Creativity Research Journal
2000–2001, Vol. 13, Nos. 3 & 4, 401–410
Creativity in Physics: Response Fluency and Task Specificity
Irene-Anna N. Diakidoy and Constantinos P. Constantinou
University of Cyprus
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to explore
creativity in the domain of physics and, specifically, its
relation to fluency of responses (divergent thinking)
and type of task. Fifty-four university students were pre-
tested on their knowledge of relevant physics concepts.
They then were asked to solve 3 ill-defined problems
representing different types of tasks. The appropriate
responses given to each problem were evaluated as to
their number (fluency) and frequency (originality).
Task-specific components were found to influence cre-
ativity independently and to moderate the effects of
general factors such as fluency of responses. Efforts to
predict and facilitate creativity in educational settings,
therefore, also must take into account the way creativity
is manifested within particular domains and the con-
straints that different types of tasks may impose.
Creativity is a complex construct and, although it has
not been well operationalized, the importance of identi-
fying and facilitating it in educational settings has been
widely recognized. The various creativity tests and
training programs that have been developed over the
past several decades (Barron, 1969; deBono, 1976;
Torrance, 1966; Treffinger, 1995) provide testimony to
an increasing interest in creativity. Nevertheless, there
is a general concern that creative potential is not identi-
fied systematically or nurtured in the schools the way it
should be (Baer, 1993; Barron, 1988; Hennessey &
Amabile, 1987; Hocevar, 1981; Sternberg, 1996; Weis-
berg, 1988). The purpose of this study was to examine
creativity and factors that may contribute to it in a spe-
cific academic domain, namely physics. Problem solv-
ing represents a dominant activity of experts as well as
learners in the domain. This study examined creativity
in the solutions or responses given to different physics
problems and its relation to fluency, problem type, and
conceptual knowledge.
Creativity Research Journal
Copyright 2000–2001 by
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
I. N. Diakidoy and
Creativity
C. P. Constantinou
in Physics
Creativity research has been directed at explaining
and predicting a complex psychological phenomenon
on the basis of evidence concerning factors that are
found or hypothesized to be crucial. However, our
knowledge about the basic components of creativity
and the factors that affect its development and manifes-
tation remain more or less fragmented. Creativity has
been conceptualized as an ability or characteristic of
the person (Barron, 1988; Taylor, 1988) or as a cogni-
tive process (Boden, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1988;
Schank, 1988; Weisberg, 1986) influenced by thinking
styles or personality traits (Richardson & Crichlow,
1995; Sternberg, 1988) and associated with divergent
thinking (Clapham, 1997; Guilford, 1956; Torrance,
1988).
The issue we raise, however, concerns the extent to
which a generally decontextualized approach to the
study of creativity has the potential of providing us
with a unified account of the construct and the factors
that influence it. Creativity does not occur out of con-
text (Baer, 1993). The context of its occurrence may be
represented by a particular situation, task, or problem
in an academic domain or in everyday life. In this re-
spect, most previous research can be said to be con-
textualized by virtue of the materials and the tasks em-
ployed. However, there is still a need for a thorough
exploration of creativity, its development, and its mani-
festation within single identifiable domains. Such an
We would like to thank D. Natsopoulos and H. Tsoukas for their in-
sightful comments and support, C. Varnavas and C. Bandis for their
help with materials and scoring, and E. Theodorou for her help with
the data. We also want to thank the students in our courses for their en-
thusiastic participation and interest in the study.
Manuscript received May 20, 1999; accepted December 1, 1999.
Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to to
Irene-Anna N. Diakidoy, Department of Education, University of Cy-
prus, P.O. Box 20537, Nicosia CY–1678 Cyprus. E-mail: eddiak@
ucy.ac.cy.
401
I. N. Diakidoy and C. P. Constantinou
approach potentially can lead to a more unified theoret-
ical account of the construct in a specific domain,
which then can be contrasted with theoretical accounts
of creativity in other domains and contexts.
The validity of such an approach is implicated by
the definition given to creative outcomes. Creative out-
comes are conceptualized to be both novel, as indi-
