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SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR D. ROBERT WORLEY IN PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COURSE METHODS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY
BY D. ROBERT WORLEY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................1 COMPARISON CRITERIA...............................................................................................................................2 KENNANS CONTAINMENT STRATEGY UNDER TRUMAN.................................................................2 NSC-68 AND THE KOREAN CONFLICT UNDER TRUMAN....................................................................3 THE NEW LOOK: EISENHOWER AND DULLES.......................................................................................5 FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: KENNEDY AND JOHNSON.................................................................................6 DTENTE UNDER NIXON-FORD AND KISSINGER.................................................................................6 DTENTE UNDER CARTER............................................................................................................................7 ROLLBACK AND FULL COURT PRESS UNDER REAGAN....................................................................8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................................9 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................................10
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1. ADMINISTRATIONS, ECONOMICS, AND RESPONSES.......................................................1
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Introduction
The Cold War is a period of history marked by competition between two great powers. Behind it was the Soviet Union expressly pursuing an expansionist policy through the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its need to internally project an external threat. US national security policy in the years 1947 through 1989 is identified with a single term containmentalthough there were obvious shifts in emphasis from administration to administration.1 One of the most notable shifts in the national security strategy of containment was in the perception of available means. Those presidents who believed their means were limited tended towards asymmetric responses to Soviet encroachments, that is, to select the place, time, magnitude and methods of competition. Presidents who believed the American economy could produce the necessary means on demand tended towards symmetric responses, countering Soviet adventurism wherever and whenever it occurred. Correlated with the symmetry of response was the acceptance of Keynesian economics suggesting that increased government spending could produce an expansion in the economy. The belief that government could manage economic expansion without long term budget deficits, higher taxes, or inflation allowed those presidents so inclined to consider all interests vital, all threats dangerous, and all measures available.2 Table 1. Administrations, Economics, and Responses Administration Truman (47-49) Truman (49-53) Eisenhower Kennedy, Johnson Nixon, Ford Carter (77-79) Carter (79-81) Reagan Expansionist Economics Rejected Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected Moot Moot Accepted Response to Soviets Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Symmetric (offensive)
Table 1 summarizes the Cold War administrations, their acceptance of Keynesian economics, and a characterization of their response to Soviet attempts at expansion. The Carter administration is the notable exception, being saddled with extreme inflation
1 2
Shifts also took place within the Truman and Carter administrations. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 346.
following high government expenditures during the Vietnam conflict. Supporting a policy of symmetric response, based on the belief in an expanding economy, was simply not an option. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed Carter toward a symmetric response nonetheless. The objective of this paper is to identify the best and worst strategies of the Cold War administrations and the policy outcomes of each. The early days of the Truman administration showed promise of developing the best strategy, but its implementation fell short as the Korean Conflict and NSC-68 overcame it. The Nixon administration subsequently developed the best strategy. Both the Kennedy-Johnson and the Carter administrations showed signs of flawed strategy, but the cost of the Kennedy-Johnson failures were greater, earning them the dubious distinction of having the worst national security strategy of the period.
Comparison Criteria
What constitutes a good strategy? The dominant criteria used to judge the goodness of a strategy is that means are subordinated to ends. Put another way, clear objectives must be pursued and the resources applied judiciously. Second, the means must be adequate and appropriate to the ends. Large, expanding means do not equate to infinite or even adequate means for all objectives. Third, a strategy must be judged relative to the time, including international politics, military developments, available technology, and domestic attitudes. Fourth, a strategy is implemented through a mix of political, economic, psychological, and military instruments and should be judged accordingly. Finally, a strategy should be consistent with national philosophy.
