Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs.

CA (2002) Facts: Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC erroneously and unlawfully levied certain propertieswhich it claims as its own. It filed a 3rdparty claim withthe Labor Arbiter and recovery of property and damageswith the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, thecourt dismissed the petition on the ground of forumshopping and that the proper remedy was appeal in duecourse, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed aMFR and argued that the filing of a complaint for accionreinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is aremedy specifically granted to an owner (whoseproperties were subjected to a writ of execution toenforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which itwas not a party). The MFR was denied. Hence, petitionerfiled this appeal. Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case Held:YES A third party whose property has been levied upon by asheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor isafforded with several alternative remedies to protect itsinterests. The third party may avail himself of alternativeremedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude thethird party from availing himself of the other alternativeremedies in the event he failed in the remedy firstavailed of.Thus, a third party may avail himself of the followingalternative remedies:a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of theLabor Arbiter, andb) If the third party claim is denied, the third partymay appeal the denial to the NLRC.Even if a third party claim was denied, a third partymay still file a proper action with a competent courtto recover ownership of the property illegally seizedby the sheriff.The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiterand the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing asubsequent action for recovery of property and damageswith the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of suchcomplaint will not make petitioner guilty of forumshopping. PAQUITO V. ANDO, PETITIONER, VS. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. Facts: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI).Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bagsof sugar. In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment. They filed acase for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City. NLRC decided inthe favor of respondents directing petitioner to pay 442,702.Petitioner and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. In a decision but failed to perfect hisappeal because he did not pay the supersedes bond. It also affirmed the LaborArbiter's decision with modification of the award for separation pay to four otheremployees who were similarly situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondentsmoved for its execution.[9] To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued aNotice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140167 in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x xmarried to Erlinda S. Ando." This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer fortheissuance of (TRO) before the RTC Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that theproperty belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could notbe subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgmentdebtor, execution should be made on the latter's properties. RTC denied the prayerfor TRO because lack of jurisdiction pursuant to theNLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment , petitioner's remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff.Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of thecase.Petitioner filed a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA affirmed RTCdecision hence this petition Issue : whether RTC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from labor decisions.Whether the notice of sale was valid. Held:CA did not, in fact, err in upholding the RTC's lack of jurisdiction to restrain theimplementation of the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear anddecide questions which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions,orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of theDepartment of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment thatgoverns any question on the execution of a judgment of that body. TheNLRC Manualon the Execution of Judgment deals specificallywith third-party claims in casesbrought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not aparty to the case, asserts title to or right to the possession of the property leviedupon. It also sets out the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim There is no doubt in our mind that petitioner's complaint is a third- party claim withinthe cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a "third party"inrelation to the property subject of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiter's decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not tothe corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership,not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party,i.e, the conjugalpartnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioner's wife is a thirdparty within contemplation of the law. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor RelationsCommission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpretedas vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with orrelating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. There is no denying that the present controversy arose from the complaint for illegaldismissal. The subject matter of petitioner's complaint is the execution of the NLRCdecision. Execution is an essential part of the proceedings before the NLRC. Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated, and therecan be no end to the controversy without the full and proper implementation of thecommission's directives.Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his wife. Since he was sued in a representativecapacity, and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to answerfor the judgment obligation of the corporation.2. notice of sale null and void The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only toproperties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff,therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.

Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to executeon the properties of the corporation.In sum, while petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights,nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps andgrant the petition. ART 226 ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAO, petitioner, vs. ATTY.ERNESTO C. VERCELES, respondent. [G.R. No. 168583. July 26, 2010.]DEL CASTILLO, J p: FACTS: - Atty. Montao worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center. Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW Staff Association, andeventually became the employees' union president. Hewas likewise designated officer-in-charge of FFW LegalCenter. - During the 21st National Convention andElection of National Officers of FFW, Atty. Montao wasnominated for the position of National VicePresident.The Commission on Election (FFW COMELEC)informed him that he is not qualified for the position ashis candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution andBy-Laws. Atty. Montao thus filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that his name be included in theofficial list of candidates. Election ensued in the NationalConvention. Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strongopposition and protest of respondent Atty. Ernesto C.Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the conventionand president of University of the East Employees' Association (UEEA-FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed Atty. Montao'scandidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimedas the National Vice-President. - Through a letter to the Chairman of FFWCOMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montao's candidacy which he manifested duringthe plenary session before the holding of the election inthe Convention. Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter tothe President of FFW requesting for immediate action onhis protest. - Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA-FFW andofficer of the Governing Board of FFW, filed before theBLR a petition for the nullification of the election of Atty.Montao as FFW National Vice-President. The BLRrendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. While it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra-uniondispute case and affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles' legalpersonality to institute the action as president of anaffiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled that there were nogrounds to hold Atty. Montao unqualified to run for National Vice-President of FFW. Atty. Verceles filed aMotion for Reconsideration but it was denied by theBLR. Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to the CAvia a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Conventionhad no authority under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws to overrule and set aside the FFW COMELEC'sDecision rendered pursuant to the latter's power toscreen candidates. The CA set aside the BLR'sDecision. -Believing that it will be prejudiced by the CADecision since its legal existence was put at stake, theFFW Staff Association, through its president, Danilo A.Laserna, sought intervention. The CA issued aResolution denying both Atty. Montao's motion for reconsideration and FFW Staff Association's motion for intervention/clarification. Hence, the present petition. -In their brief, petitioner contended the Court of Appeals seriously erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations over the intra-uniondispute as well as the collateral attack on the legality of FFW as a legitimate labor organization. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute (2) Whether or not Atty. Montano can runlegally and validly for the said position.. HELD: (1) YES, it has jurisdiction over such. Section226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR andthe Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes.Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers' association officers. Thereis, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's jurisdiction over theinstant dispute involving member-unions of a federationarising from disagreement over the provisions of thefederation's constitution and by-laws. TDCAISWe agree with BLR's observation that:Rule XVI lays down the decentralizedintra-union dispute settlement mechanism.Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard'shall be filed in the Regional Office where theunion is domiciled.' The concept of domicile inlabor relations regulation is equivalent to theplace where the union seeks to operate or hasestablished a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealingwith employers concerning terms and conditionsof employment.The matter of venue becomes problematic whenthe intra-union dispute involves a federation, becausethe geographical presence of a federation mayencompass more than one administrative region.Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureauexercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputesinvolving federations. It is well-settled that FFW, havinglocal unions all over the country, operates in more thanone administrative region. Therefore, this Bureaumaintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreementover any provision of its constitution and by-laws. (2) NO, he cannot. To begin with, FFWCOMELEC is vested with authority and power, under theFFW Constitution and By-Laws, to screen candidatesand determine their qualifications and eligibility to run in the election and to adopt and promulgate rulesconcerning the conduct of elections. Under the RulesImplementing the Labor Code, the Committee shall havethe power to prescribe rules on the qualification andeligibility of candidates and such other rules as mayfacilitate the orderly conduct of elections. The Committeeis also regarded as the final arbiter of all electionprotests. From the foregoing, FFW COMELEC,undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its owninterpretation of the explicit provisions of the federation'sconstitution and by-laws and unless it is shown to havecommitted grave abuse of discretion, its decision andruling will not be interfered with. The FFW Constitutionand By-laws are clear that no member of the GoverningBoard shall at the same time perform functions of therank-and-file staff. The BLR erred in disregarding thisclear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling whichconsidered Atty. Montao's candidacy in violation of theFFW Constitution is therefore correct.We, thus, concur with the CA that Atty. Montaois not qualified to run for the position but not for failure tomeet the requirement specified under Section 26 (d) of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and By-Laws. We notethat the CA's declaration of the illegitimate status of FFWStaff Association is proscribed by law, owing to thepreclusion of collateral attack. We nonetheless resolveto affirm the CA's finding that Atty. Montao isdisqualified to run for the position of National Vice-President in view of the proscription in the FFWConstitution and By-Laws on federation employees fromsitting in its Governing Board. Accordingly, the electionof Atty. Montao as FFW Vice-President is null and void

