Assessing 2010 Elections Automation in the Philippines

December 21, 2009

Please email to business.intelligence@psagroup.com for any inquiries about this article/report. http://www1.psagroup.com/psacms_kc_ph.nsf/Published.Pages.ByKey/RCAA-83V9GR SETTING THE STAGE The importance for the 2010 Philippines national elections to push through without controversy cannot be overstated. Indeed, the upcoming elections are a pressure-filled opportunity for the country to prove that it can effectively, democratically, and peacefully transition power. The bid to automate the 2010 elections increases this pressure significantly and adds strain to a country that has historically experienced elections mismanagement, corruption, and fraud. Several of the countrys most recognized and well-placed politicians from both sides of the aisle have expressed their concerns and doubts over the Commission on Elections (Comelec) pursuit of poll automation: Opposition Senator and Chair of the Joint Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System (AES) Francis "Chiz" Escudero has highlighted the fact that the vendor has failed to answer critical questions on issues such as transmission facilities, mapping, and the allocation of machines and resources to the voting precincts. Escudero also pointed out the absence of a master plan and non-disclosure of contract specifics, including the release of funds. Staunch Arroyo administration ally and Quezon City Representative Danilo Suarez recently admitted that the bid for automation might cause a failure of elections. Suarez suggested that the automated election should cover only parts of the country with adequate Internet access, electricity, and accessible roads. Arroyo-critic and Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio asserted that the technology to be used is largely untested and that Comelec violated provisions of the Republic Act 9369 that stated that the technology should be pilot-tested first in highly urbanized areas and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Casino also stressed that the lack of confidence in the present administration is fuelling speculation that President Arroyo and her supporters may use the failure of poll automation to perpetuate themselves in power. Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile told a joint congressional hearing on poll automation that there would be chaos in the Philippines if there are no elections in 2010. Enrile went on to suggest that there would be a revolution or social explosion of some sort if the voice of the people is not heard.

There are also numerous independent analysts and watchdogs who have reached the conclusion that there are simply too many potential human, procedural, and/or technical breakdowns that could lead to a major disruption or, most drastically, a complete failure of the May 2010 elections. This could result in a constitutional crisis of unprecedented proportions and major political instability that would drastically worsen the overall risk climate of the Philippines. Clearly, these conditions would be devastating for a country desperately trying to elevate its socio-economic status, attract foreign investment, and prove to the rest of the world that it is dedicated to democracy and the rule of law. Adding fuel to the fire, there is no official record of any country in the world transitioning completely from a pure manual to full automated elections system in one electoral exercise. This assessment aims to provide a simplified and fundamental understanding of the many risks and vulnerabilities leading up to the planned implementation of the AES for the May 2010 elections. As with any major systems integration; there are three major elements that must be evaluated and aligned to ensure a seamless implementation: (1) technology, (2) process, and (3) people. This assessment