bloc. And the third stage was to modify Soviet behavior with respect to international relations. Restoration of the balance of power, thus, required the reconstruction of Germany and Japan. The European Recovery Program was the major policy initiative of the period, and occupation efforts in both countries were shifted toward rehabilitation.5 In March of 1947, Truman spoke to Congress about providing aid to Turkey and Greece. Some interpreted that the Truman Doctrine promised aid to everyone, but by September the administration refined its position to include limits on US aid.6 By July of 1947, Kennans strategy evolved toward a strongpoint defense along the periphery of the Asian landmass rather than a strict perimeter defense all along the Soviet border.7 His defensive perimeter included Japan, Okinawa, and Philippines as strong points and excluded any presence on the Asian continent, specifically China, Korea, Indochina, and Afghanistan. If competition were to take place, then it would be on terrain and with instruments favorable to the US. The Truman administration implemented the first stage of Kennans strategy somewhat faithfully. Implementation of the second stage, however, began to depart from the original. The Marshall Plan was consistent with the need to rebuild Western Europe and to help splinter the communist bloc. Trumans rhetoric was oriented against totalitarianism, not communism, thus allowing separate relations with unaligned communist countries. Kennan opposed the creation of NATO fearing that Europe would rearm rather than focus on economic recovery. While Kennan believed the Soviets werent yet a military threat and was willing to accept the near-term risk, the Europeans were not so inclined.8 He feared that such a military alliance would serve to galvanize rather than splinter the communist bloc. Several elements of the Truman administrations strategy did not fit squarely with Kennans third stage objectives to change the Soviet concept of international relations without war and without appeasement. The creation of NATO and of Germany, the occupation of Japan, and initiating the H bomb project all worked against his strategy by building on Russias historical perception of being surrounded by hostile forces.9 However, the administration implemented Kennans recommendation to tie the level of US military activity in the eastern Mediterranean to Soviet activity in Italy and Greece.
Gaddis, 60. Gaddis, 59. 7 Gaddis, 58. 8 Gaddis, 72-74. 9 Gaddis, 71.
Paul Nitze replaced Kennan as director of the Policy Planning Staff in 1949, and Dean Acheson was appointed secretary of state. Nitze and Acheson were more concerned with measurable instruments of Soviet power than Kennan who was more interested in their immeasurable intentions. Kennan was willing to accept the risk; the new policy elite was not.10 NSC-68 contained several strong departures from Kennans formulation. First, it dropped strong point defense in favor of a perimeter defense. The underlying rationale was that if the US failed to stand by any country then its credibility would be damaged. Countries that lacked the power to defend themselves against Soviet aggression might find it more attractive to strike deals with the Soviet Union rather than risk invasion or a sustained communist insurgency. Even strong countries might doubt our resolve. US credibility became a vital interest. Second, military instruments became primary. This signaled two simultaneous changes: a dramatic increase in the area of US interests from a few strong points to every country along the perimeter and the increased need for forces that could be projected globally. NSC-68 called for a threefold increase in defense expenditures that may have been hard to sell to Congress and the public. The invasion of South Korea by the North helped overcome that obstacle. The balance of power view survived, but Kennans focus on military-industrial strength was lost. NSC-68 stated, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.11 No more strong points, all points along the perimeter were of equal importance. The logic of NSC-68 asserts that the balance of power could shift not just from economic or military developments, but also from intimidation, humiliation, or even loss of credibility. Under Kennans strategy, Korea had been a peripheral interest. Keynesian economics suggested that the economy could grow to finance more military expenditures without long-term budget deficits, taxes, or inflation.12 Without this constraint, there was no need to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. Kennan relied on political, economic, psychological, and military measures, and on natural forces of resistance, e.g., nationalism,13 whereas NSC-68 emphasized the military instrument. Kennans asymmetry pitted US strengths against Soviet weaknesses, and asymmetry could be sustained indefinitely. But a war by proxy in Korea pitted our weaknesses against their strengths. Furthermore, the US limited response highlighted its over reliance on atomic weapons. Both Kennans strategy and NSC-68 contained an element of flexible response. To Kennan it meant acting only when vital interest were at stake, conditions were favorable, and the means accessible.14 To the authors of NSC-68, it meant the ability to escalate vertically, up and down the ladder (calibration) wherever communist aggression appeared.
10 11
Gaddis, 84. Gaddis, 91. 12 Gaddis, 93. 13 Gaddis, 99. 14 Gaddis, 101.
