Knowledge by Acquaintance

Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge of an object that depends solely on ones acquaintance with the object. By contrast, knowledge by description is knowledge of an object that depends on ones knowledge of descriptive truths about the object. The distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description played an important role in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and it continues to inform much contemporary work in epistemology and the philosophy of language and mind. This entry is divided into four sections: (1) the acquaintance relation; (2) the objects of acquaintance; (3) the role of acquaintance; and (4) contemporary work on acquaintance.

The Acquaintance Relation

Acquaintance is a relation that holds between subjects and the objects of their acquaintance. But what kind of relation is it? It is sometimes said that the nature of acquaintance cannot be known by description, but only by acquaintance in other words, one must be acquainted with acquaintance in order to know what it is.

Acquaintance with an object is usually defined as a conscious state of direct and unmediated awareness of an object. This follows Russells definition: We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truth. (1912: 25)

According to Russell, there are various different forms of acquaintance, including not only perception, but also memory, introspection and conceptual awareness of universals. Nevertheless, perception is the least controversial example: in perception, we are acquainted with objects. But what are the objects of our perceptual acquaintance?

The Objects of Acquaintance

According to common sense, we are acquainted in perception with ordinary physical objects, including tables, chairs and other people. According to Russell, however, when I see a table, I am not directly acquainted with the table, but rather with mental objects, which he calls sense data. Therefore, I do not know the table by acquaintance, but merely by description, as the physical object which causes such-and-such sense data. On this view, expressions used to refer to physical objects, including demonstratives and proper names, are really descriptions in disguise.

Russell uses a version of the argument from illusion to support his view. He argues that when I view a tilted coin and seem to see an elliptical object, there is in fact an elliptical object that I am seeing: however, this object is not the coin, which is circular, but rather a mental sense datum. Critics of the argument deny that, in cases of illusion, if it seems that I am seeing an object that has certain properties, there is in fact an object that I am seeing, which has the relevant properties. Thus, there is no elliptical object that I am seeing; rather, I am seeing the circular coin, but its apparently elliptical shape is illusory.

However, the problem of giving an adequate account of illusion remains one of the central problems in contemporary philosophy of perception.

The Role of Acquaintance

Acquaintance is central to Russells theory of knowledge and his theory of conceptual thought. He draws a distinction between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, which is best understood in terms of the distinction between our conceptual ability to think about things and our epistemic ability to know truths about those things. According to Russell, acquaintance plays a foundational role in explaining each of these abilities. As he puts the point, All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation. (1912: 48)

First, acquaintance plays a foundational role in Russells theory of knowledge. He argues that all of our knowledge of truths depends ultimately upon acquaintance, which is foundational in the sense that it does not itself depend on any knowledge of truths. Acquaintance with an object enables us to know descriptive truths about the object, but this descriptive knowledge depends upon acquaintance, rather than vice versa.

Second, acquaintance plays a foundational role in Russells theory of conceptual thought. He argues that we can think about an object only if we know which object we are thinking about. Either we know the object by acquaintance or we know it by description, in which case we must be acquainted with the properties in terms of which it is described.

This is the rationale for Russells principle of acquaintance, which states: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. (1912: 58)

Contemporary Work on Acquaintance

Few contemporary philosophers endorse all aspects of Russells philosophy, but many follow his example in finding an important role for acquaintance in the theory of knowledge and conceptual thought. A common strategy is to identify conscious states that play the role of Russells notion of acquaintance in grounding our conceptual and epistemic abilities. For example, John Campbell argues that conscious visual attention to an object enables one to grasp demonstrative concepts of the object and to know truths about its visible properties. Similarly, David Chalmers argues that introspective attention enables one to grasp phenomenal concepts and to know truths about the phenomenal properties of ones phenomenally conscious mental states.

Since Russell, there has been widespread agreement on the importance of a distinction between thinking of an object by description and thinking of an object in a more direct way that exploits a descriptively unmediated relation to the object. Indeed, the term acquaintance is sometimes used as a mere placeholder for whatever relation it is that enables one to think non-descriptive thoughts about an object. From this perspective, however, it is a substantive question whether Russell was entitled to assume that the role of acquaintance can be played only by states of conscious awareness.

For example, Gareth Evans introduces a category of information-based thought, which exploits information that is causally derived from an object. According to Evans, the role of Russells notion of acquaintance is played by the information link with an object that is provided in perception, memory and testimony. However, it is a focus of contemporary debate whether the information provided by perception, memory and testimony must be conscious to play the role of Russells notion of acquaintance.

In sum, Russells work on acquaintance raises important questions about the role of consciousness in grounding our conceptual and epistemic abilities. These questions are central to much current work in epistemology and the philosophy of language and mind.

Declan Smithies

Cross-References

See also Demonstrative Thought; Descriptive Thought; Knowledge, Philosophical Perspectives; Perception and Knowledge; Perception, Philosophical Perspectives

Further Readings

Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2003). The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 5562). New York: Oxford University Press. Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press. Smithies, D. (2011). What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought? The Journal of Philosophy, 108/1, 5-34.