BILL OF RIGHTS Set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and

imposing limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,1986) The Bill of Rights affords protection against possible State oppression against its citizens, but not against an unjust or repressive conduct by a private party towards another (Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004-Justice Tingas separate opinion;).

the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. Requisites: a. The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intervention of the State; and b. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals. 2. Procedural due process this serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial agencies of the government. Requisites of due process in general: a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matters before it; b. Jurisdiction properly acquired over the person of the defendant and over property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; c. Opportunity to be heard; and To be heard does not mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.(Sandoval v. HRET, G.R. No. 19006, March 9, 2010) d. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence adduced (Banco Espaol Filipino v. Palanca, G.R. No. L11390, March 26, 1918). Right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process. It is a mere statutory right, but once given, denial constitutes violation of due process (Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, 2009 ed., p. 101). Since an appeal is a privilege of statutory origin, the law may provide relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. (Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110027, Nov.16, 1994)

Section 1 DUE PROCESS and EQUAL PROTECTION Due Process of Law - a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518). a. Life b. Liberty c. Property Due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. (Villegas v. Hiu Chong, GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978)

Aspects of Due Process: 1. Substantive due process this serves as a restriction on the governments law and rule-making powers. It requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty or property. Must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when

Requisites of administrative due process: 1. Right to hearing includes right to present ones case and submit evidence to support thereof; 2. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; 3. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 4. Evidence must be substantial, which means relevant evidence as a reasonable might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; 5. Decision must have something to support itself; 6. Decision must be based on evidence presented during hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed by the parties; and 7. Decision must be rendered in a manner that the parties can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered (Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L46496, February 27, 1940). Equal Protection of Law - all persons or things similarly situated must be similarly treated both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the Constitution requires is equality among equals. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. There is no difference between a law which actually denies equal protection of the law and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions (People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937).

4. It is germane to the purposes of the law (People v. Cayat, No. 45987, May 5, 1939) Section 2 Searches and Seizures Scope: A popular right, hence, protects all persons, including aliens (Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, No. L-10280, September 30, 1963) and, to a limited extent, artificial persons (Bache & Co., Inc. v. Ruiz, No. L-32409, February 27, 1971). . Artificial persons are entitled to the guaranty but they may be required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of the police power or the power of taxation. Their premises may not be searched nor may their papers and effects be seized except by virtue of a valid warrant. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Alvarez vs. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937) The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it (Stonehill v. Diokno, No. L-19550, June 19, 1967). Such right may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Waiver must be made by the person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992). The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from their waiver of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities (Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, Nov. 3, 2008)

Classification- the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars Requisites of Valid Classification 1. Such classification rests upon substantial distinctions; 2. It is not confined to existing conditions only; 3. It applies equally to all members of the same class; and

Requisites of Valid Warrant: 1. Probable Cause Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof (People v. Syjuco, No. 41957, August 28, 1937); Must refer to one specific offense (Asian Surety v. Herrera, No. L-25232, December 20, 1973). For a search warrant such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, No. L-64261, December 26, 1984). For a warrant of arrest such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Webb v. De Leon G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995). cause

a. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or b. If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988). Distinction between the objectives of the prosecutor and the judge in determining the existence of a probable cause: The Prosecutor determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty and should be held for trial. The Judge determines if a warrant of arrest should be issued to place the accused in immediate custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice (Ho v. People, GR No. 106632 October 9, 1997) 3. After personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; The personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive. The purpose of this rule is to satisfy the examining judge as to the existence of probable cause. Witnesses are not necessary when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; however when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary (Alvarez vs. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937)

2. Determination of probable personally by the judge;

For a search warrant The judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion (Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental, G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991). For a warrant of arrest What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

4. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts they are testifying to; Hearsay is not allowed. It must not be based on mere information or belief.

Search Warrant The judge must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them (Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court); The determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding/opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicant and the witnesses (Kho v. Judge Makalintal G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999). The description of property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise, and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern; it is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will allow (Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999).

Warrant Of Arrest It is not necessary that the judge should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1998); he would simply personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor to see if it is supported by substantial evidence; he merely determines the probability, not the certainty of the guilt of the accused and, in so doing, he need not conduct a de novo hearing (Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995).

5. The warrant must describe particularly the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. Sufficiency of the description of the object is closely related with the sufficient particularity of the averments of the offense. However, it is not required that a technical description be given (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, June 20, 1996)

The following are subject to search and seizure 1. Property subject of the offense 2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense 3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime (People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994). Although the properties may have been seized in violation of the Constitution, it does not follow that its owner shall be entitled to recover it immediately. If the said property is the subject of litigation, it will remain in court custody until the case is terminated. If the property is prohibited by law like illegal drugs, it shall be confiscated and destroyed. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001).

General warrants are proscribed and unconstitutional (Nolasco v. Puno, No. L-69803, October 8, 1985); but, a John Doe Warrant (where true name of the person to be arrested is unknown) satisfies the constitutional requirement if there is some descriptio personae which will enable the officer to identify the accused (Pangandaman v. Casar, No. L-71782, April 14, 1988).