NSC-68 did not favor Kennans third stage. Kennan thought the Soviets could be relied upon to uphold agreements that were in their interests and that the US should engage them diplomatically on those grounds. NSC-68 assumed that diplomacy would not work until the Soviet system had changed. Gaddis closes by noting that the failure of the Truman administration was in understanding the near infinite demands this policy of containment could entail. Beginning with a perception of implacable threat and expandable means, it derived a set of interests so vast as to be beyond the nations political will, if not theoretical capacity, to sustain.15
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based on balance of power theory and realpolitick. Under dtente, the US recognized that there were good communists and bad communists and that wedges could be driven between them. The Nixon White House, in response to the deep engagement in Vietnam, took steps to avoid involvement in those countries not vital to US interests, e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa. This marked a return to Kennans horizontal asymmetry. Another policy shift was the administrations preference for economic instruments over the use of military force. Security assistance was offered to anti-Communists instead of advisors or combat forces. That backfired in at least one case. By helping to modernize Irans army, the US helped to undermine the Shahs credibility at home. Strategic coherence, major successes at the global policy level, and failures at the regional level mark this period. Perhaps paramount was the recognition of the growing split between China and the Soviet Union and the deliberate exploitation of it by opening diplomatic relations with China. Communism as a monolith was now exposed as myth. The ability to play Moscow off against Peking dramatically changed the balance of power equation on the Asian continent. Regional failures included Soviet adventures in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan encouraging detractors to equate dtente with appeasement. The enabling condition for the period of dtente was the fact that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity with the United States. It was now possible to negotiate arms control. Again, the administration recognized the conditions and was able to exploit them. Policy successes include anti-ballistic missile and strategic arms limitation treaties with a freeze on offensive weapons. However, the Soviet nuclear program continued arming missiles with multiple warheads. The Paris Peace Accords, withdrawing the US from a costly military commitment on the Asian continent, can be considered another success of this administration. However, the bombing of Cambodia during peace talks eventually caused the collapse of that country that continued to be the source of misery for years to come. The strategic successes of this administration are often overshadowed by the loss of public trust in its government.
no apparent priorities, and no dominant strategic thinker. Decision making was decentralized in contrast to the Nixon era. Carter retained an asymmetrical approach of differentiating between vital and peripheral interests, distinguishing between levels of threat, and of keeping responses commensurate with means.20 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Doctrine was announced in a speech in January of 1980. In it, he said, any outside force to gain control of Persian Gulf will be regarded a threat to US vital interests and will be repelled by any means, including military.21 Carter appeared to embrac[e] the undifferentiated view of interests and threats characteristic of symmetrical response.22 Where Nixon demonstrated strategic coherence and global successes, Carter showed a lack of coherence and some regional successes including the Camp David Accords, reclaiming Egypt from the Soviet sphere, and the Panama Canal Treaty. The SALT II Treaty was withdrawn from the Senate after the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. Other policy failures include his inability to prevent or recover the hostages in Tehran and support of a dictator in Nicaragua. Carter misspent his political capital killing an Air Force bomber early in office and was later unable to kill the MX missile program.
Gaddis, 346-347. Gaddis, 345-346. 22 Gaddis, 352. 23 Garthoff, 33. 24 Garthoff, 11. 25 Carter began the Reagan buildup after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
administration. Spiritual and rhetorical support to movements in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe achieved desirable outcomes as well. On the nuclear arms front, an entire class of nuclear weapons was eliminated and on-site verification procedures were implemented. Stories of weapon system acquisitions run amok during the Reagan buildup are legion. US involvement in Lebanon and Grenada can be considered policy failures, as can the Iran-Contra episode. The Reagan administration failed to recognize strategic opportunities, unlike the Nixon administration. The most notable example was the failure to make greater progress on arms reductions while Gorbachev was in power to militate against later nuclear proliferation.
References
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Garthoff, Raymond L. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994. Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb. The Evolution of American National Security Policy in American National Security: Policy and Process, Fourth Edition. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
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