leverages that user-friendly framework of analysis to highlight the multiple anomalies and deficiencies associated with the Philippines AES. RISKS OVERVIEW Category Description Bidding and awarding of the automation contract to Smartmatic-TIM was shrouded in controversy with Bid evaluation process Smartmatic failing to disclose previous contracts and past performance indicators as required by Comelec. Smartmatics relationship with Hugo Chavezs Venezuelan Government has been called into question. Days before the Vendor / consortium bid award, TIM tried to back out of the partnership with credibility Smartmatic suggesting major differences between the foreign and domestic companies. Smartmatic announced after contract award that it would shift its manufacturing of the machines from Taiwan to Voting machine China. Consortium failed to meet its commitment to deliver production / delivery the first batch of 42,000 PCOS machines by December 2009. Despite positive pronouncements from Comelec, there were ARMM elections as a major problems during the 2008 ARMM elections which precedent utilized a very similar technology to that being used in May 2010. No evidence that Comelec or Smartmatic-TIM have Systems verification subjected the physical components of the voting systems or the production models for independent review. Machine ability to run on battery has been called into Machine testing question after the machine broke down and started smoking during preliminary tests. Comelec has not released the standards against which the Source code testing source code should be tested. US vendor faces conflict of interest to verify and approve source code for May 2010. Software will be placed on external memory disk or flash Separate memory drive complicating the voting system functionality and cards opening up opportunities for damage, tampering, and alteration. Nationwide power/electricity shortages and black outs could come into play on Election Day; particularly in remote areas. Infrastructure Lack of data transmission availability via wired, wireless, and satellite could impact communication of precinct votes. By possessing the private keys, Smartmatic and its Public / private keys associated parties can make changes to the precinct election results without detection. Canvassing (municipal, provincial, and national) takes the Target of process most time and is the target phase of wholesale cheating. Instead, Comelec chose to automate precinct counting that automation actually detracts from transparency. Contract signing, general voting instructions, continuity, contingency, auditing plans, machine delivery all either still Project planning / unavailable or were delayed. Smartmatic expected to deliver management a flawless project under a miraculously tight budget within an incredibly tight timeframe. Delivery of 82,200 counting machines across the 7,100 islands that comprise the Philippines archipelago before May Logistics 2010 would be a near impossible challenge even for a developed country. Smartmatics dependence on local logistics subcontractors also problematic. Risk

Bidding & Vendor Selection

TECHNOLOGY

PROCESS

The Ballot

Teachers

PEOPLE

Technology specialists

Voters

Approximately 1,630 different ballots. Sheer length of the ballot, erroneous marking, smudges, and poor calibration / alignment could all cause machine rejection of the ballot. Low compensation, more complex and technical system, overall higher expectations, and anxiety over a failed election are causing Comelec difficulty in finding 400,000 qualified teacher volunteers to administer the elections. Smartmatic-TIM experiencing major trouble finding and hiring the number of technology specialists needed to support the AES. Due to precinct clustering, three out of four voters will be forced to identify and travel to new precincts; resulting in voter disenfranchisement. Also, Comelec has failed to make major progress to cleanse the voters list.

BIDDING & VENDOR SELECTION In the beginning, Comelec had the opportunity to conduct an impartial and orderly review of each bid. Instead of developing a well-structured Terms of Reference (TOR) or Request for Proposal (RFP) in advance of the bid submission deadline, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC) published 25 bid bulletins or requirements changes just days before bids were due. To avoid a unified outcry by the seven bidding firms, Comelec agreed to extend the bid submission deadline by one week. A completely chaotic bid evaluation process ensued where ultimately all seven of the bidders were disqualified. More disturbing, the SBACs rationale for disqualification was never consistently or effectively communicated to the expelled firms. Upon consultation with the Comelec Advisory Council, some of the bidders were permitted to re-enter the bidding process, sparking an erratic and prolonged process of disqualification and reconsideration. While Comelec has promoted the process as transparent and efficient, meaningful review and oversight by the press and legitimate third parties was restricted. After over a month of heated bid evaluation, on June 3 the SBAC recommended to Comelec that the consortium of Smartmatic-Total Information Management (TIM) be sanctioned to lead the Philippines elections automation project. Smartmatic-TIMs bid was PhP7.19 billion (US$152 million); approximately PhP4 billion (US$84.47 million) lower than Comelecs publicized budget. On July 10, 2009, Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM finalized and signed an official automation contract for the conduct of the 2010 Philippines elections. Besides submitting an outrageously low bid by any reasonable standard, there are many questions surrounding the winning firm and whether or not Comelec and the SBAC performed the proper level of due diligence. Among them, from a contractual perspective, competitors and independent analysts claim that Smartmatic failed to provide authentic and original copies of previous client contracts that prove its competency and qualification to handle elections similar in size and scope to that of the 2010 Philippines national elections. There were also critical components of the submitted past Smartmatic contract completely redacted or blacked out including the names of the parties and the purpose of the contract. These issues were never adequately propounded by the SBAC, nor were they addressed by Smartmatic. Many knowledgeable observers found the flawed Comelec process to be tantamount to a conspiracy of obfuscation couched in highly technical language that prevented most laymen from fully grasping the nuances of the process or its many shortcomings and failures. There are other questionable details surrounding share ownership of Smartmatic and its relationship with the widely believed election-rigging Venezuela Government that were never fully assessed leading up to the SBACs recommendation. Also worth considering is that fact that local Philippines partner TIM tried to back out of the contract with foreign-owned Smartmatic just days before Comelec was making its final determination of contract award. Critical analysts assert that the sudden rift shows that there is no genuine unity of purpose among the winning consortium.