Warrantless Arrest, when valid: 1. When person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; 2. When: a. An offense has just been committed; and b. He has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and 3. When a person to be arrested is an escapee or detention prisoner (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view." (People v. Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong. G.R. NO. 144037, September 26, 2003). 4. Membership in organizations like NPA is a continuing offense, thus, a person can be arrested anytime. (Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 79731, July 9, 1990) 5. When the right is waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not to invoke it. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest, provided that he raises them before entering his plea (Sec. 26, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) Warrantless Searches, when valid: 1. When right has been voluntarily waived (People v. Malasugui, No. 44335, July 30, 1936); 2. As an incident to a lawful arrest, provided search is contemporaneous to arrest and within permissible area of search (see Sec. 13, Rule 126, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure); A valid arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed (People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999) A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made only within the permissible area of search, or the place within the immediate control of the person being arrested (Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998). 3. Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs laws

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

(Roldan v. Arca, No. L-25434, July 25, 1975); Searches and seizures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search must be sought before the warrant could be secured. Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation of immigration and smuggling laws. Custom searches however are not available in dwelling places. (Papa v. Mago, No. L27360, February 28, 1968 ); Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations; Visual search at checkpoints (Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989); Conduct of aerial target zoning and saturation drive in the exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990); When there is a genuine reason to stopand-frisk in the light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions to warrant a belief that the person detained has weapons concealed (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 1, 1997 citing Terry vs. Ohio); Where prohibited articles are in plain view (Chia v. Actg. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-43810, September 26, 1989); and Doctrine of exigent circumstances - under such urgency and exigency of the moment where a search warrant should be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994)

Knock and Announce Principle Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. Exceptions: Intrusion into the premises is permissible when:

1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; 2. When such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; 3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and 4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. (People v. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004) Plain View Doctrine the objects within the sight of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence (open to the eye and hand). The plain view doctrine is usually applied where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating object (People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993). Elements: 1. A prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; 3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and 4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Bolasa, GR No. 125754, December 22, 1999). The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a restraint upon the government. It does not apply so as to require exclusion of evidence which came into the possession of the Government through a search made by a private citizen (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991)

Limitations: 1. By lawful order of the court; 2. Public safety or public order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law (Sec. 3, Art. III). The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may one be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996).

Anti-Wire Tapping Act (R.A. 4200) prohibits any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record the same, or to communicate the content thereof to any other person. It is illegal for any person not authorized by all parties to any communication, to secretly record such communication by means of tape recorder. The law does not make any distinction, and as such, RA 4200 may be violated even by a party to the communication. (Ramirez v. Ca, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995) A telephone extension line is not among the devices covered by RA 4200 (Gaanan v. IAC, No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 ). The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications but not those which are public in character (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999). The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, stating in part that any security officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such measures reasonable measures to secure his safety and prevent his escape. By the very fact of their detention. Pre-trial detainees and convicted

Section 3 Privacy of Correspondence

Communication

and

prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. (Trillanes III v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, Aug. 25, 2005) The authorities may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of terrorist group as defined in the Human Security Act of 2007. Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized (Sec. 7, Human Security Act of 2007).

All the rights mentioned under this section, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation (Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983). Freedom of Expression Speech, expression and press include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded. It also includes movies as well as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an arm band as a symbol of protest, as well as peaceful picketing. Sovereignty would be negated if they were denied the opportunity to participate in the shaping of public affairs through the arbitrary imposition upon them of the ban of silence. The Constitutional right guaranteeing the freedom of expression is available only against government intrusion. This is apparent in the provision since it says no law shall be passed abridging the freedom. Scope The Constitution guarantees the liberty to utter what is in his mind and also guarantees him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The Freedom also includes the right to an audience, in the sense that the state cannot prohibit the people from hearing what a person has to say, whatever may be the quality of his thoughts.

US Supreme Court: Letters and sealed packages in the mails may be examined only as to their external appearance and weight and may not be opened except in accordance with the constitutional requirements of search and seizure. Exclusionary Rule Evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine) (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 ). Evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure clause, whether or not it is also self-incriminating testimonial evidence, is inadmissible. The illegally seized object must be returned if it is not a prohibited object (Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 92270, June 27, 1991); but if contraband, it can be confiscated (Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-59495-97, June 26, 1987)

Two-part test to determine reasonableness of person's expectation of privacy: 1. Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy 2. Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998). Section 4 Freedom of Expression

Elements or Aspects of Freedom of Expression: 1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint Means freedom from official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination Core Concepts of Prior Restraint a. Content-Neutral Regulation merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity; subject to an intermediate test

b. Content-Based Restraint or Censorship - the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech; given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008) Live TV coverage may be prohibited since the right of the accused must prevail over the right of the public to information and freedom of the press (A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, June 29, 2001) The doctrine of freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the protection of the core speech, speech which communicates political, social or religious ideas. It does not apply to commercial speech or the communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction. For commercial speech to enjoy protection, it must not be false or misleading and should not propose an illegal transaction (Friedman v. Rogers, G.R. No. 77-1163, February 21, 1979 and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, G.R. No. 72419, June 21, 1973 ) However, even truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if: a. Government has substantial interest to protect; b. The regulation directly advances that interest; and c. It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest d. It must not be overbroad (Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp v. Public Service Commission of NY, No. 79-565, June 20, 1980) from subsequent

A limitation on the power of the State to impose a punishment after publication or dissemination.