DIOKNO VS CACDAC Facts: FLAMES, the Supervisor's Union for MERALCO, held a Union Election. It formed its own COMELEC for the purpose of conducting fair elections, with Dante Tong as its Chairman. Jimmy Ong and others filed their certificates of candidacy (CoC). But these were rejected by the COMELEC on the ground that Ong was not a member of FLAMES, and that the others were confidential employees. Another group, that of Edgardo Daya, also filed their CoCs. Other members of FLAMES petitioned the COMELEC to have them disqualified. The COMELEC disqualified Daya on the ground that they were committing acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the interest FLAMES, as provided for in their Constitution and By-Laws (CBL). It was alleged that, in their campaign, they had solicited support from non-union members, particularly from officers of the MEMABA and the MESALA. The union elections proceeded, then COMELEC declared Diokno and other petitioners as the new President, etc. of FLAMES. Ong's group filed a petition to annul the COMELEC's Order rejecting their CoCs. Daya's group likewise filed their petition to annul their disqualification, to nullify the election proceedings and counting of votes, to declare a failure of election, and to declare the holding of a new election to be controlled and supervised by the DOLE. And yet another group, that of Gaudencio Jimenez, filed another petition alleging that the union elections were not free, orderly and peaceful. All of these petitions were filed separately before the Med-Arb Unit of the DOLE, and were subsequently consolidated. Meanwhile, a new election was held, this time with Daya's group participating. Eventually, the CA upheld the validity of the new elections, and the declaration of Daya's group as the duly elected winners. The Med-Arb ruled that Ong's petition was rendered moot and academic, and that Jimenez's petition was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies within the COMELEC. With respect to Daya's petition, the Med-Arb ruled that Daya's disqualification was improper because it was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the grounds used by the COMELEC as a basis for disqualifying Daya, Art. IV, Sec. 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, actually referred to the grounds for Expulsion of a member from the union, and not Disqualification from the election.

In all cases, the Med-Arb asserted its jurisdiction. The BLR and the CA affirmed the Med-Arb's decision. Diokno and his group argued that the Med-Arb was without jurisdiction over the disputes, because Art. 226 which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter- and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Sec. 14, RA 6715 whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the NCMB. They also contended that the COMELEC had the sole and exclusive power to rule upon the qualification of any candidate, and therefore it has the correlative power to disqualify any candidate in accordance with its guidelines. Issue: Whether or not the BLR has jurisdiction. Held: Yes. Sec. 14, RA 6715 did not repeal the jurisdiction of the BLR. It only added the clause The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. The BLR has original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. Since Art. 226 has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union conflict is one occuring or carried on between or among unions. The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of Daya by the FLAMES COMELEC in the union elections. It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that Daya sought the help of non-union members in their election campaign, the same does not detract from the real character of the controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance over the CBL of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union. ART 227 Philippine Journalists vs. NLRC Facts: In NLRCs Resolution dated May 31, 2001, petitioner Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI) was adjudged liable in the total amount of P6,447,008.57 for illegally dismissing 31 complainants-employees and that there was no basis for theimplementation of petitioner's retrenchment program.Thereafter, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement dated July 9, 2001, where PJI undertook to reinstate the31 complainant-employees effective July 1, 2001 without loss of seniority rights and benefits; 17 of them who werepreviously retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their respective monetary claims, while14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what they received by way of separation pay.The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval. All the employees mentioned in the agreementand in the NLRC Resolution affixed their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the Joint Manifesto andDeclaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been submitted for the consideration of the labortribunal.The NLRC forthwith issued another Resolution on July 25, 2002, which among others declared that the compromiseagreement was approved and NCMBNCR-NS-03-087-00 was deemed closed and terminated.In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike on July 1, 2002. In an Order dated September 16,2002, the DOLE Secretary certified the case to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketedas NCMB-NCR- NS-07-251-02.In its Resolution dated July 31, 2003, the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. The May 31,2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it had been academically mootedby the compromise agreement entered into between both parties on July 9, 2001."The Union assailed the ruling of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision datedAugust 17, 2004, the appellate court held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling for PJI. Thecompromise agreement referred only to the award given by the NLRC to the complainants in the said case, that is,the obligation of the employer to the complainants. The CA pointed out that the NLRC Resolution neverthelessdeclared that respondent failed to prove the validity of its retrenchment program, which according to it, stands evenafter the compromise agreement was executed; it was the reason why the agreement was reached in the first place.