TECHNOLOGY The esoteric language and numerous acronyms that characterize the voting industry and its technology add unnecessary degrees of complexity for the average voter. For the purposes of this analysis, one need only know that an optical mark reader (OMR) allows a voter to record votes by making marks directly on the ballot which are then input into a machine for counting. More specifically, a precinct count optical scan (PCOS) a variation of OMR technology tabulates those ballots at the polling place and automatically sends results electronically to Comelec. According to the agreement between Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, there will be 82,200 PCOS machines built and deployed throughout the Philippines for the May 2010 elections. Originally, Smartmatic purchased a Taiwanese company just two weeks before it submitted its bid to manufacture the machines in Taiwan. In November, Smartmatic announced suddenly that it would shift its manufacturing of the machines from Taiwan to China. Under the Smartmatic-TIM AES, voters will shade ovals opposite pre-printed names of candidates on specially printed ballots and feed them into voting machines for scanning of ballot images. The poll machines will then count the votes and transmit results electronically from polling precincts to Comelec servers located in Metro Manila for consolidation. Ballots are stored in a box under the machines while the results are automatically transmitted. At the end of the voting, the machines will also print copies of the election returns, some of which will be provided to various elections monitors and political parties at the precincts. In the 2008 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections, one of the two different technologies utilized by Comelec was Counting Center Optical Scan (CCOS), a system which also uses OMR technology and is very similar to PCOS. While Comelec has maintained that the ARMM elections were a huge success and set a positive precedent, others insist that there were multiple problems with the system that could have unduly influenced the outcome including; inadequate infrastructure and facilities, equipment malfunctioning, tampering or tainting of ballots, and poor training of staff and monitors. Many predict that the problems in the ARMM elections are a probable prelude to a much worse situation in May 2010. PCOS Machine Testing The Philippines automated elections law mandates that Comelec conducts systems verification prior to the elections. To date, there is no evidence that Comelec or Smartmatic-TIM have subjected the physical components of the voting systems or the production models for independent review. During the end-to-end testing process conducted early on by the SBAC technical working group (TWG), the Smartmatic system failed to run on battery power for the required 12 hours and began smoking after seven hours. The machine would not accept ballots after the incident, but still it was never subject to any independent testing to determine the cause of the failure. Since then, Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM have claimed 100% accuracy in tests, but all of these have been conducted in controlled and well air-conditioned settings. There has been little, if any, testing carried out in atmospheres that more realistically reflect the tropical and un- air conditioned environments found in the majority of Philippines provinces. Source Code Testing Proprietary software that will run the PCOS machines will count the votes in May 2010. On that basis, without proper verification and security in place, it is possible for the group that best understands the software to manipulate it and rig the results of the May 2010 elections. Source code refers to the underlying, human-readable instructions that make up any software program. The source code is being leased to Smartmatic-TIM by a Canadian-owned company known as Dominion. Smartmatic was able to acquire an exclusive license to use Dominions source code for the Philippines 2010 elections (the contract between Smartmatic and Dominion is not publicly available). Smartmatic is