Tests for Valid Government Interference to Freedom of Expression: 1. Clear and present danger rule when words are used in such circumstance and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent (Schenck v. U.S., No. 437, 438, March 3, 1919); a. Clear causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned; and b. Present time element, identified with imminent and immediate danger; the danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable (Gonzales v. COMELEC, No. L27833, April 18, 1969). 2. Dangerous tendency rule words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has a right to prevent (Cabansag v. Fernandez, No. L8974, October 18, 1957). It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. 3. Balancing of interest rule when a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional and partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the court is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented (American Communications Association v. Douds, No. 10, May 8, 1950).

2. Freedom punishment

Clear and Present Danger and Dangerous Tendency Rules Couched in terms of degree of evil and proximity of evil Evolved in the context of prosecution for seditious speech

Balancing Interests Rule

of

Engagement Network, Inc v Anti-terrorism Council, 2010) Privileged Communication communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest, although it contains incriminatory matter which without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable (Ledesma v. CA, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997). Requisites of Privileged Communication: 1. Person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication, or at least had an interest to protect, which may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; 2. Communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and 3. Statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Kinds of Privileged Communication: nd 1. Absolutely Privileged Communication (2 sentence of Sec. 11, Art VI); and 2. Qualifiedly Privileged Communication a. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (Art. 354, Revised Penal Code) b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (Art. 354, Revised Penal Code) c. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest (Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999) As to criticism of an official conduct: The people have a right to scrutinize and comment or condemn the conduct of their chosen representatives in the government. As long as their comments are made in GOOD FAITH AND WITH JUSTIFIABLE ENDS, they are insulated from prosecution or damage suits for defamation even if such views are found to be inaccurate or erroneous. A public officer must not be too thin-

For legislation whose object is not the prevention of evil measurable in terms of proximity and degree Used for commercial speech.

When speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on free speech. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government, (2) furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (3) if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest.

A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." (Concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v Sandiganbayan, 2001, cited in Southern Hemisphere

skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts (U.S. v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918). Libel of Public Officials and Public Figures A public official is prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. As to pending litigation: The Philippines proscribe public comment on pending litigation, on the ground that it would interfere with the administration of justice. Publication tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or inference the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is punishable by the courts (sub judice rule). As to art and obscenity: It was observed that movies, compared to other media of expression, have greater capacity for evil and are consequently subject to more regulation. The burden of proving the film is unprotected expression must rest on CENSOR. Test of obscenity (Miller v. California, No. 7073, June 21, 1973) 1. Whether the average person applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest 2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law. 3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political or scientific values. Courts should apply the standard of the community in which the material is being tested. Stricter rules could be followed for television (Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, G.R. No. L69500, July 22, 1985). Stricter rules have also been allowed for radio especially because of its pervasive quality and because of the interest in the protection of children (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, No. 77-528, July 3, 1978)

However, the right must be exercised in such a way that it will not prejudice the public welfare. When such rights were exercised on regular school days instead of during the free time of the teachers, the teachers committed acts prejudicial to the best interests of the service (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183 & 129221, March 25, 1999). Extent of Authority of the State to Regulate Public Assemblies 1. Primacy of human rightsfreedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievancesover property rights has been sustained (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co. Inc., G.R. No. L31195, June 5, 1973) 2. To justify limitations on freedom of assembly there must be proof of sufficient weight to satisfy the clear and present danger test (JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, G.R. No. L65366 November 9, 1983) 3. The Philippine obligation under the Vienna Convention to protect the premises of embassies must be honored but it does not preclude application of the clear and present danger rule. If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. Power of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition (Primicias v. Fugoso, No. L-1800, January 27, 1948).

Assembly and Petition: The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint and may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities.

Rules on Assembly and Petition (J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983) 1. The applicant for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it is a private place, only the consent of the owner or of the one entitled to its legal possession is required. 2. Such application should be filed ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be a valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but to another public place It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. 3. The decision of the public authority, favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicant at the earliest possible opportunity so they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Permit for public assembly is NOT necessary if meeting is to be held in: 1. Private place; 2. The campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution; and 3. Freedom park (B.P. 880: The Public Assembly Act of 1985). Tests of a lawful assembly 1. Purpose for which it is held regardless of the auspices under which it is organized 2. Auspices test nature of the people composing the assembly The provisions of BP No. 880 are not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. The Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by BP No. 880, Calibrated Pre-emptive Response serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (Bayan, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)

behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. (IBP v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010) It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter (Id.)

Procedure under BP 880 An application for the permit to assemble shall be filed before the Office of the Mayor within 5 working days before the scheduled public assembly. Upon receipt, the same shall immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. The mayor shall act on the application within 2 working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his

Demonstrations in the vicinity of courts Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of 200 meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least 1 court sala. (In re Petition to Annul 98-7-02-SC). Academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional right to peaceable assembly and free speech. Right of Association embraced in the freedom of expression because it can be used as vehicle for expression of views that has a bearing on the public welfare. The right to association also includes the right not to join any organization (Victoriano

v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974) The constitutional right to association does not preclude the imposition of relevant qualifications for membership in any organization. As such, any person who does not meet the qualifications of a particular organization cannot invoke his right to association if membership is denied. Section 5 Freedom of Religion Religion any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc. often involving a code of ethics and philosophy; profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator (Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937) Separation of church and state delineate the boundaries between two institutions to avoid encroachment by one against another.

