Proponents of realism claim that their doctrine best accounts for how scientific theories can indeed illuminate

humankind as to how the world is. An overarching definition of realism is impossible to conceptualise, given that not all its proponents espouse a similar tenet of it. I shall look into the most pertinent conceptualisations of-and supporting arguments for realism by comparing and contrasting it to empiricism and constructivism. Bearing the previous statements in mind, I adopt Hirsts (Devit 1991: 13) account of realism which states that realism is (1) the view that material objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense experience. Firstly this essay will outline the main arguments for realism chiefly taken from Boyds article The Current Status of Scientific Realism (Leplin 1984: 42-43) namely; (2) mature scientific theories are at least approximately true, (3) the terms theoretically conceptualised authentically refer to actual entities and (4) more recent theories safeguard the claims of earlier theories on which they are based and explain their success. I shall henceforth make reference to these main arguments by stating their corresponding number. Given the limited scope of this essay, Ill only focus on (1) and (2) and then move on to the proposed confutations against these arguments. Lastly Ill comment on realisms strengths and shortcomings in light of the papers findings. Concerning (1), why would realists posit a mind independent world if such a world cannot be experienced at all? Wouldnt such a world be less realistic and even more phantasmic? Anaximander was the first to postulate such a world which he called apeiron (cite), in order to account for all the substances found in nature since water which was then argued to fulfil this role couldnt explain dryness. This cosmological world was considered to be permanent and static. Though he did not espouse a metaphysical doctrine, Plato (Stumpf & Abel 2002: 8) admonished his readers and pupils that appearances in the world are deceiving and advised us to rather consider substances on a higher abstract plane he called forms. Aristotle (Stumpf & Abel 2002: 352) revised Anaximanders notion of apeiron as metaphysics which he argued accounts for the first principles needed for logic and matter. Building on the ancients notions, Descartes (Stumpf & Abel 2002: 52) with his experiment with the wax and the method of doubt provided an even more powerful argument that our sense experience may not in fact be

adequate for ascertaining the essences of objects. To this day most scientists endeavour to atone for our seemingly misleading and idiosyncratic senses by adhering to metaphysical, methodological, epistemological and semantic doctrines (Stumpf & Abel 2002: 23). As a result realism adheres to the metaphysical doctrine (1) (Leplin 1984: 42), in order to avoid relativism and allow for the universal legitimacy and truth-status of successful scientific theories. Such an admirable endeavour that realists avow to undertake is not without objection. The chief opposition against (1) are formulated by the empiricist and constructivist arguments (Leplin 1984: 44). Empiricism can be construed as an epistemology that states that only experience can be considered that which is knowable (Stumpf & Abel 2002: 62), thus it contests the realist assumption (1) on a metaphysical plane and (2) on an epistemological plane. In other words empiricists contend that there can be no such thing as a reality outside of the senses and knowledge outside of what can be observed. By referring to scientific enquiry they argue that two theories which yield the same observable results are evidentially indistinguishable. Also empiricists argue that knowledge cannot be extrapolated to unobservable variables (Leplin 1984: 43). The chief counter-arguments to (1) is that the line between what is observable or unobservable constantly shifts and that such an argument do not take into account supplementary hypotheses (Leplin 1984: 43). Maxwell gives an example of how the line shifts by demonstrating how bacteria could not have been observed without the invention of the microscope (Curd 1998: 1058), but was still an abducted unobservable postulated in hypotheses prior to the advent of the microscope. Boyd (Leplin 1984: 48) also argues that theoretical terms are needed to stipulate the observables and unobservables operationality, but maintains that such a distinction neednt be so rigorously kept since experience for the realist does not necessarily dictate all knowledge. The constructivist argument does not assume (1) nor the empiricist doctrine outlined above, proponents instead argue that the emphasis should be on methods and theoretical considerations dictated by the tradition within which these theories are articulated (Leplin 1984: 52). Constructivist antirealists shift the focus away entirely from observable entities, averring that what must be observed of those entities are already

