Criminal Law 1 Article 11: Justifying circumstances San Beda College of Law

Case
The United States, (plaintiffappellee) VS Jose Laurel et al., (defendantsappellants) March 15, 1912 G.R. No. L-7037

Doctrine/Article
Article 11: Justifying Circumstances Defense of person or rights. Defense of a relative. Actual danger.

Facts
On the night of December 26, 1909, while the girl Concepcion Lat was walking along the street, on her way from the house of Exequiel Castillo, situated in the pueblo of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, accompanied by several young people, she was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately thereafter ran off in the direction of his house, pursued by the girl's companions, among whom was the master of the house above mentioned, Exequiel Castillo; but they did not overtake him. On the second night after the occurrence of the kissing incident, a fight broke between Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel. Both sides gave their own version of what transpired that day: Prosecutions (Exequiel Castillos group) Version: While watching the entertainment held on the upper floor of the parochial building with Primitivo Gonzales, Exequiel was approached by his brother, Roque, who told him that Jose Laurel, through Domingo Panganiban, told him that he wants to give an explanation regarding the kissing and that Laurel was awaiting him on the ground floor. Exequiel left the parochial building accompanied by the two while they met three others. They waited for half an hour. Then the group of Jose Laurel arrived. Laurel approached him and immediately took him aside; Laurel told him that before the explanation he would ask him whether it is true that some letters addressed by him to Lat. Exequiel said that he was not obliged to answer. Suddenly, Laurel struck him with a knife a blow in the left side of his breast. He struck Laurel with a cane. Laurel dodged and ran. He then saw Vicente Garcia and Domingo Panganiban in the act of again assaulting him. He was struck by Conrado Laurel with a cane. Exequiel was able to run to a drugstore. Laurel and company were arrested. Defenses (Jose Laurels group) Version: While watching entertainment held on the upper floor of the parochial building with his cousin, Laurel was approached by Domingo Panganiban who told him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him on the ground floor and would want to hear his explanation about the kissing incident. Laurel told Panganiban to tell Castillo that the latter should wait. Thereafter Laurel was summoned twice more. On the third summon, Laurel decided to go down were he saw Exequiel Castillo with other companions. Castillo immediately took Laurel aside then asked him the reason why he kissed Concepcion Lat. Laurel said that she was very fickle and prodigal of her use of the word "yes" on all occasions and Castillo told him that he ought not to act that way and immediately struck Laurel with a cane twice. Laurel, on defense, struck with a knife Castillos left chest and ran. Castillo tried to pursue Jose Laurel but the former was struck by Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia. Trial court favored Castillo.

Issues
Which of the two first assaulted the other?

Held
By reason, therefore, of all the foregoing, we are of opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we should acquit, as we do hereby, the defendants Jose Laurel, Vicente Garcia, Conrado Laurel, and Domingo Panganiban. They have committed no crime, and we exempt them from all responsibility. The costs of both instances shall be de oficio, and the bond given in behalf of the defendants shall immediately be canceled.

Reason
Considering that the one who was aggrieved, offended, and insulted the most in the kissing incident was Exequiel Castillo, following the natural order of things, it would Castillo who would want to demand an explanation. His interest of the explanation was shown by the fact that he waited for Jose Laurel for half an hour. Thus, it is likely that it was Castillo who invited Laurel and must be the one who brought the encounter and not the other way around. Exequiel Castillo was the one who commenced the attack. It was highly unlikely for Castillo to deliver two consecutive blows to Laurel if he was already stabbed by Laurel in the chest. Laurel acted on self-defense. The elements of self defense are: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression was present when Castillo struck Laurel with two consecutive blows of cane. For the second requisite, the person making the defense cannot be expected to act coolly and to assess the situation. Laurel cannot be expected to struck Castillo in a non-vital part of the body. Also, the only weapon available for him at that time was his knife. Although Laurel provoked Castillos anger (Laurel told Castillo that Lat was fickle and prodigal of her use of the word yes) such provocation was not sufficient. Castillos reaction was not justified.

People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appelle) VS Narciso

Article 11: Justifying circumstances Defense of person or rights.