3. Article XIV Section 3 (3) (optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools) 4. Article XIV Section 4 (2) (citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards) 5. Article VI Section 29 (2) (appropriation allowed where ecclesiastic is employed in armed forces, in a penal institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium) B. Freedom of religious belief and worship Dual aspect of freedom of religious belief and worship: 1. Freedom to believe absolute as long as it is confined in the realm of thought 2. Freedom to act on ones belief subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Freedom to believe carries with it the corollary expectation that the government, while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into a persons religious pretensions. However, the moment belief flows into action, it becomes subject to government regulation. To compel students to take part in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious freedom (Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993). Expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations (Dominador L. Taruc, et al. v. Bishop Porfirio dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005). Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible

A. Non-establishment clause Scope: 1. State cannot set up a church; 2. Cannot pass laws which aid one or all religions or prefer one over another; 3. Cannot influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will; or 4. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither the state nor the government can set up a church, pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. (Everson v. Board of Education, No. 52, February 10, 1947).

Tests to determine when there is no violation of establishment clause: 1. The statue has a secular legislative purpose; 2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 3. It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion Constitutionally Created Exceptions to the Non-Establishment Clause: 1. Article VI Sec. 29 2. Article VI Section 28 (3) (exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes

constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST involves a three-step process. The Court explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz: 1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion? The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth. 2. The court asks: Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty? In this step, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO ESTABLISH THAT ITS PURPOSES ARE LEGITIMATE FOR THE STATE AND THAT THEY ARE COMPELLING. 3. The court asks: Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state? The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-021651, June 22, 2006 and August 4, 2003).

Limitations: 1. Liberty of abode upon lawful order of the court. 2. Right to travel a. In the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law; b. Any person on bail (Silverio vs. CA, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991).
Liberty of Abode May be impaired only upon lawful order of the court and within the limits prescribed by law Right to Travel May be curtailed even by administrative authorities, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law

Section 6 Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel Concept: Includes the right to choose ones residence, to leave whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another (Reyes v. Razon G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009)

Under the Human Security Act, cases where EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS NOT STRONG, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. (See Sec. 26 of the Human Security Act of 2007). The right to return to ones country is not included in the right to travel. The right to travel only includes: 1. The right to travel from the Philippines to another country; and 2. The right to travel within the Philippines (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989) While the right to travel of citizens covers both exit from and entry into the country, aliens cannot claim the same right. Every sovereign nation has the power to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe (Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, No. 1393, January 18, 1892) A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond (Manotoc

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986). Section 7 Right to Information Rights guaranteed: 1. Right to information on matters of public concern, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development; and 2. Corollary right of access to official records and documents. These are political rights that are available to citizens only (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution, p. 91, 2006 ed.). The law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. Availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION SOUGHT IS OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR PUBLIC CONCERN (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987).

and other national security, and information on inter government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. 3. Trade secrets and banking transactions, pursuant to the Intellectual property Law, and other related laws, and to the secrecy of bank deposits act. 4. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters, such As those relating to the apprehension, prosecution and detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior such arrest, detention and prosecution, 5. Other confidential matters. a. Parties to a government contract cannot stipulate that the terms thereof should be considered confidential and should be, open for examination by the public (AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008). b. The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings." (Neri v. Senate G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008) As to Public Documents: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Except perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. (Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 1948) Section 8 Right to Form Associations Right to form association cannot be impaired without due process of law.

Restrictions on the access to information 1. National security matters and intelligence information 2. Trade secrets and banking transactions 3. Criminal matters 4. Other confidential information Scope: Contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, or if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects (Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002). Exceptions: (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998) 1. The exercise is subject to reasonable regulations to project the integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of government operations. 2. National Security matters. These include state secrets regarding military, diplomatic

This general provision is fortified by Article IX-B, Section 2(5) which affirms that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. A reading of the proceedings of the ConCom shows that in recognizing the right of the government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to information of unions or association only, without including the right to strike. (SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989) Also guarantees the right not to join an association (Sta. Clara Homeowners Assoc. v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002).

The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the hearing panel that heard the petition for approval of the rehabilitation plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body and thus, its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the freedom to contract (China Banking Corp v ASB Holdings, G.R. No. 172192, December 23, 2008)

Exceptions: 1. Police power public welfare is superior to private rights (PNB v. Remigio, G.R. No. 78508, March 21, 1994) 2. Eminent Domain 3. Taxation In every contract, there is an implied reservation that it is subject to the police power of the State (Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979).