cated by their low frequency of occurrence (Sternberg,
1988; Torrance, 1990), and appropriate, as indicated
by judgments of correctness, usefulness, and quality
(Amabile, 1990; Johnson-Laird, 1987; Sternberg,
1988; Weisberg, 1986). The criterion of appropriate-
ness is closely linked with the domain and task in ques-
tion, because they necessarily impose constraints on
what outcomes can be considered appropriate. Knowl-
edge of the concepts, constraints, and regularities of a
domain must influence the generation, evaluation, and
modification of responses within that domain (John-
son-Laird, 1987; Weisberg, 1986). Moreover, Boden
(1992) argued that if creativity is thought to involve the
breaking or bending of rules imposed by the domain,
then knowledge of these rules is a prerequisite for cre-
ativity in the domain. At the task level, knowledge of
relevant concepts and solution requirements contrib-
utes to the representation of the givens and to the prob-
lem’s solution (Johnson-Laird, 1988). That, in turn,
most likely provides the basis for the generation of ap-
propriate and potentially creative solutions.
Previous research on creativity has focused mostly
on creativity as a general ability or process (Hennessey
& Amabile, 1988; Richardson & Crichlow, 1995;
Sternberg, 1988; Taylor, 1988; Treffinger, 1995). This
focus has guided psychometric work in the area—as
indicated by the fact that items on widely used creativ-
ity tests are relatively domain independent (Barron,
1988; Torrance, 1966, 1990)—and has resulted in the
expectation that individuals who score high on general
creativity tests are more likely to exhibit high creative
achievement in one chosen area, if not in several. How-
ever, this is not generally the case (Baer, 1993; Feld-
husen, 1993; Hocevar, 1981; Nickerson, Perkins, &
Smith, 1985), and concern about the tests’ modest pre-
dictive validities led Feldhusen (1994) to suggest that
creative functioning in one domain may be unique and
psychologically different from creative functioning in
another domain.
The general lack of attention to domain-specific
components does not only limit our understanding of
creativity, but also may have serious educational impli-
402
cations. Creativity test scores may contribute to deci-
sions about placement in gifted education programs
(Feldhusen, 1994, 1995), and findings, such as the in-
fluence of divergent thinking on creativity in general,
may shape instructional methods developed to facili-
tate it in the school setting (deBono, 1976; Treffinger,
1995). Facilitating creativity in school also must in-
volve facilitating creativity in specific academic do-
mains in addition to promoting general creativity.
However, it is highly unlikely that tests and instruc-
tional methods designed to identify and increase gen-
eral creativity levels will be equally effective when the
objective is to identify and promote creativity in do-
mains, such as mathematics and science, in which out-
comes, creative or otherwise, depend on the availabil-
ity of conceptual knowledge and problem-solving
strategies.
A prerequisite to understanding the extent to which
creativity is domain specific involves the examination
of creativity in particular, identifiable domains. This
study represents a first attempt in this direction. In this
study, university students were asked to solve three
ill-defined physics problems, each representing a dif-
ferent problem type in the domain: explanation, pre-
diction, or application. Open-ended tasks and ill-de-
fined problems that allow multiple solutions are
assumed to facilitate creativity to a greater extent than
well-defined tasks and problems (Barron, 1988; Hen-
nessey & Amabile, 1987; Sternberg, 1988; Torrance,
1988; Weisberg, 1986). Problem type was operation-
alized in terms of solution requirements. A problem
that requires one to explain or find the causes of a phys-
ical phenomenon presents different constraints with
respect to what kinds of solutions are appropriate in
comparison to a problem that requires one to predict
physical consequences or to apply a concept. Accord-
ing to our position, we hypothesized that creative per-
formance within the domain would vary as a function
of the type of problem encountered.
Although it is generally accepted that creativity is
virtually impossible in the absence of some relevant
knowledge, it also has been claimed that too much
knowledge can have a negative impact, preventing the
individual from going beyond what is already known
(Sternberg, 1988; Taylor, 1988). In this study, to pre-
vent simple recall or direct application of knowl-
edge—which has been found to hinder creativity
(Weisberg, 1986)—the physics problems were unfa-
miliar to the participating students. However, the un-
Creativity Research Journal