On March 21, 1926 the appellant invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery of his property. They spent the day at said fishery and in the afternoon returned in two boats, one steered by the appellant and the other by an old woman named Anastasia Penaojas. Nine persons were in the boat steered by the appellant, the great majority of whom were women and among them the appellant's wife and son and a nursing child, son of a married couple who had also gone in this boat. The deceased Juan Loquenario was another passenger in this boat. Upon reaching a place of great depth the

Whether or not appellant should be exempt from criminal liability. Whether or not appellant acted in defense of relatives

The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it

Appellant was justified in making such action to save the lives of the passengers of the boat which include his family, a nursing child, and some woman. The action of the deceased placed the lives of the passengers in peril and so the appellant believed that the only way to save their lives was to separate the deceased from the boat as the

Criminal Law 1 Article 11: Justifying circumstances San Beda College of Law
Cabungcal (defendantappellant) August 1, 1928 G.R. No. L28451 Defense of relatives and strangers. Imminent danger.
deceased rocked the boat which started it to take water, and the appellant, fearing the boat might capsize, asked the deceased not to do it. The deceased paid no attention and continued rocking the boat. The appellant struck him on the forehead with an oar. The deceased fell into the water and was submerged, but a little while after appeared on the surface having grasped the side of the boat, saying that he was going to capzise it and started to move it with this end in view, seeing which the women began to cry, whereupon the appellant struck him on the neck with the same oar, which submerged the deceased again. With the movement that the appellant made in giving him the second blow, the boat upset and then the appellant proceeded to save his passengers. In the meantime the aged Anastasia Penaojas, who steered the other boat, and who at that time was about 200 or 300 meters away, having heard the cries of the wrecked persons, quickened its speed, repaired to and arrived in time to pick up the passengers who are clinging to the side of the capsized boat, taking them later to the river bank. The appellant, after having thus saved his passengers, proceeded to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body was recovered later. CFI found appellant guilty of the crime of homicide. and strangers. was at the cost of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability. Reversing the judgment appealed from, the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de oficio. So ordered. deceased did not pay any attention to his warning. Thus, striking the deceased with an oar was he least that the appellant could have done to achieved his purpose of disabling the deceased momentarily. With respect to the second blow, the appellant was still justified as imminent danger did not cease to exist. If the appellant did not struck the deceased, the danger may be greater as many lives will perished. The recourse of taking the boat to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require sometime, whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time to arrive at the shore.

People of the Philippines (plaintiff-apellee) VS Jose Encomienda y Navarro (defendantappellant) August 18, 1972 G.R. No. L26750

Article 11: Justifying circumstances Defense of person or rights.

Appellant was a tenant of hacienda Doa Nena in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija since 1947. The land he was working was recorded in the name of his father who died in 1963. The deceased Severino Cabaral was the hacienda overseer. About one week before the incident of May 30, 1965, the deceased went to appellants house and invited him to his (victims) house and informed him that he could no longer work on the land. He did not accept the invitation. The deceased went to his house again but only his child was at home back then. On May 30, about 4:30 pm, the deceased went to appellants house again. That time appellant was cutting wood beside the stairway using a bolo. The deceased told appellant that he could no longer work on the land and he was being removed as a tenant. Appellant asked for the reason and the deceased told him that he has no right to work on the land for it was not under his name. Appellant countered that the deceased had no right to removed him because he was also a tenant just like him and only the hacienda has the right to remove him as a tenant. Deceased became angry at the appellant and with his right hand drew his revolver tucked in left side. Appellant and the deceased were about one meter apart that time. Appellant immediately grabbed the right hand of the deceased with his left hand. The deceased was forced to lean on the stairway. During their struggle, the revolver fired four times (this was corroborated by witnesses). Appellant, with a bolo in his right hand, struck the deceaseds right forearm. The deceased tried to get the gun with his left hand. Appellant boloed the deceaseds left arm. Appellant shook the deceaseds right hand which caused the gun to fall. The deceased again tried to get the gun but the appellant hacked the deceaseds forehead causing the deceased to fall backward on the stairway. The appellant retrieved the gun. The deceased slowly got up and washed his forehead with the water from the box nearby. Appellant went to the municipal building with the bolo and the gun which he surrendered to police inspector Casimiro Aguinaldo. CFI found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder.