Section 9 Eminent Domain (See previous discussion under the Power of Eminent Domain) Section 10 Non-impairment of Contracts Contract any lawful agreement on the property or property rights, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible but does not cover licenses, marriage contract, and public office. Impairment anything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract. When is there impairment: There is impairment when there is a change in the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms (Clemons v. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922). Degree of diminution is immaterial. As long as the original rights of either parties are changed to their prejudice, there is already impairment of the obligation of contract No impairment: as long as a substantial and efficacious remedy remains; holds true even if there is remedy remained but it is the most difficult to employ, the easy ones are withdrawn

Section 11 Free Access to Courts The IBP provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, including representation in court, and similar services are available from the Department of Justice to litigants who cannot afford retained counsel. There are also private legal assistance organizations functioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable to resort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune of being poor. Free access to the court does not mean that the courts cannot impose filing fees. RA No. 9999 An Act Providing a Mechanism for Free Legal Assistance and for Other Purposes (Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010) Legal Services refers to any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court. (Sec.3)

Requirements for Availment.- For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a CERTIFICATION from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel. For purpose of DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF HOURS actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the NECESSARY CERTIFICATION that said legal services were actually undertaken. Incentives to Lawyers For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships rendering ACTUAL FREE LEGAL SERVICES, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR MATTER NO. 2012 issued by the Supreme Court. Bar Matter No. 2012 Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Practicing Lawyers members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies Exceptions: 1. Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed to practice law; 2. Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court; 3. Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics in law schools and lawyers of NGOs and Peoples Organizations who by nature

of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants; 4. Those who do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Covers, criminal, civil and administrative cases involving indigent and pauper litigants. Minimum of 60 hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants in a year, spread over 12 months with a minimum of 5 hours every month A practicing lawyer must secure from the Clerk of Court a certificate attesting to the hours spent. Practicing lawyers are required to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasijudicial bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance period; otherwise it may be a ground for the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records If no explanation is given by the practicing lawyer for the failure to render the prescribed number of hours or if the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) finds the explanation unsatisfactory, upon report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors, the erring lawyer shall be declared as a member not in good standing. Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under the Rule for at least 3 consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the Committee on Bar Discipline.

Section 12 Rights of an Accused under Custodial Investigation Custodial Investigation questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (Cruz, 2003). Time when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carryout a process of interrogations that lender itself to eliciting statements (Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478, 1964).

1. Right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel; Rationale: a. To make him aware of it; b. To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere; and c. To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke it. Carries the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed (People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 110290, January 25, 1995). As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police just to repeat the person under investigation the provisions of the constitution. He is not only duty bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled, he must also explain their effects in practical terms (People v. Roxas, G.R. No. L-16960-62, January 8, 1987). 2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and will be used against him; Rationale: a. To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent; and b. To make him aware that this is an adversary system and the police are not acting in his interest.

to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense (People v. Barasina, G.R. No. 109993, January 21, 1994). The following are NOT considered independent counsel: special counsel, public or private counsel, counsel of the police, or municipal attorney whose interest is adverse to that of the accused (People v. Fabro, G. R. No. 95089, August 11, 1997) or any other counsel whose interest may be adverse to that of the accused. A PAO lawyer is considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution. (Estrada v. Badoy, A. M. No. 0112-01-SC, January 16, 2003) 5. Right to be provided with counsel, if the person cannot afford the services of one; Rationale: a. To inform him that if he does not have a counsel or cannot afford one, he does not have to defend himself alone; b. To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right to counsel. While the choice of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one (People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 19, 1998).

3. Right to remain silent; 4. Right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; Rationale: a. To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the inherent pressure initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the right to counsel; and b. To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police.

6. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him; 7. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited; 8. Confessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights are inadmissible as evidence. Requisites of admissible extrajudicial confession a. Voluntary b. With assistance of a counsel c. In writing d. Express

"preferably of his own choice" does not mean that the choice of a lawyer is exclusive as

e. Signed (Section 2 (d), RA 7438) What is sought to be avoided by the rule is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter to convict him (People v. Bonola, G.R. No. 116394, June 19, 1997).

enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997). Sec. 2 of RA No. 7438 provides that custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is under investigation in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. The rights under custodial investigation are not available in administrative proceedings (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989).

Miranda Doctrine 1. Person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. 2. After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. 3. The right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer with him during the interrogation. 4. If he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 5. Even if he consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. 6. If the foregoing are not demonstrated, no evidence obtained cannot be used against. When available: The rights under Sec. 12, Art. III are available when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry unto an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, as when the suspect has been taken into police custody and the police carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements (People v. Mara, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994). Custodial Investigation The constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. (People of the Philippines v. Eric Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004.) A municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law

What rights may be waived: 1. Right to remain silent; 2. Right to counsel Waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.

What rights cannot be waived: 1. Right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel; 2. Right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel. Rights of Person Suspected and Subsequently Charged: 1. Before case is filed for preliminary investigation but after being put into custody or otherwise deprived of liberty, and on being interrogated by police: a. The continuing right to remain silent and counsel; b. To be informed thereof; c. Not to be subjected to force, violence, threat or intimidation which vitiates free will; d. To have evidence obtained in violation of these rights inadmissible as evidence. 2. After the case is filed in court: a. To refuse to be witness against himself; b. Not to have prejudice imputed on him as a result of such refusal; c. To testify on his behalf; d. To cross-examination; while testifying, to refuse questions which tend to incriminate him for some crime other than the present charge (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989)

It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they
BAIL BOND RECOGNIZANCE An obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act.

An obligation under seal given by the accused with one or more sureties, and made payable to the proper officer with the condition to be void upon performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform.

