative deals with Osaka Gas (9532-T) and Chubu Electric (9502-T) from Japan, once again highlighting the demand from Asian buyers for North American LNG. Tolling Model In GOM Pulling Some Interest From Canadian LNG But Price Difference Is Not Large: Cheniere (LNG-AMEX) surprised the market by selling out all of the capacity on its Sabine Pass export project. More recently, Freeport LNG announced tentative deals on its first Train with Japanese buyers lining up. Clearly buyers are attracted to the tolling model as an alternative to the traditional LNG oil linked pricing deal. However, we note that the long-term prices are not terribly different. Under current spot prices the gap is large as the cost to get cargoes back to Asia is $8.45 (US$3/Mcf gas plus tolls and shipping) vs. US$11- US$14/Mcf under oil linked pricing. However, on current strip prices, the cost through the tolling model is US$10.41/Mcf (US$4.70/Mcf gas plus tolls) US$11-US$14/Mcf under oil linked pricing (oil curve is relatively flat through 2017). Additionally, under the traditional model the buyer would also take an equity position which further reduces the apparent price gap. Overall, we continue to believe there will be oil linked pricing for Western Canadian LNG but potentially with a minor natural gas link.
Exhibit 112. Landed Natural Gas Price To Asia From GOM Under Tolling Model
Spot $3.00 $0.45 $3.45 $3.00 $2.00 $8.45 2017 Futures $4.70 $0.71 $5.41 $3.00 $2.00 $10.41
Gas Cost 2017 Futures Curve Contracted Premium (15% premium to NYMEX to cover Fuel Shrink & basis) Effective Gas Price @ Plant Gate Contracted Toll Shipping Cost (via Panama Canal post expansion - $3/Mcf currently) Landed Gas Price
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
Kitimat Behind Schedule But Will Likely Move To FID In Late 2012/Early 2013: Based on our analysis of Australian LNG costs, we believe liquefaction costs are likely in the $800-$1200 per MMtpa ($37,000-$55,000/Boe/d) range, well above original cost estimates. We also expect pipeline costs to have increased to $240-$280 per MMtpa ($11,000-$13,000/Boe/d) for an overall project cost of $1,040-$1,480 per MMtpa ($48,000-$68,000/Boe/d) for Phase 1. We still believe Kitimat may surprise the market by announcing an anchor partner for its full 1.4 Bcf/d of proposed capacity, not just the first 0.7 Bcf/d train. Even with higher
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costs, we still believe Kitimat will deliver reasonable returns with our mid-case modeling yielding $2.8 billion of NPV and a 15% IRR at US$100/Bbl and US$5/Mcf gas. If FID is declared in late 2012/early 2013, we should see first gas exports in the 2016-2017 time frame. Shell Unveils LNG Canada Plans: After much secrecy, Shell has finally unveiled its plans for LNG Canada in Kitimat. The project is initially envisioned as a 12 MMtpa (1.6 Bcf/d) facility with the intent to double to 24 MMtpa (3.2 Bcf/d). First gas from Train 1 is expected in 2019 with Train 2 on-stream likely six months after. Timing for Trains 3&4 have not been announced but we believe a likely scenario is to continue the pace and bring on these additional trains in about six months intervals. Petronas Demonstrates Commitment To LNG: While we never doubted Petronas (PGAS-KL) intent to develop LNG, following its $5.5 billion bid for Progress (PRQ-SP), there is little doubt it will continue to aggressively pursue LNG. Petronas announced in the spring that it has selected Prince Rupert as the location for its planned LNG facility with first gas still slated for the ~2018 time frame. Other Parties Still Assessing Canadian LNG: Progress highlighted in its recent information circular that it was approached several times by a party other than Petronas to acquire the firm. Petronas then went on to bid $20.45/share cash and then raised the offer again after the other party came back. In our view, this is a clear depiction that there is another large party wanting to get positioned for LNG exports and that desire likely has not gone away following their failed bid for Progress. Some of the parties still thought to be looking at B.C. LNG exports are BG [BG-L] (acquired a site in Prince Rupert but has no resource as of yet), Exxon/Imperial and Nexen [likely to be CNOOC (CEONYSE)]/Inpex. North American LNG Can Compete Effectively With Australian LNG: Greenfield Canadian liquefaction costs will likely be similar to Australia, shipping distances into Asia are only modestly longer (4,300 nautical miles from Canada vs. 3,100 - 4,300 from Australia) and upstream development costs are similar. We also believe that LNG buyers will see some value in diversifying markets away from Australia, which has become a very heated environment.
U.S. Demand Growth Expected To Average 1.4 Bcf/d Per Year Through 2016 And 2.0 Bcf/d Per Year From 20162020 As LNG Exports Begin
Overall, we estimate that U.S. demand for natural gas should increase approximately 1.4 Bcf/d per year through 2016 and 2.0 Bcf/d per year from 2016-2020 as LNG exports accelerate (1 Bcf/d excluding LNG exports). As discussed, the main growth drivers behind U.S. natural gas demand is power which we expect to grow ~0.6 Bcf/d per year with upside to the 1 Bcf/d per year range. We believe it is reasonable to assume 2-3 U.S. LNG export terminals in operation by the 2020 time frame with aggregate exports in the 4.5 Bcf/d range, representing a big incremental demand driver.
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122
2011 31,775 31,775 31,775 31,775 31,775 31,775 31,775 31,775 34,429
2016 40,258 42,628 44,662 47,689 45,864 49,068 53,130 57,442 29,802
2020 45,759 49,440 53,201 70,361 54,723 60,227 64,143 70,851 26,420
'11-'16 1,696 2,171 2,577 3,183 2,818 3,459 4,271 5,133 (925)
'16-'20 1,375 1,703 2,135 5,668 2,215 2,790 2,753 3,352 (845)
'11-'20 1,554 1,963 2,381 4,287 2,550 3,161 3,596 4,342 (890)
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Northeast Region Growing Marcellus Production Lessens Need For Canadian Imports
The Northeastern U.S. is still the largest consuming region of natural gas in the U.S., consuming ~35 Bcf/d in peak winter months. The region has always had a large supply deficit, which was filled from a combination of Canadian imports, Mid-Continent and U.S. Southwest movements (and some LNG imports). As depicted in the chart below, the growth in the Marcellus has been staggering but the region is still by far a large net consumer, even in the summer months.
Although the US NE is still a large net consumer of gas, the dramatic growth in the Marcellus is having an impact on inter-regional flowslessening the need for Canadian gas in Eastern markets.
Although the US NE is still a large net consumer of gas, the dramatic growth in the Marcellus is having an impact on inter-regional flows as the lower need for imports into the region is meaning that gas that would otherwise be destined for this market is finding a new home. Increasingly, we are starting to see bigger movements of U.S. natural gas into the Eastern Canada market effectively backing out some of the need for Western Canadian gas in this market. Importantly, this trend is not going away. At current rig counts (which are off 30% from their highs), we expect Marcellus production to grow from current levels of approximately 6.5 Bcf/d to ~9 Bcf/d by 2016 and in the 12 Bcf/d range by 2020. With a return to 2010-11 rig counts, we could be in the 12 Bcf/d range by 2016 and in the 17 Bcf/d range by 2020. While any of these scenarios still leave the US NE in a net consuming position, it would have a radical impact on intra-regional pipeline flows/market access.
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To date, the impact on AECO-NYMEX differentials hasnt been as bad as one would think given this backdrop. Part of the issue is that Canadian gas production has been declining due to overall price weakness for natural gas, which has meant that the backed out gas, was essentially voluntarily backed out. The basis risk could become bigger though should overall gas prices increase to a level that prompts higher reinvestment in natural gas drilling in Western Canada, and there is an actual competition for market access. The following chart depicts our current outlook through 2020 for gas movements out of the Western Canadian gas market. As depicted, we expect only moderate growth in overall dry gas production which combined with potentially very meaningful growth in oil sands, leaves gas movements out of Western Canada declining through the 2016 time frame. The decline in gas movements out of Western Canada would accelerate should LNG exports come to pass (which we believe they will). Overall, we see continued competition for Canadian gas in traditional markets but a continued industry focus on oil, combined with opening of non-traditional markets should lead to AECO-NYMEX basis differentials remain in a reasonable range. In a scenario where gas prices remain sub US$4/Mcf, we could actually see Western Canada gradually emerge as a very independent market as supply would decline to a point where oil sands demand growth and LNG leave very little left to export to the U.S. or Eastern Canada.
Exhibit 115. Western Canadian Gas Available For Export To Eastern Canada/U.S.
Canadian Supply Growth Scenario
22,500 20,000 17,500 15,000 LNG Exports Other WC Gas Demand Oil Sands Gas Demand Gas Available For Export To Eastern Can or US
MMcf/d
1E
2E
7E
6E
3E
4E
8E
9E
20 08
20 09
20 10
5E
0E
17 E
16 E
13 E
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 1
20 2
20 1
20 08
20 09
20 10
12 E
11 E
15 E
14 E
18 E
19 E 20
20
20
125
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20 E
Surplus WC Gas Flat In Best Case And Meaningful Declines In Worst Case: We expect Canadian supply to be down modestly in 2012 and 2013 and settling into a modest growth profile thereafter, with most of the growth wedge allocated to planned LNG facilities. Demand for gas in Western Canada will increase ~ 0.2-0.4 Bcf/d per year through 2016 and 0.2-0.6 Bcf/d per year through 2020 due primarily to higher demand for natural gas for oil sands. We expect LNG exports out of Western Canada to be up to 3.0 Bcf/d by 2020 (2-3 facilities). Overall, gas available for movement to Eastern Canada or the U.S. will likely remain flat in the growth scenario and down 6 Bcf/d by 2020 in a low price scenario (limited gas drilling). Shales Decelerating: We expect shale gas growth to decelerate massively from the high growth rates seen in 2008-2010. At current rig counts, shales would only grow ~1.7 Bcf/d per year through 2016 vs. the ~4 Bcf/d per year growth seen previously. Adding in extraction losses and declines in non-shale production would see U.S. dry gas production growth of only 0.5 Bcf/d per year through 2016. We also note that our modeling suggests overall dry gas production flat to down modestly in 2013/14 before beginning to ramp up again. Tighter Balances: Given the combination of flat to declining Canadian production in 2012-14, combined with flat to declining U.S. dry gas production in 2013/14, and higher demand we clearly see significantly tighter balance for natural gas in the near future, which should continue price momentum. Prices Unsustainably Low: The clear takeaway from our modeling (both the linear models and the simulation models), indicates that the current rig count and prices are unsustainably low. However, finding equilibrium remains a real balancing act.
Investment Conclusions
Global Investors Likely To Remain Luke Warm On Canada Due To Pricing/Infrastructure Risk: Global investors have generally been moving away from Canadian oil & gas exposure for many reasons, but generally speaking a combination of macro fears (Greece, Spain, China slowing) along with fears regarding short-term differential risk for Canadian oil producers. With the dismal stock performance YTD for Canadian large caps, one could argue that much of our macro thesis is already discounted in stock prices which is generally true. However, the general negative backdrop with more limited growth visibility and rising pipeline/differential risk means that global investors are unlikely to flock back to Canadian oil and gas exposure anytime soon unless we see the recent flurry of M&A turn into a full blown wave (possible). Some Big Players May Adjust Strategies: If our macro view pans out, it will (or should) impact investment decisions by producers. The most likely adjustment will be to those planning mega-projects such as upgraders or mining oil sands projects. We expect operators to move more cautiously on these projects, with a high chance of outright cancellation. On the one hand, lower growth is a negative. However, we believe investors have compressed valuations on many of these stocks due to concerns about low return investment. On balance, we actually believe investors would react favorably to large-cap producers to moving to lower growth but higher returning and higher free cash yielding strategies. For example, we can make a case that Suncor would be worth 40%-50% more if it moved to a slower and more SAGD oriented strategy and paid out excess free cash.
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Negative Backdrop For Long-dated Oil Sands: Much of our macro thesis is very bearish for the value of long-dated bitumen assets. As we highlighted, producer growth forecasts are wildly optimistic and we believe there will be big competition for pipe access and resources to build projects which leaves the longer-date more fringe resources at a distinct disadvantage. Additionally, investors will likely remain much more cautious on providing the necessary capital for those growth ambitions, meaning that early stage oil sands companies will face far more execution risk than better financed players. Value can still be obtained/recognized for long-dated resource, but this depends more on M&A or JV activity. Downstream Value Becomes Very Apparent: Our macro view clearly favors companies with downstream assets. In Canada, there are no pure refiners so this by default means that integrated energy companies (Suncor, Cenovus, Husky and Imperial Oil) are best positioned. The rationale is that in-land refineries capture much of the value of lower upstream pricing. We have seen the integrateds outperform PADD 2 exposed names YTD indicating that some of this theme is already reflected in share prices. However, we believe investor expectations are still generally that current downstream cash flows are supernormal and will revert to low levels again in 2014+. We believe that downstream cash flows will remain robust over the long term and that is not reflected in share prices. We highlight Suncor and Cenovus as two of the best positioned integrateds.
Good Opportunity Still In Quality Gas Producers: For the first time in many years, the outlook for natural gas prices looks quite attractive. With tightening balances in 2013/14 and a rig count that will likely be slow to return to gas drilling gas prices should move into the US$4/Mcf range in 2013. We note that some gas players like Encana are already reflecting ~US$4.50/Mcf natural gas so much of the upside is already built in. However, we still see good upside in some of the smaller-/mid-cap gas names. Among the dividend-paying corps, our top two ways to play natural gas include Trilogy and Peyto with Trilogy as the more defensive gas play (due to its 45% liquids weighting) and Peyto as a higher torque gas pick (88% weighted to gas).
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In the junior/intermediate space, Celtic and Painted Pony are our top gasweighted names. Both companies offer investor meaningful torque to gas prices as they control substantial resource potential from large contiguous land positions. We also highlight NuVista as another gas-weighted pick for its undervalued asset base with 500 drilling locations identified in the Wapiti Montney liquids-rich gas play that is a strong M&A candidate. In addition, we believe the company's shares are trading inexpensively relative to its natural gas peers as measured by Core NAV (P+P reserves value). Light Oil Players Will See Lower-than-expected Pricing But Low-cost Players Will Still Make Very Strong Returns: Our thesis of lower light oil pricing will take some of the shine off domestic light oil producers. However, we note that producers with low costs and high-quality resources like Crescent Point will continue to prosper (although consensus numbers may be overstated if our macro view holds). Light oil companies with high cost structures and high capital obligations such as Canadian Oil Sands (opex in US$40/Bbl range with sustaining capex in the ~US$30/Bbl range through 2014) will see many challenges in this environment.
Top Picks
Large Caps: Among the large caps, we continue to focus on Brent-focused producers and integrateds as our top picks. In order of preference, we highlight Suncor (inexpensive with high-quality downstream), Cenovus (highest quality oil sands and well positioned with downstream) and Talisman (turnaround story, gas assets will get re-rated if prices recover and enough Brent-priced growth projects in Colombia and Asia that will interest investors). Small- To Mid-cap Oil Sands: From a macro perspective, it is more challenging to get excited about the small- to mid-cap oil sands producers, however, we continue to highlight MEG Energy (innovative and one of lowest cost resources bases) and Athabasca Oil. We remain positive on ATH primarily because we see it reducing oil sands exposure and believe the light oil assets will drive remaining value in short term. Dividend-paying Corps: Our top picks in this space include our highest netback domestic light oil producers, Crescent Point and PetroBakken (whose margins are better protected in a downside scenario in which crude oil sees pressure). We would also highlight Trilogy as a top pick owing to its strong growth profile and its ability to fund its development (and pay its dividend) within cash flow. Small And Mid Caps: Our top pick is Angle Energy as it offers exposure to a high netback Cardium oil play at Harmattan, which has become the largest focus area for the company. We highlight that the corporate liquids have increased from 39% at the end of 2010 to 46% projected for Q4/12. We also expect large year-end reserve growth associated with the active drilling program in Harmattan and area. International Producers Our two top picks in the International Producer space are Coastal Energy and Gran Tierra Energy. Both companies produce over 90% high netback oil that track to Brent pricing. CEN has a strong balance sheet, good free cash flow generation from its producing properties and significant upside potential with booked P3, 2C and prospective resources. GTE trades at a 20% discount to its 2P NAV but has a surplus of cash on its balance sheet, is expected to generate free cash flow in 2013 and has an active 2H12 planned with potential for significant catalysts.
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Appendix
129
130
Resource Map
VET
A m ar an th
The following section of our Appendix pertaining to Natural Gas Liquids (pages 132 to 146 inclusive) has been provided by CIBC World Markets analyst David Noseworthy, P.Eng, CFA.
NGLs
Source: EIA.
Growing supply and pipeline capacity constraints have combined for particularly weak mid-continent NGL prices. The supply of NGLs from U.S. natural gas production has increased faster than demand for both ethane and propane (Exhibit 2), causing prices for both to collapse over the last three months. Compounding this issue, pipeline constraints out of the Midwest (PADD II) into the export-driven U.S. Gulf Coast (PADD III) have resulted in depressed midcontinent NGL pricing. We discuss NGL supply and demand by component and NGL pipeline constraint issues below.
Exhibit 2. U.S. Forecasted Ethane Oversupply And U.S. NGL Supply from U.S. Gas Production
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Source: LyondellBasell, En*Vantage, Markwest Energy Partners L.P. and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
Ethane
We expect weak ethane prices relative to WTI to persist until demand increases.
We expect weak relative prices to persist until several petrochemical plants complete planned expansions. Average Q3/12-to-date Mont Belvieu ethane is trading at 15% of WTI, below its five-year average relative value of 30% (see Exhibit 3). Significant expansions are not expected to come online until beyond 2013 (see Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5). Near term, we do not expect any sustainable price catalysts for higher ethane prices, barring any fractionator outages. While there is limited intrinsic seasonality in ethane demand, most petrochemical plants on the U.S. Gulf Coast shut down for regular maintenance in Q3, while fractionator turnarounds are completed in Q2 and Q3 as economics are driven more by seasonal propane demand.
60%
Growing NGL production from liquidrich gas has depressed historical relationship between C2 and WTI
The decline of crude oil prices (~US$20/bbl) from early May levels have triggered price declines in 2012.
50%
% of WTI
40%
30%
20%
VET
10%
0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q1 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q2 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q3 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q4 2009 2010 2011
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
133
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NGLs
Proponent Dow Chemical (restart) Westlake Chemicals LyondellBasell NOVA Chemicals Westlake Chemicals NOVA Chemicals LyondellBasell NOVA Chemicals NOVA Chemicals Dow Chemical (upgrade) Royal Dutch Shell Dow Chemical (upgrade) Aither Chemicals Formosa Plastics Dow Chemical Chevron Phillips Chemical Chevron Phillips Chemical
Location St. Charles, LA Lake Charles, LA Channelview, TX Corunna, ON Lake Charles, LA Moore Township, ON LA Porte, TX Sarnia, ON Joffre, AB Plaquemine, LA Beaver County, PA TX US Northeast Point Comfort, TX Freeport, TX Baytown, TX near Old Ocean, TX
Feedstock Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane natural gas Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane Ethane natural gas Ethane Ethane Ethane
Estimated COD End of 2012 H2/2012 2012 Late 2013 H2/2014 N/A 2014 Late 2014 - 2017 Late 2014 - 2018 2014 Final investment decision anticipated to be made in 2015-2016. 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
Increases In C2 Cracking Capability (000 bbls/d) Year End 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 2017 2018
Source: En*Vantage.
35 85 18 25 53 198 78
Expansion Expansion Expansion Expansion New Build New Build New Build
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Propane
Exhibit 6. Conway (LHS) And Mont Belvieu (RHS) Propane As A % Of WTI
140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Q3/12TD Avg: 27% / $25.03 8 Year Avg: 78% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% Q3/12TD Avg: 41% / $37.51 8 Year Average: 79%
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20% 0% Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
The single-largest determinant for propane demand in North America is winter temperatures. Propane is primarily used for residential and commercial cooking and space heating (40%-50%), petrochemical feedstock (25%-35%), and agricultural uses, including crop drying (5%-10%). We expect propane to trade at a discount to its historical relationship with WTI absent a colder-than-normal winter. Q3-to-date Conway propane is trading at 27% of WTI, below its five-year average relative value of 52%. We expect this weaker-than-normal relationship to persist as propane storage levels are high (Exhibit 7) following one of the warmest North American winters on record and North American propane demand lags growing supply from increasing U.S. natural gas shale production. However, we believe the current relative value of propane to WTI is overly depressed, even for the seasonally weak summertime, and will strengthen as we move into the fall and winter, assuming exports continue to increase (Exhibit 8) and normal winter weather. We forecast Conway propane to trade at 30%, 40%, 48%, and 48% of WTI in Q3/12E, Q4/12E, 2013E, and 2014E, respectively, below the five-year average of 57%.
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135
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NGLs
60 000 bbls 50 40 30 20 10
Mbbls/d
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: EIA.
Source: EIA.
Butane
We expect that growing butane demand from the Alberta oil sands and the planned Cochin pipeline reversal in July 2014 should provide price support. Q3to-date Conway butane is trading at 48% of WTI, below its five year average relative value to WTI of 65%. We forecast butane to trade at 54%, 70%, 73%, and 73% of WTI in Q3/12E, Q4/12E, 2013E, and 2014E, respectively, in line with the five-year average of 71%.
Basin Differentials
There are significant basin differentials between the major North American NGL hubs of Mont Belvieu, Texas, Conway, Kansas, Edmonton, Alberta, and Sarnia, Ontario (see Exhibit 9). Differentials between Conway, Kansas, and Mont Belvieu, Texas are due to a combination of access to higher Brent priced markets at Mont Belvieu and NGL pipeline capacity constraints between Conway and Mont Belvieu.
We expect new NGL pipelines scheduled to be built in 2013 will largely remove these constraints and provide NGLs at Conway access to additional demand from waterborne export markets and, thus, reduce the differential. There have been a number of new NGL pipeline project announcements in recent months. For a full list, please refer to Exhibit 10; otherwise, we highlight four projects below, which we believe will benefit Conway NGL prices.
1. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners spent $30 million to upgrade its existing
A m ar an th
Cochin pipeline, which will move 13,000 Bbls/d of Conway-sourced E-P mix to Sarnia, Ontario. The project was expected to come online on April 1, but has been delayed due to permitting issues. Kinder Morgan signed a threeyear contract with Nova Chemicals. Nova Chemicals is in the midst of expanding its Corunna, Ontario facility.
2. DCP Midstream (DPMNYSE) is proceeding with the 150,000 Bbls/d
common carrier Southern Hills Pipeline between Conway, Kansas and Mont Belvieu, Texas. DCP will convert the Seaway Products Pipeline, which it bought from ConocoPhillips (COP-NYSE) on November 1, 2011, from a refined products pipeline to a NGL pipeline. Southern Hills Pipeline is targeting a mid-2013 in-service date.
3. Oneok Partners (OKSNYSE) is planning a 193,000 Bbls/d NGL pipeline
called Sterling III Pipeline between Medford, Oklahoma (just south of Conway, Kansas) and Mont Belvieu, Texas. Commercial operation is expected by late 2013, assuming construction starts in early 2013. As currently designed, the 16-inch Sterling III pipeline capacity can be expanded to 250,000 Bbls/d with additional pumping stations.
4. On January 3, 2012, Enterprise Products Partners L.P. (EPD-NYSE)
announced it had received sufficient commitment to develop its 1,230-mile Appalachia to Texas NGL pipeline, ATEX Express. ATEX Express, originating in Washington County, Pennsylvania, will have 190,000 Bbls/d of capacity and terminate in Mont Belvieu, Texas. ATEX Express is expected to begin commercial operations in Q1/14.