derlying physics concepts were judged by the stu-
dents’ physics instructors to be within the students’
capabilities. In addition, a conceptual knowledge pre-
test was administered to establish the extent to which
the underlying concepts were familiar and to allow
for the examination of the effects of prior knowledge
on students’ responses. We expected knowledge of
the relevant underlying concepts to support creativity
in the domain.
Guilford (1956) proposed that divergent thinking,
as opposed to convergent thinking, is a basic compo-
nent of creativity. This hypothesis has been con-
firmed by research that has required participants to
provide multiple responses (Richardson & Crichlow,
1995; Torrance, 1988), and it has dominated creativ-
ity testing and training (Clapham, 1997; deBono,
1976; Hocevar, 1981; Torrance, 1966). In fact,
Torrance’s (1966, 1990) work on creativity testing
has relied on the premise that divergent thinking
qualities—that is, the ability to produce a large num-
ber (fluency) of different (flexibility) ideas that are
unusual (originality) and richly detailed (elabora-
tion)—are indicators of creativity. However, the im-
portance of divergent thinking was disputed by
Weisberg (1986, 1988), who argued that the ability to
generate a large number of responses does not ensure
that any of them will qualify as creative or original.
This study examined the contribution of divergent
thinking as represented by the number of appropriate
responses given to each physics problem. Appropriate
responses were considered to be those that fell within
the domain of physics and that did not appear to orig-
inate from fundamental misconceptions with respect
to the underlying physics concepts. This operational-
ization of appropriateness and the nature of the prob-
lems utilized allowed us to obtain a range of re-
sponses from each participant and for each problem.
In this study, creativity was operationalized as re-
sponse originality. The responses to each problem
were scored as to their total number, their acceptability
or appropriateness as indicated by the constraints of
the domain, and their originality as indicated by fre-
quency of occurrence in the sample. This method of
scoring follows the guidelines and procedures com-
monly utilized in creativity research (Vernon, 1971).
However, Davis (1989) drew attention to the fact that
originality scores that are based on the sum of the fre-
quency weights assigned to responses (see Torrance,
1990) are a direct function of the number of responses
Creativity Research Journal
Creativity in Physics
given. As a result, there may be a confounding of the
originality measures with the fluency measures, which
in turn may magnify the influence of divergent think-
ing functions. Therefore, in this study, fluency and
originality were separated by computing originality as
the average of the frequency weights of the appropriate
responses given by each participant to each problem.
This departure from standard procedure may result in
an underestimation of the strength of the relation be-
tween divergent thinking and originality. On the other
hand, it also allows the examination of the contribution
of divergent thinking to creativity without any con-
founding influences.
Method
Participants
The participants were 54 University of Cyprus stu-
dents majoring in education. The majority of the stu-
dents were women (n = 50) and in their 3rd year of
study (n = 40). Their college performance was average
or above, compared to the performance of all education
majors. Their grade point average (GPA) ranged from
7.00 to 9.00, with a mean of 7.52 and a highest possible
grade of 10.00. At the time of the study, 45 of the stu-
dents had completed a university course in physical
science as part of their program requirements. Their
average grade in this course was 6.91.
Materials
The target physics problems were selected from a
pool of 40 ill-defined problems constructed by two ex-
perts, both of them university professors of physics.
All of the problems on this list were classified into
three problem types on the basis of their solution re-
quirements. Some problems required that solvers ex-
plain possible mechanisms behind a phenomenon;
some required that solvers predict what will happen
given a physical situation or a sequence of events; and,
finally, some problems required that solvers find ways
of using an item or device. These problem types were
judged independently by the two instructors of the
physical science course as not being representative of
the problems found in textbooks and course assign-
403
I. N. Diakidoy and C. P. Constantinou

