AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

26TH AAPAM ANNUAL ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE, WHITESANDS HOTEL, MOMBASA, KENYA 7TH 11TH MARCH, 2005

THEME: THE ENABLING STATE AND THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN WEALTH CREATION: PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

TOPIC : DEMOCRATIZATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION REFORM IN AFRICA DR PAUL N. NDUE

INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the often neglected relationship between democratisation and governance on one hand, and administrative reform on the other, that has characterised the literature. It argues that administrative reform is an essential prerequisite to democratisation and governance and that any attempt to delink the three concepts will make democratisation and governance a farce. In other words, any political reform at democratizing institutions, in particular the founding of a pluralistic democracy, will only be fully effective insofar as it is accompanied by far reaching administrative reforms which effectively redistribute power. The paper also discusses the implications of this link between democratisation, governance and administrative reform for public administration in Africa. 1- WHAT IS DEMOCRATISATION? The concept democratisation defies precise definition. In its

minimalist/formalist definition or delineation, democratisation has the criteria of regular electoral competitions, usually in a multiparty political system, and thus governmental succession by constitutional, electoral procedures, guaranteed in the rule of law. On the other hand, the maximalist socio-economic delineation of democratisation include the criteria such as redistributive socio-economic reforms, broadened popular participation, social justice and human rights (Qadir et. al., 193:416). According to Elly Runierse (1993) three stages of the process of democratization may be discerned. First, is the political liberalization, which has been defined as the process in which the fear of repression is relaxed

and there are constitutional guarantees of a range of political freedoms (especially the recognition of the right of opposition groupings to function and to express dissent) in which there is greater independence for legislative assemblies where they still exist, and freedom of the press. (Healey and Robinson, 1992:22). To Qadir et. al. (1993:416), political liberalization is a process of political change controlled from the top down, as means of preserving most of the status quo. They seem to be cynical of political liberalization, which they regard as the game the elites play to manage the granting of very carefully selected concessions a cosmetic exercise and does not install the fundamentals of democratization. Qadir et al. (1993:416-417) however concede that political change escapes from elite control to encompass broader social forces and its purpose is transformed from the preservation to the status quo of interests to genuine reform. They conclude that the processes of democratization and political liberalization are distinct, and only the truly deserving cases should be referred to as democratization, where ultimate outcome of the process and its agency are almost the reverse of political liberalization (Qadir, 1993:417). Anything short of this is to trivialize the concept of democratization, and worse still, to mislead people. (Qadir et. al., 1993: 417) Adrain Ledtwich (1993:616) takes their warning further by pointing that faith in the economic and political liberalism of the minimal state as the universally appropriate means of development is deeply flawed. Perhaps a more forceful and cynical attempt to press home the point that democratization and political liberalization are not the same and are therefore distinct has been made by lemarchand (1992:183-184): For, if by liberalization is meant the dismantling of dictatorships, there are good reasons to assume that liberalization can occur without

democratization and that in some parts of Africa the disintegration of authoritarian rule may be followed by anarchy or intensified corruption. Second, it is the process of growing political accountability which has been viewed as a move towards more inclusive politics, even within a singleparty system, through the introduction of measures to extend societal participation in political decision-making (Healey and Robinson, 1992:151). Third, is to regard democratization as a historical process rather than an end state that seems to involve the introduction of universal suffrage and genuine political competition with free and fair elections to decide who will take power (Healey and Robinson, 1992:151). II DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE Democratization has been linked to good governance, which the World Bank defines as the exercise of political power to manage a nations affairs (World Bank, 1989:60) and also regards as synonymous with sound development (World Bank, 1992-1). The relationship between democratization and good governance, supported and promoted by institutions such as the World Bank, United States, British and French governments, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Council and the Commonwealth Secretariat, is based on the fact that the latter (good governance) has the ingredients, features, the functional and institutional prerequisites as well as the building blocks of democratization. These include an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds ; an independent public auditor, representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels

of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press (World Bank, 1989:6, 15, 60-61, 192). According to Leftwich (1993; 1994) the concept of democratic good governance has the three main levels of meaning which can be classified into systemic, political and administrative. First, from a systematic angle, good governance is government that embraces the formed institutional structure location of authoritarian decision making in the modern state power. In this sense, good governance denotes the structures of political and crucially, economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed (Leftwich, 1993:611; Leftwich, 1994:371). In short, good governance means a democratic capitalist regime presided over by a minimal state which forms part of the wider governance of the New World Order (World Bank, 1989; World Bank, 1992; Healey and Robinson; Leftwich 1994). Second, from a political sense, good governance presupposes a regime or state which enjoys legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Whether in a presidential or parliamentary system, this presupposes a pluralist polity with a freely and regularly elected representative legislature, with the capacity at least to influence and check executive power (Leftwich, 1993: Leftwich, 1994). Third, from an administrative point of view, good governance means an efficient, independent, accountable and open audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is. It also