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137
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te
1 1b 2 3 3b 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Project Name Vantage Pipeline Cochin Reversal Baaken NGL Mariner West Mariner East ATEX Express Sand Hills West Texas Gateway NGL Sterling III Southern Hills Texas Express Front Range Cajon-Sibon Extension
7/13/2012 12.47 17.35 2.23 4.87 -10.25 -15.12 7/13/2012 18.94 -0.38 -14.66 -19.32 -33.60 -14.28
VET
NGLs
Amaranth
1 1b
Southern Lights
3b 3
10 4
7/6/2012 6/29/2012 13.36 11.34 18.23 16.09 -0.25 0.13 4.87 4.87 -13.61 -11.21 -18.48 -15.96 7/6/2012 6/29/2012 19.03 17.51 -1.55 -3.49 -17.51 -19.03 -20.58 -3.49 -36.54 -36.54 -15.96 -15.54
Propane Differential Mt Belvieu - Conway Mt. Belvieu - Edmonton Mt. Belvieu - Sarnia Conway - Edmonton Conway - Sarnia Edmonton - Sarnia Butane Differential Mt. Belvieu - Conway Mt. Belvieu - Edmonton Mt. Belvieu - Sarnia Conway - Edmonton Conway - Sarnia Edmonton - Sarnia
All figures in US$/bbl
8 9
5 11
Note: Details of pipeline projects are in Exhibit 12. Source: Encana, Bloomberg and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
1 1b. 2 3 3b 4 5 6 7 8 9
Project Name Vantage Pipeline Cochin Pipeline Reversal Bakken NGL Mariner West Mariner East ATEX Express Sand Hills West Texas Gateway NGL Sterling III Southern Hills (inc. conversion costs) Texas Express
Proponent Vantage Pipeline Canada ULC Kinder Morgan Energy Partners Oneok Partners MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources LLC and Sunoco Logistics LP MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources LLC and Sunoco Logistics LP Enterprise Products Partners LP DCP Midstream LLC Lone Star NGL LLC (JV of Energy Transfer Partners LP and Regency Energy Partners LP) Oneok Partners DCP Midstream LLC Enterprise Products Partners LP, Enbridge Energy Partners LP, Anadarko Petroleum Corp., DCP Midstream Partners (10%) Enterprise Products Partners LP, Enbridge Energy Partners LP and Anadarko Petroleum Corp. Crosstex Energy LP
Estimated Capacity (MBbls/d) 40, Expandable to 60 95 60, Expandable to 110 Initial 50, up to 75 TBD 125, Expandable to 190 200, Expandable to 350 130 193, Expandable to 250 150 280 150, Expandable to 230 70
Capex (US$mlns) 240 30 450 - 550 N/A TBD N/A N/A 700 610 - 810 780 - 850 1100
Est. COD Q4 / 2012 July 2014 2013 July 2013 TBD Q1 / 2014 Q3 / 2012 Q1 / 2013 Late 2013 Mid 2013 Q2 / 2013
To Near Empress, AB Fort Saskatchewan, AB Weld County, CO Sarnia, ON TBD Mont Belvieu, TX Mont Belvieu, TX Jackson County, TX Mont Belvieu, TX Mont Belvieu, TX Mont Belvieu, TX
From Tioga, ND Kankakee County, IL Sidney, MT Houston, PA TBD Washington County, PA Ector, TX Winkler, TX Medford, OK Conway, KS Carson County, TX
10 11
TBD 230
Q4 / 2013 Q2 / 2013
Source: Company reports, Oil And Gas Journal and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te
VET
NGLs
Amaranth
A m ar an th
NGLs
2. Pipelines and differentials; 3. Declining natural gas export volumes; 4. Natural gas producer trends; and 5. Restructuring of the NGL extraction rights market.
Source: CAPP.
A m ar an th
NGLs
AB Demand (ex. solvent flood demand) AB Supply (ERCB Estimate) AB Supply Plus Potential Supply From Import Pipelines
Source: ERCB.
We expect a significant portion of growing condensate demand to be satisfied by Enbridge Inc.s Southern Lights pipeline and Kinder Morgan Energy Partners L.P.s Cochin pipeline reversal. Southern Lights began operations in July 2010 with an initial capacity of 180,000 Bbls/d and incremental expansion capability to an ultimate capacity of 330,000 Bbls/d. Southern Lights delivers condensate from a variety of refineries and producers near Chicago, Illinois to Hardisty, and Edmonton, Alberta. Currently, two shippers have committed volumes of 77,000 Bbls/d. In 2011, average volumes transported were about 65,000 Bbls/d. The toll for committed volumes in 2011 was about $8.10/Bbl and $16.25/Bbl for committed and uncommitted volumes, respectively. This falls to about $2.20/Bbl and $14.60/Bbl for committed and uncommitted volumes, respectively, when the pipeline is operating at full capacity. Pembina has a direct pipeline connection to Southern Lights at its Pembina Nexus Terminal in Edmonton, but not at its Redwater facility. We believe an NGL pipeline connection between its PNT facility and Redwater facility could be one of the early integration projects as it would require a relatively short 20 km pipeline within an existing right-of-way between Namao and Edmonton as Pembina already has an NGL pipeline between Namao and Redwater.
On June 5, 2012, Kinder Morgan announced strong binding commercial support for the Cochin pipeline reversal project. The Cochin Reversal project, which is expected to be in-service by July 1, 2014, will allow shippers to move up to Mon 90,000 Bbls/d of mixed product from Kankakee County, Illinois to terminal tney facilities near Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta. Kinder Morgan will also connect the Cochin pipeline to the Explorer pipeline at Kankakee, Illinois. The Explorer pipeline transports finished products from Houston, Texas to just south of Chicago, Illinois and is owned by Chevron (CVXNYSE), American Capital Strategies Ltd. (ACASNASDAQ), ConocoPhillips, Marathon (MRONYSE), Sunoco Logistics (SXLNYSE), and Shell. This connection will allow shippers to access condensate in Mont Belvieu for transport to Alberta. Proposed tolls are US$4.95/Bbl for committed volumes and US$7.50/Bbl for uncommitted volumes. The Cochin pipeline terminates at Pembinas Redwater facility.
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141
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We expect demand for NGL storage and logistics to benefit from increased condensate deliveries by pipeline. However, opportunities to import condensate to Pembinas 75,000 Bbls/d rail offloading terminal at Redwater, for example, may be limited as potentially cheaper pipeline line transportation displaces condensate transportation by rail, which costs about $6.50/Bbl from Chicago to Edmonton and about $15/Bbl from Mont Belvieu to Edmonton. In the case of the Cochin Reversal project, we expect there may be increased rail opportunities to transport propane volumes by rail that were previously transported to the U.S. and Sarnia by the Cochin pipeline. We also note other pipeline plans to transport condensate from the USGC to Alberta could negatively impact Some NGL rail transportation business. One such plan was recently announced by Plains All American during its Investor Day. Plains All American suggested the Capline pipeline could be used to allow condensate delivery into Enbridges Southern Lights system. The 1.2 MMBbls/d Capline is co-owned by Plains All American, Marathon, and BP and stretches from St. James, Louisiana to Patoka, Illinois. Finally, incremental diluent volumes from Southern Lights and the potential Cochin Reversal into the Redwater/Fort Saskatchewan NGL hub suggest the need for additional pipeline capacity from Redwater to the oil sands. We expect midstream companies to pursue this opportunity as part of a unique integrated diluent service offering to oil sands producers.
NGLs Cardium Cardium Gas Glauconite Horn River Mon tney VET
142
Exhibit 13. Summary Of Recently Announced U.S. Propane Export Terminal Expansions
Additional Capacity Capex (MBbls/d) (US$ mlns.) 3.4 N/A 60 $250 N/A N/A Up to 100 N/A 120 N/A
Company Enterprise Product Partners L.P. Targa Resources ConocoPhillips/Occidental/TransMontaigne Vitol Group Enterprise Product Partners L.P.
Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
Source: NEB, ERCB, CAPP, TRP and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
143
We expect weaker Sarnia pricing to negatively impact Midstream Companies who sell propane production at Empress into the Sarnia market. The extent of the impact will depend on which markets companies ultimately sell their supply into. We believe a business case could be made for a propane export terminal on the Canadian West Coast targeting Asian markets, similar in concept to the liquid natural gas and oil terminal proposals. Exhibit 13 summarizes recently announced U.S. propane export terminal expansions that provide an indication of potential capital costs.
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NGLs
Declining natural gas export volumes impact straddle plants in two ways: 1) decreased NGL extraction volumes; and, 2) increased NGL extraction fees paid to shippers as the various straddle plant owners compete to process the dwindling supply of available natural gas. For example, we estimate throughput declines at Pembinas Empress plants of 3%/year from 2011 to 2014. We calculate lower volumes negatively impact Empress gross margins for the company by about $2 million to $3 million per year. Extraction premiums have increased about 1,000% at Empress over the past six years. Extraction premiums are the fees Empress straddle plant owners pay shippers for the right to extract NGLs from the natural gas being transported on the TransCanada mainline. These fees are paid as a premium on the shrinkage natural gas purchased to replace the heat content of the NGLs extracted. In Q4/2011 Empress extraction premiums were near the mid-point of a $6/GJ to $9/GJ range, according to Provident, while in 2006 extraction premiums were about $0.66/GJ, according to disclosure in the NGL Extraction Inquiry. We believe lower straddle plant utilization and higher operating costs may prompt consolidation among the Empress straddle plants. Average annual natural gas throughput in 2011 on the TransCanada mainline was about 3.2 Bcf/d compared with the nearly 10 Bcf/d of straddle plant gas processing capacity at Empress. Consolidation will allow for the reduction of extraction capacity and more efficient utilization of the lower-cost plants. Pembinas position as 65% owner and operator of the deepest-cut, highest efficiency Empress straddle plant may position it as the natural consolidator or, conversely, the most attractive asset to purchase. We question whether the Empress plant fits Pembinas overall risk profile and strategic direction.
Producer Trends
Low gas prices and high NGL prices have resulted in several producer trends, such as: 1) fewer well completions; 2) focus on liquids-rich gas production; 3) a preference for deep-cut field gathering and processing plants in order to maximize the NGL volumes extracted; 4) a propensity among producers to pay for gas processing services under fee-for-service or cost-of-service arrangements, allowing producers to retain control over the NGLs; and, 5) a willingness among capital-conscious producers to outsource gas processing to midstream players. Canadian natural gas well completions have tapered off with the fall in AECO natural gas prices (Exhibit 15 Canadian Natural Gas Well Completions). We expect continued depressed gas prices to dampen production in the WCSB. However, historically strong NGL prices have caused natural gas producers to focus on liquids-rich gas production areas such as the Duvernay, Deep Basin, Swan Hills, and Montney formations. Producers have focused on controlling and maximizing the value of the entrained NGLs in the raw gas stream as NGLs become a more significant component of the producers netback. Producer preference for NGL extraction capability in the field has resulted in lower C3+ volumes at straddle plants (Exhibit 16 NGL Content Of Gas Processed At Alberta Straddle Plants). Reduced C3+ volumes will negatively impact operating margins at Pembinas Empress facilities as propane, butane, and condensate have higher margins than ethane. However, we believe Pembina is well positioned to benefit from producer demand for deep-cut NGL FG&P facilities, as it is uniquely situated to successfully buy, build, and own many of the incremental deep-cut facilities required by producers within the footprint of Pembinas NGL pipeline system. Pembinas integrated legacy asset base allows it to generate multiple revenues and, therefore, higher returns.
A m ar an th
NGLs
Cardium Cardium
$1.00 $0.00
Source: Bloomberg, Daily Oil Bulletin, and CIBC World Markets Inc. (David Noseworthy).
Gas
14
Mon We believe the restructuring of the NGL extraction rights market as tney proposed under Nova Gas Transmission Ltd. s (NGTL) NEXT model will be a net negative for Alberta straddle plants operators because: 1) extraction premiums are likely to increase; and, (2) producers are unlikely to be compelled to place liquids-rich gas on the NGTL system if a deep-cut FG&P option is available. Therefore, incremental liquids-rich volumes due to the implementation of the NEXT model are unlikely to be significant. The NGL Extraction (NEXT) model is a mechanism that allocates extraction rights of the receipt customers (producers) on the Integrated Alberta System (ATCO and NGTL systems) based on proportionate value of NGLs delivered to the system by each producer, and enables customers to use extraction rights to direct gas to extraction plants. Eventual implementation of the NEXT model is a result of the Alberta Energy and Utility Board (AEUB) decision following the NGL Extraction Inquiry, which concluded in 2009.
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145
A m ar an th
NGLs
The AEUB decision recommended the current model be replaced with the NEXT model. The NEXT model would operate in the same way as the current convention, in that straddle plant owners pay shippers a premium on the shrinkage gas purchased, effectively sharing some of the value added from extracting NGLs from the gas stream. The NEXT model differs from the current convention because receipt shippers, rather than delivery shippers, will receive the premium. We believe implementation of the NEXT model is unlikely before 2014. Prior to May 25, 2012, NGTL proposed to implement the NEXT model on November 1, 2013, assuming timely National Energy Board (NEB) approval. On May 25, 2012, the NEB suspended proceedings pursuant to NGTLs request so that NGTL could explore new opportunities that have arisen as a result of falling natural gas prices and increased quantities of available NGLs. NGTL has committed to report back on the status of discussions no later than October 15, 2012. We expect the extraction rights market to become more liquid and transparent as proposed under the NEXT model, similar to the Natural Gas Exchange (NGX) and Nova Inventory Transfer (NIT) markets. Extraction rights available to a given straddle plant will no longer be restricted to the delivery point, but instead any receipt shipper can sell its extraction rights to any straddle plant. This means a given straddle plant will no longer be competing with only the other plants at its particular export point (e.g., Empress, Cochrane), but instead it will be able to bid for more extraction rights than are contained in the gas to be shipped downstream of that plant. We are uncertain as to how this will work operationally. In a transparent market we expect NGL extraction premiums to trend toward the economic rents of the marginal extraction plant or nominal new plant, whichever is lower. That is, extraction premiums will equal the NGL fractionation margins of the marginal straddle plant less the full cost of extraction including a return of and on capital. In our view, incremental liquids-rich volumes in the NGTL system are unlikely to be significant following the implementation of the NEXT model. Under the current NEXT proposal a producer would receive its pro rata share of the value of NGLs entrained in the gas that are extracted at an Alberta straddle plant. In 2011 only 53% of gas produced was processed at a straddle plant. Without the ability to selectively direct liquids-rich natural gas to the straddle plants a producer that contributed 100% of the NGLs on the NGTL system would only receive payments for 53% of these NGLs. With the ability to direct liquids-rich gas to straddle plants and dry gas to intra-Alberta demand this could improve, but we are uncertain as to how NGTL can prevent the co-mingling of rich and dry gas within its system.
147
Card ium
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
Bak ken
Anadarko (Horizontal)
Exhibit 17. Anadarko (Horizontal) Map
Ellis Lipscomb Ochiltree
VET
Roberts Moore Potter Carson
Anadarko (Hz)
OKLAHOMA
Hemphill Wheeler
Grady
Woodford
Top 5 Producers
1 Chesapeake Energy 2 Mewbourne 3 Linn Energy 4 Devon Energy
Permian
Barnett
TEXAS
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Chesapeake Energy Apache Sandridge Mewbourne Oil Devon Energy Unit Petroluem Active Rigs 29 21 11 9 5 5
Source for Exhibits 17 and 18: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te
Bak ken
VET
Anadarko (Hz)
Anadarko (Hz)
Wells Drilled
700 600 500
Wells Drilled
160 140
Rigs Running
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
2,000 1,500 1,000 500 E E E E E E E E Q1 /08 Q4 /11 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 E E E E
333 250 167 83 /12 /13 /14 /14 /15 /16 /17 /17 /19 /18 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 /20 /20
2,000 1,500 Low 1,000 500 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E Q1 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q4 /08
Horn River
Mon tney
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5
MMcfe/d
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 0 650 1,300 1,950 2,600 3,250 3,900 4,550 5,200 5,850 6,500 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
150
Mboe/d
120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
400 300 200 100 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
A m ar an th Wells Drilled
1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200
Wells Drilled
Anadarko (Vt)
25 20 15 10 5 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
1,000 800 600 400 200 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Cardium
6,000 Low 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E Q1 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q4 /08
Cardium Gas
3,000 2,000 1,000 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E Q1 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q4 /08
Glauconite
25,000
25,000
-25,000
-25,000
-50,000
-50,000
-75,000
-75,000
-100,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
-100,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Quarterly IP
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 MMcfe/d 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 00 03 06 09 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42
Q1/08 Q1/09 Q1/10 Q1/11 Q1/12 Q2/08 Q2/09 Q2/10 Q2/11 Q3/08 Q3/09 Q3/10 Q3/11 Q4/08 Q4/09 Q4/10 Q4/11
5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 Frequency 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 0 272 544 816 1,088 1,360 1,632 1,904 2,176 2,448 2,720 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
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Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Bakken (US)
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Bakken
Exhibit 20. Bakken Map
Divide Williams
Burke Mountrail
Roosevelt
Richland
McKenzie
NORTH DAKOTA
Top 5 Producers
1 Continental Resources 2 Hess Corp. 3 Whiting Petroleum 4 EOG Resources 5 Brigham O&G 6 Other
MONTANA
SOUTH DAKOTA
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Continental Resources Whiting O&G Hess Brigham Oil & Gas Petro Hunt Oasis Petroleum Active Rigs 25 21 18 16 12 10
Source for Exhibits 20 and 21: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION WHITING PETROLEUM CORPORATION EOG RESOURCES INCORPORATED BRIGHAM OIL & GAS, L.P. MARATHON OIL COMPANY SLAWSON EXPLORATION COMPANY, INC. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY XTO ENERGY, INC. PETRO-HUNT CORPORATION OASIS PETROLEUM NORTH AMERICA LLC KODIAK OIL & GAS (USA) INC. DENBURY RESOURCES INC. ENERPLUS RESOURCES USA CORPORATION SM ENERGY COMPANY WPX ENERGY WILLISTON, LLC NEWFIELD EXPLORATION COMPANY OCCIDENTAL ENERGY COMPANY,INC. RRH CORPORATION (HUNT OIL COMPANY) MUREX PETROLEUM CORPORATION Total Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Total Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d)
Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d) Sum of Last Reported Total Prod (Boe/d) Average of Peak Well Rate (Boe/d)
275 167
177 267
9,560 346
1,043 469 32,472 434 42,752 622 38,973 599 8,071 845 12,586 495 21,912 624 0 10 429 383 502 294 4,479 491
70,498 418 61,800 476 52,816 504 48,583 551 32,481 700 29,949 330 27,285 505 25,856 396 25,402 328 21,971 431 19,102 454 18,938 506 17,520 422 16,558 350 12,750 322
2,886 255
3,494 387
432 204 3,993 432 12,270 627 1 1 14,720 290 838 243 4,855 327 7,448 312 2,860 297 7,685 442 6,956 541 8,191 567 2,132 352 7,387 603 3,961 494 2,685 597 759 584
1,841 589 10,261 800 920 322 1,452 255 18,917 485 6,195 337 12,920 547 3,592 750 3,667 439 15,007 486 147 236 7,162 362
285 197
2,557 368 2,076 363 94 123 25 154 6,888 313 459 258 15 147 123 113
241 187
55 322
0 0
75 511
15 165
4,556 486
4,571 741
833 199
232 382
0 8 6 19 4,072 196 4,092 322 5,206 310 6,834 220 21,656 289 35,624 306 4,558 421 85,859 435
3,289 581
90,416 416
139,252 483
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Bakken (US)
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Rigs Running
150
Wells Drilled
Ba kk en (U S)
250
2,000
200 1,500
1,000
100 500
Bakken (US)
50
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
250,000
250,000
200,000
200,000
150,000
150,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
200 150 100 50 0 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
154
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
VET
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Barnett
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Barnett
Exhibit 23. Barnett Map
OKLAHOMA
Montague
Woodford
Cooke Palo Pinto Wise Denton Tarrant Parker Johnson Somervell Ellis Hill
ARKANSAS
Hood
Haynesville
MISSISSIPPI
Top 5 Producers
1 Devon Energy
TEXAS
Eagleford
LOUISIANA
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Devon Energy EOG Resources XTO DTE Gas Resources Enervest Operating Aruba Petroleum Active Rigs 8 6 4 3 3 2
Source for Exhibits 23 and 24: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Barnett
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Rigs Running
Ba kk en (U S)
50 40 30
Wells Drilled
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
1,500
1,000
Ba rn et t
20 10 0
500
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Barnett
5,000
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Mmcfe/d
Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q1 /08
Q3 /09 Q2 /10
Q4 /08
Horn River
Mon tney
Quarterly IP
2.3 2.0 1.8 1.5 Q1/08 Q4/08 Q3/09 Q2/10 Q1/11 Q4/11 Q2/08 Q1/09 Q4/09 Q3/10 Q2/11 Q1/12 Q3/08 Q2/09 Q1/10 Q4/10 Q3/11 375 333 292 250
MMcfe/d
00
04
02
12
14
06
08
10
16
18
20
24
22
26
28
30
34
32
36
38
Months On Production
158
40
42
Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q1 /08
Q2 /10
Mboe/d
Glauconite VET
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Barnett
VET
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Eagle Ford
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Eagle Ford
Exhibit 26. Eagle Ford Map
Barnett
Permian
TEXAS
Gonzales
Atascosa
Wilson
Major Producers
1 EOG Resources Live Oak McMullen 2 Geosouthern Energy 3 Anadarko Petroleum 4 ConocoPhillips 5 Talisman Energy 6 Other
MEXICO
Webb
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Chesapeake Energy Marathon BHP-Billiton EOG Resources ConocoPhillips Pioneer Natural Active Rigs 26 23 22 19 11 11
Source for Exhibits 26 and 27: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Eagle Ford
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Rigs Running
Ba kk en (U S)
2,000
Wells Drilled
1,500
1,000
Ba rn et t
500 50 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Ea gl ef or d
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Eagle Ford
/11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Horn River
200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Mon tney
/08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q4 /08
/08
/09
/10
Q1
Q3
Q2
Q1
Q1
Q4
/08
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 Q1/08 Q1/09 Q1/10 Q1/11 Q1/12 Q2/08 Q2/09 Q2/10 Q2/11 Q3/08 Q3/09 Q3/10 Q3/11 Q4/08 Q4/09 Q4/10 Q4/11 750 667 583 500 417 333 250 167
MMcfe/d
83
0
74 0 37 0 10 50 80 20 60 30 90 10 40 00 80 70 50 20 90 1,1 2,5 1,8 2,9 2,2 1,4 3,3 4,8 5,1 3,7 4,0 5,5 4,4 5,9 6,2 6,6 60
0
162
Mboe/d
12,000
2,000
12,000
VET
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Eagle Ford
VET
Montney
VET
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Fayetteville
Exhibit 29. Fayetteville Map
Jackson Pope
Independence
OKLAHOMA
TENNESSEE
Woodford
Top 5 Producers
1 Southwestern Energy 2 XTO Energy 3 BHP Billiton 4 Arrington, David 5 Traton 6 Other
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Southwestern Energy BHP-Billiton XTO Active Rigs 11 5 5
Source for Exhibits 29 and 30: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Montney
VET
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Rigs Running
Ba kk en (U S)
25 20 15
Wells Drilled
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Ba rn et t
10 5 0
Ea gl ef or d
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Low
Base
High
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q3
Fayetteville
Mon tney
-100,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
2009
2010
2011
2012E
Q1
2013E
2014E
/08
/09
/08
Q4 /0
Q2 /1
/11
/11
/12
Q1
Q3
Q1
Q1
Q4
Q2
Q4
/14
/13
/14
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 MMcfe/d 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.0 00 03 06 09 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 Months On Production Q1/08 Q1/09 Q1/10 Q1/11 Q1/12 Q2/08 Q2/09 Q2/10 Q2/11 Q3/08 Q3/09 Q3/10 Q3/11 Q4/08 Q4/09 Q4/10 Q4/11 417 375 333 292 250
250 200 150 100 50 0 2 120 238 356 474 592 710 828 946 1,064
166
Mboe/d
2,500
417
2,500
417
VET
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Mon tney
Fayetteville
VET
167
VET
Haynesville
Haynesville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Haynesville
Exhibit 32. Haynesville Map
OKLAHOMA
Woodford
ARKANSAS MISSISSIPPI
Bossier De Soto
Caddo
Barnett
Panola
Bienville
Top 5 Producers
TEXAS
Eagleford
LOUISIANA
1 Chesapeake Energy 2 EXCO Resources 3 Petrohawk Energy 4 Encana Corp. 5 El Paso Corp. 6 Other
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Anadarko Exco Resources XTO Indigo Drilling Petrohawk Devon Energy Active Rigs 8 5 5 4 4 3
Source for Exhibits 32 and 33: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
VET
Haynesville
Haynesville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Haynesville Profile
Rigs Running Wells Drilled
High Base Low 1,200 High Base Low 250
Rigs Running
Ba kk en (U S)
200
1,000
800
Wells Drilled
150
600
100
400
Ba rn et t
50
200
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Ea gl ef or d
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q3
Q2
H ay ne sv ill e
300,000 200,000 100,000 0 -100,000 -200,000 -300,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
2009
2010
2011
Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q2 /10 Q1 /11
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q1 /08
Q4 /11
Q2 /10 Q1 /11
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q1 /08
/12
/13
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Haynesville
Quarterly IP
9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0
MMcfe/d
900 800 700 600 Frequency Boe/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1 929 1,857 2,785 3,713 4,641 5,569 6,497 7,425 8,353 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
170
Mboe/d
VET
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
H ay ne sv ill e
Haynesville
VET
171
Marcellus
Marcellus
Haynesville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Marcellus
Exhibit 35. Marcellus Map
Tioga
Bradford Susquehanna
Wyoming
Lycoming
Top 5 Producers
1 Chesapeake Energy 2 Talisman Energy 3 Cabot Oil & Gas Crop. 4 Range Resources 5 Anadarko Petroleum 6 Other
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Chesapeake Energy CNX Gas Co LLC Antero Resources Shell EQT Range Resources Active Rigs 22 9 8 8 7 7
Source for Exhibits 35 and 36: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Marcellus
Marcellus
Haynesville
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Rigs Running
Ba kk en (U S)
2,000
Wells Drilled
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
1,500
1,000
Ba rn et t
500 50 0 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Ea gl ef or d
13,750 12,500 11,250 10,000 8,750 7,500 6,250 5,000 3,750 2,500 1,250 -
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Mboe/d
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
500,000
500,000
H ay ne sv ill e
400,000
400,000
300,000
300,000
200,000
200,000
100,000
100,000
M ar ce llu s
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Quarterly IP
7.0 6.0 5.0
MMcfe/d
Boe/d
Marcellus
167 0
0 0 400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 2,400 2,800 3,200 3,600 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
174
Mboe/d
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
Marcellus
175
Card ium
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
Bak ken
Mississippi Lime
Exhibit 38. Mississippi Lime Map
VET
Woodward Major
Mississippi Lime
KANSAS
Woods
Alfalfa
Grant
Kay
Osage
Top 5 Producers
1 Sandridge Exploration Noble 2 Chesapeaske Energy 3 Eagle Energy Garfield 4 Range Resources Payne
Woodford
OKLAHOMA
5 Primexx 6 Other
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Sandridge Chesapeake Energy Devon Energy Chaparral USA Energy Shell Longfellow Active Rigs 25 20 7 4 4 3
Source for Exhibits 38 and 39: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te
Bak ken
VET
Mississippi Lime
Mississippi Lime
Wells Drilled
900 800 700 600 High Base Low
100
Rigs Running
Wells Drilled
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Mboe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
167 125 83 42 -
167 125 83 42 0
Q3
Q2
Q1
Q4
Q3
Q2
Q1
Q4
Q3
Q2
Q1
Q4
Horn River
Mon tney
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
2009
2010
2011
Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q1 /08
Q4 /11
Q2 /10 Q1 /11
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q2 /10 Q1 /11
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q1 /08
/12
/13
/14
/14
/15
/16
/17
/19
/20
/20
/17
/18
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
178
Mboe/d
80
60
40
20
0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Mississippi Lime
VET
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te
Permian (Horizontal)
Exhibit 41. Permian (Horizontal) Map
VET
Permian (Hz)
Amaranth
NEW MEXICO
Lea Yoakum Eddy
Hockley
Woodford
Gaines
Scurry
Andrews
Barnett
Ward
Ector
TEXAS
Top 5 Producers
Pecos 1 Occidental Energy 2 Kinder Morgan 3 XTO Energy
MEXICO
Eagleford
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Occidental Apache Chesapeake Energy Devon Energy Energen Resources Petrohawk Active Rigs 9 7 7 7 7 6
Source for Exhibits 41 and 42: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te te
Bak ken
VET VET
Permian (Hz)
A m ar an th
Permian (Hz)
Rigs Running
Wells Drilled
50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
1,000 800 600 400 200 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Mmcfe/d
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Horn River
Mon tney
-60,000 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
2.0 1.8 1.5 1.3 MMcfe/d 1.0 0.8
1000 900 800 700 Frequency 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0 292 584 876 1,168 1,460 1,752 2,044 2,336 2,628 2,920 Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
Boe/d
182
Mboe/d
A m ar an th Wells Drilled
7,000 6,000 5,000 High Base Low
Rigs Running
Wells Drilled
Ba kk en (U S)
Permian (Vt)
1,000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Cardium Gas
1,667
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
Base
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Mboe/d
8,000
1,333
8,000
1,333
Glauconite
Q1 /08 Q4 /08 Q3 /09 Q2 /10 Q1 /11 Q4 /11 Q3 /12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
-150,000
2009
2010
2011
2012E
2013E
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
0.7 0.6 0.5 MMcfe/d 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 00 03 06 09 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42
Months On Production
100,000
VET
17 0
183
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Woodford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Woodford
Exhibit 44. Woodford Map
MISSOURI
Blaine Dewey Canadian
OKLAHOMA
Fayetteville
Atoka Carter
TEXAS
Barnett
Coal
Top 5 Producers
ARKANSAS
Top Operators
1 2 3 4 5 6 Devon Energy XTO Energy Cimarex Energy Continental Resource Chesapeake Energy Eagle Rock Exploration Active Rigs 12 12 6 5 3 3
Source for Exhibits 44 and 45: HPDI, Google Earth and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Card ium
Glau coni te te
Bak ken
VET VET
Woodford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Rigs Running
120 100
80
Wells Drilled
60 40
Ba rn et t
20 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
50 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Woodford
1,250
Mmcfe/d
Mmcfe/d
Mboe/d
125 83 42 -
125 83 42 0
/12 E Q2 /13 E Q1 /14 E Q4 /14 E Q3 /15 E Q2 /16 E Q1 /17 E Q4 /17 E Q3 /18 E Q2 /19 E Q1 /20 E Q4 /20 E
Q2 /10 Q1 /11
Q4 /08 Q3 /09
Q1 /08
Q4 /11
Q3
Q2
Horn River
40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Mon tney
2009
2010
2011
2012E
Q1
2013E
Q4
Q1 /08
Q3 /09 Q2 /10
Q4 /08
Q1 /11
Q4 /11
/12
/13
Q3
/14
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
Quarterly IP
3.5 3.0 2.5 MMcfe/d 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 00 03 06 09 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 Months On Production Q1/08 Q1/09 Q1/10 Q1/11 Q1/12 Q2/08 Q2/09 Q2/10 Q2/11 Q3/08 Q3/09 Q3/10 Q3/11 Q4/08 Q4/09 Q4/10 Q4/11 583 500 417
Boe/d
250 200 150 100 50 0 0 376 752 1,128 1,504 1,880 2,256 2,632 3,008
Peak IP Rate (Boe/d)
186
Mboe/d
1,000
167
1,000
167
Glauconite VET
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Woodford
VET
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Emerging Plays
Exhibit 47. Eaglebine
Barnett
Emerging Plays
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
TEXAS
Haynesville
Robertson Leon
Madison Burleson
Grimes Brazos
Eagleford
LOUISIANA
SOUTH DAKOTA
Converse
WYOMING
Goshen Platte Wilkinson Laramie Weld Larimer West Feliciana Morgan East Feliciana Saint Helena Amite
MISSISSIPPI NEBRASKA
TEXAS
Tanglpahoa
COLORADO
LOUISIANA Boulder
KANSAS
Mississippi Lime
Source for Exhibits 47 and 48: GoogleEarth, HPDI and CIBC World Markets Inc.