ments. The instructors, who were familiar with the par-
ticipating students, were subsequently asked to iden-
tify the problems that were most likely to be unfamiliar
but appropriate for this particular student group. Only
problems identified by both instructors as fulfilling the
set criteria were considered, resulting finally in the se-
lection of three problems, each representing a different
problem type (see Table 1).
The explanation problem required students to pro-
vide possible valid explanations for a natural phenom-
enon, the prediction problem provided the beginning
of a science fiction story that the students had to com-
plete, and the application problem required students to
describe possible applications for a device having spe-
cific physical properties. The students who had com-
pleted the physical science course had spent only 1
week covering static electricity (application problem)
and 1 week on concepts pertaining to materials (expla-
nation problem). Concepts related to radioactivity and
the social impact of nuclear energy (prediction prob-
lem) were mentioned only in passing and were not
treated rigorously in that course.
The prior knowledge test consisted of 12
true–false statements constructed by the instructors of
the physical science course (Table 2). There were 4
statements for each target problem assessing knowl-
edge of concepts related to the phenomenon or situa-
tion described by the problem. For example, State-
ment 3.1 (Table 2) tests whether one understands the
difference between magnetization and electrical
charging. Inability to make such a distinction possi-
bly would influence how one represents the applica-
tion problem and, subsequently, his or her choice of
technological applications. To prevent familiarization
with the situations described in the target problems,
the test statements were designed to assess the rele-
vant concepts in contexts different from those pre-
sented in the problems.
In addition to the items assessing knowledge of tar-
get problem concepts, there were 12 more true–false
statements assessing knowledge of physics concepts
unrelated to the problems, which served as foils. Their
purpose was to prevent subsequent familiarization with
the target concepts.
Procedure
The students were divided into two groups for study
participation. The prior knowledge test was adminis-
tered on 2 consecutive days, with one group of students
taking the test on the 1st day and the other group taking
the test on the 2nd day. Students were instructed to think
carefully before answering each item and to do their
best. The test took students about 30 min to complete it.
Two weeks later, the students met again in their
groups and were given the target physics problems to
solve. They were instructed to think carefully about
each problem and to try to provide as many appropriate
responses as possible to all three of them. Some effort
was made to create a relaxed atmosphere in which the
students would feel that they could work at their own
pace. The students were allowed to make notes on sep-
arate pieces of paper and to work on the problems in
any order they wished. It took students about 1 hr to
complete this part of the study.

