Acebedo Optical Co.

Inc VS CA Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

G R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS 236 SCRA 197 . Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the

solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose? Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993,

it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid HELD: No Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Mayor Lim signed into law City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short-time admission, short-time admission rates, and wash-up rate schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses, and similar establishments in the city of manila. White Light Corporation and other operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila complained that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; an invalid exercise of police power; and an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. On the other hand, the City of Manila argued that the Ordinance is a valid police power measure. It asserts that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila. Thus, it became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Is Ordinance No. 7774 constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the

businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. (visit fellester.blogspot.com) Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. (White Light Corp. vs. City of ManilaG.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)

Notes: In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila (1967) upheld the validity a City Ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance that sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. xxx The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy (6) must not be unreasonable.

MMDA VS TRACKWORKS
This case concerns whether the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) could unilaterally dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT3) installed by respondent advertising company by virtue of its existing contract with the owner of the MRT3. The trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authority to dismantle. MMDA is now before the Court to assail such adverse ruling. Antecedents In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income therefrom, viz:
16.1. Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby confirms and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop commercial premises in the Depot and the air space above the Stations, which shall be allowed to such height as is legally and technically feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease interests or assign such interests in the Depot and such air space and (c) obtain any advertising income from the Depot and such air space and LRTS Phase I.

LRTS Phase I means the rail transport system comprising about 16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue, Pasay City, to North Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the center of EDSA approximately 10.5 meters wide (approximately 12 meters wide at or around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and Buendia Stations), plus about 0.1 to 0.2 line kilometers extending from the North Avenue Station to the Depot, together with the Stations, 73 Light Rail Vehicles and all ancillary plant, equipment and facilities, as more particularly detailed in the Specifications. 16.2. Assignment of Rights. During the Development Rights Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any of its rights, titles and interests in the Development Rights to bona fide real estate developers. In this connection, Metro Rail may enter into such development, lease, sub-lease or other agreements or contracts relating to the Depot and the air space above the Stations (the space not needed for all or any portion of the operation of the LRTS) for all or any portion of the Development Rights Period.

In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement. On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil Case No. 68864.

On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA from dismantling or destroying Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertizing media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the same purpose. Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTCs issuances, MMDA brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70932, but the CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC on August 31, 2004. The CA ultimately denied MMDAs motion for reconsideration through its resolution issued on March 14, 2005. Thence, MMDA appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 167514), which denied MMDAs petition for review on October 25, 2005.1[1] Ruling of the RTC In the meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, the RTC (Branch 155) rendered its decision permanently enjoining MMDA from dismantling, removing or destroying the billboards, signages and other advertizing media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.2[2] Ruling of the CA

MMDA appealed the RTCs decision to the CA.

On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDAs appeal,3[3] holding that Trackworks right to install billboards, signages and other advertizing media on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3 must be protected by a writ of permanent injunction; and that MMDA had no power to dismantle, remove or destroy Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertizing media.4[4] MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion for reconsideration on September 3, 2007.5[5] Hence, this appeal by petition for review. Issues MMDA claims that its mandate under its charter6[6] of formulating, coordinating and monitoring of policies, standards, progress and projects for the use of thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenient movement of

persons and goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which reads in part:
h. ) It is unlawful for any person/s, private or public corporations, advertising and promotions companies, movie producers, professionals and service contractors to post, install, display any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, professional service advertisements and other visual clutters in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees parks and open space.

MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) into the carriageway of the MRT3 line did not exempt the EDSA center island from the coverage of the MMDA regulation;7[7] that the Governments grant of development rights to MRTC was not an abdication of its right to regulate, and, therefore, the development of the MRT3 remained subject to all existing and applicable national and local laws, ordinances, rules and regulations;8[8] that MMDA was merely implementing existing and applicable laws;9[9] that Trackworks advertising materials were placed indiscriminately and without due regard to safety, and as such might be classified as obstructions and distractions to the motorists traversing EDSA;10[10] and that the interests of a few

should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose safety and general welfare MMDA was mandated to protect.11[11] Trackworks maintains, on the other hand, that MMDAs petition was defective for its failure to raise any genuine question of law; and that the CAs decision dated April 30, 2007 was valid and correct.12[12] Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit.

That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the

former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,13[13] this Court expressly recognized Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected. It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14[14] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,15[15] and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,16[16] the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and

administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.17[17] Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx. The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters.18[18]

The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly,

MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition. MMDAs insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the laws following provision, thus:
Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary.

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review, and affirm the decision dated April 30, 2007 and the resolution dated September 3, 2007.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent. 292 SCRA 676

Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." It was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. Issue: Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement in the exercise of its power of eminent domain Held: The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1.An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2.The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3.There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4.A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A valid ordinance is required before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain. A mere resolution will not suffice.

[G.R. No. 109338. November 20, 2000]

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION PARDO, J.: The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. We have before the Court for consideration a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,i[1] and its resolution,ii[2] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.iii[3] The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaintiv[4] for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte. On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter 1. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,798,750.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from November, 1989 until the whole amount shall have been fully paid; 2. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,500.00 as attorneys fees; to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as expenses incidental to this litigation; and 3. to pay the costs of this suit. IT IS SO ORDERED.v[5] When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land covered TCT Nos. T-13505 and T-13514 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC.