COLORADO
Mississippi Lime
Sandoval
TEXAS
Top 5 Permit Holders
1 McElvain Oil & Gas 2 XTO Energy 3 Rosetta Resources 4 Encana Corp 5 Elm Ridge Exploration
NEW MEXICO
Haynesville
MISSISSIPPI
Wilkinson Amite
TEXAS
Tanglpahoa
LOUISIANA
Source for Exhibits 49 and 50: GoogleEarth, HPDI and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Emerging Plays
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Emerging Plays
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
New York
Madison
Haynesville
Chenango Broome
Utica
Trumbull Portage Mahoning Holmes Beaver Columbiana West Feliciana Jefferson Morgan Monroe East Feliciana Saint Helena Lawrence Butler Wilkinson Amite
MISSISSIPPI
Pennsylvania
Tanglpahoa
TEXAS
Ohio
LOUISIANA
191
192
193
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
0 Cardium Seal Tight Carbonates Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Duvernay Viking
Amaranth
Ba rn et t
Bakken (Alberta)
Amaranth
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
Ea gl ef or d
Actual
Forecast
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Amaranth
Mon tney
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
117
Source: The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
194
Montney Oil
60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Liquids Production (MBoe/d)
Pekisko
VET
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
150 100 50 0 0 3 6 9 12 15
Low
$1.0
$0.5
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
18
21
24
27
30
1st yr Decline Rate: 65% 2nd yr Decline Rate: 25% Success Rate: 90%
Ba kk en (U S)
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ba rn et t
150 100 50 0
3 6 401 9 377 12 15 18 21
150 100 50 0
3 6 9
24
27 68
30 37
33 19
36 14
-50
# of We lls -100
430 430
# of We lls -100
-50
27
30
33
36
141 141
113
91
67
Ea gl ef or d
450 400
Peak I.P. Rate (Boe/d)
350
Count
60 30
0 (Boe/d)
Top/Bottom Quartile
Fa ye tt ev ill e
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
25
50
75
Well Count
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Amaranth
150 100 50 0 0 3 6
Mon tney
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
12
15
18
21
24
200
150
200
150
VET
100
Waskada continues to be a focal point of development for EOG & Penn West.
100
but recent results at Pierson (western area) signal an extension of the play.
50
50
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
195
Montney
VET
Amaranth
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
197
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
H ay ne sv ill e
Alberta Bakken - Drilling / Licensing Activity - Data Available As Of MAY 25, 2012; Production Data Current To April 30, 2012 At Update
# Wells 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 Operator Antelope Argosy Argosy Argosy Argosy Argosy Copper Copper Copper Copper Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crescent Point Crocotta Crocotta Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Deethree Legacy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Murphy Nexen Nexen Nexen Nexen Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Shell Timberrock Torc Torc Torc Torc Torc Torc Torc Torc Symbol PRIVATE GSY GSY GSY GSY GSY PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CPG CTA CTA DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX DTX LEG MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR MUR NXY NXY NXY NXY RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A RDS.A PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE Stike Area Stdoff Pearce Pearce Granum Granum Granum Reagan Reagan Reagan Reagan Sunburst Del Bonita Reagan Branch Reagan Del Bonita Reagan Warner Blood Barons Barons Stirling Stirling Reagan Reagan Reagan Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Ferguson Coaldale Springco Reagan Reagan Bonita Reagan Reagan Jensen Jensen Ninsto Blood Blood Blood Blood Ninsto Blood Blood Blood Keho Keho Keho Clares Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Del Bonita Woolfd Aetna Clares Pearce Pearce Pearce Amelia Keho Penny Amelia Amelia Well Location 05-30-007-25W4 04-16-009-24W4 01-21-009-24W4 03-31-010-25W4 13-35-010-26W4 01-24-011-26W4 01-06-001-19W4 13-01-001-20W4 01-23-001-20W4 14-23-001-20W4 03-08-001-18W4 14-07-001-21W4 15-01-002-20W4 13-11-002-20W4 01-09-002-21W4 14-23-002-21W4 13-24-002-21W4 16-10-004-19W4 01-05-007-21W4 01-15-012-24W4 16-35-012-24W4 03-10-007-19W4 14-10-007-19W4 07-03-002-20W4 12-03-002-20W4 16-03-002-20W4 03-19-003-16W4 08-19-003-16W4 16-19-003-16W4 05-22-003-17W4 13-22-003-17W4 07-25-003-17W4 11-31-003-17W4 04-32-003-17W4 11-12-003-18W4 01-36-008-20W4 02-36-003-23W4 16-04-001-20W4 08-16-001-20W4 08-21-001-22W4 14-02-002-21W4 14-11-002-21W4 06-10-003-21W4 14-24-003-21W4 09-29-004-25W4 02-18-005-23W4 07-10-005-24W4 14-21-005-24W4 01-35-005-24W4 09-07-005-25W4 06-32-006-23W4 08-09-006-24W4 13-36-006-24W4 01-06-011-24W4 12-06-011-24W4 11-28-011-24W4 01-12-012-25W4 10-20-001-22W4 14-25-001-22W4 06-33-001-22W4 05-23-001-23W4 13-23-001-23W4 02-28-001-23W4 13-14-001-24W4 14-32-001-24W4 14-04-002-22W4 04-13-002-22W4 16-02-002-24W4 16-24-002-25W4 06-36-013-25W4 03-08-009-24W4 02-17-009-24W4 03-13-009-25W4 03-26-009-27W4 14-10-010-22W4 16-02-010-24W4 04-22-010-26W4 01-29-010-27W4 Reported Formation Stettler Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Stettler Stettler Bakken Bakken Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Bakken Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Big_Val Stettler Stettler Stettler Bakken Bakken Bakken Bakken Bakken Bakken Big_Val Stettler Livngstn Big_Val Stettler Stettler Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Wabamun Big_Val Wabamun Exshaw Exshaw Wabamun Big_Val Big_Val Wabamun Wabamun Big_Val Wabamun Exshaw Banff Stettler Big_Val Big_Val Big_Val Stettler Banff_L Big_Val Big_Val Depth (M) Msrd. Vt. 2,825 2,825 3,765 2,536 3,956 3,456 1,495 1,540 1,548 2,896 3,167 3,020 2,969 3,436 3,209 3,114 1,655 2,161 3,413 2,623 1,481 1,902 2,961 2,629 2,386 2,528 2,601 2,289 1,540 1,548 1,420 1,949 1,590 1,548 1,813 1,674 1,654 2,161 2,086 1,452 1,481 1,545 1,553 1,533 Hz/Vt Well V V H V H H V V V V H H H H H H H V H V H H V H H H H H H H H H H V H V V H H H H H H V H H V V H H H V H V H H H H V V V H H H V V H V V V H H V H H V H V Date Licensed 9/7/2011 1/16/2012 12/6/2011 9/24/2010 12/21/2010 1/14/2011 1/4/2011 12/9/2010 11/26/2010 11/26/2010 9/23/2010 7/9/2010 11/5/2010 2/2/2012 9/20/2011 8/30/2011 3/1/2012 1/11/2012 3/7/2011 10/29/2010 11/18/2010 11/2/2011 9/1/2011 12/3/2010 12/3/2010 6/16/2011 4/18/2012 4/18/2012 3/22/2012 2/24/2012 3/15/2012 10/12/2011 3/11/2011 4/29/2009 5/15/2012 10/25/2011 3/11/2011 1/26/2011 4/6/2011 3/25/2011 1/21/2011 2/17/2011 6/8/2011 6/16/2011 6/16/2011 1/27/2012 11/25/2011 1/27/2012 6/29/2011 11/23/2011 3/1/2012 12/1/2011 2/29/2012 2/26/2011 2/26/2011 12/20/2010 3/31/2011 10/21/2010 6/29/2011 12/19/2011 12/22/2011 2/24/2012 11/17/2010 11/23/2010 8/23/2011 6/10/2011 11/2/2010 6/10/2011 8/5/2010 6/23/2011 3/26/2012 3/17/2011 12/29/2011 10/11/2011 5/8/2012 11/14/2011 4/27/2011 11/30/2011 Date On Spudded 9/17/2011 12/13/2011 9/29/2010 3/15/2011 1/21/2011 1/25/2011 12/28/2010 12/4/2010 10/3/2010 7/24/2010 11/11/2010 2/10/2012 10/17/2011 9/22/2011 3/13/2012 2/1/2012 12/7/2010 12/5/2010 11/6/2011 9/30/2011 12/6/2010 12/6/2010 7/8/2011 4/25/2012 3/30/2012 3/1/2012 3/24/2012 1/3/2012 5/7/2011 11/12/2009 Date Rig Released 11/15/2011 1/18/2012 10/19/2010 4/24/2011 3/12/2011 2/12/2011 1/17/2011 12/23/2010 10/29/2010 8/25/2010 12/2/2010 3/8/2012 11/14/2011 10/16/2011 2/9/2012 12/22/2010 1/6/2011 11/30/2011 10/18/2011 2/11/2011 2/11/2011 8/4/2011 Reported Date On Stream Mths On Cumulative Production Oil Gas Water % (Bbl) (Mcf) (Bbl) Water
A m ar an th
3 16 10 12
732 52
12% 1%
17 19 17 6 7
Ba kk en (U S)
07/01/2011
11
2,235
465
3,805
63%
08/16/2011 09/13/2011
10 9
12,893 4,709
37,858 14,513
947 1,841
7% 28%
Ba rn et t
3 2 4
4,878 14,484
4 4,252
848 1,914
15% 12%
10/22/2011 05/01/2011
8 13
1,751 6,847
2,165 64,095
1,994 586
53% 8%
14 9 6
8,646 13,488
378 762
Ea gl ef or d
31,238 19,269
3,432 4,351
2,371 2,875
7/28/2011 2/18/2012
8/27/2011 4/2/2012
11 13 5 15
145
5%
Fa ye tt ev ill e
3,563 4,341
2,628
11/26/2011 5/11/2011
7/15/2011
01/01/2012
539
316
3,806 2,771 2,223 3,800 3,463 3,839 4,514 3,379 3,731 4,712
2/8/2011 8/17/2010 6/26/2011 4/11/2012 3/29/2011 1/10/2012 10/19/2011 11/21/2011 5/15/2011 2/17/2012
06/01/2011
12
10,629
10,517
6 7 1
940 28,254
667 13,165
08/01/2011
10
6,066
2,318
H ay ne sv ill e
Bakken (AB)
Alberta Bakken - Key Play Parameter vs. Other Tight Oil Plays
Alberta Bakken
(Southern Alberta) Gross OOIP (Bln Barrels) OOIP/section (MMBoe) Recovered to date (%) Est. Ult. Recovery Rate (%): Depth (metres) Capital Costs/well DCT ($MM) Total "AB. BAKKEN" Package Shale, Limestone, & Dolomite Package 2-12% 0.1 - +20 mD 10 - +35 m 32 - 38 API 15.0-25.0 Bln 12-15 MMBoe/sec <1.0% ? 2,000 - 2,800 m $3.0-4.0 MM EXSHAW (Bakken) Shale 4 - 8% 0.1 - 2 mD 4.5 - 11 m 36 API BIG VALLEY BANFF
Bakken
(SE Sask) 5.0 Bln 5 MMBoe/sec 1.0% 30-40% 1,600 m $1.5-2.0 MM
Cardium
(Central AB) 10.0 Bln 5-10 MMBoe/sec 16.0% 25-35% 1,200 - 2,000 m $2.0-3.0 MM
L. Shaunavon Carbonates
(Central AB) 4.3 Bln 5-10 MMBoe/sec <1.0% 10% 1,350 m $1.5-2.0 MM (Central AB)
Viking
(SE Sask)
7.5 Bln 6.0 Bln 5-20 Mmboe/sec 5-10 MMBoe/sec 28.0% <1.0% 50-60% 16% 2,650 m 700 m $2.0-4.0 MM $0.8-1.2 MM
VET
Rock Type Porosity (%) Permeability (millidarcies) Net Pay (metres) Oil Quality (API)
199
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
20
15.0
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
Ba rn et t
Cardium
Seal
Tight Carbonates
Amaranth
Duvernay
Bakken (Alberta)
Bakken
2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated at May 2012. Source: Gvmnt. of Sask.; N. Dakota Geological Survey; Canadian Discovery Digest; GeoScout; Geological Atlas of Western Canada;CIBC World Markets Inc.
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
Bakken (SK)
219
200
172
100
97
90
86
82
77
68
53
45
35
Source: North Dakota Geological Survey; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Crescent Point's acreage includes only 90 net sections of Ryland's acreage 3) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
200
Montney Oil
200 180 160
Viking
Pekisko
31
A m ar an th
250
200
150
Mid High Curve Curve Commodity Prices $3.9 $6.5 Productivity $2.7 $4.6 Capital Cost 59% 169% 1.3x 2.3x Royalties 1.8 0.8 Operating Cost Low Mid High
(C$,mlns)
Ba kk en (U S)
100
Assumptions Well Cost (C$,mln): $2MM 1st yr Decline Rate: 65% Op Costs (incl.trans): $9.00/Boe 2nd yr Decline Rate: 25% Discount Rate: 9% Success Rate: 90%
50
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ba rn et t
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Bakken - Variance of Results - All Time 300 250 Production Rate (Boe/d) Mean (Average) 200 150 100 50 0 3 -50 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average
Bakken - Variance of Results - Since 2011 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 3 -50 # of
1074 984 876
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 Months on Production (Normalized)
361 311 189 145
# of Wells -100
2355 2301 2146
Wells -100
H ay ne sv ill e
600
Distribution Curve
2008 & Earlier (1077 Wells) 2009 (424 Wells) 2010 (493 Wells) 2011 (361 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
400
300
Count
500
M ar ce llu s
(Boe/d)
200
600
Bakken (SK)
100
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
0 Well Count
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
201
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
Bakken (SK)
202
A m ar an th
250
Production Rate (Boe/d)
Ba kk en (U S)
24
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
Ba rn et t
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
2009-01
2009-03
2009-05
2009-07 2009-09
2009-11 2009-09
2009-11
2010-01
2010-03
2010-05 2010-09
2010-11 2010-07
2010-09
2010-11
2011-01
2011-03 2011-09
2011-11 2011-05
2011-07
2007-01
2007-05 2007-07
2007-09
2008-01 2008-04
2008-07 2008-05
2008-09
2009-04 2009-01
2009-05
2009-09 2010-01
2010-01
2010-05 2010-10
2011-01 2010-09
2011-01
2011-10 2011-05
2011-09
2009-01
2009-03
2009-05
2009-07
2010-01
2010-03
2010-05
2010-07
2011-01
2011-03
2011-05
2011-07
2012-01
2012-03
2007-01
2007-04
2007-10
2008-01
2008-10
2009-01
2009-07
2009-10
2010-04
2010-07
2011-04
2011-07
2012-01
2012-04
Bakken - YOY Actual Results WATERFLOOD Pilot #3 100 90 2500 80 70 2000 60 50 1500 40 30 1000 20 10 500 0
0 2010-01
2012-05
2011-09
700
Injection Injection started Started First two HZs recompleted 2nd two HZs recompleted
100
100 500 90 450 80 70 400 60 350 50 300 40 250 30 200 20 150 10 100 0
50
Injection Started
Waterflood Response
Production (Boe/d)
Production (Boe/d)
Injection started
500 100 450 90 400 350 80 300 70 250 60 200 50 150 40 100 50 30 0 20
10 0
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Water - 13 HZ Production (Boe/d) Pilot #3 - Combined Production - 13 HZ Wells Offsetting Injector Combined Production Cut (%) Wells Offsetting Injectors
Production (Boe/d)
Injection Started
We may be seeing the first signs of production response from CPG's 4th pilot.
