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RESEP is a structured approach for the whole site Allows for progression of events from single plant to whole site Searches for 'cliff-edge' effects Develops timelines for critical safety functions (CSF) Addresses infrastructure requirements on and off-site Identifies opportunities for resilience enhancement Provides a key focus for damage control teams.
RESEP is a structured approach for the whole site Allows for progression of events from single plant to whole site Searches for 'cliff-edge' effects Develops timelines for critical safety functions (CSF) Addresses infrastructure requirements on and off-site Identifies opportunities for resilience enhancement Provides a key focus for damage control teams.
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RESEP is a structured approach for the whole site Allows for progression of events from single plant to whole site Searches for 'cliff-edge' effects Develops timelines for critical safety functions (CSF) Addresses infrastructure requirements on and off-site Identifies opportunities for resilience enhancement Provides a key focus for damage control teams.
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Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
Phil Hallington IAEA Vienna, 19-22 March 2012 IAEA-CN-209-025 Scope Overview of Sellafield Nuclear Safety Principles Resilience Evaluation Process [RESEP] Peer Review Building the Programme Sellafield Considerations Conclusions Sellafield Context 7 shutdown reactors 2 Reprocessing plants Waste Management High hazard legacy facilities Product Storage Supporting Infrastructure Low temperature, low pressure processes Very large inventory of radioactive material Relatively low rates of change to loss of cooling Aging facilities and infrastructure Nuclear Safety Principles Maintaining containment Maintaining cooling Maintaining control of reactivity Maintaining control of chemistry 30-60-90 Day Plan Resilience Architecture Goals for RESEP Provides a structured approach for the whole site Allows for progression of events from single plant to whole site Searches for cliff-edge effects Develops timelines for critical safety functions (CSF) Addresses infrastructure requirements on and off-site Identifies opportunities for resilience enhancement Provides a key focus for damage control teams Cliff Edge Identification Dynamics of Mitigation Timeline - Conceptual I n i t i a t i n g E v e n t Time Current Backups Alternative Backups Mitigating Actions Current Backups Alternative Backups Current Backups Event A Event B Event C 72 Hrs 1 week Severe Accident Analysis Severe Accident Management Strategies Safety Case Boundary Real Cliff Edge RESEP Process Diagram Decomm RESEP 1 SFM RESEP 1 WEDD RESEP 1 Electricity RESEP1a Cooling RESEP1a SECC Comms F&RS RESEP2.1 Site and External Utilities/Resources RESEP 2 nfrastructure Demand ndividual Plant Resilience U t i l i t y R e s i l i e n c e RESEP2.1 RESEP2.1 Pu OU RESEP 1 RESEP Workshops The key characteristics of a successful workshop are: Strong representation from plant operators who know the plant and are likely to be confronted with securely challenging situations Support from a knowledgeable technical team who have prepared thoroughly An open and questioning environment which is respectful of all contributions Methodical capture of all key observations. Building the Programme PHASE 1 SITE RESILIENCE PHASE 2 SITE RESILIENCE DEFINED SCOPE EMERGING SCOPE Respond to ONR Interim Report Develop and Implement RESEP Process Respond to WANO SOER 2011-2 Complete ENSREG Stress Tests and report Develop Wider Resilience Architecture Accelerated delivery of SAA/SAMS Implement RESEP Improvements Respond to WANO SOER 2011-3 Respond to Further LFE from Japan Respond to additional ONR Report(s) ALARP consideration of outputs Initiate Studies into identified problems
Key topics for
peer review Summary of Key Programme Outcomes A resilience architecture which will provide an appropriate level of robustness in terms of responses, maintainability and capability to successfully manage significant challenges to the business Maximum learning is taken from events in Japan and effectively applied across our operations (including effective communication with industry colleagues) Consequence led and risk informed analysis defining appropriate mitigating actions and countermeasures which will arrest the progression of fault sequences Investment in equipment and resources is justified against the severity of consequences that are effectively mitigated A realistic view is taken of common cause effects and potential domino situations that may arise Effective engagement of plants and supporting functions is essential to the success of these activities, Wider public confidence in the Nuclear Industry and matters of safety is secured Decision Making Process Decision making process for considerations Auditable, proven and accepted by key stakeholders Including strong element of peer review Focuses effort where greatest benefit can be derived Flexible to late changes in understanding Leads to an accepted resilience improvement index Implementation Actions to be delivered locally, by plants Progress to be monitored centrally, by programme Draft Principles Draft Principles for Site Resilience Following an incident, as far as possible, facilities should be self-reliant for a suitable period (typically 24 hours). They should also have the local capability to get the plant into control and then into a quiescent state, without external support. Similarly, Site should be self-reliant for a longer period, without external support, typically at least 7 days Favouring simple, robust solutions providing value. Conclusions Faced with translating reactor-based stress tests onto a complex suite of nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, Sellafield Limited and its specialist suppliers have developed an effective and systematic method of assessing resilience. This method (RESEP) has focussed on the plants within the greatest potential consequences and has provided successful new insights into many facilities beyond their Design Basis. The process has identified a range of considerations and actions which will make a genuine and sustainable improvement in resilience. To be success RESEP needs Thorough preparation Knowledgeable inputs An open environment where questioning is welcomed Close engagement with Regulators and industry colleagues has been important to success We at Sellafield are committed to sustaining this approach to enhance resilience and wide incorporate this approach into our long-term periodic review of safety cases (LTPR) which is a cornerstone of the licensing system.
Dimitrova Krusteva Effective - Practices in Public Communication To Mitigate Undesirable Outcomes For The General Public As A Result of A Nuclear or Radiological Emergency