NO JUDGE AND NO ATTORNEY & NO PUBLIC DEFENDER HAS ANY LEGAL RIGHT TO WAIVE YOUR SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS

WITHOUT YOUR EXPRESS PERMISSION IN WRITING

A basic fundamental right such as the right to a speedy trial cannot be waived by defendants attorney or public defender without knowledge of and acquiescence or agreement thereto by the defendant. Assuming solely for the purposes of argument that a choice was made by counsel to waive the defendants rights, since that choice was not participated in by the petitioner [it] does not automatically bar relief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 at p. 439 (1963).
. . . While an attorney is impliedly authorized to waive procedural matters, a clients substantial rights may not be waived without that clients consent. Graves v. P.J. Tagares Co., 94 Wn.2d 298, 303, 616 P.2d 1223 (1980); In re Coggins, 13 Wn. App. 736, 537 P.2d 287 (1975). We find the right under Const. Art. 4, section 5, to be tried in a court presided over by an elected . . . judge accountable to the electorate, is a substantial right. Thus, the requirement of Mr. Sains written consent could not be waived by Mr. Burchards unauthorized statements. . . . "Consequently, we are constrained to hold the judge pro tempore did not have jurisdiction to preside over the trial of Larry Sain and his conviction must be reversed. State v. Sain 34 Wn. App. 553, 663 P.2d 493 (May 1983). And;

The Court of Appeals held that while an attorney may waive procedural issues, the attorney may not waive substantive rights without the clients consent. STATE v. HASTINGS, 115 Wn.2d 42, 44,, 793 P.2d 956 [No. 56964-9. En Banc. July 5, 1990.] And;

However, it is clear under the CrR 1.1 & the CrRLJ 1.1 decisional case law that an attorney or public defender cannot bind his client to any admission or stipulation or act, regarding any substantial right of the client, without specific authorization to do so. Fite v. Lee, 11 Wn.App. 21, 521 P.2d 644 (1974); Crossman v. Will, 10 Wn.App. 141, 516 P.2d 1063 (1973); and In Re Houts, 7 Wn.App. 476, 499 P.2d 1276 (1972); State v. Sain, supra; and State v. Hastings, supra. The trial court in this instance has failed to conduct a colloquy on the record to assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendants speedy trial rights as required by the well settled principles of the CrRLJ 1.1 decisional law as stated in State v. Buelna, 83 Wn.App. 658 (1996) and has failed to instruct the defendant of his or her speedy trial rights as required by CrRLJ 3.5 as stated in State v. Williams, 91 Wn.App. 344, 347 (1998). And, see Seattle v. Kohles, cited below which reads in part:

This failure to notify Kohles of both the right to a speedy hearing and the procedure he must follow to preserve it also violates the principle of fundamental fairness guarantee. See State v. Galbreath, 69 Wn.2d 664, 667, 419 P.2d 800 (1966) (the concept of fundamental fairness is inherent in the due process clause of the U.S. Const. amend. 14.); State v. Tang, 75 Wn.App. 473, 478, 878 P.2d 487 (1994) (same). Under the circumstances presented here, it is fundamentally unfair to include a time limitation in a local rule but fail to include notice of that limit in the correspondence sent to the party subject to that limitation. Seattle v. Kohles, 81 Wn. App. 678, at 684, 916 P.2d 440 (February 26, 1996). And;

WASHINGTON LAW REQUIRES THAT IN ORDER FOR A PARTY TO VALIDLY WAIVE HIS OR HER RIGHTS, HE OR SHE MUST FIRST HAVE KNOWLEDGE AND SECONDLY, HE MUST VOLUNTEER TO WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS.

Washington law apparently requires that a party waiving its rights have knowledge of those rights. A waiver is the intentional and VOLUNTARY relinquishment of a known right. The FAY CORPORATION v. BAT HOLDINGS I, INC., 682 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 1116, 1120 (March 25, 1988). And; . . . WE HOLD THE PETITIONERS CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO WAIVE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. ABAD v. COZZA, 77 Wn. App. 762, 765, 898 P.2d 695 (May 9, 1995). And; A waiver of that right must be VOLUNTARY, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Forza, 70 Wn.2d 69, 422 P.2d 475 (1966). Additionally, a court must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental rights. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62. S. Ct. 457 (1942). BELLEVUE v. ACREY, 103 Wn.2d 203, 207, 691 P.2d 957 No. 50510-1. En Banc. December 6, 1984.]; REYNOLDS v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., 176 Wash. 36, 45 (January 3, 1934); LESTER v. PERCY., 58 Wn. (2d) 501, 503 [No. 34561. En Banc. August 24, 1961.]; PANORAMA ASSN v. PANORAMA CORP., 97 Wn.2d 23, 28, 640 P.2d 1057 [No. 47843-1. En Banc. February 4, 1983.]; BIRKELAND v. CORBETT., 51 Wn. (2d) 554, 565 (January 16, 1958); MEYERS WAY v. UNIVERSITY SAVINGS, 80 Wn. App. 655, 670, 671, 910 P.2d 1308 (February 20, 1996). And; The one against whom waiver is claimed must have actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right. BOWMAN v. WEBSTER, 44 Wn. (2d) 667 669 (April 29, 1954). And; "Presuming waiver of ...(rights) from a silent record is impermissible. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109

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