The Application of Resilience Learning to

UK Spent Fuel Management Facilities

Phil Hallington
IAEA Vienna, 19-22 March 2012
IAEA-CN-209-025
Scope
Overview of Sellafield
Nuclear Safety Principles
Resilience Evaluation Process [RESEP]
Peer Review
Building the Programme
Sellafield Considerations
Conclusions
Sellafield Context
7 shutdown reactors
2 Reprocessing plants
Waste Management
High hazard legacy facilities
Product Storage
Supporting Infrastructure
Low temperature, low pressure processes
Very large inventory of radioactive material
Relatively low rates of change to loss of cooling
Aging facilities and infrastructure
Nuclear Safety Principles
Maintaining containment
Maintaining cooling
Maintaining control of reactivity
Maintaining control of chemistry
30-60-90 Day Plan
Resilience Architecture
Goals for RESEP
Provides a structured approach for the whole site
Allows for progression of events from single plant to
whole site
Searches for cliff-edge effects
Develops timelines for critical safety functions (CSF)
Addresses infrastructure requirements on and off-site
Identifies opportunities for resilience enhancement
Provides a key focus for damage control teams
Cliff Edge Identification
Dynamics of Mitigation
Timeline - Conceptual
I
n
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t
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g
E
v
e
n
t
Time
Current Backups
Alternative Backups
Mitigating Actions
Current Backups
Alternative Backups Current Backups
Event A
Event B
Event C
72 Hrs
1 week
Severe
Accident
Analysis
Severe
Accident
Management
Strategies
Safety Case
Boundary
Real
Cliff Edge
RESEP Process Diagram
Decomm
RESEP 1
SFM
RESEP 1
WEDD
RESEP 1
Electricity
RESEP1a
Cooling
RESEP1a
SECC
Comms
F&RS
RESEP2.1
Site and External
Utilities/Resources
RESEP 2
nfrastructure
Demand
ndividual Plant Resilience
U
t
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l
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t
y
R
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s
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n
c
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RESEP2.1
RESEP2.1
Pu OU
RESEP 1
RESEP Workshops
The key characteristics of a successful workshop are:
Strong representation from plant operators who know the plant
and are likely to be confronted with securely challenging
situations
Support from a knowledgeable technical team who have
prepared thoroughly
An open and questioning environment which is respectful of all
contributions
Methodical capture of all key observations.
Building the Programme
PHASE 1 SITE RESILIENCE
PHASE 2 SITE RESILIENCE
DEFINED SCOPE
EMERGING
SCOPE Respond to
ONR Interim
Report
Develop and
Implement
RESEP
Process
Respond to
WANO SOER
2011-2
Complete
ENSREG
Stress Tests
and report
Develop Wider
Resilience
Architecture
Accelerated
delivery of
SAA/SAMS
Implement
RESEP
Improvements
Respond to
WANO SOER
2011-3
Respond to
Further LFE
from Japan
Respond to
additional
ONR Report(s)
ALARP
consideration
of outputs
Initiate Studies
into identified
problems

Key topics for

peer review
Summary of Key Programme Outcomes
A resilience architecture which will provide an appropriate level of robustness in
terms of responses, maintainability and capability to successfully manage
significant challenges to the business
Maximum learning is taken from events in Japan and effectively applied across
our operations (including effective communication with industry colleagues)
Consequence led and risk informed analysis defining appropriate mitigating
actions and countermeasures which will arrest the progression of fault
sequences
Investment in equipment and resources is justified against the severity of
consequences that are effectively mitigated
A realistic view is taken of common cause effects and potential domino
situations that may arise
Effective engagement of plants and supporting functions is essential to the
success of these activities,
Wider public confidence in the Nuclear Industry and matters of safety is secured
Decision Making Process
Decision making process for considerations
Auditable, proven and accepted by key stakeholders
Including strong element of peer review
Focuses effort where greatest benefit can be derived
Flexible to late changes in understanding
Leads to an accepted resilience improvement index
Implementation
Actions to be delivered locally, by plants
Progress to be monitored centrally, by programme
Draft Principles
Draft Principles for Site Resilience
Following an incident, as far as possible, facilities should
be self-reliant for a suitable period (typically 24 hours).
They should also have the local capability to get the plant
into control and then into a quiescent state, without
external support.
Similarly, Site should be self-reliant for a longer period,
without external support, typically at least 7 days
Favouring simple, robust solutions providing value.
Conclusions
Faced with translating reactor-based stress tests onto a complex suite of
nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, Sellafield Limited and its specialist
suppliers have developed an effective and systematic method of assessing
resilience.
This method (RESEP) has focussed on the plants within the greatest potential
consequences and has provided successful new insights into many facilities
beyond their Design Basis.
The process has identified a range of considerations and actions which will
make a genuine and sustainable improvement in resilience.
To be success RESEP needs
Thorough preparation
Knowledgeable inputs
An open environment where questioning is welcomed
Close engagement with Regulators and industry colleagues has been important
to success
We at Sellafield are committed to sustaining this approach to enhance
resilience and wide incorporate this approach into our long-term periodic review
of safety cases (LTPR) which is a cornerstone of the licensing system.