Whether or not appellant acted in self defense.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed, the accused-appellant is hereby acquitted, and his immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered.

Three essential elements must concur for legitimate self-defense to exist, namely; (1) unlawful aggression on part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means, employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind. In the case at bar, the act of the deceased in drawing his gun placed the appellant in imminent danger. The Supreme Court ruled that if the deceased had no intention to use his gun he would have not drawn it or resisted appellants attempt to prevent him from using it. As regards the second requisite, SC ruled that appellant was not expected nor had the time to determine whether he could save himself from other means (i.e., kicking the gun). The SC further reiterated that in such cases, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. Finally, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant. On the contrary, the deceased was the one who provoked the appellant. Appellant replied but that such retort was no justification to draw the deceaseds gun.

Criminal Law 1 Article 11: Justifying circumstances San Beda College of Law
People of the Philippines (plaintiffappellee) VS Cunigunda BoholstCaballero (accusedappellant) November 25, 1974 G.R. No. L23249 Article 11: Justifying circumstances Defense of person or rights. Necessity of the means used.
Appellant and the deceased, Francisco Caballero, were married on June 7, 1956. Appellant lived with her husband in the house of her parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. Their marriage was blessed with a daughter. Appellant and her husband were frequently quarreling because her husbands gambling, drinking, and serenading. There were times that her husband maltreated and beat her. After more than a year she and her husband transferred to a house of their own, but a month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to live with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child. Sometime in November, 1957, her daughter became sick and she went to her husband and asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her away and said "I don't care if you all would die". Appellant then decided to went out caroling with her friends on the night of January 2, 1958. About 12 midnight they divided the proceeds in the house of Crispina Barabad. Before appellant could leave the vicinity, she met her husband, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left side of his body; because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife. Note: a witness (Ignacio Barabad) for the prosecution testified that the appellant called the deceased. When the latter approached her, the appellant suddenly stabbed him. Appellant surrendered to the police in the morning of January 3. CFI found appellant guilty of the crime of parricide. Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accusedappellant acted in the legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de officio. As regards the contradicting versions, the SC upheld the version of the appellant by considering the location of the wound inflicted by the appellant to her husband. The blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn was a strong indication of the appellants testimony. If it were true that the husband and wife were standing face-to-face when the wife struck the husband with a knife, then naturally, the wound would be inflicted in the front part of the body not at the back. Moreover, the three elements of self-defense were satisfied. The acts of the husband (slapping appellant in the face, pulling her hair, pushing her to the ground and strangling her) constitute unlawful aggression. The means used by the appellant was reasonable because the use of knife (of her husband) was the only means available for her to escape from her husbands strangling. Finally, appellant did not give sufficient provocation.

People of the Philippines (appellee) VS Marivic Genosa (appellant) January 15, 2004 G.R. No. 135981

Article 11: Justifying circumstances Defense of person and rights. Defense of fetus. Battered Woman Syndrome as

Criminal Law 1 Article 11: Justifying circumstances San Beda College of Law
self-defense.

People of the Philippines (plaintiffappellee) VS CIC Gilbert Peralta y Rigor (accusedappellant) January 24, 2001 G.R. No. 128116

Article 11: Justifying circumstances Defense of person or rights. Performance of duty.