The right to bail may be invoked once detention commences even if no formal charges have yet been filed (Teehankee v Rovira, No. L-101, December 20, 1945) Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend right to bail (Sec.13, Art.III). Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail before conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy is to increase the amount of bail (Sy Guan v. Amparo, G.R. No. L-1771. December 4, 1947). An extraditee has also the right to apply for bail (See discussion in Treatment of Aliens PIL).

Forms of Bail: 1. Corporate surety; 2. Property bond; 3. Cash deposit; 4. Recognizance

had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel (People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995) A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999) and because the process has not yet shifted from investigatory to accusatory stage and it is usually the witness or complainant who is interrogated and who gives statement in the course of the line up (People v. Amestuzo, G.R. No. 140383, July 12, 2001). However, after the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police lineup is inadmissible (People vs. Macam, G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994)

Bail is a matter of right if a person is charged with an offense NOT punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
BAIL, A MATTER OF RIGHT (SEC. 4, RULE 114, Rules of Court)

All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this rule: (a) Before or after conviction by the MTC; and (b) Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (Note that RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of death penalty).

Bail is discretionary when a person is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the evidence of guilt is not strong.
BAIL, WHEN DISCRETIONARY (SEC. 5, RULE 114)

Section 13 RIGHT TO BAIL Bail security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under conditions specified under the Rules of Court (see Sec. 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

strong. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty after the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: a. that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion; b. that the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; c. that the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; d. that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or e. that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

Standards for fixing amount of bail: 1. Financial ability of accused; 2. Nature and circumstances of offense; 3. Penalty for offense; 4. Character and reputation of accused; 5. Age and health of accused; 6. Weight of evidence against him; 7. Probability of his appearance at trial; 8. Forfeiture of other bail; 9. Whether he was a fugitive from justice when arrested ; and 10. Pendency of other cases where he is on bail. (Sunga v. Judge Salud, Adm. Matter No. 2205-MJ, November 19, 1981). Excessive bail shall not be required (Sec. 9, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong (Baylon v. Judge Sison, AM No. 92-7360-0, April 6, 1995). Since bail is constitutionally available to all persons, it must be available to one who is detained even before formal charges is filed (Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil 634, 1945). It is sufficient that the person claiming the right must be under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As a general rule, the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that respondents in deportation proceedings, which are administrative in nature, do not enjoy the right. Traditionally, the right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the military, as an exception to the Bill of Rights (Comendador v. de Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991).

The exercise of discretion of the court is only limited in the determination of the gravity of guilt of the accused. If after summary hearing, it is determined that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court has no choice but to deny the application for bail. Inversely, if the court finds that the evidence of guilt of the accused is weak, the court has no discretion but to grant bail.

Hearing: Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors (Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997).
WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED (SEC. 7, RULE 114) No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall be admitted to bail if: (a) Charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or death; AND evidence of guilt is

When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. (Go. v. Ramos G.R. No. 167569, Sept. 4, 2009)

C. Right to be heard by himself and counsel The right to be heard can be understood to mean the totality of the rights embodied in an adequate criminal procedural system, which can be viewed as expressing both the qualities of the hearer and the manner of the hearing. Qualities of the hearer The qualities demanded of the HEARER are fairness and impartiality. It is demanded that the judge may not play the double role of prosecutor and judge in one and the same case. He must maintain an attitude of neutrality in regard to the prosecution and the accused. Influence on the judge, even if unconscious, which prevents a calm and careful review of the evidence can nullify his decision. Rights of the accused during trial 1. Right to present evidence and to be present at the trial Right to present evidence includes the right to testify in ones favor and the right to be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses, he is entitled to a trial of each case, and it is error for the court to consider in one case the evidence adduced against him in another. 2. Right to be assisted by counsel Right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver (Flores v. Ruiz, No. L-35707, May 31, 1979). 3. Right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. D. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him Description, not designation of the offense, is controlling. Purposes: 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the sane cause; and

Section 14 Rights of the Accused A. Criminal Due Process Requisites of criminal due process 1. Accused is heard by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law; 3. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard; and 4. Judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law (Mejia v. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988). To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (Martelino v. Alejandro, G.R. No. L20707, March 30, 1970) B. Presumption of Innocence 1. Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account; 2. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People v. Austria, G.R. No. 55109, April 8, 1991). Reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971)

Equipoise Rule evidence of both sides are equally balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused (Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991).

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (U.S. v. Karelsen, No. 1376, January 21, 1904). In Soriano v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984), the petitioner claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court held that the contention is wrong because a reading of the information which has been reproduced clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

E. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial Purpose: To serve as safeguard against attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. Speedy free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003). Impartial accused entitled neutrality of an impartial judge; to cold

safeguard is the belief that the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104, July 25, 1973). General public may be excluded when the evidence to be presented in the proceeding may be characterized as offensive to decency or public morals. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only implies that court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in available seats, and conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. (Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001) The right may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The presumption is always against the waiver of constitutionally protected rights.

