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Two Common Problems in Capital Structure Research: The FinancialDebt-To-Asset Ratio and Issuing Activity Versus Leverage Changes
IVO WELCH Brown University, RI and NBER
ABSTRACT
This paper points out two common problems in capital structure research. First, although it is not clear whether non-nancial liabilities should be considered debt, they should never be considered as equity. Yet, the common nancial-debt-to-asset ratio (FD/AT) measure of leverage commits this mistake. Thus, research on increases in FD/AT explains, at least in part, decreases in non-nancial liabilities. Future research should avoid FD/AT altogether. The paper also quanties the components of the balance sheet of large publicly traded corporations and discusses the role of cash in measuring leverage ratios. Second, equity-issuing activity should not be viewed as equivalent to capital structure changes. Empirically, the correlation between the two is weak. The capital structure and capital issuing literature are distinct.
I. INTRODUCTION
Leverage is dened as the sensitivity of the value of equity ownership with respect to changes in the underlying value of the rm. Empirically, leverage ratios are frequently independent variables (sometimes as part of a hypothesis, sometimes as a control). Leverage ratios are also the dependent variable in the empirical capital structure literature. This literature tries to explain variations in corporate leverage, both in the cross section of capital structure (i.e. why some rms have high leverage) and in the time series (how capital structures evolve). In the theory of capital structure, one common hypothesis derives directly from the equity-sensitivity channel: a rm with more leverage has both higherpowered incentives and (usually) a higher probability of nancial distress. (In turn, this means that leverage can inuence managerial behavior.) A second common hypothesis about leverage arises from the fact that payments to creditors are excluded from corporate income tax. These two hypotheses have formed the basic workhorse capital structure model since they were put forth by Robichek and Myers (1966).
r 2011 The Author. International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
A. An illustration
Recall that the balance sheet of a rm consists of three components: Total assets = Financial debt + Non-financial liabilities + Equity where nancial debt (FD) is the sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC). My paper objects to the use of nancial debt divided by total assets (FD/AT) as a measure of leverage. (When not otherwise dened, capitalized abbreviations are Compustat mnemonics.) The assets are often
1. Many papers incorrectly write that they divide by the rms assets or value, even if they really divide by nancial capital, i.e., nancial debt plus equity. My paper prefers the less misleading abbreviation capital for the latter.
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
I have chosen the claims in Structure A, so that they are roughly representative of large publicly-traded rms in the United States. Structure B is made up for illustration. It should be immediately obvious that A is the more levered structure. It has more sensitivity of equity, with respect to underlying asset changes. A decrease of 10% in the value of the rm would manifest itself as an equity loss of ($40$10)/$401525% under Structure A. The same 10% decrease in the value of the rm would manifest itself as an equity loss of ($40$7)/$401517.5% under Structure B. Yet, according to the FD/AT metric, A is less levered than B: A has an FD/AT of $30/$100530%, while B has an FD/AT of $30/$70 % 43%. Changes in leverage are similarly affected by this problem. Structure B could reduce its FD/AT by assuming an additional $50 million in accounts payables, regardless of whether the extra funds are used to fund current assets or are discarded. It should be clear that the FD/AT is not an appropriate measure of leverage. Of course, the FD/AT ratio may well be an appropriate measure in contexts in which it is not used as a leverage ratio. For example, it can appear in debt covenants. If the goal is to predict for such rms how likely they are to experience a decline in FD/AT that then induces them to violate a covenant, explaining FD/AT is a valid research question. However, from the perspective of capital structure theory, appearing in debt covenants does not make FD/AT an appropriate measure of leverage. Many nancial ratio debt covenants also limit debt-to-cash ow ratios, coverage ratios, net worth conditions, and liquidity ratios. Other non-nancial covenants limit rms dividend payouts acquisition restrictions, and capital expenditure restrictions. Some even have restrictions on key personnel or insurance policy requirements. None of these measures would automatically be considered measures of leverage by virtue of being mentioned in some covenants.