Table 1. Target Physics Problems Representing Different Problem Types

Target Problem Problem Type

When I think of iron rusting, wood rotting, and rubber disintegrating, then I am led to believe that “any Explanation
material that is taken from nature, with time strives to return to its natural form and environment.” Why
might this be happening?
When the spaceship Thrumfus landed on the reef known as Imia to the Greeks and as Kardak to the Turks, Prediction
its crew did not know what to expect from this planet. After 60 years of travel at the speed of light,
Captain Maximus from the Andromeda galaxy decided to land somewhere in order to generate the
radioactive fuel required by thei spaceship. He first had to distill 3 tons of water which would be used as a
cooling liquid for the nuclear reactor. With a process of nuclear fusion he would produce the necessary
plutonium, and then, with a large explosion, he would push the spaceship thousands of kilometers away
in a matter of a few hundredths of a second. Complete the story.
An electrically charged piece of a particular plastic has the ability to remove dust particles from the air. Application
Mention ways in which this material could be used. You could assume that the material has additional
properties as long as you specify them.

404 Creativity Research Journal


Table 2. Prior Knowledge Test Items
1.1 Many construction materials derive from nature and have
undergone some processing.
1.2 On our planet there exists a fine and fragile equilibrium. In
the case of a permanent temperature change (an increase
of 1°C for example on a permanent basis) we could have
catastrophic changes.
1.3 When a system is in a state of dynamic equilibrium then it
has ceased to change.
1.4 Dinosaurs may have become extinct on this planet as a
result of darkness persisting for a few weeks and caused
by a comet impacting the earth.
2.1 The atomic bomb explosion at Hiroshima gave rise to fire
and major destruction that affected millions of people.
2.2 Distillation of wine will yield water.
2.3 Coca-Cola is produced through water distillation.
2.4 The speed of light is 300 million kilometers per second.
3.1 When I rub a pen it becomes magnetized, and I can use it
to raise small pieces of paper.
3.2 Dust is made up of groups of molecules which are
suspended in the air.
3.3 A transparent material has a smooth surface.
3.4 An electrically charged body has more electrons than protons.
Scoring
The prior knowledge test was scored according to
the number of items that were answered correctly. The
scores were corrected for guessing—by subtracting the
total number of incorrect answers from the total num-
ber of correct answers (Nunnally, 1978)—and con-
verted to a proportional scale to indicate proportion of
items answered correctly by each student.
The scoring of the responses given to the target phys-
ics problems followed a three-step procedure. First, two
independent raters, one expert in physics and one famil-
iar with the target problems, examined the responses
and counted the number of different responses given by
each student to each problem. Responses that were simi-
lar to or simply elaborations of previous responses were
grouped together and counted as one response. This step
yielded a total number of responses score for each stu-
dent for each problem. The interrater agreement was
75%, and the differences were resolved in conference.
Second, two independent raters, both experts in the
domain of physics, assessed the correctness or appro-
priateness of each response given. This step yielded a
number of valid responses score for each student and
problem. On the explanation and application problems,
Creativity Research Journal
Creativity in Physics
it was relatively easy to discern which responses were
physically valid and particularly feasible. This was not
the case with the prediction problem (Table 1), which
included social and cultural aspects. In this case, re-
sponses such as the possibility of a Greek–Turkish war,
which were possible and valid given the political situa-
tion, were counted as separate responses but were not
considered to be appropriate unless they included valid
physical information. The interrater agreement was
96%.
Finally, all of the responses given by the students to
each problem were tabulated, and their frequency of
occurrence in the sample was calculated. A response
given by fewer than 3 students (5%) received a score of
3 and was considered to be highly original. A response
given by fewer than 15 students (15%) received a score
of 2. Responses given by fewer than 27 students (50%)
in the sample received a score of 1, and those given by
more than 28 students received a score of 0. This pro-
cedure yielded a sample frequency score for each re-
sponse. Subsequently, the average of all the frequency
scores received by each student for each problem was
calculated to give the student’s originality score.
Analysis
The data were analyzed using hierarchical regression
following the logic of mixed analysis of covariance. The
main dependent variable was originality. GPA and phys-
ics grade were between-subject factors and were entered
first. The grand mean of the students across problems
subsequently was entered to remove any remaining vari-
ance associated with between-subject factors. Then, the
within-subjects factors—prior knowledge, problem
type, number of valid responses, and total number of re-
sponses—were entered, followed by their interactions.
That problem type was a within-subjects factor resulted
in obtaining three measures of originality, one for each
problem type. The F ratio for each within-subjects fac-
tor was calculated by taking into account the increment
in R2 attributed to that factor:
R2 change
(1 - R2 ) /[( N - k - S - 1) - 1]
where R2 = the variance accounted for by the model, N
= the number of observations, k = the number of vari-
405
I. N. Diakidoy and C. P. Constantinou

ables in the model, and s = the number of participants.
This formula yields a more conservative test for the
within-subjects factors than the standard formula com-
monly used for the calculation of the F ratio for the be-
tween-subject factors (Kerlinger, 1986).
A preliminary examination of the data indicated
that the distributions of total number of responses and
number of valid responses were positively skewed
(skewness > 1). That was expected because the prob-
lems were unfamiliar, resulting in fewer high scores
than low scores. Square root transformations normal-
ized the data, and the transformed scores were em-
ployed in the analyses. Because of missing values on
physics grade, the data of only 45 students were uti-
lized in the regression analyses.
Results
Descriptive statistics indicated that students per-
formed differently in the three target problems (Table
3). The concepts related to the application problem
were less familiar to this sample, and yet the students
overall gave more responses and more appropriate re-
sponses to this problem.
The responses given to the prediction problem were
more original than those given to either the explanation
or the application problems.
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients among
the variables of interest. It can be seen that total num-
ber of responses, number of valid responses, and origi-
nality were all highly and positively correlated with
each other (p < .01).
However, the correlation between total number of
responses and originality was not significant (r = .04, p
> .05) when number of valid responses was partialed
out. In contrast, the correlation between number of
valid responses and originality increased (r = .63, p <
.01) after total number of responses was partialed out,
indicating that the ability to come up with more than
one appropriate response is positively related to the de-
gree of originality. Physics grade was positively related
only to GPA, as expected, but not to any other vari-
ables. It is interesting to note that prior knowledge was
negatively related to the number of valid responses.
Analysis within each problem indicated that the corre-