90
Production (Boe/d)
500 80 400
70 60
Injection started
500 30 0
20 10 0
40
Injection started
300 50 200
2010-03 2010-06 40 30
20 100
100 600
H ay ne sv ill e
2010-01
2010-03 2010-05
2010-05
2010-07
2010-09 2011-01
2010-11
2011-01
2011-03 2011-09
2011-05
2011-07
2012-05 2011-09
10 0 2012-05
M ar ce llu s
2009-10
2009-12
2010-02 2009-09
2010-04
2010-08 2010-07
2010-10
2011-01 2010-12
2011-02 2011-05
2011-04
2011-11 2011-06
Production (Boe/d)
Water Cut (%)
1400 100
Production (Boe/d)
Production (Boe/d)
1000
Still early days on 5th pilot, but we may already be seeing production response. Injection started
2011-01
2011-03 2011-03
2011-05 2011-05
2011-07
2011-09
2011-11
2011-12 2012-01
2012-03 2012-02
2012-05
2012-07
2012-09
2012-09 2012-11
2011-01 2011-02
2011-03
2011-05
2011-07
2011-09
2011-11 2011-11
2012-01 2012-01
2012-03 2012-03
2012-05
2012-07
2012-09
2012-11
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
1200 80
90
Injection started
90 80
Production (Boe/d)
100
Production (Boe/d)
100
1600
2011-08 2012-03
2010-03
2010-07
2010-09
2010-11
2011-03
2011-05
2011-07
2011-11
2012-01
2012-03
2009-01
2009-03
2009-05
2009-07
2009-11
2010-01
2010-05
2010-09
2010-11
2011-03
2011-07
2011-09
2012-01
100
Bakken (SK)
2011-06
2011-07
2011-08
2011-09
2011-10
2011-11
2012-01
203
2012-03
2011-04
2011-05
2011-06
2011-07
2011-08
2011-09
2011-10
2011-12
2012-02
2012-04
2012-05
2012-06
2012-07
2012-08
2012-09
2012-10
Carbonates
20
15.0
20.0
20.0
Recovered-to-Date
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
Amaranth
Cardium
Bakken (Alberta)
Pekisko
Viking
Duvernay
Tight Carbonates
Carbonates
2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
125
Actual
Forecast
100
75
50
25
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; Sherwin; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mon tney
Company Ticker Penn West Petrl Ltd PWT Coral Hill Enrg Ltd PRIVATE Pengrowth Enrg Corp PGF Arcan Rsrcs Ltd ARN Pinecrest Enrg Inc PRY Lone Pine Rsrcs Cda Lt LPR Second Wave Petrl Ltd SCS Apache Cda Ltd APA-NYSE Harvest Oprtns Corp PRIVATE Devon Cda Corp DVN-NYSE Mancal Enrg Inc PRIVATE Surge Enrg Inc SGY Avenex Enrg Corp AVF Barrick Enrg Inc PRIVATE Baytex Enrg Ltd BTE Dolomite Enrg Inc PRIVATE Guide Exploration GO Crescent Point Enrg Co CPG ARC Rsrcs Ltd ARX Athabasca Oil Sands Co ATH
Horn River
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
545
23
14
30
29
23
15
Source: Company reports; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout Estimate. Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
204
Montney Oil
175 150 125
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
0 Seal
100
75
50
25
Carbonates
Tight Carbonates - SWAN HILLS Type Curve Well Economics (Mid Cycle)
SWAN HILLS Type Curve Economics
Low 1 Midcycle Well Economics: Curve NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) IRR (A-tax) (%) 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) Payback Period (yrs) NPV9 Breakeven ($US/bbl) Mid High Curve Curve
Low
-
$58.50 $47.50
Bakken Cardium
$2.0 $1.5 $1.0 $0.5 $0.0 $0.5 $1.0 $1.5 $2.0 $2.5
Assumptions
18
21
24
27
30
1st yr Decline Rate: 65% 2nd yr Decline Rate: 20% Success Rate: 90%
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Tight Carbonates - SLAVE POINT Type Curve Well Economics (Mid Cycle)
SLAVE POINT Type Curve Economics
Midcycle Well Economics: NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) IRR (A-tax) (%) 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) Payback Period (yrs) NPV9 Breakeven ($US/bbl)
1
Low Curve
Mid Curve
High Curve
Low
$62.00 $48.50
High
$1.5
$1.0
$0.5
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
$1.5
$2.0
Assumptions
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
1st yr Decline Rate: 50% 2nd yr Decline Rate: 20% Success Rate: 90%
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Cardium Gas
300 200
100
Glauconite
3
360
6
280
# of -200 Wells
30
14
33
14
36
13
6
179
9
106
12
68 26
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
# of Wells -200
-100
241 241
Distribution Curve
Count
1,600
(Boe/d)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400
Well Count
Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
400
200
300
300
200
200
400
600
800
2008 & Earlier (8 Wells) 2009 (12 Wells) 2010 (81 Wells) 2011 (241 Wells) 2012 (64 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
VET
100
100
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months on Production (normalized)
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Months on Production (normalized)
205
Carbonates Bakken Cardium Cardium Gas Glauconite Horn River Mon tney VET
206
Carbonates
600
300
Bakken Cardium
400
200
300
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Tight Carbonates - YOY Actual Results - SAWN LAKE / RED EARTH / EVI
400
Cardium Gas
SAWN LAKE / RED EARTH / EVI Hz Wells Average Per Well Production
2008 (6 Wells) 2010 (33 Wells) 2012 (41 Wells) 2009 (7 Wells) 2011 (122 Wells)
Increasing data set of strong results derisking Swan Hills Trend. 200
200
Results also improving in the northern Slave Point carbonates trend, where 1st year decline rates appear lower.
Glauconite
100
100
0 0 3
Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
18
21
24
200
200
100
100
VET
207
Bak ken
Card ium
Glau coni te
Montney VET
Hor n Rive r
Carbonates
Bak ken
Card ium
Glau coni te
Montney VET
Hor n Rive r
Carbonates
A m ar an th
Recovered-to-Date
Cardium
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
0 Seal Cardium Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Bakken (Alberta) Duvernay Tight Carbonates Pekisko Viking
Amaranth
Cardium
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
300
Actual
250 200 150 100 50 -
Forecast
250 200 150 100 50 0
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Horn River
Mon tney
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1039
300
350
265
219
209
204
195
149
132
124
120
118
110
102
100
91
81
80
75
71
67
60
57
52
51
50
49
48
47
40
38
27
25
20
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
210
17 13
Montney Oil
450 400 350 300
A m ar an th
Low Midcycle1 Well Economics Curve NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) $0.4 NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) $0.0 IRR (A-tax) (%) 9% P/I Ratio2 (A-tax) 0.0x Payback Period (yrs) 6.6 Low
NPV9 Breakeven
High Curve Commodity Prices $6.4 Productivity $4.4 Capital Cost 93% 1.5x Royalties 1.2 Operating Cost High
(C$,mlns)
Cardium
Cardium Cardium
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Cardium Oil - Variance of Results - All Time 400 350 300 Production Rate (Boe/d) 250 200 150 100 50 0 3 -50 6
1035
350
Mean (Average) Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average Average well performance now exceeding our mid-case type curve.
Gas
250
200
Glauconite
150
100
50
33
11
36
8
Cardium Oil - Distribution By Peak I.P. Rates Distribution by Peak I.P. Rate HORIZONTAL Cardium Oil Wells
1200 1100 1000
Count 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 0 2008 & Earlier (3 Wells)
Distribution Curve
2009 (46 Wells) 2010 (405 Wells) 2011 (737 Wells) 2012 (156 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
900 Peak I.P. Rate (Boe/d) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
150
300
450
(Boe/d)
600
# of -100 Wells
1347 1235
804
VET
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
50
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
211
A m ar an th
A m ar an th
Cardium
While well performance has varied by sub-area, overall average well results in the Cardium
Strong 2011 results in the Pembina Core area (particularly at Minnehik/Buck Lake) have challenged negative preconceptions of the core legacy area.
Cardium Cardium
We believe the West Pembina / Brazeau area to be one of the most prospective areas of the Cardium - showing the strongest rates in the play after 8-9 months on production.
Gas
Glauconite
After a promising start in 2010 (supported by successful conglomerate wells at Tomahawk) follow up wells have, on average, been less impressive to the northeast.
On average, 2010 wells underperformed 2009 wells in East Pembina, while the most recent wells in 2011 have shown improvement.
Exceptional results at Willesden Green continue to lead the pack in the play.
Well performance in the Greater Garrington area has been the most consistent to date in the Cardium.
VET
21
24
213
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Horn River
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout, Sherwin Geoedges, Canadian Discovery Digest, The Edge, Geological Atlas of Western Canada, Core Laboratories, Company reports, CIBC World Markets
Mon tney
VET
214
Deep Basin - Type Curve Well Economics - VERTICAL WELLS (Mid Cycle)
Low Mid 1 Midcycle Well Economics: Curve Curve NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) $1.1 NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) $0.5 IRR (A-tax) (%) 21% 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) 0.3x Payback Period (yrs) 3.1 Low
NPV9 Breakeven ($C/Mcf)
A m ar an th
Mid
$2.75
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Ba kk en (U S)
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Deep Basin - Type Curve Well Economics - HORIZONTAL WELLS (Mid Cycle)
Low Mid 1 Midcycle Well Economics: Curve Curve NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) $2.9 $1.7 NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) 17% IRR (A-tax) (%) 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) 0.3x Payback Period (yrs) 4.6 Low
NPV9 Breakeven ($C/Mcf)
Deep Basin
Mid
$2.90
12
Months on Production
15
18
21
24
27
30
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Cardium Gas
Variance to Mean - All Producers (2007 to Present) VERTICAL Deep Basin Wells (Cardium to Cadomin)
Mean (Average) Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average
Variance to Mean - All Producers (2007 to Present) HORIZONTAL Deep Basin Wells (Cardium to Cadomin)
Mean (Average) Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average
Glauconite
1,000 0 3
1077 1025
9
2596
12
2482
15
18
2294
21
2107
24
1877
27
30
1585
33
1432
36
1356
# of Wells -2,000
-1,000
2980
-1,000
6
894
9
757
12
683
15
558
18
449
21
370
24
317
27
249
30
203
33
177
36
159
Distribution Curve
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
(Mcfe/d/d)
6,000
4.0
9,000
2008 (1437 Wells) 2009 (700 Wells) 2010 (886 Wells) 2011 (671 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
3,000
0 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 200 400 600 800
Well Count
Count
VET
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
215
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
VET
A m ar an th
Pekisko
Amaranth
500 300
Horn River
CBM Mnvl
CBM HSC
Montney
Duvernay
Cardium Gas
Deep Basin
Utica Shale
Nikannassin
Notikewin
0
18
Colorado Shale
Cordova
Doig
Duvernay
2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
400 350
Duvernay
300
Actual
Forecast
Note: Map updated as of June 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Duvernay - Economics
12,000 Production Rate (Mcfe/d) 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000
NPV9 Breakeven ($C/Mcf)
Horn River
Low Mid 1 Midcycle Well Economics: Curve Curve NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) $3.5 $11.9 NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) $1.4 $7.6 IRR (A-tax) (%) 12% 28% 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) 0.1x 0.6x Payback Period (yrs) 6.0 3.1 Low
$3.00
Mid
$2.25
Mon tney
Assumptions Well Cost (C$,mln): $12MM 1st yr Decline Rate: 70% Op Costs (incl.trans): $8.50/Boe Liquids Content: 175Bbls/Mmcf Discount Rate: 9% Success Rate: 90%
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Athabasca
625 623 563 400 313 225
86
79
79
73
70
59
58
43
43
31
23
12
Husky
Sonde
Crew
Terra
Yoho
Vero
Penn West
Connacher
Cequence
Encana
CNRL
Enerplus
Sinopec
Talisman
Chevron
Longview
Chinook
Guide
Delphi
Angle
Bonavista
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. (3) Due to licensing data we believe Shell has acquired 42.6 sections from PetroBakken; however, we believe Shell likely has much more land. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
218
Birchcliff
Shell (3)
Trilogy
Celtic
Westfire
Bellatrix
Glauconite
Ba rn et t
164 69 65 25 15 5
Montney Oil
Ba kk en (U S)
6.0
4%
5.0
1%
4.3
7%
4.0
5%
<1%
<1%
<1%
16%
2.5
2%
2.5
2%
Glauconite VET
Duvernay - All Known Well Results to Date: Data Available As Of June 05, 2012; Production Data Current To May 30, 2012 At Update
# Wells 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 Stike Area Kaybob Chickdee Chickdee Kaybobs Willgr Saxon Saxon Kaybob Fir Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Edson Pembina Grizzly Saxon Grizzly Grizzly Ferrier Brazr Willgr Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Foxck Pembina Wilsonck Willgr Ferrier 7-17-63-23 Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Riv Kaybobs Kaybob Kaybobs Kaybob Ck Kaybobs Cecilia Foxck Kaybobs Kaybob Ckn Kaybob Kaybobs Ferrier Grizzly Grizzly Kaybob Brazr Kaybobs Pembina Pembina Ck Kaybobs Willgr Saxon Saxon Kaybobs Wahigan Cecilia Saxon Kaybobs Foxck Kaybob Kaybob Willgr Willgr Kaybobs Kaybobs Kaybobs Ferrier Reported Formation Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Majeaulk Duvernay Bvrhl_Lk Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Cook_Lk Duvernay Duvernay Bvrhl_Lk Cook_Lk Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Duvernay Nisku Bvhl_Lkb Swan_Hl Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Bvhl_Lkb Bvrhl_Lk Majeaulk Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Bvrhl_Lk Duvernay Bvrhl_Lk Duvernay Duvernay Swan_Hl Nisku Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Bvrhl_Lk Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Gilwd_B Duvernay Rmontney Swan_Hl Cook_Lk Duvernay Bvhl_Lkb Rmontney Nisku Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Duvernay Bvrhl_Lk Duvernay Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Bvhl_Lkb Duvernay Duvernay Duvernay Swan_Hl Swan_Hl Cook_Lk Depth (M) Msrd. Vt. 4,203 2,780 3,027 3,018 5,081 3,313 5,158 3,404 4,559 3,102 5,187 3,824 3,906 3,906 2,975 2,975 4,673 3,441 4,867 3,302 3,308 4,862 3,292 3,179 3,179 3,570 3,570 3,100 3,100 3,761 3,720 3,646 3,646 3,701 3,722 4,671 3,456 3,471 3,453 3,286 3,286 3,281 3,281
A m ar an th
Operator Athabasca Celtic Celtic (TET/YO) Celtic (TET/YO) ConocoPhillips EnCana EnCana Shell Talisman Trilogy (CLT/YO) Yoho (CLT) Yoho (CLT) Alta Angle Antelope Athabasca Athabasca Athabasca Athabasca Bellatrix Blaze Bonavista Celtic Celtic Celtic Celtic Celtic Chevron ConocoPhillips EnCana EnCana EnCana EnCana Husky Husky Husky Husky Husky Mke Shell Shell Shell Talisman Talisman Talisman Taqa Trilogy Trilogy Trilogy Trilogy Westfire Arriva Athabasca Athabasca Athabasca Blaze Celtic Charger Charger Chevron Chevron EnCana EnCana EnCana EnCana EnCana EnCana EnCana Husky Shell Shell Shell Talisman Talisman Trilogy Westfire Westfire Yoho
Well Location 07-18-064-17W5 05-20-060-17W5 15-33-060-20W5 13-36-060-20W5 11-16-044-07W5 16-05-062-24W5 11-08-062-24W5 09-34-062-17W5 01-18-060-20W5 03-13-060-20W5 14-16-062-21W5 13-22-062-21W5 06-18-062-19W5 04-36-052-17W5 10-17-045-06W5 01-24-061-23W5 10-09-062-23W5 04-02-062-23W5 11-10-062-23W5 08-24-044-10W5 04-04-048-13W5 16-33-042-06W5 13-25-059-19W5 13-09-060-19W5 15-31-060-19W5 04-11-060-20W5 14-15-061-21W5 06-22-062-18W5 07-11-045-07W5 13-17-043-04W5 13-05-043-06W5 12-04-042-08W5 06-09-063-23W5 01-01-060-18W5 05-11-060-18W5 08-25-060-18W5 11-25-060-18W5 10-33-056-22W5 10-32-058-17W5 03-21-063-18W5 15-09-063-20W5 02-22-063-20W5 04-09-057-18W5 12-26-059-20W5 12-12-057-22W5 14-10-061-18W5 05-03-060-19W5 09-18-064-19W5 04-03-064-21W5 04-08-063-20W5 03-32-061-19W5 01-06-038-07W5 14-03-062-23W5 04-12-062-23W5 04-18-064-17W5 03-08-047-14W5 03-36-058-18W5 15-25-045-08W5 12-02-046-08W5 08-06-056-18W5 01-36-061-22W5 10-13-044-07W5 09-31-061-24W5 08-05-062-24W5 13-15-063-21W5 13-17-063-23W5 11-34-057-23W5 01-16-061-24W5 16-13-060-18W5 01-18-061-17W5 11-30-063-19W5 01-07-064-19W5 03-02-038-06W5 11-03-041-05W5 13-05-060-19W5 05-32-061-19W5 02-23-062-20W5 16-24-038-07W5
4,353 3,479 3,077 3,077 4,237 3,921 5,577 4,994 3,128 3,147 4,401 4,131 3,101 4,221 4,760 4,861 4,018 3,133 5,307 3,134 4,138 3,184 3,284
3,563
Reported Cumulative Prod. Calc'd Reported Hz/Vt Date Date Rig Date On Mths Oil Cdn Gas Liquids Liquids Well Spudded Released Stream On (Bbl) (Bbl) (MMcf) (Bbl/MMcf) (Bbl/MMcf) V Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 3 6,119 10.5 583 325 (oil) V Mar-11 Mar-11 Jun-11 12 18 0.4 45 H Jun-10 Aug-10 Apr-11 14 761 292.8 3 75 (cond.) V Oct-11 Dec-11 Dec-11 6 2,102 115.3 18 80 (cond.) H Jul-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 7 1,536 92.1 22 H Nov-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 3 4,026 20.5 196 200 (cond.) V Nov-10 Dec-10 Aug-11 10 1,632 2.3 710 300 (cond.) V Sep-11 Oct-11 Feb-12 4 550 0.3 1,833 H Sep-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 5 63 209.3 0 H Jan-11 Feb-11 Apr-11 14 45,049 537.8 84 80 (cond.) V Dec-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 11 745 7.1 105 H Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 5 1,098 n.m. 109 (cond.) V Jan-12 Feb-12 V Jul-11 Aug-11 V Sep-11 Oct-11 V Nov-11 Dec-11 V Oct-10 Nov-10 V Oct-11 Dec-11 H Feb-12 H Feb-12 Mar-12 ~0 V Oct-11 Dec-11 V Oct-11 Nov-11 75 V Aug-10 Sep-10 H Apr-12 H Apr-12 V Jan-12 Mar-12 V Jan-11 Feb-11 V Feb-12 Mar-12 V Oct-11 Dec-11 V Dec-11 Feb-12 190 (cond.) V Oct-11 Dec-11 120 (cond.) H Mar-12 H Dec-11 Mar-12 V Feb-12 V Aug-11 Aug-11 V Mar-11 Apr-11 H Oct-11 Nov-11 V May-10 Aug-10 V Dec-10 Jan-11 V Nov-11 Dec-11 H Apr-12 V Dec-11 V Nov-11 Jan-12 V Feb-12 V Mar-00 Aug-09 V Sep-11 Nov-11 H Mar-12 Apr-12 V Mar-11 Apr-11 H Mar-12 V Nov-11 Dec-11 V Aug-11 Sep-11 V V V Company Activity Summary H Confidential TOTAL V Producing Drilled/Spud TOTAL Locations Drilled or V Company Ticker Wells Wells Drilled (Licensed) Licensed V 1 EnCana ECA 2 4 6 7 13 V 2 Celtic CLT 6 5 11 1 12 V 3 Trilogy TET 3 4 7 1 8 4 Athabasca ATH 1 4 5 3 8 V 1 3 4 3 7 5 Shell RDS.A-NYSE V 6 Husky HSE 5 5 1 6 V 5 6 7 Yoho YO 5 1 V 4 6 8 Talisman TLM 1 3 2 V 9 Chevron CVX-NYSE 1 1 2 3 V 10 Westfire WFE 1 1 2 3 V 11 ConocoPhillips COP-NYSE 1 1 2 2 V 1 1 1 2 12 Blaze PRIVATE H 13 Charger CHX 2 2 14 Alta Enrg Prtnr PRIVATE 1 1 1 V 15 Angle NGL 1 1 1 H 1 1 1 16 Antelope PRIVATE V 1 1 17 Bellatrix BXE 1 H 1 1 18 Bonavista BNP 1 V 1 1 19 Mke MKE-ASX 1 H 20 Taqa North TAQA-ADX 1 1 1 V 21 Arriva PRIVATE 1 1 V Total (gross) 12 39 51 27 78 V Mean Liquids Yield (Bbl/MMcf)1 123 Median Liquids Yield (Bbl/MMcf) 93
Producing Wells
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Locations
Duvernay Glauconite
VET
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Mean liquids yield is calculated removing outliers (i.e. the highest value and the lowest value). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
219
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Duvernay
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Hor n Rive r
Montney
Glau coni te
VET
Duvernay
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
500
200 164
200
100
69 65 25 15 5 Glauconite
140 130 Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Colorado Shale
Ba rn et t
0 CBM Mnvl Cordova Cardium Gas Horn River Nikannassin Deep Basin Utica Shale CBM HSC Notikewin Montney Duvernay Doig
Glauconite
Glauconite
Horn River
Mon tney
Suncor
Quatro (2)
Husky Oil
ConocoPhillips
KNOC/Harvest
Sinopec (2)
Ravenwood
Penn West
Bonavista
Vermilion
Petrobakken
Imperial Oil
Pengrowth
Source: The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
222
Fairborne
Enerplus
Blaze (2)
Waldron
Angle
Devon
CNRL
Shell
NAL
Apache
Baytex
Nuvista
Omers
Taqa
Duvernay
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Actual
Forecast
Bonavista Enrg Corp BNP 102 14 116 177 Quatro Rsrcs Inc PRIVATE 23 8 31 178 Taqa North Ltd TAQA-ASX 9 17 26 59 Penn West Petrl Ltd PWT 10 4 14 59 Apache Cda Ltd APA-NYSE 12 6 18 5 Omers Enrg Inc PRIVATE 11 3 14 143 Cdn Nat Rsrcs Lmtd CNQ 11 0 11 63 ConocoPhillips Cda Corp COP-NYSE 4 8 12 110 Devon Nec Corp DVN-NYSE 1 0 1 0 Nordegg Rsrcs Inc PRIVATE 8 0 8 18 Waldron Enrg Corp WDN 2 0 2 18 Ravenwood Enrg Corp PRIVATE 2 3 5 220 Birchill Expl Corp PRIVATE 2 2 4 0 Yangarra Rsrcs Corp YAN 6 5 11 110 Harvest Oprtns Corp PRIVATE 3 3 6 0 Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
69,568 18,083 11,909 11,819 11,230 9,007 9,400 4,504 4,337 3,506 3,455 1,938 3,123 2,162 2,231
98% 94% 97% 97% 100% 91% 96% 87% 100% 97% 97% 60% 100% 77% 100%
70,629 19,153 12,261 12,172 11,261 9,866 9,777 5,163 4,337 3,612 3,562 3,256 3,123 2,823 2,231
2 8 7 6 0 13 6 27 0 2 9 110 0 18 0
682 786 1,323 1,182 936 819 855 1,126 4,337 438 1,727 969 1,561 360 744
692 833 1,362 1,217 938 897 889 1,291 4,337 451 1,781 1,628 1,561 471 744
VET
Glauconite - Type Curve Well Economics (Mid Cycle) Glauconite Hz Wells - Type Curves
High Case: 5,000 Mcfe/d IP, 4 Bcf recovery Mid Case: 2,500 Mcfe/d IP, 2.5 Bcf recovery Low Case: 1,000 Mcfe/d IP, 1 Bcf recovery
High liquids content supporting economics of Glauconite play.
Low 1 Midcycle Well Economics Curve (C$,mlns) NPV (B-Tax) NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) IRR (A-tax) (%) 1% 2 P/I Ratio (A-tax) Payback Period (yrs) 10.2 Low
NPV9 Breakeven ($C/Mcf) $4.75
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
Commodity Prices Productivity Capital Cost Operating Cost Royalties
(C$,mlns)
$2.0 $1.0 $0.0 $1.0 $2.0
Ba kk en (U S)
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Glauconite - Variance of Results - All Time 6,000 Prod. Rate (Mcfe/d) 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 -1,000 3
243 224
Glauconite - Variance of Results - 2011 to Present 6,000 Prod. Rate (Mcfe/d) 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 3
131 122
Ba rn et t
6
180
33
28
36
-1,000
6
89
9
55
12
18
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
Duvernay
75 50 25
Glauconite
0 (Mcfe/d/d)
Top/Bottom Quartile
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
21
24
Well Count
240
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
VET
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
223
A m ar an th
Horn River & Cordova Embayment - Area Map (Circa August 2012)
Ba kk en (U S)
200 164
200
100
69
65 25 15 Notikewin 5 Glauconite
250 225 200 175
0 CBM Mnvl CBM HSC Montney Duvernay Colorado Shale Cardium Gas Horn River Cordova Doig Utica Shale
Ba rn et t
Horn River
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
1,350
1,200
Ea gl ef or d
1,050
Nikannassin
Deep Basin
900
Actual
Forecast
150
750
125
600
100
450
75
300
50
150
25
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
# Operated # Licensed Oil & Liquids Company EnCana Corp Apache Cda Ltd Nexen Inc Ticker ECA APA-NYSE NXY PRIVATE KWK-NYSE EOG-NYSE PRIVATE DVN-NYSE SRX PBG Hz Wells 23 12 8 3 2 7 2 4 1 1 Wells 10 1 2 1 6 11 1 (bbl/d) 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nat. Gas (mcf/d) 114,503 34,552 28,696 12,528 10,392 5,301 4,947 3,720 3,699 514
Nat. Gas (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SMR O&G Ltd Quicksilver Rsrcs Cda Inc EOG Rsrcs Cda Inc Ramshorn Cda Invstmnt Ltd Devon Nec Corp Storm Gas Rsrcs Corp Petrobank Enrg&Rsrcs
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout, CIBC World Markets Inc.