F. Right to meet the witnesses face to face (Right to confrontation) Two-fold purpose of this right: 1. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and 2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness (U.S. v. Javier, No. 12990, January 21, 1918). Right to cross-examination may be waived. Testimony of witness who was not cross-examined is not admissible as evidence for being hearsay (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-8781, March 30, 1914). If cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material time, was not completed, and the witness in the meantime died before cross-examination could be resumed, so much of the testimony as had already

Public to prevent possible abuses which may be committed against the accused. Public trial is when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. The reason for this

been covered by cross-examination is admissible. (People v. Seneris, G.R. No. L-49933. August 6, 1980) An accused is not entitled, as a matter of right, to be present during the preliminary examination nor to crossexamine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. A preliminary examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate or be present. (Marinas v. Siochi, G.R. No. L-25707, May 14, 1981)

Requirements: (People v. Sandal, No. 32394, September 5, 1930) 1. That the witness is really material; 2. That he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining attendance of said witness; 3. That the witness will be available at the time desired; and 4. That no similar evidence could be obtained. H. Trial in absentia This is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence is unjustified (People v. Judge Salas No. L-66469, July 29, 1986). The right to be present during the trial may be waived provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC) The judge may exclude any person, INCLUDING THE ACCUSED, whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child. Alternative Ways to Testify 1. Live-link television testimony in criminal case where the child is a victim or a witness the judge may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. 2. Videotaped Deposition 3. Screens, one-way mirror, and other devises to shield child from the accused

The presence of the accused is mandatory: 1. During arraignment and plea; 2. During trial, for identification, unless the accused has already stipulated on his identity during the pre-trial and that he is the one who will be identified by the witnesses as the accused in the criminal case; or 3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense. Section 15 Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Habeas Corpus - issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf (Bouviers Law Dictionary). Habeas Corpus have the body When Available: 1. In cases of illegal detention or restraint; or 2. In custody cases

G. Right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of evidence The accused is entitled to the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum for the purpose of compelling the attendance of the witnesses and the production of evidence that he may need for his defense. Failure to obey the process is punishable as contempt of court; if necessary, the witness may even be arrested so he can give the needed evidence (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., p 348).

Primary requisite for its availability is actual deprivation of personal liberty, or deprivation of right of custody. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a persons liberty has been judicially adjudged to be illegal or unlawful (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong-Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995). Once a person detained is DULY CHARGED in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies AUTHORIZED TO ORDER THE PERSONS CONFINEMENT, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration (Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, Sept. 4.2009)

(The discussion regarding the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ and the person who may suspend the privilege is discussed in Article VII: Executive Department.) Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with a violation with an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity Sec. 1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-912-SC). The adoption of such a remedy in the Philippines may be based on ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 5(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION, which empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "FREEDOM FROM THREAT." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" clause in the latter part of SECTION 1 OF THE AMPARO RULE is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.(Reyes v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009) The writ of amparo is not intended to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.(Id.) When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec.22 A.M. No. 07-9-12SC). Although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to

Purpose of the Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: To enable the government to deal with situation of an invasion or a rebellion and the government must charge JUDICIALLY those who are involved in the rebellion or invasion. The Supreme Court has the power not just to determine executive arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the suspension but also the power to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension (Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971). Since the Court will have to rely on the factfinding capabilities of the executive department, the executive department, if the President wants his suspension sustained, will have to open whatever findings the department might have to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. For a person to lose the privilege of the writ he must be judicially charged. It is not enough that a complaint is under investigation by a fiscal or that a charge has been filed before the fiscals office; it is necessary that the criminal charge has been filed in court.

carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009). The parties shall establish their claims by SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. The respondent who is a PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability (Sec. 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009). If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied (Sec. 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009). The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it

is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. (Id.) Writ of Habeas Data - is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party (Sec. 1, Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC). It is intended to insure the human right to privacy by requiring the respondent to produce the necessary information to locate the missing person or such data about him that have been gathered in secret to support the suspicion that he has been taken into custody in violation of his constitutional rights or, worse, has been salvaged without benefit of lawful trial. The writ may also be sought to secure destruction of such secret information gathered in violation of the persons right to privacy to justify summary action against him by the government or any private entity.(Cruz, 2007)

Writ of Kalikasan - It is available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (Rule 7, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A. M. No. 09-6-8-SC) The petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan can be filed with the Supreme

Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner shall be exempt from payment of docket fees. (Rule 7, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A. M. No. 09-6-8-SC) Section 16 Right to Speedy Determination of Cases The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings (Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001). In case of violation of the right to a speedy trial, the remedy for violation of said right is dismissal obtained through mandamus (Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999).

incrimination. (Samson v. Beltran, No. 32025, September 23, 1929). Waiver of the right against self-incrimination Either directly or by failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and willingly made. The witness may be cross examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination. Transactional Immunity Statute testimony of any person or whose possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates (Sec. 18 (8), Art. XIII). Use and Fruit Immunity Statute prohibits the use of the witness compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness (Galman v. Pamaran, No. L-71208-09, August 30, 1985). Section 18 Non-detention by Reason of Political Beliefs or Aspiration No man is to be interfered with because of his opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb public order or established law.

Section 17 Self-incrimination Availability: Criminal Proceedings All Governmental proceedings Civil Actions and Administrative Legislative Investigations Note: May be claimed not only by the accused (when called to testify) but also by the witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed. Effect of Violation: In People v. Alicando (G.R. No. 117487, December 2, 1995), the Court declared that once the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is inadmissible. Scope: Applies only to testimonial compulsion and production of documents, papers and chattels in court except when books of account are to be examined in the exercise of police power and the power of taxation. An accused may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his garments may be removed, and his body may be examined. An order requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated with the documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional proscription against self-

Involuntary Servitude it is the condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not. General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall exist. Exceptions: 1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted (Sec. 18(2), Art. III); 2. Service in defense of the State (Sec 4, Art. II); 3. Naval enlistment (Robertson v. Baldwin, No. 334, January 25, 1897); 4. Posse comitatus (U.S. v. Pompeya, No. 10255, August 6, 1915) 5. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest (Kaisahan ng Mangagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948); and

6. Patria Potestas (Art. 211, par.(2), FC) Slavery the civil relation wherein one man has absolute power over the life, fortune and liberty of another. Peonage a condition of enforced servitude by which the servitor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in liquidation of some debt or obligation real or pretended, against his will. Restraint of the individual so he can be compelled to work for another, be it the government or a private party, violates the constitutional guaranty, subject to certain exceptions.

A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Hence, its non-payment maybe validly punished with imprisonment. While debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. L-63419, 18 December 1986).

Section 19 Prohibited Punishment Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To violate constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the senses of the community (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953). To be CRUEL AND UNUSUAL OR EXCESSIVE, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed. Mere fines and imprisonment are not violative. To be so, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and shocking to the conscience. Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of death penalty. Section 20 Non-imprisonment for Debt Coverage: 1. Debt any civil obligation arising from a contract. It includes even debts obtained through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution (Ganaway v. Quillen, G.R. No. L-18619, February 20, 1922) 2. Poll Tax a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or occupation (e.g. Community Tax )

Section 21 Double Jeopardy The rule of double jeopardy means that when a person was charged with an offense and the case was terminated by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without his consent; he cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense (Melo v. People, No. L-3580, March 22, 1950). Appeal An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens in the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process (People v. TriaTirona, G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006) 1. A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment because of the doctrine that nobody may be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense (Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100) 2. The rule prohibiting appeal in judgments of acquittal in criminal cases should not be avoided in the guise of a petition for certiorari. 3. Exceptions: An appeal from order of dismissal shall not constitute double jeopardy if: 1. Dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; 2. Dismissal is not acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or on the merits of the case; 3. The question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further

proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant (People v. City of Manila, G. R. No. L-36528; September 24, 1987) Motion for Reconsideration As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight. Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. (Lejano v. People, G. R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011) Two types: 1. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense; and 2. Double jeopardy of punishment for the same act DISMISSAL OF ACTION, when made at the instance of the accused, DOES NOT put accused in first jeopardy, EXCEPT: a. When the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence; or b. When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial (Cue v. IAC, G.R. No. 74989-90, November 6, 1989).

4.

Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (People v. Ylagan, No. 38443, November 25, 1933).

Crimes covered: 1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or frustration thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original complaint or information; and 2. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall bar another prosecution for the same act. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the IDENTITY OF OFFENSES CHARGED: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. (People v. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987) Where one is punished by law and an ordinance, the inquiry is on the identity of the act.

Doctrine of Supervening Event allows the prosecution for another offense if subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted (People v. Villarama, G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992) Double jeopardy for the same act does not require prior conviction or acquittal or dismissal of the first information, as long as the first jeopardy has already attached (People v. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987). Double jeopardy DOES NOT attach in preliminary investigations (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 44205, February 16, 1993). Conviction of accused shall NOT bar another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense originally charged when: 1. Graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission; 2. Facts constituting the graver offense arose or discovered only after the filing

Requisites for double jeopardy for the same offense: 1. Valid complaint or information; 2. Filed before a competent court; 3. To which defendant has pleaded; and

of the former complaint or information; and 3. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of prosecutor or offended party (People v. Judge Villarama, G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992). Inseparable offenses Where one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions. However, it is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes: separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed provided the elements of the several crimes are not identical. Reopening of Kuratong Baleleng Cases: The new rule (Sec. 8, Rule 117) has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a prior notice to the offended party. The time-bar cannot be applied retroactively in 1999 when the cases were dismissed for to do so, the State shall effectively have less than two years to reopen the case because the rule only took effect in December 2000. This would prevent absurd results and injustice to the State (People, et al. vs. Panfilo Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003). Section 22 Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder Ex Post Facto Law is one that would make a previous act criminal although it was not so at the time it was committed. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.

4. Law altering the legal rules of evidence and allowing the receipt of less or different testimony than what the law required at the time of commission, in order to convict accused; 5. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful; and 6. Law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled, such as protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Characteristics: 1. Refers to criminal matters; 2. Retroactive; and 3. Prejudicial to the accused. Application: Prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. It also applies to criminal procedural law prejudicial to the accused. But it is improper to apply the prohibition to an executive proclamation suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. Even if the law be penal and retroactive, it will still not be ex post facto if it does not operate to the disadvantage of the accused. If the punishment originally imposed is retroactively made heavier, or the method of its execution made more severe, then the law will be subject to the constitutional prohibition.

Bill of Attainder legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial (Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277). It substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder. The provision prevents the legislature from assuming judicial magistracy. It is thus a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply trial by legislature.

Kinds: (U.S. v. Diaz-Conde, No. 18208, February 14, 1922) 1. Law making an act criminal which was not so before its passage; 2. Law aggravating the penalty for a crime committed before its passage; 3. Law inflicting a greater or more severe penalty;