rolling out a variation of Dominions ImageCast technology that is being customized to fit Comelec requirements and without several components. Due to the technical changes, Smartmatic changed the name of the system to SAES 1800. Last October 13, Comelec officially turned over the review of the source code to a company known as SysTest Labs. SysTest is one of several certification labs or Independent Testing Authorities (ITA) in the US. Based in Denver, Colorado, SysTest is charged with testing the systems security, telecommunications, error notification, auditing, and recovery, as well as its functions under various load and stress situations. Theoretically, each module of the source code will be assessed and checked against industry standards. The timetable shows that SysTest will have less than 5 months to undertake the examination and must submit its report on February 6. In the US, an agency known as the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) certifies that elections systems meet specified standards and these standards are widely distributed and debated before being finalized. To date, there is no evidence that Comelec has designed or approved such standards; begging the question what standards is SysTest using to review the Smartmatic source code and if there are standards, who designed them? Indeed, testing without defined and publicly available standards leaves the process wide open to fraudulence and is essentially worthless. The credibility of SysTest has also been called into question having previously been suspended by the EAC for failing to be accredited and certified by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). There also might be some lingering conflicts of interests for SysTest as Dominion already uses the accreditation company to certify the ImageCast against New York State standards. As Dominion prepares to market its products across the US, the company will undoubtedly require extensive state-tostate certification a job that will likely fall to SysTest. Thus, SysTest stands to benefit financially if the SAES 1800 technology and the ImageCast pass verification so they can be marketed across the US and the rest of the world. Separate Memory Cards Increasing the vulnerability of the AES software, the newer model of Smartmatic-TIMs machine no longer houses the software on the hard drive of the actual machine; rather the software will be placed on separate memory cards. These separate memory cards will be managed independently from the machines and must be actually inserted into the machine prior to utilization. Clearly, placing the software on an external memory disk or flash drive complicates the voting system functionality and opens up opportunities for damage, tampering, and alteration. Infrastructure An October 2008 post-election Report on the Advisory Council on the Use of an Automated Election System in the 2008 ARMM Elections stated that, the existing IT infrastructure in Comelec is inadequate to meet the complexities of an automated elections process. Indeed, there are several critical infrastructure problems that are threatening to interrupt the entire 2010 elections process. Already, there are rotating blackouts in the Visayas and Mindanao as a result of deficient power supply and the demand for power on Election Day will certainly challenge the power levels throughout the country. While the state-owned National Power Corporation has supposedly devised a contingency plan to deal with power outages in next years elections, valid doubts persist. The plan, which has been submitted to the Department of Energy and Comelec, will require a few megawatts of mobile capacity which can be moved from one area to another. In the absence of adequate power, Comelec will rely on batteries. Yet, machines depending on battery power crashed during early trial phases and many analysts question the claim that each battery has the appropriate 12 to 16-hour lifespan. Electronic transmission service availability is another major infrastructure concern. Originally, Comelec mandated that the vendor must maintain greater than 99% data availability and that the service be available from 3PM on Election Day to 3PM the following day or until all election results have been transmitted. This service, says Comelec, should cover 100% of all clustered precincts by utilizing wireless, wired, or satellite-based connection or a combination thereof. Smartmatic-TIM contends that

they have started testing mobile phone networks of telecommunication firms Smart and Globe to determine their reliability. If mobile phone signals are found to be weak or failing in various areas; satellite links would be installed to ensure the immediate transmission of election results. If anyone has ever used a cell phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), or the Internet in the Philippines, then he or she realizes that data service availability is frequently inconsistent. Furthermore, there is nothing in the ComelecSmartmatic-TIM contract that mandates the provisioning of satellite bandwidth. Analysts agree that while 99% data availability was a necessary requirement for Comelec to issue during the bidding process as it would help ease public concern over the transmission of election results; it is nearly impossible for Smartmatic-TIM or any other vendor to achieve in a consecutive 24-hour period under current Philippines infrastructure conditions. Private and Public Keys A public key infrastructure (PKI) enables users of a basically unsecure public network, such as the Internet, to securely and privately exchange data through the use of a public and a private cryptographic key pair that is acquired and shared through a trusted authority. Comelec bid bulletin #10 directs Smartmatic-TIM to generate private and public keys of all Board of Elections Inspectors (BEI) and Board of Canvassers (BOC) personnel the individuals responsible for communicating the precinct results. Unfortunately, in the proposed system, the private key is not private. After collation of votes, the BEI will seal its tally with a digital signature using private keys before transmitting the results. Regrettably, as it stands now, Smartmatic will have possession of the secret and the public keys of all BEI. In essence, the digital signatures would be generated and assigned by Smartmatic and or groups authorized by it; not an independent or trusted authority. By possessing the private keys, Smartmatic and its associated parties can make changes to the precinct election results without detection. PROCESS Well-engineered processes must accompany every technology implementation. The central processfocused argument against Comelecs entire approach to elections automation is that it is automating entirely the wrong process. Historically, canvassing (municipal, provincial, national) takes the most time and is the target phase of wholesale cheating. Allegations of fraud and cheating typically occur during canvassing when the tally sheets at the municipal or provincial level are doctored by some local officials to favor certain candidates. The Tagalog term DAGDAG-BAWAS (rough translation: add-subtract) is another common cheating tactic during canvassing and simply means that numbers are manipulated by adding digits to the preferred candidate and at the same time subtracting digits from the actual votes tallied or from another candidate. Many analysts assert that canvassing phase should have been the target of automation. Instead, Comelec chose to automate precinct counting whereby the process loses transparency, counting will be hidden from the public view, and automated cheating becomes a real possibility. There are multiple other process-oriented shortfalls. Project Planning / Management Project planning and management is a core process based on three interrelated components: schedule, cost, and quality. It is widely known in the project management profession that changes to any one of these components will likely result in changes to the others. For example, if functionality is added to a technology system to enhance its quality, there will likely be delays in the project schedule and increases to the project cost. Similarly, if the project schedule is accelerated, the project will likely require more resources to get the job done faster, thus increasing project costs and would be more susceptible to quality degradation. Simply, Comelecs project management does not adhere to globally accepted industry best practices in implementing a massive nationwide technology project. Any schedule delay puts the entire project in jeopardy and there have already been many. The contract signing alone delayed the vendor by six weeks. To date, general voting instructions, continuity, contingency, auditing plans are all either still unavailable or were delayed. Comelec earlier said the training of teachers and other support staff would be held in November 2009, but postponed it to February 2010. The latest advisory from Comelec rescheduled the exercise to March or April 2010.

Additionally, the automation consortium will fail to meet its commitment to deliver the first batch of 42,000 PCOS machines by December 2009. Comelec admitted that the team deployed to inspect the ongoing manufacturing of the machines in Shanghai, China revealed that Smartmatic-TIM could probably only deliver around 30,000 machines by the end of December 2009 and the other 12,000 in January 2010. The consortium gave as reasons for the delay the heavy sea traffic and the high shipping cost during the holidays. This excuse is highly questionable as manufacturers traditionally ship holiday goods far in advance of Christmas to ensure their availability to consumers in November when shopping begins. Additionally, by all accounts there is a surplus of unused freighters and container ships sitting idly at anchor off ports like Shanghai waiting for the global recession to subside. Finally, the Smartmatic-TIM claim of prohibitively higher shipping costs would also indicate little slack in the project budget to complete the project if time is running out. Logistics Even if Smartmatics technology was perfect, the logistical requirements are in and of themselves a nightmare for even the most competent elections systems provider. These logistical tasks involve the delivery of the 82,200 counting machines across the 7,100 islands that comprise the Philippines archipelago before May 2010. At the hearing of the constitutional amendments and electoral reforms committee in the Senate, Comelec officials were criticized for leaving most of the decisions about logistics and communication facilities to the consortium of Smartmatic-TIM. Of course, Smartmatic turned to subcontractors to coordinate logistics. During a June 23 congressional hearing, Comelec revealed that Smartmatic would use the firm 2Go to store and deploy the counting machines to be used on Election Day. Owned by the powerful Aboitiz family who is well-connected with President Arroyo and First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, 2Go is a nationwide courier firm with facilities across the country. After review of the logistics requirements, however, 2Go backed out of the arrangement. Now Smartmatic is negotiating with local logistics providers to facilitate the storage and delivery of the hardware. There has been little publicized on Smartmatics success to contract these parties and one must question if all the proper due diligence has been conducted before each local company is trusted to control and monitor voting machine storage and distribution. The Ballot Since the May 2010 elections will include candidates down to municipal and city positions, there will be approximately 1,630 different ballots. Clearly, any misprinting of these ballots including errors and omissions will confuse voters and provide parties significant reason for protest. Furthermore, the ballot is expected to be approximately 30 inches in length; depending on the total number of candidates. The unconventional length was never tested by the SBAC and there is still much uncertainty over whether or not the PCOS will be able to effectively process that many ballots at that length in the time allotted; especially for the more crowded voting precincts. The unwieldy nature of the ballot also does not provide adequate degree of privacy during voting and can easily jam the PCOS. There were also accusations during the original machine testing that ink on the ballots bled through to the opposite side, partially obscuring the candidate names listed on the other side. Erroneous marking, smudges, poor calibration/alignment could cause rejection of the ballot. Since no replacement ballot would be given, this could result in major disenfranchisement of the voter. PEOPLE Even first-class technology and optimized processes require human management, oversight, and, when something inevitably goes wrong, troubleshooting. There are many people involved in the conduct of these automated elections and none of them appear to completely understand their roles and responsibilities or have the necessary training to conduct their jobs effectively.

Teachers Public school teachers across the Philippines are being called on to tackle the arduous task of administering the vote on Election Day 2010. Public school teachers serve as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and the Board of Election Canvassers (BEC) the duties and responsibilities of which have nothing to do with their role as teachers. While using teachers to facilitate and manage the voting process is common for democracies across the world, the 2010 Philippines national elections are shaping up to offer a unique set of risks and challenges for the educators. In the past, prior to Election Day, teachers attend instructional briefings by Comelec to familiarize themselves with the elections processes. On the actual Election Day, independent poll watchers accompany the teachers to pick up all voting materials and bring them to the voting site usually a school or community center. Typically, there are three teachers that comprise the BEI for each precinct. Voting starts at 7:00AM and there are no official lunch breaks. When the voting ends at 3:00PM, the teachers must count the ballots and then physically bring the official election returns and ballot box to the local Comelec office leaving the teachers vulnerable to threats and intimidation. Theoretically, poll automation is expected to streamline the process and lesson the workload of the teachers as they are no longer expected to manually count and deliver the results by hand because the automated polls will send the results to Comelec headquarters online. In fact, Comelec is estimating that the required number of teachers for the 2010 elections is approximately 400,000 almost half of the 750,000 teachers that have served at voting precincts in the past. The planned reduction in staff in 2010 is a byproduct of the clustering of precincts from 250,000 nationwide to only 80,000. Each clustered precinct will still be manned by three public school teacher BEIs. While all this appears to be good news for teachers and voting administration in general, automating the elections will now require the teachers to fully understand the PCOS technology so they can assist the largely non-technical voting public and troubleshoot a wide-range of potential technical glitches and problems. While Comelec claims that teacher training and demos have begun in select areas, critics question how that is possible when the voting machines have not yet been built or delivered. Moreover, in the provincial Philippines, few people including school teachers have even a basic understanding of technology systems and or how to use computers. For their hard work and trouble, the teachers are each paid a small honorarium of PhP1,000 (US$21) per day. The low compensation, more complex system, overall higher expectations, and anxiety over a failed election have some teachers up in arms and asking to be excluded. The 25,000-strong Teachers Dignity Coalition (TDC) has urged lawmakers to amend the Omnibus Election Code to make rendering poll duties voluntary for teachers. The bill has been filed in the Senate, but with Congress soon adjourning, analysts are highly doubtful that it will ever pass. Some teachers in Sulu and parts of Western Mindanao have also threatened to boycott the May 2010 elections if the government cannot guarantee appropriate security. This is especially true in remote areas where rogue groups and private armies command more of the security situation than the government. Fears worsened with the recent kidnapping and beheading of Gabriel Canizares, the school head of the Kanagi Elementary School in Patikul, Sulu. Since the start of the year, at least nine teachers have been kidnapped in Sulu and other parts of Western Mindanao. The Teachers Organization of the Philippines Public Sector (TOPPS) said the abduction of teachers in Mindanao is a disturbing trend that highlights the risks that all school teachers face on a daily basis. Technology Specialists Technology specialists will be required to help administer and operate the 82,000 PCOS machines. Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM claim that many of these employees will be deployed in the field and others will be stationed in a special call center to respond to technical questions. Allegedly, Comelec and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) are also training 500 technology experts for the BEI. The poll body has mandated that at least one member of the BEI should have technology knowledge and training on how to handle PCOS machines. Comelec has also claimed that the agency has coordinated with the local IT industry for its personnel requirements and is planning to field 100 IT experts to various