VET
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
224
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 3 6
(C$,mlns)
$5.0
$2.5
$0.0
$2.5
$5.0
Ba kk en (U S)
12 15 18 21 Months on Production
24
27
30
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ba rn et t
14,000 12,000 Prod. Rate (Mcfe/d) 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 3
14,000 12,000
Production Rate (Mcfe/d)
Ea gl ef or d
21
24
# of Wells
63 61
41 41
30,000 27,000
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Count
Distribution Curve
2008 & Earlier (17 Wells) 2009 (13 Wells) 2010 (11 Wells) 2011 (21 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile Bottom Quartile
(Mcfe/d/d)
10.5
0.0
1.5
3.0
4.5
6.0
7.5
9.0
Well Count
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mon tney
Horn River
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
-33% -18%
-34% -54%
VET
2009
2009
2010F
225
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
200 164
200
100
69
65 25 15 Notikewin
0
5 Glauconite
1,200 1,080 960
Ba rn et t
Montney Gas
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
Cardium Gas
Nikannassin
Deep Basin
Utica Shale
CBM Mnvl
Horn River
Montney
Duvernay
Cordova
Ea gl ef or d
840
Actual Forecast
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
H ay ne sv ill e
Montney Gas
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
80 78 70 67 55
VET
Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
226
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
Mid
$3.30
Ba kk en (U S)
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ba rn et t
9,000 8,000 Prod. Rate (Mcfe/d) 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 -1,000 -2,000 # of Wells -3,000 3
1459 1406
Ea gl ef or d
6
1261
33
299
36
1144
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 -1,000 # of -2,000 Wells -3,000 Prod. Rate (Mcfe/d)
Fa ye tt ev ill e
H ay ne sv ill e
3
573 519
6
382
271
33
36
Montney Gas
Distribution Curve
12,000
9,000
10
12
14
(Mcfe/d/d)
6,000
16
2008 & Earlier (210 Wells) 2009 (254 Wells) 2010 (415 Wells) 2011 (456 Wells) 2012 (124 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
Count
VET
3,000
50
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
Well Count
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
227
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Northeast Region
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Dawson Groundbirch
H ay ne sv ill e
228
A m ar an th
8,000 7,000
Mid Case: 5,000 Mcfe/d IP, 5 Bcf recovery Low Case: 2,000 Mcfe/d IP, 2 Bcf recovery
Ba kk en (U S)
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Months on Production
12
15
18
21
24
Ba rn et t
Ea gl ef or d
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
Fa ye tt ev ill e
6,000
4,000
2,000
0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
12
15
18
21
24
H ay ne sv ill e
Montney Gas
VET
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
229
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
20
15.0
20.0
20.0
Recovered-to-Date
15
15.0
15.0
10.0
10
Tight Carbonates
Duvernay
Amaranth
Ba rn et t
<1%
<1%
<1%
16%
28% 4% 1% 7% 5%
2%
Seal
Bakken (Alberta)
Montney Oil
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
200
Ea gl ef or d
175
175
150
150
125
Actual
Forecast
125
100
100
75
75
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
50
50
25
25
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
Company Ticker Trilogy Rsrc Ltd TET ARC Rsrcs Ltd ARX Galleon Enrg Inc GO Cdn Nat Rsrcs Lmtd CNQ Tourmaline Oil Corp TOU RMP Enrg Inc RMP NAL Rsrcs Lmtd NAE Whitecap Rsrcs Inc WCP Pace O&G Ltd PCE Barrick Enrg Inc PRIVATE Bonavista Enrg Corp BNP ATH Athabasca Oil Sands Corp Seven Generations Enrg L PRIVATE Devon Cda Corp DVN-NYSE Deethree Expl Ltd DTX
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Montney Oil - Land Position By Operater 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
260
Montney Oil
120
Trilogy (2)
Guide (4)
Bellamont (4)
Bonavista
Pace
Whitecap (3)
RMP
ARC
Source: The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Trilogy Montney Oil land position is a CIBC estimate and includes prospective land outside Trilogys first Kaybob pool. 3) Whitecap lands are GROSS and CIBC estimates 4) CIBC estimates. Source: Company reports; geoSCOUT; CIBC World Markets Inc.
230
NAL
Montney Oil
Cardium
Viking
Pekisko
A m ar an th
Mid High Curve Curve Commodity Prices $4.3 $11.4 Productivity $2.7 $7.9 Capital Cost 30% 223% 0.6x 1.7x Royalties 3.2 0.8 Operating Cost Low Mid High
(C$,mlns)
($2.5)
($1.5)
($0.5)
$0.5
$1.5
$2.5
Ba kk en (U S)
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mid High Curve Curve $13.3 $20.0 $9.2 $13.9 368% 11376% 2.0x 3.1x 0.6 0.3 Mid High
$28.50
Ba rn et t
(C$,mlns)
($4.0)
($2.0)
$0.0
$2.0
$4.0
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ea gl ef or d
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380
Variance to Mean - Since 2007 HORIZONTAL Montney Oil Wells Mean (Average) Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average
Variance to Mean - 2011 to Present HORIZONTAL Montney Oil Wells Mean (Average) Top Quartile Average Bottom Quartile Average
3 385 359
6 304
9 235
12 206
15 190
18 168
21 142
24 121
27 113
30 93
33 76
36 70
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
Wells
152 130
55
Fa ye tt ev ill e
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
WORSLEY to GRAND PRAIRIE - Montney Oil Hz Wells Average Per Well Production
Elmworth-Grand Prairie (8 Wells) Sturgeon Lake (24 Wells) Tangent-Girouxville (32 Wells) Worsley/Dixonville (95 Wells)
Montney Oil
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
231
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
H ay ne sv ill e
M ar ce llu s
Montney Oil
Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Altas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
232
A m ar an th
Trilogys most recent well at Kaybob tested at close to 4,000 boe/d, and continued to produce at over 2,000 boe/d after over 30 days on production.
We will be watching the Waskahigan area closely to establish repeatability and gain comfort in the stabilization levels of new horizontals.
Ba kk en (U S)
0 9 12 15 18 21 24 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Ba rn et t
Increased processing capacity for associated gas should debottleneck Montney Oil development at Ante Creek in 2012.
Recent HZ wells drilled by Whitecap at Valhalla may have opened up a new Montney Oil fairway.
Ea gl ef or d
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
800
Fa ye tt ev ill e
Wells in the Elmworth/Grand Prairie area are highly productive, but more commonly produce liquids-rich gas rather than oil.
H ay ne sv ill e
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
12
15
18
21
24
M ar ce llu s
Montney Oil
12
15
18
21
24
12
15
18
21
24
233
Nikanassin
Colorado Shale
Utica Shale
Nikannassin
Notikewin
40 Trilogy(3)
Cardium Gas
Deep Basin
Nikanassin
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
90
480
80
420
70
360
60
Actual
300
Forecast
50
240
40
180
30
120
20
60
10
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Horn River
Mon tney
Company ConocoPhillips Cda Corp Devon Cda Corp Talisman Enrg Inc Shell Cda Lmtd Lone Pine Rsrcs Cda Ltd Tourmaline Oil Corp Progress Enrg Ltd Apache Cda Ltd Delphi Enrg Corp Pace O&G Ltd EnCana Corp Cdn Nat Rsrcs Lmtd Chinook Enrg Inc Husky Oil Oprtns Ltd EOG Rsrcs Cda Inc Nuvista Enrg Ltd Artek Expl Ltd Paramount Rsrcs Ltd
Ticker COP-NYSE DVN-NYSE TLM RDS-NYSE LPR TOU PRQ APA-NYSE DEE PCE ECA CNQ CKE HSE EOG-NYSE NVA RTK PMT
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
70 Taqa(3)
61 Advantage(3)
60 Pace
60 Omers(2)(3)
36 Suncor(3)
Source: The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout Estimate. Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
234
Glauconite
Horn River
CBM Mnvl
Montney
Duvernay
CBM HSC
Cordova
Doig
200 164
200
100
69 65 25 15 5
Nikanassin
Low
-
$2.95
$1.80
CIBC Base Commodity Price Assumption 2012 2013 2014
WTI (US$/bbl) FX ($US/$Cdn) Nat Gas (C$/mcf) $90.00 $0.99 $2.39 $87.50 $0.98 $3.43 $85.00 $0.98 $4.08
High
($1.00)
($0.50)
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
Bakken Cardium
Assumptions
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
1st yr Decline Rate: 40% Liquids Content: 14Bbl/Mmcf Success Rate: 90%
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Months on Production
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
8,000
6,000
($3.0)
($2.0)
($1.0)
$0.0
$1.0
$2.0
$3.0
4,000
Assumptions
Well Cost (C$,mln): $6.5MM Op Costs (incl.trans): $6.50/Boe Discount Rate: 9% 1st yr Decline Rate: 60% Liquids Content: 14Bbl/Mmcf Success Rate: 90%
2,000
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc. 0
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Cardium Gas
24
27
30
Months on Production
Glauconite
-2,000
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
6 51 45
9 42
12 29
15 25
18 19
21 15
24 13
27 11
30 11
33 9
36 7
# of Wells -6,000
-4,000
Nikanassin - Distribution By Peak I.P. Rates Distribution by Peak I.P. Rate VT + HZ Nikanassin Wells
2008 & Earlier (180 Wells)
Distribution Curve
2009 (66 Wells) 2010 (137 Wells) 2011 (72 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
10
15
(Mcfe/d)
20
0 Well Count 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450
Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
8000
15000
Count
VET
18
21
24
18
21
24
235
A m ar an th
Recovered-to-Date
Pekisko
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
0 Cardium Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Tight Carbonates Amaranth Bakken (Alberta) Duvernay Pekisko Viking Seal
Pekisko
Pre 2008 2012 2008 2013 2009 2014 2010 2015 2011 Liquids
Actual
Forecast
Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mon tney
Company Crew Enrg Inc Cenovus Enrg Inc Bonavista Enrg Corp Second Wave Petrl Ltd Husky Oil Oprtns Ltd Pace O&G Ltd Connacher O&G Lmtd NAL Rsrcs Lmtd Cdn Abraxas Petrl Corp Pengrowth Enrg Corp All Points Enrg Ltd ISH Enrg Ltd Cdn Nat Rsrcs Lmtd
Ticker CR CVE BNP SCS HSE PCE CLL NAE PRIVATE PGF PRIVATE PRIVATE CNQ
Horn River
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
442 200
Pengrowth(3)
Husky(3)
Crew
EOG(3)
Cenovus(3)
NAL(3)
CNRL(3)
ConocoPhilips(3)
Source: The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout Estimate. Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
236
Second Wave
Twin Butte
Pace
Bonavista
TAQA (3)
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
92
90
50
30
Montney Oil
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Pekisko - Type Curve Well Economics (Mid Cycle) Pekisko HZ Wells - Type Curves
High Case: 250 Boe/d IP, 250 MBoe recovery Mid Case: 150 Boe/d IP, 150 MBoe recovery
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
Mid High Curve Curve Commodity Prices $2.4 $4.0 Productivity $1.7 $2.8 Capital Cost 70% 162% 1.3x 2.2x Operating Cost 1.6 0.8 Royalties Low Mid High
Pekisko
(C$,mlns) $1.0
$0.5
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Months on Production
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Cardium Cardium
12 87
15 66
18 47
21 34
24 25
27 16
30
33
36
-100
# o -200 f We lls -300
6
59
9
34
12
18
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
Gas
1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
80 60
Distribution Curve
500
400
Count
40 20 0
0 150 300 450
300
Glauconite
200
(Boe/d)
600
100
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
12
15
18
21
24
Well Count
700 600 To date, the Princess area has shown significantly better productivity than the Judy Creek or Northern areas. "Gassier" Pekisko wells at Sylvan Lake have recently shown promise, however.
12
15
18
21
24
2008 (3 Wells) 2009 (11 Wells) 2010 (46 Wells) 2011 (46 Wells)
12
15
18
21
24
Date On Mths % Prod. (Boe/d) Depth (Meters) Rank Operator Strike Area UWI (Well Location) Stream On Peak I.P. Current Gas Msrd. Vt. 11-06-018-11W4 2010/12 14 1,028 193 11% 1,580 993 1 Crew Bantry 2 Crew Princess 10-07-019-11W4 2009/10 28 947 149 15% 1,890 1,004 3 Bonavista Prevo 12-07-039-01W5 2010/01 25 945 683 88% 3,199 2,043 4 Crew Alderson 12-06-018-11W4 2011/10 4 820 764 8% 1,944 992 5 Crew Princess 16-12-019-12W4 2009/11 27 766 132 37% 1,763 1,016 6 Crew Bantry 08-02-018-12W4 2010/01 25 634 62 4% 1,959 997 7 Crew Bantry 15-01-018-12W4 2010/08 18 561 41 7% 1,529 989 8 Crew Princess 01-11-019-11W4 2011/07 7 557 1,589 79% 1,919 995 9 Crew Bantry 15-05-017-11W4 2011/03 11 546 68 8% 1,777 985 10 Crew Bantry 09-36-017-12W4 2010/12 14 506 195 18% 1,898 993 11 Cenovus Countess 13-25-019-15W4 2011/02 12 488 191 11% 1,977 1,009 12 Crew Bantry 05-05-017-11W4 2010/10 16 461 90 5% 1,887 983 13 Crew Bantry 11-06-018-11W4 2011/08 6 449 78 24% 1,713 1,005 14 Crew Bantry 09-01-018-12W4 2009/09 29 444 89 5% 1,609 988 15 Crew Alderson 01-32-017-11W4 2010/10 16 442 35 4% 1,796 994 16 Crew Bantry 08-08-017-11W4 2008/10 40 426 33 5% 2,198 982 17 Crew Bantry 07-18-017-11W4 2010/08 18 411 12 2% 2,026 981 18 Husky Bantry 01-03-019-14W4 2009/09 29 409 45 15% 1,707 1,025 19 Crew Alderson 02-01-018-12W4 2011/11 3 384 384 13% 1,823 993 20 Crew Princess 15-12-019-11W4 2011/11 3 378 11,339 21% 1,621 1,000 21 Crew Princess 06-05-019-11W4 2010/12 14 377 34 27% 1,795 1,007 22 Crew Princess 12-06-019-11W4 2010/11 15 374 96 38% 2,289 1,002 23 Crew Princess 04-36-018-11W4 2011/02 12 374 17 8% 1,253 989 24 Husky Bantry 15-03-019-14W4 2010/03 23 368 15 25% 1,415 1,023 25 Crew Princess 12-02-019-11W4 2011/08 6 366 128 84% 1,869 1,003 26 Crew Alderson 11-30-017-11W4 2010/02 24 347 56 11% 1,934 986 27 Crew Princess 09-15-019-12W4 2010/05 21 331 26 23% 2,063 1,026 28 All Hussar 08-31-026-21W4 2011/03 11 308 118 30% 2,724 1,486 29 NAL Sylvan Lake 07-08-037-03W5 2010/10 16 308 138 58% 3,227 2,346 30 Hemisphere Jenner 10-14-021-09W4 2010/11 15 294 106 9% 2,002 981 31 Crew Bantry 15-06-017-11W4 2010/11 15 290 12 8% 1,966 994 32 Crew Alderson 02-32-017-11W4 2009/08 30 288 4 4% 1,814 1,003 33 Crew Bantry 15-02-018-12W4 2011/10 4 284 54 24% 2,098 995 34 Crew Princess 12-31-018-10W4 2010/11 15 275 67 19% 1,980 984 35 Crew Princess 07-11-019-11W4 2011/11 3 273 5,399 52% 1,604 997 36 Crew Alderson 06-33-016-11W4 2010/10 16 258 19 3% 2,034 996 37 Crew Princess 03-36-018-11W4 2011/11 3 254 118 34% 1,680 981 38 Husky Bantry 08-03-019-14W4 2011/02 12 250 42 39% 1,559 1,025 39 Crew Princess 16-34-018-11W4 2011/03 11 246 70 51% 2,093 1,001 Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents 01-14-019-11W4 the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note 40 Crew Princess 2010/08 18 245 34 56% 1,920 1,006 All we exclude months with less 2,021 thatProducers (188) - Average than 10 days of production). Current rate is a 177 "calendar259 rate27% last month's 1,122 day" (i.e.
VET
cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
237
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
20
15.0
20.0
20.0
Recovered-to-Date
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
0 Cardium Viking Tight Carbonates Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Pekisko Seal Duvernay Bakken (Alberta)
Amaranth
Seal
Seal
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Actual
Forecast
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; Hubbard et. Al. (1999); Bluesky Depositional Environments; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Horn River
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mon tney
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
42
40
26
22
20
Notes 1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company. Land positions are approximations based on company disclosure and public data, and do not adjust for prospectivity. * PWT and CIC are joint parnters. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
238
Montney Oil
130 120 110 100
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
A m ar an th
Mid High Curve Curve $4.9 $8.3 $3.5 $6.0 91% 319% 2.0x 3.4x 1.3 0.6 Mid High
18
21
24
27
30
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc. Source: Company Reports;
Assumptions Well Cost (C$,mln): $1.75MM 1st yr Decline Rate: 50% Op Costs (incl.trans): $11.00/Boe 2nd yr Decline Rate: 25% Discount Rate: 9% Success Rate: 90%
Ba kk en (U S)
We assume peak production is achieved in the 4th steam cycle (yr 4).
Seal
12
24
36 Months on Production
48
60
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports.
Assumptions Well Cost (C$,mln): $31MM EUR: 3,900 MBoe Op Costs (incl.trans): $10.00/Bo Peak Rate: 2,200 Boe/d Discount Rate: 9% Peak Year Rate: 1,700 Boe/d
Cardium Gas
702 677 636 612 -200 Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
# of We lls
30 451
33 441
36 423
Glauconite
27
30
33
36
141
132
89
67
37
Distribution Curve
IP Rate (Boe/d)
Count
(Boe/d)
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Well Count
Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
2008 & Earlier (453 Wells) 2009 (51 Wells) 2010 (58 Wells) 2011 (134 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
VET
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
12
15
18
21
24
239
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
20
15.0
20.0
20.0
Recovered-to-Date
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1%
Ba rn et t
<1%
<1%
16%
28%
0 Cardium Seal Tight Carbonates Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Amaranth Bakken (Alberta) Pekisko Viking Duvernay
Shaunavon
Shaunavon
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 -
Actual
Forecast
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Mon tney
Company Crescent Point Enrg Corp Cenovus Enrg Inc Wild Stream Expl Inc Anterra Enrg Inc Jarrod Oils Ltd Husky Oil Oprtns Ltd Grizzly Rsrcs Ltd ARC Rsrcs Ltd Trafina Enrg Ltd Avenex Enrg Corp Novus Enrg Inc Penn West Petrl Ltd
# Operated Ticker Hz Wells CPG 313 CVE 68 WSX 59 AE.A 1 7 PRIVATE HSE 7 PRIVATE 1 ARX 1 TFA.A 1 AVF 1 NVS 1 PWT 1
# Licensed Wells 30 49 28 5 8 -
Horn River
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout Estimate. Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
240
Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
54
25
10
Montney Oil
70 65 60 55
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Glauconite VET
Lower Shaunavon - Generic Type Curves 350 Prod. Rate (Boe/d) 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 0 3 6 9
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
A m ar an th
High Curve Commodity Prices $5.0 Productivity $3.5 Capital Cost 107% 2.0x Operating Cost 1.3 Royalties High
(C$,mlns)
$1.0
$0.5
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
Ba kk en (U S)
12 15 18 21 Months on Production
24
27
30
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Lower Shaunavon - Variance of Results - All Time 350 300 Prod. Rate (Boe/d) 250 200 150 100 50 6
345
30
103
33
93
36
78
Ba rn et t
6
62
308
30 13
30
33
36
Shaunavon
Lower Shaunavon - Distribution By Peak I.P. Rates 700 Peak I.P. Rate (Boe/d) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 25 50 75
300 250 200 150 100 50 0 0
(Boe/d)
2008 & Earlier (104 Wells) 2009 (71 Wells) 2010 (113 Wells) 2011 (173 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
Count
Glauconite
160
320
480
Well Count
Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
21
24
Lower Shaunavon - YOY Actual Results WATERFLOOD PILOT #1 Combined Production - 5 HZ Wells Offsetting Injector Production (Boe/d) 100 Water Cut (%) 80 60 40 20 0 2006-09
Injection Started
A 2nd waterflood pilot into the lower Shaunavon has now commenced. Water Cut (%) Production (Boe/d) 600 500
Waterflood Response?
VET
2007-01
2007-05
2007-09
2008-01
2008-05
2008-09
2009-01
2009-05
2009-09
2010-01
2010-05
2010-09
2011-01
2011-05
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
241
A m ar an th
ALBERTA
SASK
Ba kk en (U S)
20
15.0
20.0
20.0
Recovered-to-Date
15
10.0
15.0
15.0
10
5
<1% <1% <1% 16%
28%
Ba rn et t
0 Cardium Seal Bakken (SE Sask.) Lower Shaunavon Bakken (Alberta) Pekisko Viking Tight Carbonates Duvernay
Amaranth
2012
Viking
110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20
Actual
Forecast
Viking Oil
10 Q2/08 Q3/08 Q4/08 Q1/09 Q2/09 Q3/09 Q4/09 Q1/10 Q2/10 Q3/10 Q4/10 Q1/11 Q2/11 Q3/11 Q4/11 Q1/12 Q2/12 Q3/12 Q4/12 Q1/13 Q2/13 Q3/13 Q4/13 Q1/14 Q2/14 Q3/14 Q4/14 Q1/15 Q2/15 Q3/15 Q4/15
Note: Map updated as of May 2012. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; Geological Atlas of Western Canada; The Edge; Canadian Discovery Digest; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Horn River
Mon tney
Note: Quoted production is a gross estimate from public databases which may vary from actual production rates. Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
1170
220
150
150
137
114
110
110
100
98
85
85
75
60
60
60
51
47
45
44
40
31
30
30
27 Equal Energy
Compass
Sure Energy
ISH Energy(2)(3)
Crescent Point
Penn West
Source: The Edge, Canadian Discovery Digest, CIBC World Markets Inc.
1) 1 section = 640 acres; 2) Denotes private company; 3) Denotes CIBC/Geoscout estimate Note: Land positions include acreage accessible via farm-in agreements. Source: Company reports; GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
242
ConocoPhillips(3)
Silverback(2)
Wild Stream
Imperial(3)
Pengrowth
Husky(3)
Renegade
Enerplus
Apache
Zargon
Vero
CNRL(3)
Cutpick(2)
Bonavista
Teine(2)
Emerge
ARC(3)
NAL(3)
Baytex
Novus
Angle
Devon(3)
Westfire
Kallisto
24
Montney Oil
160 150 140 130 120 110
Duvernay VET
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
A m ar an th
NPV/well Sensitivity (+/- 20%)
Low Mid High 1 Midcycle Well Economics: Curve Curve Curve Commodity Prices NPV (B-Tax) (C$,mlns) $1.4 $3.2 Productivity NPV (A-Tax) (C$,mlns) $0.9 $2.2 Capital Cost IRR (A-tax) (%) 27% 71% P/I Ratio2 (A-tax) 0.7x 1.7x Operating Cost Payback Period (yrs) 3.5 1.7 Royalties Low Mid High
NPV9 Breakeven ($US/bbl)
$53.50 $37.50
(C$,mlns)
$0.5
$0.0
$0.5
Ba kk en (U S)
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
Months on Production
Note: We will be watching actual results to either validate or disprove these type curves, and plan to make adjustments on an on-going basis as dictated by empirical data. Source: GeoScout; Company reports; CIBC World Markets Inc.
Notes: 1) Midcycle Economics include dry hole costs, and a 10% capital cost gross up for infrastructure spending. Land costs are considered sunk costs. Economics assume crown royalties. 2) P/I ratios calculated as per well NPV (@ 9%) divided by initial capital invested, and can be thought of as the discounted % return for per dollar invested. Source: Company reports and CIBC World Markets Inc.