Table 3. Means of Originality, Number of Valid Responses, Total Number of Responses, and Prior Knowledge in Problem
Types

Problem Type

Explanation Prediction Application

Measures M SD M SD M SD

Originality 0.43 0.92 1.14 1.18 0.97 0.81

Number of Valid Responses 0.19 0.39 0.54 0.57 1.37 0.55
Total Number of Responses 1.27 0.29 1.32 0.37 1.74 0.53
Prior Knowledge 0.64 0.17 0.68 0.20 0.46 0.23

Table 4. Intercorrelations Among Measures of Academic Achievement, Knowledge, and Creativity

Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Grade Point Average — .69* .21* .15 .09 .10

2. Physics Grade — .17 .13 .13 .11
3. Prior Knowledge — –.06 –.22* .05
4. Total Number of Responses — .67* .71*
5. Number of Valid Responses — .43*
6. Originality —

*p < .01.

406 Creativity Research Journal

 Creativity in Physics

lation coefficients between prior knowledge and each Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis
of the creativity measures (originality, number of valid for Variables Predicting Originality Score
responses, and total number of responses) were non- Variable B R2 change F to Enter
significant in all problems (p > .05) but negative only in
the prediction problem. Grade Point Average 0.18 .0077 1.03
Physics Grade 0.07 .0039 0.78
Preliminary regression analyses indicated that the
Grand M 1.00 .4727 41.01**
day the prior knowledge test was administered and Prior Knowledge 0.11 .0005 0.27
nonlinear components did not have significant effects Problem Type 0.32 .0541 28.53**
on any variables of interest and, therefore, were ex- Number of Valid 1.08 .1958 103.25**
cluded from the main analysis. Table 5 presents the fi- Responses
nal regression model predicting originality score. Total Number of Responses 0.35 .0132 6.97*
Problem Type × Prior 0.48 .0058 3.03
It can be seen that the variance accounted for by Knowledge
GPA, physics grade, and prior knowledge was not sig- Problem Type × Number –0.81 .0984 51.87**
nificant. Table 6 presents the means of originality, of Valid Responses
number of valid responses, and total number of re- Prior Knowledge × –.088 .0001 0.06
sponses in two levels of prior knowledge. Number of Valid
Responses
Even though there were no significant differences in
Model R2 .8521
originality scores and total number of responses across Multiple R .9231
prior knowledge levels (p > .05), the difference in mean
number of valid responses across prior knowledge lev- Note: N = 45.
els was significant, F(1, 162) = 7.98, p < .01. Students *p < .05. **p < .01.
who received high scores (above the mean) on the prior
knowledge test did not give as many correct responses
to the problems as students whose prior knowledge of Table 6. Means of Originality, Number of Valid
the relevant concepts was low. The same trend was ap- Responses, and Total Number of Responses in Levels of
parent with originality scores and total number of re- Prior Knowledge
sponses as well. Prior Knowledge
It can be seen from Table 5 that problem type was
a highly significant predictor of originality. Students Low High
gave the least original responses to the explanation
Measures M SD M SD
problem and the most original responses to the pre-
diction problem (Table 3). Even though the interac- Originality 0.87 0.95 0.82 0.98
tion of prior knowledge with problem type was not Number of Valid Responses 0.85 0.67 0.54 0.69
significant, it did approach significance (p = .07). Ta- Total Number of Responses 1.47 0.52 1.41 0.45
ble 7 shows the means of originality within problem
types and levels of prior knowledge. Students with
relatively high knowledge of relevant concepts
showed a tendency to give more original responses to
the explanation and application problems. In contrast,
Table 7. Means of Originality Within Problem Types and
students with low conceptual knowledge gave more Levels of Prior Knowledge
original responses to the prediction problem (Table
7). Even though none of the mean differences within Prior Knowledge
each problem reached significance (p > .05), it may
Low High
be the case that a high level of knowledge hindered
creativity in the prediction problem, whereas the op- Problem Type M SD M SD
posite appears to be true for the other two problems.
This negative influence of prior knowledge on the Explanation 0.37 0.87 0.47 0.97
Prediction 1.32 1.19 1.05 1.19
originality scores of responses to the prediction prob-
Application 0.94 0.82 1.04 0.84
lem also may have masked the positive effects of this