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
B. Non-nancial liabilities
The source of the problem with the FD/AT is the presence of non-nancial liabilities. They originate in the process of operating and add to the rms assets, just as an inow of debt or equity would add to the rms assets. Just like nancial interest payments, payments for non-nancial liabilities are made from pre-tax income.2 A priori, it is not clear whether nancial liabilities should be considered superior to non-nancial liabilities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the opposite is sometimes the case. For example, Like other short-term creditors, many non-nancial credit providers can stop rolling over the credit before Chapter 11, and thereby recapture their funds before the rm encounters formal nancial distress and therefore before longer-term nancial debtors can lay claim on the assets. Bankruptcy trustees will often grant suppliers payments, even if they are nominally junior creditors. This is because suppliers may not otherwise be willing to help keep the company a going concern. Current liabilities can also include compensation and benets, which typically receive priority (to retain necessary employees). Taxes have super priority. Of course, there are also non-nancial obligations where relative precedence is less clear. For example, non-current accruals can include such items as environmental accruals, accrued executive compensation (which executives will presumably draw down if nancial distress were to become possible), as well as liabilities from restructuring, pre-retirement post-employment and disability benets. In sum, nancial debt and non-nancial liabilities are both senior to equity. In contrast, non-nancial liabilities can be of higher, equal, or lower priority than nancial debt. Unconditionally, it is a reasonable a priori approximation to consider the two liabilities to be of roughly equal priority.
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
(17.5)
LT/AT Coef 0.384 0.074 Std coef 0.000 0.408 (116.49) (118.65) TNW MV FD/MAT Coef Std coef TNW FD/MCP Coef Std coef TNW LT/MAT Coef Std coef TNW
0.001 0.050 0.000 0.336 (0.08) (110.76) 0.137 0.095 0.000 0.447 (5.61) (118.27) 0.002 0.099 0.000 0.454 (10.09) (123.00)
0.158 0.123 (5.69) (115.2) 0.203 0.110 (16.33) (132.9) 0.345 0.182 (114.26) (145.8)
Description: The sample are all rms on Compustat from 2000 to 2009, with available assets in the current year, and at least $10 billion in assets and equity market value in the previous year. (The number of rm years in the regressions ranges from 2283 to 2380. The number of rms ranges from 252 in 2000 to 319 in 2009.) The dependent variables are shown in the rows; the independent variables are shown in the columns. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. In the far left column, BV indicates measures where equity is in book value, and MV indicates measures where equity is in market value. Some mnemonics are directly from Compustat: AT is total assets, LT is total liabilities, NI is net income, PPEGT is tangible assets, and AP is accounts payable. Other mnemonics are derived: BEQ is the book value of equity (SEQ1MIB), MEQ is the market value of equity (PRCCF CSHO), FD is nancial debt (DLTT1DLC), BCP is the book value of capital (FD1BEQ), MCP is the market value of capital (FD1MEQ), and MAT is the market value of assets (ATBEQ1MEQ). Std coef is the standardized coefcient (i.e., multiplied by the SD of the independent variable, and divided by the SD of the dependent variable). The T-statistic is Newey White heteroskedasticity adjusted. Interpretation: There are variables for which the inference depends on the measure of leverage. For asset-normalized tangible assets, the nancial-debt-to-asset ratio suggests a positive coefcient, while the other two leverage ratios suggest a zero or negative correlation. For accounts payables, the nancial-debt-to-asset ratio suggests a negative correlation, while the other two leverage ratios suggest positive correlations.
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
Unfortunately, this correction raises as many problems as it solves. 1. The cash may not have been committed for repayment but for real projects that have the same characteristics as the rms projects. In this case, the 80% leverage ratio in the example may have been observed because it was the rms optimal debt ratio, after all. (It may not have been the case that the unused parked cash merely served to distort the rms correct 60% leverage ratio on its real assets into an 80% fake measured leverage ratio.)
