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Strategy:
The debasing of the RBI and the negative consequences for Indian banks
Analyst: Saurabh Mukherjea, CFA, saurabhmukherjea@ambitcapital.com, Tel: +91 99877 85848 Once upon a time India had a genuinely independent central bank, one that could be relied upon for, both, sensible monetary policy (focused as much on price stability as on economic growth) and prudential banking supervision (of the sort that curbed the worst excesses of bank CEOs). That golden age ended roughly 3-4 years ago as a Finance Minister determined to take India back to the Socialist age and an RBI Governor with his roots in the Finance Ministry debased one of the few respectable public institutions in our country. The RBI has been robbed of its independence in two specific ways - with regards to monetary policy and with regards to banking supervision. In this mail, I explore this erosion in the RBIs quality of banking supervision over the past four years. In a separate mail our Financial Services team looks at the inadequacy of Indian banks disclosures which, to make matters worse, are non-uniform across banks. These two mails from Ambit kick of a series of publications from our house on the parlous state of Indian banking, a sector whose compromised state is a source of considerable concern within our team. The investment implications of Indias weak banking sector are fairly obvious: Indian banks (both public and private sectors banks) financial statements are no longer worth the paper they are written on. Whilst flattering a banks Tier-1 can temporarily postpone the day of equity dilution, the risk that it creates is that the money markets will at some stage over the next year pull the plug on one of the private sector banks. That in turn could trigger a run on the bank which could undermine confidence in the Indian financial system. This (and not policy paralysis) is the single biggest risk to economic growth in India. We reiterate that investors should shun large Indian banks where asset quality looks highly suspect and where profits and networth are obviously heavily overstated. Amongst the larger banks, the only ones where we find the financial statements to be credible are ICICI Bank, Bank of Baroda and Kotak Mahindra Bank. We continue to stay heavily underweight banks in our model Good & Clean portfolio. The erosion in the quality of banking supervision and the overstating of networth Aggressive CEOs in charge of Indian banks is nothing new (whether it be in the public sector or in the private sector). The very nature of the sector encourages such aggression because the CEO knows that if grows the Balance Sheet aggressively for two years, gathers plaudits from the Government and from the media, by the time the chickens come home to roost 3-4 years out (in the form of bad debts), he will be long gone. This is especially true for long-term loans in sectors such as Power, Roads, Telecom and Real Estate and it is notable that loans to all of these sectors have grown much faster than broader lending over the past four years. However, during the previous economic boom (2003-2007) the RBI could check such aggression by bank CEOs by summoning them to Mint Road, rapping their knuckles for aggressive lending (and the attendant posting of fictitious results) and forcing them to, both, come clean (by writing down dud loans) and tone down the aggression (by reducing loan book growth). The threat that the RBI used in such circumstances was that of a forced merger with a public sector bank at a depressed share price. This sensible mode of bank regulation started unraveling in the months running up to the Lehman Brothers crisis. On 27th August 2008, towards the fag end of his tenure, Dr. YV Reddy, former governor of the RBI, in keeping with the stress building up in the banking system, allowed a degree of regulatory forbearance and permitted banks to restructure loans without having to downgrade the asset classification (therefore, a standard asset remained a standard asset even upon restructuring). Indian banks needed no second invitation - the proportion of restructured advances soared over the last four years to ~3% of loans outstanding as of March 2012 and has continued rising further during 1HFY13.
Strategy: The debasing of the RBI and the negative consequences for Indian banks
Even more damagingly, the signal that such a retrograde intervention gave to the banking sector was that the RBI was seemingly willing to turn a blind eye to banks that cooked their balance sheets i.e. those that kept restructuring assets, which were palpably dud and those that even refused to restructure assets, which were dud (thanks to evergreening). Subsequently, during FY11 and FY12, even as the economy slowed down and even as some of the public sector banks stepped up their restructuring, the private sector banks decided that they were simply not going to come clean vis a vis the quality of their assets; these banks were reluctant to restructure some loans even though such assets had no real commercial viability. Now, given the challenges around raising equity capital in FY12 and 1HFY13, this was an understandable (albeit unethical) tactic from the private banks. However, rather than stepping in to check the private banks from indulging in such creative accounting, the RBI has kept mum perhaps because of the fear that if public sector banks too are forced to do sensible accounting then the recapitalization that it implies will burden the Exchequer even further and, perhaps, seal the downgrade of Indias sovereign credit rating. Here is some back-of-the-envelope mathematics that gives you a sense of how meaningfully Indian banks have overstated their financial position: Loans to the Power, Roads, Commercial Real Estate, Telecom and Aviation sectors amount to over $140bn (or ~20% of system assets). Now, assume that only a quarter of these assets (or 5% of system assets) will end up being economic losses. Of the rest of the loans in the Indian economy (the other 80%), assume that only 5% will end up being economic losses due to the prolonged effects of the economic downturn. (Gross NPAs as a % of loans outstanding averaged 2-3% in the glory days of the Indian economy in FY04-07. So a doubling of that is not unreasonable given the marked slowdown of the economy.) Adding the two set of economic losses (5% + 4%) suggests that 9% of Indian banks assets have little or no economic value and hence, cannot be recovered. This, in effect, amounts to ~100% of their shareholders equity. Compare this 9% to the currently declared NPA figure for the banking system at 4% (of loans outstanding) and you get a sense of how useless the currently published financial statements of the Indian banks are. If our estimate of the proportion of loans that are dud in the Indian banking system is right (at 9%) then that implies that Indian banks Tier 1 is 5% (and not over 10% as the banking system and the RBI often claims it to be). Obviously, 5% is significantly short of the RBIs core Tier-1 requirement of 8% (under Basel-III) suggesting that we have a grossly under-capitalized banking system. With the RBI standing on the cusp of issuing new bank licenses (perhaps even to industrial houses) and thereby increasing the competitive pressure on the sector, we urge investors not only to be vigilant about Indian banks dodgy financial statements but also to step up the pressure on these banks to get their act together. How best investors can do so is detailed in our other Banks piece published today.
Strategy: The debasing of the RBI and the negative consequences for Indian banks
Strategy: The debasing of the RBI and the negative consequences for Indian banks
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