Issues: 1.Whether or not the petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of CivilProcedure is a proper remedy in this case. 2. Whether or not the the NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the respondent Union did notrender the NLRC resolution ineffectual, nor rendered it"moot and academic. 3. Whether or not CA can review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the labor tribunal. Held: 1. At the outset, we note that this case was brought before us via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of theRevised Rules of Civil Procedure. The proper remedy, however, was to file a petition under Rule 45. It mustbe stressed that certiorari under Rule 65 is "a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not ageneral utility tool in the legal workshop." Moreover, the special civil action for certiorari will lie only when acourt has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45. Such moveis in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.As the instant petition was filed within the prescribed fifteen-day period, and in view of the substantial issuesraised, the Court resolves to give due course to the petition and treat the same as a petition for review on certiorari 2. Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the execution and subsequent approval by the NLRC of theagreement forged between it and the respondent Union did not render the NLRC resolution ineffectual, norrendered it "moot and academic." The agreement becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal, andas a logical consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal.In any event, the compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in thesettlement itself and gave specific individual consent. It must be remembered that a compromise agreementis also a contract; it requires the consent of the parties, and it is only then that the agreement may beconsidered as voluntarily entered into.A careful perusal of the wordings of the compromise agreement will show that the parties agreed that theonly issue to be resolved was the question of the monetary claim of several employees. The agreement waslater approved by the NLRC. The case was considered closed and terminated and the Resolution dated May31, 2001 fully implemented insofar as the employees "mentioned in paragraphs 2c and 2d of thecompromise agreement" were concerned. Hence, the CA was correct in holding that the compromiseagreement pertained only to the "monetary obligation" of the employer to the dismissed employees, and inno way affected the Resolution in NCMB-NCRNS-03-087-00 dated May 31, 2001 where the NLRC madethe pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioners' retrenchment program.To reiterate, the rule is that when judgment is rendered based on a compromise agreement, the judgmentbecomes immediately executory, there being an implied waiver of the parties' right to appeal from thedecision. The judgment having become final, the Court can no longer reverse, much less modify it. 3. Petitioners' argument that the CA is not a trier of facts is likewise erroneous. In the exercise of its power toreview decisions by the NLRC, the CA can review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the labortribunal. Thus, the CA is not proscribed from "examining evidence anew to determine whether the factualfindings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefromaccurately ascertained."

ART 232

Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. 141471, September 18, 2000- Labor Law

Q: X was employed as sewer by a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes, gowns and casual and formal dresses. Eventually, she started to feel chest pains. She then filed a leave of absence from work as the chest pains became unbearable. After subjecting herself to medical examination, she was found to be suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia. Upon recommendation of her doctor, she resigned from her work hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be cured. She later filed a disability claim with the SSS from the Employees Compensation Fund, under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Was the sickness compensable?

A: Yes, the illness is compensable. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either Case Digest on aLabor Law any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or Case Digest on b- Labor Law any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. In other words, for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex A the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation; otherwise, the claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition. Indisputably, cardiovascular diseases, which, as herein above-stated include atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia, are listed as compensable occupational diseases in the Rules of the Employees Compensation Commission, hence, no further proof of casual relation between the disease and claimants work is necessary.