entails an independent judicial system to uphold the law and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy. The administrative aspect of good governance focuses on four main areas of public administration in general and public sector management in particular. They are: - accountability, which in essence means holding officials responsible for their actions; - a legal framework for development, which means a structure of rules and laws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private sector, which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide the basis for conflict resolution through an independent judicial system; - information, by which is meant that information about economic conditions, budgets, markets and government intentions is reliable and accessible to all, something which is crucial for private sector calculations; - insistence on transparency, which is basically a call for open government, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate consultative processes between government and private interests over policy development (World Bank, 1992; Leftwich, 1993; Leftwich, 1993). Viewed from the foregoing connotations of good governance, it is no wonder that the concept is inseparable from the process of democratization.

III - WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM? Like democratization, the concept of administrative reform does not lend itself to a clear-cut definition. However, the definition, which is commonly used because of its comprehensiveness and scope, is the one offered by Gerald Caiden (1969). According to Caiden (1960:65) administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative need to improve on the status), artificial transformation (departure from existing arrangements and natural change processes), and administrative resistance (opposition is assumed). Administrative reform is political rather than merely organizational. It is a political process designed to adjust the relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in society or within the bureaucracy itself (Montgomery, 1967:17). Succinctly put, administrative reform is: Power politics in action; it contains ideological rationalization, fights for control of areas, services, and people, political participants and institutions (Caiden, 1969:9). Administrative reform has a moral content in that it seeks to create a better system by removing faults and imperfections. It is usually undertaken to change the status quo for the better. It aims at making the administrative and political structures and procedures compatible with broader goals. Administrative reform sets additional political values to be used as yardsticks against which administrative performance may be judged. The crux of administrative reform, therefore, is innovation and wealth creation that is, injection of new ideas and new people in a new

combination of tasks and relationships into the policy and administrative process. Administrative reform may occur where two conditions are met. - a set value with which the existing bureaucratic arrangements, public personnel and values are seen to be in conflict. - The concern by politicians and the general public that the existing bureaucratic structures cannot realize new goals set for them. Consequently, administrative reform may involve centralizing or decentralizing initiatives or both: the denominators are away from or towards the centre (Caiden, 1969; United Nations, 1973; Dror, 1976; Leemans, 1976). Administrative reform involves system diagnosis, that is, examination of administrative systems to detect what is wrong and what can be improved. Given that all systems are imperfect, system diagnosis is not difficult. Getting the right solution is something else. As in medicine, the same symptoms may have several possible causes, some of little consequence, others serious. A wrong diagnosis may prove quite harmful. Every system, like patient, needs careful examination and the selection of those remedies that best fit in peculiar circumstances, not a superficial examination, acceptance of the clients own diagnosis, and hasty reference to standard texts (Caiden, 1978: 114; Caiden, 1988).

IV

DEMOCRATIZATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION REFORM AS A MEANS OF INNOVATION AND WEALTH CREATION.

Democratization, good governance and administrative reform are related in a number of ways first, they are all concerned with institution and capacity building. The process of democratization and the concept of governance involve institution and capacity building aimed at not only the improvement of governmental capacity but also the creation of more efficient and more autonomous state and civil institutions, capable of ushering in development in the Third World. The over-development of the post-colonial state, with the vast expansion of its size, regulatory powers and administrative responsibilities led to the erosion of its efficiency, authority and economic viability and these are supposed to be corrected via institution and capacity building methods of rolling the state back (decentralization, privatization, and deregulation) and liberalization. For instance, with economic liberalization, the corruption and other administrative weakness encouraged by over-regulation would be minimised, if not eradicated (Jeffries, 1993). Administrative reform, in the other hand, is also concerned with incorporated, foster and protect (new) normative relationships and actions patterns, (b) perform functions and services which are valued in the environment, and (c) facilitate the assimilation of new physical and social technologies. Such organizations are instruments of planned change in the administrative system. They bring about reform by their linkages (enabling, functional, normative and diffused) with their environment. Their effectiveness depends on the quality of their leadership and the appropriateness of their internal structures. Quality leadership can be trusted to decide on correct tactics while appropriate structures will ensure