Ba rn et t
200 150
200 150
100 50 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
Duvernay
24
27
30
33
36
# of
# of
-50
758 747 613
Wells -100
Wells -100
Viking Oil
800 Peak I.P. Rate (Boe/d) 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
(Boe/d)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 950 1000 1050 1100 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450
Well Count
Notes: Our Peak I.P. rate represents the maximum monthly producing-day rate in a wells first 8 months of production (note that we exclude months with less than 10 days of production). Current rate is a "calendar day" rate (i.e. last month's cumulative volumes divided by 30.5 days). Source: GeoScout; CIBC World Markets Inc.
250 225 200 Prod. Rate (Boe/d) 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 0 3
2008 (47 Wells) 2009 (37 Wells) 2010 (424 Wells) 2011 (758 Wells) 2012 (211 Wells) Median Mean (Average) Top/Bottom Quartile
Count
150
300
VET
21
24
21
243
A m ar an th
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
Viking Oil
244
Duvernay
Viking - YOY Actual Results - All Producers Viking HZ Wells - Type Curves
A m ar an th
High Case: 125 Boe/d IP, 125 MBoe recovery Prod. Rate (Boe/d) Mid Case: 70 Boe/d IP, 75 MBoe recovery Low Case: 30 Boe/d IP, 35 MBoe recovery
2008 (47 Wells) 2009 (37 Wells) 2010 (424 Wells) 2011 (758 Wells) 2012 (211 Wells)
Ba kk en (U S)
Ba rn et t
6 9 12 15 18 Months on Production (normalized) 21 24
12 15 18 21 Months on Production
24
27
30
Duvernay
2008 (42 Wells) 2009 (31 Wells) 2010 (279 Wells) 2011 (502 Wells) 2012 (151 Wells)
Lower drilling costs for the Viking in SW Saskatchewan allow economics to remain competitive with other tight oil plays, despite the area's lower productivity.
2008 (5 Wells) 2009 (10 Wells) 2010 (41 Wells) 2011 (102 Wells) 2012 (29 Wells)
While HZ Viking wells at Red Water have been more productive than those in SW Saskatchewan, the resource potential at Redwater is somewhat smaller.
Viking Oil
300 280 260 240 220 200 Prod. Rate (Boe/d) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 0 3
2010 (14 Wells) 2011 (10 Wells) 2012 (7 Wells) Recent wells drilled by Glencoe (private) at Chigwell, and by NAL at Caroline represent the best Viking wells drilled to-date. We will be watching follow up wells in these areas closely to establish repeatability.
2010 (45 Wells) 2011 (136 Wells) 2012 (46 Wells) While less known, we consider the Provost pool to be the most interesting emerging Viking sub-area (owing to its ariel extent, the high productivity of its initial wells). Recent activity has begun to test the prospectivity of the southern part of the play.
21
24
VET
21
24
21
24
245
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Viking Oil
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
D uv er na y
Hor n Rive r
Montney
VET
Viking Oil
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
D uv er na y
A m ar an th
Methodology: New Tools For A New Ball Game Welcome To The Matrix
Our price targets are set close to our Risked NAV which we define as our CORE NAV (2P booked reserves) + a companys Risked upside potential.
B ak ke n (U S)
B ar ne tt
Ea gl ef or d
Fa ye tt ev ill e
As plays improve their scores in the criteria outlined in our developmental and geological/asset frameworks, the plays become de-risked and shift from tier 5 towards tier 1, receiving greater credit in our Risked NAV.
Methodology
Our de-risking tiers correlate with cascading risking percentages which are applied to drilling inventories on a year-by-year basis. Our risking not only becomes more punitive in the higher risking tiers (where riskier plays are placed) but also is more punitive for wells drilled into the future. The additional time risking in each tier is incremental to our 9% discount rate, and is justified by basic assumptions such as the notion that companies drill their best wells first, down-spacing wells are typically less productive, and, empirically, investors are less inclined to pay for wells drilled 5 years from now than for wells expected to be drilled in a year. Source: CIBC World Markets Inc.
VET
248
A m ar an th
Risked and UnRisked upside summary (by play). Risked NAV Bluesky (unrisked) NAV Target multiple: Near-term production growth (shown to the right) is the greatest factor in determining whether or not a company receives a premium or a discounted target multiple. Target Price Key assumptions: key assumptions for each play include NPV/well, prospective net sections, wells per section, initial wells per year, and optimal wells per year.
Proved + Probable Res. (2) Undeveloped Land Long Term Debt Other Assets and Liab. (3) CORE NAV
$9.60
$10.80
$2.64
$4.34
B ak ke n (U S)
Our $29.00/share target price is based on a discounted 0.9x multiple to Penn West's Risked NAV (vs. the group avg. of 1.0x). We award a discounted multiple to Penn West primarily due to the company's lower than average production per share growth profile.
$2.52
$4.21
$1.72
$3.80
Core NAV Risked Upside
$16
$20
$24
$28
$32
$36
$40
$44
$48
$52
B ar ne tt
Current Price
Price Target
Cardium - (AB)
NPV/well - Midcycle ($M) Risking Tier (1 to 5)
Drilling Inventory
A-Tax 4.1 B-Tax 4.6 2 1040 80% 832 4 330 2998 1073 115 325 5 9 B-Tax 2.0 3 1170 60% 702 8 280 5336 1486 145 350 5 15 B-Tax 4.0 2 115 100% 115 12 276 1104 485 145 150 5 7 B-Tax 7.2 3 258 50% 129 12 1548 377 10 80 5 19 B-Tax 42.0 4 258 50% 129 4 516 70 1 25 5 21
RISK timeline (TIER 2) 75% 60% 50% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 2998 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 2998 2998 Total Company Pace RISKED Bluesky (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 115 86 168 101 220 110 273 109 325 98 325 98 325 98 325 98 1073 2998
Risked Valuation
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $13,734 $1,366 $1,253 $1,150 $1,055 $968 $888 $736 $675 $13,734 $8,837 Undiscounted Discounted $26.18/boe $16.84/boe $29.04/sh $18.69/sh Company Pace RISKED Bluesky NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $483 $363 $646 $388 $778 $389 $884 $354 $968 $290 $888 $266 $736 $221 $675 $202 $7,683 $2,960 Bluesky RISKED $14.64/boe $5.64/boe $16.25/sh $6.26/sh
Impact of Risking
Included in Valuation $35.00 $29.04 $30.00 $25.00 $18.69 Impact Relative NPVs $16.25 $20.00 ($/share) (%) (%) $15.00 Undiscounted $29.04 ### $6.26 $10.00 Discounted $18.69 ### -36% $5.00 Bluesky $16.25 ### -13% $0.00 Risked $6.26 ### -61%
Assumptions:
ou nt ed
co un te d
Bl ue s
nd isc
Initial # Wells/yr (company) Optimal # Wells per Year Years to Optimal Pace Optimal Years to Dev. Inventory
525
188
D is
COMPANY
Colorado/Viking (AB/SK)
NPV/well - Midcycle ($M) Risking Tier (1 to 5)
Drilling Inventory
RISK timeline (TIER 3) 60% 50% 40% 30% 25% 25% 25% 25% Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 5336 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 5336 5336 Total Company Pace RISKED Bluesky (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 145 87 196 98 248 99 299 90 350 88 350 88 350 88 350 88 1486 5336
Risked Valuation
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $10,916 $657 $603 $553 $507 $465 $427 $356 $326 $10,916 $5,576 Undiscounted Discounted (C$/boe) $27.28/boe $13.93/boe (C$/share) $23.08/sh $11.79/sh Company Pace RISKED Bluesky NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $272 $163 $338 $169 $391 $156 $433 $130 $465 $116 $427 $107 $356 $89 $326 $82 $4,920 $1,490 Bluesky RISKED $12.29/boe $3.72/boe $10.40/sh $3.15/sh
Impact of Risking
$25.00 $20.00
UNCO NSTR COMP (C$/share) AINE ANY D
Assumptions:
A-Tax 1.9
$23.08
Relative NPVs ($/share) $23.08 $11.79 $3.15
Included in Valuation
De-risking Tier: it is at this step that we integrate our risk ranking from our matrix on the preceding page.
co un te d
ou nt ed
Bl ue s
Un di s
Initial # Wells/yr (company) Optimal # Wells per Year Years to Optimal Pace Optimal Years to Dev. Inventory
400
111
i sc
COMPANY
Amaranth (MB)
Assumptions:
NPV/well - Midcycle ($M) Risking Tier (1 to 5) A-Tax 3.7
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 RISK timeline (TIER 2) 75% 60% 50% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30%
Drilling Inventory
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 1104 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 54 1104 1104 Total Company Pace RISKED Bluesky (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 145 109 146 88 148 74 149 60 150 45 150 45 150 45 67 20 485 1104
Risked Valuation
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $4,453 $555 $509 $467 $429 $393 $361 $304 $100 $4,453 $3,118 Undiscounted Discounted (C$/boe) $32.27/boe $22.60/boe (C$/share) $9.42/sh $6.59/sh Company Pace RISKED Bluesky NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $537 $402 $497 $298 $459 $230 $425 $170 $393 $118 $361 $108 $304 $91 $124 $37 $3,099 $1,454 Bluesky RISKED $22.46/boe $10.54/boe $6.55/sh $3.08/sh
Impact of Risking
Included in Valuation $10.00 $9.42 $9.00 $8.00 $6.59 $6.55 $7.00 Relative NPVs Impact $6.00 $5.00 ($/share) (%) (%) $3.08 $4.00 Undiscounted $9.42 ### $3.00 Discounted $6.59 ### -30% $2.00 $1.00 Bluesky $6.55 ### -1% $0.00 Risked $3.08 ### -53%
Inventory / Pace of Development: the companys pace of development and the risked inventory included in our valuation are shown here.
co un te d
ou nt ed
Bl ue s
Un di s
Initial # Wells/yr (company) Optimal # Wells per Year Years to Optimal Pace Optimal Years to Dev. Inventory
p
138
61
i sc
COMPANY
Drilling Inventory
RISK timeline (TIER 3) 60% 50% 40% 30% 25% 25% 25% 25% Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 1548 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 1548 1548 Total Company Pace RISKED Bluesky (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 10 6 28 14 45 18 63 19 80 20 80 20 80 20 80 20 377 1425
Risked Valuation
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $11,174 $530 $486 $446 $409 $375 $344 $292 $268 $11,174 $5,010 Undiscounted Discounted (C$/boe) $19.36/boe $8.68/boe (C$/share) $23.63/sh $10.59/sh Company Pace RISKED Bluesky NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $66 $40 $167 $84 $251 $100 $320 $96 $375 $94 $344 $86 $292 $73 $268 $67 $4,005 $1,120 Bluesky RISKED $6.94/boe $1.94/boe $8.47/sh $2.37/sh
Impact of Risking
$25.00 $20.00
UNCO NSTR COMP (C$/share) AINE ANY D
Assumptions:
A-Tax 6.7
$23.63
Relative NPVs ($/share) $23.63 $10.59 $8.47 $2.37
Included in Valuation
ou nt ed
Bl ue sk
sc o
Initial # Wells/yr (company) Optimal # Wells per Year Years to Optimal Pace Optimal Years to Dev. Inventory
577
152
nd i
Di sc
COMPANY
Drilling Inventory
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 516 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 516 500 Total Company Pace RISKED Bluesky (wells/yr) (wells/yr) 1 0 7 2 13 3 19 4 25 4 25 4 25 4 25 4 70 440
Risked Valuation
Unconstrained Pace Undiscounted Discounted NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $21,683 $964 $884 $811 $744 $683 $626 $515 $472 $21,683 $9,081 Undiscounted Discounted (C$/boe) $12.97/boe $5.43/boe (C$/share) $45.85/sh $19.20/sh Company Pace RISKED Bluesky NPV/yr ($M) NPV/yr ($M) $39 $15 $248 $74 $422 $105 $566 $113 $683 $102 $626 $94 $515 $77 $472 $71 $6,951 $1,160 Bluesky RISKED $4.16/boe $0.69/boe $14.70/sh $2.45/sh
Impact of Risking
Included in Valuation $50.00 $45.85 $45.00 $40.00 $35.00 Relative NPVs Impact $30.00 ($/share) (%) $25.00 $19.20 (%) $14.70 $20.00 Undiscounted $45.85 ### $15.00 Discounted $19.20 ### -58% $10.00 $2.45 $5.00 Bluesky $14.70 ### -23% $0.00 Risked $2.45 5% -83%
O
Impact of risking: the impact of our different layers of risking is illustrated here, as is the value per unit included in our valuation for each play.
co un te d
ou nt ed
Bl ue sk y
U nd is
Initial # Modules per year Optimal # Modules per Year Years to Optimal Pace Optimal Years to Dev. Inventory
1,672
264
i sc
COMPANY
R i sk
Net Sections Prospectivity Prospective Sections Wells per Section Booked (or producing) Locations Max Well Inv. (less booked loc.) RISKED Well Inventory
C O M PA
(C$/share) C
U N
Net Sections Prospectivity Prospective Sections Wells per Section Booked (or producing) Locations Max Well Inv. (less booked loc.) RISKED Well Inventory
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Impact
$8.47 $2.37
$0.00 Risked
un te d
ed
i sk ed
R is
Net Sections Prospectivity Prospective Sections Wells per Section Booked (or producing) Locations Max Well Inv. (less booked loc.) RISKED Well Inventory
ky
ke d
Ri s
Net Sections Prospectivity Prospective Sections Wells per Section Booked (or producing) Locations Max Well Inv. (less booked loc.) RISKED Well Inventory
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
$11.79
(%) ### ### ### ###
Net Sections Prospectivity Prospective Sections Wells per Section Booked (or producing) Locations Max Well Inv. (less booked loc.) RISKED Well Inventory
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ea gl ef or d
ky
is k
ed
$3.15
Bluesky $10.40
$0.00Risked
Fa ye tt ev ill e
ky
ke d
Methodology VET
249
Comparative Valuations
250
2011 Free Cash Flow Yield - % 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E
3% 0% 1% 12% 4%
2% -1% -3% 3% 0%
2% 0% -1% 0% 0%
1% 5% 0% 0% 2%
2% 4% 4% 1% 3%
4% 4% 4% 1% 3%
SO SP SU SO
13% 4% 8% 36%
1% -1% 1% -2% 0%
2% -3% 7% -1% 1%
7% -5% 5% -1% 1%
13.0x nm nm 13.0x
-3% 1% 2% -2% -116% -93% -18% -15% -15% -8% -44% -35%
3% 0% 1% 12% 4%
2% -1% -2% 4% 1%
2% 0% 0% 1% 1%
2% 5% 1% 2% 2%
3% 4% 5% 2% 3%
4% 4% 5% 2% 4%
-1% 0% 3% -4% 0%
2% -8% 8% -1% 0%
7% -10% 5% -3% 0%
8.9x nm nm 8.9x
11.7x nm nm 11.7x
12% 0% -7% 2%
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
2011 2011 $4.32 $5.63 $4.70 $6.17 2012E $4.88 $4.43 $4.84 $5.74 CFPS (Diluted) 2013E 2014E $4.70 $4.48 $5.21 $5.72 $5.09 $5.24 $5.11 $5.84 2015E $5.50 $5.52 $6.45 $6.14 2016E $6.25 $5.88 $6.59 $6.45 T+2 4% -11% 5% -4% -1% CAGR T+5 8% 1% 7% 1% 4%
2011 2011 $1.64 $2.31 $3.95 $3.59 2012E $2.02 $1.69 $3.79 $2.95 Operating EPS (Diluted) 2013E 2014E $2.06 $1.72 $3.67 $2.69 $2.22 $2.11 $3.50 $2.71 2015E $2.44 $2.28 $4.49 $2.89 2016E $2.79 $2.39 $4.52 $3.01 T+2 12% -14% -4% -13% -5% CAGR T+5 11% 1% 3% -3% 3%
8% 0% 3% 4% 3%
9% 28% -12% 7% 8%
-8% nm 22% 7%
2011
2011 2011 $1.64 $2.31 $3.95 $3.59 2012E $2.06 $1.84 $4.00 $3.26 Operating EPS (Diluted) 2013E 2014E $2.23 $1.81 $3.95 $3.02 $2.47 $2.24 $3.82 $3.08 2015E $2.58 $2.27 $4.72 $3.09 2016E $2.87 $2.26 $4.64 $3.11 T+2 17% -11% 0% -8% -1% CAGR T+5 12% 0% 3% -3% 3%
9% 8% -13% 2% 2%
2011 2011 $2,744 $5,278 $3,974 $6,876 Capital Expenditures ($mm) 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E $3,257 $4,680 $5,245 $7,455 $3,118 $4,483 $4,817 $8,926 $3,669 $3,812 $4,369 $8,858 $3,615 $4,229 $3,980 $9,066 2016E $3,805 $4,567 $3,974 $9,345
2011 2011 $3,276 $4,823 $4,009 $9,746 Cash Flow From Continuing Operations ($mm) 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E $3,699 $3,862 $4,135 $8,941 $3,555 $4,359 $4,459 $8,893 $3,848 $5,105 $4,373 $9,084 $4,158 $5,374 $5,512 $9,545 2016E $4,723 $5,721 $5,634 $10,022
2011 2011 0.8x 1.1x 0.9x 0.4x 0.8x Reinvestment Ratio (Net Capex / Cash Flow) 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 0.9x 1.2x 1.2x 0.8x 1.0x 0.9x 1.0x 1.1x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 0.7x 1.0x 1.0x 0.9x 0.9x 0.8x 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x 2016E 0.8x 0.8x 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x
2011.0x
2011 2011 $3,276 $4,823 $4,009 $9,746 Cash Flow From Continuing Operations ($mm) 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E $3,750 $4,043 $4,327 $9,551 $3,712 $4,463 $4,713 $9,512 $4,082 $5,235 $4,666 $9,747 $4,292 $5,367 $5,724 $9,908 2016E $4,801 $5,588 $5,736 $10,194
2011 2011 0.8x 1.1x 0.9x 0.4x 0.8x Reinvestment Ratio (Net Capex / Cash Flow) 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 0.9x 1.2x 1.2x 0.8x 1.0x 0.8x 1.0x 1.0x 0.9x 1.0x 0.9x 0.7x 0.9x 0.9x 0.9x 0.8x 0.8x 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x 2016E 0.8x 0.8x 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
2011 2011 $3,032 $2,260 $5 $6,976 2012E $3,453 $3,219 $1,653 $5,657 Net Debt - $mm 2013E 2014E $3,723 $4,544 $2,409 $6,613 $4,209 $4,420 $2,803 $7,271 2015E $4,331 $4,444 $1,669 $7,738 2016E $4,079 $4,457 $408 $8,072
2011 2011 24% 11% 0% 15% 13% 2012E 25% 15% 9% 12% 15% Net Debt / Debt + Equity 2013E 2014E 25% 19% 12% 13% 16% 25% 18% 12% 13% 17% 2015E 24% 18% 6% 13% 15% 2016E 21% 17% 1% 13% 12%
2011 2011 0.9x 0.4x 0.0x 0.7x 0.5x 2012E 0.9x 0.7x 0.4x 0.6x 0.7x Net Debt / Cash Flow 2013E 2014E 1.0x 1.0x 0.5x 0.7x 0.8x 1.1x 0.9x 0.6x 0.8x 0.9x 2015E 1.0x 0.8x 0.3x 0.8x 0.7x 2016E 0.9x 0.8x 0.1x 0.8x 0.6x
8% 66% 1% 25%
2,011.0x
2011 2011 24% 11% 0% 15% 13% 2012E 24% 14% 8% 11% 14% Net Debt / Debt + Equity 2013E 2014E 23% 18% 9% 10% 14% 23% 16% 9% 10% 14% 2015E 21% 16% 3% 10% 11% 2016E 18% 16% -2% 9% 8%
3-Jul-05 2011 0.9x 0.4x 0.0x 0.7x 0.5x 2012E 0.9x 0.7x 0.3x 0.5x 0.6x Net Debt / Cash Flow 2013E 2014E 0.9x 0.9x 0.4x 0.5x 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x 0.4x 0.5x 0.7x 2015E 0.9x 0.8x 0.1x 0.6x 0.6x 2016E 0.7x 0.8x -0.1x 0.6x 0.5x
8% 66% 1% 25%
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Exhibit 59. Oil Sands Pure Plays Liquidity and NAV Sensitivities
CAPEX 2011 Oil Sands Pure Plays Athabasca Oil Sands Canadian Oil Sands Connacher Oil & Gas MEG Energy Petrobank (HBU) $610 $643 $40 $856 $169 ($757) $1,124 $42 $1,791 $43 $1,199 $2,942 $49 $2,392 ($125) ($135) ($81) $24 $163 ($175) $13.17 $4.02 ($0.45) $27.41 $5.09 $14.64 $9.20 ($0.01) $35.88 $5.09 $16.11 $14.08 $0.38 $43.40 $7.94 $17.43 $18.53 $0.80 $50.69 $10.43 $18.70 $22.63 $1.21 $57.53 $12.78 $19.83 $26.45 $1.55 $63.70 $14.77 $30.16 $5.08 $0.05 $38.46 $9.60 $35.06 $10.26 $0.53 $50.14 $15.24 $40.23 $15.14 $0.97 $60.43 $20.17 $45.01 $19.59 $1.51 $70.61 $24.80 $49.58 $23.70 $2.05 $80.14 $28.72 $53.79 $27.52 $2.51 $88.68 $32.35 2012E Available Liquidity 2012E 2013E $60.00 $70.00 Risked NAV $80.00 $90.00 $100.00 $110.00 $60.00 $70.00 Unrisked NAV $80.00 $90.00 $100.00 $110.00
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
ARC ARX Baytex BTE Bonavista BNP Bonterra BNE Crescent Point CPG Eagle EGL.UN Enerplus ERF Freehold FRU Longview LNV Parallel PLT.UN Perpetual PMT Pengrowth PGF Penn West PWT PetroBakken PBN Peyto PEY Progress PRQ Trilogy TET Twin Butte TBE Vermilion VET Total/Average - INTERMEDIATES Total/Average - JUNIORS Total/Average
$23.27 $44.09 $17.06 $47.20 $41.10 $9.73 $14.49 $19.30 $6.35 $6.26 $1.13 $6.76 $14.14 $12.72 $20.76 $22.33 $23.79 $2.56 $46.00
$26.74 $59.40 $27.49 $57.40 $47.30 $11.74 $30.95 $21.59 $11.05 $9.40 $3.17 $11.48 $22.22 $18.29 $26.33 $23.00 $39.47 $3.00 $50.96
$18.36 $38.54 $13.76 $38.75 $35.51 $7.95 $11.67 $14.51 $5.89 $5.20 $0.55 $5.92 $12.51 $6.04 $14.62 $9.44 $20.23 $1.28 $38.62
291.5 118.9 168.6 19.7 327.1 27.9 197.3 65.4 46.8 50.3 147.1 500.4 474.6 187.9 143.9 234.6 116.3 192.0 98.3
$6,784 $5,243 $2,876 $932 $13,444 $271 $2,859 $1,263 $297 $315 $166 $3,383 $6,711 $2,390 $2,987 $5,238 $2,766 $492 $4,523 $4,307 $528 $3,313
$713.3 $760 $375.1 $445 $1,121.3 $557 $133.4 $0 $1,592.4 $838 $36.5 $0 $1,400.2 $791 $25.1 $0 $118.8 $0 $201.1 $57 $319.5 $147 $1,932.1 $959 $4,066.0 $1,974 $1,567.2 $874 $505.4 $100 $471.6 $0 $605.3 $0 $163.0 $0 $524.1 $222 $1,095 $548 $109 $12 $835 $407
$7,497 $5,618 $3,997 $1,065 $15,036 $308 $4,260 $1,288 $416 $516 $486 $5,315 $10,777 $3,957 $3,492 $5,709 $3,371 $655 $5,047 $5,402 $636 $4,148
R 0.8x 3.0x 2.1x R 1.0x 2.5x 0.4x 2.0x 5.6x 6.6x 3.9x 3.7x 2.9x 2.4x 3.9x 1.5x 1.5x 1.2x 2.9x 2.1x 2.6x
P/CF (x) 2012E
R 1.0x 2.9x 2.1x R 0.9x 2.3x 0.6x 2.2x 4.2x 5.3x 1.8x 3.6x 2.7x 1.7x 3.2x 1.1x 1.7x 1.3x 2.4x 1.9x 2.3x
$1,025 $700 $1,000 $120 $2,100 $49 $1,000 $210 $200 $175 $140 $1,250 $3,000 $1,400 $700 $650 $600 $240 $950
-$181 -$134 $476 $76 $583 $24 $369 $23 $112 $134 $81 $474 $1,717 $213 $475 $47 $567 $121 $230
R -19% 48% 63% R 49% 37% 11% 56% 76% 58% 38% 57% 15% 68% 7% 95% 51% 24% 41% 49% 43%
Core P+P NAV ($/sh)
R -7% 55% 93% R 41% 31% 15% 57% 75% 45% 15% 68% 33% 96% 27% 71% 73% 52% 48% 52% 49%
Risked NAV ($/sh) Unrisked NAV ($/sh)
R $46.00 $22.00 $49.00 R $12.00 $14.50 $20.00 $9.00 $6.25 $2.00 $8.00 $18.50 $18.00 $26.00 $22.00 $34.00 $2.65 $48.00
R 10% 37% 10% R 34% 8% 10% 51% 14% 77% 25% 38% 49% 29% 0% 45% 14% 9% 28% 25% 27%
P/Risked NAV
R SP SO SP R SO SU SP SP SO SO SP SO SO SO SP SO SP SP
Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Gill Kaliel Gill Grayfer Gill Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Kaliel Grayfer Kaliel Kaliel Gill/Grayfer
EV/ Prd'n ($/boe/d) EV/P+P Reserves ($/boe)
2013E
Cash Flow from Operations ($ per Share, basic) Per Share Growth 2011A 2012E 2013E 2012E 2013E
2013E
P/Core NAV
P/Bluesky NAV
ARC ARX Baytex BTE Bonavista BNP Bonterra BNE Crescent Point CPG Eagle EGL.UN Enerplus ERF Freehold FRU Longview LNV Parallel PLT.UN Perpetual PMT Pengrowth PGF Penn West PWT PetroBakken PBN Peyto PEY Progress PRQ Trilogy TET Twin Butte TBE Vermilion VET Total/Average - INTERMEDIATES Total/Average - JUNIORS Total/Average
Price Forecast Crude Oil (US$/bbl) Nymex Gas (US$/mcf) Natural Gas (C$/mcf) F/X (US$/C$) 2011A
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.53 $1.58 $0.60 $0.89 $0.00 $0.66 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.16 $2.28
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.08 $1.44 $0.60 $0.72 $0.00 $0.48 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.18 $2.28
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 10.6% 8.2% 9.4% 14.1% 0.0% 9.8% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 6.2% 5.0% 5.7% 9.8% 6.9%
2014E
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 7.5% 7.5% 9.4% 11.5% 0.0% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 7.0% 5.0% 5.2% 9.2% 6.4%
Long-term
R $4.79 $3.44 $5.27 R $1.11 $3.19 $2.14 $1.60 $0.67 $0.52 $1.87 $3.29 $3.79 $2.36 $0.99 $1.89 $0.44 $5.22
R $4.26 $2.13 $4.04 R $1.76 $3.17 $1.29 $1.24 $0.76 $0.37 $1.23 $2.41 $3.14 $2.27 $0.65 $2.75 $0.59 $5.23
R $4.17 $2.36 $4.80 R $1.76 $3.79 $1.31 $1.30 $0.92 $0.46 $1.35 $2.74 $3.66 $3.27 $0.97 $4.23 $0.50 $5.59
R -11.0% -38.2% -23.4% R 58.7% -0.7% -40.0% -22.4% 12.9% -28.6% -34.3% -26.7% -17.1% -4.0% -34.0% 45.6% 33.1% 0.1% -14.4% 8.5% -7.6%
R -2.2% 11.1% 18.8% R 0.0% 19.8% 1.6% 4.9% 21.5% 24.9% 9.8% 13.7% 16.5% 44.3% 48.5% 53.7% -15.6% 6.9% 22.1% 2.5% 16.4%
R 10.3x 8.0x 11.7x R 5.5x 4.6x 15.0x 5.1x 8.3x 3.0x 5.5x 5.9x 4.0x 9.2x 34.1x 8.6x 4.4x 8.8x 9.5x 7.7x 8.9x
R 10.6x 7.2x 9.8x R 5.5x 3.8x 14.8x 4.9x 6.8x 2.4x 5.0x 5.2x 3.5x 6.3x 23.0x 5.6x 5.2x 8.2x 7.6x 7.4x 7.5x
R 10.7x 10.0x 13.1x R 6.5x 6.5x 15.1x 6.7x 11.5x 6.1x 6.9x 8.1x 6.1x 10.7x 32.3x 11.3x 5.5x 9.4x 10.9x 9.0x 10.4x
R 11.4x 9.2x 11.3x R 6.5x 5.5x 15.0x 6.6x 9.2x 5.5x 6.1x 7.4x 5.4x 7.5x 23.2x 7.1x 6.4x 8.9x 9.0x 8.7x 9.0x
R $14.96 $9.00 $15.00 R $9.02 $10.44 $7.69 $8.03 $8.54 $2.03 $4.32 $6.64 $8.13 $9.32 $2.08 $6.44 $1.73 $28.43
R $42.73 $22.45 $46.01 R $11.95 $16.54 n.a. $9.24 $7.09 $2.72 $8.33 $22.06 $23.79 $25.36 $11.54 $31.49 $2.46 $40.73
R $82.70 $48.83 $70.14 R $17.89 $33.08 n.a. $9.90 $8.49 $4.61 $14.51 $48.15 $31.54 $46.31 $26.23 $82.97 $2.77 $58.29
R 295% 190% 315% R 108% 139% 251% 79% 73% 56% 156% 213% 156% 223% 1075% 369% 148% 162% 279% 132% 236%
R 103% 76% 103% R 81% 88% n.a. 69% 88% 42% 81% 64% 53% 82% 193% 76% 104% 113% 89% 86% 88%
R 53% 35% 67% R 54% 44% n.a. 64% 74% 25% 47% 29% 40% 45% 85% 29% 92% 79% 48% 71% 54%
R $104,030 $58,140 $157,822 R $106,170 $51,166 $155,179 $65,497 $83,857 $22,859 $60,918 $62,838 $87,452 $76,338 $123,442 $91,110 $46,069 $129,420 $85,461 $91,354 $87,194
R $22.28 $11.71 $25.89 R $40.12 $13.23 $58.05 $10.99 $16.65 $6.04 $16.12 $14.99 $19.60 $10.83 $17.65 $38.06 $18.38 $34.52 $19.24 $28.84 $22.06
Notes: Shares outstanding, net debt, and convertible debentures are based on most recent information adjusted for any equity issues or acquisitions. Debt-to-cash flow (D/CF) ratios are based on estimated 2012E year-end debt and 2012E cash flow. Ratio of enterprise value to proved plus probable (P+P) reserves based on YE/11 reserve estimates adjusted for 2012 acquisitions YTD. Ratio of enterprise value to daily production is based on 2012E estimated production. Total debt includes convertible debentures as debt. Cash dividends per share are based on the actual shares outstanding at the time of each dividend. Cash flow from operations per share is based on the weighted average of shares outstanding during the fiscal year. Core NAV is based on a blowdown analysis of P+P reserves, using a 9% after-tax discount rate, and is net of G&A, mgmt. fees, and abandonment costs. Risked NAV = Core NAV + Risked Unbooked Value. Bluesky NAV = Core NAV + Unrisked Unbooked Value. Ratings: SO=Sector Outperformer, SP=Sector Performer, SU=Sector Underperformer, R=Restricted. Source: Company reports; CIBC estimates.
