German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism ed.

Rockmore Kerszberg : Being as an Idea of Reason 36 In his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Kant is credited with discovering pure temporality as pure imaginationH. then says imagination contains the whole secret of time and being. (Remember, intuition is passive, intellect is active synthesizing, imagination is _____? transcendental imagination is the mediating faculty that represents in time that which is structural and intelligible, it is the seat of the schematism, which fits the categories of the understanding onto the manifold----a propos, is the function of understanding bijective onto the manifold?) Kant claims that the transcendental subject constitutes time, but is itself atemporal. H. is searching for a subjectivity in Kant that is historical or temporal. The imagination is prior to both subject and object, since it mediates the two. Kant calls it Urzeit. 37 Kant's objection to Heidegger's primordial temporal transcendence of Dasein is that Dasein can't ever get at Being, since by approaching Being, the Unconditioned is necessarily transformed into an Idea of Reason (just like self, world and god). (The whole Unconditioned, which is fallaciously assumed to be already given (sez Kant) reminds me of the transcendence of the world...there is always more unconditioned out there, and we can never establish closure on the cosmos. The world is the model by which we learn the value of excess, individuality. Think of the horizon like a planar orifice, spewing novelty.) Heidegger thinks there is a ground where intuition and concepts meet up, but Kant asks us to see them as absolute heterogeneity, never a heirarchy, and we freely jump from one to the other (admittedly problematic). There are transcendental illusions when we take what makes sense for subject knowledge to be an object. Kant: Reason has an indirect relation to intuition, and can put undestanding out of play for a pause to capture the regularly concealed essence of appearance (e.g. as apperance). The understanding is unable to do this in its constant forward motion, for it is always a re-cognizing. We wish to redouble the appearance so we can make sure it is what it is. 40 Thought is a spontaneous production: how to check its sources? Reason is not constitutive, but some sort of dynamic regulative principle which is at play in the dialogue between thought and world, sez Kant. The illusions are useful for our epistemological projects, unavoidable with the peckish tendencies of Reasonit's just that these ideas need to be used regulatively and not constitutively ???? A645/B673 We are incapable of jettisoning these ideas, and need to use them wiselythey will not provide concepts through which we can access objects of speculative reason.73) 41 B&T 166 (Macquerrie) Dasein, in its lostness within the they, takes on all of reality, the ens realissimum. This is broadest, highest, concept of reality in Kant (god itselfcan we have theoretical knowledge of god? Or is the Idea just a useful fiction? Every theory is god, isn't it? A heaven on Earth?). And Heidegger speaks disparagingly of it. The ens realissimum, I believe, is the unified worldwhen all is one. In line with Heidegger, this is to be avoided, and we must step back from it to find the authentic self.

Re: illusions in Kantthey are not outright errors, but are created when thinking withdraws from the sensory world. There is a danger of transgressing the boundaries of any human contact with the real world. Reason does this ineluctably by its appetite for closure. [What is the reasonably basic movement of Reason's drive toward systematization? Why, in posing this very question as such it's obviously: generalization. The foundation of mathematics is a composite of a very few axioms of set theory (perhaps, an articulated unity? For surely no axiom is prior to the other, but they work together to form the world). The original movement of reason is that these distinct things share a have ownedness in common. 46 Possibly the Crux of the essay so far: Thinking the absence of a transcendental appearance (the always visible correlate to sensibility's tug on the understanding, which is made sensible by outer intuition) can only be done by doubling that very same appearance. This logic of illusion defines the phenomenality of thought, which is more orginary than pure thought itself. (and so we have the strain toward mystical non-thought?) Vasterling : The Problem of Time 97 Only if we could stop time would understanding be complete and definite. The unretreivable past comes from behind our back to imbue the present with meaning, it is the light in which we see (the decoder ring for the present circumstances). It is a beckoning and receding horizon we can never grasp because we cannot stop time. [Now, can time be stopped? The reach of information may complete its projectthe past will be fixed and understanding complete. A catalogue of all, a final cyclopedia.] The transparency of knowledge and perception are due to this blindness to the informing presuppositions. Just as we are able to ecstatically get beyond our bodies because we can ignore the biological foundations. Or the noise in our brains is transcended.... 98 Dasein is able to regain its sense of authentic time, deconstruct the grasp of the presentonly if there is a world to be open to, that is. There may be no more elbow room for ecstatic transcendence. Young H and Fichte 108 Fichte sez all science is systematic. It is important that the first principle be an act, not an empirically determined state. 110 When the divisible-I determines the divisible-not-I ----practical reason. Vice versa, theoretical reason. The striving between the two is an intentional structure that must be enacted time and time again 112 Fichte understood that basic philosophy must abstract out the content of experience to find the unvarying forms and norms. But, sez H, is doesn't get to ought. Fichte sez reason just ought to be, for freedom 113 Heidegger and Windelband both agree that the ideals of reason depend on the material at hand (church, state, etc. cf Scheler's ethics) But, poor Windelband, the ideals cannot be abstracted from ontic material 116 Unlike Fichte's highest principle, the primal something of H is not self-evident, but must be taken phenomenologically. Husserl identified the pre-theoretical with the theoretical....a mistake. H is more subtle Strube : h's turn to German Idealism