survival. In short, to distinguish institution and capacity building characteristics of democratization, good governance and administrative reform concentrate their energies on building a few key strategic instruments in an administrative system and maximise the use of scarce reform resources. The three concepts also draw attention to factors such as legitimacy, leadership, timing, rationale, appropriateness, goals and reform resources which can be incorporated into useful reform monitoring guides. Secondly, democratization, good governance and administrative reforms are being embarked upon to promote development in the Third World. Caiden (1973), for instance, has asserted that development is enhanced by administrative reform programmes in four ways. First, reform proposals challenge bureaucratic inertia and reactionary administrators and although defence mechanisms may temporarily suppress change, things can never quite be the same and peace tokens have to be made if the situation is to be kept in hand. Second, reform programmes attract enterprising administrative talent and provide valuable experience for a new generation of administrative aspirants. Third, reformers promote badly needed administrative modernization which is likely to set off a chain reaction in functional reforms as changes in techniques, skills and attitudes in specialized fields seems more attainable than possibly the harder changes to carry through in administration. Fourth, administrative reform introduces some inventiveness in outmoded systems, obsolete institutions, inert bureaucracies and in an environment of official indifference, technical ignorance, political intransigence and public apathy. Hence administrative reform demands most of administrators in countries unable to sustain administration at minimal and unacceptable levels:

encased in outmoded legalistic codes, obsessed by mimicry of great powers, deficient in administrative talent, or suffering from excessive institutionalised poverty, where reform, even if partial, sporadic, episodic, and periodic, is cumulative in transforming and modernizing administrative systems for development purposes (Caiden, 1973: 344). Fifthly, administrative reform is premised on the fact that lasting change is the product of sharing and participation. Proposals for administrative reform need to be formulated with the active involvement of those likely to be affected to reduce resistance. Human behaviour, it must be pointed out, cannot be effectively changed through coercion (Caiden, 1978: 114). On the other hand good governance and democratisation have been regarded as remedies for the difficult problems of development. For instance, the 1989 World Bank report on Africa 1989 has argued that a crisis of governance underlay the litany of Africas development problems and good governance, which was meant as the exercise of political power to manage a nations affairs (World Bank, 1989: 60) is to become magin world, pluralistic institutional structure (World Bank, 1989: 60). In other words, good governance and democratisation are to promote a legal framework for development, capacity building, and the civil society, which is linked to the fostering of accountability, legitimacy, transparency and participation as it is these factors which empower civil society and reduce the power of the state (World Bank, 1992; Williams and Young, 1994 : 87).

Some scholars have, however, questioned the validity of democratisation, governance and administrative reform in promoting development in the Third World, especially Africa. According to Leftwich (1994), effective development has often required that some quite radical steps are taken early on in a development cycle. These might include land reform or wage restraint, which are precisely the kind of measures which may alienate major socio-economic groups whose consent is necessary for stable democracy. There is also abundant empirical evidence which seems to show that many of the successful examples of late development since the mid-nineteenth century, as in Germany, Japan, Korea or Thailand, have occurred under conditions which have not remotely approximated competitive democracy, though some have moved or are now moving in a democratic direction, as in Indonesia or Korea (Leftwich, 1994 : 364). Democratization cannot result into coherent development strategies in Africa where there exists debilitating conditions, like the incapacity of most states to exercise effective jurisdiction over their societies, low levels of legitimacy, consensus and elite commitment, absence of a robust and substantial middle class, powerful middle working class which push for and protect democratic advance, limited civil society that is seldom independent and has often enmeshed with the state, the fractures nature of many African societies and their politics by ethnic, religious and regional pluralism, sustained economic crisis and subsequent liberalization that have a heavy price on the poor, rumours of coups and counter coups as well as a proliferation of political parties that emerged with the opening up of democratic possibilities over 200 in Zaire, 100 in Cameroon, 71 in the Congo, 30 in Angola and 26 in Cte dIvoire (Leftwich, 1993:617). With these conditions in Africa and some other Third World countries, Leftwich (1994:364), sounding rather pessimistic, cautions that:

Democratization in the socio-political and economic conditions which in much of the third world and elsewhere is likely to engender political turbulence and also blow stable market friendly development strategies wildly off course. As the 1990s unfold, therefore, it seems likely that we shall see a period of democratic reversal, not consolidation, much of the developing world and parts of Eastern Europe. Richard Jeffries (1993:30) has also pointed out that democratisation may not result in development. He argued that although democratic regimes are electorally accountable and popularly responsive in Africa, they have generally been responsive not to the interest of an indigenous, marketoriented group, but rather to: - pressure from urban-dwellers to expand government employment; - clienteles networks pressing for redistribution (rather than concentration) of capital, often along ethnic/religion lines; - rent-seekers. Consequently, it is important for one to recognise the fact that: democratisation in an African setting is unlikely in itself to reduce corruption/prebendalisation or the pressures for (from a development perspective) wasteful government expenditure. Groups of electors support particular parliamentary candidates, precisely in the hope that they will succeed in prebendalising government offices in their favour Elected civilian regimes in African states are, then, under intense popular pressure to be economically irresponsible and short-sighted (Jeffries, 1993 :30).

These criticisms notwithstanding, it is pertinent to point out that instrumental to the success of democratisation, governance and administrative reform is the building of civil institutions: viable political parties which openly function and contest elections as well as a free and dynamic press which would curb clientelism and corruption, thus making both the private sector and government accountable for their conduct. By exposing the misdeeds and mistakes, a free press would not only induce a new and creative proposals and policy options. Another key of the success of democratisation is the ability of both government and opposition to build bridges of compromise and mutual political accommodation. Third, democratisation, governance and administrative reform are

concerned with administrative improvement, effectiveness, efficiency and rationality. In this connection, the concepts extol the virtues in revamping the performance and strengthening the civil service and local government units as well as improving the performance of state-owned enterprises through corporate plans, performance contracts, privatisation and recapitulisation. Since democratisation, governance and administrative reform seek to challenge social mores and long-standing policies, procedures, them. attitudinal and behavioural patterns, there is always considerable resistance and foot-dragging in any attempt to implement

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

One of the distinct political trends or phenomena, which has characterised world politics over the past decade, has been the ascendance of democratisation. The process of democratisation fosters and promotes an environment which not only encourages but also sustains the rule of law, human rights, popular participation, public accountability, transparency in government all leading to wealth creation. Democratisation therefore requires not only institutional pluralism, but also independent institutions, such as an independent judiciary, an impartial civil service, an effective parliament and a strong and autonomous local government structure. To achieve this, there is the urgent need to reorganise and restructure public administration. First, the civil service and local government units have to be delinked from the government of the day. Secondly, measures have to be undertaken to strengthen democratic control over public administration and increase its accountability to democratically elected bodies. Administrative reform is therefore undoubtedly and inseparable part of the democratisation and governance processes. Second, democratisation, governance and administrative reform will be meaningless if the government of the day fails to realise that family and ethnic ties that strengthen communal actions have no place in central government agencies where staff must be selected on merit, and public and private monies must not be confused (Wold Bank, 1989: 60). Efforts must be made to develop a cadre of public officials committed to an ethic of public service as well as more efficient and capable government

bureaucracy (Jeffries, 1993). Corruption, rent-seeking, prebendalisation or pressures for wasteful government expenditure, nepotism, favouritism, patronage and clientelism must be reduced or controlled. The supposedly democratic character of Fourth Republic must be insulated from the bonanza of embezzlement and irresponsible expenditure. Third, democratisation, governance and administrative reform depend on building administrative capacity at all levels both by involving a wider ranger of organisations and by decentralizing authority and responsibility. Esman and Montgomery (1980) have pointed out that human resource development programmes requires a variety of organisational arrangements for eliciting the participation of those that are to be affected by the projects, and for assuring that resources reach the intended groups. In addition to using centrally financed and managed bureaucracies, programmes should be administered through modified bureaucracies that can be realised from conventional central controls to extend their reach in unconventional ways. Local authorities often have linkages of interaction with local groups that central bureaucracies do not know about and cannot reach. Market mechanisms may be used effectively to deliver services with only modest government intervention. Many voluntary organisations have ties and channels of distribution to groups that are frequently identified as beneficiaries of social and economic development projects, and through which experimental, pilot, and demonstration projects can be carried out. It is therefore necessary to build the administrative capacity of, and involve in planning and administration, what Esman and Montgomery (1980) call organised special publics, for example, interest groups such as credit unions, womens clubs, labour