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
Basic
ARC Baytex Bonavista Bonterra Crescent Point Eagle Enerplus Freehold Longview Parallel Perpetual Pengrowth Penn West PetroBakken Peyto Progress Trilogy Twin Butte Vermilion INTERMEDIATES JUNIORS Total/Average
R $46.76 $30.89 $57.45 R $84.19 $42.27 $46.71 $58.57 $34.53 $22.71 $43.91 $51.05 $67.45 $21.92 $19.06 $35.45 $48.76 $73.61 $42.71 $54.55
R $3.54 $0.22 $0.00 R $1.08 $1.29 $0.00 $0.46 $2.83 $3.43 $1.75 $0.76 $0.02 $3.13 ($0.03) ($0.02) $6.99 ($0.55) $1.13 $2.27 $1.46
R ($9.41) ($5.07) ($5.75) R ($23.60) ($8.59) ($1.89) ($11.83) ($6.87) ($1.74) ($9.08) ($9.56) ($9.90) ($2.11) ($1.73) ($5.07) ($10.97) ($3.96) ($6.00) ($11.03) ($7.48)
R 20% 16% 10% R 28% 20% 4% 20% 20% 8% 21% 19% 15% 10% 9% 14% 22% 5% 14% 19% 15%
R ($12.06) ($9.14) ($15.30) R ($12.95) ($10.31) ($4.17) ($19.50) ($7.11) ($10.80) ($14.21) ($17.27) ($12.31) ($1.94) ($5.79) ($7.76) ($18.50) ($12.71) ($10.80) ($12.45) ($11.28)
Oil (bbl/d)
R $28.83 $16.90 $36.40 R $48.72 $24.65 $40.65 $27.70 $23.38 $13.60 $22.37 $24.98 $45.25 $21.00 $11.51 $22.60 $26.28 $56.40 $27.04 $33.34 $28.89
2013E Production Gas (mmcf/d)
R 3.7% 3.5% 4.9% R 26.4% 2.4% 13.7% n.a. 43.7% 3.6% 2.4% 1.3% 6.2% 1.8% 2.5% 6.5% 9.3% 4.7% 3.6% 23.3% 8.5%
Total (boe/d)
R 1.1% 6.8% 3.0% R 0.0% 6.4% 5.3% n.a. 17.1% 2.0% 5.6% 3.9% 1.0% 9.8% 19.9% 14.2% 4.5% 1.5% 6.3% 6.7% 6.4%
R 6.0% 4.3% 5.4% R 26.6% 6.7% 13.8% n.a. 44.0% 4.2% 2.4% 2.5% 6.1% 2.8% 4.7% 9.9% 9.4% 6.2% 5.1% 23.5% 9.7%
R 29% 36% 0% R 20% 33% 0% 0% 18% 72% 28% 41% 46% 38% 45% 10% 25% 33% 34% 13% 28%
R 59% 3% 0% R 5% 20% 0% 2% 13% 18% 13% 10% 0% 37% 0% 0% 18% -8% 13% 8% 11%
R 31% 47% 0% R 40% 45% 0% 0% 157% 56% 45% 56% 53% 0% 0% 24% 30% 44% 33% 45% 37%
R $97.97 $83.41 --R n.a. $96.22 n.a. n.a. n.a. $84.25 $93.40 $85.53 ------$90.66 $83.83 $83.16 $89.32 $83.83 $88.71
R $5.18 $2.93 --R n.a. --n.a. n.a. n.a. $3.31 $4.26 $4.30 --$3.86 $4.00 ----$2.74 $3.82 n.a. $3.82
R $400 $375 $65 R $42 $850 $30 $46 $24 $65 $525 $1,525 $875 $450 $270 $300 $70 $450 $6,150 $212 $6,362
R R 79% 49% 104% 39% 82% 28% R R 98% 41% 137% 38% 36% -63% 80% 64% 66% -25% 119% 84% 96% 48% 133% 42% 150% 46% 140% 49% 176% 22% 112% 73% 60% 100% 86% 66% 118% 49% 68% 23% 103% 41%
R 21% 20% 0% R 42% 4% 101% 0% 110% 0% 23% 7% 13% 0% 15% 0% 0% 17% 10% 51% 22%
R 30% 41% 72% R 16% 58% 62% 36% 15% 16% 29% 51% 41% 51% 63% 27% 0% 17% 41% 26% 37%
R 63% 53% 65% R 60% 28% 110% 46% 78% 0% 36% 39% 26% 22% 41% 12% 36% 41% 36% 66% 45%
R 138% 140% 134% R 145% 127% 145% 128% 120% 95% 112% 156% 148% 106% 199% 83% 106% 123% 130% 129% 130%
R 118% 118% 134% R 107% 122% 112% 128% 99% 95% 98% 143% 124% 106% 171% 83% 106% 107% 118% 110% 116%
R 39% 12% 47% R 77% 0% 98% 13% 77% 0% 8% 0% 2% 26% 0% 46% 27% 46% 19% 58% 31%
Oil (bbl/d)
(% Gas)
Production Growth Prod. Per Share (PPS) PPS + Dist. Reinvested 2012E 2013E 2012E 2013E
P+P Reserve Reconciliation (mmboe) - 2011A Opening Develop. Closing Balance Net Drilling Balance YE/09A Acq's & Rev. Prod'n YE/10A
ARC Baytex Bonavista Bonterra Crescent Point Eagle Enerplus Freehold Longview Parallel Perpetual Pengrowth Penn West PetroBakken Peyto Progress Trilogy Twin Butte Vermilion INTERMEDIATES JUNIORS Total/Average
R 46,432 27,757 4,694 R 2,865 41,046 5,273 4,890 4,070 3,565 47,377 107,851 38,292 5,477 6,705 15,516 11,625 25,964 370,677 28,722 399,399
R 45.4 246.0 12.3 R 0.2 253.2 18.2 8.8 12.5 106.1 239.2 354.9 38.7 241.6 237.3 128.9 15.5 72.2 1,976 55 2,031
R 54,000 68,750 6,750 R 2,900 83,250 8,300 6,350 6,151 21,250 87,250 171,500 45,250 45,750 46,250 37,000 14,208 39,000 705,999 37,910 743,909
R 14% 60% 30% R 1% 51% 36% 23% 34% 83% 46% 35% 14% 88% 86% 58% 18% 32% 50% 23% 42%
R 50,000 28,503 5,522 R 3,533 45,500 5,056 5,000 5,025 4,000 54,050 116,982 45,131 8,602 6,750 21,000 13,300 29,800 415,840 31,914 447,753
R 45.0 240.0 12.5 R 1.1 258.0 17.1 9.0 14.9 97.5 263.7 339.1 41.2 305.4 262.5 141.0 15.0 71.7 2,078 57 2,135
R 57,500 68,500 7,600 R 3,710 88,500 7,900 6,500 7,500 20,250 98,000 177,500 52,000 59,500 50,500 48,000 15,800 42,750 770,600 41,410 812,010
R 13% 58% 27% R 5% 49% 36% 23% 33% 80% 45% 32% 13% 86% 87% 53% 16% 29% 48% 23% 40%
R 8% -1% 7% R 111% 11% 11% 1% 86% -10% 18% 2% 9% 29% 6% 32% 87% 8% 10% 59% 24%
R 6% 0% 13% R 28% 6% -5% 2% 22% -5% 12% 4% 16% 30% 9% 20% 11% 10% 10% 12% 11%
R 5% -6% 5% R 54% 2% 3% -28% 26% -10% -12% 1% 8% 22% 4% 31% 26% 0% 4% 16% 8%
R 10% 2% 12% R 70% 10% 12% -23% -37% -10% -6% 10% 16% 27% 8% 33% 35% 6% 10% 11% 10%
R 9% 3% 19% R 17% 9% 0% 8% -150% -5% 2% 7% 18% 32% 11% 21% 9% 12% 12% -23% 1%
R 15% 2% 8% R 62% 4% 13% -19% -41% 126% -8% 3% 29% 18% 1% 30% 21% -1% 19% 7% 15%
R 8% 2% 16% R 17% 4% 0% 5% -150% -6% 4% 2% 12% 32% 4% 25% 11% 12% 9% -23% 0%
485.1 229.0 310.7 39.4 379.5 7.1 306.2 23.6 n.a 29.4 80.9 317.5 661.0 169.8 259.7 253.4 78.2 142.3 3,713 60 3,773
(14.6) 11.4 22.4 5.3 (5.1) 0.2 n.a 4.6 (2.0) (0.2) (5.3) (0.9) 2.2 (8.8) (0.2) 4 5 9
132.0 30.0 33.3 4.1 66.9 1.1 48.2 1.0 n.a (2.2) 10.1 39.3 123.3 47.8 73.5 94.6 20.6 17.0 741 (0) 741
(30.1) (18.3) (25.1) (2.3) (26.9) (0.5) (27.5) (2.6) n.a (1.0) (8.5) (26.8) (59.3) (14.8) (12.9) (15.9) (10.2) (12.8) (292) (4) (296)
572.4 252.2 341.4 41.1 424.8 7.7 321.9 22.2 37.9 31.0 80.4 329.7 719.0 201.9 322.4 323.4 88.6 35.6 146.2 4,165 134 4,300
R 3.2 5.4 8.2 R 3.0 6.2 4.9 6.4 13.7 3.4 6.7 6.2 4.2 8.9 5.5 5.5 4.2 4.7 5.7 6.4 5.9
R 8.1 8.7 11.5 R 5.0 7.8 5.0 9.1 19.3 4.5 8.4 8.1 6.8 15.7 11.3 6.2 6.3 7.2 8.7 8.9 8.8
R 13.0 12.7 16.9 R 10.4 11.4 7.8 16.5 22.4 9.0 11.8 11.7 11.5 22.4 19.4 8.6 10.8 10.9 13.3 13.6 13.4
Notes: Per share cash flow sensitivities are based on 2011 estimates and include the impact of hedging activity. Reserve Life Index is calculated using estimated year-end 2011 reserves divided by estimated Q4/11 production (adjusted for 2012 acquisitions YTD). Basic payout ratio is defined as cash dividends divided by cash flow from operations. Total payout ratio is defined as cash dividends plus development capital expenditures divided by each company's cash flow from operations. Total payout ratio (including the DRIP) is defined as cash dividends plus development capital expenditures divided by each company's cash flow from operations plus proceeds from the company's dividend reinvestment program (DRIP). Sustainable payout ratio is defined as a theoretical payout ratio which would yield flat production and be financially self-sustaining (i.e., fund 100% of capex from cash flow while spending sufficient capital to replace 100% of annual production declines). CFPS: Cash flow per share; CF: Cash flow. R=Restricted. Source: Company reports; CIBC estimates.
ARC $23.27 Baytex $44.09 Bonavista $17.06 Bonterra $47.20 Crescent Point $41.10 Eagle $9.73 Enerplus $14.49 Freehold $19.30 Longview $6.35 Parallel $6.26 Perpetual $1.13 Pengrowth $6.76 Penn West $14.14 PetroBakken $12.72 Peyto $20.76 Progress $22.33 Trilogy $23.79 Twin Butte $2.56 Vermilion $46.00 Total/Average - INTERMEDIATES Total/Average - JUNIORS Total/Average
R $4.79 $3.44 $5.27 R $1.11 $3.19 $2.14 $1.60 $0.67 $0.52 $1.87 $3.29 $3.79 $2.36 $0.99 $1.89 $0.44 $5.22
R $4.26 $2.13 $4.04 R $1.76 $3.17 $1.29 $1.24 $0.76 $0.37 $1.23 $2.41 $3.14 $2.27 $0.65 $2.75 $0.59 $5.23
R $4.17 $2.36 $4.80 R $1.76 $3.79 $1.31 $1.30 $0.92 $0.46 $1.35 $2.74 $3.66 $3.27 $0.97 $4.23 $0.50 $5.59
R -11.0% -38.2% -23.4% R 58.7% -0.7% -40.0% -22.4% 12.9% -28.6% -34.3% -26.7% -17.1% -4.0% -34.0% 45.6% 33.1% 0.1% -14.4% 8.5% -7.6%
R -2.2% 11.1% 18.8% R 0.0% 19.8% 1.6% 4.9% 21.5% 24.9% 9.8% 13.7% 16.5% 44.3% 48.5% 53.7% -15.6% 6.9% 22.1% 2.5% 16.4%
R $2.42 $1.44 $3.06 R $1.05 $2.16 $1.68 $0.49 $0.63 $0.20 $0.84 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.00 $2.28
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.53 $1.58 $0.60 $0.89 $0.00 $0.66 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.16 $2.28
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.08 $1.44 $0.60 $0.72 $0.00 $0.48 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.18 $2.28
R 10.3x 8.0x 11.7x R 5.5x 4.6x 15.0x 5.1x 8.3x 3.0x 5.5x 5.9x 4.0x 9.2x 34.1x 8.6x 4.4x 8.8x 9.5x 7.7x 8.9x
R 10.6x 7.2x 9.8x R 5.5x 3.8x 14.8x 4.9x 6.8x 2.4x 5.0x 5.2x 3.5x 6.3x 23.0x 5.6x 5.2x 8.2x 7.6x 7.4x 7.5x
R 10.7x 10.0x 13.1x R 6.5x 6.5x 15.1x 6.7x 11.5x 6.1x 6.9x 8.1x 6.1x 10.7x 32.3x 11.3x 5.5x 9.4x 10.9x 9.0x 10.4x
R 11.4x 9.2x 11.3x R 6.5x 5.5x 15.0x 6.6x 9.2x 5.5x 6.1x 7.4x 5.4x 7.5x 23.2x 7.1x 6.4x 8.9x 9.0x 8.7x 9.0x
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 10.6% 8.2% 9.4% 14.1% 0.0% 9.8% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 6.2% 5.0% 5.7% 9.8% 6.9%
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 7.5% 7.5% 9.4% 11.5% 0.0% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 7.0% 5.0% 5.2% 9.2% 6.4%
R $14.96 $9.00 $15.00 R $9.02 $10.44 $7.69 $8.03 $8.54 $2.03 $4.32 $6.64 $8.13 $9.32 $2.08 $6.44 $1.73 $28.43
R $42.73 $22.45 $46.01 R $11.95 $16.54 n.a. $9.24 $7.09 $2.72 $8.33 $22.06 $23.79 $25.36 $11.54 $31.49 $2.46 $40.73
R 295% 190% 315% R 108% 139% 251% 79% 73% 56% 156% 213% 156% 223% 1075% 369% 148% 162% 279% 132% 236%
R 103% 76% 103% R 81% 88% n.a. 69% 88% 42% 81% 64% 53% 82% 193% 76% 104% 113% 89% 86% 88%
R 63% 53% 65% R 60% 28% 110% 46% 78% 0% 36% 39% 26% 22% 41% 12% 36% 41% 36% 66% 45%
R 138% 140% 134% R 145% 127% 145% 128% 120% 95% 112% 156% 148% 106% 199% 83% 106% 123% 130% 129% 130%
R 0.8x 3.0x 2.1x R 1.0x 2.5x 0.4x 2.0x 5.6x 6.6x 3.9x 3.7x 2.9x 2.4x 3.9x 1.5x 1.5x 1.2x 2.9x 2.1x 2.6x
R -7% 55% 93% R 41% 31% 15% 57% 75% 45% 15% 68% 33% 96% 27% 71% 73% 52% 48% 52% 49%
R $46.00 $22.00 $49.00 R $12.00 $14.50 $20.00 $9.00 $6.25 $2.00 $8.00 $18.50 $18.00 $26.00 $22.00 $34.00 $2.65 $48.00
R 10% 37% 10% R 34% 8% 10% 51% 14% 77% 25% 38% 49% 29% 0% 45% 14% 9% 28% 25% 27%
$0.10 $0.22 $0.12 $0.26 $0.23 $0.09 $0.09 $0.10 $0.05 $0.07 $0.00 $0.04 $0.09 $0.08 $0.06 $0.03 $0.04 $0.02 $0.19
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.08 $1.16 $0.60 $0.89 $0.00 $0.48 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.27 $2.28
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 7.5% 6.0% 9.4% 14.1% 0.0% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 10.5% 5.0% 5.2% 10.2% 6.7%
B. Forward Strip Pricing Assumptions (as at 08/10/12) Share Price ($) 08/13/12 Cash Flow from Operations ($ per Share, basic) Per Share Growth 2011A 2012E 2013E 2012E 2013E 2011A 2012E 2013E CDPS CDPS CDPS P/CF (x) 2012E 2013E EV/DACF (x) 2012E 2013E Cash Yield 2012E 2013E Core NAV ($) Net Asset Value (NAV) Risked P/Core P/Risked NAV ($) NAV NAV 2012E Payout Ratio Basic Total Total Bank Line Debt/CF Drawn 2012E 2012E Implied Target Price Potential Return
ARC $23.27 Baytex $44.09 Bonavista $17.06 Bonterra $47.20 Crescent Point $41.10 Eagle $9.73 Enerplus $14.49 Freehold $19.30 Longview $6.35 Parallel $6.26 Perpetual $1.13 Pengrowth $6.76 Penn West $14.14 PetroBakken $12.72 Peyto $20.76 Progress $22.33 Trilogy $23.79 Twin Butte $2.56 Vermilion $46.00 Total/Average - INTERMEDIATES Total/Average - JUNIORS Total/Average
Pricing Assumptions:
$2.95 $4.79 $3.44 $5.27 R $1.11 $3.19 $2.14 $1.60 $0.67 $0.52 $1.87 $3.29 $3.79 $2.36 $0.99 $1.89 $0.44 $5.22
R $4.52 $2.29 $4.46 R $1.88 $3.30 $1.42 $1.48 $0.81 $0.41 $1.25 $2.72 $3.46 $2.34 $0.68 $2.44 $0.58 $5.77
R $4.71 $2.51 $5.37 R $1.69 $3.94 $1.31 $1.39 $1.00 $0.45 $1.51 $3.05 $4.14 $3.26 $0.92 $3.78 $0.53 $5.93
R -5.6% -33.3% -15.4% R 70.2% 3.6% -33.8% -7.2% 21.0% -21.7% -33.0% -17.3% -8.8% -1.1% -31.3% 28.8% 30.9% 10.6% -10.4% 16.2% -2.6%
R 4.2% 9.4% 20.3% R -10.4% 19.2% -7.3% -6.1% 23.9% 11.5% 20.5% 12.3% 19.6% 39.4% 35.5% 55.3% -7.8% 2.8% 20.8% -1.5% 14.3%
$1.20 $2.42 $1.44 $3.06 R $1.05 $2.16 $1.68 $0.49 $0.63 $0.20 $0.84 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.00 $2.28
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.53 $1.56 $0.60 $0.83 $0.00 $0.66 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.16 $2.28
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.08 $1.44 $0.60 $0.72 $0.00 $0.48 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.18 $2.28
R 9.7x 7.4x 10.6x R 5.2x 4.4x 13.6x 4.3x 7.7x 2.8x 5.4x 5.2x 3.7x 8.9x 32.8x 9.8x 4.4x 8.0x 9.0x 7.0x 8.5x
R 9.4x 6.8x 8.8x R 5.8x 3.7x 14.7x 4.6x 6.2x 2.5x 4.5x 4.6x 3.1x 6.4x 24.2x 6.3x 4.8x 7.8x 7.3x 7.2x 7.3x
R 11.5x 10.2x 12.0x R 6.1x 7.2x 14.6x 8.4x 10.9x 6.0x 8.3x 8.2x 5.9x 9.2x 18.9x 12.0x 5.1x 8.3x 9.8x 9.0x 9.6x
R 11.2x 9.4x 10.3x R 7.1x 6.2x 15.7x 8.9x 9.7x 5.1x 7.2x 7.4x 4.8x 6.9x 14.9x 7.9x 5.8x 8.2x 8.3x 9.4x 8.6x
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 10.6% 8.1% 9.4% 13.2% 0.0% 9.8% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 6.2% 5.0% 5.7% 9.5% 6.8%
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 7.5% 7.5% 9.4% 11.5% 0.0% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 7.0% 5.0% 5.2% 9.2% 6.4%
R $16.59 $8.08 $16.11 R $9.84 $10.32 $8.48 $8.75 $6.85 $0.33 $5.81 $7.35 $9.33 $7.06 $0.58 $5.64 $1.87 $27.02
R $44.21 $19.72 $53.83 R $12.96 $16.56 n.a. $10.07 $7.29 $1.02 $10.58 $24.23 $26.24 $22.00 $6.53 $32.57 $2.69 $39.88
R 266% 211% 293% R 99% 140% 228% 73% 91% 347% 116% 192% 136% 294% 3874% 422% 137% 170% 539% 125% 417%
R 100% 87% 88% R 75% 87% n.a. 63% 86% 111% 64% 58% 48% 94% 342% 73% 95% 115% 106% 80% 99%
R 58% 55% 70% R 56% 46% 110% 41% 101% 0% 53% 40% 28% 31% 59% 17% 28% 39% 41% 67% 49%
R 132% 152% 144% R 125% 178% 143% 109% 174% 108% 165% 158% 161% 167% 228% 123% 89% 119% 153% 128% 146%
R 0.7x 2.9x 1.8x R 0.6x 2.4x 0.4x 1.6x 5.3x 6.0x 3.5x 3.2x 2.5x 2.3x 3.4x 1.9x 1.5x 1.1x 2.6x 1.9x 2.4x
R -12% 53% 86% R 32% 28% 14% 56% 80% 42% 68% 55% 35% 94% 26% 78% 74% 46% 50% 51% 50%
R $46.00 $22.00 $49.00 R $12.00 $14.50 $20.00 $9.00 $6.25 $2.00 $8.00 $18.50 $18.00 $26.00 $22.00 $34.00 $2.65 $48.00
R 10% 37% 10% R 34% 8% 10% 51% 14% 77% 25% 38% 49% 29% 0% 45% 14% 9% 28% 25% 27%
R $0.22 $0.12 $0.26 R $0.09 $0.09 $0.10 $0.05 $0.07 $0.00 $0.04 $0.09 $0.08 $0.06 $0.03 $0.04 $0.02 $0.19
R $2.64 $1.44 $3.12 R $1.05 $1.08 $1.16 $0.60 $0.89 $0.00 $0.48 $1.08 $0.96 $0.72 $0.40 $0.42 $0.27 $2.28
R 6.0% 8.4% 6.6% R 10.8% 7.5% 6.0% 9.4% 14.1% 0.0% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 3.5% 1.8% 1.8% 10.5% 5.0% 5.2% 10.2% 6.7%
Crude Oil (US$/bbl) Ed. Par (C$/bbl) Natural Gas (US$/mcf) Natural Gas (C$/mcf) F/X (US$/C$)
2011A
LT Crude Oil (US$/bbl) Ed. Par (C$/bbl) Natural Gas (US$/mcf) Natural Gas (C$/mcf) F/X (US$/C$)
2011A
2014E
VET
Comparative Valuations
Methodology
Fayetteville
Eagleford
Barnett
Bakken (US)
Amaranth
As illustrated above, our NAV valuation can be broken into three distinct stages (or wedges):
1. Core NAV: The wedge is our Core after-tax NAV, which includes our 2P
NAV (2P reserve valuation) as well as the portion of unbooked resource potential that we believe investors should consider paying for today.