GA 28:91 Fichte prescribed a program basic to metaphysics: the priority of certainty over truth. Facticity is prior to meaning, it is meaningless, and Fichte is hungry for the deductive step-wise march of certainty. 124 The upshot of phenomenology is that unconditioned, the unproveable (which serves as the limit encountered by Fichte's will to certainty) is phenomenologically significant. 125 There is a strange unconditioned decree of Reason which provides the end-goal...maybe... It applies in Fichte's famous 3rd principle, which posits the divisibility of the non-I and the I, so that Knowledge may begin. He says since the principle is made up of two propisitions, and is determined by form alone, it may be thereby proved (cf. formalism in mathematics). The task is given at hand easily, but the resolution, the solution, Lsung is given by an unconditioned decree of reason. 126 We are already surrendered (berantwortet) to the decree, sez H's reading of Fichte 127 It is the hermeneutic situation that must always be presupposed facticity 132 The decree of reason, proclaims: let there be no not-I at all! In the encounter of I and not-I, the I must dominate. Dasein is its acts, its situation...the absolute I solves the problem of interaction. The infinite self, yet bounded...the peace of a nation!! Schelling : Hedley 143 Jacobi sez that speculative (idealistic) philosophy leads to nihilism. And, whaddyaknow, he used 'Seyn' for Spinoza's monistic substance. The challenge of German Idealism was to make a system that is not nihilistic. Mysticism could rise to the challenge. It assumes an activity between god and man (Look up Michel Vater Heidegger and Schelling : the finitude of being 147 Hegel locates the final freedom in the state (mediation, rational praxis of the spirit), Jacobi sez freedom is immediate, prerational and supernatural 148 Schelling : there is a non-mediated rupture in the godhead, it opens an abyss in which we may freely exercise decision Hegel and Heidegger : Rockmore 158 Heidegger sez Hegel has dissolved ontology into logic, and for this must be overcome 160 Weltanschauung presupposes both a subject and a perspective 161 Kant's theoretical reason is, after all, practical. His philosophy fits within the bounds of human reason, and goes after the ends of reason. Heidegger -- Lask -- Fichte : Kisiel 242 Cassirer made the comparison between Fichtes irrationality to the ego and Kants notion that freedom is inconceivable. 244 In the middle abyss, Fichtes hiatus irrationalis, in which Kants schematism interfaces, disclosed by anguish...Lask saw a pre-judicative supra-oppositional panarchy of the logos which structures irrational matter and becomes the matter of judgement (apparently a position to combat the pan-logicism of Hegelian school). In Fichte's vocab, facticity has a counter-concept: logicity (lawfulness). This abyss that opens between various sorts of empirical and trancendental poles: Husserl: pure givens are in a separate realm and reducible to each other Scheler: emotional intuition of value essences

Lask: alogical dispersion of forms through their matter which itself is logically nude. All of these and more are in Heideggerequiprimordial categories, throwness of the situation, angst Facticity is a concept that goes back a ways--possibly to Descartes--as the basic fact of the I-think. For Kant, the fact of the feeling of pure practical reason that cannot be given any ground. Freedom is the sole fact of pure reason. (Is this the distinctly human character of worldopenness?) [the ultimate ground is that ground grounds. This applies equally to electricity as well as evolution.] 246 In selective moments of historical time there happen Events, which impart new meaning. ((cross this with my kairological ruptures.) Kant's second critique sez freedom and the moral law are the sole fact of pure reason There are, to some degree, individual values, transcendental facts, irreducible value singularity. (Fichte Werke Vol 1, 226 or 240) 247 Philosophic logic, logic of logic, is not situated in the psyche. Or for that matter, in the physical or metaphysical, but in the Third World. ((this jives with an LoA understanding...there is a logic between tree-soil, my two hands, math. Insofar as there is communication (the logos?). Thus, logical truths are just stable channels of communication. This is why Hegel is forced to assert even negativity has a certain presence) 248 The fundamental ways of being for productive logical activity are, around 1925-26, for H called Temporalien (tensors---rhema @Sophist 410 are called tense-words (Zeitwort). The verbs don't have any content themselves, but work on the content-laden nouns, to produce a gatheredtogether speaking which is delotic) and then Existentialen. 252 The environing world appeared to Lask as the ought or value...the not speculatively unthinglike world is factic. To grasp this non-object would be grasping the mediating LoA immediately. (Thus, in SZ we are normally absorbed in the homogeneous environing world) Division 1 of SZ: a techne of poeisis. Division 2: a phronesis of praxis. 253 Recall with Lask that form is materially determined. Domains of reality are differentiated by matter to begin with, put into regionalized material logics. Homogenization comes next. Now, Lasks reflexive category seems to encompass the undifferentiated primal concrete totality (cf. Deleuzes anexact?). 255 For there to be an object there must be difference (sez Rickert, and, like, everyone else in Germany). Heidegger sez every object has (or is?) an intentional nexus. (cf. Scheler has that an object can be the bearer of indefinitely many values) and Lask describes the panarchy of logos as a bundle of rays and relations. Should it not seem to me that so many officially diverse thinkers are the same thing? Maybe its just easiest to notice what they get right... 259 Knowledge seems to always be of something--mediated in a way--but young Heidegger sez as for the original something, Ur-etwas, the primal grasp is of the comporting relation (Verhalten) itself. This pays no mind in who or what does the comporting, or what is comported toward. It is just the out-toward relational sense (Bezugsinn). This is what a formal indication indicates--no specification of ontic content. In SZ this becomes the description of Daseins sense (Sinn), and this intentional drive is transformed into Daseins temporality. Dasein, and life at the most basic level, holds potency (Sturm?) to world-out. So....the primal something is a comporting relation, the intent, interest, value conferring drive. All of

these are particular LoAs, with their own behavioral temporality. But even more, to immediately apprehend the LoA is nothing but a view from nowhe(n)re And the momentous suspension of these system times discloses the impossible possibility for transcendence.