unions, co-operatives and the like. Thus, constituencies are created that will support projects for their members and act as channels of interaction between beneficiaries and the agencies sponsoring development projects. Once mobilised, these organisations can also begin to generate their own projects, thereby supplementing and extending the impact of governmentsponsored ones. Because complex and uncertain projects cannot be controlled entirely from the centre, administrative capacity must be strengthened through decentralisation. Much more attention should be given to alternative means of decentralizing authority, responsibility, and resources through field administration, creation of local administrative units, delegation of functions of regional, special-purpose, or functional authorities, and devolution of functions to local government units (Rondinelli, 1982). Fourth, the success of democratisation, governance and administrative reform depends on politicians and administrators attitudes toward error. Under conditions of uncertainty, errors and mistakes are not only likely, they are to be expected. The concept of development administrative reform be designed in such a way that errors and mistakes can be uncovered as they proceed; they can then be redesigned and revised incrementally. Learning by doing can become an acceptable managerial approach only when it is explicitly recognised that democratisation, governance and administrative reform are basically experiments. Incentives and rewards must be provided to encourage innovation, experimentation and creativity. Only uncorrected errors should be considered evidence of poor management. Consequently, politicians and administrators must continuously monitor and evaluate the processes of democratisation,

governance and administrative reform, so that mistakes are uncovered and corrected quickly before they get out of hand. Finally, the idea of a developmental state must be considered. Certain features characterise a developmental state. First, it is dominated by purposeful and determined developmental elites, which have also been relatively uncorrupt, at least by comparison with Nigeria, Zaire, Cameroon, Haiti and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. As in Japan, a developmental state is also characterised by a well-documented and intimate linkage between political leaders and top bureaucracies. The solidity of these elites had been enhanced by what Leftwich (1994) calls a dense traffic between the top levels of the bureaucracy and high political office. For instance, Roger Charlton (1991: 273) points out in 1984 almost half of the eleven cabinet members in Botswana were former civil servants. While these elites have regularly experienced internal differences, they all have varying combinations of political, ideological and nationalist considerations as well as internal and external security threats. Examples are South Koreas and Taiwans fierce competition with North Korea and China respectively, Thailands fear regional communist threats, Botswanas anxiety for maximum economic development, given the power and threat of South Africa, and Singapores concern about its position, sandwiched between Islamic Indonesia and Malaysia (Leftwich, 1994 : 378; Wade, 1990). Second, a developmental state has relative autonomy of the developmental elites and the state institution which they command. By this is meant that the state (or its leadership) has been able to achieve relative independence from demands of special interests and could, and did, over-ride them in the

national interest. This is best explained: either by revolution, conquest or coup by modernising elites (e.g. Thailand from 1923, China from 1949, Korea from 1960, Taiwan from 1949, Indonesia from 1966), or by an electoral process that has nonetheless consistently yielded one dominant party of government (as in Botswana, Malaysia and Singapore). Third, whether democratic or not, a developmental state has all been de facto or de jure one-party state for much of the past thirty years, although in general the democratic group (Botswana, Singapore and Malaysia) have had better human rights rating than the non-democratic group has been ruled by military-backed authoritarian regimes (Thailand has had short democratic interludes), the democratic states have been ruled either by a single party (the BDP in Botswana and the PAP in Singapore) or in Malaysia, by a coalition in which a single party (UMNO) has dominated. The effect has been to concentrate very considerable and unchallenged political power at the top in these states, thus usually enhancing political stability and continuity in policy (Leftwch, 1993; Leftwich 1994). Finally, elite determination and the relative autonomy of the state has helped to shape very powerful, highly competent and insulated economic bureaucracies with authority in directing and managing economic and social development. Examples of these Economic Planning Board of Korea. What differentiates these economic institutions in developmental states is their real power, authority, technical competence and insulation in shaping development policy. Their existence, form and function should be understood as a consequence of the politically-driven urgency for development and the politics of a strong state (Leftwich, 1994 : 379). It is important for us to note that the concepts of democratisation, good

governance and administrative reform run counter to the idea of a developmental state. While the former concepts eulogise the minimal state, a Weberian-type bureaucracy, rigorous respect for human rights, a rich and diverse civil society, political pluralism and a sharp separation of economic and political life, the latter, whether democratic or not, espouses a strong and determined state which protects powerful and competent bureaucracy that largely shapes and directs development policy, a dubious (and sometimes appalling) civil and human rights, the suppression or control of civil society and a fusion at least at the top of the political direction of economic power. As an agenda for future research, it is pertinent for one to know whether democratisation, governance and administrative reform have promoted accountability, popular participation, transparency, legitimacy and the empowerment of civil society and the subsequent reduction of the power of the state as well as the feasibility of the idea of a developmental state in Africa.

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