Creativity Research Journal 407

I. N. Diakidoy and C. P. Constantinou
variable on the originality of responses given to the
other two problems.
It can be seen from Table 5 that the number of valid
responses that a student could give predicted the extent
to which at least some of these responses were original.
The interaction of this variable with problem type was
also significant. Table 8 shows the means of originality
within problem types and levels of number of valid re-
sponses. It is apparent that the ability to produce a large
number of responses influences originality in the ex-
planation and prediction problems to a greater extent
than in the application problem.
The total number of responses that students gave to
the problems was also a significant predictor of origi-
nality (Table 5). However, because the partial correla-
tion coefficient between this variable and originality,
when controlling for number of valid responses, was
not significant (r = .04, p > .05), the high positive cor-
relation initially observed and part of the variance ac-
counted for may be due to this third variable and its re-
lation to the total number of responses.
Discussion
The results of this study indicated that the number
of appropriate responses that students could give to
ill-defined physics problems (fluency) and the type of
problem were the most significant predictors of re-
sponse originality.
The number of appropriate or valid responses that a
student can give to a problem is essentially an index of
divergent thinking, and, within the framework of
psychometric research, it has always been assumed
that divergent thinking ability is highly related to cre-
ativity (Guilford, 1956, 1970, 1971; Torrance, 1966,
1988). Consequently, it has been argued that ill-de-
Table 8. Means of Originality Within Problem Types and
Levels of Number of Valid Responses
Number of Valid Responses
Low High
Problem Type M SD M SD
Explanation 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.48
Prediction 0.00 0.00 2.29 0.41
Application 0.00 0.00 1.04 0.80
408
fined tasks and problems, which allow more than one
appropriate response, are more conducive to creativity
(Hennessey & Amabile, 1988). However, the highly
significant interaction of this factor with problem type
indicates that the extent to which divergent thinking
contributes to creativity depends on the type of the
ill-defined task encountered. In this study, a greater
number of valid responses was given to the application
problem, but the responses given to the prediction
problem received higher originality scores than the re-
sponses given to any other problem. This finding also
supports, in part, Weisberg’s (1986, 1988) claim that
the ability to produce a large number of responses does
not ensure that these responses will be highly creative.
The students in our study responded differently to
problems representing different types of tasks in the
domain of physics. An examination of the data re-
vealed that, whereas 57% of the students gave highly
original responses (responses receiving frequency
scores of 3) to at least one problem, only 7% gave orig-
inal responses to all three problems. Because the prob-
lems were equivalent in terms of appropriateness and
familiarity, these differences in performance can be at-
tributed, at least in part, to the fact that the problems
differed in their solution requirements and constraints.
Even though this study was motivated by the theoreti-
cal position that creativity is in part domain specific
(Feldhusen, 1994; Hocevar, 1981), it was not designed
to address this issue directly. Nevertheless, these find-
ings allow the extension of this position and its impli-
cations to the level of the task. Creative performance in
connection with one type of task does not appear to en-
sure creative performance in other types of tasks.
The extent to which creativity is task and domain
specific has important theoretical and educational im-
plications, and needs to be the subject of further re-
search. If creativity varies in connection with tasks,
and possibly in connection with domains as well, then
the extent to which it represents a relatively stable
characteristic or ability is questionable. These findings
cast doubts on the appropriateness of employing gen-
eral measures to identify and predict creative potential
for research or educational purposes. Instead, a more
valid approach might be the assessment of creativity
through the use of a variety of appropriate and repre-
sentative tasks within a domain of interest.
Even though the problem types we have em-
ployed—explanation, prediction, and application—are
highly representative of those frequently addressed in
Creativity Research Journal