theoretically constructed prior to investigation (ibid). They also adopt the pessimistic meta-inductive argument against realism which states that theories are constantly being replaced by other ones; hence scientific enquiry doesnt converge or progress to a better explanation of reality and truth-status (Leplin 1984: 43 & 52). In defence of realism, Devitt (1991: 32) maintains that the objects which theories propound do not become replaced and instead certain statements about it become improved. For example when Einsteins theory of relativity succeeded Newtons theory of universal gravitation, the objects remained, only the statements about it transformed. Both Sklar (Papineau 1996: 68) and Van Fraassen (Papineau 1996: 90) argue that the constructivist doctrine is insufficient to be considered an approach for scientific enquiry for different reasons. Adhering to (1) Sklar (Papineau 1996: 62) maintains that logical propositions inferred from observation and an integrated theory is required. Given that constructivism lacks the logical propositions, it is insufficient. Van Fraassen on the other hand refutes it from his constructive empiricist stance which requires empirical adequacy. Empirical adequacy is acquired when ...all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures in at least one of its models. (Papineau 1996: 90). Since constructivism does not account for empirical substructures which are based on observation, he argues that it is insufficient. With regards to (2), Putnam (1975: 73) posited a strong argument for realism namely the no miracles argument: He boldly asserted that realism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. In other words Putnam avers that if the approximate truth-claims of realism arent accepted, then the theories and their auxiliary hypotheses which accurately and successfully predict the effects of observable entities must then be a miracle. In response the empiricists argue that only the observable component can be regarded as true, not the theoretical. But this cannot constitute as a counter-argument since it doesnt address the success of those theories. The constructivist on the other hand can only measure truth if truth were itself conceptualised as a construct within a theoretical tradition (Leplin 1984: 59), rendering it liable to replacement which is insufficient for (1). Based on the refutations of these possible anti-realist arguments mentioned above Boyd (ibid), following Putnam, surmises that the theories and its accompanying observables might indeed actually be approximately true

and therefore must be the best explanation. Later Boyd (Leplin 1984: 67) argues that without the realist assumptions, it would be difficult for scientific enquiry to proceed if at all possible. My concern is that, assuming (1) and (2), what would then be the ontological status of the abstract concepts like velocity? If the abstract concepts do not form part of the mind-independent reality, then how could we confidently assert that we can have access to the relations between different entities if those relations are formulated and represented by abstract concepts? A realist can argue that an object has been successfully proven to be able to be set in motion and can be predicted that the object would to be at that location at that specific time due given a certain velocity. But such a theory would then also have to include and be measured by the abstract concepts motion, location and time; rendering its theories and predictions to be a construction procedure. Success can also be considered a construction, since its criteria can only be measured with abstract concepts. If these abstract concepts do not form part of this mind-independent reality, then what approximate truths about reality have we in fact garnered through such a theory? Surely if objects are needed along with the abstract concepts which they measure the relations between objects with, then the abstract concepts cannot only be a metaphysical reference point. Given the previous paragraph and limited scope excluding (3) and (4) I tentatively argue for the constructivist position, but shall reserve stringent critique until (3) and (4) have been thoroughly examined. On the other hand my position was not the main aim of this paper. By comparing the main arguments for realism with those from constructivism and empiricism, I gained much clarity as to what is at stake for scientific enquiry and realism in general and also a critical perspective on methodology, epistemology, metaphysics, truth, theory and a part of the history of the philosophy of science. Bibliography: Putnam, H. (1975) Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, volume 1. London: Cambridge University Press.

Curd, M. & J.A. Cover (Eds.). (1998). Philosophy of Science. W.W.Norton & Company. pp 1052-1063. Devitt, M. (1991, 2n Edition). Realism and Truth. Princeton University Press. pp 13-59. Leplin, J. (Ed.). (1984). Scientific Realism. University of California Press. pp 41-82. Stumpf, E & Abel, D. 1979.. Elements of philosophy. 4th Ed. McGraw-Hill New York: 2002.