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r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
would produce badly distorted inference. For rms whose market value of assets (ATSEQ1CSHO PRCCF) is not greater than their cash holdings, the denominator could become zero or negative if cash is subtracted out. Any ratio that can take a zero or negative denominator never makes any sense. This sign problem is an even greater concern for nancial capital-based leverage ratios, because the value of capital is less than the value of assets. Thus, the denominator is smaller to begin with. The nave nancial-leverage ratio Bad leverage measure FD CH FD EQ CH
where EQ is now either the market value or the book value of debt, is therefore useless, too. For rms whose nancial capital (FD1EQ) is not greater than their cash, the denominator could become zero or negative if cash is subtracted out. One method to deal with this ratio problem is to winsorize the net-ofcash-liabilities rst, i.e., LT 0 5max (LTCH, 0). The revised (prime) totalliability gure can then be used instead of the original total liability gure to compute a better leverage ratio Leverage ratio maxLT CH; 0 : maxLT CH; 0 CSHO PRCCF
With this correction, any rm with more cash than liabilities is treated as if it were unlevered, albeit without regard to the extent by which its cash exceeds its liabilities.
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
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where EQ is either the book value of equity (SEQ) or the market value of equity (CSHO PRCCF1PSTK). In sum, there is no clear economic method to handle cash holdings. Theories of leverage are typically about the underlying real assets (projects). Measures to test these theories should not be distorted by economically empty cashdebt transactions. Unfortunately, without knowledge whether cash or near-cash is committed to covering the debt or committed to covering real projects (and/or without the implicit leverage in real options or projects), it may well be impossible to compute a meaningful debt ratio on the underlying projects. Even when it is known that cash is committed to debt repayment, care must be applied in the calculation of the revised leverage ratio to avoid meaningless ratios that can have non-positive values in the denominator. One research strategy would be to run estimations with uncorrected and corrected leverage ratios. However, because for some rms or even for some rm-years (but not others), cash may back debt, while for others cash may back projects, this is not a perfect solution, either. One would need a direct proxy for when cash backs debt and when it backs projects. Such a proxy is usually not available.
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r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
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0.265 0.000 (10.70) 0.447 0.000 (13.09) 1.874 0.000 (18.01) 2.148 0.000 (110.61) Constants SSTK/BCP1
14.814 0.035 (11.43) 2.484 0.015 (10.39) 27.383 0.114 (12.22) 12.905 0.056 (11.41) DLTIS/BCP1
(10.1)
(0.0)
(11.3)
(10.3) 2 R (%)
BV D(FD/BCP) Coef Std coef TNW D(LT/AT) Coef Std coef TNW MV D(FD/MCP) Coef Std coef TNW D(LT/MAT) Coef Std coef TNW
0.370 0.000 (1.13) 0.020 0.000 (0.11) 1.003 0.000 (13.37) 1.403 0.000 (15.52)
9.852 0.023 (11.01) 1.142 0.007 (0.19) 20.262 0.085 (11.89) 6.381 0.028 (10.82)
5.659 0.096 (12.48) 4.244 0.181 (13.75) 7.874 0.231 (14.47) 6.829 0.216 (14.42)
(10.9)
(13.2)
(16.5)
(14.8)
Description: The sample and statistics are the same as in Table 1, except that current FD, LT, and MEQ (as well as SSTK and DLTIS) had to also be available. SSTK is the Compustat-reported equity stock issued, as reported on the ow-of-funds statement. DLTIS is the Compustat-reported amount of long-term debt issued. The independent variables are scaled by book capital measured at the beginning of the period (BCP1). Interpretation: The correlation between contemporaneous issuing activity and changes in leverage was modest. Seemingly perverse, it even appears that rms that issued equity increased their leverage.
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r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
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Ivo Welch CV Starr Professor of Economics (Finance) Brown University 64 Waterman Street Providence, RI 02912 USA ivo.welch@brown.edu; ivo.welch@gmail.com
REFERENCES
Chang, X., and S. Dasgupta (2009), Target Behavior and Financing: How Conclusive is the Evidence, Journal of Finance, 64, 176796. Chen, L., and X. Zhao (2006), Mechanical Mean Reversion of Leverage Ratios, Economic Letters, 95, 22329.
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r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
r 2011 The Author International Review of Finance r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2011
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