the domain of physics and science in general, they are
not representative of those encountered in physics
courses at the secondary and undergraduate levels.
Typically, students are required to describe physical
phenomena, calculate quantities, and conduct experi-
ments that have been carefully prespecified as to their
procedures and outcomes by instructors and textbook
authors. These activities are designed to promote the
acquisition of theories, concepts, and procedures in the
domain. At the same, time they may foster the percep-
tion of knowledge acquisition as an end goal, thus ren-
dering the knowledge acquired less flexible and appli-
cable in novel situations. In that case, these activities
are unlikely to promote creativity as exemplified by the
extension of acquired knowledge and the creation of
new knowledge (Johnson-Laird, 1987).
It has been argued extensively that creativity de-
pends on the availability of a large knowledge base
(Amabile, 1990; Boden, 1992; Sternberg, 1988; Weis-
berg, 1986). Conceptual knowledge is considered to be
a prerequisite to mentally representing the problem
and guiding the generation and evaluation of solutions
(Feldhusen, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 1988). Although
these findings do not appear to support the preceding
claim, they cannot be taken to confirm the opposite
claim that too much knowledge may hinder creativity
(Sternberg, 1988). The relation between prior concep-
tual knowledge and the creativity measures was weak
but negative only with respect to the prediction prob-
lem. An examination of the response protocols indi-
cated that at least half of the appropriate responses to
the prediction problem were based on concepts of as-
tronomy and space travel, and not on concepts of nu-
clear energy as we had originally hypothesized and as-
sessed with the prior knowledge test. Therefore, the
negative relation may be partly due to the fact that we
evaluated a different knowledge base from the one ac-
tually accessed by our students.
According to Schank (1988), the interpretation and
the solution of a problem depend not only on prior con-
ceptual knowledge, but also on the availability of rele-
vant previous experiences in memory. The rules, or
what Schank (1988) referred to as the explanation pat-
terns, that were employed to deal with previous experi-
ences are selectively accessed and modified to apply to
a new problem. Amabile (1990) and Runco and Chand
(1995) also argued that creativity is based on different
kinds of domain-relevant knowledge, both declarative
and procedural. Considering these claims, it becomes
Creativity Research Journal
Creativity in Physics
apparent that the prior knowledge test employed in this
study was limited in terms of the extent and the depth
to which it assessed potentially relevant knowledge.
The test was not designed to evaluate procedural
knowledge—that is, familiarity and strategy use with
problems of this type.
The possibility that the results concerning the
knowledge factor may be attributable to the test is
strengthened by a closer examination of the responses
and the results concerning the explanation problem.
Knowledge of the underlying concepts (entropy and
dynamic equilibrium) was above average, and the re-
sponse protocols indicated that this knowledge pro-
vided the basis for the responses given. Yet, only 11%
of all the responses were judged to be appropriate, and
only 3% received high originality scores. Clearly, the
explanation problem presented a greater challenge to
our students than either the prediction or the applica-
tion problem. The task it represents is highly demand-
ing, requiring the formulation of a theory to account for
the physical phenomena described. Theory formula-
tion requires not only in-depth and flexible knowledge
of immediately related and more distant concepts, but
also knowledge about the structure of theories and the
processes that are involved in their construction. Even
though this study did not examine this kind of knowl-
edge, it can be expected to be low. The content, goals,
and methods of teaching and testing at the secondary
and undergraduate levels, at least in the context of sci-
ence education, are characterized by more of an em-
phasis on the learning of phenomena and the laws that
govern their behavior than on the epistemological con-
struction of structured theories. Therefore, our stu-
dents can be expected to know more about established
theories and their applications than the processes that
guide theory formulation.
The results concerning the influence of academic
achievement indexes, such as GPA and grade in a phys-
ical science course, parallel those concerning the influ-
ence of prior knowledge. This is not surprising if we
consider that grades in different academic subjects are
taken to reflect the knowledge acquired in the corre-
sponding subject areas. These findings overall support
the notion that creativity and academic achievement
are not linked (Guilford, 1956; Sternberg, 1988; Tay-
lor, 1988). However, prior knowledge represents a
complex factor, and creativity appears to depend not so
much on the simple availability of knowledge but on
the ability to extend and go beyond the knowledge ac-
409
I. N. Diakidoy and C. P. Constantinou
quired. Therefore, further research should examine
more thoroughly the different kinds of knowledge and
skills that may contribute to creativity in different do-
mains and tasks. Such research has greater potential to
provide a more solid basis for educational planning
and practice.
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