ART 234

MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS, INC., vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, et al

G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009 FACTS: On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A. On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code. The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions.SMMSC-Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there was failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement 2) Whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members affected the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned RULING The Supreme Court DENIED the petition. On the first issue, while it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the unions application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence. On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the employers pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect. The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club vs. CA, et. al. G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010 Facts:

Petitioner Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club(Eagle Ridge), which has around 112 rank-and-file employees, alleges that Eagle Ridge Employees Union(EREU) committed fraud, misrepresentation and false statement when it filed for its registration and that EREU failed to comply with the membership requirement for the registration as a labor organization. Eagle Ridge seeks to have EREUs registration cancelled when the Union filed a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members actually ratified the constitution and bylaws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery. DOLE Regional Director granted Eagle Ridges petition and delisted EREU from the roster of legitimate labor organizations. EREU appealed to the BLR, which initially affirmed the order of the Regional Director, but upon filing of the EREU of a motion for reconsideration it was reinstated in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Eagle Ridge filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, thus a petition for certiorari to the CA. The CA dismissed Eagle Ridges petition for being deficient as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was subscribed to by Luna C. Piezas on her representation as the legal counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the requisite] Secretarys Certificate or Board Resolution authorizing her to execute and sign the same. The CA denied a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Eagle Ridges petition to cancel EREUs registration? Ruling: No. A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the

election of its officers, and the adoption of the Unions constitution and by-laws. EREU complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). when it had 30 employees as member when it registered. Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership. In the issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits. It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. It is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union. For their non-presentation, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the instant case. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22 employees. When the EREU filed its application for registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement. Prior to their withdrawal, the six employees who retracted were bona fide union members. With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.

Cert of Registration
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS V. TAGAYTAYEMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No. 142000, January 22, 2003 Respondent (THEU-Tagaytay HighlandsEmployees Union) labor organization filed a petitionfor CE to represent majority of the rank-andfileemployees of THIGCI (Tagaytay HighlandsInternational Golf Club Incorporated). The petitioner opposed, claiming that only 71 of 192 were actualrank and file employees the rest were supervisors,resigned, awol etc.MA: Ordered the holding of the CE; DOLESecretary: Dismissed the CE due to clear absenceof community or mutuality of interests; Motion for Reconsideration to DOLE Undersecretary by Union:Remanded the case to MA for the conduct of CEand simply removed the disqualified employeesrather than disregard the legitimate status of theunion. SC: Denied petition.Whether or not the disqualified employees couldsimply be removed from the roster instead of resolving the legitimacy of the unions status. Yes. Under ARTICLE 239,the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among thegrounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion isdue to misrepresentation, false statement or fraudunder the circumstances enumerated therein.Moreover, the legitimacy of herein union cannot bequestioned sinceafter a certificate of registration isissued to a union, its legal personality cannot besubject to collateral attack . It may be questionedonly in an independent petition for cancellation(BOOK V, Rule IV, Section 8 S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION(SSVLU) AND DIR. HANS LEO CACDAC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OFLABOR RELATIONS (BLR), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: SS Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the SS Ventures Labor Union's certificate of registration invokingthe grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code alleging the following:(1) The Union included the names and forged the signatures of more or less 82 former employees nolonger connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in theadoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws(2) The Union twice entered the signatures of three persons;(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and(4) The Union's application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-fileemployees of Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197- employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the500

signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which isvery much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.The Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery. Regional Director decision: ifo Ventures.Union appealed to Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). BLR decision ifo Union.Ventures sought reconsideration. Denied by the BLR.Ventures appealed to the CA: Dismissed, Hence SC Petition. RULING : Petition lacks merit. The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII,Section 3 of the Constitution and such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimatelabor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization. While acertificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or askfor certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may bedecertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art.239(a)of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the union's constitution and like documents. The Court, has in previous cases, said that todecertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership.It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with theapplication for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of theconstitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents