PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia RosarioBedia-Santos

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, led to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not dene the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specicity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the ndings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity dees any precise denition since psychological causes can be of an innite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and delity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to conne the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and signicance to the

marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA GR No. 119190 January 17,1997

I. CASE TITLE: CHI MING TSOI (accused of psychological incapacity) vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI (virgin wife) GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997 II. FAMILY CODE: Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by EO 227 dated July 17, 1987) III. QUOTED: Clearly this ground (for void and voidable marriage) is restricted to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. The malady or mental disposition of one or both of the spouses must be such as to seriously and effectively prevent them from having a functional and normal marital life clearly conducive to bringing up a healthy personal inter-marital relationship within the family which is necessary for its growth. It involves a senseless, protracted, and constant refusal to comply with the essential marital obligations by one or both of the

spouses although he, she or they are physically capable of performing such obligations. While a person may be truly very efficient and mentally capable in undertaking a particular profession in life, he or she can still be considered as a completely irresponsible person vis--vis his or her married life if he or she spends almost the whole day working and not minding his or her family. Also, the fact that a person really loves his or her spouse and children does not constitute a bar to successfully invoke this ground if it is clearly shown that, despite this authentic feeling of love, he or she is so absolutely indifferent with respect to his or her duties as father and husband or mother and wife, as the case may be. Indeed, there must be something wrong for one to feel affection and love inside a marital life for another and yet totally inhibited to foster the same. It is indeed a mental disposition. IV. FACTS Nature of the case: Gina Lao-Tsoi (Gina for short) charged her husband Ching Ming Tsoi (Ching for short) for psychological incapacity in the Court of First Instance in Manila that ruled that indeed Ching is psychologically incapacitated. Ching appealed to the Court of Appeals that later AFFIRMED the lower courts decision. Thus, Ching is now filing for certiorari of the CAs decision at the Supreme Court. (I am reprinting this for better appreciation of the case but it is suffice to say that for ten months Gina and Ching did not have any sexual intercourse. Because of this Gina is asking the court to declare their marriage null and void ab initio on the grounds of psychological incapacity in the part of her husband Ching.) Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then

turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital on Jan. 20, 1989. The results of their physical examination were that she (Gina) is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. Gina is not willing to reconcile with her husband. Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty

that this will not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. He also claims that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. Ching gave two reasons why he believes Gina is slapping him these charges (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother (2) that he might finally consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. In fact, the defendant submitted himself to physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr. for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. Dr. Alteza contended that Ching there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. The doctor said he asked the Ching to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two inches or five centimeters (5 centimeter), Chings penis lengthened by one inch and one centimeter (1.1 centimeter). Dr. Alteza said the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated. V. ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage VI. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs. VII. APPLICATION

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Republic vs. CA and Molina

Republic v. CA and Molina GR 108763, 13 February 1997

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pretrial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The

incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos G.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 2000 3rd Division
FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and had five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in 1987. Consequently, due to the respondents failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological incapacity. HELD: The court ruled the negative. RATIONALE: The totality of the respondents acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. POLICY: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004 FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano led a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving nancial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita led an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to le his answer. Toshio led to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita led a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE:Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identied Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

David Dedel vs Court of Appeals & Sharon Corpuz-Dedel

Art 46 compared with PI

FACTS: In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven. HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality

should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

SIAYNGCO V S IAYNGCO 441 S CRA 422 O CTOBER 27, 2004

FACTS: A pe**on for review on cer*orari of the decision of the Court of A ppeals promulgated on 01 J uly 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 J anuary 2001, which dismissed the pe**on for declara*on of nullity of marriage led by respondent herein J udge M anuel Siayngco
y August 11, 1973 ! J uanita Cara*ng (pe**oner) married M anuel S iayngco

(respondent) civil rites and church on J une 27, 1973. A dopted baby boy

y September 25, 1997 ! respondent led for declara*on of nullity based on A rt 36;

pe**oner was over domineering, selsh, vola*le, nagger and trivial. N o respect for his posi*on as judge. This is rooted in her deep-seated resentment from lack of love and apprecia*on from her parents
y According to pe**oner, respondent is lying because he wants to be with his paramour y Respondent presented Dr V alen*na Garcia (psychiatrist); from her psychiatric

evalua*on, both had narcissis*c psychological repertoire (along with their other maladap*ve traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensi*ve) to each other's needs and feelings
y Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo M aaba, pe**oner is psychologically

capacitated to comply with essen*al marital obliga*ons

y January 31, 2001 ! R TC denied pe**on for nullity based on insucient evidence y July 1, 2003 ! C A reversed R TC decision based on psychiatric report of Dr Garcia that

both are psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi M ing Tsoi v C A

ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was iden*ed based on M olina guideline #2 HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the tes*monies of the par*es and their witnesses is that the only essen*al marital obliga*on which respondent M anuel was not able to fulll, if any, is the obliga*on of delity. Sexual indelity, per se, however, does not cons*tute psychological incapacity within the contempla*on of the Family Code. I t must be shown that respondent M anuel's unfaithfulness is a manifesta*on of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essen*al obliga*ons of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own esh and blood. Respondent failed to prove that his wife's behavior and ac*ons are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essen*al obliga*ons of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the incep*on of the marriage or that they are incurable. I n fact, Dr. M aaba, whose exper*se as a psychiatrist was admieed by respondent M anuel, reported that pe**oner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essen*al obliga*ons of marriage. Dr. Garcia's report does not even men*on that pe**oner is psychologically incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. C A DECISION WAS REVERSED

Ma. Armida Amy Perez-Ferraris vs Brix Ferraris

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity FACTS: Armida and Brix are showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic

attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family. ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar. HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.

What is psychological incapacity?

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie IvonneReyes

Art 45 (3) distinguished from PI FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo led to annul the marriage due to Maries PI. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about

herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. Shed claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the latters number 1 money maker but shes not. Shed also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo presented an expert that proved Maries PI. Marie denied all Leos allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the case. HELD: Yes, PI is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at bar. The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, claries that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leos consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish ction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

Fa c ts : Delia Do min g o , p riv ate resp o n d en t, led a p etitio n b efo re RTC o f Pa s ig fo r th e d e c la ra tio n o f n u llity o f m a rria g e a n d s e p a ra tio n o f p ro p e rty a g a in s t Ro b e rto D o m in g o , p e titio n e r. Sh e a lle g e d th a t t h e y w e r e m a r r i e d a t Carmo n a, Cav ite with ev id en ces o f marriag e certi cate an d marriag e licen se, u n k n o wn to h er, p etitio n er h ad a p rev io u s marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to k n o w th e p rio r marriag e wh en Emerlin a su ed th em fo r b ig amy . Sh e p ray s that th eir marriage b e d eclared n u ll an d v o id an d , as a

co n seq u en ce, to d eclare th at sh e is th e ex clu siv e o wn er o f all p r o p e r t i e s s h e a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e a n d t o reco v er th em from h im. R o b e r t o m o v e d t o d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d th at th e marriag e b ein g v o id ab in itio , th ep etitio n o f d eclaratio n o f n u llity is u n n ecessary . It ad d ed th at p riv ate resp o n d en t h as n o p ro p erty wh ich in h is p o s s e s s i o n . Issue: Wh eth er o r n o t resp o n d en t may claim fo r th e d eclaratio n o f n u llity o f marriag e an d sep aratio n o fp ro p erty ag ain st p etitio n er o n th e g ro u n d o f b ig amy . Ruling: Th ere is n o q u estio n th at th e marriag e o f p etitio n er an d p riv ate resp o n d en t celeb rated wh ile th e fo rmer's p rev io u s marriag e with o n e Em e rlin a d e la Pa z w a s s till s u b s is tin g is b ig a m o u s . A s s u c h , it is fro m th e b e g in n in g . Pe titio n e r h im se lf d o e s n o t d isp u te th e ab so lu te n u llity o f th eir marriag e. Th e Co u rt h ad ru led th at n o ju d icial d ecree is n ecessary to estab lish th e in v alid ity o f a v o id , b ig a m o u s m a rria g e . Th e Fa m ily Co d e h a s c le a rly p ro v id e d th e effects o f th e d eclaratio n o f n u llity o f marriag e, o n e o f wh ich is th e sep aratio n o f p ro p erty acco rd in g to th e reg ime o f p ro p erty relatio n s g o v ern in g th em. It stan d s to reaso n th at th e lo wer co u rt b efo re wh o m th e issu e o f n u llity o f a rst marriag e is b ro u g h t is lik ewise clo th ed with ju risd ictio n to d ecid e th e in cid en tal q u estio n s reg ard in g th e co u p le's p ro p erties.

Meynardo Beltran vs People and JudgeTuazon

Article 40

FACTS: In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran led an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home

to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she led a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he led is a prejudicial question to the criminal case led by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the nal determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a nal judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a nal judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBIS GR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

336 SCRA 747

FACTS: 1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier. 2. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. 3. An information for bigamy was filed 4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. 5. Respondent then filed a Motion to Suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. 6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. 7. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 8. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutesa prejudicial question to a criminal case for Bigamy? HELD: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimate connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the relocation of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an issue similarly or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented its case. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements

concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. As ruled in LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731), he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106) . This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO A.K.A. VINCENT G. MERCADO VS. CONSUELO TAN

Facts: Dr. Vincent Mercado and Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 civilly of which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of petitioner was single. At the time of the celebration of the wedding, petitioner was actually married to Ma. Thelma Oliva. This fact was known to the respondent, Consuelo Tan. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by respondent through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, petitoner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still be convicted of bigamy even if the previous marriage was already declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ruling: Numerous rulings have been rendered on cases like the one at hand. Petitioner contends that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. The Court agrees with the respondent and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and enumerated the elements of the crime of bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) That the offender has been legally married; (2) That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; (4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

MORIGO vs PEOPLE
FACTS Lucio Morigo decided to marry Lucia Barrette when she came home from Canada afterbeing sweethearts for some time. They were married in 1990 at the Iglecia Filipina Nacional. Lucia eventually left for Canada again leaving Lucio. Lucia then petitioned for a divorce decree in Ontario which was later on granted by the Court of Ontario. After discovery of this fact, he married Maria Lumbago and later on paryed for the declaratgion of the nullity of his marriage with Lucia because no marriage ceremony actually took place. The lower court in turn led a case for bigamy against him. They said that nullication of marriage is not a defense for bigamy. Also, that the divorce acquired by Lucia is not recognized in the Philippines, Ontario having no jurisdiction over the marriage of the couple. Upon appeal, the CA declared the marriage between Lucio aqnd Lucia as null and void ab initio. Lucio then seeked the dismissal of his case for bigamy by reason of the declaration ofhis marriage with Lucia as null and void meaning no marriage took place. The lower court and court of Appeals found that said nullication is not a valid defense for bigamy. ISSUE Whether or not a declaration of marriage as void ab intio is a valid defense for bigamy RULING The court ruled in the afrmative. In the present case, the marriage was declared void ab initio. This means that the marriage was null from the very beginning and no marriage took place by reason of the absence of an authorized solemnizing ofcer

which is an essential requisite. It is considered that Lucio was never married to Lucia and therefore when he contracted the marriage with another woman he was not considered married. Thus, no bigamy took place.