On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale,vi[6] which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in his capacity as executive judge, approved. On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion.vii[7] On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removalviii[8] of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Petitioner opposed the motionix[9]on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property. The trial courtx[10] set the hearing on the amended motion on September 29, 1992 but the hearing was re-scheduled on October 28, 1992, and then again on November 10, 1992.xi[11] On all these dates, no hearing was conducted. Then the case was re-raffled to Branch 39 of the regional trial court presided over by respondent judge. On November 27, 1992, the trial courtxii[12] set the hearing on the amended motion for demolition. However, instead of adducing evidence for petitioner, its counselxiii[13] manifested that he was withdrawing his appearance since the authority given him by petitioner was only for the filing of the opposition to the amended motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite the fact that petitioner had no counsel present. Thus, only Vines Realty presented its evidence. On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing and deputizing Lt. Col. Rufino Chavez, Jr. and Capt. Alfredo Borja to constitute an augmentation force for the immediate implementation of the writ. xiv[14] On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction.xv[15] Petitioner argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated November 27. 1992. On December 10, 1992, the Court of Appeals sent telegrams to respondents informing them of the issuance of a restraining order. On the same day, however, the trial court issued a writ of demolition.xvi[16] The court addressed the writ to sheriff Eduardo de los

Reyes,xvii[17] who was not a respondent in the petition before the Court of Appeals, so that the latter can implement the writ on the pretext that he was not covered by the restraining order. On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another order directing the National Power Corporation sub-unit in Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines energizing the New Lucena Oil Products Corporation, one of the consumers serviced by petitioner, as shown by the radiogramxviii[18] of Simeon P. Zao III, OIC Labo, NPC. Mr. Zao filed a manifestationxix[19] with the trial court that if NPC would shut off said power supply before the sub-station of petitioner, it would deprive Benguet Mining Corporation of electricity and endanger the lives of its miners. On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly using a chainsawxx[20] and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. Philippine National Police desk officer Bianito Cobachaxxi[21] of Barangay Jose Panganiban Police Station entered in the police blotter that on December 11, 1992, at about 2 p.m., men led by the provincial sheriff felled petitioners electric posts along the cemetery of Bagumbayan. Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist from proceeding with the demolition due to a restraining order but to no avail. On January 4, 1993, Vines Realty filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of demolition.xxii[22] The hearing was scheduled on January 12, 1993, at 8:30 a. m. but petitioners lawyer, Atty. Jose Maacop, received a copy only on January 11, 1994. Atty. Bienvenido A. Paita made a special appearance for petitioner through a manifestation with motion for reconsiderationxxiii[23] dated January 21, 1993. Atty. Paita declared it was impossible for him to appear and file an opposition to the motion on very short notice. He said that petitioner was not a party to the case, that the restraining order of the Court of Appeals was good until further orders, and the writ of execution was executed on December 11, 1992. Petitioner manifested that it was denied its day in court. On January 25, 1993,xxiv[24] the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the appearance of Atty. Paita was irregular and that Atty. Maacop as the counsel in the appellate court must first make an entry of appearance with the trial court. On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias writ of demolition.xxv[25] The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays.

Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals, promulgated a decisionxxvi[26]dismissing the petition for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let it be stated that the temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court on December 9, 1992 has a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue (Carbungco vs. CA, 181 SCRA 313) and has therefore become void at the expiration of the said twenty (20) days (Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586). SO ORDERED. On February 19, 1993, petitioners new counsel, Gancayco Law Offices, filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Appearance And Motion To Admit Supplemental Petition.xxvii[27] This was a new petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction.xxviii[28] On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the admission of the supplemental petition on the ground that the petition had been decided.xxix[29] Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of the District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH]. On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH. Hence, this petition.xxx[30] At issue is whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard.xxxi[31] A court denies a party due process if it renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence.xxxii[32] We find that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of demolition on the same day.

It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence on petitioners right over the property to be demolished. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.xxxiii[33] Due process is equally applicable in a case involving public utilities, where a strict application of the rules would bring about catastrophic inconveniences to the public. Hence, the act would do more harm than good to the public, which the government seeks to protect. Damages and losses of a considerable amount of time (about 8 years) could have been prevented if the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion on the matter. Well aware that the counsel was not authorized, the trial court could have stretched its liberality a little to ensure that it would serve the ends of justice well for the people of Camarines Norte. Petitioner must be given the chance to prove its position. We cannot conceive how, knowing fully well that destroying the power lines and electric posts would cause overwhelming losses to a lot of business establishments and a great inconvenience to a lot of people, the trial court still ordered the demolition of the property. Their personal motives aside, the Court finds that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in hastily ordering the removal of the electric posts. We are not a trier of facts. We cannot determine whether petitioners Agreements of Right of Wayxxxiv[34] or that of the authorizationxxxv[35] of the OIC District Engineer to construct electric posts within the limits of the road right of way were genuine instruments. We can, however, determine the legality of the acts of the trial court in issuing the writs of demolition over the property. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269xxxvi[36] are: Section 16 Powers(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission and distribution lines along, upon, under and across publicly owned lands and public thoroughfares, including, without limitation, all roads, highways, streets, alleys, bridges and causeways; Provided, that such shall not prevent or unduly impair the primary public uses to which such lands and thoroughfares are otherwise devoted; (k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain.

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.xxxvii[37] The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDTxxxviii[38] thus held that: "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement.xxxix[39] Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation,xl[40] which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property. Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.xli[41] The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation.xlii[42] No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.xliii[43] Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-of-way easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator. xliv[44] Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition can not prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 19, 1993, and the resolution adopted on March 15, 1993, in CA-G. R. SP No. 29624, are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial court dated November 27, 1992, December 10, 1992, January 18, 1993, and January 25, 1993 and the writs of demolition issued on December 11, 1992, and January 26, 1993, are ANNULLED.

Private respondents are ordered to restore or restitute petitioners electric posts and power lines or otherwise indemnify petitioner for the cost of the restoration thereof. Finally, private respondents are permanently enjoined or prohibited from disturbing or interfering with the operation and maintenance of the business of petitioner. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.