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DISCUSSION PAPER
policies and procedures to ensure that no harm occurs, and 2) the results or impacts of implementing safeguards. This second function of the SIS would overlap with assessing additional NCBs so they may be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Links between REDD+ finance, safeguards and benefits and the role of the SIS are illustrated in Figure 1, while Figure 2 uses biodiversity as an example to show how results-based payments might work to incentivize safeguards implementation and non-carbon benefits, noting that advice and reporting requirements under the CBD are relevant for the assessment of biodiversity. Since, at a minimum countries need to demonstrate through the SIS that safeguards have been addressed and respected, and the safeguards go beyond a no-harm approach, the SIS is well positioned to demonstrate additional NCBs. Another important question to consider is whether or not to bundle payments for ERRs and NCBs. Under a bundling approach, payments would be made for ERRs and NCBs bundled into a REDD+ unit. Under an unbundled approach, an additional incentive is provided only if NCBs are achieved beyond the minimum requirement (e.g., through premium payments for NCBs in addition to payments for ERRs). As argued in the previous R-SWG briefing on REDD+ finance and safeguards, bundling payments would be more likely to lead to outcomes that are sustainable over the long-term.5 Figure 1. Links between REDD+ finance, safeguards and benefits and the role of the SIS
Figure 2. Illustrating how results-based payments might work to incentivize safeguards implementation and non-carbon benefits
(2) Monitoring emissions reductions/removals through proxy indicators: If ERRs are not used to offset emissions produced elsewhere, a simplified approach to measurement through proxy indicatorswhich are used to measure a result indirectlycan be used. This also increases flexibility of REDD+. Proxies can be closely linked to quantifying ERRs (e.g., area planted or conserved) or linked to an activity assumed to reduce emissions / increase removals (e.g., increasing the area of land managed by Indigenous Peoples). There are advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. The former has the advantage that data would be captured as part of a forest monitoring system, which countries need to develop anyway for managing their forests and as part of the requirements under the Cancun agreement,6 but makes an assumption about the amount of carbon stored in a given area, and that conserving trees reduces/removes emissions. The latter has the advantage of combining an emission outcome with a social outcome, but makes an assumption that the outcome will reduce/remove emissions and provide social benefits. (3) Challenges of demonstrating actions only through emissions reductions/removals: Experiences with monitoring LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry) in developed countries have shown that there are challenges with demonstrating actions only through ERRs, e.g., it may take time for behavior to change (enforcement), or to implement the action (addressing tenure security), or unexpected natural events (droughts or fires) may mask the emission reductions/removals. Even without these factors, EERs from LULUCF are difficult to measure accurately. ERRs may also occur when no actions have been taken (e.g., due to a change in global commodity price). In these cases it may be more useful to structure payments around Type 2 results if the goal is to create an incentive for actions. 3. OPTIONS FOR RESULTS BASED PAYMENTS If we accept that there are several ways to think about results-based approaches, and that how results are defined will affect what is being paid for, different options for payments can be identified. The two approaches (Type 1 and Type 2 defined above) are relevant whether thinking about results in terms of emission reductions/removals, safeguards, or NCBs. Table 1 illustrates different options and approaches for assessing results. Table 1. Different options and approaches for assessing results
Emission reduction/removals results framing Payment for ERRs only Type 1: Payment per unit X dollars per unit of ERRs which is not pre-defined X dollars per hectare of forest not cut Type 2: Payment per pre-defined result X dollars for a set amount of ERRs
Payment for ERRX dollars per policy passed (e.g., on focused implementation equitable distribution of benefits) X dollars per number of people with new capacity
X dollars for policy passed, budget for participatory processes, implementation agency with capacity and work plan
Non Carbon Benefits Social X dollars for every person making X dollars over the baseline X dollars for each hectare of land with clarified tenure for local actors Environmental X dollars for each additional hectare of intact forest Programme aimed at reducing poverty with specific aspects whose implementation can be tracked (e.g., local communities credit system set up and proved to be used) Programme aimed at increasing biodiversity with specific aspects which can be tracked (e.g., planting native species, diverting infrastructure out of biodiversity hot spots) Demonstrate, e.g., participatory process occurred and inputs were responded to
Governance
DISCUSSION PAPER*
A REDD+ finance mechanism that could recognize both Type 1 and Type 2 results would be useful for developing a more flexible system that would enable countries to access results-based payments based on different starting points. The different criteria for defining which option to choose might be: the type and amount of finance; the timing and length of time finance is necessary; and the type of results the REDD+ country is trying to achieve. There may even be ways to link both types of results. 4. CONCLUSIONS There are many options when it comes to developing an international system that could recognize and support countries taking actions to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to achieve multiple benefits. REDD+ is at a critical juncture in its development. A clear understanding of results-based payments and how they link to safeguards and achieving multiple benefits is needed. Meanwhile, available finance needs to be directed towards enabling activities, particularly governance improvements, that will ensure both carbon and non-carbon benefits, recognizing that safeguards implementation and the SIS are minimum requirements. The direction provided in Doha on REDD+ finance and for SBSTAs work programme in 2013 and beyond will be important for determining if REDD+ can respond to the changing vision of the system, begin to address linkages between its different elements, as well as synergies with relevant processes such as the CBD, and develop as a more flexible system to enable broad participation. ----------------------------------------------------------------Endnotes
1. 2. NCBs include social and biodiversity benefits (e.g., livelihood security and enhanced ecosystem resilience through increased biodiversity) and governance improvements (e.g., strengthened tenure/use/access/management rights). Informal note, Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (Agenda item 3(b)(iii)), LCA Informal Additional Session, 30 Aug 5 Sept 2012. (LCA is the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, i.e. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change). CBD Decision XI/19, http://www.cbd.int/cop/cop-11/doc/2012-10-24-advanced-unedited-cop-11-decisions-en.pdf (advance version), Biodiversity and Climate Change and Related Issues: Advice on the application of relevant safeguards for biodiversity with regard to policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. See also previous Briefing Papers: Additional Guidance on REDD+ Safeguards Information Systems: Briefing Paper: 36th Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, 14-25 May 2012 and supplement Recommendations on Safeguards; and REDD+ Finance and Safeguards: Briefing Paper: Informal Additional Sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Groups UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bangkok, 30 August - 5 September 2012. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/113736314/AdditionalGuidance-on-REDD-SIS. REDD+ Finance and Safeguards: Briefing Paper: Informal Additional Sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Groups UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bangkok, 30 August - 5 September 2012.Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/113736317/Briefing-Paper-on-REDD-Finance-and-Safeguards. Decision 1/CP.16, para 71(c).
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18th Conference of Parties UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Doha, 26 November 7 December 2012
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Please contact REDDSWG@yahoo.com for questions, comments and suggestions. These will be referred to relevant working group members.