Prosecutions Version Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Doriano, Danilo Gaa and Louise Rimando (deceased) were students of the Technological Institute of the Philippines and fraternity brothers in Tau Gamma Fraternity. After watching a basketball game in Pasig (July 2, 1991), the group decided to go to QC "to pick up" prostitutes. When they reached the Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, Rimando alighted from their owner type jeep that was being driven by Esguerra and talked to a gay pimp named Roberto Reyes. Rimando introduced himself as an agent of the NBI apparently to avail of a discount for the services of the prostitutes. Reyes agreed to introduce certain young girls to Rimando and proposed to pick them up in front of the Aberdeen Court Hotel. When the jeep reached the hotel. Reyes together with two (2) of the girls and another gay named Sandro Lim suddenly boarded the jeep. Reyes told Rimando, "Mamang NBI, tulungan ninyo kami. Andiyan iyong CAPCOM na nanghihingi sa amin ng pera." Upon Rimando's instructions, the jeep sped away with eight (8) persons on board. While driving along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, one of the pimps noticed that they were being followed by appellant in a taxi cab. Rimando instructed Esguerra to park the jeep in front of Dunkin Donuts at the corner of Quezon and West Avenues in Quezon City. Rimando ordered the two gays to alight from the jeep. Meanwhile, the taxi parked behind the jeep. One of the ladies also got off the jeep for fear of being arrested. The appellant who was holding a .38 caliber firearm alighted and approached Rimando who was then seated beside the driver's seat. Appellant inquired if they were policemen, but Rimando replied in the negative. Rimando stated that he was an agent of the NBI and showed the appellant his NBI Identification Card. The appellant said, "NBI ka pala" and suddenly grabbed Rimando's identification card before he shot Rimando twice in the body. Appellant went back to his taxi and left. The three (3) eyewitnesses had a clear view of appellant's face inasmuch as there was a lamppost that illuminated the area. Appellants Version While conducting police surveillance on board a taxi, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 1991, he spotted three (3) young girls sitting in front of the Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue in QC. Suspecting them to be prostitutes, he instructed the taxi driver to stop in front of the hotel. A pimp (Reyes) approached him and said, "Mama, gusto mong chicks?", then he identified himself as a police officer. Reyes then shouted to warn the girls that the appellant was a police officer. Reyes together with two (2) of the girls and another gay boarded an owner-type jeep. Appellant went back to the taxi and followed the jeep to effect an arrest. When the jeep stopped, he alighted from the taxi and approached its passengers. After identifying himself as a police officer, Rimando arrogantly introduced himself by saying "E, ano kung pulis ka, NBI naman ako." Appellant showed his identification card to Rimando but the latter asked him what he wanted from them. Appellant replied, "Pare, wala naman iyon," and informed Rimando that the girls inside the jeep were subject to arrest. The hot-tempered Rimando insisted that the ladies were the girlfriends of his companions. Their heated discussion lasted for about two (2) to three (3) minutes. The girls jumped off the jeep after hearing that the, appellant

Whether or not appellant acted in performance of a duty. Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 is hereby MODIFIED in that the appellant is GUILTY only, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code; and the sentence imposed on the appellant is hereby reduced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law; and the appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim., Louise Rimando, the sum of P26,900.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Elements of self-defense were not sufficiently proved. The appellants claim that his forearm was held by the deceased and even attempted to grabbed his gun was not treated as believable by the SC. There were no signs of injuries on the hands of the victim. Also, the claim that the deceased was shot by the appellant while the former was seated beside the drivers seat was proven by the medical findings. The act of firing twice was inconsistent with the idea of accidentally firing his service firearm. Appellants claim that the shooting happened while he is performing an official duty cannot be entertained. SC rules that for such defense to prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) The accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; (2) That the injury caused or the offense committed should be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. Both requisites were absent in the case at bar. Appellant was not in the performance of official duty at that time because the girls he claims he was attempting to arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his presence. The only person he was authorized to arrest was Roberto Reyes because he offered him (appellant) services of a prostitute. Finally, the injuries committed by him were not necessary consequences of his performance of duty. His duty was to arrest the female suspects and not to shoot the victim to death.

Criminal Law 1 Article 11: Justifying circumstances San Beda College of Law
was going to arrest them. Appellant tried to pursue them but Rimando grabbed appellant's right forearm and held appellant's .38 caliber gun. However, the appellant maintained his hold of the gun with both of his hands. As the companions, of Rimando were already approaching, appellant accidentally pressed the trigger twice. After the gun went off, appellant took cover behind a concrete post. After the jeep had left toward the south, appellant proceeded to his headquarters and reported the incident to the Officer-in-Charge of the Intelligence Investigation Unit, Dante Yan. RTC convicted appellant with the crime of murder.

People of the Philippine Islands (plaintiffappellee) VS Felipe Delima (defendantappellant) December 22, 1922 G.R. No. L18660

Article 11: Justifying circumstances Performance of a duty.

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. This peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. CFI found appellant guilty of the crime of homicide.

Whether or not the killing was done in the performance of a duty.

Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.