3. Bluesky NAV: The third stage is our Bluesky NAV (or Unrisked NAV), which
includes our Risked NAV in addition to the incremental valuation that we believe is realistically obtainable by the company, but not yet concrete enough for investors to pay for today.
plays with significant unbooked upside to break into our Risked NAV?
260
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES:
Analyst Certification: Each CIBC World Markets research analyst named on the front page of this research report, or at the beginning of any subsection hereof, hereby certifies that (i) the recommendations and opinions expressed herein accurately reflect such research analyst's personal views about the company and securities that are the subject of this report and all other companies and securities mentioned in this report that are covered by such research analyst and (ii) no part of the research analyst's compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by such research analyst in this report. Potential Conflicts of Interest: Equity research analysts employed by CIBC World Markets are compensated from revenues generated by various CIBC World Markets businesses, including the CIBC World Markets Investment Banking Department. Research analysts do not receive compensation based upon revenues from specific investment banking transactions. CIBC World Markets generally prohibits any research analyst and any member of his or her household from executing trades in the securities of a company that such research analyst covers. Additionally, CIBC World Markets generally prohibits any research analyst from serving as an officer, director or advisory board member of a company that such analyst covers. In addition to 1% ownership positions in covered companies that are required to be specifically disclosed in this report, CIBC World Markets may have a long position of less than 1% or a short position or deal as principal in the securities discussed herein, related securities or in options, futures or other derivative instruments based thereon. Recipients of this report are advised that any or all of the foregoing arrangements, as well as more specific disclosures set forth below, may at times give rise to potential conflicts of interest.
261
Important Disclosure Footnotes for Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.:
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. (2g) (AAV-TSX, C$3.26, Sector Performer) Anderson Energy Ltd. (2g) (AXL-TSX, C$0.29, Sector Underperformer) Angle Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (NGL-TSX, C$3.67, Sector Outperformer) ARC Resources Ltd. (2g, 7) (ARX-TSX, C$23.26, Restricted) Arcan Resources Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (ARN-V, C$1.49, Sector Outperformer) Athabasca Oil Corp. (2g) (ATH-TSX, C$13.05, Sector Outperformer) Baytex Energy Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (BTE-TSX, C$44.88, Sector Performer) Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (2g) (BXE-TSX, C$3.24, Sector Outperformer) Birchcliff Energy Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (BIR-TSX, C$7.09, Sector Performer) Bonavista Energy Corporation (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (BNP-TSX, C$16.91, Sector Outperformer) Bonterra Energy Corp. (2g) (BNE-TSX, C$45.33, Sector Performer) Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2g, 7, 9) (CNQ-TSX, C$30.56, Sector Outperformer) Canadian Oil Sands Limited (2a, 2b, 2d, 2e, 2g, 7) (COS-TSX, C$21.18, Sector Underperformer) Celtic Exploration Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (CLT-TSX, C$17.17, Sector Outperformer) Cenovus Energy Inc. (2g, 7, 9) (CVE-TSX, C$32.59, Sector Outperformer) Cequence Energy Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (CQE-TSX, C$1.24, Sector Performer) Coastal Energy Company (2g) (CEN-TSX, C$14.66, Sector Outperformer) Connacher Oil & Gas Limited (2g) (CLL-TSX, C$0.36, Sector Performer - Speculative) Crescent Point Energy Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (CPG-TSX, C$41.00, Restricted) Crew Energy Inc. (2g) (CR-TSX, C$6.75, Sector Outperformer) Delphi Energy Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (DEE-TSX, C$1.28, Sector Performer) Eagle Energy Trust (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (EGL.UN-TSX, C$9.64, Sector Outperformer) Enbridge Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7, 9) (ENB-TSX, C$39.50, Sector Outperformer) Encana Corporation (2a, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2g, 7, 9) (ECA-NYSE, US$22.42, Sector Performer) Enerplus Corporation (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (ERF-TSX, C$14.76, Sector Underperformer) Fairborne Energy Ltd. (2g) (FEL-TSX, C$1.63, Sector Performer) Freehold Royalties Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (FRU-TSX, C$19.27, Sector Performer) Gran Tierra Energy Inc. (2g) (GTE-TSX, C$4.81, Sector Outperformer) Husky Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (HSE-TSX, C$26.87, Sector Performer) Imperial Oil Limited (2g) (IMO-TSX, C$45.88, Sector Underperformer) Legacy Oil + Gas Inc. (2g, 7) (LEG-TSX, C$6.76, Sector Outperformer) Longview Oil Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (LNV-TSX, C$6.33, Sector Performer) MEG Energy Corp. (2a, 2e, 2g) (MEG-TSX, C$39.48, Sector Outperformer) Nexen Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (NXY-TSX, C$25.40, Sector Underperformer) NuVista Energy Ltd. (2g) (NVA-TSX, C$4.40, Sector Outperformer) Painted Pony Petroleum Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (PPY-V, C$10.11, Sector Outperformer) Parallel Energy Trust (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (PLT.UN-TSX, C$5.75, Sector Outperformer) Paramount Resources Ltd. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (POU-TSX, C$25.24, Sector Performer) Pembina Pipeline Corporation (2g, 7) (PPL-TSX, C$27.05, Sector Outperformer) Pengrowth Energy Corporation (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (PGF-TSX, C$6.94, Sector Performer) Penn West Petroleum Ltd. (2g, 7) (PWT-TSX, C$14.04, Sector Outperformer) Perpetual Energy Inc. (2g) (PMT-TSX, C$1.18, Sector Outperformer) PetroBakken Energy Ltd. (2a, 2e, 2g) (PBN-TSX, C$13.01, Sector Outperformer) Petrobank Energy And Resources Ltd. (2g) (PBG-TSX, C$12.16, Sector Outperformer) Peyto Exploration & Development Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (PEY-TSX, C$21.21, Sector Outperformer) Pinecrest Energy Inc. (2g, 7) (PRY-V, C$1.87, Sector Outperformer) Progress Energy Resources Corp. (2g) (PRQ-TSX, C$22.32, Sector Performer)
262
Important Disclosure Footnotes for Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.: (Continued)
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: RMP Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (RMP-TSX, C$1.76, Sector Performer) Suncor Energy Inc. (2g, 3a, 3c, 7, 9) (SU-TSX, C$31.59, Sector Outperformer) Surge Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (SGY-TSX, C$8.12, Sector Outperformer) Talisman Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (TLM-NYSE, US$13.40, Sector Outperformer) Tourmaline Oil Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (TOU-TSX, C$28.62, Restricted) TransCanada Corp. (2g, 7) (TRP-TSX, C$45.25, Sector Performer) Trilogy Energy Corp. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g) (TET-TSX, C$24.10, Sector Outperformer) Twin Butte Energy Ltd. (2g, 7) (TBE-TSX, C$2.67, Sector Performer) Vermilion Energy Inc. (2a, 2c, 2e, 2g, 7) (VET-TSX, C$45.89, Sector Performer) Vero Energy Inc. (2g) (VRO-TSX, C$1.87, Sector Performer) WestFire Energy Ltd. (2g) (WFE-TSX, C$3.89, Sector Performer) Whitecap Resources Inc. (2g) (WCP-TSX, C$7.39, Sector Outperformer)
Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Not Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.:
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA-DU, [AED]1.24, Not Rated) American Capital Ltd. (ACAS-NASDAQ, US$11.03, Not Rated) Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (APC-NYSE, US$69.29, Not Rated) Apache Corp. (APA-NYSE, US$87.68, Not Rated) Argosy Energy Inc. (GSY-TSX, C$0.24, Not Rated) Arsenal Energy Inc. (AEI-TSX, C$0.46, Not Rated) Artek Exploration Ltd. (RTK-TSX, C$2.00, Not Rated) Atikwa Resources Inc. (ATK-V, C$0.03, Not Rated) Atlas Energy Inc. (ATLS-NYSE, US$34.02, Not Rated) AvenEx Energy Corp. (AVF-TSX, C$2.75, Not Rated) Barnwell Industries, Inc. (BRN-NASDAQ, US$2.99, Not Rated) BG Group PLC (BG-L, p13.23, Not Rated) BHP Billiton (BHP-NYSE, US$68.24, Not Rated) Bill Barrett Corporation (BBG-NYSE, US$22.67, Not Rated) BlackPearl Resources Inc. (PXX-TSX, C$3.31, Not Rated) BNK Petroleum Inc. (BKX-TSX, C$1.06, Not Rated) Border Petroleum Corp. (BOR-V, C$0.16, Not Rated) Bowood Energy Inc. (BWD-V, C$0.06, Not Rated) BP p.l.c. (BP-NYSE, US$42.44, Not Rated) Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. (COG-NYSE, US$42.42, Not Rated) Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc. (CRZO-NASDAQ, US$25.24, Not Rated) Charger Energy Corp. (CHX-V, C$0.57, Not Rated) Cheniere Energy Inc. (LNG-AMEX, US$14.48, Not Rated) Chesapeake Energy Corporation (CHK-NYSE, US$18.87, Not Rated) Chevron Corporation (CVX-NYSE, US$112.49, Not Rated) China Petroleum And Chemical Corporation (SNP-NYSE, US$95.91, Not Rated) Chinook Energy Inc. (CKE-TSX, C$1.48, Not Rated) Chubu Electric Power Company Inc. (9502-T, 986.00, Not Rated) Cimarex Energy Co. (XEC-NYSE, US$61.98, Not Rated)
263
Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Not Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.: (Continued)
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: CNOOC Ltd. (CEO-NYSE, US$200.41, Not Rated) Compton Petroleum Corporation (CMT-TSX, C$1.24, Not Rated) Comstock Resources, Inc. (CRK-NYSE, US$17.35, Not Rated) Concho Resources Inc. (CXO-NYSE, US$95.60, Not Rated) ConocoPhillips (COP-NYSE, US$57.14, Not Rated) Continental Resources, Inc. (CLR-NYSE, US$72.61, Not Rated) Crocotta Energy Inc. (CTA-TSX, C$2.77, Not Rated) Crosstex Energy LP (XTEX-NASDAQ, US$15.60, Not Rated) DCP MIDSTREAM LP (DPM-NYSE, US$43.08, Not Rated) Deethree Exploration Ltd. (DTX-TSX, C$4.67, Not Rated) Denbury Resources Inc (DNR-NYSE, US$15.44, Not Rated) Devon Energy Corp. (DVN-NYSE, US$58.38, Not Rated) Dow Chemical (DOW-NYSE, US$29.52, Not Rated) DTE Energy Company (DTE-NYSE, US$60.10, Not Rated) Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (EEP-NYSE, US$29.61, Not Rated) Energen Corporation (EGN-NYSE, US$52.31, Not Rated) Energy Transfer Partners LP (ETP-NYSE, US$43.75, Not Rated) Eni S.p.A. (E-NYSE, US$43.98, Not Rated) Enterprise Products Partners L (EPD-NYSE, US$52.40, Not Rated) EOG Resources, Inc. (EOG-NYSE, US$110.58, Not Rated) EQT Corp. (EQT-NYSE, US$55.08, Not Rated) Equal Energy Ltd. (EQU-TSX, C$3.31, Not Rated) EXCO Resources, Inc. (XCO-NYSE, US$7.41, Not Rated) ExxonMobil Corporation (XOM-NYSE, US$88.00, Not Rated) Forest Oil Corporation (FST-NYSE, US$7.25, Not Rated) Formosa Plastics Group (1301-TW, [TWD]84.60, Not Rated) GAIL India Ltd. (GAIL-BO, [INR]375.00, Not Rated) GMX Resources Inc. (GMXR-NYSE, US$0.82, Not Rated) Goodrich Petroleum (GDP-NYSE, US$12.82, Not Rated) Guide Exploration Ltd. (GO-TSX, C$1.70, Not Rated) Gulfport Energy Corporation (GPOR-NASDAQ, US$25.55, Not Rated) Harvest Operations Corp. (HTE.DB.G-TSX, C$104.00, Not Rated) Hess (HES-NYSE, US$49.42, Not Rated) Inpex Corp. (1605-T, 472500.00, Not Rated) Insignia Energy Ltd. (ISN-TSX, C$0.70, Not Rated) Kinder Morgan Energy Partners (KMP-NYSE, US$82.41, Not Rated) Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI-NYSE, US$34.87, Not Rated) Kodiak Oil & Gas Corp. (KOG-NYSE, US$8.94, Not Rated) Korea Gas Corporation (036460-KS, [KRW]51600.00, Not Rated) Linn Energy, LLC (LINE-NASDAQ, US$39.28, Not Rated) Lone Pine Resources Inc. (LPR-TSX, C$1.34, Not Rated) LyondellBasell Industries NV (LYB-NYSE, US$47.50, Not Rated) Mako Energy Ltd. (MKE-AUS, A$0.06, Not Rated) Manitok Energy Inc. (MEI-V, C$1.86, Not Rated) Marathon Oil Corp. (MRO-NYSE, US$27.25, Not Rated) MarkWest Energy Partners, LP (MWE-AMEX, US$48.70, Not Rated) Mitsubishi Corp (8058-T, 1555.00, Not Rated)
264
Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Not Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.: (Continued)
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: Murphy Oil (MUR-NYSE, US$54.13, Not Rated) National Fuel Gas (NFG-NYSE, US$50.67, Not Rated) Noble Energy Inc. (NBL-NYSE, US$89.71, Not Rated) Oasis Petroleum Inc. (OAS-NYSE, US$30.43, Not Rated) Occidental Petroleum (OXY-NYSE, US$88.99, Not Rated) Oneok Partners LP (OKS-NYSE, US$56.70, Not Rated) Open Range Energy Corporation (ONR-TSX, C$1.53, Not Rated) Osaka Gas Co Ltd (9532-T, 338.00, Not Rated) Pace Oil & Gas Limited (PCE-TSX, C$2.86, Not Rated) PDC Energy Inc. (PDCE-NASDAQ, US$26.63, Not Rated) Penn Virginia Corporation (PVA-NYSE, US$7.41, Not Rated) Petro-Reef Resources Ltd. (PER-TSX, C$0.16, Not Rated) Petronas Gas (PGAS-KL, [MYR]19.92, Not Rated) PetroQuest Energy, Inc. (PQ-NYSE, US$6.46, Not Rated) Pioneer Natural Resources (PXD-NYSE, US$98.01, Not Rated) Plains Exploration & Production Co. (PXP-NYSE, US$40.97, Not Rated) QEP Resources, Inc. (QEP-NYSE, US$26.64, Not Rated) Questerre Energy Corp. (QEC-TSX, C$0.67, Not Rated) Quicksilver Resources Inc. (KWK-NYSE, US$4.08, Not Rated) Range Resources Corp (RRC-NYSE, US$66.75, Not Rated) Redwater Energy Corp. (RED-TSX, C$0.19, Not Rated) Regency Energy Partners LP (RGP-NYSE, US$22.94, Not Rated) Reliance Industries Limited (500325-BO, [INR]780.30, Not Rated) Renegade Petroleum Ltd. (RPL-V, C$2.72, Not Rated) Rosetta Resouces Inc. (ROSE-NASDAQ, US$44.67, Not Rated) Royal Dutch Shell (RDS.A-NYSE, US$70.93, Not Rated) Sandridge Energy (SD-NYSE, US$6.43, Not Rated) Sasol (SSL-NYSE, US$42.30, Not Rated) Second Wave Petroleum Inc. (SCS-TSX, C$0.92, Not Rated) SM Energy Co. (SM-NYSE, US$47.58, Not Rated) Sonde Resources Corp. (SOQ-TSX, C$0.91, Not Rated) Southwestern Energy Co. (SWN-NYSE, US$31.99, Not Rated) Spartan Oil Corp. (STO-TSX, C$3.70, Not Rated) Statoil ASA (STO-NYSE, US$25.18, Not Rated) Storm Resources Ltd. (SRX-V, C$1.70, Not Rated) Sunoco Inc. (SUN-NYSE, US$47.50, Not Rated) Sunoco Logistics Partners LP (SXL-NYSE, US$42.52, Not Rated) Sure Energy Inc. (SHR-TSX, C$0.71, Not Rated) Targa Resources Corp. (TRGP-NYSE, US$42.61, Not Rated) Terra Energy Corp (TT-TSX, C$0.27, Not Rated) Torquay Oil Corp. (TOC.A-V, C$0.18, Not Rated) Total S.A. (TOT-NYSE, US$49.19, Not Rated) Transmontaigne Inc (TLP-NYSE, US$36.82, Not Rated) TriOil Resources Ltd. (TOL-V, C$1.96, Not Rated) Unit Corporation (UNT-NYSE, US$41.20, Not Rated) Waldron Energy Corporation (WDN-TSX, C$0.59, Not Rated) WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORP (WLK-NYSE, US$66.69, Not Rated)
265
Companies Mentioned in this Report that Are Not Covered by CIBC World Markets Inc.: (Continued)
Stock Prices as of 08/15/2012: Whiting Petroleum Corporation (WLL-NYSE, US$44.61, Not Rated) Williams Partners LP (WPZ-NYSE, US$51.04, Not Rated) WPX Energy Inc. (WPX-NYSE, US$14.83, Not Rated) Yangarra Resources Ltd. (YGR-V, C$0.32, Not Rated) Yoho Resources Inc. (YO-V, C$1.83, Not Rated) Zargon Oil & Gas Ltd. (ZAR-TSX, C$8.85, Not Rated) Important disclosure footnotes that correspond to the footnotes in this table may be found in the "Key to Important Disclosure Footnotes" section of this report.
266
10 11 12 13 14
267
Sector Weightings**
**Broader market averages refer to the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the S&P/TSX Composite in Canada. "Speculative" indicates that an investment in this security involves a high amount of risk due to volatility and/or liquidity issues. ***Restricted due to a potential conflict of interest.
Oil & Gas - Large Cap Sector includes the following tickers: ATH, CLL, CNQ, COS, CVE, ECA, HSE, IMO, MEG, NXY, PBG, SU, TLM. *Although the investment recommendations within the three-tiered, relative stock rating system utilized by CIBC World Markets Inc. do not correlate to buy, hold and sell recommendations, for the purposes of complying with NYSE and NASD rules, CIBC World Markets Inc. has assigned buy ratings to securities rated Sector Outperformer, hold ratings to securities rated Sector Performer, and sell ratings to securities rated Sector Underperformer without taking into consideration the analyst's sector weighting.
Important disclosures required by IIROC Rule 3400, including potential conflicts of interest information, our system for rating investment opportunities and our dissemination policy can be obtained by visiting CIBC World Markets on the web at http://researchcentral.cibcwm.com under 'Quick Links' or by writing to CIBC World Markets Inc., Brookfield Place, 161 Bay Street, 4th Floor, Toronto, Ontario M5J 2S8, Attention: Research Disclosures Request.
268
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