municipalities and cities to supervise the poll proceedings. In a country that has a major shortage of technology professionals that can barely support the still budding Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry, analysts and observers are doubting that Smartmatic-TIM will be able to find and hire the number of technology specialists needed to support the AES. Voters An estimated 48 million voters are expected to vote in the May 2010 elections. As stated, there were 250,000 precincts nationwide of 200-300 voters per precinct. For 2010, these will be re-clustered to only 80,000 precincts so roughly one out of four voters will vote in the same facility as he or she has traditionally voted. Three out of four will be forced to identify and travel to new precincts. The situation could very well result in major voter inconvenience and disenfranchisement. Comelec also claims that it will cleanse the voters list by December. The Institute for Political and Electoral Reform recently revealed 691 voters registers in Taguig City who were strangely all born in 1901.Local Comelec officials explained that this might be due to the computer default, where registrants, who failed to write down their actual birth dates, are registered under the computer's default birth date of January 1, 1901. Other anomalies are a result of erroneous encoding. To date, Comelecs only real solution to voter list cleansing has been to define what constitutes an invalid name. First, the voter name is invalid if he or she is already dead. Second, a voter is de-activated when he or she did not exercise his or her right to vote for two consecutive elections. Third, a voter is excluded by the court because he or she is not qualified, convicted of a crime, or not a resident of that municipality. A polluted voters list has historically been a major cause of concern in Philippines elections and is one that cannot be alleviated by automation. CONCLUSIONS The most rational argument against the bid to automate the 2010 elections is that the Philippines Government and Comelec simply do not have the capability or knowledge to manage such a major technology project. Phrased another way, the government does not have a full grasp on exactly what is being outsourced so they have no way to determine if the automation consortium is getting the job done. Clearly, the more Smartmatic-TIM relinquishes control to third parties that stood outside of the official evaluation process, the higher the risk of something major going wrong. Proving institutional difficulties and widespread ineptitude, the Philippines Government has a deplorable track record implementing technology projects. An independent study on government ICT and telecommunications projects concluded that government agencies lack coordination and the infrastructure to deliver services to the public. Moreover, the study revealed that legal problems, technical issues, equipment dysfunction, and poor financial management impact the vast majority of Philippines Government technology implementation attempts. The preliminary results of the study compelled the researchers to identify and track specific government technology projects and assign various completion or success levels. This analysis resulted in a disturbing number of Level 3 technology projects which indicates that the work has been suspended or is incomplete; that the project requires an audit; that the system was never operationalized or implemented; that the benefits were never realized; and that the project requires a closure strategy. The following table captures several of the most noteworthy Level 3 projects attempted by the Philippines Government. It is important to note that most of these projects cost less than the AES which would imply a more modest and manageable scope of work. If the below projects are considered failures expect the same from the much more complex automated elections in May 2010.

LEVEL 3 PHILIPPINES GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS Agency Cost Start Date Comelec PhP1.3 billion n/a (US$28.26 million) Land Titling Land Registration Authority (LRA) PhP4.1 billion 2000 Computerization (US$89.13 million) Machine Readable Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) PhP2.5 billion 2002 Passport Visa (US$54.34 million) National Crime National Computer Center (NCC) PhP200 million n/a System (US$4.34 million) Emergency Department of Interior and Local PhP90 million 2004 Network Philippines Government (DILG) (US$1.95 million) PCs for Public High Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) PhP584 million 2004 Schools (US$12.69 million) GMDSS Commission on Information and PhP781.4 million n/a Communications Technology (CICT) (US$16.98 million) NTP I-1 and RTDP Department of Transportation and PhP22 billion n/a (Digitel) Communication (DOTC) (US$478.26 million) TSB II CICT PhP1.57 billion 1998 (US$34.13 million) Philippines Admin Office Press Secretary-Philippines PhP75 million 2004 Network Information Agency (PIA) (US$1.63 million) PhilSat DOTC PhP1 billion 1994 (US$21.74 million) Project Comelec- ACM

Level 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3

It begs the question, If the Philippines Government has proven a complete inability to carry out major projects, what are the chances that the AES a massive, nationwide technology implementation that must be conducted flawlessly under a tight timeline with the entire country watching is conducted and implemented successfully? More troubling, Comelec specifically has a reputation for being mismanaged and lacking transparency. Less than four months from elections day in 2004, the Supreme Court declared an elections automation contract void with Mega Pacific consortium. It was later discovered that the bid was rigged and the company did not participate in the actual bidding. The company did not even come close to meeting the eligibility requirements. The computer hardware and software also failed to pass tests at the time of the award. Mega Pacific has refused to pay back the government for the contract award despite a complete failure to deliver. Transparency and rigor at every stage of the automation testing and accreditation process is critical for the proper conduct of the Philippines 2010 elections and Comelec must demonstrate a dedication to proper management and oversight. Yet to date, there is no substantive evidence of proper controls to limit the kind of inappropriate behavior that could ultimately call the automated system or entire elections into question. Elections losers and others who do not get their way will definitely be the first ones to look back, suggest impropriety, and make noise about illegitimate elections. These kinds of holes make their job easy. While the Philippines Government and Comelec continue to guarantee a successful automated election in 2010, there are very real consequences if the automated elections in May fail to deliver credible returns. The Omnibus Election Code stipulates that after a party submits a valid petition or protest, the Comelec shall call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in a failure to elect. The Code states that the election should occur not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. After any vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President, the Philippines Constitution empowers Congress to convene within seven days to enact a law calling for a special election to elect a

President and a Vice-President. This election should be held within 45-60 days from the time Congress makes its decision. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. It is important to note that there is no specific constitutional provision that addresses a complete failure of elections. Just like the offices of the President and Vice President, however, the sitting Congress remains in place until June 30, 2010 and would be expected to determine the path forward. Complicating the matter, all of the House seats and half of the Senate seats are to be elected in May so political posturing between May 10 and June 30 is a guarantee. Senator Escudero has proposed that Congress convene five days before June 30, 2010 to select a transition president in case there is a failure of elections. Others are recommending that Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno be designated by law as acting president in case of elections failure. Acknowledging the countrys history of political controversy and still immature democratic institutions, analysts question if the Philippines can endure this kind of advanced political process. Indeed, with so much in stake in 2010, any initial failure of elections could provoke political passions to the point of constitutional crisis and chaos. The wild card in all this is how sitting President Gloria Arroyo will react to elections failure. Arroyo critics suggest that some pro-administration congressmen in the lower House would obstruct congressional proceedings to determine the interim leader so she could stay in office. More dramatically, Arroyo could exploit any perceived malfunction in the automated election to invalidate the results. This is especially true if Arroyo does not see things going her way and the opposition is well-positioned to win. If she still commands the support of the military and police, Arroyo could use the elections failure as pretext to declare martial law, or at the very least a state of emergency, to arm her government additional powers against opposition members. This remains a most drastic scenario, but in Philippines politics anything is possible. Elections in the country are typically full of irregularities a reality that has seemingly been accepted by Filipinos. Misdeeds including fraud, vote-buying, ballot switching, top down cheating schemes, and both valid and unfounded protests over results are hard-wired into the Philippine elections system and voter psyche. It is doubtful that even the best AES could fully reverse these dynamics.

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